Twenty-Five Years of

Ideological Homicide
Victimization in the
United States of America
Report to the Office of University Programs,
Science and Technology Directorate,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
March 2016

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence
Led by the University of Maryland
8400 Baltimore Ave., Suite 250 College Park, MD 20742 301.405.6600
www.start.umd.edu

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

About This Report

The authors of this report are Dr. William S. Parkin, Department of Criminal Justice, Seattle University; Dr.
Steven M. Chermak, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University; Dr. Joshua D. Freilich, Doctoral
Program in Criminal Justice, The Graduate Center & John Jay College, CUNY; Dr. Jeff Gruenewald, School of
Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis. Questions about
this report should be directed to Dr. William S. Parkin at parkinw@seattleu.edu.
This research was supported by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorates Office of University Programs through Award Number 2012-ST-061-CS0001, Center for the
Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB), made to START to investigate the understanding and
countering of terrorism within the U.S. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those
of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either
expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or START.

About START
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in
part by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a
Center of Excellence program led by the University of Maryland. START uses stateoftheart theories,
methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins,
dynamics and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at
infostart@start.umd.edu or visit www.start.umd.edu.

Citations
To cite this report, please use this format:
Parkin, William S., Steven M. Chermak, Joshua D. Freilich, and Jeff Gruenewald. Twenty-Five Years of
Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America, Report to the Office of University
Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD:
START, 2016.

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 1
Inclusion Criteria ............................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Results ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 7

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Introduction
This brief report presents the preliminary results of 25 years of ideological victimization committed by
al-Qaida and affiliated movements and the extremist far-right in the United States from 1990 to 2014.
Excluding the homicide victims associated with the four attacks on 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing,
62 individuals were killed in 38 ideologically motivated homicide events committed by extremists
associated with al-Qaida and affiliated movements1 and 245 were killed by far-right extremists in 177
ideologically motivated incidents. The data for this report originates from the United States Extremist
Crime Database (ECDB), an open-source dataset that examines ideologically motivated and routine
criminal activity, both violent and financial, committed by ideological extremists. Although the results of
incident and suspect data have been released, this is the first report that focuses solely on victimization
characteristics. In addition, this report also compares two distinct types of ideological victimization,
homicides committed by adherents to far-right extremism (FRE) in the U.S. and those committed by
individuals who associate themselves with al-Qaida and affiliated movements (AQAM).

Inclusion Criteria
This report includes all homicide victims identified in open-source materials who satisfied the ECDBs
inclusion criteria.2 Specifically, our inclusion criteria for each victim comprises that:
The victim was killed in a homicide event identified in open-sources
At least one of the offenders involved in the incident was an ideological extremist
The homicide event was ideologically motivated3
The extremist ideology to which the offender adhered and the incident was motivated was
connected to al-Qaida and affiliated movements or far-right extremism4
1

This numbers also includes one homicide victim killed in an ideologically motivated, secular nationalist incident.

For an in-depth discussion about the data collection process for the ECDB and the reliability and validity of the data, please
see Freilich, J., Chermak, S., Belli, R., Gruenewald, J., & W. Parkin. (2014). Introducing the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB).
Terrorism & Political Violence, 26, 372-384 and Chermak, S., Freilich, J., Parkin, W., & J. Lynch. (2012) American Terrorism
and Extremist Data Sources and Selectivity Bias: An Investigation Focusing on Homicide Events Committed by Far-Right
Extremists. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 28(1), 191-218
2

A homicide was coded as ideologically motivated if specific indicators were identified that provide evidence that the offender
engaged in the fatal, criminal act based at least partly on their extremist ideology. These indicators could include, but are not
limited to, personal statements made by the offender, physical evidence such as a note or manifesto, or comments made by law
enforcement or lawyers stating that the motive was ideological. For a longer discussion on these indicators and determining
how coders determined whether an incident was ideologically motivated or not, see Gruenewald, J. (2011). A comparative
examination of homicides perpetrated by Far-Right Extremists. Homicide Studies, 15(2), 177-203 and Parkin, W., Freilich, J. &
S. Chermak. (2015). Ideological Victimization: Homicides Perpetrated by Far-Right Extremists. Homicide Studies, 19(3), 211236.
3

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

The victim was killed within one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia
The victim was killed between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2014

Results
Between 1990 and 2014, 62 individuals were killed by AQAM offenders in 38 incidents (1.6 victims per
homicide incident) and 245 individuals were killed by FRE offenders in 177 incidents (1.4 victims per
homicide incident). Once again, this does not include the nearly 3,000 individuals killed in the 9/11
attacks perpetrated by AQAM offenders or the 168 individuals killed in the Oklahoma City bombing
perpetrated by FRE offenders. Table 1 presents these results, as well as temporal and geographic
characteristics of ideological homicide victimization.
The temporal distribution of the homicide victimizations varies between the two ideologies. For the
AQAM victims, only slightly more than 16 percent were killed prior to the year 2000, compared to slightly
more than 45 percent of FRE victims. Although the numbers of victims are relatively smaller for AQAM,
almost two-thirds of their victims were killed during the 10-year period between 2000 and 2009. FRE
victims, on the other hand, appear to be killed in cycles, with the first half of each decade consistently
being lower than the second half. Although research has shown fluctuations in violent crime trends based
on seasonality, the temporal distribution of ideological victimization does not appear to be consistent
with this research, at least for AQAM victims. More than half of AQAM victims were killed during the fall
and slightly less than a quarter during the winter. FRE victims, whose temporal distribution is more
similar to trends found in homicide victimization in general, were more likely to be killed during the
spring or summer (60.8%), and least likely to be killed during the fall and winter (38.8%).

