EVIDENCE 3C Case Digests (Reports)

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Evidence 3C 2015-2016
Atty. Quicho
QUALIFICATION
PEOPLE VS. ESTOYA Y MATEO
GR NO. 200531
5 DECEMBER 2012
(GONZALES AND RAMOS)
FACTS: The case stemmed from an Appeal filed by the accused-appellant Radby
Estoya y Mateo for the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan finding him guilty of raping
AAA, a 14 year old minor.
On April 5, 2006, around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, AAA was sleeping on her
aunts bed when she was awakened because someone was on top of her. When she
realized that it was appellant, she attempted to shout but her resistance was subdued
by his threat that he will stab her with a knife. She realized that appellant had undressed
her and suddenly felt appellants penis entering her vagina. Due to fear, the two (2)
nephews of AAA and her brother CCC, hurriedly ran out of the house to report AAAs
ordeal to DDD, a neighbor. After satisfying his lust, appellant ran away and climbed to
the roof of the house. However, he immediately returned to the room and taunted AAA
to report to the police if she can prove that rape was committed. Then appellant left.
Soon after, CCC and DDD arrived and saw AAA crying on the bed. DDD accompanied
AAA to the police station to report the incident and later, accompanied her to the doctor
for physical examination. The medical examination yielded the following result: a
shallow fresh laceration at 6:00 oclock position and clear evidence of penetrating
trauma to the hymen.
During the trial, the Prosecution presented as witnesses: 1.) AAA, the victim; 2.)
BBB, the Auntie; and 3.) CCC, the victims younger brother. They also presented as
documentary evidence the birth certificate of the victim showing she was a minor at the
time that the incident took place and the report made by Dr. Carpio during the physical
examination.
To refute the claim by the prosecution the defense questioned the
inconsistencies and ambiguities as to the statement made by CCC in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay whereby he claimed that he saw the victim naked while the accused while on
top of her and his statement during cross examination that he didnt see the accused at
the time the incident took place.
The RTC rendered its decision finding Estoya guilty of raping AAA. On appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the decision of the lower court was affirmed with
modification; hence, the petition.
ISSUE: WON the Court erred in admitting in evidence the testimony of CCC despite its
inconsistencies.
HELD: No. Said inconsistencies do not at all damage CCCs credibility as a witness. It
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is doctrinally settled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness

affidavit and testimony in open court do not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex
parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching
inquiries by the investigating officer. The Court also add that CCC was only 10 years of
age when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and testified in court. It is not difficult
to imagine that CCC was also overwhelmed by the circumstances, young as he was
when these all happened. The important thing is that CCC was consistent in saying that
he saw Estoya with AAA in BBBs house; he saw AAA crying; and he immediately ran to
ask help from their neighbor, DDD. Moreover, as we pronounced previously herein,
AAAs testimony alone already established the elements of rape committed against her
by Estoya. At most, CCCs testimony on the events that occurred on April 5, 2006 is
merely corroborative.
PEOPLE VS. GARCIA
GR NO. 200529
19 SEPT. 2012
(TAMAYO)
NORTHWEST AIRLINES VS. CHIONG

543 SCRA 308
(DELA PENA)
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308
which affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision holding petitioner
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Northwest) liable for breach of contract of carriage.
FACTS:
On March 14, 1989, Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare),
as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired
respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia at the
San Diego, California Port. Under the service crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed
compensation at a monthly salary of US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of
US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1989, Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL
Hutchins & Co., Inc., TransOcean's agent at the San Diego Port, confirming Chiong's
arrival thereat in time to board the M/V Elbia which was set to sail on April 1, 1989
(California, United States time). For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a
Northwest plane ticket for San Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989
from Manila. Ten (10) days before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire
family from Samar and brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.
On April 1, 1989, Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA), at about 6:30
a.m., three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's
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Liaison Officer, met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong's seaman service record book
for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong's passport was duly stamped, after complying with
government requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest
check-in counter. When it was Chiong's turn, the Northwest personnel informed him that
his name did not appear in the computer's list of confirmed departing passengers.
Chiong was then directed to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest's
counters from whom Chiong could allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong
approached the "man in barong" who demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefor.
Without the said amount, and anxious to board the plane, Chiong queued a number of
times at Northwest's Check-in Counter and presented his ticket. However, the
Northwest personnel at the counter told him to simply wait and that he was being a pest.
Frustrated, Chiong went to Calvo at the PCG counter and inquired if she had money so
he could obtain a boarding pass from the "man in barong." Calvo, who already saw that
something was amiss, insisted that Chiong's plane ticket was confirmed and as such, he
could check-in smoothly and board the plane without shelling out US$100.00 for a
boarding pass. Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24
bound for San Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia
by April 1, 1989 (California, U.S.A. time).
It appears that Chiong's name was crossed out and substituted with "W. Costine" in
Northwest's Air Passenger Manifest.
In a letter dated April 3, 1989, Chiong's counsel demanded as recompense: (1) the
amount equivalent to Chiong's salary under the latter's Crew Agreement with
TransOcean; (2) P15,000.00 for Chiong's expenses in fetching and bringing his family
from Samar to Manila; (3) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) P500,000.00 as
legal fees.
Northwest demurred. Thus, on May 24, 1989, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of
contract of carriage before the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
citing the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial
court denied the same.
NORTHWEST CONTENTION:
In its Answer, Northwest contradicted the claim that it breached its contract of carriage
with Chiong, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its
records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger for Northwest Flight No. 24 on April 1,
1989.
RTC ISSUE:
In the RTC's Pre-trial Order based on the parties' respective Pre-trial Briefs, the triable
issues were limited to the following:
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(a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether

[Chiong] "no-showed" for said flight.
(b) If defendant is found guilty of having breached its contract of carriage with plaintiff,
what damages are awardable to plaintiff and how much.
NORTHWEST:
In the course of proceedings, Northwest, on September 14, 1990, filed a separate
criminal complaint for False Testimony against Chiong based on the latter's testimony
that he did not leave the Philippines after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his
seaman service record book that he had left the country on April 17, 1989, and returned
on October 5 of the same year.
Chiong did not participate in the preliminary investigation; thus, on December 14, 1990,
the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information against Chiong with the RTC Manila,
Branch 54, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-89722.
RTC AND CA:
In the meantime, after a flurry of motions filed by Northwest in the civil case were denied
by the RTC, Northwest filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA imputing grave abuse
of discretion to the RTC. Correlatively, Northwest moved for a suspension of the
proceedings before the trial court. However, both the Petition for Certiorari and Motion
for Suspension of the proceedings were denied by the CA and RTC, respectively.
RTC RULING:
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision finding preponderance of evidence in favor of
Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of carriage. The RTC ruled
that the evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was
deliberately prevented from checking-in and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to
accommodate an American passenger by the name of W. Costine.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered, ordering the defendant liable to plaintiff in damages by reason
of the latter's inability to take defendant's NW Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, for the
following amounts:
1) U.S.$8,447.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of finality of this judgment with legal
interests until fully paid, representing compensatory damages due to plaintiff's loss of
income for one (1) year as a direct result of defendant's breach of contract of carriage;
2) P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing plaintiff's actual incurred damages as
a consequence of his failure to avail of defendant's Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989;
3) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing moral damages suffered and
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of defendant's breach of contract of carriage;
4) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, representing exemplary or punitive damages due
to plaintiff from defendant, owing to the latter's breach of contract of carriage with malice
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and fraud; and

