Full 2nd Batch Stolt To Serrano

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Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)
Twenty19
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177498
January 18, 2012
STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP

MANAGEMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 of the
First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91632 dated 31
January 2007, denying the petition for certiorari filed by Stolt-Nielsen
Transportation Group, Inc. and Chung Gai Ship Management (petitioners) and
affirming the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated July
27, 2005 are AFFIRMED.3
The facts as gathered by this Court follow:
On 6 March 1995, Sulpecio Madequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before
the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal under a
first contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract. In his
complaint-affidavit,4 respondent alleged that:
1. On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen
Marine Services, Inc on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Ship
Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the
vessel "Stolt Aspiration" for a period of nine (9) months;
2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed
overtime pay of $404.00 or a total of $1,212.00 per month during the
employment period commencing on 6 November 1991;
3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV "Stolt Aspiration";
4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service
and while the vessel was at Batangas, he was ordered by the ships
master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back to Manila for no
reason or explanation;
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5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the

petitioners office where he was transferred employment with another
vessel named MV "Stolt Pride" under the same terms and conditions of
the First Contract;
6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the
POEA;
7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the
vessel, certified the Second Employment Contract on 18 September
1992.
8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992,
petitioners failed to deploy him with the vessel MV "Stolt Pride";
9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to
comply with the Second Employment Contract.
10.
On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seamans
book and other employment documents. However, he was only allowed
to claim the said documents in exchange of his signing a document;
11.
He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because
without these documents, he could not seek employment from other
agencies.
He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys
fees for his illegal dismissal and in view of the Petitioners bad faith in not
complying with the Second Contract.
The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the
effectivity of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The parties were required to submit their respective position papers before
the Labor Arbiter. However, petitioners failed to submit their respective
pleadings despite the opportunity given to them.5
On 21 July 2000, Labor Arbiter Vicente R. Layawen rendered a
judgment6 finding that the respondent was constructively dismissed by the
petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring
the respondents guilty of constructively dismissing the complainant by not
honoring the employment contract. Accordingly, respondents are hereby
ordered jointly and solidarily to pay complainant the following:
1. $12,537.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.7
The Labor Arbiter found the first contract entered into by and between the
complainant and the respondents to have been novated by the execution of
the second contract. In other words, respondents cannot be held liable for
the first contract but are clearly and definitely liable for the breach of the
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second contract.8 However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence

to grant the prayer for moral and exemplary damages.9
The petitioners appealed the adverse decision before the National Labor
Relations Commission assailing that they were denied due process, that the
respondent cannot be considered as dismissed from employment because he
was not even deployed yet and the monetary award in favor of the
respondent was exorbitant and not in accordance with law.10
On 28 February 2003, the NLRC affirmed with modification the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby,
MODIFIED BY DELETING the award of overtime pay in the total amount of
Three Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Six US Dollars (US $3,636.00).
In all other respects, the assailed decision so stands as, AFFIRMED.11
Before the NLRC, the petitioners assailed that they were not properly notified
of the hearings that were conducted before the Labor Arbiter. They further
alleged that after the suspension of proceedings before the POEA, the only
notice they received was a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.12
The NLRC ruled that records showed that attempts to serve the various
notices of hearing were made on petitioners counsel on record but these
failed on account of their failure to furnish the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
copy of any notice of change of address. There was also no evidence that a
service of notice of change of address was served on the POEA. 13
The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure
on the part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their
non-deployment of the respondent.14 It denied the claim of the petitioners
that the monetary award should be limited only to three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term of the contract. It ruled that the factual incidents
material to the case transpired within 1991-1992 or before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 which provides for such limitation.15
However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award with respect
to the deletion of the overtime pay due to the non-deployment of the
respondent.16
The Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by
the NLRC in its Resolution dated 27 July 2005.17
The petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC when it affirmed with
modification the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. They prayed that the Decision
and Resolution promulgated by the NLRC be vacated and another one be
issued dismissing the complaint of the respondent.
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Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the

Decision of the labor tribunal.
The Courts Ruling
The following are the assignment of errors presented before this Court:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SECOND CONTRACT
NOVATED THE FIRST CONTRACT.
1. THERE WAS NO NOVATION OF THE FIRST CONTRACT BY THE SECOND
CONTRACT; THE ALLEGATION OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST
CONTRACT MUST BE RESOLVED SEPARATELY FROM THE ALLEGATION
OF FAILURE TO DEPLOY UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT.
2. THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL DISMISSAL UNDER THE FIRST CONTRACT
TRANSPIRED MORE THAN THREE (3) YEARS AFTER THE CASE WAS
FILED AND THEREFORE HIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR
BEING BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE
DISMISSAL UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT.
1. IT IS LEGALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL WHEN
THE EMPLOYMENT HAS NOT YET COMMENCED.
2. ASSUMING THERE WAS OMISSION UNDER THE SECOND CONTRACT,
PETITIONERS CAN ONLY BE FOUND AS HAVING FAILED IN DEPLOYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT BUT WITH VALID REASON.
III.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT EVEN ASSUMING THERE
WAS BASIS FOR HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR "FAILURE TO DEPLOY"
RESPONDENT, THE POEA RULES PENALIZES SUCH OMISSION WITH A MERE
"REPRIMAND."18
The petitioners contend that the first employment contract between them
and the private respondent is different from and independent of the second
contract subsequently executed upon repatriation of respondent to Manila.
We do not agree.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change
of the obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the
first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or, by substituting
another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights
of the creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the
following requisites is indispensable:
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1. There must be a previous valid obligation,

2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new
contract,
3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and
4. There must be the validity of the new contract.19
In its ruling, the Labor Arbiter clarified that novation had set in between the
first and second contract. To quote:
xxx [T]his office would like to make it clear that the first contract entered into
by and between the complainant and the respondents is deemed to have
been novated by the execution of the second contract. In other words,
respondents cannot be held liable for the first contract but are clearly and
definitely liable for the breach of the second contract.20
This ruling was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision ruling
that:
Guided by the foregoing legal precepts, it is evident that novation took place
in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished the first contract by
agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who was
unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The second contract
would not have been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and
conditions of Madequillo, Jr.s employment under the first contract. The
records also reveal that the 2nd contract extinguished the first contract by
changing its object or principal. These contracts were for overseas
employment aboard different vessels. The first contract was for employment
aboard the MV "Stolt Aspiration" while the second contract involved working
in another vessel, the MV "Stolt Pride." Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr.
accepted the terms and conditions of the second contract. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, the first contract was a "previous valid contract" since
it had not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.s repatriation to
Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality.
Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract when he
negotiated with petitioners on the second contract. As such, the NLRC
correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second
contract.21
We concur with the finding that there was a novation of the first employment
contract.
We reiterate once more and emphasize the ruling in Reyes v. National Labor
Relations Commission,22 to wit:
x x x [F]indings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a
trier of facts.
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xxxx
x x x Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such
findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be
altered, modified or reversed.(Emphasis supplied)23
With the finding that respondent "was still employed under the first contract
when he negotiated with petitioners on the second contract",24 novation
became an unavoidable conclusion.
Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when
supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.25 But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing
that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record,
they may be examined by the courts.26 In this case, there was no showing of
any arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in their findings of facts.
Hence, we follow the settled rule.
We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by the Court of
Appeals with its ruling that recovery of damages under the first contract was
already time-barred. Thus:
Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which
Medequillo Jr. may initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced
on the date of his repatriation. xxx The start of the three (3) year prescriptive
period must therefore be reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo
Jr.s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at this
point in time that Medequillo Jr.s cause of action already accrued under the
first contract. He had until February 1995 to pursue a case for illegal
dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract. With the filing of his
Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly beyond the
prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was already
time-barred.27
The issue that proceeds from the fact of novation is the consequence of the
non-deployment of respondent.
The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of
the seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the
employment.28 We agree with petitioners on such point. However, even
without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations
on the part of petitioners.
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A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds

himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service.29 The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 30
The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall
commence "upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or
seaport in the port of hire."31 We adhere to the terms and conditions of the
contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the
controversy started. Else, the obligatory force of every contract will be
useless. Parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to
their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.32
Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only "upon
actual departure of the seafarer", this does not mean that the seafarer has
no remedy in case of non-deployment without any valid reason.
Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor
performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV "Stolt Aspiration"
cannot be sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove
the same was presented.33
We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the
employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee
relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with
the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent
agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and
conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner
been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of
any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection
of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations,
the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring
party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or
refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.34
Further, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the
penalty is a mere reprimand.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment 35 dated 31
May 1991 provides for the consequence and penalty against in case of nondeployment of the seafarer without any valid reason. It reads:
Section 4. Workers Deployment. An agency shall deploy its recruits within
the deployment period as indicated below:
xxx
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b. Thirty (30) calendar days from the date of processing by the

administration of the employment contracts of seafarers.
Failure of the agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed
period without valid reasons shall be a cause for suspension or
cancellation of license or fine. In addition, the agency shall return
all documents at no cost to the worker.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty of reprimand36 provided
under Rule IV, Part VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers is not
applicable in this case. The breach of contract happened on February 1992
and the law applicable at that time was the 1991 POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty for nondeployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.
Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated
by reason of the unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners?
The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do
not provide for the award of damages to be given in favor of the employees.
The claim provided by the same law refers to a valid contractual claim for
compensation or benefits arising from employer-employee relationship or for
any personal injury, illness or death at levels provided for within the terms
and conditions of employment of seafarers. However, the absence of the
POEA Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected seafarer
does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The
sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or
cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to
the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not forfend a seafarer from
instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has
failed to deploy him.37
We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment.lavvphil The law
provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
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Following the law, the claim is still cognizable by the labor arbiters of the
NLRC under the second phrase of the provision.
Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code
provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus
liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9)
months worth of salary as provided in the contract.38 This is but proper
because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 31 January 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 91632 is hereby AFFIRMED. The
Petitioners are hereby ordered to pay Sulpecio Medequillo, Jr., the award of
actual damages equivalent to his salary for nine (9) months as provided by
the Second Employment Contract.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 197528, September 05, 2012 ]
PERT/CPM MANPOWER EXPONENT CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. ARMANDO A.
VINUY A. LOUIE M. ORDOVEZ, ARSENIO S. LUMANTA,. JR., ROBELITO S.
ANIPAN, VIRGILIO R. ALCANTARA, MARINO M. ERA, SANDY O. ENJAMBRE AND
NOEL T. LADEA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the
decision[2] dated May 9, 2011 and the resolution[3] dated June 23, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353.
The Antecedents
On March 5, 2008, respondents Armando A. Vinuya, Louie M. Ordovez,
Arsenio S. Lumanta, Jr., Robelito S. Anipan, Virgilio R. Alcantara, Marino M.
Era, Sandy O. Enjambre and Noel T. Ladea (respondents) filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the petitioner Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc.
(agency), and its President Romeo P. Nacino.
The respondents alleged that the agency deployed them between March 29,
2007 and May 12, 2007 to work as aluminum fabricator/installer for the
agencys principal, Modern Metal Solution LLC/MMS Modern Metal Solution
LLC (Modern Metal) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
The respondents employment contracts,[4] which were approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), provided for a twoyear employment, nine hours a day, salary of 1,350 AED with overtime pay,
food allowance, free and suitable housing (four to a room), free
transportation, free laundry, and free medical and dental services. They each
paid a P15,000.00 processing fee.[5]
On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal gave the respondents, except Era,
appointment letters[6] with terms different from those in the employment
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contracts which they signed at the agencys office in the Philippines. Under
the letters of appointment, their employment was increased to three years at
1,000 to 1,200 AED and food allowance of 200 AED.
The respondents claimed that they were shocked to find out what their
working and living conditions were in Dubai. They were required to work from
6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., with a break of only one hour to one and a half hours.
When they rendered overtime work, they were most of the time either
underpaid or not paid at all. Their housing accommodations were cramped
and were shared with 27 other occupants. The lodging house was in Sharjah,
which was far from their jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four
hours of sleep a day because of the long hours of travel to and from their
place of work; there was no potable water and the air was polluted.
When the respondents received their first salaries (at the rates provided in
their appointment letters and with deductions for placement fees) and
because of their difficult living and working conditions, they called up the
agency and complained about their predicament. The agency assured them
that their concerns would be promptly addressed, but nothing happened.
On May 5, 2007, Modern Metal required the respondents to sign new
employment contracts,[7] except for Era who was made to sign later. The
contracts reflected the terms of their appointment letters. Burdened by all
the expenses and financial obligations they incurred for their deployment,
they were left with no choice but to sign the contracts. They raised the
matter with the agency, which again took no action.
On August 5, 2007, despondent over their unbearable living and working
conditions and by the agencys inaction, the respondents expressed to
Modern Metal their desire to resign. Out of fear, as they put it, that Modern
Metal would not give them their salaries and release papers, the
respondents, except Era, cited personal/family problems for their resignation.
[8]
Era mentioned the real reason because I dont (sic) want the company
policy[9] for his resignation.
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It took the agency several weeks to repatriate the respondents to the

Philippines. They all returned to Manila in September 2007. Except for
Ordovez and Enjambre, all the respondents shouldered their own airfare.
For its part, the agency countered that the respondents were not illegally
dismissed; they voluntarily resigned from their employment to seek a better
paying job. It claimed that the respondents, while still working for Modern
Metal, applied with another company which offered them a higher pay.
Unfortunately, their supposed employment failed to materialize and they had
to go home because they had already resigned from Modern Metal.
The agency further alleged that the respondents even voluntarily signed
affidavits of quitclaim and release after they resigned. It thus argued that
their claim for benefits, under Section 10 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8042,
damages and attorneys fees is unfounded.
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
On April 30, 2008, Labor Arbiter Ligerio V. Ancheta rendered a
decision[10] dismissing the complaint, finding that the respondents voluntarily
resigned from their jobs. He also found that four of them Alcantara, Era,
Anipan and Lumanta even executed a compromise agreement (with
quitclaim and release) before the POEA. He considered the POEA recourse a
case of forum shopping.
The respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). They argued that the labor arbiter committed serious
errors in (1) admitting in evidence the quitclaims and releases they executed
in Dubai, which were mere photocopies of the originals and which failed to
explain the circumstances behind their execution; (2) failing to consider that
the compromise agreements they signed before the POEA covered only the
refund of their airfare and not all their money claims; and (3) ruling that they
violated the rule on non-forum shopping.
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On May 12, 2009, the NLRC granted the appeal.[11] It ruled that the
respondents had been illegally dismissed. It anchored its ruling on the new
employment contracts they were made to sign in Dubai. It stressed that it is
illegal for an employer to require its employees to execute new employment
papers, especially those which provide benefits that are inferior to the POEAapproved contracts.
The NLRC rejected the quitclaim and release executed by the respondents in
Dubai. It believed that the respondents executed the quitclaim documents
under duress as they were afraid that they would not be allowed to return to
the Philippines if they did not sign the documents. Further, the labor tribunal
disagreed with the labor arbiters opinion that the compromise agreement
they executed before the POEA had effectively foreclosed the illegal
dismissal complaint before the NLRC and that the respondents had been
guilty of forum shopping. It pointed out that the POEA case involved predeployment issues; whereas, the complaint before the NLRC is one for illegal
dismissal and money claims arising from employment.
Consequently, the NLRC ordered the agency, Nacino and Modern Metal to
pay, jointly and severally, the respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 April 2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, a new Decision is hereby issued ordering the respondents PERT/CPM
MANPOWER EXPONENTS CO., INC., ROMEO NACINO, and MODERN METAL
SOLUTIONS, INC. to jointly and severally, pay the complainants the following:
Employee
Underpaid Salary Placement Salary for the

fee
unexpired
portion of the
contract
(1350 x 6
months)
Vinuya, ARMANDO 150 x 6 = 900
USD 400
8100 AED
AED
Alcantara VIRGILIO 150 X 4 = 600
USD 400
8100 AED
Exemplary
Damages
P20,000.00
P20,000.00
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AED
Era, MARINO
350 x 4 = 1400
AED
adea, NOEL
150 x 5 = 750
AED
Ordovez, LOUIE
250 X 3 = 750
AED
Anipan, ROBELITO 150 x 4 = 600
AED
Enjambre, SANDY 150 x 4 = 600
AED
Lumanta, ARSENIO 250 x 5 = 1250
AED
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
USD 400
8100 AED
P20,000.00
TOTAL:
US$3,200 64,800 AED
6,850 AED
P400,000.0
0
or their peso equivalent at the time of actual payment plus attorney[]s fees
equivalent to 10% of the judgment award.[12]
The agency moved for reconsideration, contending that the appeal was
never perfected and that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing
the labor arbiters decision.
The respondents, on the other hand, moved for partial reconsideration,
maintaining that their salaries should have covered the unexpired portion of
their employment contracts, pursuant to the Courts ruling in Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.[13]
The NLRC denied the agencys motion for reconsideration, but granted the
respondents motion.[14] It sustained the respondents argument that the
award needed to be adjusted, particularly in relation to the payment of their
salaries, consistent with the Courts ruling in Serrano. The ruling declared
unconstitutional the clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, in Section 10, paragraph 5, of R.A. 8042,
limiting the entitlement of illegally dismissed overseas Filipino workers to
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their salaries for the unexpired term of their contract or three months,
whichever is less. Accordingly, it modified its earlier decision and adjusted
the respondents salary entitlement based on the following matrix:
Employee
Duration of
Contract
Departure Date
Unexpired portion of
date
dismissed contract
Vinuya,
ARMANDO
Alcantara,
VIRGILIO
Era, MARINO
2 years
Ladea, NOEL
2 years
29 March
2007
3 April
2007
12 May
2007
29 March
2007
3 April
2007
3 April
2007
29 March
2007
29 March
2007
2 years
2 years
Ordovez, LOUIE 2 years