As operationalized in Freilich et al (2014:380), Far-right extremists subscribe to aspects of the following beliefs: They are
fiercely nationalistic, anti-global, suspicious of federal authority, and reverent of individual liberties, especially their right to
own guns and be free of taxes. They believe in conspiracy theories involving imminent threats to national sovereignty or
personal liberty and beliefs that their personal or national way of life is under attack. Sometimes such beliefs are vague, but
for some the threat originates from specific racial or religious groups. They believe that they must be prepared to defend
against this attack by participating in paramilitary training or survivalism, while Al-Qaida and associated movements adhere
to aspects of the following beliefs: They believe that only acceptance of Islam promotes human dignity. Islamic extremists
reject the traditional Muslim respect for People of the Book (i.e., Christians and Jews). They believe that Jihad (i.e., to
struggle in Gods path like the Prophet Muhammad) is a defining belief in Islam and includes the lesser Jihad that endorses
violence against corrupt others. Islamic extremists believe that their faith is oppressed in nominally Muslim MiddleEastern/Asian corrupt governments and in nations (e.g., Russia/Chechnya) that occupy Islamic populations. The U.S. is seen as
supporting the humiliation of Islam, and exploiting the regions resources. They believe that Americas hedonistic culture (e.g.,
gay rights, feminism, etc.) negatively affects Muslim values. Islamic extremists believe that the American people are
responsible for their governments actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat this assault. They believe that
Islamic lawShariaprovides the blueprint for a modern Muslim society and should be forcibly implemented.
4

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Table 1. Temporal & Geographic Characteristics of Ideological Homicide Victimization

AQAM
FRE
N
%
N
%
Victims*
62
245
Incidents
38
177
Victims/Incident
1.6
1.4
Years
1990-1994
6
9.7%
43
17.6%
1995-1999
4
6.5%
68
27.8%
2000-2004
19
30.6%
41
16.7%
2005-2009
20
32.3%
60
24.5%
2010-2014
13
21.0%
33
13.5%
Season
Winter
14
22.6%
49
20.0%
Spring
8
12.9%
76
31.0%
Summer
8
12.9%
73
29.8%
Fall
32
51.6%
46
18.8%
Unknown
0
0.0%
1
0.4%
Census Region
Midwest
3
4.8%
33
13.5%
Northeast
13
21.0%
46
18.8%
South
35
56.5%
81
33.1%
West
11
17.7%
85
34.7%
Census Division
East North Central
3
4.8%
21
8.6%
East South Central
5
8.1%
21
8.6%
Mid-Atlantic
8
12.9%
33
13.5%
Mountain
2
3.2%
41
16.7%
New England
6
9.7%
14
5.7%
Pacific
9
14.5%
44
18.0%
South Atlantic
13
21.0%
32
13.1%
West North Central
0
0.0%
12
4.9%
West South Central
16
25.8%
27
11.0%
*These numbers do not reflect the nearly 3,000 victims killed in the AQAM terrorist
attacks in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 and the 168
victims killed in the FR terrorist bombing in Oklahoma on April 19, 1995.

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Table 2. Incident Characteristics of Ideological Homicide Victimization

Targeting

Ideological
Motivation
Victim Type

Line of Duty
Only Fatal Victim
Others Injured
Primary Weapon

Purposeful
Representative
Random
Unknown
High
Medium
Low
Business
Civilian
Government
Race/Ethnicity
Other
Law Enforcement
Military
Yes
Yes
Firearm
Knife
Bodily Weapon
Blunt Object
Other
Unknown

AQAM
N (62)
12
23
12
15
25
34
3
0
39
18
3
2
2
13
28
50
45
5
0
4
5
3

%
19.4%
37.1%
19.4%
24.2%
40.3%
54.8%
4.8%
0.0%
62.9%
29.0%
4.8%
3.2%
3.2%
20.6%
44.4%
79.4%
72.6%
8.1%
0.0%
6.5%
8.1%
4.8%

FRE
N (245)
106
93
23
23
114
97
34
5
69
32
130
9
31
0
148
116
154
34
19
15
14
9

%
43.3%
38.0%
9.4%
9.4%
46.5%
39.6%
13.9%
2.0%
28.1%
13.1%
53.1%
3.7%
12.7%
0.0%
60.4%
47.3%
62.9%
13.9%
7.8%
6.1%
5.7%
3.7%

The geographic distribution of victimizations also varied, 56.5 percent of AQAM victims died in the South,
followed by the Northeast (21.0%), West (17.7%), and Midwest (4.8%). For the FRE victims, the plurality
was killed in the West (34.7%), followed closely by the South (33.1%). The percentage of FRE victims
who were killed in the Northeast and Midwest were also relatively close (18.8% and 13.5%,
respectively). When broken down by census division, we find the largest differences in the percentage of
victims killed across ideologies in the Mountain and West South Central areas. In the Mountain states
(Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado), almost 17 percent of FRE victims were
killed, compared to slightly more than 3 percent of AQAM victims. Conversely, 25.8 percent of AQAM
victims were killed in West South Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), compared to 11
percent of FRE victims.
Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Examining individual and incident level characteristics across ideologies identifies both similarities and
differences in the types of victims killed by AQAM and FRE extremists in the United States (Table 2).
When examining levels of targeting, we find that FRE victims were more often purposefully targeted for
an ideological homicide than AQAM victims (43.3% to 19.4%, respectively). This is to say that the
offenders knew of the victims and purposefully decided to kill them for ideological reasons. However,
there was little difference in the percentage of victims who were targeted for what they represented
(37.1% versus 38%). In these victimization events, ideological offenders targeted their victims not
because they knew of them, but because they represented something that was antithetical to their
ideology, such as a military officer or a bi-racial couple. The last type of targeting behavior examined is
that related to random victimization. In these homicide incidents, these individuals are chosen neither for
what they represent, nor purposefully based on the offenders prior knowledge of the victim, but were
considered victims of random chance. Random targeting was more prevalent among AQAM-related
homicides, at 19.4 percent of all events, as compared to FRE homicides, at 9.4 percent.
The next incident level variable measures the ideological motivation behind the homicide incident. In the
ECDB, an ideological event can range from 1 to 4, where 1 represents a low level of ideological motivation
for a victimization event and 4 represents a high level of ideological motivation for a victimization. In
events coded with a low level of ideological motivation, there is a single indicator that points toward the
event being ideologically motivated, while there is also evidence that the victimization might not be
ideologically motivated. For a high level of ideological motivation, there are multiple indicators of
ideological motivation and no indicators that question whether or not it was ideologically motivated.5
Victimization events coded as a medium level of ideological motivation had either a single piece of
evidence supporting ideological motivation and no contradictory evidence or multiple pieces of evidence
supporting an ideological motive and at least one contradictory piece of information. Far-right extremist
victims were more likely to be killed in events with a high level of ideological motivation when compared
to AQAM violence (46.5% to 39.7%, respectively), but also were more likely to have a higher level of low
ideological motivation (13.9% to 4.8%, respectively).
For victim type, the majority of AQAM victims were civilian targets, while the second largest category was
government victims. For the government victims, this is partially connected to another variable, which
shows more than 20 percent of AQAM victims were in the military and killed in the line of duty.
Compared to this, FRE victims were most often targeted for racial or ethnic reasons, specifically as their