5) P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, for and as attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
CA RULING:
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.
Identical to the RTC's findings, those of the CA were as follows: on April 1, 1989,
Chiong was at the MIA three hours before the 10:15 a.m. departure time for Northwest
Flight No. 24. Contrary to Northwest's claim that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger,
the CA likewise concluded, as the RTC did, that Chiong was not allowed to check-in
and was not issued a boarding pass at the Northwest check-in counter to accommodate
a certain W. Costine. As for Northwest's defense that Chiong had left the country after
April 1, 1989 and worked for M/V Elbia, the CA ruled that Northwest's failure to raise this
defense in its Answer or Motion to Dismiss is equivalent to a waiver thereof. The CA
declared that, in any event, Northwest failed to present any evidence to prove that
Chiong had worked under the original crew agreement.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES:
Northwest ascribes grievous errors to the CA when the appellate court ruled that:
(1) Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong who was present at
the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwest's Flight No. 24;
(2) As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to Chiong for compensatory,
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit; and
(3) Northwest's Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name
Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the
records.
(1) ISSUE: Northwest breached the contract of carriage with Chiong who was
present at the MIA on April 1, 1989 to board Northwest's Flight No. 24;
(1) HELD: The petition must fail.
We are in complete accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that Northwest
breached the contract of carriage with Chiong, and as such, he is entitled to
compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
NORTHWEST CONTENTION:
Northwest contends that Chiong, as a "no-show" passenger on April 1, 1989, already
defaulted in his obligation to abide by the terms and conditions of the contract of
carriage; and thus, Northwest could not have been in breach of its reciprocal obligation
to transport Chiong. In sum, Northwest insists that Chiong's testimony is a complete
fabrication, supposedly demonstrated by the following:
(1) Chiong's seaman service record book reflects that he left the Philippines after April
1, 1989, specifically on April 17, 1989, to board the M/V Elbia, and was discharged
therefrom upon his personal request;
(2) the Information filed against Chiong for False Testimony; and
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(3) the Flight Manifest and the Passenger Name Record both indicate that he was a
"no-show" passenger.
We are not convinced.
The records reveal that Chiong, as plaintiff in the trial court, satisfied the burden of proof
required in civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence.
Section 1 of Rule 133 provides:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number.
In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiong's evidence
consisted of:
1. A Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24,
2. Chiong's passport and seaman service record book duly stamped at the PCG
counter, and
3. The testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez, and Philippine Overseas
Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified the
signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiong's passport.
We have scoured the records, and found no reason to depart from the well-settled rule
that factual findings of the lower courts deserve the utmost respect and are not to be
disturbed on appeal.
1. Indeed, Chiong's Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989,
2. coupled with the PCG stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct
evidence that he was present at MIA on said date as he intended to fly to the
United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA personnel and officers,
the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed through the PCG
counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government
requirements for departing seafarers.
3. Calvo, Philimare's liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport,
corroborated Chiong's testimony on the latter's presence at the MIA and his
check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch. Calvo further testified that she
purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was able to board
the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare's liaison officer, to confirm with
their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and
commenced travel to the designated port where the vessel is docked. Thus, she
had observed that Chiong was unable to check-in and board Northwest Flight
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No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around by Northwest personnel.
It is of no moment that Chiong's witnesses who all corroborated his testimony on his
presence at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was
subsequently bumped-off are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an
interest in the outcome of this case.
We intoned in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, thus:
(T)his Court has repeatedly held that a witness' relationship to the victim does not
automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony. While this principle is often
applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same principle may apply in this case,
albeit civil in nature. If a witness' relationship with a party does not ipso facto render
him a biased witness in criminal cases where the quantum of evidence required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, there is no reason why the same principle should
not apply in civil cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of
evidence.
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish
the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG
counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he
presented his confirmed ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and
ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.
In stark contrast is Northwest's bare-faced claim that Chiong was a "no-show"
passenger, and was scheduled to leave the country only on April 17, 1989. As
previously discussed, the records belie this assertion. It is also noteworthy that
Northwest did not present any evidence to support its belated defense that Chiong
departed from the Philippines on April 17, 1989 to work as Third Engineer on board M/V
Elbia under the original crew agreement.
It is true that Chiong's passport and seaman service record book indicate that he had
left the country on April 17, 1989 and come back on October 5 of the same year.
However, this evidence fails to debunk the facts established to have transpired on April
1, 1989, more particularly, Chiong's presence at the airport and his subsequent
bumping-off by Northwest despite a confirmed ticket. Although initially, the burden of
proof was with Chiong to prove that there was a breach of contract of carriage, the
burden of evidence shifted to Northwest when Chiong adduced sufficient evidence to
prove the facts he had alleged. At that point, Northwest had the burden of going forward
to controvert Chiong's prima facie case. As the party asserting that Chiong was a "noshow" passenger, Northwest then had the burden of evidence to establish its claim.
Regrettably, Northwest failed to do so.
Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest, despite the declaration in
its Pre-Trial Brief, did not present as a witness their check-in agent on that contentious
date. This omission was detrimental to Northwest's case considering its claim that
Chiong did not check-in at their counters on said date. It simply insisted that Chiong was
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a "no- show" passenger and totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously,
showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiong's name, and the name W. Costine written
above it. The reason for the insertion, or for Chiong's allegedly being a "no-show"
passenger, is not even recorded on the remarks column of the Flight Manifest beside
the Passenger Name column. Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his
other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp on his passport and seaman service
record book, prevails over Northwest's evidence, particularly the Flight Manifest. Thus,
we are perplexed why, despite the evidence presented by Chiong, and the RTC's
specific order to Northwest's counsel to present the person(s) who prepared the Flight
Manifest and Passenger Name Record for a proper identification of, and to testify on,
those documents, Northwest still insisted on presenting Gonofredo Mendoza and
Amelia Meris who were, admittedly, not competent to testify thereon.
In its desperate attempt to evade liability for the breach, Northwest claims that Chiong
worked at M/V Elbia when he left the Philippines on April 17, 1989. The argument was
not only belatedly raised, as we have repeatedly stated, but is off-tangent.
On this point, we uphold the RTC's and CA's ruling that the failure of Northwest to raise
the foregoing defense in its Motion to Dismiss or Answer constituted a waiver thereof.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 8. Omnibus Motion. Subject to the provisions of section 1 of Rule 9, a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all
objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Moreover, Northwest paints a scenario that ostensibly transpired on a different date.
Even if Chiong left the Philippines on April 17, 1989, it would not necessarily prove that
Chiong was a "no-show" on April 1, 1989. Neither does it negate the already
established fact that Chiong had a confirmed ticket for April 1, 1989, and first passed
through the PCG counter without delay, then reached and was at the Northwest checkin counters on time for the scheduled flight.
Essentially, Northwest argues that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger on two (2)
separate occasions, March 28 and April 1, 1989 because he was actually scheduled to
depart for the US on April 17, 1989 as ostensibly evidenced by his passport and
seaman record book. Had this new matter alleged been proven by Northwest, it would
prevent or bar recovery by Chiong. Unfortunately, Northwest was unsuccessful in
proving not only the "no- show" claim, but that Chiong, likewise, worked under the
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original crew agreement.

