Conceptualizing Causes and Consequences of Application of Uti Possidetis Juris in Europe

VOLUME 11
The International Journal of
Interdisciplinary
Social Sciences:
Annual Review
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Conceptualizing Causes and Consequences

of Application of Uti Possidetis Juris in
Europe
BENEDICT EDWARD DEDOMINICIS
THESOCIALSCIENCES.COM
EDITOR
Gerassimos Kouzelis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece
MANAGING EDITOR
Dominique Moore, Common Ground Publishing, USA
ADVISORY BOARD
Patrick Baert, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

Andreja Bubic, University of Split, Split, Croatia
Norma Burgess, Syracuse University, Syracuse, USA
Hillel Goelman, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
Peter Harvey, Flinders University, Adelaide, South Australia
Vangelis Intzidis, University of Aegean, Rhodes, Greece
Paul James, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia
Ivana Batarelo James, University of Split, Split, Croatia
Gerassimos Kouzelis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Alexandros-Andreas Kyrtsis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Massimo Leone, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
Jose Luis Ortega Martin, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
Francisco Fernandez Palomares, Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
Constantine D. Skordoulis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Sanja Stanic, University of Split, Split, Croatia
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Conceptualizing Causes and Consequences of

Application of Uti Possidetis Juris in Europe
Benedict Edward DeDominicis, Catholic University of Korea, South Korea
Abstract: Images of the policy motivations and power capabilities of actors targeted by the initiator state that prevail
politically in the latter determine the latters strategic policy direction. These images may tend in pathological directions
that include oversimplification of the domestic political factors driving the target polities foreign policy. Nation state
polities such as the US and Russia are relatively more prone to perceive challenges from target state and non-state
actors. They are more prone to adopt policy decisions as if perceiving their targets in accordance with regular image
patterns tending towards oversimplification, i.e., stereotypes. These image stereotypes can be categorized and the
strategic policy tends that would associate with them can be inferred. The national security infrastructure founded and
developed during the Cold War has institutionalized established interests that promote stabilization as a strategy. This
stabilization strategy is embodied in the international legal principle, uti possidetis juris, i.e., the right of selfdetermination applies only to communities defined by existing provincial or republic territorial boundaries. This strategy
serves those powerful interests vested at the pinnacle of the regional international political status quo.
Keywords: European Union, Yugoslavia, Ukraine
Introduction
or international relations scholars seeking to develop international conflict resolution

strategies, uti possidetis juris, and attempts at stabilization more broadly, may be
inadequate. Stability as a strategy serves to reinforce the position of vested interests in
response to disruptive nationalist social movement challenges. A suitable conceptualization of
nationalism as a social change force is necessary to accommodate more effectively these
challenges. It is also desirable to lessen the potential for escalation of local crises into global
ones. Currently, the European Unions security policies serve this Western stabilization strategic
approach that has been conceptually and strategically deficient. The Western stabilization
strategy inadequately accommodates nationalist demands for change. External competitive
interference on behalf of local unsatisfied nationalistic social movements against others is a form
of Great Power competition. This study outlines a theoretically-informed analysis for the
international response to the dynamics of these conflicts. It aims to highlight the assumptions that
are driving the development of these international crises as a step towards obtaining, collectively,
greater management capability over them.
This study begins with an analysis of Western prevailing views in relation to the Milosevic
regime in Belgrade during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It compares these views
with the prevailing views regarding the Putin regime in Moscow in relation to the evolving crisis
in Ukraine. It then places these prevailing views within the context of American hegemony in
response to East European crises since the end of the Cold War (Tsygankov 2008). The
international community has responded in an ad hoc manner to nationalist social movements
challenging the inviolability of postcolonial or post-Communist borders. The international legal
justificatory principle is entitled uti possidetis juris. It holds that provincial or republic
boundaries may not be changed in seceding from an empire or in the dissolution of a state (Shaw
2014). It has been enforced in Southeast Europe up to the point that critical Great Powers view
adherence to it to be too costly. The 2008 US recognition of the sovereignty of what had been the
autonomous province of Kosovo within Serbia was later justified as inevitable. Violence in the
1990s, followed by more than nine years of de facto separation from Serbia had created political
conditions that necessitated stabilization through recognition (US Department of State 2008).
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This sought for stabilization has not been achieved (Smale 2015). The inevitable inconsistency in
ultimately doomed enforcement of this legal principle risks a greater potential for uncontrolled
local conflict escalation as the Ukrainian case illustrates.
Uti Possidetis Juris

Uti possidetis juris is the international legal principle that acknowledges and limits selfdetermination as an international legal right. It restricts international recognition of sovereignty
to those communities as they are defined by their existing territorial administrative boundaries at
the time of independence (Shaw 2014). The norm first emerged out of the context of the Latin
American independence struggle from the Spanish empire (Shaw 2014).
Figure 1: Latin America