An example of a victimization event with a high level of ideological motivation would be the murder of an African-American
and his friend by a group of skinheads. Immediately prior to the homicide the offenders remarked that they were disappointed
skinheads were less active in their area and felt they needed to do something, decided to search for victims in a neighborhood
where they knew minorities lived, and specifically targeted a minority and his friend, who was white, for being a race traitor.
There was no evidence of an alternative motive. On the other side of the ideological motive spectrum, a victimization event
coded as low ideological motivation will have mixed support. For example, a the murder of a minority by a white supremacist
was coded as ideologically motivated as officials stated race played a part in the killing; however, there was also evidence that
the offender may have acted in self defense, plus there was a history of prior conflicts between the victim and offender.
5

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

status as minorities. This was followed by civilian targets (28.1%) and then government targets,
primarily law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty (12.7%).
Table 3. Individual Characteristics of Ideological Homicide Victimization

Age

Sex

Race

<10
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
>59
Unknown
Female
Male
Unknown
Asian
Black
Hispanic (any race)
White
Other
Unknown

AQAM
N (62)
5
3
20
9
4
13
4
4
16
44
2
4
15
4
29
6
4

%
8.1%
4.8%
32.3%
14.5%
6.5%
21.0%
6.5%
6.5%
25.8%
71.0%
3.2%
6.5%
24.2%
6.5%
46.8%
9.7%
6.5%

FRE
N (245)
3
28
45
52
54
33
29
1
44
200
1
15
80
18
118
12
2

%
1.2%
11.4%
18.4%
21.2%
22.0%
13.5%
11.8%
0.4%
18.0%
81.6%
0.4%
6.1%
32.7%
7.3%
48.2%
4.9%
0.8%

In 44.4 percent of AQAM cases, there was only one homicide victim, while 79.4 percent of fatal victims
were killed in incidents where another individual was injured. For FRE victims, 60.4 percent were the
sole fatality, and 47.3 percent were killed in homicide incidents where another individual was violently
victimized, but not fatally. Finally, 72.6 percent of AQAM victims were killed by a firearm, compared to
62.9 percent of FRE victims, who were more likely than AQAM victims to be killed with a knife or bodily
weapon.
Table 3 presents individual level characteristics of the ideological victims, specifically basic demographic
data. Although the age of FRE victims appears to be normally distributed, peaking around the ages of 40
to 49 (22.0%), the ages AQAM victims peak in the age category of 20 to 29 (32.3%), but also are high in
the older category of 50 to 50 (21.0%). For sex, FRE victims are more often male when compared to
AQAM victims (81.6% to 71.0%, respectively). In addition, there are no severe deviations in race and
ethnicity between the two types of ideological victims, with the largest departure between the two
occurring for victims who were Black. In this instance, FRE victims were Black 32.7 percent of the time,
while AQAM victims were Black only 24.2 percent of the time.
Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence

Conclusion
Over the last 25 years, when including the ideological victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the
Oklahoma City bombing, offenders associated with AQAM have killed nearly seven and half times more
people than FRE in one-fifth as many incidents. However, when these two outliers are removed, another
story unfolds. Under these circumstances, there are nearly four times as many FRE victims as AQAM. The
purpose of this analysis is not to discount the victims of these events, but to examine ideological
victimization without the disproportionate impact of such catastrophic acts of terrorism.
For the most part, these two types of ideological victimization appear to be more unique than similar. It is
thus important to, as this study did, disaggregate the study of terrorism by ideology. Victims of AQAM
were killed at different times and in different locations when compared to FRE victims. AQAM victims
were killed in events that more often had multiple victims, where others were injured, and the use of a
firearm was the primary weapon of the offender. FRE victims were more often the sole victim (both fatal
and not), and although a firearm was still the primary weapon used, they were more likely than AQAM
victims to be stabbed or beaten to death. Although both sets of victims had disproportionate numbers of
individuals killed in the line of duty, especially when one considers the percentage of the general
population engage in active military or law enforcement service at any given point in time, AQAM victims
were more likely to be military, while FRE victims were more likely to be law enforcement. Finally, AQAM
victims were younger (45.2% were under 30, compared to 31% of FRE victims) and more often female,
when compared to FRE victims (25.8% to 18%, respectively).
In some ways, AQAM victims appear to have characteristics that are slightly closer to that of typical
homicide victims and even the general population. This could be a mechanism of the fact that AQAM
victims are much more likely to be random or representative victims than are FRE victims. In these
circumstances, it could be argued that a victims routine activities and lifestyle play a larger role in their
risk of ideological victimization. If an individual is fatally victimized by an AQAM offender depends on
whether they are in the proverbial wrong place at the wrong time. FRE victims, however, are more likely
to be targeted purposefully for assassination based on the offenders previous knowledge of the
individual. In these circumstances, their lifestyle and routine activities only dictate when and where, not
if, they are victimized. These victimization patterns over the last 25 years demonstrate that ideological
victimization from terrorist and extremist violence varies across ideologies and underlines the
importance of future research in the fields of criminology and victimology in attempting to understand
these differences and reduce victimization risk.

Twenty-Five Years of Ideological Homicide Victimization in the United States of America

Terrorism Cases
Involving
Muslim-Americans,
2014
CHARLES KURZMAN
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL
FEBRUARY 9, 2015


Twenty-five Muslim-Americans were
associated with violent terrorism in 2014,
bringing the total since 9/11 to 250, or less
than 20 per year (Figure 1). A large majority of
the cases involved travel (5 individuals) or
attempted travel (14 individuals) to join
designated terrorist organizations in Syria or
(in one case) Yemen.