LEGAL MAXIM: FALSUS IN UNO, FALSUS IN OMNIBUS
Northwest likewise insists now that there is a pending criminal case for False
Testimony against Chiong that a falsified part of Chiong's testimony would indicate
the falsity of his entire testimony, consistent with the "falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus" doctrine. Following Northwest's flawed logic, this would invariably lead to
the conclusion that the corroborating testimonies of Chiong's witnesses are also false.
The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a
positive rule of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can
be applied, the witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more
material points. The principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a
material point contrary to subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the
records show that Chiong's testimony did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred
on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even attempted to explain or impugn the
evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that his
passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.
As to the criminal case, it is well to note that there is no final determination, as yet, of
Chiong's guilt by the courts. But even if Chiong is adjudged guilty, it will have little effect
on the outcome of this case.
As we held in Leyson v. Lawa:
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in
truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its
isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the
facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered.
It must be stressed that facts imperfectly or erroneously stated in answer to one
question may be supplied or explained as qualified by his answer to other question.
The principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction.
The doctrine deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law,
and the same is not an inflexible one of universal application. The testimony of a
witness can be believed as to some facts and disbelieved as to others:
xxx xxx xxx
Professor Wigmore gives the following enlightening commentary:
It may be said, once for all, that the maxim is in itself worthless first, in point of
validity, because in one form it merely contains in loose fashion a kernel of truth
which no one needs to be told, and in the others, it is absolutely false as a maxim of
life; and secondly, in point of utility, because it merely tells the jury what they may do
in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore it is a superfluous
form of words. It is also in practice pernicious, first, because there is frequently a
misunderstanding of its proper force, and secondly, because it has become in the
hands of many counsel a mere instrument for obtaining new trials upon points wholly
unimportant in themselves.
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From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest

breached its contract of carriage with Chiong.
(2) ISSUE: As a result of the breach, Northwest is liable to Chiong for
compensatory, actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs
of suit
(2) HELD:
Time and again, we have declared that a contract of carriage, in this case, air transport,
is primarily intended to serve the traveling public and thus, imbued with public interest.
The law governing common carriers consequently imposes an exacting standard of
conduct. As the aggrieved party, Chiong only had to prove the existence of the contract
and the fact of its non-performance by Northwest, as carrier, in order to be awarded
compensatory and actual damages.
We reiterate that Northwest failed to prove its claim that Chiong worked on M/V Elbia
from April 17 to October 5, 1989 under the original crew agreement. Accordingly, we
affirm the lower court's finding on Chiong's entitlement to actual and compensatory
damages.
We, likewise, uphold the findings of both courts on Northwest's liability for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
MORAL DAMAGES:
Under Article 2220 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an award of moral damages, in
breaches of contract, is in order upon a showing that the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It means
breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the
nature of fraud. Bad faith is in essence a question of intention.
In the case at bench, the courts carefully examined the evidence as to the
conduct and outward acts of Northwest indicative of its inward motive. It is borne
out by the records that Chiong was given the run-around at the Northwest checkin counter, instructed to deal with a "man in barong" to obtain a boarding pass,
and eventually barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 to accommodate an
American, W. Costine, whose name was merely inserted in the Flight Manifest,
and did not even personally check-in at the counter.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES:
Under the foregoing circumstances, the award of exemplary damages is also correct
given the evidence that Northwest acted in an oppressive manner towards Chiong.
ATTORNEYS FEES:
As for the award of attorney's fees, while we recognize that it is sound policy not to set a
premium on the right to litigate, we sustain the lower courts' award thereof.
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Attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur

expenses to protect his interest, or where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
In the case at bench, Northwest deliberately breached its contract of carriage with
Chiong and then repeatedly refused to satisfy Chiong's valid, just and
demandable claim. This unjustified refusal constrained Chiong to not only lose
income under the crew agreement, but to further incur expenses and exert effort
for almost two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and vindicate his right.
Therefore, this Court deems it just and equitable to grant Chiong P200,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The award is reasonable in view of the time it has taken for this
case to be resolved.
(3) ISSUE: Northwest's Exhibits "2" and "3," the Flight Manifest and the
Passenger Name Record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be
excluded from the records.
(3) HELD:
Finally, the issue of the exclusion of Northwest's Exhibits "2" and "3" need not
detain us long.
Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay
evidence.
We quote with favor the CA's holding thereon, thus:
As a rule, "entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer,
by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty". [Rule 130, Section 43, Revised
Rules of Court]
Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it
is necessary that:
(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) the
entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty;
and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be
mere hearsay evidence.
While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually made
the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were making
the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the
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entries were regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench,
while MENDOZA was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal
knowledge of the entries in the manifest since he did not supervise the preparation
thereof. More importantly, no evidence was presented to prove that the employee who
made the entries was dead nor did the defendant- appellant set forth the circumstances
that would show the employee's inability to testify.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The ruling of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50308 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EXAMINATION
DELA PAZ VS. IAC
154 SCRA 65
(GRIMARES)
IMPEACHMENT
GAW VS. CHUA
551 SCRA 505
(PARUNGO)
The facts of the case are as follows:
Spouses Chua Chin (FATHER) and Chan Chi (MOTHER) were founders of three
business enterprises (1) Hagonoy Lumber (2) Columbia Wood (3) Capitol
Sawmill Corp. The father died and left his widow, and their 7 children. At the time
of his death, Hagonoy Lumber, the enterprise part of the dispute today, worth
P400k.
The 7 children are: Santos (A), Conception (B), Suy Ben (C), Chua Suy (D),
Chua Sioc (E) Chua Suy (F) Julita (G).
These surviving heirs executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and renunciation
of hereditary rights in favor of a co-heir, leaving E as the sole proprietor of
Hagonoy Lumber.
In 1986, sibling B and her husband Antonio Gaw, asked C to lend them 200k. B
and C agreed that the debt would be paid in 6 months with no interest, and C
delivered to them a check against his own personal funds from China Bank.
B and husband were not able to pay after 6 months even after demand. He sent
them a letter stating that he would be constrained to take legal action if they did
not pay. Complaint for sum of money. B and husband filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaim stating that the 200k was not a loan, but was instead
her share of the profits of the 3 business enterprises.
They then prayed that C give her 1/6 of her share in Hagonoy Lumber, now
under his name. C denied this, maintained that it was a loan and that he bought
Hagonoy Lumber from E in 1990 (or 4 years after the loan).
During trial, the spouses called C to testify as adverse witness, under sec. 10
rule 132. They took his testimony over the course of 11 hearings. Cross-
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examination (by Cs lawyer to C), C testified that (1) he became owner of