Anipan,
ROBELITO
Enjambre,
SANDY
Lumanta,
ARSENIO
2 years
2 years
2 years
8 August
2007
8 August
2007
8 August
2007
8 August
2007
26 July
2007
8 August
2007
26 July
2007
8 August
2007
19 months
days
20 months
days
21 months
days
19 months
days
21 months
days
20 months
days
20 months
days
19 months
days15
and 21
and 5
and 4
and 21
and 23
and 5
and 3
and 21
Again, the agency moved for reconsideration, reiterating its earlier

arguments and, additionally, questioning the application of
the Serrano ruling in the case because it was not yet final and executory. The
NLRC denied the motion, prompting the agency to seek recourse from the CA
through a petition for certiorari.
The CA Decision
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.[16] It upheld the NLRC ruling
that the respondents were illegally dismissed. It found no grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRCs rejection of the respondents resignation letters, and
the accompanying quitclaim and release affidavits, as proof of their
voluntary termination of employment.
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The CA stressed that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is

inconsistent with resignation. Moreover, it found nothing in the records to
substantiate the agencys contention that the respondents resignation was
of their own accord; on the contrary, it considered the resignation letters
dubious for having been lopsidedly-worded to ensure that the petitioners
(employer[s]) are free from any liability.[17]
The appellate court likewise refused to give credit to the compromise
agreements that the respondents executed before the POEA. It agreed with
the NLRCs conclusion that the agreements pertain to the respondents
charge of recruitment violations against the agency distinct from their illegal
dismissal complaint, thus negating forum shopping by the respondents.
Lastly, the CA found nothing legally wrong in the NLRC correcting itself (upon
being reminded by the respondents), by adjusting the respondents salary
award on the basis of the unexpired portion of their contracts, as enunciated
in the Serrano case.
The agency moved for, but failed to secure, a reconsideration of the CA
decision.[18]
The Petition
The agency is now before the Court seeking a reversal of the CA dispositions,
contending that the CA erred in:
1. affirming the NLRCs finding that the respondents were illegally dismissed;
2. holding that the compromise agreements before the POEA pertain only to
the respondents charge of recruitment violations against the agency; and
3. affirming the NLRCs award to the respondents of their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their employment contracts, pursuant to
the Serrano ruling.
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The agency insists that it is not liable for illegal dismissal, actual or
constructive. It submits that as correctly found by the labor arbiter, the
respondents voluntarily resigned from their jobs, and even executed
affidavits of quitclaim and release; the respondents stated family concerns
for their resignation. The agency posits that the letters were duly proven as
they were written unconditionally by the respondents. It, therefore, assails
the conclusion that the respondents resigned under duress or that the
resignation letters were dubious.
The agency raises the same argument with respect to the compromise
agreements, with quitclaim and release, it entered into with Vinuya, Era,
Ladea, Enjambre, Ordovez, Alcantara, Anipan and Lumanta before the POEA,
although it submitted evidence only for six of them. Anipan, Lumanta, Vinuya
and Ladea signing one document;[19]Era[20] and Alcantara[21] signing a
document each. It points out that the agreement was prepared with the
assistance of POEA Conciliator Judy Santillan, and was duly and freely signed
by the respondents; moreover, the agreement is not conditional as it
pertains to all issues involved in the dispute between the parties.
On the third issue, the agency posits that the Serrano ruling has no
application in the present case for three reasons. First, the respondents were
not illegally dismissed and, therefore, were not entitled to their money
claims.Second, the respondents filed the complaint in 2007, while
the Serrano ruling came out on March 24, 2009. The ruling cannot be given
retroactive application. Third, R.A. 10022, which was enacted on March 8,
2010 and which amended R.A. 8042, restored the subject clause in Section
10 of R.A. 8042, declared unconstitutional by the Court.
The Respondents Position
In their Comment (to the Petition) dated September 28, 2011,[22] the
respondents ask the Court to deny the petition for lack of merit. They dispute
the agencys insistence that they resigned voluntarily. They stand firm on
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their submission that because of their unbearable living and working

conditions in Dubai, they were left with no choice but to resign. Also, the
agency never refuted their detailed narration of the reasons for giving up
their employment.
The respondents maintain that the quitclaim and release affidavits,[23] which
the agency presented, betray its desperate attempt to escape its liability to
them. They point out that, as found by the NLRC, the affidavits are readymade documents; for instance, in Lumantas[24] and Eras[25] affidavits, they
mentioned a certain G & A International Manpower as the agency which
recruited them a fact totally inapplicable to all the respondents. They
contend that they had no choice but to sign the documents; otherwise, their
release papers and remaining salaries would not be given to them, a
submission which the agency never refuted.
On the agencys second line of defense, the compromise agreement (with
quitclaim and release) between the respondents and the agency before the
POEA, the respondents argue that the agreements pertain only to their
charge of recruitment violations against the agency. They add that based on
the agreements, read and considered entirely, the agency was discharged
only with respect to the recruitment and pre-deployment issues such as
excessive placement fees, non-issuance of receipts and placement
misrepresentation, but not with respect to post-deployment issues such as
illegal dismissal, breach of contract, underpayment of salaries and
underpayment and nonpayment of overtime pay. The respondents stress that
the agency failed to controvert their contention that the agreements came
about only to settle their claim for refund of their airfare which they paid for
when they were repatriated.
Lastly, the respondents maintain that since they were illegally dismissed, the
CA was correct in upholding the NLRCs award of their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their employment contracts, as enunciated in Serrano.
They point out that the Serrano ruling is curative and remedial in nature and,
as such, should be given retroactive application as the Court declared in Yap
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v. Thenamaris Ships Management.[26] Further, the respondents take

exception to the agencys contention that the Serrano ruling cannot, in any
event, be applied in the present case in view of the enactment of R.A. 10022
on March 8, 2010, amending Section 10 of R.A. 8042. The amendment
restored the subject clause in paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. 8042 which
was struck down as unconstitutional inSerrano.
The respondents maintain that the agency cannot raise the issue for the first
time before this Court when it could have raised it before the CA with its
petition for certiorari which it filed on June 8, 2010;[27] otherwise, their right to
due process will be violated. The agency, on the other hand, would later
claim that it is not barred by estoppel with respect to its reliance on R.A.
10022 as it raised it before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353.28 They further
argue that RA 10022 cannot be applied in their case, as the law is an
amendatory statute which is, as a rule, prospective in application, unless the
contrary is provided.[29] To put the issue to rest, the respondents ask the
Court to also declare unconstitutional Section 7 of R.A. 10022.
Finally, the respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed outright
for raising only questions of fact, rather than of law.
The Courts Ruling
The procedural question
We deem it proper to examine the facts of the case on account of the
divergence in the factual conclusions of the labor arbiter on the one hand,
and, of the NLRC and the CA, on the other.[30] The arbiter found no illegal
dismissal in the respondents loss of employment in Dubai because they
voluntarily resigned; whereas, the NLRC and the CA adjudged them to have
been illegally dismissed because they were virtually forced to resign.
The merits of the case
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We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible

error and neither did it commit grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the NLRCs illegal dismissal ruling.
The agency and its principal, Modern Metal, committed flagrant violations of
the law on overseas employment, as well as basic norms of decency and fair
play in an employment relationship, pushing the respondents to look for a
better employment and, ultimately, to resign from their jobs.
First. The agency and Modern Metal are guilty of contract substitution. The
respondents entered into a POEA-approved two-year employment contract,
[31]
with Modern Metal providing among others, as earlier discussed, for a
monthly salary of 1350 AED. On April 2, 2007, Modern Metal issued to them
appointment letters[32] whereby the respondents were hired for a longer
three-year period and a reduced salary, from 1,100 AED to 1,200 AED,
among other provisions. Then, on May 5, 2007, they were required to sign
new employment contracts[33] reflecting the same terms contained in their
appointment letters, except that this time, they were hired as ordinary
laborer, no longer aluminum fabricator/installer. The respondents
complained with the agency about the contract substitution, but the agency
refused or failed to act on the matter.
The fact that the respondents contracts were altered or substituted at the
workplace had never been denied by the agency. On the contrary, it
admitted that the contract substitution did happen when it argued, [a]s to
their claim for [underpayment] of salary, their original contract mentioned
1350 AED monthly salary, which includes allowance while in their
Appointment Letters, they were supposed to receive 1,300 AED. While there
was [a] difference of 50 AED monthly, the same could no longer be claimed
by virtue of their Affidavits of Quitclaims and Desistance[.][34]
Clearly, the agency and Modern Metal committed a prohibited practice and
engaged in illegal recruitment under the law. Article 34 of the Labor Code
provides:
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Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity,
licensee, or holder of authority:
xxxx
(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the
Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the
approval of the Secretary of Labor[.]
Further, Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 8042,35 defined
illegal recruitment to include the following act:
(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the
time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment[.]
Second. The agency and Modern Metal committed breach of contract.
Aggravating the contract substitution imposed upon them by their employer,
the respondents were made to suffer substandard (shocking, as they put it)
working and living arrangements. Both the original contracts the respondents
signed in the Philippines and the appointment letters issued to them by
Modern Metal in Dubai provided for free housing and transportation to and
from the jobsite. The original contract mentioned free and suitable housing.
[36]
Although no description of the housing was made in the letters of
appointment except: Accommodation: Provided by the company, it is but
reasonable to think that the housing or accommodation would be suitable.
As earlier pointed out, the respondents were made to work from 6:30 a.m. to
6:30 p.m., with a meal break of one to one and a half hours, and their
overtime work was mostly not paid or underpaid. Their living quarters were
cramped as they shared them with 27 other workers. The lodging house was
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in Sharjah, far from the jobsite in Dubai, leaving them only three to four
hours of sleep every workday because of the long hours of travel to and from
their place of work, not to mention that there was no potable water in the
lodging house which was located in an area where the air was polluted. The
respondents complained with the agency about the hardships that they were
suffering, but the agency failed to act on their reports. Significantly, the
agency failed to refute their claim, anchored on the ordeal that they went
through while in Modern Metals employ.
Third. With their original contracts substituted and their oppressive working
and living conditions unmitigated or unresolved, the respondents decision to
resign is not surprising. They were compelled by the dismal state of their
employment to give up their jobs; effectively, they were constructively
dismissed. A constructive dismissal or discharge is a quitting because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as,
an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[37]
Without doubt, the respondents continued employment with Modern Metal
had become unreasonable. A reasonable mind would not approve of a
substituted contract that pays a diminished salary from 1350 AED a month
in the original contract to 1,000 AED to 1,200 AED in the appointment letters,
a difference of 150 AED to 250 AED (not just 50 AED as the agency claimed)
or an extended employment (from 2 to 3 years) at such inferior terms, or a
free and suitable housing which is hours away from the job site, cramped
and crowded, without potable water and exposed to air pollution.
We thus cannot accept the agencys insistence that the respondents
voluntarily resigned since they personally prepared their resignation
letters[38] in their own handwriting, citing family problems as their common
ground for resigning. As the CA did, we find the resignation letters
dubious,[39] not only for having been lopsidedly worded to ensure that the
employer is rendered free from any liability, but also for the odd coincidence
that all the respondents had, at the same time, been confronted with urgent
family problems so that they had to give up their employment and go home.
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The truth, as the respondents maintain, is that they cited family problems as
reason out of fear that Modern Metal would not give them their salaries and
their release papers. Only Era was bold enough to say the real reason for his
resignation to protest company policy.
We likewise find the affidavits[40] of quitclaim and release which the
respondents executed suspect. Obviously, the affidavits were prepared as a
follow through of the respondents supposed voluntary resignation. Unlike
the resignation letters, the respondents had no hand in the preparation of
the affidavits. They must have been prepared by a representative of Modern
Metal as they appear to come from a standard form and were apparently
introduced for only one purpose to lend credence to the resignation
letters. In Modern Metals haste, however, to secure the respondents
affidavits, they did not check on the model they used. Thus, Lumantas
affidavit[41]mentioned a G & A International Manpower as his recruiting
agency, an entity totally unknown to the respondents; the same thing is true
for Eras affidavit.[42] This confusion is an indication of the employers hurried
attempt to avoid liability to the respondents.
The respondents position is well-founded. The NLRC itself had the same
impression, which we find in order and hereunder quote:
The acts of respondents of requiring the signing of new contracts upon
reaching the place of work and requiring employees to sign quitclaims before
they are paid and repatriated to the Philippines are all too familiar stories of
despicable labor practices which our employees are subjected to abroad.
While it is true that quitclaims are generally given weight, however, given
the facts of the case, We are of the opinion that the complainants-appellants
executed the same under duress and fear that they will not be allowed to
return to the Philippines.[43]
Fourth. The compromise agreements (with quitclaim and release)
[44]
between the respondents and the agency before the POEA did not
foreclose their employer-employee relationship claims before the NLRC. The
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respondents, except Ordovez and Enjambre, aver in this respect that they all
paid for their own airfare when they returned home[45] and that the
compromise agreements settled only their claim for refund of their airfare,
but not their other claims.[46] Again, this submission has not been refuted or
denied by the agency.
On the surface, the compromise agreements appear to confirm the agencys
position, yet a closer examination of the documents would reveal their true
nature. Copy of the compromise agreement is a standard POEA document,
prepared in advance and readily made available to parties who are involved
in disputes before the agency, such as what the respondents filed with the
POEA ahead (filed in 2007) of the illegal dismissal complaint before the NLRC
(filed on March 5, 2008).
Under the heading Post-Deployment, the agency agreed to pay Era[47] and
Alcantara[48] P12,000.00 each, purportedly in satisfaction of the respondents
claims arising from overseas employment, consisting of unpaid salaries,
salary differentials and other benefits, including money claims with the NLRC.
The last document was signed by (1) Anipan, (2) Lumanta, (3) Ladea, (4)
Vinuya, (5) Jonathan Nangolinola, and (6) Zosimo Gatchalian (the last four
signing on the left hand side of the document; the last two were not among
those who filed the illegal dismissal complaint).[49] The agency agreed to pay
them a total of P72,000.00. Although there was no breakdown of the
entitlement for each of the six, but guided by the compromise agreement
signed by Era and Alcantara, we believe that the agency paid them
P12,000.00 each, just like Era and Alcantara.
The uniform insubstantial amount for each of the signatories to the
agreement lends credence to their contention that the settlement pertained
only to their claim for refund of the airfare which they shouldered when they
returned to the Philippines. The compromise agreement, apparently, was
intended by the agency as a settlement with the respondents and others
with similar claims, which explains the inclusion of the two (Nangolinola and
Gatchalian) who were not involved in the case with the NLRC. Under the
ELS: Labor Law 1
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circumstances, we cannot see how the compromise agreements can be

considered to have fully settled the respondents claims before the NLRC
illegal dismissal and monetary benefits arising from employment. We thus
find no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in the rejection by the
NLRC and the CA of said agreements.
Fifth. The agencys objection to the application of the Serrano ruling in the
present case is of no moment. Its argument that the ruling cannot be given
retroactive effect, because it is curative and remedial, is untenable. It points
out, in this respect, that the respondents filed the complaint in 2007, while
the Serrano ruling was handed down in March 2009. The issue, as the
respondents correctly argue, has been resolved in Yap v. Thenamaris Ships
Management,[50] where the Court sustained the retroactive application of the
Serrano ruling which declared unconstitutional the subject clause in Section
10, paragraph 5 of R.A. 8042, limiting to three months the payment of
salaries to illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers.
Undaunted, the agency posits that in any event, the Serrano ruling has been
nullified by R.A. No. 10022, entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No.
8042, Otherwise Known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, As Amended, Further Improving the Standard of Protection and
Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, Their Families and Overseas
Filipinos in Distress, and For Other Purposes.[51] It argues that R.A. 10022,
which lapsed into law (without the Signature of the President) on March 8,
2010, restored the subject clause in the 5th paragraph, Section 10 of R.A.
8042. The amendment, contained in Section 7 of R.A. 10022, reads as
follows:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized
deductions from the migrant workers salary, the worker shall be entitled to
the full reimbursement of his placement fee and the deductions made with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
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months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