Source: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/latin_america_1990.jpg
Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin
The UN affirmed this principle amidst African decolonization in the mid-twentieth century.
It had the objective to limit the destabilization both of domestic order and international relations
28
DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE
(Cassese 2005). In response to the escalating Balkan crisis, the European Community in 1991
convened an international Conference on Yugoslavia. It created concomitantly the Arbitration
Commission. The latters mandate was initially vague, but it came to focus on adjudicating the
conflicting content of the demands for national self-determination among its constituent peoples.
Also known as the Badinter Commission, after its chairman, Robert Badinter, the President of the
French Constitutional Council, its members included the Presidents of the German and Italian
Constitutional Courts, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal and the Belgian Court of Arbitration
(Pellet 1992). It affirmed the International Court of Justices declaration that the uti possidetis
juris principle has universal, and not just regional, application (Malanczuk 1997). It asserted
repeatedly in its Opinions that the existing borders between the Yugoslav republics must not be
changed except insofar as a change in frontiers is agreed by the republics (Pellet 1992). The
Committee further stated that the human rights of national minorities must be respected within
these existing boundaries.
The principle of uti possidetis juris does not rule out the legitimation of international border
changes that occur as a consequence of large-scale violence. If the cost from an internal, civil
conflict reaches a level that state authorities view as unacceptable, they may then acquiesce to the
border change through, for example, secession. External responses to these internal conflicts
shape the cost calculations of these internal combatants and prospective external interveners
more or less effectively. NATO Operation Allied Force employed lethal force over seventy-eight
days of aerial bombardment to coerce the Serb authorities to withdraw their security forces from
Kosovo in June 1999 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2014). Arguably the inevitable
consequence nearly nine years later was US recognition of the independence of Kosovo in
February 2008. In response to overpowering international support at the time, Belgrade has
grudgingly acquiesced to it, if not formally recognized it. Likewise, the Ethiopian acquiescence
to the secession of Eritrea was legal, but at a high cost following thirty years of civil war
(Malanczuk 1997). The underlying determining factor in these cases remains the traditional
international legal principle of effectiveness (Cassese 2005). The ability to create long-term
political realities that inevitably evolve from de facto to de jure reflects two factors. On the one
hand is the interaction of conflicting Great Power regional foreign policy goals and differential
capabilities involving their respective local clients and allies. On the other are the national selfdetermination aspirations of ethno-sectarian groups resisting relegation to minority status in an
other-dominated state. The latter interact with the former, and the balance of political forces,
unfortunately, is at times demonstrated by their violent interactive consequences. Cassese quotes
the Badinter Commission (2005, 75, fn.3) in its Opinion No. 10 of July 4, 1992, which briefly
denotes that international declaratory recognition of a state may be an instrument appropriate for
responding to violations of the precepts of international law. Paragraph 4 affirms, while
recognition is not a prerequisite for the foundation of a State and is purely declaratory in its
impact, it is nonetheless a discretionary act that other States may perform when they choose and
in a manner of their own choosing, subject only to compliance with the imperatives of general
international law, and particularly those prohibiting the use of force in dealings with other States
or guaranteeing the rights of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities (Arbitration Commission
1992). A prudential international community approach to the conundrum of conflicting territorial
national self-determination demands among intermixed ethno-national groups is therefore
necessary (Oklopcic 2009). Logically, it therefore requires collaborative agreement among the
Great Powers, which include Russia. Discounting their sensitivities risks tragedy as the conflicts
in Ukraine and Syria illustrate.
National self-determination movements by definition challenge those political interests
vested in the international political status quo. An appropriate theory of nationalism may include
a focus on its impact in shaping community hard and soft bargaining leverage capabilities of the
relevant actors. It may assist in forecasting and diagnosing potentially deadly conflicts and
prescribing differing degrees of devolution before the outbreak of violence. In contrast, a
29
stabilization political strategic approach to international relations may intensify international and
interethnic, racial, and sectarian polarization. Violence itself intensifies the intergroup fears and
hatreds that drive the competition to control, if not the existing state, then a new, seceding state.
Once large-scale violence does break out, the political latitude available to leaders rapidly
constricts along with intensifying communal stereotyping and negative affect. This spiraling
dynamic makes total political separation, despite its high costs, increasingly likely. Note, for
example, the continuing, dire economic situation in Kosovo. The frozen conflict over its status
within the international community, as well as the status of the small remaining Serb minority in
the north, persists, obstructing investment. Kosovo is consequently again one of the major
sources of refugees heading to the European Union in 2015 (Lyman, Erlanger, and Breeden
2015).
Uti possidetis juris developed out of a Latin American community context (Figure 1)
fundamentally different from that found in Europe (e.g., Figures 4 and 5), Asia (e.g., Figure 2),
and Africa (Figure 3). Cassese (2005, 84) translates uti possidetis juris as you will have
sovereignty over those territories you possess as of law. It reflects the predominantly territorial
foundation of the comparatively young communities of the New World (Figure 1). These
communities were populated for the most part by immigrants and their descendants who
generally assimilated the remaining indigenous populations. The latter were the remnants of
those groups that epidemics inadvertently introduced by European settlers did not obliterate. As a
consequence, territorial nations were built with comparatively ineffective resistance from
competing existing structures, e.g., the pre-Colombian indigenous empires. The territorial
national identity community underlay of the Spanish and Portuguese imperial provinces were
thus laid.
Pan-Latin American national identity sentiments were not sufficiently strong to overcome
the imperial provincial divisions that Spain and Portugal bequeathed. Instead, respective primary
national community self-identification sentiments emerged that generally corresponded with the
delineations of these existing former imperial provincial boundaries. As in the nascent US, selfdetermination and sovereignty demands overcame European imperial resistance. Subsequent
conflicts in the Latin American regional international legal status quo were not sufficiently
disruptive to erase the post-imperial state boundaries. Pan-North American identity trends
appeared more strongly among the separate English colonies in North America south of the Great
Lakes. The Northern victory in the US Civil War solidified the political supremacy of the PanAmerican national territorial identity over other competing community identity loyalties.
Like much of international law, uti possidetis juris represents an accommodation of an
emerging irresistible force upon a heretofore, immovable object. The former is the modern power
of nationalism. The latter are the vast array of vested domestic and international interests in the
international political status quo. The treaties and precedents that together constitute international
law institutionalize international relations and reflect these interests. State citizenship political ingroup attitudes evolved, more or less coercively, in the New World to align with national
identities as territorially-defined (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin 2014). The predominance of jus
soli principles of citizenship in the New World reflects the evolving array of economic and
political incentives to make citizenship available to immigrants and their offspring. This
citizenship by territorial birthright stands in contrast to ethnic notions of national selfidentification and citizenship determined by cultural inheritance, i.e., jus sanguinis. The latter is a
product of different historical, political, and sociological circumstances in the Old World. In the
latter, intermingled members of differing ethnic cultural communities mobilized and competed
for resources, often with external, imperial power patronage. They identified co-brethren from
perceived shared historical ethnic cultural histories, typically professed as rooted on a dynastic
territory. Recognizing everyone now living on that territory affectively as co-nationals became
problematic for competing, territorially-rooted authorities over concentrated cultural groups.
National self-determination requires sovereignty over a territory that has been contested.
30
Figure 2: Ethno-sectarian Populations and Modern State Borders in the Levant and Part of Mesopotamia
Source: Dr. Michael Izady, The Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University,
gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Levant_Ethnicity_lg.png. This version was posted at
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/08/27/the-one-map-that-shows-why-syria-is-so-complicated/
Nationalist self-determination social movements may or, often, may not correspond with
already existing, or previously emplaced, territorial boundaries. Examples where they did
generally correspond included France and England. In these west European cases, a predominant
shared national cultural identity emerged over many generations within established medieval
states. This large, national identity generally superseded regional ethnic community selfidentities.
Cases where they did not correspond include ethnic national self-determination movements
challenging imperial and postcolonial boundaries in Eurasian and African regions. European
imperial competition left states with often-dubious boundaries, encompassing multiple, latent
ethnic primary identity groups as well as groups straddling these borders. European imperial
control strategies may have identified and formalized differentiating cultural and even
phenotypic characteristics of these ethnic groups (Eltringham 2006). They thereby sought to
identify and create local subalterns to rule on their behalf, lowering the costs of control. Later,
these more or less latent polarizations were subsumed temporarily in the joint struggle against
European imperialism, the independence outcome codifying uti possidetis juris (Cassese 2005).
A shared bond emerged in the common struggle against the imperial, often racially defined,
European occupying power. This shared memory of common struggle against the common
adversary has faded into history (Young 1990). Internal interethnic competitive political
mobilization and conflict over control of the territorially-delineated, postcolonial states political
and material resources came to dominate politics (Horowitz 2000). One outcome of this
polarization was military or single-party authoritarianism amidst fortified intra-ethnic community
solidarity. The state regime may degenerate into neo-patrimonialism and corruption, often
contributing to further intensification of interethnic (i.e., so-called tribal) polarization amidst elite
31
control maintenance (Young 1979). These conflicts may be increasingly perceived in zero sum
terms without the unifying threat of a common enemy.
The argument for uti possidetis in Africa rests on the relative political weakness and
diffusion of these primordial ethnic subunits aspiring to would be statehood. These states are
often subject to centrifugal tendencies challenging the larger postcolonial state due to discontent
over state policy. If more powerful external actors do not support secession, these states continue
to formally exist despite their relative weakness and inefficacy (Hughes 2004, 864). Local
conflicts were often intensified by internal group alliances with external actors providing
resources to local clients. These external actors, including regional and extra-regional actors,
have their own goals, including competition for influence, motivating their positive response to
these solicitations. A result was the intensification of the mutually shared suspicions and hatreds
fueling the polarization of these internal struggles (Hughes 2004). Consequent suspicions of
disloyalty and treason further fueled the perception of politics as a zero sum, life and death
struggle. In the worst cases, conflicts intensified to genocidal levels.
Figure 3: Ethnic Groups vs. State Boundaries in Africa