Hagonoy after buying it from E, (2) hagonoy was acquired by E through deed of
EP
RTC: In favor of C. Pay loan with interest from 1991 (institution of the complaint). Basis
is the personal check issued by C and not from the Hagonoy funds. And the fact that the
validity and due execution of (1) the deed of extrajudicial partition and (2) the deed of
sale were never impuned. B also judicially admitted her signature on the deed of EP.
CA: Affirmed. B and husband were doing fishing expedition with 11 hearings. Not
having acquired the information they desired, they cant disclaim the same. That the
testimony of B that the deed of EP was only a paper agreements was uncorroborated.
ISSUE: whether the CA erred in admitting the testimony of C under cross-examination.
HELD: No. Petition is without merit.
1. The delineation of a piece of evidence to one party or the other is only significant
where the burden of proof is placed on one party, and the evidence is delineated
to determine whether the quantum of evidence needed to discharge that burden
has been met. Due process dictates that the entirety of the evidence must be
considered by the tribunal, regardless of who actually presented it. And that the
entirety of the evidence must be accorded its apposite probative weight. The
testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case, and becomes weightier
when the calling party fails to impeach his testimony.
2. That the witness is an adverse party does not mean that his testimony will not
bind the calling party. The calling party may impeach the adverse witness in all
respects, as if he had been called by the adverse party. In other words, the
general rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness does not apply if that
witness is the adverse party. The phrase as if he had been called by the adverse
party points to sec. 11 of Rule 132 impeachment of adverse partys witness. All
this basically says the adverse party can, and should be, impeached. Otherwise,
his statement, being taken under oath, will be presumed truthful, as any other
testimony, and will bind the calling party.
3. B failed to discredit how C came into ownership of the Hagonoy Lumber Corp.
She insisted that the transfer to E was only temporary but was unable to
corroborate this by testimony of the other heirs. When the loan occurred, both B
and C had no more interest in the 3 business enterprises. C then, couldnt have
given her the 200k as part of the profits. Only in 1991 did C become the sole
proprietor of Hagonoy, and only in her answer in a suit for collection of money,
did B assert her right to a share in it.
4. Best evidence rule only applies when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry. In this case, having admitted the validity and due execution of
the documents, and the subject of inquiry not being the contents, but its
existence, the best evidence rule does not apply.
US VS. MANTE
14
Atty. Quicho
27 PHIL 134
(ESCALONA)
Facts:
In the early 1900s, election laws in force then made it a penal offense in the case of a
voter or elective officer to be delinquent in the payment of taxes. The sole fact of
delinquency does not of itself constitute the offense; there must be also be knowledge
of such delinquency.
Defendant Mante was a Municipal Councilman convicted of taking the oath of office and
discharging the duties thereof, knowing at the time that he was not qualified to hold
such and that he was delinquent in the payment of his taxes.
Prosecution presented 3 evidence against Mante
1. Mantes oath of office
2. A portion of the Minutes of a municipal council session where he took part therein
3. Mantes tax receipt showing he paid a 2 days after swearing the oath of office
and taking part in the Municipal council meeting
Mantes defense: He was honestly of the opinion and had good reason to believe that
he was not delinquent in the payment of his taxes.
Testimonial declarations of his sons: Defendant gave money to his two sons to pay his
taxes on a Friday morning. The elder son, the one in charge of paying, got drunk with a
friend and forgot to pay this but when he was asked by the younger son if it was paid,
he answered in the affirmative. So when Mante asked his younger son on the day he
was to take oath, if the tax had been paid, he answered yes and on the strength of that,
took his oath and discharged his duties on Saturday. On Sunday, he came to know that
it was not paid when his elder son returned the money and so Mante paid it immediately
on the next working day, Monday.
There are no inconsistencies in their testimony, their story is reasonable, and the sole
ground given by the trial court for refusing to credit their declarations in that they are all
related, and consequently interested in the acquittal of the defendant.
Issue: WON the testimonies of the sons can be admitted as evidence
Held: Yes
It is error to discredit the testimony of witnesses on the ground on interest alone. If the
testimony of an interested witness is reasonable and consistent and is not contradicted
by evidence from any reliable source, we see no reason, as a general rule, for not
accepting it. The frank confession of the defendant of his knowledge of the law making it
a criminal offense for a delinquent taxpayer to qualify for an elective office, and his
promptness in paying the tax on Monday, which was the first available opportunity for
doing so after his eldest son informed him that it had not been paid, indicate to us that
he did not take the oath of office knowing that his taxes were delinquent. Trial court did
not give due weight to the testimony for the defendant, and that such testimony rebuts
the inference that he took the oath of office knowing that his taxes were delinquent.
Defendant is acquitted
Refer to Rule 132 Sec 11, Impeachment of adverse partys witness.
US VS. BALUYOT
40 PHIL 385
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Atty. Quicho
(CHAN)
Facts: At the general election Conrado Lerma was elected Governor of Bataan one of
his competitors was Jose Baluyot who came out third in the race as a result a feeling of
personal rancor was developed on the mind of Baluyot against Conrado Lerma and
during the two years the accused became fully imbued that Lerma was persecuting him.
In 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted by the CFI of Manila for the offense of Estafa and
was still pending decision by the Judge who tried the case.
Upon organization of the National Guard Baluyot became captain, but because of the
accusation for estafa and the damage to his reputation he had been asked to resign as
captain of the National Guard he did not resign but was temporarily relieved from duty
pending investigation.
Jose Baluyot attributed all his misfortune to the machinations of Governor Lerma
which increased his feeling of enmity towards Governor Lerma. Baluyot left Manila and
went to Orion in the province of Bataan taking with him a revolver.
He went to Balanga, the capital of Bataan arriving at the recorder office where he
inquired for Governor Lerma. Baluyot was told that the Governor had not yet arrived, but
he was determined to wait at 11am the Governor Lerma arrived. Baluyot and Lerma
greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands. The governor called on
Baluyot to confer with him he hesitated because of another caller, but the Governor said
that Baluyot should go first.
Lerma and Baluyot remained alone for 3-4mins in the office. Governor Lerma did not
expect that the interview would be so long so he suspended the interview of Baluyot to
confer with Antonio Aranjuez and that they will continue later.
When Aranjuez came out Baluyot said it was now his turn. The evidence shows that
at the time Baluyot re-entered the office of the Governor Lerma certain words were
heard by Antonio Aranjuez, who merely heard the accused call out governor while
Gregorio De Guzman understood that Baluyot was asking for the Governors revolver.
Baluyot testified that reference to the revolver was intended to urge the Governor
Lerma to duel with him. There was a conversation between them which was unnatural
especially with the length of time spent in the office until the first shot was fired.
The lower court found out what really happened based on the testimony of a witness
in the recorder office is that the first shot was fired a few seconds after Baluyot re enter
the governors office and upon asking the Governor Lerma about his revolver and
knowing that he is unarmed, Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired at Lerma. The
second shot was made when the governor was fleeing the office at the right shoulder
blade. The Third shot was made when the Governor hid in the closet and shouting for
help he was shot at the head. Then Baluyot called on the Constabulary down below
threw his gun and surrendered without resistance.
CFI found Baluyot guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the decision of the CFI.
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Issue: WON the cross examination is admissible to impeach the witness.