[52]
(emphasis ours)
This argument fails to persuade us. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided.[53] By its very nature, the amendment
introduced by R.A. 10022 restoring a provision of R.A. 8042 declared
unconstitutional cannot be given retroactive effect, not only because there
is no express declaration of retroactivity in the law, but because retroactive
application will result in an impairment of a right that had accrued to the
respondents by virtue of the Serrano ruling -entitlement to their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective application,
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a
retrospective effect are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from
the language used.[54] We thus see no reason to nullity the application of the
Serrano ruling in the present case. Whether or not R.A. 10022 is
constitutional is not for us to rule upon in the present case as this is an issue
that is not squarely before us. In other words, this is an issue that awaits its
proper day in court; in the meanwhile, we make no pronouncement on it.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated May 9, 2011 and the Resolution dated June 23, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114353 are AFFIRMED. Let this Decision
be brought to the attention of the Honorable Secretary of Labor and
Employment and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration as a black mark in the deployment record of petitioner
Pert/CPM Manpower Exponent Co., Inc., and as a record that should be
considered in any similar future violations.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
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[ G.R. No. 155903, September 14, 2007 ]

C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., PETITIONER, VS HON.
UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M. ESPANOL, JR., HON. SECRETARY LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING AND RIZAL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. (C.F. Sharp) appeals
by certiorari the April 30, 2002 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 53747 and the November 5, 2002 Resolution[2] denying its
reconsideration.
In 1991, Louis Cruise Lines (LCL), a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of Cyprus, entered into a Crewing Agreement[3] with
Papadopolous Shipping, Ltd. (PAPASHIP). PAPASHIP in turn appointed private
respondent Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency
in the Philippines, recruiting Filipino seamen for LCL's vessel.
On October 3, 1996, LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP
to take effect on December 31, 1996. It then appointed C.F. Sharp as
crewing agent in the Philippines. C.F. Sharp requested for accreditation as
the new manning agency of LCL with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), but Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation
still existed and would only expire on December 31, 1996.
Pending approval of the accreditation, Theodoros Savva and Adrias Tjiakouris
of LCL arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for
seafarers at C.F. Sharp's office. Rizal reported LCL's recruitment activities to
the POEA on December 9, 1996, and requested an ocular inspection of C.F.
Sharp's premises.
On December 17, 1996, POEA representatives conducted an inspection and
found Savva and Tjiakouris at C.F. Sharp interviewing and recruiting hotel
staffs, cooks, and chefs for M/V Cyprus, with scheduled deployment in
ELS: Labor Law 1
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January 1997.[4] The Inspection Report[5] signed by Corazon Aquino of the

POEA and countersigned by Mr. Reynaldo Banawis of C.F. Sharp was
thereafter submitted to the POEA.
On January 2, 1997, Rizal filed a complaint[6] for illegal recruitment,
cancellation or revocation of license, and blacklisting against LCL and C.F.
Sharp with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. RV-97-01-004. Then, on
January 31, 1997, Rizal filed a Supplemental Complaint[7] adding violation of
Section 29 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, for designating and/or
appointing agents, representatives and employees, without prior approval
from the POEA.
For its part, C.F. Sharp admitted that Savva and Tjiakouris conducted
interviews at C.F. Sharp's office, but denied that they were for recruitment
and selection purposes. According to C.F. Sharp, the interviews were held for
LCL's ex-crew members who had various complaints against Rizal. It
belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team claiming that it
simply stated that interviews and recruitment were undertaken, without
reference to who were conducting the interview and for what vessels.[8] C.F.
Sharp also averred that Rizal was guilty of forum shopping, and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on this ground and for its lack of merit. [9]
The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C.F. Sharp liable for
illegal recruitment. According to the Administrator, the inspection report of
Ms. Aquino established that Savva and Tjiakouris had conducted, and, at the
time of the inspection, had been conducting interviews, selection and hiring
for LCL, without any authority from the POEA. The Administrator also held
that C.F. Sharp violated Section 29 of the Labor Code when it designated
officers and agents without prior approval of the POEA. [10]
Thus, the Administrator disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent CF Sharp Agency is as it
is hereby ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months or in lieu thereof,
ELS: Labor Law 1
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it is ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00 for violation of Art. 29 of the Labor

Code, as amended in relation to Sec. 6(b), Rule II, Book II of the Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment in accordance with the
schedule of penalties.
Further, the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby ordered suspended for
another period of [eighteen] (18) months or to pay the fine of P180,000.00
for committing 9 counts of violation of Article 29 of the Labor Code as
amended in relation to Sec. 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the Rules and Regulations
governing Overseas Employment.
The period of suspension shall be served cummulatively (sic).
The charges of violation of Sec. 6(b) of RA 8042 are hereby referred to the
Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[11]
C.F. Sharp elevated the Administrator's ruling to the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). On December 19, 1997, the then Secretary of
Labor, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,[12] issued an Order,[13] ruling that:
WHEREFORE, except as above MODIFIED, the Order dated March 13, 1997 of
the POEA Administrator is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, the C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of
having violated Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13 (b) and (f), and
Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II (jj), Book I and Sec 1 and 6,
Rule I, Book II, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment, for having conspired and confederated with the [Louis] Cruise
Lines, Theodorus Savva and Andrias (sic) Tjiakouris in the recruitment of
seafarers for LCL's ships, before it was duly accredited by POEA as the
manning agency of LCL, thus a non-holder of authority at the time. The
penalty imposed against it of suspension of its license for six (6) months or in
lieu thereof, to pay a fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), is AFFIRMED.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Further, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is hereby found guilty of one (1)
count of violation of Art. 29 of the Labor Code in relation to Sec. 2 (k), Rule I,
Book VI of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, and
is imposed the penalty of two (2) months suspension of its license or in lieu
thereof, to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The penalties of suspension for both violations shall be served cumulatively.
Out of the P230,000.00 cash supersedeas bond posted by the petitionerappellant, let the amount of P160,000.00 be released and refunded to it,
retaining P70,000.00 to be applied to the payment of the fines as imposed
above, should the petitioner opt to pay the fine instead of undergoing
suspension of its license. However, the suspension shall remain in force until
such fine is paid, or in the event that the petitioner-appellant further appeals
this Order.
The charge and finding of violation of Sec. 6 (b) of R.A. 8042 are hereby
referred to the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[14]
C.F. Sharp's motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5,
1999 by the then Undersecretary, Jose M. Espanol, Jr.,[15] it elevated the case
to this Court on petition for certiorari, with the case docketed as G.R. No.
137573. But, in the June 16, 1999 Resolution, this Court referred the petition
to the CA.
In the meantime, on April 15, 1999, C.F. Sharp requested the lifting of the
suspension decreed by the Secretary of Labor in his December 19, 1997
Order,[16] which was granted by Deputy Administrator for Licensing and
Adjudication Valentin C. Guanio. C.F. Sharp was allowed to deploy seafarers
for its principals.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Consequently, on April 30, 2002, the CA denied C.F. Sharp's petition

for certiorari,[17] holding that C.F. Sharp was already estopped from assailing
the Secretary of Labor's ruling because it had manifested its option to have
the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed upon it. By
paying the adjudged fines, C.F. Sharp effectively executed the judgment,
having acquiesced to, and ratified the execution of the assailed Orders of the
Secretary of Labor. The CA also agreed with the POEA Administrator and the
Secretary of Labor that Savva and Tjiakouris of LCL, along with C.F. Sharp,
undertook recruitment activities on December 7, 9 to 12, 1996, sans any
authority. Finally, it affirmed both labor officials' finding that C.F. Sharp
violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k), Rule I, Book VI of the
POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent, without prior
approval from the POEA. Thus, the appellate court declared that the
Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding C.F. Sharp liable
for illegal recruitment.
C.F. Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration,[18] but the CA denied it on
November 25, 2002.[19]
Hence, this appeal, positing these issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS IN ESTOPPEL IN QUESTIONING THE ORDER
DATED DECEMBER 19, 1997 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 5,
1999.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 6[,] R.A.
NO. 8042 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 13 (b) and (f) AND ARTICLE 66 (sic) OF
THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED; RULE II (jj) BOOK I; AND SECTIONS 1 AND
6, RULE I, BOOK III POEA RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 29 OF THE LABOR
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CODE, AS AMENDED, IN RELATION TO SECTION II (k)[,] RULE I, BOOK VI OF

THE RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT. [20]
C.F. Sharp faults the CA for ruling that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the resolutions of the Secretary of Labor. It denied that it
voluntarily executed, or acquiesced to, the assailed resolutions of the
Secretary.
The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes
beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the
proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby
established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a
judgment debtor who acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the
judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.[21]
In holding C.F. Sharp in estoppel, the CA apparently relied on the April 15,
1999 Order of the POEA, and, thus, declared:
[P]etitioner C.F. Sharp had already manifested its option to have the cash
bond posted as an answer for the alternative fines imposed in the Orders
dated December 19, 1997 as stated in the Order dated April 15, 1999 of the
POEA, Adjudication Office x x x. Thus, for voluntary execution of the Order of
the Secretary of DOLE dated December 19, 1997 by paying the adjudged
fines, the petitioner was then estopped from assailing such Order before Us
by way of petition for certiorari. Where a party voluntarily executes, partially
or totally a judgment or acquiesces or ratifies the execution of the same, he
is estopped from appealing therefrom. x x x.[22]
The April 15, 1999 Order of Deputy Commissioner Valentin C. Guanio reads:
Respondent C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc., thru counsel having
manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the
alternative fines imposed in the above-entitled case; the alternative
suspension imposed in the Order of the Secretary dated December 19, 1997
is hereby Lifted.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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SO ORDERED.[23]
This Order was issued in response to C.F. Sharp's request to lift the
suspension decree of the Secretary of Labor. The request stated, viz.:
[W]e write in behalf of our client, C.F. Sharp Crew Management Inc.,
regarding the Advice To Operating Units dated April 15, 1999, which arose
from the Decision of the Office of the Secretary of Labor in the case entitled
C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV
97-01-004.
In this connection, we would like to express our option to have the cash bond
posted by us in the case entitled C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. versus
Rizal Shipping and docketed as RV 97-01-044 to answer for any fine that the
Supreme Court may finally decide that our client should pay in the Case
entitled, C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. vs. Secretary Leonardo
Quisumbing and Rizal International Shipping Services and docketed as G.R.
No. 137573.
Under the circumstances, it is most respectfully requested that the aforesaid
advice be RECALLED and that a clearance be issued in favor of our client, C.F.
Sharp Crew Management, Inc.
Hoping for your immediate and favorable action on the matter.[24] (Emphasis
supplied)
C.F. Sharp's letter was explicit that the cash bond posted would be
answerable for any fine that it may ultimately be held liable to pay by virtue
of a final decision. In fact, on March 25, 1999, prior to the filing of the abovequoted letter-request, C.F. Sharp had already filed a petition
for certiorari assailing the Orders of the Secretary of Labor. Furthermore,
there is no showing that the assailed Order of then Secretary Quisumbing
ELS: Labor Law 1
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was indeed executed to warrant the appellate court's conclusion that C.F.
Sharp was estopped from assailing the said Order. Clearly, there is no basis
for the CA to rule that C.F. Sharp voluntarily executed, or acquiesced to, the
execution of the unfavorable ruling of the Secretary of Labor.
The first issue having been settled, we now resolve whether C.F. Sharp is
liable for illegal recruitment.
C.F. Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December
1996. It posits that the interviews undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris do
not amount to illegal recruitment under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or
the Migrants Workers Act. Further, it contends that the interviews conducted
were not for selection and recruitment purposes, but were in connection with
the seamen's past employment with Rizal, specifically, their complaints for
non-remittance of SSS premiums, withholding of wages, illegal exactions
from medical examinations and delayed allotments. It claims that it was only
upon approval of its application for accreditation that the employment
contracts were entered into and actual deployment of the seamen was
made. C.F. Sharp, thus, concludes that it cannot be held liable for illegal
recruitment.
The reasoning is specious.
Undoubtedly, in December 1996, LCL had no approved POEA license to
recruit. C.F. Sharp's accreditation as LCL's new manning agency was still
pending approval at that time. Yet Savva and Tjiakouris, along with C.F.
Sharp, entertained applicants for LCL's vessels, and conducted preparatory
interviews.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad whether for profit or not:
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Provided, That any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C.F. Sharp wants to
portray - the conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity.
The fact that C.F. Sharp did not receive any payment during the interviews is
of no moment. From the language of Article 13(b), the act of recruitment
may be "for profit or not." Notably, it is the lack of the necessary license or
authority, not the fact of payment, that renders the recruitment activity of
LCL unlawful.
C.F. Sharp's claim that the interviews were not for selection and recruitment
purposes does not impress. As the Secretary of Labor aptly said:
This Office cannot conceive of a good reason why LCL/Savva/Tjiakouris
should be interested at the time in unearthing alleged violations committed
by Rizal Shipping whose representative status as manning agency was to be
terminated in just a few weeks thereafter, spending valuable time and
money in the process. They stood to gain nothing from such taxing exercise
involving several hundreds of ex-crew members, which could be handled by
government agencies like the POEA, NLRC, SSS. The observation of the
POEA Administrator that the complaints of the crewmen were filed only after
Rizal Shipping filed its complaints with the POEA merely to bolster the
defense of CF Sharp/LCL/Savva and Tjiakouris, is telling.
Upon the other hand, it was more to LCL'S gain to interview, select and
recruit the disembarking crewmen previously recruited by Rizal Shipping,
using CF Sharp's facilities, as this would result in less recruitment time and
cost.
Finally, the claim of Savva and Tjiakouris that Savva "talked to the POEA
representative during their visit" about these interviews and the violations
which were confirmed, is just an afterthought to support their defense; there
ELS: Labor Law 1
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is no entry in the Inspection Report confirming such claim. If such claim were
true, then the "able officer" of CF Sharp (LCL's Attorney-in fact) who signed
his conformity on the 4th page of the report, and put his initial on the last
page of the report containing the handwritten findings of the inspectors on
the selection and recruitment activities of Savva and Tjiakouris, would have
insisted that an entry be made thereon about what Savva told the
inspectors, or he could simply himself have written thereon that the two LCL
officials merely conducted interviews on the violations committed by Rizal
Shipping. However, the report is bereft of anything to that effect. More
significant is the fact that the inspectors, in their Memorandum dated
December 11, 1996 (the very same day they conducted the inspection),
stated that they "approached said persons" (referring to Banawis, Savva and
Tjiakouris) "and told us that they were doing interview to select applicants"
to complement the crew of a passenger ship for [LOUIS] CRUISE LINES." [25]
Indeed, it was Savva and Tjiakouris that conducted the interviews, and
undertook selection and hiring. However, C.F. Sharp cannot steer clear of
liability for it conspired with LCL in committing illegal recruitment activities.
As the Secretary of Labor had taken pains to demonstrate:
x x x [T]here is substantial evidence on record that as alleged by Rizal
Shipping, CF Sharp conspired with LCL and its officers Savva and Tjiakouris to
conduct recruitment activities in its offices, at a time when LCL was not yet
its POEA-accredited principal, in violation of Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to
Article 13(b) and (f) and Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj)
Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6, Rule I, Book III, all of the POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment.
Indeed, C.F. Sharp was aware of these violations when it alleged in its
Petition for Review that:
"in any and all events, the findings relied upon by the Public Respondent
show, at best, that the parties responsible for the alleged acts of illegal
recruitment are LCL and its officers alone, or at worst, LCL and its officers, in
conspiracy with petitioner. Yet, it is petitioner alone, who is severely
ELS: Labor Law 1
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punished and penalized." (underscoring supplied)