ThisisthesixthannualreportonMuslimAmerican
terrorismsuspectsandperpetratorspublishedbythe
TriangleCenteronTerrorismandHomelandSecurity.
Thesereports,andthedataonwhichtheyarebased,
areavailableathttp://kurzman.unc.edu/muslim
americanterrorism.
Twenty Muslim-Americans have carried out
attacks on targets in the United States since
9/11 nine involving firearms, seven involving
explosives, two involving knives or hatchets,
one each involving a car or small aircraft
(Figure 3). In 2014, four terrorism-related
incidents involving Muslim-Americans two
using firearms, one a knife, and one a hatchet
-- killed seven people in 2014, bringing the
total number of fatalities in the United States
from terrorism by Muslim-Americans since
9/11 to 50.1

Only six of the 25 individuals plotted or

engaged in violence in the United States in
2014 (Figure 2), matching the lowest total
since 2008. (Three of these individuals are
included provisionally, as the evidence is
unclear at present whether their plots ought to
be characterized as terrorism.)
Over the 13 years since 9/11, the U.S.
governments counterterrorism efforts have
identified 109 Muslim-Americans plotting
against targets in the United States. (Another
33 individuals had no publicly-known targets.)
Two thirds of the domestic plots were
disrupted early, with weapons or explosives
provided by undercover agents or informants.
Three quarters of plots involving explosives
were disrupted early, compared with one third
of plots with other weapons.

Meanwhile, the United States suffered

approximately 14,000 murders in 2014 and
more than 200,000 murders since 9/11.2
While the murder rate has declined in recent
years, mass shootings and active shooter
incidents have increased.3 In 2014, there were
30 mass shootings with four or more fatalities

in the United States, killing 136 people,4 more

than twice as many victims as from MuslimAmerican terrorism in the United States in
more than 13 years since 9/11.

James B. Comey, testified to Congress in

2014 that homegrown violent extremists are
increasingly savvy and willing to act alone,
repeating the characterization that his
predecessor, Robert S. Mueller III, had used
since 2011.7

As in previous years editions of this report,

cases of terrorism involving MuslimAmericans were identified through monitoring
of news media, social media, government
agency statements, and other researchers
work on the subject.5

While small numbers of Muslim-Americans

continue to be indicted for terrorism-related
offenses, the publicly-known cases of
domestic plots does not suggest large-scale
growth in violent extremism or more
sophisticated planning and execution than in
recent years. The most deadly plot involved
Ali Muhammad Brown, who shot and killed
four random people on the street in
Washington State and New Jersey in April
and June, 2014, as vengeance for Iraq,
Syria, Afghanistan, all these places where
innocent lives are being taken every single
day, as he told police officers after his arrest.8

U.S. Plots Remained Rare and

Unsophisticated
U.S. government officials have continued to
place a high priority on homegrown Islamic
terrorism as a threat to public safety in the
United States. In June 2014, for example, the
Department of Homeland Securitys
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review noted
that the terrorist threat to the Nation has
evolved, but it remains real and may even be
harder to detect. Because of these new
threats, the review proposed, homeland
security programs will, over the next four
years, become even more important.6 The
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Two other cases involved suspects in the

early stages of designing terrorism plots: a
wiretap on El Mehdi Semlali Fathi revealed his
aspiration to bomb Harvard University and a
courthouse in Hartford, Connecticut, but he
was arrested for and pled guilty to immigration
3


Figure 2. Muslim-American Terrorism Suspects and Perpetrators, Violent Plots, 2014
Name
Location
Plot or alleged plot
Disrupted Status of case
Nicholas Teausant
Lodi, CA
Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Trial pending
Mohammad Hassan
Dearborn
Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Trial pending
Avin Marsalis Brown
Raleigh, NC
Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Pled guilty
Akbar Jihad Jordan
Raleigh, NC
Attempting to join terrorist group in Yemen
Early
Pled guilty
Pled guilty to immigration fraud, not charged
El Mehdi Semlali Fathi
Bridgeport, CT
or tried for allegations of plot to bomb Harvard Early
Pled guilty
and courthouse in Hartford
Shannon Conley
Arvada, CO
Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Pled guilty
Moner Abusalha
Vero Beach, FL Joining terrorist group in Syria
No
Deceased
Abdullahi Yusuf
Minneapolis, MN Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Trial pending
Abdi Mohamud Nur
Minneapolis, MN Joining terrorist group in Syria
Charged in
No
absentia
Mufid A. Elfgeeh
Rochester, NY
Plot to kill U.S. military veterans
Early
Trial pending
Michael Todd Wolfe
Austin, TX
Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Pled guilty
Adam Dandach
Orange County, Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria
Early
Trial pending
Four murders in Washington State and New
Seattle, WA;
Ali Muhammad Brown
No
Trial pending
West Orange, NJ Jersey in revenge for U.S. policy toward
Douglas McAuthur McCain Minneapolis, MN; Joining terrorist group in Syria
No
Deceased
San Diego, CA
Abdirahmaan Muhumed
Yusra Ismail

Minneapolis, MN

Joining terrorist group in Syria

Alton Nolen

Oklahoma City,
OK

Murder and attempted murder of former coworkers; terrorist motives unknown

Mohammed Hamzah Khan

Unnamed minor sister of
Mohammed Hamzah Khan
Unnamed minor brother of
Mohammed Hamzah Khan
Unnamed minor
Unnamed minor
Unnamed minor
Zale H. Thompson

No

Charged in
absentia

No

Trial pending
Trial pending

Chicago, IL

Denver, CO

Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria

Attempting to join terrorist group in Syria;

arrested in Germany

Early

Late

Not charged

Unknown

New York, NY

Attacking policemen with a hatchet; terrorist

No
Deceased
motives unknown
Attempted murder of former girlfriend; murder
Ismaaiyl Abdullah Brinsley Baltimore, MD;
No
Trial pending
of two police officers
New York, NY
Early disruption is defined here as coming to the attention of authorities prior to the gathering of weapons or explosives.

fraud before constructing an explosive device;

Mufid Elfgeeh purchased a weapon from an
undercover FBI agent, allegedly intending to
kill U.S. military veterans.

they constituted acts of terrorism: Alton Nolen,

who stabbed two former co-workers in Moore,
Oklahoma, after he was fired, beheading one
of them; Zale Thompson, who injured two
police officers with a hatchet and was shot
dead; and Ismaaiyl Brinsley, who shot and
wounded his former girlfriend in Baltimore,
Maryland, took a bus to New York City, and

Three additional violent incidents are included

in this report on a provisional basis, although
the evidence is unclear at present whether
4