Source: The Murdock map originally appeared in George Murdocks 1959 book Africa, Its Peoples, and Their Culture
History, published by McGraw-Hill. This version was posted at
pslarson2.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/murdockmapbound.png.
In Europe, ethnic minority groups typically already possess a perceived patron state. Its
existence promotes irredentist aspirations including the belief that changing borders is feasible.
The reality of Serbia promoted Croatian Serb, Kosovo Serb, and Bosnian Serb
separatist/irredentist aspirations. A comparable pattern is evident in the case of the Russian
minority in eastern Ukraine. Whether or not these challenges to uti possidetis juris are legitimate
32
depends upon the relative power capabilities of their irredentist patrons. International law is a
product of a decentralized global community divided into sovereign states. What those sovereign
states decide is the law ultimately defines what is legal. What is legal is therefore a product of the
application of the full range of hard and soft power instruments that governments apply to each
other in gaining their assent to a situation. This situation may be actual or desired. The
emergence of a customary norm in international law, therefore, depends critically on the
acquiescence of the major international powers at the time (Shaw 2014). A domestic Russian
nationalist framing narrative concerning the Crimean annexation in Russian public and elite
opinion is today prevalent (Laruelle 2015). Political dynamics have raised its salience for
contemporary Moscow regime legitimacy (Hansen 2015). International application of hard and
soft power instruments to unwind the Russian annexation without Russian regime change is
therefore highly problematic. The prospect of the peaceful return of pro-Russian Crimea to
Ukraine is questionable.
Figure 4: Changing State Borders of Ukraine

Source: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine-growth.png by Spiridon Ion Cepleanu.
This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license
Immediate Post-Cold War Great Power Responses to Nationalism

The rise and persistence of mass political participation in the twentieth century illustrated the
power limitations of the major powers. For example, pan-Vietnamese nationalism defeated US
policy to maintain the existence of South Vietnam. The United States and eighty-seven other
states recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, i.e., South Vietnam (Prugh 1975).
The German Democratic Republic had diplomatic relations with 100 states by the end of 1973,
and the UN Security Council agreed to its admission, with West Germany, to the UN (Sodaro
1991, 252).
The brief period of US unipolar dominance at the end of the Cold War provided it with the
capabilities to suppress pan-Serb irredentist collective attitudes in Yugoslavia. Ideally, the entire
international community would have exhibited the level of intensity of interest necessary to
intervene before the conflict escalated to civil war. The media-relayed suffering amidst the war,
and the respective domestic political reactions of NATO members to it, itself helped instigate an
33
escalation of concern in the conflict. Once large-scale fighting broke out, the respective political
capabilities of the warring communal parties to accept a compromise short of complete
separation rapidly evaporated (Hayden 2011). The Vance-Owen plan for politically restructuring
Bosnia and Herzegovina was an effort to create a new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia
short of communal separation. At that point, however, even Slobodan Milosevic lacked the
political capability to enforce Belgrades will to make the Bosnian Serbs accept the plan (Sell
1999). The resolution of the Bosnian War then became tragically predictable: separation of
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks as a result of mass refugee fear of genocide amidst military
operations. The 1995 Dayton Accords maintained the legal fiction of the sovereign Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while violent population shifts functionally reinforced uti possidetis
juris.
Figure 5: Yugoslavia, 1992