xxxx
The intention, agreement and both common design of both LCL and CF Sharp
to engage in recruitment of crewmen for LCL's ships had already been made
manifest when LCL through Savva had instructed, in the October 14, 1996
letter to disembarking crewmembers, for the latter to report to CF Sharp for
processing of their papers. This was followed by the execution by LCL on
October 17, 1996 of a Special Power of Attorney in favor of CF Sharp as new
manning agent and attorney-in-fact of LCL, with authority, among others, "to
sign, authenticate and deliver all documents necessary to complete any
transaction related to the recruitment and hiring of Filipino seamen including
the necessary steps to facilitate the departure of recruited seamen"; "to
assume, on our behalf and for our account, any liability that may arise in
connection with the recruitment of seamen and/or implementation of the
employment contract of said seamen." And on November 8, 1996, CF Sharp
applied for accreditation as manning agent of LCL for the latter's five named
vessels. The discovery by the POEA inspectors of the selection and
recruitment activities undertaken by Savva and Tjiakouris at CF Sharp's
offices on December 11, 1996, followed. The interviews by Savva and
Tjiakouris at CF Sharp's offices on December 7, 1996 with around 300
crewmen, as sworn to by 98 crewmen (their affidavits were submitted in
evidence by CF Sharp); the interviews for selection and recruitment from
December 9 to 12, 1996 as found by the POEA inspectors; and the
immediate deployment of 154 crewmen for LCL right after [the] POEA
approval of accreditation of LCL as principal of CF Sharp, could not have
been undertaken without the assistance and cooperation of CF Sharp, even
before such transfer of accreditation was granted by POEA.
The petitioner-appellant must be reminded that prior to approval of the
transfer of accreditation, no recruitment or deployment may be made by the
principal by itself or through the would-be transferee manning agency, or by
the latter, as this would constitute illegal recruitment by a non-holder of
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authority under Sec. 6, R.A. 8042 in relation to Article 13(b) and (f) and
Article 16 of the Labor Code as amended; Rule II(jj), Book I, and Sec. 1 and 6,
Rule 1, Book III, POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas
Employment.
The petitioner-appellant alleges that "there is no need for a license to enable
LCL's officers to conduct their alleged activities of interviewing, selecting and
hiring crewmen. Indeed, LCL's officers could have conducted these activities
without a license."
Such claim is without legal basis, as direct hiring by employers of Filipino
workers for overseas employment is banned; they can only do so through,
among others, licensed private recruitment and shipping/mining agencies
(Art. 18, Labor Code as amended; Sec. 1, Rule 1, Book II, POEA Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment).[26]
We need not say more.
C.F. Sharp also denies violating Article 29 of the Labor Code. It insists that
Henry Desiderio was neither an employee nor an agent of C.F. Sharp. Yet,
except for its barefaced denial, no proof was adduced to substantiate it.
Desiderio's name does not appear in the list of employees and officials
submitted by C.F. Sharp to the POEA. However, his name appeared as the
contact person of the applicants for the position of 2nd and 3rd assistant
engineers and machinist/fitter in C.F Sharp's advertisement in the February
2, 1997 issue of The Bulletin Today.[27]
Article 29 of the Labor Code is explicit, viz.:
Art. 29. NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF LICENSE OR AUTHORITY
No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person
other than the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than
that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be
ELS: Labor Law 1
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transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer

of business address, appointment or designation of any agent or
representative including the establishment of additional offices
anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.
(Emphasis ours)
Thus, Section 2(k), Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules Governing Overseas
Employment provides:
Section 2. Grounds for Suspension/Cancellation of License.
xxxx
k. Appointing or designating agents, representatives or employees without
prior approval from the Administration.
The appointment or designation of Desiderio as an employee or agent of C.F.
Sharp, without prior approval from the POEA, warrants administrative
sanction. The CA, therefore, correctly rejected C.F. Sharp's posture.
Apparently, realizing the folly of its defenses, C.F. Sharp assails the
admissibility of the Memorandum and Inspection Report of the POEA. It
contends that these are patently inadmissible against C.F. Sharp for it was
not given an opportunity to crossexamine the POEA inspectors regarding
the report.
The argument does not deserve even a short shrift. First, C.F. Sharp did not
raise it before the POEA and Secretary of Labor. The issue was raised for the
first time in its petition for certiorari with the CA, where the jurisdiction of the
appellate court is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion. On numerous occasions, we have made it clear that to allow
fresh issues at this stage of the proceedings is violative of fair play, justice
and due process.[28]
Second, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that administrative bodies are
ELS: Labor Law 1
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not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in the courts of law.[29] Hence, whatever merit C.F. Sharp's
argument might have in the context of ordinary civil actions, where the rules
of evidence apply with greater rigidity, disappears when adduced in
connection with labor cases.
The claim of denial of due process on the part of C.F. Sharp must also be
rejected. The essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity
afforded a party to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of its
defense. What is vital is not the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse
witness, but an opportunity to be heard.[30]
In this case, C.F. Sharp was given ample opportunity to be heard, to adduce
evidence in support of its version of the material occurrences, and to
controvert Rizal's allegation and the Inspection Report. It submitted its
position paper with supporting affidavits and documents, and additionally
pleaded its causes on appeal before the Secretary of Labor. Under the
circumstances, a claim of denial of due process on C.F. Sharp's part is
completely unavailing.
C.F. Sharp next impugns the probative value given by the Administrator and
the Secretary of Labor to the Inspection Report. It alleges that the POEA
Administrator, the Labor Secretary and the CA relied only on the Inspection
Report and gave very little or no probative value to the affidavits that it
submitted in support of its claim.
C.F. Sharp would have us re-evaluate the factual veracity and probative value
of the evidence submitted in the proceedings a quo. C.F. Sharp may well be
reminded that it is not our function to review, examine, and evaluate or
weigh the evidence adduced by the parties. Elementary is the principle that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Judicial review of labor cases does not go
beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
labor officials' findings rest. Hence, where the factual findings of the labor
tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by, the CA, the same are
accorded respect and finality, and are binding upon this Court. It is only
ELS: Labor Law 1
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when the findings of the labor agencies and the appellate court are in
conflict that this Court will review the records to determine which findings
should be upheld as being more in conformity with the evidentiary facts.
Where the CA affirms the labor agencies on review and there is no showing
whatsoever that said findings are patently erroneous, this Court is bound by
the said findings.[31]
Although the rule admits of several exceptions, none of them are in point in
this case. In any event, we have carefully examined the factual findings of
the CA and found the same to be borne out of the record and sufficiently
anchored on the evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 53747 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 152642
November 13, 2012
HON. PATRICIA A. STO.TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA

LAZO, Petitioners,
vs.
REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE
BELONIO, LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY BONNEVIE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152710
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), HON. ROSALINDA D.
BALDOZ, in her capacity as Administrator, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), and the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNING BOARD, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE G. PANEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch 220, Quezon City, ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE
CHAPTER, INC. (ARCOPHIL), for itself and in behalf of its members:
WORLDCARE PHILIPPINES SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC.,
STEADFAST INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT CORP., VERDANT
MANPOWER MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS PERSONNEL,
INC., ARL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., DAHLZEN INTERNATIONAL
ELS: Labor Law 1
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SERVICES, INC., INTERWORLD PLACEMENT CENTER, INC., LAKAS TAO

CONTRACT SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTI-SERVICES, DMJ
INTERNATIONAL, and MIP INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES,
represented by its proprietress, MARCELINA I.
PAGSIBIGAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 167590
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), the OVERSEAS WORKERS WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR ARBITERS OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), the HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (P
ASEI), Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 182978-79
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC., and
JAIME ORTIZ (President of White Falcon Services, Inc.), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 184298-99
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
deceased daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners,
vs.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER
AND PROMOTION, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts and the Case
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On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes,
sets the Governments policies on overseas employment and establishes a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant
workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710
(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the
business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino
workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario
Montenegro, Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.)
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against
petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96. 2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10)
and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE,
POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules
and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the
policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act
8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.s petition and
ordered the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment
and placement of OFWs.3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15,
and all other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the
policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTCs above actions, the government officials concerned
filed the present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to annul the RTCs decision
and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March 20,
2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment
abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated Association of
Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for the
same purpose.4
ELS: Labor Law 1
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On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon
City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment
Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction
against the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA
Director-General,6 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the
latter from implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist
from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the
recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy of deregulation
provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the
petition and enjoining the government agencies involved from exercising
regulatory functions over the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This
prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA
Director-General to file the present action in G.R. 152710. As in G.R. 152642,
the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed7 the Court that on
April 10, 2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
94228 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted
the policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and deployment
of OFWs. R.A. 9422 pertinently provides:
xxxx
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" is hereby
amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration The Administration
shall regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas
placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system. It
shall also formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities
concerned, when necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the
overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration their
welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform
migrant workers not only of their rights as workers but also of their rights as
human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert their rights and
provide the available mechanism to redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for
trained and competent Filipino workers of foreign governments and their
ELS: Labor Law 1
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instrumentalities, and such other employers as public interests may require,

the administration shall deploy only to countries where the Philippines has
concluded bilateral labor agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such
countries shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers;
and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or comply with
the international laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642
that they agree9 with the Republics view that the repeal of Sections 29 and
30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and
academic. The Court has no reason to disagree. Consequently, the two
cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be dismissed for being moot and
academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters,
Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being
unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the
Court will take up this point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts
constituting the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts.
Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or nonholder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad
to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a nonlicensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
SEC. 7. Penalties.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
person illegally recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or
committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising
from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of the province or city where the
offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the
ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails to
distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11 and for that
reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of
the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses
or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous
and, contrary to the RTCs finding, actually makes a distinction between
licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers" without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty
of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they
commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that
its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to
the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty
imposed on such violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere
failure to render a report under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by
the Labor Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for
six years and one day and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but which could
unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least
three persons.
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Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave
penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as
condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for
each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its
prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible,
consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and
deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to
question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has
been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212 which
increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the
amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling
fact that OFWs must work outside the countrys borders and beyond its
immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow
protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who,
fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that
their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,13 the State under its police power
"may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the
consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud."
Police power is "that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables
it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that
allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of
residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is
the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed.
Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of
criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended parties violates
their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined
herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city
where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court
where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions
shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an
alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the
venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a),
Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
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SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws,
the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal
actions is, consistent with that laws declared policy15 of providing a criminal
justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of
illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent
spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death
and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc.
(White Falcon) for the death of their daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while
working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas
had already received insurance benefits arising from their daughters death
from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also
gave due credence to the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that
Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found
Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable for Jasmins death and
ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual
damages. The NLRC relied on the Cabanatuan City Health Offices autopsy
finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA).18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and White Falcon
jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual
damages, with Becmen having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmins death not work-related or workconnected since her rape and death did not occur while she was on duty at
the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted
the award of actual damages but ruled that Becmens corporate directors
and officers are solidarily liable with their company for its failure to
investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White Falcon
abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in
obtaining justice for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign
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employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the latters
corporate directors and officers jointly and severally liable to the Cuaresmas
for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary
damages; 3) attorneys fees of 10% of the total monetary award; and 4) cost
of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely,
Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman
(Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to Intervene. They questioned the
constitutionality of the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10,
R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly
and solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs
against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September 9, 2009
the Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.s motion for
reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd
paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors,
officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and
solidarily liable for money claims and damages that may be adjudged
against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as
unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate officers
and directors of the erring company had knowledge of and allowed the illegal
recruitment, making them automatically liable would violate their right to
due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency
for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership
for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the
liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them
jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that
they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring
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or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.19 In the case of Becmen and

White Falcon,20 while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in
not investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is no mention of any
evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al.,
Becmens corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their
companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the
injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad.
The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of
the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court
must uphold its validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions
for having become moot and academic.1wphi1
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of
Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court
HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic
Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and
SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99
that held intervenors Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio,
and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen
Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila
Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such intervenors had a
part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169076
January 23, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSEPH JAMILOSA, Appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph
Jamilosa of large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8042, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay
a P500,000.00 fine.
The Information charging appellant with large scale illegal recruitment was
filed by the Senior State Prosecutor on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory
portion of the Information reads:
That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or thereabout in
the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, representing to have the capacity, authority or license
to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas employment,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and
promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Haide R.
Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work
or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care
Center without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the
Contrary to law.2
On arraignment, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of Appeals (CA), is
as follows:
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: private complainants
Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.
Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that on January 17, 1996, she met the
appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on board an aircon bus. She was on her way
to Shoemart (SM), North EDSA, Quezon City where she was working as a
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company nurse. The appellant was seated beside her and introduced himself
as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The appellant told her that
his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles, California, USA
and he could help her get employed as a nurse at a monthly salary of Two
Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she could leave in two (2) weeks
time. He further averred that he has connections with the US Embassy, being
a US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the
Philippines for one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the
amount of US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant gave his
pager number and instructed her to contact him if she is interested to apply
for a nursing job abroad.
On January 21, 1996, the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went
to her house where she gave him the photocopies of her transcript of
records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) license and
other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the appellant
the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North EDSA, Quezon
City, and the latter showed to her a photocopy of her supposed US visa. The
appellant likewise got several pieces of jewelry which she was then selling
and assured her that he would sell the same at the US embassy. However,
the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry.
Thereafter, the appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she
was booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles, California,
USA on February 25, 1996.
The appellant promised to see her and some of his other recruits before their
scheduled departure to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the
appellant who was supposed to be with them in the flight failed to show up.
Instead, the appellant called and informed her that he failed to give the
passport and US visa because he had to go to the province because his wife
died. She and her companions were not able to leave for the United States.
They went to the supposed residence of the appellant to verify, but nobody
knew him or his whereabouts. They tried to contact him at the hotel where
he temporarily resided, but to no avail. They also inquired from the US
embassy and found out that there was no such person connected with the
said office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman, for her part, testified that she is a
registered nurse by profession. In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went
to SM North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that
time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet the appellant who is
an FBI agent and was willing to help nurses find a job abroad. Bamba invited
Lagman to go with her. On the same date at about 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon, she and Bamba met the appellant at the SM Fast-Food Center,
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Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The appellant convinced them of his
ability to send them abroad and told them that he has a sister in the United
States. Lagman told the appellant that she had no working experience in any
hospital but the appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one.
The appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American visa
and an additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos
(P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.
On January 24, 1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA,
Quezon City wherein she handed to the latter her passport and transcript of
records. The appellant promised to file the said documents with the US
embassy. After one (1) week, they met again at the same place and the
appellant showed to her a photocopy of her US visa. This prompted her to
give the amount of US$300.00 and two (2) bottles of Black Label to the
appellant. She gave the said money and liquor to the appellant without any
receipt out of trust and after the appellant promised her that he would issue
the necessary receipt later. The appellant even went to her house, met her
mother and uncle and showed to them a computer printout from Northwest
Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los Angeles, California,
USA on February 25, 1996.
Four days after their last meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called
her because her number was appearing in the appellants cellphone
documents. The caller asked if she knew him because they were trying to
locate him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his telephone bills in the
amount of P100,000.00. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the
matter. One (1) week before her scheduled flight on February 25, 1996, they
called up the appellant but he said he could not meet them because his
mother passed away. The appellant never showed up, prompting her to file a
complaint with the NBI for illegal recruitment.
Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a registered nurse, declared that she
first met the appellant on February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City
when Imelda Bamba introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that
he is an undercover agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has a
contact in the US embassy. The appellant told her that he could help her and
her companions Haidee Raullo, Geraldine Lagman and Imelda Bamba find
jobs in the US as staff nurses in home care centers.
On February 14, 1996 at about 6:30 in the evening, the appellant got her
passport and picture. The following day or on February 15, 1996, she gave
the appellant the amount of US$300.00 and a bottle of cognac as "grease
money" to facilitate the processing of her visa. When she asked for a receipt,
the appellant assured her that there is no need for one because she was
being directly hired as a nurse in the United States.
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She again met the appellant on February 19, 1996 at the Farmers Plaza and
this time, the appellant required her to submit photocopies of her college
diploma, nursing board certificate and PRC license. To show his sincerity, the
appellant insisted on meeting her father. They then proceeded to the office
of her father in Barrio Ugong, Pasig City and she introduced the appellant.
Thereafter, the appellant asked permission from her father to allow her to go
with him to the Northwest Airlines office in Ermita, Manila to reserve airline
tickets. The appellant was able to get a ticket confirmation and told her that
they will meet again the following day for her to give P10,000.00 covering
the half price of her plane ticket. Singh did not meet the appellant as agreed
upon. Instead, she went to Bamba to inquire if the latter gave the appellant
the same amount and found out that Bamba has not yet given the said
amount. They then paged the appellant through his beeper and told him that
they wanted to see him. However, the appellant avoided them and reasoned
out that he could not meet them as he had many things to do. When the
appellant did not show up, they decided to file a complaint for illegal
recruitment with the NBI.
The prosecution likewise presented the following documentary evidence:
Exh. "A" Certification dated February 23, 1998 issued by Hermogenes C.
Mateo, Director II, Licensing Branch, POEA.
Exh. "B" Affidavit of Alma E. Singh dated February 23, 1996.3
On the other hand, the case for the appellant, as culled from his Brief, is as
follows:
Accused JOSEPH JAMILOSA testified on direct examination that he got
acquainted with Imelda Bamba inside an aircon bus bound for Caloocan City
when the latter borrowed his cellular phone to call her office at Shoe Mart
(SM), North Edsa, Quezon City. He never told Bamba that he could get her a
job in Los Angeles, California, USA, the truth being that she wanted to leave
SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba
called him up several times, seeking advice from him if Los Angeles,
California is a good place to work as a nurse. He started courting Bamba and
they went out dating until the latter became his girlfriend. He met Geraldine
Lagman and Alma Singh at the Shoe Mart (SM), North Edsa, Quezon City thru
Imelda Bamba. As complainants were all seeking advice on how they could
apply for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Imelda
Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh sign separate certifications on
January 17, 1996 (Exh. "2"), January 22, 1996 (Exh. "4"), and February 19,
1996 (Exh. "3"), respectively, all to the effect that he never recruited them
and no money was involved. Bamba filed an Illegal Recruitment case against
him because they quarreled and separated. He came to know for the first
time that charges were filed against him in September 1996 when a
preliminary investigation was conducted by Fiscal Daosos of the
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Department of Justice. (TSN, October 13, 1999, pp. 3-9 and TSN, December
8, 1999, pp. 2-9)4
On November 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.5 The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in large scale; accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), plus costs.
Accused is ordered to indemnify each of the complainants, Imelda Bamba,
Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh the amount of Three Hundred US Dollars
($300.00).
SO ORDERED.6
In rejecting the defenses of the appellant, the trial court declared:
To counter the version of the prosecution, accused claims that he did not
recruit the complainants for work abroad but that it was they who sought his
advice relative to their desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles, California, USA
and thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them sign
three certifications, Exh. "2," "3" and "4," which in essence state that
accused never recruited them and that there was no money involved.
Accuseds contention simply does not hold water. Admittedly, he executed
and submitted a counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation at the
Department of Justice, and that he never mentioned the aforesaid
certifications, Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 in said counter-affidavit. These
certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed against him.
Knowing that he was already being charged for prohibited recruitment, why
did he not bring out these certifications which were definitely favorable to
him, if the same were authentic. It is so contrary to human nature that one
would suppress evidence which would belie the charge against him.
Denials of the accused can not stand against the positive and categorical
narration of each complainant as to how they were recruited by accused who
had received some amounts from them for the processing of their papers.
Want of receipts is not fatal to the prosecutions case, for as long as it has
been shown, as in this case, that accused had engaged in prohibited
recruitment. (People v. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574).
That accused is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment, is shown in the Certification issued by POEA, Exh. "A."
In fine, the offense committed by the accused is Illegal Recruitment in large
scale, it having been committed against three (3) persons, individually. 7
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Appellant appealed the decision to this Court on the following assignment of