Figure 3. Muslim-American Terrorist Attacks in the United States Since 9/11
Name
Year Plot
Fatalities
Hesham Hadayet
2002 Shot Israeli airline personnel, Los Angeles, California
2 (plus himself)
Charles Bishop
2002 Flew plane into office tower, Tampa, Florida
0 (plus himself)
John Allen Muhammad
2002 Beltway Snipers, metropolitan Washington, D.C. area
17
Lee Boyd Malvo
Mohammed Taheri-Azar 2006 Ran over students with rented SUV, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 0
Naveed Haq
2006 Shot workers at Jewish center, Seattle, Washington
1
Sulejmen Talovich
2007 Shot people at shopping center, Salt Lake City, Utah
5 (plus himself)
Tahmeed Ahmad
2007 Attacked military police at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida 0
Abdulhakim Muhammad 2009 Shooting at military recruitment center, Little Rock, Arkansas
1
Nidal Hasan
2009 Fort Hood shooting, Texas
13
Faisal Shahzad
2010 Times Square car-bomb, New York City
0
Yonathan Melaku
2011 Shot at military buildings in northern Virginia
0
Abdullatif Aldosary
2012 Allegedly detonated explosive at Social Security office in Arizona 0
Tamerlan Tsarnaev
2013 Boston Marathon bombing
4 (plus T. Tsarnaev)
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
Ali Muhammad Brown
2014 Shot people in Washington State and New Jersey
4
Attacked former co-workers in Oklahoma with a knife, beheading
1
Alton Nolen
2014
one of them; terrorist motives unknown
Attacked and injured 2 policemen in New York City with a
Zale Thompson
2014
0 (plus himself)
hatchet; terrorist motives uncertain
Shot and wounded former girlfriend in Baltimore; shot and killed
2
Ismaaiyl Abdullah Brinsley 2014
two police officers in New York City; terrorist motives unknown
Recruitment to Terrorist Groups Overseas

shot and killed two police officers before killing

himself. New York City Police Commissioner
William Bratton called Thompsons violence a
terrorist attack, based on a review of
Thompsons online statements and browser
history.9 Brinsley appears to have been
motivated by personal troubles his former
girlfriend talked him out of suicide before he
shot her and anger about police violence
against African-Americans, not by sympathies
with Islamic terrorism, although one online
post nine months earlier may have expressed
support for violent extremism. Evidence of
Nolens motives has not yet been made
public.

The growth in terrorism cases involving

Muslim-Americans is due entirely to
individuals and small groups seeking to join
two revolutionary groups based in Syria, the
Nusra Front, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda,
and its rival, the self-styled Islamic State
(sometimes referred to by the acronyms IS,
ISIL, and ISIS). Both groups have been
designated as terrorist organizations by the
United States government. Five individuals
were identified in 2014 as reaching Syria
andjoining one of these groups: Moner
Abusalha, Douglas McCain, and Abdirahmaan
Muhumed, who died in clashes in Syria; and
Abdi Mohamud Nur and Yusra Ismail, who are
believed to be alive and were charged in
absentia. An additional five individuals were
identified in 2013 as having joined militant
organizations in Syria. Fourteen MuslimAmericans were detained at airports in 2014,
allegedly on their way to join militants in Syria
(plus one on his way to Yemen), on top of two

These disturbing cases do not indicate

widespread recruitment of Muslim-Americans
by transnational terrorist organizations to
engage in attacks in the United States, or
sophisticated planning by the handful of
individuals who have self-radicalized.


identified in this report, approximately 35 (14
percent) have returned to the United States
after training with designated terrorist
organizations abroad. Four fifths of these
individuals had been with groups in
Afghanistan or Pakistan, plus two each in Iraq,
Somalia, and Syria, and one in the Dagestan
region of the Russian Federation.

in 2013 (plus four on their way to Yemen and

one on his way to Pakistan).
In total, 26 Muslim-Americans have been
publicly identified as joining or attempting to
join militants in Syria over the past two years.
These 26 individuals are a fraction of the
Muslim-Americans suspected by the U.S.
government of having traveled or attempted to
travel to Syria, who officials estimate to
number 100 or more.10 FBI Director James
Comey told reporters in August 2014 that the
actual figure may be many times more than
100: When I give you the number of more
than 100, I can't tell you with high confidence
that's a hundred of 200, that's a hundred of
500, that's a hundred of a 1,000 or more,
because it's so hard to track.11

Most of the returnees were arrested for plots

aimed at targets overseas. Only nine of 35
returnees engaged in plots aimed at targets in
the United States, and only two of them
succeeded in carrying out attacks: Tamerlan
Tsarnov, who allegedly trained in Dagestan
and bombed the Boston Marathon in 2013,
and Faisal Shahzad, who trained with militants
in Pakistan and attempted to detonate a car
bomb in New York Citys Times Square in
2010 (apparently his training was inadequate,
because his bomb was improperly constructed
and did not explode). The returnees rate of
success in carrying out plots in the U.S. (2 of
9) was not significantly higher than the rate
among Muslim-American terrorism suspects
and perpetrators who had not trained abroad
(18 of 100).

If dozens or hundreds more MuslimAmericans are fighting in the civil war in Syria,
they are keeping such a low profile no
recruitment videos or online messages that
they have not come to the attention of the
media and research organizations scouring
the internet for evidence of their existence.
They have also not returned to the United
States and engaged in violence. This has
been a concern of U.S. officials since the
Syrian conflict began to attract foreign fighters
two years ago.12 In late 2013, the director of
the National Counterterrorism Center,
Matthew Olsen, told Congress that travel to
Syria by Muslims from the U.S. and Europe
raises concerns that capable individuals with
extremist contacts and battlefield experience
could return to their home countries to commit
violence.13 The murders at the Charlie Hebdo
magazine office in early 2015, one of whose
perpetrators claimed to have trained in Yemen
with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
heightened concerns further.

The number of returnees has trended

downward in recent years, from three per year
before 2010 to less than two per year (8 total)
since then. Despite the presence of Islamic
insurgencies in a variety of locations over the
past dozen years, there have been very few
instances of Muslim-Americans returning to
the United States from terrorist training
camps.
Non-Violent Support for Terrorism
Cases of non-violent support for terrorism -assistance such as money or services that
does not involve acts of violence remained
very low in 2014 (see Figure 5). Eight MuslimAmericans were indicted for such offenses in
2014: one who attempted to recruit an FBI

Of the 250 Muslim-American terrorism

suspects and perpetrators since 9/11
6

informant to join al-Shabaab in Syria in 2011,

two who allegedly assisted people traveling to
Syria, three who alleged wired small amounts
of money in support of al-Shabaab (see
Figure 6), one who tweeted in support of the
Islamic State (arrested on unrelated weapons
possession charges), and one who lied about

his contact with the Tsarnaev brothers after

the Boston Marathon bombing.
The virtual disappearance of these support
cases suggests that Muslim-Americans have
little contact with terrorist activities in the
United States or overseas.