Source: www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg
Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, University of Texas at Austin
The Serbs were condemned for challenging NATO aims to limit the accommodation to
nationalism with the lowest cost approach for NATO. NATO collectively and unintentionally
chose to default to the recognition of the old internal Yugoslav republic borders as the new
34
international borders. Another strategic option was to attempt to unravel the authoritarian Titoist
constitutional formula for Communist Yugoslav stabilization. This formula included internal
boundaries that intentionally politically weakened a numerically predominant Serb nation. The
Tito regime altered this formula over the years to accommodate moderate national selfdetermination aspirations while lessening reliance on centralized authoritarian control. This
accommodation included autonomous province status for Kosovo and republic status for Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Following Titos death, latent Serb national resentment over its internal
partition achieved expression in the 1986 Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and
Sciences (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences 1986). Calling for the restructuring of the
Yugoslav state, it was initially condemned by leading Communist figures. Some later exploited
this intensifying, heretofore suppressed, public sentiment that burgeoned in the midst of the
intensifying economic and political crises of Communist Yugoslavia. Competitive political
dynamics within liberalizing, multinational Yugoslavia meant that respective political
entrepreneurs could, would, and did exploit public nationalist sentiments. These latent and now
salient nationalist predispositions intensified in reaction to the perceived challenge of conflicting
nationalist claims among the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia. Public discourse exploited
historical communal recollections of genocidal victimizations. Within Serbia, liberal reformers
were soon marginalized. If Slobodan Milosevic had not exploited irredentist Serb nationalist
predispositions to rise to predominance, someone else surely would have, in or outside of the
Communist party.
The US added Milosevics Serbia to the rogue state category because Serb nationalism was
most disruptive to the low cost republic stabilization strategy to which the US had defaulted.
Some observers inferred that Belgrade received tacit approval from the US administration
forcefully to prevent Slovenian and Croatian secession in 1991 (Touval 1996). The intent would
have been to avoid prolonged, full-scale violent disintegration of the country. Given that the
Yugoslav military leadership did not have the will to carry out such a policy, recognizing the
republics as sovereign entities became the default formula. It also accommodated German and
Italian sympathy for the demands of the Croats and Slovenes to escape from domination by
Belgrade. Germany had just reunified. German nationalist sentiment mobilized to come to the
support of the self-determination demands of the Catholic Croats and Slovenes (Thomas 1997).
The German government insisted that it would recognize the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, despite insufficient preparation for the political consequences (Dorff 1998). London and
Paris wanted recognition as a lever to incentivize the Yugoslav republics to come to an
agreement on a post-Yugoslav order in the western Balkans. This post-Yugoslav arrangement
was to include guarantees for the protection of the national minorities distributed across the
Titoist internal Yugoslav republic boundaries. As noted, the Serb ethnos, constituting a large
plurality of the total Yugoslav population, had been targeted for counterbalancing by the Titoist
constitutional stabilization formula. Recognition without such an agreement would lead to
unilateral actions by the ex-Yugoslav republics, resulting in an intensification of the violence
already occurring. Along with moving these issues to be resolved by deadly force, it encouraged
Zagreb and Belgrade to proceed with aspirations for their partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Banac 2009).
The frustration of pan-Serb irredentism, and also of Croat irredentism towards Herzegovina,
was institutionalized in the Dayton Accords. The unaddressed national self-determination
aspirations of Kosovar Albanians focused on escape from permanent, despised minority status
under Belgrades control. These aspirations received inadvertent international encouragement.
This encouragement came from the NATO major powers that Serb irredentism had alienated by
pursuing radical changes in the seceding republic borders. Orthodox Serbia had become a rogue
state, and Belgrades enemy, the Kosovo Liberation Army, therefore, became an ally of the West.
This support would be activated in NATO Operation Allied Force in response to publicized
atrocities as Serb internal security forces suppressed Kosovar self-determination actions.
35
With post-Soviet Russia being weak in the years immediately following the USSRs
disintegration, the Serbs received inadequate aid from their traditional Orthodox Slav ally. Yet,
conflicting respective Great Power partisanship on behalf of Kosovar Albanian and Serbian
nationalism risked escalating a war crisis to even higher levels. Russian peacekeeping forces
rushed from neighboring Bosnia to Prishtina in 1999 at the chaotic end of the NATO air war
campaign to force the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. Had British General Sir Michael Jackson
obeyed NATO US commander General Wesley Clarks orders to intercept and stop them, the
world may be a very different place than it is. Jackson personally refused NATO commander US
General Wesley Clarks order to intercept militarily a Russian force moving into Prishtina airport
from Bosnia. Jackson stated at one point, Sir, Im not going to start World War Three for you
(Jackson 2007, para. 39). The Balkans have not yet again triggered a severe Great Power conflict,
but it might well have done so.
With the 1995 Dayton Agreement, the US administration accepted the principle of no
additional border changes in Yugoslavia, to the consternation of the Kosovar Albanians
(Koestler-Grack 2007). The US government reiterated its later preference that Montenegro not
leave the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Husarska 1999). It nevertheless did secede and
was duly recognized. The US government formally opposed Kosovos secession from Serbia
until negative political trends there under the status quo became unacceptable. US recognition
ran counter to the wishes of Russia and China, as well as several EU states. These states include
Spain with its own discontented national minorities. In doing so, it implicitly continued its policy
of placing most of the blame for the continuing crisis in the Balkans on pan-Serbian irredentist
nationalism. The Kosovo Serbs remain unwilling to accommodate to their minority position in a
restructured constitutional order. Meanwhile, Russia, recovering from its immediate post-Cold
War prostration, has signaled its continuing interest in cooperating with Serbia.
The US declared its recognition of the sovereignty of Kosovo after more than eight years of
the de facto separation of the former Yugoslav province (not republic) from Serbia. The US
justification emphasized the actual reality created by years of separation from Serbia. This
justification has not pacified the remnants of the Serb minority in Kosovo. It has left Kosovo a
divided, unstable society in international limbo, unattractive to foreign investors. Poverty and
European lifestyle aspirations have resulted in the unresolved Kosovo crisis becoming another
source of refugees streaming into the European Union (Bytyci and Than 2015). Uti possidetis
juris has not only not resolved conflicts peacefully, but it rather has contributed to their
prolongation (Owen 2001). It has served as a momentarily convenient Great Power default
political option to accommodate demands for change. This dilemma derives from the fact that
these borders were originally drawn for political purposes taking precedence over national selfdetermination. They were even drawn originally to help stymie movements for national selfdetermination.
The Ukrainian case illustrates the essentially ad hoc soft and hard power state responses to
the competing actions of local nationalist public contestants. These escalating conflicts are over
borders that the latter did not draw. The African precedent does not appropriately apply to
Eastern Europe. The latter regional actors are too interested and too powerful to maintain the
international status quo. While the US and its allies placed sanctions on Russia for retaking
Crimea (Figure 4), the likelihood that the Euro-Atlantic community will cause Russia to return it
to Ukraine appears improbable. The international community will likely, therefore, acquiesce and
eventually accommodate to annexation of Crimea. Indeed, cooperation with Russia on Syria,
Iraq, Iran, and a range of other issues continues to create bargaining leverage for this
accommodation. The rest of the world witnesses this acquiescence, and notes the role of power in
determining what is legal and illegal regarding international law, including border changes. Great
Powers by definition set their own foreign policy objectives. Lesser powers, however, can make
themselves useful to Great Power patrons to increase their own power capabilities in the form of
bargaining leverage. A result is more exploitation of opportunities and ad hoc Great Power
36
responses that can produce significant potential for violent escalation as per the 1999 Kosovo
case.
Analysis
In-group/Out-group Political Psychology and Post-Cold War Strategy
Collective image simplifications of policy targets and adversaries come to predominate in the
midst of these ad hoc crises responses. An international crisis is defined as a discreet political
episode focusing on making a policy decision. High values perceived to be at stake, together with
perceived imminent time deadlines and awareness of incomplete vital information, describe an
international crisis. Simplified images of policy targets come to characterize the decision making
environment of a state, particularly of a nation state, in such environments (Druckman 2001). As
described below, these image simplifications demonstrate regular patterns in terms of their
perceived characteristics of the policy targets. On the basis of these perceived features, policy
preferences are selected. Stereotypical perceptions by definition denigrate the political
complexity in a targets foreign policy making process. Consequently, policies adopted towards
the target are more likely not to produce the expected policy responses. They risk contributing to
a loss of control over the crisis dynamics and consequent escalation.
In the Ukraine case, Moscows nuclear capabilities stymied Western policy approaches that
would have conformed with the rogue stereotype, i.e., prevented pigeonholing Russia essentially
as a lesser actor reprobate detritus of the Cold War. Yet, analogies in public discourse were still,
not surprisingly, sought in the case of rogue Yugoslavia. Putin was likened to Milosevic (e.g.,
Pejic 2014). He has been described by various commentators as a thug (e.g., Friedman 2015,
2014), ruling over a gangster-type regime in Moscow (e.g., Roxbury 2011; Birrell 2015).
Nevertheless, the Russian government continues to be an interlocutor for Washington. Scholarly
analyses highlight how the Putin regime is significantly symptomatic of broader, populist, and
xenophobic political trends in the West-centered global order that have parallels, for example, in
the Berlusconi phenomenon in Italy (Rigi 2012) (Comparisons with the US Donald Trump
phenomenon are noteworthy for future analyses). Of course, the reality of Russias vastly greater
power capability requiring a different policy approach to Russia in comparison with roguetypecast Serbia is not surprising.
A conceptualization of nationalism is necessary to facilitate a more effective strategic
response to nationalist challenges to the status quo. A conceptualization that emphasizes a
political strategic perspective would recognize national self-determination as a primary intensity
motivation for mass political participation. Its emergence, as well as its relevant political
capabilities and limitations, should be conceptualized. In this regard, it shares qualities of being
difficult, if not impossible to control, comparable in a parallel sense to the autonomy of market
forces. Market forces are influenced with difficulty and can destabilize a regime. So nationalism
can, under the right conditions, strongly affect the policy option range that is available to a
government. Successful appeals to nationalistic predispositions of a community can compensate
for the inefficacy of economic policy in generating adequate domestic political support. It can
also limit the options available to the decision makers in a government. If a government leader
adopts policies that appear to violate the sovereignty of the nation in the modal view of the
public, it can spell the death knell for that government leader. That leader will therefore risk, in
turn, being replaced by a new leader who will redress the political trespass of the previous,
displaced authority.
If the intent was to reestablish stability, uti possidetis juris may have contributed, but only as
a hiatus. These postcolonial states have themselves came under serious challenge in newly
independent states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Kosovo, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine,
and elsewhere. The international communitys response has been ad hoc. As such, it has been
37
more prone to generate international crises with roots in mutual Great Power suspicion. This
suspicion and competition exacerbates the local animosities that contribute to this continuing,
irresistible force that continues to change the international status quo.
Comparative Prevailing US Perceptions in the Yugoslavia and Ukraine Crises