error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY THE
PROSECUTION.8
According to appellant, the criminal Information charging him with illegal
recruitment specifically mentioned the phrase "for a fee," and as such,
receipts to show proof of payment are indispensable. He pointed out that the
three (3) complaining witnesses did not present even one receipt to prove
the alleged payment of any fee. In its eagerness to cure this "patent flaw,"
the prosecution resorted to presenting the oral testimonies of complainants
which were "contrary to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary habits of
life [under Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence] and defied
credulity." Appellant also pointed out that complainants testimony that they
paid him but no receipts were issued runs counter to the presumption under
Section [3](d), Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence that persons take ordinary
care of their concern. The fact that complainants were not able to present
receipts lends credence to his allegation that it was they who sought advice
regarding their desire to apply for jobs in Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus,
thinking that he might be charged as a recruiter, he made them sign three
(3) certifications stating that he never recruited them and there was no
money involved. On the fact that the trial court disregarded the certifications
due to his failure to mention them during the preliminary investigation at the
Department of Justice (DOJ), appellant pointed out that there is no provision
in the Rules of Court which bars the presentation of evidence during the
hearing of the case in court. He also pointed out that the counter-affidavit
was prepared while he was in jail "and probably not assisted by a lawyer."9
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that
the absence of receipts signed by appellant acknowledging receipt of the
money and liquor from the complaining witnesses cannot defeat the
prosecution and conviction for illegal recruitment. The OSG insisted that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt
via the collective testimonies of the complaining witnesses, which the trial
court found credible and deserving of full probative weight. It pointed out
that appellant failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of the complaining
witnesses to falsely charge him of illegal recruitment.
On appellants claim that the complaining witness Imelda Bamba was his
girlfriend, the OSG averred:
Appellants self-serving declaration that Imelda is his girlfriend and that she
filed a complaint for illegal recruitment after they quarreled and separated is
simply preposterous. No love letters or other documentary evidence was
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presented by appellant to substantiate such claim which could be made with

facility. Imelda has no reason to incriminate appellant except to seek justice.
The evidence shows that Alma and Geraldine have no previous quarrel with
appellant. Prior to their being recruited by appellant, Alma and Geraldine
have never met appellant. It is against human nature and experience for
private complainants to conspire and accuse a stranger of a most serious
crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. (People v. Coral, 230 SCRA 499, 510
[1994])10
The OSG posited that the appellants reliance on the
certifications11 purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses is
misplaced, considering that the certifications are barren of probative weight.
On February 23, 2005, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the CA.12 On
June 22, 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC.13
The OSG filed a Supplemental Brief, while the appellant found no need to file
one.
The appeal has no merit.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and
placement as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally
or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when
undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or
non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x
Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
contracts shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.14 Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as
a group.15
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To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to

prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook
a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group.16 As gleaned from the collective testimonies of the
complaining witnesses which the trial court and the appellate court found to
be credible and deserving of full probative weight, the prosecution mustered
the requisite quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Indeed, the findings of the trial
court, affirmed on appeal by the CA, are conclusive on this Court absent
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misunderstood, or misapplied
substantial fact or other circumstance.
The failure of the prosecution to adduce in evidence any receipt or document
signed by appellant where he acknowledged to have received money and
liquor does not free him from criminal liability. Even in the absence of money
or other valuables given as consideration for the "services" of appellant, the
latter is considered as being engaged in recruitment activities.
It can be gleaned from the language of Article 13(b) of the Labor Code that
the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the
accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment.17 As the Court held in People v. Sagaydo:18
Such is the case before us. The complainants parted with their money upon
the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that
she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. In the end,
complainants were neither able to leave for work abroad nor get their money
back.
The fact that private complainants Rogelio Tibeb and Jessie Bolinao failed to
produce receipts as proof of their payment to accused-appellant does not
free the latter from liability. The absence of receipts cannot defeat a criminal
prosecution for illegal recruitment. As long as the witnesses can positively
show through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one
involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense
despite the absence of receipts.19
Appellants reliance on the certifications purportedly signed by the
complaining witnesses Imelda Bamba, Alma Singh and Geraldine Lagman20 is
misplaced. Indeed, the trial court and the appellate court found the
certifications barren of credence and probative weight. We agree with the
following pronouncement of the appellate court:
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Anent the claim of the appellant that the trial court erred in not giving weight
to the certifications (Exhs. "2," "3" & "4") allegedly executed by the
complainants to the effect that he did not recruit them and that no money
was involved, the same deserves scant consideration.
The appellant testified that he was in possession of the said certifications at
the time the same were executed by the complainants and the same were
always in his possession; however, when he filed his counter-affidavit during
the preliminary investigation before the Department of Justice, he did not
mention the said certifications nor attach them to his counteraffidavit.lavvphil.net
We find it unbelievable that the appellant, a college graduate, would not
divulge the said certifications which would prove that, indeed, he is not an
illegal recruiter. By failing to present the said certifications prior to the trial,
the appellant risks the adverse inference and legal presumption that, indeed,
such certifications were not genuine. When a party has it in his possession or
power to produce the best evidence of which the case in its nature is
susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the evidence is
withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his
evil or fraudulent purpose. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:
"x x x These certifications were allegedly executed before charges were filed
against him. Knowing that he was already being charged for prohibited
recruitment, why did he not bring out these certifications which were
definitely favorable to him, if the same were authentic. It is so contrary to
human nature that one would suppress evidence which would belie the
charge against him." (Emphasis Ours)21
At the preliminary investigation, appellant was furnished with copies of the
affidavits of the complaining witnesses and was required to submit his
counter-affidavit. The complaining witnesses identified him as the culprit who
"recruited" them. At no time did appellant present the certifications
purportedly signed by the complaining witnesses to belie the complaint
against him. He likewise did not indicate in his counter-affidavit that the
complaining witnesses had executed certifications stating that they were not
recruited by him and that he did not receive any money from any of them.
He has not come forward with any valid excuse for his inaction. It was only
when he testified in his defense that he revealed the certifications for the
first time. Even then, appellant lied when he claimed that he did not submit
the certifications because the State Prosecutor did not require him to submit
any counter-affidavit, and that he was told that the criminal complaint would
be dismissed on account of the failure of the complaining witnesses to
appear during the preliminary investigation. The prevarications of appellant
were exposed by Public Prosecutor Pedro Catral on cross-examination, thus:
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Q Mr. Witness, you said that a preliminary investigation [was] conducted by

the Department of Justice through State Prosecutor Daosos. Right?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Were you requested to file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir. I was required.
Q Did you file your Counter-Affidavit?
A Yes, Sir, but he did not accept it.
Q Why?
A Because he said "never mind" because the witness is not appearing so he
dismissed the case.
Q Are you sure that he did not accept your Counter-Affidavit, Mr. Witness?
A I dont know of that, Sir.
Q If I show you that Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared, will you be able
to identify the same, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I will show you the Counter-Affidavit dated June 16, 1997 filed by one
Joseph J. Jamilosa, will you please go over this and tell if this is the same
Counter-Affidavit you said you prepared and you are going to file with the
investigating state prosecutor?
A Yes, Sir. This the same Counter-Affidavit.
Q There is a signature over the typewritten name Joseph J. Jamilosa, will you
please go over this and tell this Honorable Court if this is your signature, Mr.
Witness?
A Yes, Sir. This is my signature.
Q During the direct examination you were asked to identify [the] Certification
as Exh. "2" dated January 17, 1996, allegedly issued by Bamba, one of the
complainants in this case, when did you receive this Certification issued by
Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A That is the date, Sir.
Q You mean the date appearing in the Certification.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was this handed to you by Imelda Bamba, Mr. Witness?
A At SM North Edsa, Sir.
Q During the direct examination you were also asked to identify a
Certification Exh. "3" for the defense dated February 19, 1996, allegedly
issued by Alma Singh, one of the complainants in this case, will you please
ELS: Labor Law 1
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go over this and tell us when did Alma Singh allegedly issue to you this
Certification?
A On February 19, 1996, Sir.
Q And also during the direct examination, you were asked to identify a
Certification which was already marked as Exh. "4" for the defense dated
January 22, 1996 allegedly issued by Geraldine M. Lagman, one of the
complainants in this case, will you please tell the court when did Geraldine
Lagman give you this Certification?
A January 22, 1996, Sir.
Q During that time, January 22, 1996, January 17, 1996 and February 19,
1996, you were in possession of all these Certification. Correct, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q These were always in your possession. Right?
A Yes, Sir, with my papers.
Q Do you know when did the complainants file cases against you?
A I dont know, Sir.
Q Alright. I will read to you this Counter-Affidavit of yours, and I quote "I,
Joseph Jamilosa, of legal age, married and resident of Manila City Jail, after
having duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and states that:
1) the complainants sworn under oath to the National Bureau of Investigation
that I recruited them and paid me certain sums of money assuming that
there is truth in those allegation of this (sic) complainants. The charge filed
by them should be immediately dismissed for certain lack of merit in their
Sworn Statement to the NBI Investigator; 2) likewise, the complainants
allegation is not true and I never recruited them to work abroad and that
they did not give me money, they asked me for some help so I [helped] them
in assisting and processing the necessary documents, copies for getting US
Visa; 3) the complainant said under oath that they can show a receipt to
prove that they can give me sums or amount of money. That is a lie. They
sworn (sic), under oath, that they can show a receipt that I gave to them to
prove that I got the money from them. I asked the kindness of the state
prosecutor to ask the complainants to show and produce the receipts that I
gave to them that was stated in the sworn statement of the NBI; 4) the
allegation of the complainants that the charges filed by them should be
dismissed because I never [received] any amount from them and they can
not show any receipt that I gave them," Manila City Jail, Philippines, June 16,
1997. So, Mr. Witness, June 16, 1997 is the date when you prepared this.
Correct?
A Yes, Sir.
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Q Now, my question to you, Mr. Witness, you said that you have with you all
the time the Certification issued by [the] three (3) complainants in this case,
did you allege in your Counter-Affidavit that this Certification you said you
claimed they issued to you?
A I did not say that, Sir.
Q So, it is not here in your Counter-Affidavit?
A None, Sir.
Q What is your educational attainment, Mr. Witness?
A I am a graduate of AB Course Associate Arts in 1963 at the University of
the East.
Q You said that the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice did not
accept your Counter-Affidavit, are you sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you receive a copy of the dismissal which you said it was dismissed?
A No, Sir. I did not receive anything.
Q Did you receive a resolution from the Department of Justice?
A No, Sir.
Q Did you go over the said resolution you said you received here?
A I just learned about it now, Sir.
Q Did you read the content of the resolution?
A Not yet, Sir. Its only now that I am going to read.
COURT
Q You said it was dismissed. Correct?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you receive a resolution of this dismissal?
A No, Your Honor.
FISCAL CATRAL
Q What did you receive?
A I did not receive any resolution, Sir. Its just now that I learned about the
finding.
Q You said you learned here in court, did you read the resolution filed against
you, Mr. Witness?
A I did not read it, Sir.
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Q Did you read by yourself the resolution made by State Prosecutor Daosos,
Mr. Witness?
A Not yet, Sir.
Q What did you take, if any, when you received the subpoena from this
court?
A I was in court already when I asked Atty. Usita to investigate this case.
Q You said a while ago that your Affidavit was not accepted by State
Prosecutor Daosos. Is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please read to us paragraph four (4), page two (2) of this
resolution of State Prosecutor Daosos.
(witness reading par. 4 of the resolution)
Alright. What did you understand of this paragraph 4, Mr. Witness?
A Probably, guilty to the offense charge.22
It turned out that appellant requested the complaining witnesses to sign the
certifications merely to prove that he was settling the cases:
COURT
Q These complainants, why did you make them sign in the certifications?
A Because one of the complainants told me to sign and they are planning to
sue me.
Q You mean they told you that they are filing charges against you and yet
you [made] them sign certifications in your favor, what is the reason why you
made them sign?
A To prove that Im settling this case.
Q Despite the fact that they are filing cases against you and yet you were
able to make them sign certifications?
A Only one person, Your Honor, who told me and he is not around.
Q But they all signed these three (3) certifications and yet they filed charges
against you and yet you made them sign certifications in your favor, so what
is the reason why you made them sign?
(witness can not answer)23
The Court notes that the trial court ordered appellant to refund US$300.00 to
each of the complaining witnesses. The ruling of the appellate court must be
modified. Appellant must pay only the peso equivalent of US$300.00 to each
of the complaining witnesses.
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IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of