Indeed, a Fox News Poll from 2011 found that
more Americans are concerned about a
terrorist attack in the area where you live by
non-Muslim Americans who are
antigovernment fanatics (49 percent) than
from radical Muslim-Americans (32
percent).17

Local Law Enforcement Less Concerned

About Muslim-American Terrorism Than
Right-Wing Terrorism
In a survey conducted last year by David
Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and the Police
Executive Research Forum, 382 police chiefs
and sheriffs across the United States reported
their perception of the threat of violent
extremism in their jurisdictions. Only 3 percent
rated Al-Qaeda inspired violent extremism as
a severe threat, half the proportion that rated
other forms of violent extremism as severe
threats. Full results of this survey will be
reported later this year.14

As public debate continues over terrorism, it is

worth keeping these threats in perspective.
Terrorists aim to instill fear disproportionate to
their actual capabilities to generate violence,
and to provoke social and policy overreactions
that they can use in their recruitment efforts.
In the field of public health, the response to
crises is calibrated to the level of threat, so as
not to alarm the public unnecessarily, violate
precious liberties, or waste resources on
relatively low-level threats to public safety.
Government officials, journalists, and the
public would do well to follow this model when
responding to terrorist threats as well.

Another study by the START Center at the

University of Maryland found that there has
been more individual radicalization from the
far right than among Muslims in the United
States.15 Recent radicals on the right include
Eric Matthew Frein, who allegedly shot two
state troopers in Pennsylvania, killing one of
them; Dennis R. Marx, who allegedly tried to
take over a courthouse in Georgia with
firearms and explosives; and Robert James
Talbot, Jr., who allegedly plotted to rob banks,
attack mosques, and kill police in Texas and
federal officials in Washington, D.C., in order
to restore America Pre-Constitutionally and
stop the Regime with action by
bloodshed.16

About the author:

Charles Kurzman is a professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and a
specialist on Islamic movements. His book, The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim
Terrorists, was published by Oxford University Press in 2011. He can be contacted through his
website, http://kurzman.unc.edu.


Notes:

1
ThenumberoffatalitiesassociatedwiththeBeltwaySnipers,JohnAllenMuhammadandLeeBoydMalvo,is
listedas17inthisyearsreport,upfrom11inpreviousyearsreports,toincludeadditionalvictimswhowerekilled
inpreviousmonthsinotherpartsofthecountry.ThepairsmotivesandassociationwithIslamicextremismremain
unclear.SariHorwitzandMichaelRuane,Sniper:TheHuntfortheKillersWhoTerrorizedtheNation(NewYork:
RandomHouse,2003);AngieCannon,23DaysofTerror:TheCompellingTrueStoryoftheHuntandCaptureofthe
BeltwaySnipers(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,2010);
2
FederalBureauofInvestigation,CrimeintheUnitedStates,2013,Table1,CrimeintheUnitedStatesbyVolume
andRateper100,000Inhabitants,19932013.Theestimatefor2014isextrapolatedfromtrendsinpreceding
years.
3
AmyP.Cohen,DeborahAzrael,andMatthewMiller,RateofMassShootingsHasTripledSince2011,Harvard
ResearchShows,MotherJones,October15,2014;FederalBureauofInvestigation,AStudyofActiveShooter
IncidentsintheUnitedStatesBetween2000and2013,September16,2013.
4
MassShootingTracker,http://shootingtracker.com/wiki/Mass_Shootings_in_2014.Accordingtothissources
preferreddefinitionoffourormorecasualties(killedorwounded),thetotalfor2014is283incidentswith349
fatalitiesand1,026peoplewounded.Analternativelistingidentifies24masskillingsoffourormorein2014,with
atotalof110fatalities:USAToday,BehindtheBloodshed:TheUntoldStoryofAmericasMassKillings,updated
January19,2015,http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/masskillings/index.html.
5
Inparticular,IwouldliketoacknowledgeandthanktheHomegrownTerrorismprojectoftheNewAmerica
Foundation;theTerroristTrialReportCardoftheCenteronLaw&SecurityatNewYorkUniversity;theresearch
centeroftheInvestigativeProjectonTerrorism;theterrortrialdatabaseproducedbyTrevorAaronsonatMother
Jonesmagazine;thePost9/11TerrorismDatabaseoftheMuslimPublicAffairsCouncil;andtheextremismand
terrorismprojectoftheAntiDefamationLeague.
6
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,QuadrennialHomelandSecurityReview,June18,2014,p.6.
7
JamesB.Comey,testimonybeforetheHouseAppropriationsCommittee,SubcommitteeonCommerce,Justice,
Science,andRelatedAgencies,March26,2014;andtestimonybeforeHouseHomelandSecurityCommittee,
September17,2014.ThephrasewasusedbyRobertS.MuellerIIIinaspeechtotheCommonwealthClubof
CaliforniaonNovember17,2011;andintestimonybeforeCongressonMay16,2012,andJune19,2013.
8
TheStateofWashingtonv.AliMuhammadBrown,SuperiorCourtofWashingtonforKingCounty,Certification
forDeterminationofProbablyCause,August20,2014.
9
Reuters,October24,2014.
10
TheNewYorkTimes,May31,2014(about100);June14,2014(roughly100);August29,2014(morethan
100).SeealsoPeterR.Neumann,ForeignfightertotalinSyria/Iraqnowexceeds20,000;surpassesAfghanistan
conflictinthe1980s,InternationalCentrefortheStudyofRadicalisation,KingsCollegeLondon,January2015.
11
CBSNews,August11,2014,http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbidirectoramericansfightinginsyriahardto
track.
12
BrianMichaelJenkins,WhenJihadisComeMarchingHome:TheTerroristThreatPosedbyWesterners
ReturningfromSyriaandIraq,Rand,2014.
13
MatthewOlsen,directoroftheNationalCounterterrorismCenter,TheHomelandThreatLandscapeandU.S.
Response,testimonybeforetheSenateCommitteeonHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairs,November
13,2013.
14
PreliminaryresultsarereportedinDavidSchanzerandCharlesKurzman,HomegrownTerrorismThreatWas
Overhyped,NewarkStarLedger,April14,2014
15
STARTCenter,UniversityofMaryland,ProfilesofIndividualRadicalizationintheUnitedStates:Preliminary
Findings,January2015.
16
UnitedStatesofAmericav.RobertJamesTalbot,Jr.,UnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictof
Texas,CriminalComplaint,March27,2014.
17
FoxNewsPollconductedMarch1416,2011.