The global response to the first Yugoslav and Iraq crises established the blueprint for post-Cold
War US grand strategy. The formula for confronting world crises had crystallized: it consisted
of a strongly assertive US leadership, a willingness on the part of the European Cold War allies
of the United States to grant their support, an acquiescence in this leadership by Russia and
China, and an acquiescence in a subordinate support role from the United Nations and other
international institutions (Cottam and Cottam 2001, 248). The prevailing mutual images that
Moscow and Washington in particular have of each other reflect this formula. The formula has
not remained politically fixed, as the competitive interference of the Euro-Atlantic community
and Russia in internal Ukrainian politics illustrates. Explaining this instability in terms of its
assumptions forming prevailing images includes the relatively more intense predisposition of
nation states like the US and Russia to stereotype (Druckman 1994). Individual members of
nationalistic in-groups are prone to display biases in perception of self and other due to more
intense entitativity, i.e., in-group shared self-identification (Sacchi, Castano, and Brauer 2009,
332930). Cottam and Cottams theory of nationalism identifies patterns in image perception
towards perceived sources of challenge to the national in-group. These systematic stereotype
simplifications in perception shape policy decision-making (see Table 1). The ideal-typical rogue
stereotype is the particular focus here.
Table 1: Image Attributes of a Perceived Source of Challenge (i.e., Threat or Opportunity)
Image/Stereotype
Capability
(as
perceived)
Enemy
Barbarian
Imperial
Colonial
Degenerate
Equal
Superior
Superior
Inferior
Superior or
equal
Inferior
Equal
Rogue
Ally
Culture (as
perceived; today,
tends to be equated
with perceived
technological
proficiency)
Equal
Inferior
Superior
Inferior
Weak-willed
Intentions
(as
perceived)
Decision
Makers
(as perceived)
Threat/
Opportunity
(as
perceived)
Harmful
Harmful
Harmful
Benign
Harmful
Threat
Threat
Threat
Opportunity
Opportunity
Inferior
Equal
Harmful
Good
Small elite
Small elite
A few groups
Small elite
Confused,
differentiated
Small elite
Many groups
Source: Data adapted from Cottam and Cottam 2001, 98 (emphasis DeDominicis).
Threat
Threat
These perceptual stereotypes associate with psychological behavioral pattern predispositions

that, in turn, become the basis for derivate group behavior orientations by the perceiver as
outlined below in Table 2.
38
Table 2: Images and Policy Predispositions
Image of
perceived
challenger
Enemy
Barbarian
General Policy Predispositions

towards perceived challenger
Policy Predispositions towards perceived

challenger in intense conflicts
Wary suspicion, containment

Fear, form alliances
Imperial
When domination is stable: fear,

avoid conflict, submit
Paternalistic policy guidance
and direction
Contempt, mobilize for
competition
Derogate, isolate
Hostility, defense
Preemptive strikes, precipitate alliance
intervention (potential for genocide)
When conflict is unstable: anger, shame, struggle
for liberation
Most commonly nonviolent repression
Colonial
Degenerate
Rogue
Disgust, offensive aggression