the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Joseph Jamilosa for large
scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is hereby ordered to refund to
each of the complaining witnesses the peso equivalent of US$300.00. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LOURDES
VALENCIANO Y DACUBA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated July 24, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390 which upheld the Decision [2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 in Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 979851. The RTC convicted Lourdes Valenciano of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale.
The Facts
In May 1996, Lourdes Valenciano, claiming to be an employee of Middle East
International Manpower Resources, Inc., went with one Susie Caraeg to the
house of Agapito De Luna, and told him he could apply for a job in Taiwan. A
week later, De Luna went to Valenciano's house, there to be told to undergo
a medical examination, with the assurance that if there were a job order
abroad, he would be able to leave. He was also told that the placement fee
for his employment as a factory worker in Taiwan was PhP 70,000.
After passing the medical examination, De Luna paid Valenciano at the
latter's residence the following amounts: PhP 20,000 on June 21, 1996; PhP
20,000 on July 12, 1996; and PhP 30,000 on August 21, 1996. The first and
last payments were turned over by Valenciano to Teresita Imperial, who
issued the corresponding receipts, and the second payment was turned over
by Valenciano to Rodante Imperial, who also issued a receipt.
Also in May 1996, Valenciano visited the house of Allan De Villa,
accompanied by Euziel N. Dela Cuesta, Eusebio T. Candelaria, and De Luna,
to recruit De Villa as a factory worker in Taiwan. De Villa was also asked for
PhP 70,000 as placement fee. He paid Valenciano the following amounts: PhP
ELS: Labor Law 1
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20,000 on May 16, 1996 at Valenciano's residence; PhP 20,000 on May 30,
1996 at the Rural Bank of Calaca, Batangas; PhP 20,000 on July 8, 1996 at
Valenciano's residence; and PhP 10,000 on August 14, 1996, also at her
residence. Valenciano turned over the amounts to either Teresita or Rodante.
Teresita issued receipts for the May 16, July 8, and August 14, 1996
payments, while Rodante issued a receipt for the payment made on May 30,
1996.
On May 20, 1996, Valenciano, accompanied by Rodante and Puring Caraeg,
went to the house of Dela Cuesta to recruit her for employment as a factory
worker in Taiwan. Dela Cuesta paid Valenciano PhP 20,000 as initial payment
on May 20, 1996. On May 30, 1996, she paid Valenciano another PhP 20,000.
On August 12, 1996, she paid PhP 15,000, and on August 21, 1996, she paid
PhP 7,000. Valenciano turned the May 20 and 30, 1996 payments over to
Rodante, who issued receipts for these payments. The payments made on
August 12 and 21, 1996 were turned over to Teresita, who also issued
receipts for them. These payments were to cover the placement fee and
other expenses for the processing of the requirements for the employment of
Dela Cuesta in Taiwan.
On May 1, 1996, Valenciano, with Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel Imperial,
went to Lian, Batangas to recruit workers for employment abroad. Candelaria
applied for a job as a factory worker in Taiwan when Valenciano went to his
residence in Lian. Valenciano asked him for an initial payment of PhP 20,000.
On May 30, 1996, Candelaria paid Valenciano PhP 20,000 when she returned
to Lian. He then paid PhP 20,000 on June 24, 1996 and PhP 29,000 on July
17, 1996 at Valenciano's residence in Manila. These payments were to cover
the placement fee and the expenses for the processing of his passport and
other papers connected with his application for employment as a factory
worker in Taiwan. The payments made on May 30 and July 17, 1996 were
turned over to Rodante, who issued a receipt for the said payments. The
payment made on June 24, 1996 was turned over by Valenciano to Teresita.
After the payments were made, Valenciano brought the prospective workers
ELS: Labor Law 1
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to the office of Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc. in Pasay

City, where they were made to fill out application forms for their employment
as factory workers in Taiwan. The complainants were introduced to Romeo
Marquez, alias "Rodante Imperial," Teresita Marquez, alias "Teresita Imperial,"
and Rommel Marquez, alias "Rommel Imperial," whom Valenciano made to
appear as the owners of the employment agency. She assured the
prospective workers that they could leave for Taiwan within one month from
the filing of their applications. During the period material, they have not yet
found employment as factory workers in Taiwan.
Valenciano, Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel were charged with the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined under Article 13(b) of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, in relation to Art. 38(a), and penalized under Art.
39(c) of the Code, as amended by PD 1920 and PD 2018. The Information
reads as follows:
That sometime in May, 1996 to August, 1996, or thereabout, in the City of
Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, representing to have the capacity,
authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for
overseas employment, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping each
other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit and
promise to deploy the herein complainants, namely, Agapito R. De Luna,
Allan Ilagan De Villa, Euziel N. Dela Cuesta and Eusebio T. Candelaria, as
factory workers in Taiwan, in exchange for placement, processing and other
fees ranging from P62,000.00 to P70,000.00 or a total of P271,000.00,
without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Accused-appellant Valenciano pleaded not guilty and waived the pre-trial.
The other three accused remained at large.
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The RTC found accused-appellant guilty, the dispositive portion of the

decision reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Lourdes Valenciano y Dacuba is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale as
charged in the aforequoted Information; and she is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
She is also ordered to indemnify complainants Agapito R. de Luna, Allan
Ilagan de Villa, Euziel N. dela Cuesta and Eusebio T. Candelaria the amounts
of P70,000.00, P70,000.00, P62,000.00 and P69,000.00, respectively, as
reparation of the damage caused.
No other civil liability may be adjudged against the accused for lack of any
factual or legal basis therefor.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court, but the case was transferred to
the CA through a Resolution dated September 6, 2004, following People v.
Mateo.[5]
The CA, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390, affirmed the decision of the trial court
finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Hence, we have this appeal.
The Issues
Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors: (1) the lower
court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on reasonable doubt;
and (2) the lower court gravely erred in holding that a conspiracy exists
between accused-appellant and her co-accused.
The Court's Ruling
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The appeal is without merit.

In her defense, accused-appellant claims that she was an ordinary employee
of Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc., where her other coaccused were the owners and managers. She also denies receiving payment
from the complainants; that had she promised employment in Taiwan, this
promise was made in the performance of her duties as a clerk in the
company. She denies too having knowledge of the criminal intent of her coaccused, adding that she might even be regarded as a victim in the present
case, as she was in good faith when she made the promise.
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code reads:
"Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38(a) and (b) of the Labor Code reads as follows:
(a)
Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices

enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by nonlicensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
(b)
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale

shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall
be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out

by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
ELS: Labor Law 1
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transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph

hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.
Art. 39(a) provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of PhP
100,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined above.
The claim of accused-appellant that she was a mere employee of her other
co-accused does not relieve her of liability. An employee of a company or
corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal,
together with his employer, if it is shown that the employee actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.[6] As testified to by the
complainants, accused-appellant was among those who met and transacted
with them regarding the job placement offers. In some instances, she made
the effort to go to their houses to recruit them. She even gave assurances
that they would be able to find employment abroad and leave for Taiwan
after the filing of their applications. Accused-appellant was clearly engaged
in recruitment activities, notwithstanding her gratuitous protestation that her
actions were merely done in the course of her employment as a clerk.
Accused-appellant cannot claim to be merely following the dictates of her
employers and use good faith as a shield against criminal liability. As held
in People v. Gutierrez:
Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that
before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she should first
be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum
prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a defense.[7]
The claim of accused-appellant that she received no payment and that the
payments were handed directly over to her co-accused fails in the face of the
testimony of the complainants that accused-appellant was the one who
received the money. In spite of the receipts having been issued by her coaccused, the trial court found that payments were directly made to accused-
ELS: Labor Law 1
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appellant, and this finding was upheld by the CA. Nothing is more entrenched
than the rule that where, as here, the findings of fact of the trial court are
affirmed by the CA, these are final and conclusive upon this Court. [8] And
even if it were true that no money changed hands, money is not material to
a prosecution for illegal recruitment, as the definition of "recruitment and
placement" in the Labor Code includes the phrase, "whether for profit or
not." We held in People v. Jamilosa that it was "sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal
recruitment."[9] Accused-appellant made representations that complainants
would receive employment abroad, and this suffices for her conviction, even
if her name does not appear on the receipts issued to complainants as
evidence that payment was made.
Neither accused-appellant nor her co-accused had authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. The Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), through its employee, Corazon Aquino, issued on July
8, 1997 the following certification to that effect:
This is to certify that per available records of this Office, MIDDLE EAST
INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER RESOURCES INC., with office address at 2119 P.
Burgos St., cor. Gil Puyat Ave., Pasay City represented by SAPHIA CALAMATA
ASAAD is a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on October 13,
1996. Per record, said agency has not filed any application for renewal of
license.
Per available records, the names of RODANTE IMPERIAL a.k.a. ROMEO
MARQUEZ, TERESITA IMPERIAL a.k.a. TERESITA MARQUEZ, ROMMEL
MARQUEZ a.k.a. ROMMEL IMPERIAL and LOURDES VALENCIANO do not
appear on the list of employees submitted by agency.
This certification is being issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve.[10]
Another certification dated July 9, 1997 stated that accused-appellant in her
personal capacity was not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment and that any recruitment activities undertaken by her
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are illegal.[11] Accused-appellant could thus point to no authority allowing her

to recruit complainants, as she was not an employee of Middle East
International Manpower Resources, Inc. nor was she allowed to do so in her
personal capacity. Furthermore, she undertook recruitment activities outside
the premises of the office of a licensed recruitment agency, which can only
be done with the prior approval of the POEA, and neither she nor her coaccused had permission to do so, as testified by Aquino of the POEA.[12]
Accused-appellant was convicted of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and
there could be no other result. As held in Jamilosa:
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to
prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook
a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the
and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
individually or as a group.[13] x x x
The RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment activities,
and this was affirmed by the CA. A POEA certification was submitted stating
that accused-appellant was not authorized to recruit applicants for overseas
employment, and she did not contest this certification. In the present case,
there are four complainants: De Luna, De Villa, Dela Cuesta, and Candelaria.
The three essential elements for illegal recruitment in large scale are
present. Thus, there can be no other conclusion in this case but to uphold the
conviction of accused-appellant and apply the penalty as imposed by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the appealed CA Decision
dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390, with no costs.
SO ORDERED.
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FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 184058, March 10, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. MELISSA CHUA, APPELLANT.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale)
and was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. She
was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted only for three.
The Court of Appeals, by Decision[1] dated February 27, 2008, affirmed
appellant's conviction.
The Information[2] charging appellant, together with one Josie Campos (Josie),
with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), docketed as Criminal Case No. 04222596, reads:
The undersigned accuses JOSIE CAMPOS and MELISSA CHUA of violation of
Article 38 (a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions of Book I, PD 442,
otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, in relation to Art.
13 (b) and (c ) of said Code, as further amended by PD Nos. 1693, 1920 and
2019 and as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042
committed in a [sic] large scale as follows:
That sometime during the month of September, 2002, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, representing themselves to have the capacity
to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit and
promise employment/job placement abroad to ERIK DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN
O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR., HARRY JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C.
ANGELES for overseas employment abroad without first having secured the
required license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required
by law, and charge or accept directly from:
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ERIK DE GUIA TAN
P73,000
.00
MARILYN D.
MACARANAS
83,000.
00
NAPOLEON H. YU, JR.
23,000.
00
HARRY JAMES P. KING
23,000.
00
ROBERTO C. ANGELES -
23,000.
00
Twenty19
For purposes of their deployment, which amounts are in excess of or greater

than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as prescribed by the
POEA, and without valid reasons and without the fault of said complainants,
failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred in
connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their
deployment.
xxxx
The five Informations[3] charging appellant and Josie with Estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 04-222597-601, were similarly worded and varied only
with respect to the names of the five complainants and the amount that each
purportedly gave to the accused. Thus each of the Information reads:
xxxx
That on or about . . . in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud xxx in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations
which they made to the said . . . to the effect that they had the power and
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capacity to recruit the latter as factory worker to work in Taiwan and could
facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary
amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar
deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said xxx to give and deliver, as
in fact he gave and delivered to the said accused the amount of . . . on the
strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well
knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to
obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of . . . which amount once in
their possession, with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal
use and benefit, to the damage of said . . . in the aforesaid amount of . . .,
Philippine Currency.
xxxx
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie remained
at large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded only with
respect to appellant.
Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D. Macaranas
(Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King (King). The substance
of their respective testimonies follows:
Marilyn's testimony:
After she was introduced in June 2002 by Josie to appellant as capacitated to
deploy factory workers to Taiwan, she paid appellant P80,000 as placement
fee and P3,750 as medical expenses fee, a receipt[4] for the first amount of
which was issued by appellant.
Appellant had told her that she could leave for Taiwan in the last week of
September 2002 but she did not, and despite appellant's assurance that she
would leave in the first or second week of October, just the same she did not.
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She thus asked for the refund of the amount she paid but appellant claimed
that she was not in possession thereof but promised anyway to raise the
amount to pay her, but she never did.
She later learned in June 2003 that appellant was not a licensed recruiter,
prompting her to file the complaint against appellant and Josie.
Tan's testimony:
After he was introduced by Josie to appellant at the Golden Gate, Inc.,
(Golden Gate) an agency situated in Paragon Tower Hotel in Ermita, Manila,
he underwent medical examination upon appellant's assurance that he could
work in Taiwan as a factory worker with a guaranteed monthly salary of
15,800 in Taiwan currency.
He thus paid appellant, on September 6, 2002, P70,000[5] representing
placement fees for which she issued a receipt. Appellant welched on her
promise to deploy him to Taiwan, however, hence, he demanded the refund
of his money but appellant failed to. He later learned that Golden Gate was
not licensed to deploy workers to Taiwan, hence, he filed the complaint
against appellant and Josie.
King's testimony:
His friend and a fellow complainant Napoleon Yu introduced him to Josie who
in turn introduced appellant as one who could deploy him to Taiwan.
On September 24, 2002,[6] he paid appellant P20,000 representing partial
payment for placement fees amounting to P80,000, but when he later
inquired when he would be deployed, Golden Gate's office was already
closed. He later learned that Golden Gate's license had already expired,
prompting him to file the complaint.
Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as a temporary
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cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by
one Marilyn Calueng,[7] she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed
recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent.
Admitting having received P80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of
which she issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed
that she turned over the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene
Vega, who in turn remitted the money to Marilyn Calueng whose present
whereabouts she did not know.
By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC convicted appellant
of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused Melissa
Chua beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the
accused as principal of a large scale illegal recruitment and estafa three (3)
counts and she is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment.
The accused is likewise convicted of estafa committed against Harry James P.
King and she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Six (6) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum; in Criminal Case No. 0422598; in Criminal Case No. 04-222600 committed against Marilyn
Macaranas, accused is sentence [sic] to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and in
Criminal Case No. 04-222601 committed against Erik de Guia Tan, she is
likewise sentence [sic] to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years
and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Eleven (11) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused Melissa Chua is also ordered to return the amounts of P20,000.00 to
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Harry James P. King, P83,750.00 to Marilyn D. Macaranas, and P70,000.00 to

Erik de Guia Tan.
As regards Criminal Cases Nos. 04-222597 and 04-222599, both are
dismissed for lack of interest of complainants Roberto Angeles and Napoleon
Yu, Jr.
In the service of her sentence, the accused is credited with the full period of
preventive imprisonment if she agrees in writing to abide by the disciplinary
rules imposed, otherwise only 4/5 shall be credited.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals, as stated early on, affirmed the trial court's decision by
the challenged Decision of February 27, 2008, it holding that appellant's
defense that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money
which was ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having
failed to prove the existence of an employment relationship between her and
Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden Gate and the
extent of her involvement therein.
Citing People v. Sagayaga,[8] the appellate court ruled that an employee of a
company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal
together with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of appellant,
actively and consciously participated therein.
Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a person
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of Estafa as
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, held
that the elements thereof were sufficiently established, viz: that appellant
deceived the complainants by assuring them of employment in Taiwan
provided they pay the required placement fee; that relying on such
representation, the complainants paid appellant the amount demanded; that
her representation turned out to be false because she failed to deploy them
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as promised; and that the complainants suffered damages when they failed
to be reimbursed the amounts they paid.
Hence, the present appeal, appellant reiterating the same arguments she
raised in the appellate court.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The term "recruitment and placement" is defined under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code of the Philippines as follows:
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not. Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended,
under which appellant was charged, provides:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code,
to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The
Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall
be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be
penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
ELS: Labor Law 1
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group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is
deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group. (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be
undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts, or as in the present
case, an agency with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. And illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
or more persons individually or as a group.
Thus for illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to
prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the
and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more
persons individually or as a group.[9]
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a
cashier from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit
workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden
Gate's license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the
roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the
complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation
that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad. In the
absence of any evidence that the complainants were motivated by improper
motives, the trial court's assessment of their credibility shall not be
interfered with by the Court.[10]
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Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not
make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as
principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown
that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process. [11]
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the
recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability either.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or
"The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a
violation of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus
immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa,
convicted of such offense.
[I]llegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is malum in
se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction. In the second, such an intent is
imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by
using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.[12] (emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179931
Appellee,
Present:
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QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus -
CARPIO,*
CARPIO MORALES,
BRION, and
ABAD, JJ.
NIDA ADESER y RICO,
Promulgated:
Appellant.
October 26, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated June 28, 2007, of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902, affirming the Decision [2] dated May 2,
2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 03-2700 and 03-2701. The RTC convicted appellant of the crimes
of syndicated illegal recruitment constituting economic sabotage and estafa.
On November 12, 2003, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay filed
before the RTC two Informations[3] against appellant Nida Adeser y Rico,
Lourdes Chang, and the spouses Roberto and Mel Tiongson. The Informations
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 03-2700
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That on or about and sometime in the month of May, 2003, in

Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, by
means of false representation and fraudulent allegation to the
effect that they could secure employment abroad for
complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee aforesaid person
without the corresponding license from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, a syndicated illegal recruitment
involving economic sabotage.
Contrary to law.[4]
Criminal Case No. 03-2701
That on or about and sometime in the month of May, 2003, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another,
defrauded private complainant JOSEPHINE R. PALO, in the
following manner to wit: that said accused, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations that they could
facilitate private complainants working and travel papers, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously ask, demand
and receive from the said complainant the amount of P80,000.00
as placement fee for the latters supposed deployment to
Australia as Apple Picker/Office Worker; and said private
complainant carried away by said misrepresentations, in fact
gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P80,000.00,
which amount accused in turn misapplied, misappropriated and
converted to their own personal use and benefit, failing,
however, to deploy private complainant to Australia, and despite
repeated demands accused failed and refused to do so, or
account for the said amount, to the damage and prejudice of the
said private complainant in the aforesaid amount of P80,000.00.
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Contrary to law.[5]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty[6] to both charges while

her co-accused remained at large. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Private complainant Josephine R. Palo and her sister Teresa Caraig
testified that sometime in November 2002, the spouses Roberto and Mel
Tiongson, agents of Naples Travel and Tours, introduced Palo to appellant,
owner and general manager of Naples, to discuss employment opportunities
in Australia.During their meeting held at the Naples office
in Villaruel Tower, Villaruel Street, Pasay City, appellant and the spouses
Tiongson informed Palo that for a placement fee of P80,000, she can work as
an apple picker in Australia with a monthly salary of $1,400.
Thus, on November 8, 2002, Palo and Caraig went to the Naples office
and gave Roberto Tiongson and Lourdes Chang, operations manager
of Naples,P15,000 as first installment for the placement fee. Palo was issued
a voucher[7] signed by Roberto and Chang stating therein that the P15,000
was for Palos visa application.
On November 11, 2002, Palo and Caraig returned to the Naples office
and paid P58,500. She was again issued a voucher[8] signed by Roberto and
Chang stating therein that the amount paid was for Palos visa
application. Palo insisted that the voucher should indicate that her payments
were for placement fees but they were able to convince her that it is not
necessary because they know her.
After making her payments, she was required to submit her resume
and pictures and was promised that she would be employed within three
months.
More than three months passed, however, but Palo was not deployed
to Australia. Neither did she get her Australian visa.
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In May 2003, she learned from the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) that Naples had closed down. NBI likewise informed her
that Naples had no license to operate and deploy workers abroad. Upon
advice of the NBI, Palo filed a complaint[9] against appellant, the spouses
Tiongson and Chang.
Appellant on the other hand denied the charges against her. She
admitted that she was the owner and general manager of Naples which was
a travel agency that offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation,
airport transfer and courier services, but denied having engaged in
recruitment. She claimed that she cannot remember meeting Palo in her
office and asserted that she met her for the first time only at the fiscals
office when Palo was already claiming for a refund. She testified that
Roberto, to whom Palo claims to have given her payment, was neither her
employee nor her agent but was only her drivers brother.Based on her
records, Roberto endorsed to her office P30,000 from Palo for tourist visa
assistance. Appellant also admitted that she and Roberto offered to settle
the P30,000 but not the amount claimed by Palo per vouchers issued to her.
On May 2, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision finding appellant
guilty of both charges. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered NIDA ADESER is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Syndicated Illegal Recruitment constituting Economic Sabotage
in Criminal Case No. 03-2700 and Estafa in Criminal Case No. 032701. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
following penalties:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 3-2700 LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and a FINE of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), and
2.
In Criminal Case No. 03-2701 Indeterminate
imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 13 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
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indemnify Josephine R. Palo the sum of Eighty Thousand Pesos

(P80,000.00) with legal interest from the time of the filing of the
information.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Appellant appealed her conviction but the same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 28, 2007. The appellate court did
not give credence to appellants denials and found that the prosecution
evidence fully supports the finding that appellant and her co-accused
engaged in recruitment and placement as defined under the Labor Code
despite having no authority to do so. It likewise held that the same evidence
proving the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment also established
that appellant and her co-accused acted in unity in defrauding Palo and in
misrepresenting to her that upon payment of the placement fee, they could
obtain employment abroad for her. The appellants act of deception and the
resultant damage suffered by Palo render appellant guilty of estafa.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:
THE [APPELLATE] COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[11]
Essentially, the issue is whether appellants guilt for the crimes of

syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant argues that she was able to prove that she was not part of
the group that defrauded Palo. She points out that as can be gleaned from
the facts established and even from Palos testimony, she was not involved in
ELS: Labor Law 1
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the evil scheme orchestrated by Roberto and Chang as her signature did not
even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo.
Appellant likewise contends that the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment were not established with moral certainty. Naples was never into
recruitment as it was only engaged in the business of assisting clients
procure passports and visas. She argues that it should be Roberto and Chang
who should be convicted as she had no hand in recruiting Palo.
Appellants arguments are bereft of merit.
Illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1)
the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable
them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and
(2) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning
of recruitment and placementdefined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited
practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b),
recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes
or abroad, whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment
is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give
the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.[12] The law imposes a higher penalty when the crime
is committed by a syndicate as it is considered as an offense involving
economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article
38 of the Labor Code.[13]
Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case is illegal recruitment
by a syndicate. As categorically testified by Palo and Caraig, appellant,
together with her co-accused, made representations to Palo that they could
ELS: Labor Law 1
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send her to Australia to work as an apple picker. There is no denying that

they gave Palo the distinct impression that they had the power or ability to
send her abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to part with a
huge amount of money as placement fee in order to be employed. And this
act was committed by appellant and her co-accused even if they did not
have the required license to do so.Appellant herself admitted that Naples,
the travel agency which she owned and managed, only offered visa
assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and courier
services. Clearly, neither she nor her agents had a license to recruit Palo to
work abroad. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders
the recruitment unlawful or criminal.[14]
Thus, as against the positive and categorical testimonies of Palo and
Caraig, appellants denials cannot prevail.[15] Moreover, there is no reason to
overturn the trial and appellate courts findings on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses as there is no showing that any of them had ill
motives against appellant or her co-accused and especially since it appears
they were motivated solely by the desire to bring appellant and her coaccused to justice for the crimes they have committed.[16]
Neither can this Court sustain appellants contention that her
participation in the recruitment is negated by the fact that her signature
does not even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not
present receipts signed by appellant, this would not rule out the fact that
appellant did receive the money. This Court has consistently ruled that
absence of receipts as to the amounts delivered to a recruiter does not mean
that the recruiter did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the
Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts
required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the
procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from
the credible testimonies of witnesses[17] as in the case at bar.
We likewise uphold appellants conviction for estafa. A person who is
convicted of illegal recruitment may also be convicted of estafa under Article
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315(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are
present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name,
or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar
deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means of the accused and as a result thereof, the offended
party suffered damage.[18]
Such is the case before us. Palo parted with her money upon the
prodding and enticement of appellant and her co-accused on the false
pretense that they had the capacity to deploy her for employment
in Australia. Unfortunately, however, Palo was not able to work abroad nor
get her Australian visa.Worse, she did not get her money back.
As to the penalties, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042[19] or the
Migrant Workers Act of 1995 provides the penalties for illegal recruitment:
SEC. 7. Penalties.
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine
not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor
more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
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As appellant was found guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment

constituting economic sabotage, she was aptly meted out the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.
With respect to the estafa case, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
xxxx
Considering that the total amount paid by Palo is P73,500 or P51,500 in
excess of the P22,000 limit, an additional sentence of five years should be
imposed based on the above-quoted provision. Thus, appellant was correctly
meted the maximum penalty of 13 years of reclusion temporal.
As to the amount to be indemnified to Palo, contrary to the findings of
the trial and appellate courts, Palos testimony and the vouchers she
presented establish that the total amount she paid is only P73,500[20] and
not the P80,000 quoted as placement fee. Thus, she should only be
indemnified the said amount, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from the
time of filing of the information.[21]
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WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28,

2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01902 is
herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The amount to be indemnified to
private complainant Josephine R. Palo is reduced to Seventy-Three Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (P73,500) with legal interest of 12% per annum from the
time of filing of the information until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 176169, November 14, 2008 ]
ROSARIO NASI-VILLAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Rosario Nasi-Villar assailing the Decision[2] dated 27 June 2005 and
Resolution[3] dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals. This case
originated from an Information[4] for Illegal Recruitment as defined under
Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042[5] filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao del Sur on
5 October 1998 for acts committed by petitioner and one Dolores Placa in or
about January 1993. The Information reads:
That on [sic] or about the month of [January 1993], in the Municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another through fraudulent
representation and deceitful machination, did then and there [willfully],
unlawfully and feloniously recruit Nila Panilag for employment abroad[,]
demand and receive the amount of P6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as
placement fee[,] the said accused being a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority to engage in the recruitment of workers abroad to the damage and
prejudice of the herein offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
On 3 July 2002, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 18, Digos
City, Davao del Sur found the evidence presented by the prosecution to be
more credible than that presented by the defense and thus held petitioner
liable for the offense of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, as
amended.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
ELS: Labor Law 1
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused ROSARIO

NASI-VILLAR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Illegal Recruitment and,
in accordance with the penalty set forth under the Labor Code, as amended,
said accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
FOUR YEARS as minimum to FIVE YEARS as maximum.
On the civil aspect of the case, there being no substantial proof presented to
justify a grant of civil damages, this Court makes no pronouncement thereon.
With respect to accused Ma. Dolores Placa, who is still at large, the records of
this case are hereby sent to the archives to be retrieved in the event that
said accused would be apprehended. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the
apprehension of said accused.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising as sole issue the alleged
error by the trial court in finding her guilty of illegal recruitment on the basis
of the trial court's appreciation of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 June 2005,[9] following the
principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open
for review, noted that the criminal acts alleged to have been committed
happened sometime in 1993. However, R.A. No. 8042, under which
petitioner was charged, was approved only on 7 June 1995 and took effect on
15 July 1995. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared that petitioner should have
been charged under the Labor Code, in particular Art. 13(b) thereof, and not
under R.A. No. 8042. Accordingly, it made its findings on the basis of the
provisions of the Labor Code and found petitioner liable under Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 13(b), and Art. 39 of the Labor Code. The appellate court
affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, decreeing in the
dispositive portion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Br. 18, City of Digos, Province of
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Davao del Sur, finding Rosario Nasi-Villar guilty beyond reasonable doubt o
the crime of Illegal Recruitment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
Rosario Nasi-Villar isORDERED to pay Nila Panilag the sum of P10,000.00 as
temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On 28 November 2006, the appellate court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.[11]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider that
R.A. No. 8042 cannot be given retroactive effect and that the decision of the
RTC constitutes a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto law. Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in January 1993 when the
crime was allegedly committed, petitioner argues that law cannot be used as
the basis of filing a criminal action for illegal recruitment. What was
applicable in 1993 is the Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in relation to Art.
39, the violation of the Code is penalized with imprisonment of not less than
four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than
P20,000.00 and not more than P100,000.00 or both. On the other hand, Sec.
7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes illegal recruitment with a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more
than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than P200,000.00 nor more than
P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment provided in the Labor Code
was raised or increased by R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner concludes that the
charge and conviction of an offense carrying a penalty higher than that
provided by the law at the time of its commission constitutes a violation of
the prohibition against ex post facto law and the retroactive application of
R.A. No. 8042.
In its Comment[12] dated 7 September 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) argues that the Court of Appeals' conviction of petitioner
ELS: Labor Law 1
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under the Labor Code is correct. While conceding that there was an
erroneous designation of the law violated by petitioner, the OSG stresses
that the designation of the offense in the Information is not determinative of
the nature and character of the crime charged against her but the acts
alleged in the Information. The allegations in the Information clearly charge
petitioner with illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in relation to Art.
13(b) of the Labor Code, and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the same Code.
The evidence on record substantiates the charge to a moral certainty. Thus,
while there was an erroneous specification of the law violated by petitioner in
the Information, the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's imposition of the
penalty for simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code, the OSG
concludes.
The petition is denied. We find no reversible error in the decision arrived at
by the Court of Appeals.
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[13] we held that the real nature of the crime
charged is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information
nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violatedthese
being conclusions of lawbut by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information. What controls is not the designation but the description of the
offense charged. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of
no concern to the accused what the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged is. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the body of
the information, in the manner stated, then he ought to be punished and
punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those
acts constitute.[14]
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner had performed the acts constituting the offense defined in Art. 38,
in relation to Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the Labor Code, as alleged
in the body of the Information. To prove illegal recruitment, two elements
must be shown, namely: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities, or any of the activities enumerated in
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and (2) said person does not have
a license or authority to do so.[15] Art. 13(b) defines "recruitment and
placement" as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising, or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons, is
considered engaged in recruitment and placement." The trial court found
these two elements had been proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has not
offered any argument or proof that countervails such findings.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is punishable under the law in force at
the time of its commission. Thus, petitioner can only be charged and found
guilty under the Labor Code which was in force in 1993 when the acts
attributed to her were committed. Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an
Information that erroneously designated the offense as covered by R.A. No.
8042, but alleged in its body acts which are punishable under the Labor
Code. As it was proven that petitioner had committed the acts she was
charged with, she was properly convicted under the Labor Code, and not
under R.A. No. 8042.
There is no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto law nor a
retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex post
facto law is one which, among others, aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed or changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed.[16]
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have
provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation
operate prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except
when they are favorable to the accused.[17]
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and gave a
new definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and provided for its higher
penalty. There is no indication in R.A. No. 8042 that said law, including the
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penalties provided therein, would take effect retroactively. A law can never
be considered ex post facto as long as it operates prospectively since its
strictures would cover only offenses committed after and not before its
enactment.[18] Neither did the trial court nor the appellate court give R.A. No.
8042 a retroactive application since both courts passed upon petitioner's
case only under the aegis of the Labor Code. The proceedings before the
trial court and the appellate court did not violate the prohibition against ex
post facto law nor involved a retroactive application of R.A. No. 8042 in any
way.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 27 June
2005 and Resolution dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009 ]
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, PETITIONER, VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and
communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided
health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They
have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from
country to country. They have provided the dynamic human link between
cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to
understand not only how much international migration impacts
development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect.
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon Global Forum on Migration
and Development Brussels, July 10, 2007[1]
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the
5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[2] to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not magnify the contributions of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) to
national development, but exacerbates the hardships borne by them by
unduly limiting their entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum
salary either for the unexpired portion of their employment contract "or for
ELS: Labor Law 1
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three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
(subject clause). Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs'
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives
them of equal protection and denies them due process.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
assails the December 8, 2004 Decision[3] and April 1, 2005 Resolution[4] of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which applied the subject clause, entreating this Court
to declare the subject clause unconstitutional.
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following
terms and conditions:
Duration of contract
12 months
Position
Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary
US$1,400.00
Hours of work
48.0 hours per week
Overtime
US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay
7.00 days per month[5]
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the
end of April 1998.[6]
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
[7]
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated
to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.[8]
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from
ELS: Labor Law 1
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March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on
May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three
(23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint[9] against respondents
for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total
amount of US$26,442.73, broken down as follows:
May 27/31, 1998 (5 days) incl. Leave US$ 413.90
pay
June 01/30, 1998
2,590.00
July 01/31, 1998
2,590.00
August 01/31, 1998
2,590.00
Sept. 01/30, 1998
2,590.00
Oct. 01/31, 1998
2,590.00
Nov. 01/30, 1998
2,590.00
Dec. 01/31, 1998
2,590.00
Jan. 01/31, 1999
2,590.00
Feb. 01/28, 1999
2,590.00
Mar. 1/19, 1999 (19 days) incl. leave

pay
1,640.00
25,382.23
Amount adjusted to chief mate's

salary
(March 19/31, 1998 to April 1/30,
1998) +
1,060.50[10]
TOTAL CLAIM
US$ 26,442.73[11]
ELS: Labor Law 1
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as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the
above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to
pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency,
based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount
of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US
$8,770.00), representing the complainant's salary for three (3)
months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of
employment.
The respondents are likewise ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner],
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of exchange
prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of FORTY FIVE U.S. DOLLARS
(US$ 45.00),[12] representing the complainant's claim for a salary differential.
In addition, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant,
jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, at the exchange rate prevailing
at the time of payment, the complainant's (petitioner's) claim for attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total amount awarded to the
aforesaid employee under this Decision.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis supplied)
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his
computation on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the
entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's
ELS: Labor Law 1
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employment contract - applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied

the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's "[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per
month."[14]
Respondents appealed[15] to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Petitioner also appealed[16] to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in
not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[17] that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contracts.[18]
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED. Respondents are
hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally, in Philippine
currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the
following:
1. Three (3) months salary
$1,400 x 3
2. Salary differential
US$4,200.00
45.00
US$4,245.00
3. 10% Attorney's fees
TOTAL
424.50
US$4,669.50
The other findings are affirmed.