U.S.
T

1970

2012:
(GTD)

Background

Author
Erin Miller

Program Manager, START

Consortiums Global Terrorism
Database

Project
Investigators

STARTs Global Terrorism Database (GTD) contains information on more than

113,000 domestic and international terrorist attacks* that occurred between
1970 and 2012. Collectively, these attacks have resulted in more than 243,000
deaths and more than 324,000 injuries. This research highlight focuses on the
terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States between 1970 and 2012.

Overall Attack Trends

Gary LaFree

From 1970 through 2012, more than 2,600 terrorist attacks took place in the
United States, resulting in more than 3,500 fatalities.

Laura Dugan

Approximately 86% of all deaths from terrorist attacks

during this period occurred in the coordinated attacks on
September 11, 2001.

Director, START Consortium at

the University of Maryland
Professor, University of
Maryland

Nearly 80% of all terrorist attacks involved no casualties

(fatalities or injuries).

Purpose
C
comprehensive
data from a variety of open
media sources about the
terrorist attacks that have
occurred in the United
States.
A
trends pertaining
to the dates, locations, tactics, targets, perpetrators,
and outcomes of attacks.
P
objective data on
terrorist violence to the
public, practitioners, and
policymakers.

More than half of terrorist attacks took place during the

1970s. Between 2000 and 2012, there were fewer than 20
attacks per year on average.

Attack Targets
The most frequently attacked type of target in the United States between 1970
and 2012 was business targets. Nearly one-third of all attacks on business
targets were on banks/commerce, and an additional 22% were on retail
entities. Remaining attacks targeted a variety of business targets.

Terrorist attacks frequently targeted buildings and infrastructure rather than individuals.

94%

6%

94% of attacks against

abortion-related targets were
on clinics, while 6% targeted
providers or personnel.

79%

21%

79% of attacks against educational

targets were on schools, universities, or
other buildings, while 21% targeted
teachers or other educational personnel.

75%

25%

75% of attacks against government

targets were on government
buildings, facilities, or offices, while
25% targeted personnel, public
officials, or politicians.

*Terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. More information available at www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
START Research Highlight

START, January 2014

Known Perpetrators**

Perpetrators, 2000-2012

Weapons Used
52%
29%
13%
2%
2%
2%
Incendiary refers to a weapon capable of catching fire,
causing fire, or burning readily and producing intensely
hot fire when exploded.
Melee refers to a weapon that can only be used at very
close range, e.g., blunt objects, knives, materials that
can be used to strangle or suffocate victims.

Attacks in the U.S. , 19 70 - 20 12

Between 2000 and 2012, the majority of attacks in which the

perpetrators were identified were carried out by
environmental and animal rights violent extremist groups.
Attacks were also frequently carried out by individuals not
known to be affiliated with a perpetrator group. These
include Wade Michael Pages assault at a Sikh temple in
Wisconsin in 2012, as well as Nidal Hasans attack at Ft.
Hood in 2009.
Seven of the 13 attacks in 2012 were attributed to
unaffiliated individual perpetrators.

UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACKS, 1970-2012

Nearly 83% of all attempted attacks, i.e.,
those in which perpetrators were out the
door intending to imminently attack
their targets, were successful.
The percentage of attempted attacks that
were unsuccessful (e.g., the bomb failed
to detonate or was defused) has varied
considerably over time, particularly as
terrorism in the country has declined.
It peaked in 2011 when 44% of attempted attacks were unsuccessful, and was at
its lowest in 1990 and 2012, when all attempted attacks were successful.

Locations

Earth Liberation Front (ELF)

Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Unaffiliated Individual(s)
Anti-Abortion Violent Extremists
Al-Qa`ida
Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation
Brigade
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
The Justice Department
Revenge of the Trees
Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Attacks,
2000-2012
59
41
33
15
4
2
1
1
1
1

Coalition to Save the Preserves (CSP)

1
Minutemen American Defense
1
Ku Klux Klan
1
**Information on the perpetrator(s) responsible for an
attack is unknown in 48 attacks. Nine attacks were
conducted by both ELF and ALF.

1970-2012:
Terrorist attacks occurred in all 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico, however more than half (50.3%)of all attacks in
the United States took place in California, New York, and Puerto
Rico.
2000-2012: Although fewer attacks occurred compared to earlier
periods, terrorist attacks still occurred in 35 states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Three states California, New York,
and Washington State accounted for 34.8% of all attacks.

TERRORISM & EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

IN THE U.S. DATABASE

This research is part of a larger effort to develop a comprehensive database on Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S.
(TEVUS) that integrates data from the Global Terrorism Database, the American Terrorism Study, Profiles of Perpetrators of
Terrorism in the U.S., and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database. Led
by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START), the research team is creating a
resource that will allow operational
and academic end-users to conduct
unprecedented analyses that
incorporate incident, perpetrator,
and geospatial information.

This research was supported by the Resilient Systems Division of the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security through Award Number 2009-ST-108-LR0003 made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START). The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted
as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

8400 Baltimore Avenue, Suite 250

College Park, Maryland 20740
301.405.6600
infostart@start.umd.edu
www.start.umd.edu
START Research Highlight

START, January 2014

Egypt's Old Strategy for New Terrorism

by Nancy Okail, foreignaffairs.com

July 21

On July 11, in yet another sign of an alarming increase of terrorism in mainland Egyptthat is, Egypt outside of northern Sinaithe
Italian consulate in Cairo was bombed. The Islamic State (also called ISIS) allegedly claimed the attack, although the groups
involvement was not confirmed. Last month, on June 29, a car bomb ripped through the armored convoy of Hisham Barakat, Egypts
prosecutor general. Barakat, a 65-year-old career prosecutor who was appointed in July 2013 and had served during a period of
remarkable political polarization, died of wounds sustained in the blast.
In his death, Barakat joined dozens of Egyptian state officials who have been assassinated or faced attempted assassination in the past
years. On September 9, 2013, former Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim narrowly escaped a similar attack when a suicide bomber
targeted him as he drove to work in the Cairene suburb of Nasr City. Other assassinations have included high-ranking police, military,
and judicial figures.