Hostility, violent repression (potential for
genocide)
Source: Data Adapted from Cottam and Cottam 2001, 121 (emphasis DeDominicis)
The stereotypical image which the US had of Serbia corresponded to the image which the
West has of weaker challengers in general to the post-Cold War new world order: rogue. The
rogue actor is a threat, while perceived as having inferior culture and capability. For example,
Anthony Lake, as national security adviser in the Clinton administration, wrote the following:
Our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to
remain outside the family [of nations] but also assault its basic values. There are few
backlash states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. For now they lack the
resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten the
democratic order being created around them. Nevertheless, their behavior is often
aggressive and defiant.These backlash states have some common characteristics.
Ruled by cliques that control power through coercion.These nations exhibit a chronic
inability to engage constructively with the outside world, and they do not function
effectively in alliances.Finally, they share a siege mentality. Accordingly, they are
embarked on ambitious and costly military programs. (Lake 1994, 456)
One analogous, personalization label for this ideal typical stereotype might be gangster or
thug. Another individual analog would be the violent criminal identified as a threat to the society.
The violent criminal/rogue threatens the civilized, established order. The violent criminal must
be eliminated as an actor in the (global, American-led) community. Adapting from Cottam
(1977), its key perceptual elements upon which US decision makers based their foreign policy
towards Milosevics Serbia were the following:
Motivation of target: simplepersonal power of ruler (Milosevic) and his clique
Decisional locus of policy making process of target: monolithic (Milosevics personal
preferences immediately translated into Belgrade government policy)
Decisional style of policy making process of target: criminally corrupt and cynically
rational
Capability of target: derived from the benevolent hegemons commitment to
transnational ethical policy norms of behavior.
Those compatriots of the foreign policy making process participant who disagree with
the above portrayal of the target?: irresponsible isolationists, shirking responsibility for
leadership in order to maintain world stability and peace. (65)
Rhetorical references to the elements of this stereotype are evident in some Western media
portrayals of the Putin regime. One theme is that it relies upon a formula of coercion, bribery,
39
and brainwashing to mobilize and maintain support among a comparatively primitive Russian
public (Smyth and Soboleva 2014).
One may indeed assume that Milosevics own internal personal power drive was his
overwhelming policy motivation. The inference, however, that Milosevics personal preferences
equated with Serbian foreign policy behavior was an oversimplification. This personal
determinism in analysis is a manifestation of stereotyping of the Serbian polity as rogue. In
reality, Milosevic was in political competition with other actors whom he had to outmaneuver
because they would not submit to his preferences. Silber and Little (1996) describe the weight of
devastating international economic sanctions creating a crisis environment in Belgrade. An
almost desperate Milosevic failed to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 1993 UNEU/Vance-Owen plan to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite his intense
pressure. To stay in power, Milosevic reacted to and reconciled conflicting, immediate
international and domestic crisis pressures in a turbulent, national crisis context (Silber and Little
1996). Similarly, the US-led UN instituted a sanctions regime against Saddam Husseins Iraq in
1990, an embargo that contributed to a humanitarian tragedy (BBC 2000). In response to the
September 11, 2001 attacks, the US acted in accordance with the rogue image to occupy Iraq to
make it an exemplar of democratic nation building.
The ideal type rogue stereotype contrasts with perceiving complexity in the politics of the
foreign policy making process of a target state. According to Richard W. Cottam, the key
perceptual elements of the initiator perceiving a complex political image of the target are the
following:
Motivation of the target: state motivation is described, rather than simply judged (for
example, as evil or good) and is seen as consisting of a number of major elements which can be
reconciled in policy terms only with great difficulty.
Decisional locus of the target: the decisional structure consists of a large number of
functional organizations with coordination and some policy leadership from above.
Decisional style of the target: the decisional style is incremental and decision makers will be
aware at best only partially of major systemic policy patterns.
Capability of the target: external power and influence capability is seen in terms of a nonjudgmental assessment of a full range of hard and soft power capability factors, including the
extent of nationalistic domestic public opinion sentiment.
Those compatriots who disagree with the above portrayal of the target: disagreements
within the citizenry regarding the particulars of the image of another state will be accepted as
inevitable, but individuals advancing a near-stereotypical view of that state will be suspected of
demagoguery (1994). The prevailing view of NATO in terms of actual thrust of foreign policy
thrust towards Serbia in 19922000 was the following:
Rogue------|--------------------------Complex
Western policy action in conformity with the rogue stereotyping of Russia is less pervasive
in regard to Putins Russia but it is still present (Logiurato 2014). Prevailing view of NATO in
terms of actual foreign policy thrust towards Russia in 2014:
Rogue---------------------------|-----Complex
The above estimation of actual policy choices contrasts with some samples of public
rhetoric, which often correspond more closely with the rogue stereotype. It reflects the impact of
elite awareness of Russias much greater bargaining leverage, including its vast nuclear arsenal.
40
Other sources of leverage include the importance of Russias cooperation for continued
subordination of Iran and North Korea as well as Russias economic importance. Russian
diplomats apply this leverage in articulating Moscows communal-national irredentist exigencies
regarding Ukraine. Moreover, the very high approval ratings for Vladimir Putin are regularly
reported in the Western media (Pew Research 2014). These ratings are often qualified by
emphasizing the encroaching state control upon the Russian media (Editorial Board 2014). As
evidence of perceptual complexity, note the Western reporting that Putin was actually
constrained in his decisional latitude by the need to maintain a coalition of core supporters.
Including militant Russian nationalists as well as the liberal business community, their allegiance
to Putin is vulnerable (e.g., Barry 2014; MacFarquhar 2014). Bloomberg reported, for example,
on March 3, 2014 that for Russians, Crimeas Sevastopol holds for them a similar nationalist
emotive symbolic role as the Alamo does for Americans (Cook 2014).
For Serbs, Kosovos romantic nationalist symbolic importance as the portrayed cradle of
Serb civilization is a continual theme (Erjavec and Volcic 2009). Serbias inferior power
capabilities did not necessitate Western acquiescence to this argument. In fact, NATO demanded
unrestricted access to all of Yugoslav territory in the draft Rambouillet agreement that Belgrade
rejected, leading to Operation Allied Force (Hudson 2009). Failure to see nationalist public
opinion as an autonomous, constraining factor on the policy option range of the leadership is a
significant indicator of stereotyping.
A serious miscalculation apparently occurred in US policy making circles regarding the
probable Serb reaction to bombing of Serbian military facilities in response to events in Kosovo.
American policy makers searched for a politically feasible policy answer to the
humanitarian/political crisis with the increasing violence in Kosovo beginning in fall 1998 and
spring 1999. Media reports following the start of the bombing campaign stated that the
subsequent ferocity of the Serb response to NATO attack was a scenario that US decision makers
evidently discounted (Harris 1999).
Apparent inconsistencies appeared in Western media reports between explanations for Serb
actions in Kosovo and reports of consequent events. They indicate the invalidity of the
assumption that the actions in Kosovo derived from the ambitions of one man, Milosevic. A sign
of the political chaos in Yugoslavia was evident in the erratic closing of the border by Serb
authorities to prevent Kosovo refugees from leaving (International Herald Tribune 1999). Yet,
NATO decision makers stated that they underestimated the alleged ambition of Milosevic to
depopulate Kosovo of 1.6 million Albanians (Gellman 1999). Later reports revealed that public
accounts of a secret Serb government plan of systematic ethnic Albanian population expulsion
from Kosovo were self-servingly inaccurate (Goetz and Walker 2000).
Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution in March 1999 outlined the justification for NATO
Operation Allied Force to remove Serb security forces from Kosovo. (Daalder would become US
ambassador to NATO in 2009). Allied Force was launched without a final Chapter VII UN
Security Council resolution authorizing use of force (Daalder 1999). Prior to Allied Force,
France had advocated requiring UN Security Council approval for NATO use of deadly force
outside of its founding mandate for collective self-defense (Daalder 1999). NATO and Russian
forces could readily have come into direct military confrontation during the operational chaos.
The rogue/gangster/thug/criminal stereotype for this regional actor is derivative of the
American prevailing view of the international environment and its consequent strategy. The
rogue image emerges to support a reactive policy against a source of threat from an actor with a
perceived inferior capability and a marginally inferior level of cultural development. The
superiority of US economic-technological capacity, which US military capabilities demonstrate,
reaffirms this perception of cultural distance inherent in the stereotype, e.g. shock and awe in
Iraq (CNN 2003).
In Europe, the threat was to US regional objectives in the 1990s: the credibility of the
North Atlantic Alliance (Roberts 1999, 1089). Burg and Shoup (1999) note that European
41
forces composed UNPROFOR in Bosnia. These forces were consequently at risk while the US
initially baulked at military intervention. Failure to assist the European military deployment
risked raising doubts about the credibility of the North Atlantic alliance if the US failed to
support its alliance partners in the crisis (Burg and Shoup 1999, 290). This credibility would
promote the cohesion and expansion of the North Atlantic alliance while demonstrating the
continuing utility of these large Cold War era military capabilities.
The policies of the West towards Ukraine under President Yanukovych corresponded to the
rogue image as a proxy for Russia. His removal opened opportunities for expansion of North
Atlantic influence into the region. Putins response, including his reference to Russias nuclear
weapons arsenal, generated a reaction in EU capitals that differentiates the EU from the US
(Marcus 2014). EU perceptions appear to be more in accordance with a greater degree of
perception of complexity in the motivations for Russian behavior, including populist discontent.
It has manifested itself in greater EU hesitancy to exploit opportunities for expansion of Western
influence in Ukraine (Pilkington and Harding 2014). Former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt
blamed the trigger for the crisis on the megalomania of EU bureaucrats with the conflict
comparable to the lead up to World War I (The Local 2014).
Conditions characterizing the structure of Western negotiations with Russia are therefore
characterized by less stereotyping. The obvious and vastly greater power capabilities of Russia
require that Western prevailing views of Russia accommodate complexity in perception of
Russian motivation. Aside from the danger of nuclear-armed Russian regime instability, Russian
power capabilities can pose serious obstacles for US policy aims towards lesser rogue states. An
intensification of Russian hostility may undercut future international economic sanctions against
Iran regarding its nuclear program (ITAR-TASS 2014). A more assertive Russia may also
strengthen North Korean bargaining leverage in negotiations with the US and its East Asian
allies (Kim 2015).
Conclusion
The Cold War established patterns of international relations that continue to reverberate a
generation after one of the Cold War superpower adversaries formally disappeared (Kroes
2014). The vast array of economic and political vested interests in Cold War strategic
containment that emerged over decades continue to shape prevailing perceptions in Moscow and
Washington. These actors compete for influence today in Ukraine and elsewhere (Weir 2015).
Nationalism is a challenge to current trends in the development of the European Unions
Common Security and Defense Policy as an instrument of the European Security Strategy. In
Eastern Europe, irredentist tendencies among bordering national minority components to join
adjacent, titular national homeland states are strong. In Yugoslavia, Western strategy focused on
a low-cost effort to stabilize the regional situation by reinforcing existing republic boundaries
that were delineated to divide national groups.
According to one graduate textbook, the European Union was a reaction to the Second
World War to maintain peace. Towards this end, the economic recovery of Germany became a
cornerstone for broader west European recovery. The pursuit of peace and economic
reconstruction, rather than as contradictory, came to be viewed as mutually reinforcing. The
vehicle to make it so was to be European integration (Cini and Borragan 2013). Its success,
according to another graduate textbook, is evident in that war between Germany and France, or
France and the United Kingdom, is inconceivable (Barash and Webel 2013, 192). Yet war in
Europe has recurred, both in Yugoslavia and today in Ukraine. A major test for European
integration in the post-Cold War era is in managing critical political trends involving Russia. A
vital issue in managing these trends, in turn, is the EU managing critical trends in its relations
with the United States. Russian perceptions and misperceptions of EU intentions and capabilities
derive significantly from Russian perceptions of EU relations with the US. This study argues that
the EU has fallen short in shaping Russian prevailing views insofar as the EU appears to be a
42
handmaiden of US post-Cold War grand strategy. One examination of EU international strategy