Held: NO. the cross examinations is not admissible because there was no proper basis
laid in the cross-examination of the witnesses who had made those statements to justify
their productions with a view to the impeachment of the declarants.
PEOPLE VS. RELUCIO
86 SCRA 227
(SANTOS)
PEOPLE VS. LEE
GR. NO. 139070 29 MAY 2002
(YATCO AND DIMANLIG)
FACTS:
Herminia Marquez and her son, Joseph, were in the living room of their house
watching a basketball game on television when Herminia looked away from the game
and casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand holding a
gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accusedappellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph.
Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, appellant fired shots with his gun hitting Joseph's head. When no more
shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant flee towards
the direction of his house. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought
Joseph to the hospital where he later died. In the hospital, Herminia told the police
investigators that Noel Lee was the one who shot the victim. After which, she went to
the Police Headquarters were she gave her sworn statement. Herminia, thereafter, filed
a complaint for murder with Prosecutor, who dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence. On appeal, the Secretary of Justice overturned the decision of the prosecutor
and a resolution was issued for the information to be filed in court. In his defense, the
accused denies the claims against him, stating that he was in a drinking spree with his
neighbor and driver at the time of the incident. The RTC adjudged him guilty. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Herminias credibility as a witness may be impeached
HELD:
Herminias testimony was positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in the
narration of facts. Even if she was subjected to rigorous cross-examination and re-cross
examination, she stuck to her testimony. However, accused-appellant still argues that
there were inconsistencies in her testimony and that she cannot be a credible witness.
Accused-appellant contend that Hermininas affidavit and her testimony in open court
contained inconsistencies that should cause her credibility as a witness to be
impeached. However, she was able to establish in open court that she didnt see the
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hand holding a gun from the hole of window, instead she saw the hand holding a gun
from the open window. Between the affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open
court, any inconsistencies therein cannot discredit the witness because affidavits are
inferior to testimonies in open court as they are made ex parte and are usually
incomplete or inaccurate.
DOCUMENTS
BERNEJO VS. BARRIOS
31 SCRA 764
(CHAN AND SALAZAR)
In G.R. No. L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "doe" were charged in the
city court of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification of public or
official document in an information filed by the city fiscal. It was alleged in the
information that on or about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two
accused, being private individuals, conspired and confederated together and mutually
helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a document
consisting of an amended petition for habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and
Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents",
which petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe" placed her thumbmark over
the name "Jovita Carmorin", which petition was subscribed and sworn to by the two
accused before the Clerk of Court, and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669, thus the two accused stated and made it
appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita
Carmorin as one of the petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin
never signed and swore to it, because it was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who signed
and swore to that petition as Julia Carmorin.
In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico
Abela with perjury, on August 23, 1963, in the same city court of Roxas City (Criminal
Case No. 4452) for allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit ... that she
was really the one who signed with her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin ... the amended
petition for habeas corpus ... when in truth and in fact, as she very well knew, she had
not done such act of signing with her thumbmark said petition and it was another
person, who signed with a thumbmark said petition as Jovita Carmorin ... ." The city
fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in accordance
with law before filing the information.
On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had conducted the proper
preliminary investigation, respondent City Judge Barrios issued an order for the arrest of
accused Carmorin. After posting a bond, said accused, thru her counsel, Atty. Pedro M.
Bermejo (the same person accused in the falsification case), filed a motion to quash the
information, alleging substantially, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her
person because the warrant of arrest issued for her arrest was improvidently issued.
Issue: WON the defendant is guilty of falsification of public document
Held: The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U.S. v. Orera,6 a
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"document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which

something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In U.S. v. Asensi, this Court held that any
instrument authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with the
solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules
of Court,8 enumerates the following as public writings:
(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies
and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b)
Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.
The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and
papers, which were involved in civil actions and which were in custody of county clerk
as ex-oficio clerk of superior court in which action was pending, were 'public documents'
and were within scope of subject matter of statute making alteration of court records an
offense."9 Considering that the petition for habeas corpus (Special Proceedings No. V2669) alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one Soterania
Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed and sworn to before Clerk of Court
Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, forming,
therefore, a part of the court records in said proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said
petition is a public or official document as contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he committed no
crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived or conspired
with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying said petition by making it appear that Jovita
Carmorin placed her thumbmark therein when in fact she did not do so.
TAN SHUY VS. MANLAWIN
665 SCRA 604
8 FEBRUARY 2012
(DAVID AND BENEDICTO)
Facts: At the general election Conrado Lerma was elected Governor of Bataan one of
his competitors was Jose Baluyot who came out third in the race as a result a feeling of
personal rancor was developed on the mind of Baluyot against Conrado Lerma and
during the two years the accused became fully imbued that Lerma was persecuting him.
In 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted by the CFI of Manila for the offense of Estafa and
was still pending decision by the Judge who tried the case.
Upon organization of the National Guard Baluyot became captain, but because of the
accusation for estafa and the damage to his reputation he had been asked to resign as
captain of the National Guard he did not resign but was temporarily relieved from duty
pending investigation.
Jose Baluyot attributed all his misfortune to the machinations of Governor Lerma
which increased his feeling of enmity towards Governor Lerma. Baluyot left Manila and
went to Orion in the province of Bataan taking with him a revolver.
He went to Balanga, the capital of Bataan arriving at the recorder office where he
inquired for Governor Lerma. Baluyot was told that the Governor had not yet arrived, but
19
Atty. Quicho
he was determined to wait at 11am the Governor Lerma arrived. Baluyot and Lerma
greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands. The governor called on
Baluyot to confer with him he hesitated because of another caller, but the Governor said
that Baluyot should go first.
Lerma and Baluyot remained alone for 3-4mins in the office. Governor Lerma did not
expect that the interview would be so long so he suspended the interview of Baluyot to
confer with Antonio Aranjuez and that they will continue later.
When Aranjuez came out Baluyot said it was now his turn. The evidence shows that
at the time Baluyot re-entered the office of the Governor Lerma certain words were
heard by Antonio Aranjuez, who merely heard the accused call out governor while
Gregorio De Guzman understood that Baluyot was asking for the Governors revolver.
Baluyot testified that reference to the revolver was intended to urge the Governor
Lerma to duel with him. There was a conversation between them which was unnatural
especially with the length of time spent in the office until the first shot was fired.
The lower court found out what really happened based on the testimony of a witness
in the recorder office is that the first shot was fired a few seconds after Baluyot re enter
the governors office and upon asking the Governor Lerma about his revolver and
knowing that he is unarmed, Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired at Lerma. The
second shot was made when the governor was fleeing the office at the right shoulder
blade. The Third shot was made when the Governor hid in the closet and shouting for
help he was shot at the head. Then Baluyot called on the Constabulary down below
threw his gun and surrendered without resistance.
CFI found Baluyot guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the decision of the CFI.
Issue: WON the cross examination is admissible to impeach the witness.
Held: NO. the cross examinations is not admissible because there was no proper basis
laid in the cross-examination of the witnesses who had made those statements to justify
their productions with a view to the impeachment of the declarants.
PATULA VS. PEOPLE
669 SCRA 135
11 APRIL 2012
(ARCIAGA AND YABUT)
FACTS:
1. PATULA was charged with estafa:
a. Saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores,
b. Having collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers of said company under the express obligation to account for
the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company,
but far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of
time despite repeated demands therefore
c. Willfully fail to deliver the said collection to the company but instead
misappropriated the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to
the damage in P131,286.97.
2.
At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of
plea bargaining. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
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Atty. Quicho
3.
PROSECUTION WITNESSES:
a.
LAMBERTO GO (branch manager)-- accounting clerk discovered erasures on
some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an audit by company auditor
Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the customers
outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance appeared unpaid
in Footluckers records
b. KAREN GUIVENCAN (store auditor)--Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid
their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances
for them; she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the
receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing her audit,
she submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of Customers
Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as
per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that
based on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount
ofP131,286.92
4.
During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of
petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand their
derivatives, inclusive.
a.
Only 49 of theledgerswere formally offered and admitted by the RTC because the
50thledger could no longer be found.
b.
PATULAs counsel interposed a continuing objection on the ground that
the figures entered in Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives, inclusive, were
hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves
presented in court
c.
With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-examine Guivencan,
apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she thereby tended
to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
5.
PROSEC DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS
a.
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation
sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and
Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies
b.
Defense decided not to file a demurrer to evidence although it had manifested
the intention to do so, and instead rested its case.The Prosecution and Defense
submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case for decision
6.
RTC: inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to present evidence for her defense
the Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and uncontroverted
a.
PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
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ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of
the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her customers violated petitioners
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the
falsification of the duplicate receipts despite the information not alleging
the falsification
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts were admissible as evidence of
petitioners guilt for estafaas charged despite their not being duly
authenticated
4. Whether or not Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts to prove
petitioners misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being
hearsay.
PATULAN:
RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her
Charge against her is ESTAFA based on falsification is an offense not alleged or
included in the Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
Said judgment disregarded the rules on admission of evidence in that the
documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were all private
documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
accordance with SEC 20, RULE 132
HELD: Petition is meritorious.
1. Lack of their proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives inadmissible as judicial evidence
a.
SEC 19, RULE 132 distinguishes between a public document and a private
document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence
i.
SEC 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents
Private documents
The written official acts, or records of
All other writings
the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country
Documents acknowledged before a
notary public except last wills and
testaments
Public records, kept in the Philippines,
of private documents required by law to
be entered therein
By virtue of its official or sovereign character,
Any other writing, deed, or
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Atty. Quicho
or because it has been acknowledged before a