Mohamed Abd El Ghany / ReutersEgyptian security officials inspect the site of a bomb blast at the Italian Consulate in Cairo,
July 11, 2015.
Photo by: Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

The assassinations come during a wave of terrorism in the country. Although there have been a number of spectacular attacks, most of
the violence is made up of frequent and smaller-scale attacks. Based on data collected by the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy,
on average, nearly 120 acts of terrorism have been reported per month thus far in 2015, versus around 30 per month in 2014. This
increase coincides with the late 2014 emergence of smaller groups operating outside of the restive Sinai Peninsula (such as the
Revolutionary Punishment and the Popular Resistance Movement). Indeed, Egypt is suffering a wave of violence unseen since the

1990s.
In this surge of violence, the judiciary is a frequent target. Sinai-based militant group Wilayat Sinai, an affiliate of ISIS, recently
launched a campaign entitled "Extermination of the Judiciary." Only hours before Barakats assassination, the group had published a
video that featured footage of a May 17 drive-by murder of three judges and a prosecutor in North Sinai. Other assassinations and
attacks have been carried out by nameless actors; in the past six months, roughly three-quarters of terrorist acts in the country have
gone unclaimed.
Barakats assassination exemplifies new trends in the nature, form, and locations of terrorist attacks. Assassinations have evolved
since the largely sporadic shootings of 2013, demonstrating increased coordination in planning and more sophisticated technical
capacity. The location of attacks is also changing. Until 2014, terrorist attacks were almost exclusively isolated to the Sinai Peninsula.
In 2014 this began to change, and today attacks occur regularly in provinces all across Egypt, with particular concentration in greater
Cairo and areas to south of there along the Nile (the provinces of Fayoum and Beni Suef). In fact, the period from January to June
2015 has seen a nearly 400 percent increase from the previous six months in the number of reported incidents outside of the Sinai
Peninsula.
In the 1990s, small groups of militants carried out attacks without much international support. Today, a range of players has
embraced terrorism and violence, which makes the groups difficult to keep track of. Targeted assassinations may have become more
common in recent years, but Barakat is still the most senior figure to have been killed since Rifaat al-Mahgoub, former Egyptian
Speaker of Parliament, was gunned down in 1990. The Islamist militants who murdered him had mistaken him for Interior Minister
Abdel Halim Moussa, who was their longtime foe. Mahgoubs assassination inaugurated a bitter decadelong confrontation between
terrorist groups and the state. A string of terrorist attacks, notably the brutal 1997 massacre of 62 tourists at the hands of the jihadist
group Gamaa Islamiya, stretched across Egypt. In parallel, the government arrested hundreds of Islamists. In fact, Egypts judiciary
alongside the security sector became the main weapon in the countrys fight against terrorism.
The crackdown quieted the country for a time. The number of attacks fell as many fighters laid down their arms and others moved
elsewhere. The Gamaa Islamiya eventually renounced violent means, but its sister organization, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, merged
with al Qaeda under the tutelage of the networks current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The strategy worked in Egypt for a time, albeit
with notable failures such as the tourist attacks in South Sinai in 2005. But after the Arab Spring, consistent attacks resumed as hope
for change gave way to political instability.
There are several major differences between Egypts security problems then and now. In the 1990s, small groups of militants carried
out attacks without much international support. Today, a range of players has embraced terrorism and violence, which makes the
groups difficult to keep track of.

ReutersFighter jets fly near Cairo Tower in central Cairo, July 21, 2015.
Photo by: Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

And whereas terrorism in the 1990s was mostly fueled by domestic grievances against police brutality, todays bloodshed cannot be
seenat least not exclusivelyas a direct consequence of domestic adversity and government repression. The project of transnational
jihad feeds and is fed by local struggles. External actors such as al Qaeda and ISIS have continued to support local groups regardless
of their interest in any domestic political conflict. And in turn, these conflicts spur sympathies toward terrorism as an alternative
political project or an easy route for revenge.
Even as the nature of the terrorism has changed, the states tactics have remained the same; in the absence of any clearly articulated
strategy to counter terrorism, Egypts leaders have reverted to old, familiar tactics. Sweeping campaigns have targeted terror suspects,
dissident activists, journalists, and human rights defenders alike. Many of those who have been arrested and handed tough prison
sentences were lauded for inspiring Egypts democratic change in 2011. Most recently, Egypt has seen a wave of forced
disappearances; according to rights groups, over 100 young Egyptians have been forcibly disappeared in 2015, many of them later
found to be held in prison without charge. A similar approach was taken in the 1990s, when scores of Islamists were held in prison
long after their prison sentences had been served.
Although the country fought its war on terror in relative isolation in the past, the world is now beginning to understand that the
transnational and extraterritorial nature of extremist networks requires global solutions. But with each passing year, such tactics are
less viable. Arbitrary arrests and disappearances have not been lasting deterrents but are employed because they demonstrate
immediate, strong, and visible action for leaders who cannot afford to appear as though they are doing nothing. Given the more
diffuse nature of contemporary networks in and outside of Egypt, an indiscriminate approach may succeed only in removing
peripheral actors, while at the same time contributing to greater violence as terrorist groups frame these actions as acts of war in a
battle of good versus evil. In addition, media propaganda supporting the war on terror, which vilifies all dissidents alike, may
influence a domestic viewership, but it will not affect those who are affiliated with transnational terrorist groupsparticularly since
those who subscribe to violent extremist ideology by and large turn to the Internet for information and communication.
Given the nature of todays terrorism, effective countermeasures should include campaigns to pursue and hold known terrorists to
justice, but they should also address legitimate economic and social grievances. Otherwise, they will just provide fodder for
extremists recruitment campaigns. A cornerstone of a rights-based security framework will be a strengthening of the rule of law. On
June 30, at Barakats funeral, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi announced that the judiciary is restricted by the law, hinting at
impending legal reforms that will broaden legislation and allow for greater subjectivity in prosecution. Subjectivity in law allows for
its politicization, only impeding the judiciarys ability to effectively investigate and prosecute legitimate terrorism. It may actually

encourage violence among those who believe the law no longer protects them.