published just weeks before the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement crisis contains no discussion
of EU relations with Russia (Stokes and Whitman 2013). Previously, Moscow appeared to rely
primarily upon economic incentives to attempt to keep Ukraine in its orbit (RIA Novosti 2013).
The Russians resorted to use of force when the US and EU intervened in support of antiYanukovych demonstrators in Ukraine (Al-Jazeera 2014).
EU power centers France and Germany attempted to oppose American expansion into Iraq in
2003. The inefficacy of their opposition, as well as the costs of it, have contributed to French and
German retrenchments that today support US policy in the Middle East. It contributes to
prevailing Russian perceptions that Euro-Atlantic structures and policies support the
institutionalization of US post-Cold War global hegemony (Putin 2014). Its expansion is focused
on the former Soviet Union, as well as in the Middle East. It is a significant factor explaining
Russian belligerence in the current Ukraine crisis. A possible consequence is the spiraling
escalation of the conflict as each side reacts to the perceived expansionist intentions of the other.
While the international community appears to be de facto acquiescing to Russias partition of
Ukraine, crises in the Middle East may provoke conflicts that could escalate.
For the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy to be an effective peace strategy, the
development of its Common Security and Defense Policy component should differentiate itself
from the US. It should not be seen as an elaboration of the NATO alliance. Indeed, at the CSDPs
founding, the US administration had concerns that it would inhibit the US in the pursuit of its
policy aims via NATO (Albright 1998). US policy in the Middle East illustrates that US
unilateralism poses a challenge to EU foreign policy objectives against which the EU has
demonstrated little long-term autonomy (Simn 2013). Yet, immediately following the 2003
public dispute between Washington versus Berlin and Paris over the US-led invasion of Iraq, the
EU, and NATO formally agreed on EU use of NATO assets (European Union n.d.). The Berlin
Plus agreement highlights the political unwillingness of EU member states to risk US hostility to
EU security policy integration.
The prevailing view in Washington towards Russia appears to show tendencies
corresponding with the stereotype held of Milosevics Serbia. Powerful political incentives,
however, to perceive comparatively greater political complexity in the Russian foreign policy
making process exist. These include Russias nuclear arsenal and greater relative power resource
base, more generally. The US pressure on Russia so far avoids threat and use of force, while
exploiting the regimes perceived vulnerability from its economic dependency on oil and gas
exports. Russia, in turn, attempts to raise its bargaining leverage by heightening the danger that
an accidental incident could lead to a military escalation. Use of force against Russia, as applied
to Iraq and Serbia, is not an advertent policy choice, but the US in effect sees quarantine as a
viable route. According to the rogue stereotype, the Russian leadership thrives on corruption.
Suppression of illegal international economic activity becomes a new security focus in dealing
with rogues (Collier 2007). Emplacing and strengthening pro-Western state regimes becomes a
major focus of strategy. Economic sanctions are a preferred means for punishment of the
particularly powerful rogue state (de Jonge Oudraat 2007).
A Western debate exists over Russian motivations in the Ukrainian conflict. Some observers
portray the Putin regime as reacting to the West as an imperialist danger to Russian national
unity and autonomy (Yaffa 2014). They view Moscows motivation as defensive against what it
sees as an expansionist North Atlantic alliance, with the EU as the soft power face of NATO. The
unwillingness to compromise with Moscow on respective spheres of influence conforms to this
view. Others claim that Moscow is opportunistically pursuing national value-based irredentism
like the Milosevic government in Serbia (Phillips 2014). The Putin regime allegedly sees an
opportunity to dismember Ukraine to re-establish Russias first rank power international status
(Stephens 2015).
43
Labeling Milosevic a gangster or Putin as a thug is an immediate Western domestic