notary public (except a notarial will) or a
competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public
record of a private writing authorized by law, is
self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court
instrument executed by a private

person without the intervention of
a notary or other person legally
authorized
by
which
some
disposition or agreement is proved
or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign
character of a public document, or
the solemnities prescribed by law,
a private document requires
authentication in the manner
allowed by law or the Rules of
Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court
b. Requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in

four instances, specifically: (
i.
When the document is an ancient one within the context of SEC 21
ii.
When the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not
been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party
iii.
When thegenuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted
iv.
When the document is not being offered as genuine
c. Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private
or business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits
came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented
and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution
dutifully seeing to their authentication in SEC 20:
i.
Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either:
1. By anyone who saw the document executed or written
2. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
3. Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be.
d. Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts.
i.
Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner on the receipt
with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as Exhibit A,
while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-1)
immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a
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Atty. Quicho
mere machine ecopy, not the original.

ii.
Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originals of
the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that
promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution
offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receipts through a
different witness (though then still unnamed).
iii.
Effort to have Go authenticate both themachine copy of the receipt with
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that receipt
was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicably forgotten and was no
longer even included in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence.
e. It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96
No. 20441was subsequently presented as Exhibit B through
Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establish that the
signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go
had earlier sought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit
A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A).
i.
Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the
machine copy of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all
intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to refer
instead to an entirely different document entitled List of Customers covered by
ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March
16-20, 1997.
f. Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on 2 receipts based
alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of
Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the
documentary evidence against petitioner.
i.
Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either
because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her
testimony bear out
ii.
There are also similar impressions of lack of proper authentication

as to the ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the
discrepancies between the amounts petitioner had allegedly
received from the customers and the amounts she had actually
remitted to Footluckers. Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries
of the unauthenticated ledgers to support her audit report on
petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her
lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries
iii.
In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions

evidence, it should come as no surprise that petitioners counsel
interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC mysteriously overruled
the objections and allowed the Prosecutionto present the
24
Atty. Quicho
unauthenticated ledgers
1. RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering
to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as
with SEC 22, RULE 132,which contains instructions on
how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a
judicial proceeding, as follows:
a.
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a
person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may
also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
2.
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents, Prosecution surely did not authenticate
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules.
Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft
of probative value as evidence. That was the only fair and just result, as the Court
held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[
a.
Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the
delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the
received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by
other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no
probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
b. SEC 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed
it, the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, any person who was present and
saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it
and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had
previously confessed execution thereof. In this
case, respondent admits that King was none of
the aforementioned persons. She merely made
the summary of the weight of steel billets based
on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS
report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually
received had no proven real basis, and Kings
25
Atty. Quicho
testimony on this point could not be taken at face

value.
c. Under the rules on evidence, documents are either
public or private. Private documents are those that do
not fall under any of the enumerations in SEC 19,
Rule 132. SEC 20 provides that before any private
document is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who
saw the document executed or written, or by evidence
of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
d. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those
enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due
execution and authenticity need to be proved
before they can be admitted in evidence.
e.
With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel
billets imported, respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured
cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no
sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.
g. Flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive,
not merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse
partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right
or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue
the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
h. RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the
hearsay rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers were prepared in the
regular course of business. RTC applied SEC 43:
i.
SEC 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
ii.
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping manner of
justifying the application of SEC 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the
concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be
excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
1. Person who made the entry must be dead or unable to
testify
26
Atty. Quicho
2. Entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to

which they refer
3. Entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the
entries
4. Entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious
5. Entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of
business or duty
2.
Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge
must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence
adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the
crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the
guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to
prove her innocence. Hera cquittal should follow.
CELESTIAL VS. CELESTIAL

408 SCRA 291
(MARASIGAN AND BAVIERA)
FACTS:
At the core of this petition is the authenticity of a Deed of Sale allegedly executed by
Amado Celestial, husband of petitioner Florencia Celestial, in favor of his sister-in-law,
Editha G. Celestial, involving Lot No. 4112, Ts-217, covering an area of 466 square
meters situated at Dadiangas, General Santos City.
Amado is the brother of co-petitioner Gloria C. Agui and Erlindo Celestial, husband of
Editha. Prior to 1962, Amado while still single, applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent
over the 466 square meter lot. During the pendency of his application for a
miscellaneous sales patent, Amado got married to Florencia and they occupied the said
466-square meter lot.
On May 9, 1966, Amados application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent was granted,
resulting in the issuance in his name of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27090.
Although the title to the land was issued on May 25, 1966, Amados civil status was
designated as "single" on the title. Petitioner Florencia and her husband did not bother
to correct the said mistake in the civil status of Amado to avoid the paper work it would
entail.
On October 10, 1975, Amado allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to
Editha the 466 square meter lot for P20,000.00. The deed described Amado, the
vendor, as single when in fact he was already married to Florencia for 13 years at the
time of the sale. Likewise, petitioner Florencia did not affix her signature on the deed of
sale. Subsequently, the Register of Deed of General Santos City cancelled OCT No. P27090 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9145 in favor of Editha.
On March 21, 1976, Amado died.
27
Atty. Quicho
Editha caused the property covered by TCT No. 9145 to be subdivided into three (3)
lots. Thereafter, the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name
of Editha. On September 4, 1979, Erlindo and Editha executed a Deed of Sale of Three
Parcels of Land over the aforesaid subdivided lots in favor of respondent Chua. The
consideration of the contract was P110,000.00. Subsequently, on October 22, 1979,
respondent Chua was issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title.
After eleven years, or on February 15, 1990, respondent Chua notified the petitioners
and several other occupants of the subdivided lots to vacate the aforesaid properties
within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice. Subsequently, respondent Chua filed a
complaint for ejectment against the petitioners.
Believing that respondent Chua had no right to eject them from the properties they
occupied, petitioners, on February 23, 1990, filed a complaint against Editha and
respondent Chua before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City for "Judicial
Declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale Executed by the deceased Amado G.
Celestial in favor of Editha G. Celestial and likewise all deeds of Absolute Sale executed
by said Editha G. Celestial in favor of Prima B. Calingacion.
On March 3, 1994, while the case was still pending before the trial court, Editha
Celestial died and she was substituted by the named respondents below.
On April 27, 1995, a decision was rendered in favor of the petitioners, declaring the
"Deed of Absolute Sale" dated October 10, 1975 as inexistent and void from the
beginning for being a product of forgery.
Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a motion for new trial,
which was denied.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. A decision was rendered reversing the
aforesaid judgment of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is a nullity, based on the evidence presented.
HELD:
The Deed of Absolute Sale was a nullity.
1. Amados signature on the deed was a forgery.
(a) Contrary to the CAs finding, the trial court did not rule that Amados signature on
the deed was a forgery based only on the testimony of the NBI handwriting expert.
In fact, its ruling was based on the NBI handwriting expert testimony and its own
comparison between the eight sample signatures and the purported signature of Amado
on the deed of sale. The court derived its authority to determine the genuineness of the
handwriting from Sec. 22 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: The handwriting of a person
may be proved ... by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings ...
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
The eight handwriting samples were proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
28
Atty. Quicho
judge because despite having been made by Amado at different points in time, they
were practically identical.
Then, upon comparing these samples with Amados signature on the deed, it was very
clear that the latter was made by a different person. It was apparently so obvious that
even a layman could tell that the latter was a forgery.
At any rate, there would have been no error had the trial court relied on the testimony of
one witness alone, because (i) quality, not quantity of witnesses, is the important
consideration, and (ii) the trial court having opportunity to directly observe the demeanor
of witnesses while they testify, means that they are in the best position to determine the
credibility of these witnesses.
(b) Although it is conceded that the separation in time between the making of two
signatures is to be considered in determining genuineness, still, in this case, the stark
difference between the samples and the signature on the deed outweighs
considerations of remoteness in time.
(c) Since the signature of the supposed seller was a forgery, no title over the subject
property could have been conveyed to Editha through the deed of sale.
2. The deed of sale was defectively notarized.

(a) From Sec. 1(a) Public Act No. 2103 and Protacio v. Mendoza: It is necessary that
a party to any document notarized by a notary public appear in person before the latter
and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated in the document. Correspondingly,
the duty of the notary public is to determine that the person appearing before him to
attest as described, is the same person who executed the instrument presented to him.
In this case, the notary public admitted that instead of ascertaining that the person who
appeared before him for acknowledgement of the deed was the same Amado Celestial
who executed the same, he merely presumed so. This is not in compliance with what
the law requires for a valid notarization.
(b) But note, this does not necessarily affect the inherent validity (or invalidity) of a
deed only, no presumption of due execution and authenticity arises because a
defective notarization means that the document never becomes a public document. As
such, it cannot be presumed authentic; nor does any presumption of due execution
arise.
In this case, what this means is that the respondents assertion that the deed of sale is
valid, is weakened by the fact that the document cannot be presumed authentic or duly
executed.
29
Atty. Quicho
3. Subsequent sale in favor of Prima Calingacion Chua is also invalid.

It may be contended that the sale in favor of Chua is valid, despite no title having
passed to Editha Celestial, because she was a purchaser in good faith.
The Court ruled, however, that Chua could not be considered a buyer in good faith. The
record of the case showed that before she purchased the subject property, she was
aware of two residences standing on the property.
Although as a general rule, a buyer of land is not required to look beyond the four
corners of the certificate of title, if there are circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to doubt the sellers title, e.g., presence of possible adverse claimants, it
becomes his duty to investigate whether the seller actually can validly convey the
property (Mathay v. CA).
In this case, Chua never investigated the possibility of adverse claimants (in the person
of the builders and inhabitants of those residences on the property), and then
proceeded to buy the land from Editha anyway. This makes her not a buyer in good
faith, and so the sale to her is likewise void.
MARIA VS. CORTEZ
669 SCRA 87
11 APRIL 2012
(BAESA AND LAGUIO)
Facts:
William Maria is married to Ernita Maria. They took a vacation in Ilocos Sur from
Australia. There they met the spouses Biteng who represented themselves as
careakers of certain parcels of land purportedly for sale. Taking interest over the same,
Spouses Maria surveyed the land and came to know that the properties were registered
under the names Gundaway, Namnama and Pascual. Being confronted with the issue
on ownership, Emmanuel presented an SPA allegedly signed by Gundaway and
Namnama appointing him as their attorney-in-fact in all transactions pertaining to the
lands. The SPA was notarized by the respondent. The complainant doubted such SPA
since it was a photocopy and that Gundaway and Namnama were abroad. Spouses
Biteng, however, promised to send Spouses Maria a duly signed SPA notarized in the
USA. Relying on their word, Ernita affixed her signature on the Deed of Sale and Deed
of Adjunction with Sale. Then the Spouses Maria found ou that the TCT's over the
subject properties have already been issued in their names but were in the possession
of the Spouses Biteng who refused to deliver them due to some misunderstanding. This
prompted the Spouses Maria to get in touch with Gundaway and Namnama in the USA
who told them that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Emmanuel. The
complainant then came back to the Philippines and reviewed all pertinent documents
involved in the sale of the properties and noticed that they were all notarized by the
respondent. Hence, the complaint.
30
Atty. Quicho
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is liable.
Held:
Yes. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most
common of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or
instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful
of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts
a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as
evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.Thus, notarization
should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. Rule 4, Section 2(b) of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice states that A person shall not perform a notarial act
if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document (1) is not in the
notarys presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The respondents excuse that the SPA was never used or has been replaced during
the registration of the subject lands is of no moment. The fact remains that the SPA was
notarized without complying with the requirements of the law. It should be noted that a
notary publics function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his
powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A
notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must
inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part
or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
BANGAYAN VS. RCBC
647 SCRA 8
4 APRIL 2011
(OCAMPO-MAGUGAT AND DE GUINTO)
ST. MARYS FARM VS. PRIME REAL PROPERTY
560 SCRA 704
(MARTINEZ AND ORBOS)
Facts:
Petitioner St. Marys Farm was the registered owner of a 25,598 square meters of land
situated in Las Pias City (subject property). Petitioner issued a board resolution
authorizing respondent Rodolfo A. Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000 square
meters of the subject property.
Allegedly, after the consummation of this transaction, defendant Agana did not return to
petitioner the title to the subject property and, instead, allegedly forged a board
resolution of the petitioner supposedly to the effect that petitioner authorized him to sell
the remaining 21,598 square meters of the subject property. An absolute deed of sale
was executed and, thereafter, a new title was issued in favor of respondent Prima. After
subsequent developments, Prima duly purchased from T.S. Cruz Subdivision the 4,000
31
Atty. Quicho
square meters of the subject property.