palliative (e.g., Farmer 2014). This rogue stereotype responds to Pro-Euro-Atlantic, Western
domestic political interest imperatives. A Pax Americana global strategy assumes less constraint
through collective security arrangements such as the UN Security Council. Consequent,
intensifying Great Power conflicts can encourage regional actors to seek these individual Great
Power alliances in Ukraine and elsewhere. Uti possidetis juris is at most an expedient concept
useful for decelerating inevitable crises that ultimately require close Great Power collaboration,
not only to resolve, but to manage them.
Acknowledgement
This article was produced through the support of the research fund of the Catholic University of
Korea. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful
critiques as well as Dominique Moore at Common Ground Publishing. The author would also
like to thank the students at the American University in Bulgaria and the Catholic University of
Korea, whom the author had the privilege to teach, for their insights and comments. Any errors
are solely the authors.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Prof. Benedict Edward DeDominicis: Associate Professor of Political Science, International
Studies Department, Catholic University of Korea, Bucheon, Gyeonggi-do, South Korea
48
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VOLUME 11

The International Journal of

Conceptualizing Causes and Consequences

BENEDICT EDWARD DEDOMINICIS

Gerassimos Kouzelis, University of Athens, Athens, Greece

Dominique Moore, Common Ground Publishing, USA

Patrick Baert, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

Articles published in The International Journal of Interdisciplinary

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences: Annual

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF

First published by Common Ground Publishing in 2016

ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING

KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP

Authors in The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences:

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences:

2016 (individual papers), the author(s)

HYBRID OPEN ACCESS

The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social Sciences:

Common Ground Publishing is a member of Crossref.

Conceptualizing Causes and Consequences of

or international relations scholars seeking to develop international conflict resolution

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

Uti Possidetis Juris

Figure 1: Latin America

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

Figure 3: Ethnic Groups vs. State Boundaries in Africa

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

Figure 4: Changing State Borders of Ukraine

Immediate Post-Cold War Great Power Responses to Nationalism

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

Figure 5: Yugoslavia, 1992

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

Comparative Prevailing US Perceptions in the Yugoslavia and Ukraine Crises

These perceptual stereotypes associate with psychological behavioral pattern predispositions

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

Table 2: Images and Policy Predispositions

General Policy Predispositions

Policy Predispositions towards perceived

Wary suspicion, containment

When domination is stable: fear,

Disgust, offensive aggression

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

handmaiden of US post-Cold War grand strategy. One examination of EU international strategy

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

Labeling Milosevic a gangster or Putin as a thug is an immediate Western domestic

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

DEDOMINICIS: CONSEQUENCES OF APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS JURIS IN EUROPE

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCES: ANNUAL REVIEW

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nine thematically focused journals also serve this

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