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages. It made the following
allegations:
1. The authorization certified by Antonio V. Agcaoili, Corporate Secretary of the
petitioner, and used by respondent Agana in selling the subject property to
respondent Prima was a forgery as the board of directors of the petitioner never
enacted a resolution authorizing Agana to sell herein subject property.
2. Prima, in collusion with Agana, acted maliciously and in bad faith in relying on the
forged authority without taking any step to verify the same with the petitioner as
owner of the subject property.
On the other hand, respondent Prima sought the dismissal of the complaint based on
the following grounds:
1. Venice B. Agana and Ma. Natividad A. Villacorta, who filed the complaint in behalf of
petitioner, lacked legal capacity to sue because they were not authorized by the
board of directors.
2. Prima argued that it acted in good faith when it relied solely on the face of the
purported authorization of respondent Agana, entered into the deed of absolute sale,
and paid in full the purchase price.
3. Even assuming that the authorization was forged, petitioner is estopped from asking
for rescission of the deed of absolute sale and reconveyance of the subject property
when petitioner, through its President, accepted part of the purchase price knowing
fully well the same to be the proceeds of the sale of the subject property.
After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. It found
that respondent Prima was a buyer in good faith and for value, relying on the authority
of Agana to sell the property, as evidenced by a notarized board resolution. On appeal,
the CA affirmed in toto.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in the ruling that respondent Agana was duly authorized by
petitioner under certification to enter into the sale of the property with respondent
Prima
2. Whether the CA gravely erred in not holding that respondent Prima was the author
of its own damage by not making reasonable and prudent inquiries into the fact,
nature and extent of respondent Agana's authority, and by causing the issuance of
checks in the name of Agana
Held and Ratio:
No, the CA was correct in both issues and did not commit any error. The SC pointed out
5 reasons why the CA was correct.
1. In petitions for review on Certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law must be raised,
save only exceptional circumstances which are not present in the case at bar. The issues
raised in the petition were factual matters. In addition, the Court stated that it defers and
32
Atty. Quicho
accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts, especially when, as in the case at bar,
such findings are affirmed by the CA.
2.
Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party
making the allegation. In the case at bar, the petitioner insists that the CA erred in not
giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the document examiner of the NBI. However,
based from the facts, it can be said that the findings were not conclusive that the
signature of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili (Corporate Secretary) was a forgery because of
procedure for the investigation of the questionable handwriting was not properly
followed and also the testimony of the examiner indicated some variations and
possibilities that do not amount to a conclusive finding of forgery.
3.
Petitioner insists that since Agcaoili didn't appear before the notary public when
the board resolution was notarized, such was void. The SC emphasized that in notarial
law or practice, the non-appearance of the party before the notarial public who notarized
the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties' transaction void ab initio.
Non-appearance of the party, however, exposes the notary public to administrative
liability which warrants sanction by the Court. To challenge the due execution of the
notarized board resolution, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to
exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. Hence the board
resolution is deemed valid.
4.
Respondent Prima was deemed to be buyer in good faith and for value. It had
every reason to rely on Agana's authority on the basis of a notarized board resolution.
The SC reiterated what or who is considered a buyer in good faith - "He buys the
property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing
had title to the property and capacity to convey it". Petitioner pointed out that when the
checks were made payable Agana and not to the company, this should have alerted the
respondent. However this was no longer necessary considering that respondent had
every reason to rely on Agana's authority to sell. When the document under scrutiny is a
special power of attorney that is duly notarized, the notarial acknowledgement is a
prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. A buyer presented with such
document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether a forger
lurks beneath the signature on it.
5.
In all the pleadings filed by respondent Agana in court, he was steadfast in his
position that he had authority to sell the subject property. A judicial admission
conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter take a position contradictory
to, or inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted unless it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the case, there is no proof of
these exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the retraction was merely an afterthought on
the part of respondent.
33
Atty. Quicho
LLEMOS VS. LLEMOS

513 SCRA 128
(RAFAEL AND TRINIDAD)
1. The late Saturnina had four (4) children: Adriano, Santiago, Domingo, who were
the predecessors of [respondents], and Felipe, who was the predecessor of
[petitioners]. [Respondents] and [petitioners] are the grandchildren of the late
Saturnina. During her lifetime, the late Saturnina acquired a parcel of land, which
all the parties presently occupy.
2. In 1964, the Register of Deeds of Dagupan, Pangasinan, cancelled Original
Certificate of Title No. 38564 and issued a new one, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15632 in the name of Felipe, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale thumb
marked by Saturnina conveying said property to Felipe, herein [petitioners]
predecessor, for a consideration of P200.00.
3. In 1991, Jovita, one of the [respondents], decided to improve her residential
house on said parcel of land. Hence, she borrowed the title of the property from
one of her cousins one of the [petitioners], Felisa, for purposes of securing a
building permit. It was on such instance only that [respondents] discovered that
the title of the property was already in the name of herein [petitioners], the
children of Felipe.
4. On August 10, 1992, respondents, filed a Complaint for the NULLITY of the title
of the petitioners. They alleged that their predecessor, their uncle, the late Felipe,
acquired the property subject of the title through a forged deed of sale.
Respondent Eusebia testified that Saturnina was her grandmother and that she
died in 1938. That, for this reason, the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed on November 5, 1964 is invalid, as there could not possibly be a
meeting of the minds between a dead person and a living one.
5. In 1996, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC held that although
respondent Eusebia testified that Saturnina was her grandmother and that she
died in 1938, Eusebia did not testify on the fact of death of Saturnina from
personal knowledge; that the respondents cause of action heavily rests on the
Certificate of Death only and no other evidence; that since at the time Saturnina
died, there was already an existing public registry by virtue of Act 3753, hence,
no other entity, not even the Catholic Church, had the authority to issue a
certificate regarding the fact of death which can qualify as a public document;
that, for these reasons, the Certificate of Death is a private document and must
be authenticated to be admissible as evidence; that respondents failed to
notarize or otherwise authenticate the same and, hence, the facts stated therein
are hearsay.
6. In 2001, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA held that the Deed of Absolute Sale
is NULL and VOID; The parties are declared co-owners of the subject parcel of
land owned by the late Saturnina, as previously covered by Original Certificate of
Title. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15632 is ordered cancelled;
The CA held that the entries in the Registry Book of St. John Metropolitan
Cathedral in Dagupan City may be considered as entries made in the course of
business under then Section 37 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay
34
Atty. Quicho
rule; that Saturnina passed away on March 12, 1938 as stated by the Book of the
Dead of the Catholic Church; that, for this reason, the Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed on November 5, 1964 is invalid, as there could not possibly
be a meeting of the minds between a dead person and a living one.
Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 37. Entries in the course of business. - Entries made at, or near the time of
the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the
Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein
stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries
in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CERTIFICATE OF DEATH ISSUED BY THE CHURCH IS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
The CA committed a reversible error in considering said evidence.
Unfortunately, respondents did not submit as evidence the authentic Register of Dead,
Book No. 20 of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral that recites the certificate as part of
entries in the course of business and they failed to comply with the provisions of Section
5, Rule 130, to wit:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Under Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court, the original document must be produced
and no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
xxxx
a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.
None of the exceptions are attendant in the present case.
As earlier held, the Certificate of Death is a private document and not a public
35
Atty. Quicho
document; and respondents failed to prove its authenticity by their failure to present any
witness to testify on the due execution and genuineness of the signature of Fr.
Natividad, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132 which provides:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Moreover, the Court notes the absence of evidence showing that "Salvatin Salvatin"
mentioned in the Certificate of Death is the same "Saturnina Salvatin" referred to by
them as their predecessor-in-interest; and that Father Natividad has personal
knowledge of the date of death of "Salvatin Salvatin". The CA merely relied on the
Register of Dead of the parish which, as earlier pointed out, was not presented in court.
On the other hand, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1964, is a
notarized document which, as correctly found by the RTC, had been executed with all
the formalities of law and ratified by a notary public who attested that the vendor
Saturnina Salvatin appeared before him and acknowledged her deed to be her free act
and deed. It was executed in the presence of two witnesses. Maria Llemos Jimenez
likewise testified that the deed was properly executed for valuable consideration at the
time.
A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and
to the authenticity of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.
As found earlier, respondents failed to establish the date of death of Saturnina which
could have proven that the thumbmark of Saturnina in the Deed of Absolute Sale was
fraudulently affixed because she had died before the deed of sale was purportedly
executed by her. In fine, respondents failed to establish by preponderance of evidence
their claim that petitioners predecessor-in-interest obtained his title through fraud.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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is doctrinally settled that discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness

NORTHWEST AIRLINES VS. CHIONG

(a) Whether [Chiong] was bumped-off by [Northwest] from Flight NW 24 or whether

and fraud; and

original crew agreement.

From the foregoing disquisition, the ineluctable conclusion is that Northwest

Attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur

examination (by Cs lawyer to C), C testified that (1) he became owner of

Issue: WON the cross examination is admissible to impeach the witness.

"document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which

Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

or because it has been acknowledged before a

instrument executed by a private

b. Requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in

mere machine ecopy, not the original.

There are also similar impressions of lack of proper authentication

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions

testimony on this point could not be taken at face

2. Entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to

CELESTIAL VS. CELESTIAL

2. The deed of sale was defectively notarized.

3. Subsequent sale in favor of Prima Calingacion Chua is also invalid.

square meters of the subject property.

LLEMOS VS. LLEMOS

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