SO ORDERED.[19]
ELS: Labor Law 1
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The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to
petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of
overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and
for vacation leave pay."[20]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause.[21] The NLRC denied the
motion.[22]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[23] with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause.[24] After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course
to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which
granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by
petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on
the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.[25]
His Motion for Reconsideration[26] having been denied by the CA,[27] petitioner
brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way
not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar
issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired
portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3)
months
II
ELS: Labor Law 1
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In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were
merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, it
is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed to
discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not theretofore
determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said law, which
unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the award for back
wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding
from petitioner's award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his
contract since under the contract they form part of his salary. [28]
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as
he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary
award for his medical treatment and medication.[29] Required to comment,
counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial
execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying
that the constitutional question be resolved.[30]
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the
Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What remains
disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to
ELS: Labor Law 1
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petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of
three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends
that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is
entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his
salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.[31]
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because it
unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their
overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a
fixed salary package.[32] It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it
treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a
cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of
illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local
workers when their dismissal is declared illegal; that the disparate treatment
is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two
groups;[33] and that it defeats Section 18,[34] Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees the protection of the rights and welfare of all Filipino workers,
whether deployed locally or overseas.[35]
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor
tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on
this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected
OFWs.[36]
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into
R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his
Memorandum, viz.:
Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the
payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on
its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign
employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for
money claims was reduced under Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042. [37] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that in mitigating the solidary liability of placement
agencies, the subject clause sacrifices the well-being of OFWs. Not only that,
the provision makes foreign employers better off than local employers
because in cases involving the illegal dismissal of employees, foreign
employers are liable for salaries covering a maximum of only three months
of the unexpired employment contract while local employers are liable for
the full lump-sum salaries of their employees. As petitioner puts it:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the
amount of backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally
dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving
the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months
unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can
be more than three (3) months.[38]
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process
clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is
entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.[39]
ELS: Labor Law 1
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The Arguments of Respondents

In their Comment and Memorandum, respondents contend that the
constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest
opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.[40]
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)[41] points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on
July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.[42]
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in terms
of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the
essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while local
workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform their
jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to acquire
jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce judgment;
and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission[43] and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[44] OFWs
are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment
status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular employees.
Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges exclusive to local
workers, but not available to OFWs; that these peculiarities make for a
reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated treatment under the subject
clause of the money claims of OFWs who are illegally dismissed. Thus, the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor Section 18, Article
II of the Constitution.[45]
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police
power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement
agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose
welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are
properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions."[46]
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains petitioner on the first and second issues.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the
acts of its co-equals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these
conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;[47] (2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party[48] and at the earliest
opportunity;[49] and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of
the case,[50] otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or decide the same on
some other ground.[51]
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly
involving petitioner who is personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and
the CA computed his monetary award based on the salary period of three
months only as provided under the subject clause.
The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that
the requirement that a constitutional issue be raised at the earliest
opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the pleadings before
a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings
before that competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.[52] Records disclose
that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause was first raised,
not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Reconsideration with said labor tribunal,[53] and reiterated in his Petition

for Certiorari before the CA.[54]Nonetheless, the issue is deemed seasonably
raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to
resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely
performs a quasi-judicial function - its function in the present case is limited
to determining questions of fact to which the legislative policy of R.A. No.
8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself;[55] thus, its foremost function is to
administer and enforce R.A. No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of
its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with the power of judicial
review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof,
such as the subject clause.[56] Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional
issue before the CA was undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore
remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of
the case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at
the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the
subject clause.
Does the subject clause violate Section 10,
Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts?
The answer is in the negative.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed
salary package he will receive[57] is not tenable.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted
have only a prospective operation,[58]and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected;[59] however, as to laws already in existence, their
provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. [60] Thus, the
non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to
laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts
or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention
of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995
preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042,
particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the
parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract,
they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No.
8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may
not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police
power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed.[61]Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even
to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.[62]
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Does the subject clause violate Section 1,

Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor
as a protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18,[63] Article II and Section 3,[64] Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of
their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed
on, others in like circumstances.[65]
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to
incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements:
1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of
the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies
equally to all members of the class.[66]
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;[67] b) the
ELS: Labor Law 1
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middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that

the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;[68] and
c) strict judicial scrutiny[69] in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right[70] or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class[71] is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that
it is theleast restrictive means to protect such interest.[72]
Under American jurisprudence, strict judicial scrutiny is triggered by suspect
classifications[73] based on race[74] or gender[75] but not when the classification
is drawn along income categories.[76]
It is different in the Philippine setting. In Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,[77] the
constitutionality of a provision in the charter of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), a government financial institution (GFI), was challenged for
maintaining its rank-and-file employees under the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL), even when the rank-and-file employees of other GFIs had been
exempted from the SSL by their respective charters. Finding that the
disputed provision contained a suspect classification based on salary grade,
the Court deliberately employed the standard of strict judicial scrutiny in its
review of the constitutionality of said provision. More significantly, it was in
this case that the Court revealed the broad outlines of its judicial philosophy,
to wit:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and
its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
ELS: Labor Law 1
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adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny
finds no support in American or English jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se
controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive and have
been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the
employment of our own endowments. We live in a different ambience and
must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs,
and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our
own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance
with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced
from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation
related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own
public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need
not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.
xxxx
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of
equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in
protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a
more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.
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Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital

social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class
on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life
should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a
living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given
to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be
given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental
right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by
the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to
be more strict.A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication
of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor
committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
xxxx
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In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary
grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a
benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP
now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the
industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-andfile employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all,
the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and
rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with
the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter
to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this
Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs
at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs
with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year;
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and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more
As pointed out by petitioner,[78] it was in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[79] (Second Division, 1999) that the
Court laid down the following rules on the application of the periods
prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which
amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker,
i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months' salary for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when
the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1)
year or more. This is evident from the words "for every year of the
unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three
months." To follow petitioners' thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to
completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while
giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed
to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used
them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.[80](Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into his
10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8 months
and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court made
conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career and
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Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations

Commission(Second Division, October 1998),[81] which involved an OFW who
was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed after
working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal illegal
and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight months,
the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court reduced the
award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months' salary, this being the
lesser value, to wit:
Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause is entitled to his salary
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondent's employment
contract is eight (8) months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his
basic salary corresponding to three (3) months or a total of SR3,600.[82]
Another was Triple-Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Third Division, December 1998),[83] which involved an OFW
(therein respondent Erlinda Osdana) who was originally granted a 12-month
contract, which was deemed renewed for another 12 months. After serving
for one year and seven-and-a-half months, respondent Osdana was illegally
dismissed, and the Court awarded her salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of four and one-half months of her contract.
The Marsaman interpretation of Section 10(5) has since been adopted in the
following cases:
Case Title
Contract
Period
Period of Unexpired
Service
Period
Period
Applied in
the
Computation
of the
Monetary
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Award
Skippers v. Maguad[84] 6 months
2 months 4 months
4 months
Bahia Shipping v.
Reynaldo Chua [85]
9 months
8 months 4 months
4 months
Centennial
Transmarine v. dela
Cruz l[86]
9 months
4 months 5 months
5 months
Talidano v. Falcon[87]
12 months 3 months 9 months
3 months
3 months
Univan v. CA
[88]
12 months
more than
10 months
2 months
3 months
PCL v. NLRC[90]
12 months
more than more or less

2 months 9 months
3 months
Olarte v. Nayona[91]
12 months 21 days
11 months and
3 months
9 days
JSS v. Ferrer[92]
12 months 16 days
11 months and
3 months
24 days
Pentagon v.
Adelantar[93]
9 months
2 months and 2 months and
12 months and 7
23 days
23 days
days
Phil. Employ v.
Paramio, et al.[94]
12 months
Oriental v. CA
[89]
Flourish Maritime v.
Almanzor [95]
2 years
10
months
2 months
26 days
6 months or 3
23 months and months for
4 days
each year of
contract
1 year, 10
Athenna Manpower v. months
1 month
Villanos [96]
and 28
days
Unexpired
portion
6 months or 3
1 year, 9
months for
months and 28
each year of
days
contract
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As the foregoing matrix readily shows, the subject clause classifies OFWs into
two categories. The first category includes OFWs with fixed-period
employment contracts of less than one year; in case of illegal dismissal, they
are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract.
The second category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment
contracts of one year or more; in case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to
monetary award equivalent to only 3 months of the unexpired portion of
their contracts.
The disparity in the treatment of these two groups cannot be discounted.
In Skippers, the respondent OFW worked for only 2 months out of his 6month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 4 months. In
contrast, the respondent OFWs in Oriental and PCL who had also worked for
about 2 months out of their 12-month contracts were awarded their salaries
for only 3 months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. Even the OFWs
involved in Talidano and Univan who had worked for a longer period of 3
months out of their 12-month contracts before being illegally dismissed were
awarded their salaries for only 3 months.
To illustrate the disparity even more vividly, the Court assumes a
hypothetical OFW-A with an employment contract of 10 months at a monthly
salary rate of US$1,000.00 and a hypothetical OFW-B with an employment
contract of 15 months with the same monthly salary rate of US$1,000.00.
Both commenced work on the same day and under the same employer, and
were illegally dismissed after one month of work. Under the subject clause,
OFW-A will be entitled to US$9,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for the
remaining 9 months of his contract, whereas OFW-B will be entitled to only
US$3,000.00, equivalent to his salaries for 3 months of the unexpired portion
of his contract, instead of US$14,000.00 for the unexpired portion of 14
months of his contract, as the US$3,000.00 is the lesser amount.
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into account
jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July 14,
1995,[97] illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of their
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employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:
Case Title
Contract
Period
Period of Unexpired
Service
Period
Period
Applied in
the
Computation
of the
Monetary
Award
ATCI v. CA, et al.[98]
2 years
2 months 22 months
22 months
23 months
23 months and
and
23 days
23 days
Phil. Integrated v.
NLRC[99]
2 years
7 days
JGB v. NLC[100]
2 years
9 months 15 months
15 months
Agoy v. NLRC[101]
2 years
2 months 22 months
22 months
EDI v. NLRC, et al.[102]
2 years
5 months 19 months
19 months
Barros v. NLRC,
et al.[103]
8 months
6 months
Philippine Transmarine
5 months and 5 months and
12 months and 22
[104]
v. Carilla
18 days
18 days
days
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods
or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and
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subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary

awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latter's unexpired contracts fall short of
one year.
Among OFWs With Employment
Contracts of More Than One Year
Upon closer examination of the terminology employed in the subject clause,
the Court now has misgivings on the accuracy of
the Marsaman interpretation.
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying
phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the
word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time.[105] Corollarily, that
"every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways:
first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter,
there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by
every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for
otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach even
a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when
the subject clause "for three (3) months forevery year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original contract period
as held in Marsaman,[106] but the length of the unexpired portion of the
contract period -- the subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired
portion of the contract period is at least one year, which arithmetically
requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination
among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who
are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those
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who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits
limited to their salaries for three months only.
To concretely illustrate the application of the foregoing interpretation of the
subject clause, the Court assumes hypothetical OFW-C and OFW-D, who each
have a 24-month contract at a salary rate of US$1,000.00 per month. OFW-C
is illegally dismissed on the 12th month, and OFW-D, on the 13th month.
Considering that there is at least 12 months remaining in the contract period
of OFW-C, the subject clause applies to the computation of the latter's
monetary benefits. Thus, OFW-C will be entitled, not to US$12,000,00 or the
latter's total salaries for the 12 months unexpired portion of the contract, but
to the lesser amount of US$3,000.00 or the latter's salaries for 3 months out
of the 12-month unexpired term of the contract. On the other hand, OFW-D is
spared from the effects of the subject clause, for there are only 11 months
left in the latter's contract period. Thus, OFW-D will be entitled to
US$11,000.00, which is equivalent to his/her total salaries for the entire 11month unexpired portion.
OFWs vis--vis Local Workers
With Fixed-Period Employment
As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation
of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This
uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.[107]
The earliest rule prescribing a uniform system of computation was actually
Article 299 of the Code of Commerce (1888),[108] to wit:
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop
clerks and employees should have been made of a fixed
period, none of the contracting parties, without the consent of the
other, may withdraw from the fulfillment of said contract until the
ELS: Labor Law 1
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termination of the period agreed upon.

Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and
damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained in the
following articles.
In Reyes v. The Compaia Maritima,[109] the Court applied the foregoing
provision to determine the liability of a shipping company for the illegal
discharge of its managers prior to the expiration of their fixed-term
employment. The Court therein held the shipping company liable for the
salaries of its managers for the remainder of their fixed-term employment.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605 of
the Code of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the
agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged
until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination
in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage caused
to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven negligence.
Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie,[110] in
which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and
subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for
the entireunexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,[111] Article 299 of
the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889,
to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for
a certain time and for a certain workcannot leave or be dismissed
without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis
supplied.)
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Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan[112] read the disjunctive "or" in
Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local
workers who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill.
This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel
de France Company.[113] And in bothLemoine and Palomar, the Court adopted
the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded on Article
1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent of the
amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract. On the
computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v.
Gay[114]held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing has
been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence,
that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty to seek other
employment of the same kind in the same community, for the purpose of
reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge. However,
while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed to make
an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that other
employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant. When
an employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of
employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he would
be entitled to had he continued in such employment until the
termination of the period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs.
Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492; Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.)
[115]
(Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on
fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3,
Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of
Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.[116] Much like Article 1586 of the Civil
Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly provide
for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally discharged.
However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,
[117]
the Court carried over the principles on the payment of damages
underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the same to a
ELS: Labor Law 1
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case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose fixed-period

employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new Civil Code was
already in effect.[118]
More significantly, the same principles were applied to cases involving
overseas Filipino workers whose fixed-term employment contracts were
illegally terminated, such as in First Asian Trans & Shipping Agency, Inc. v.
Ople,[119]involving seafarers who were illegally discharged. In Teknika Skills
and Trade Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[120] an OFW
who was illegally dismissed prior to the expiration of her fixed-period
employment contract as a baby sitter, was awarded salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of her contract. The Court arrived at the same ruling
in Anderson v. National Labor Relations Commission,[121] which involved a
foreman hired in 1988 in Saudi Arabia for a fixed term of two years, but who
was illegally dismissed after only nine months on the job -- the Court
awarded him salaries corresponding to 15 months, the unexpired portion of
his contract. In Asia World Recruitment, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[122] a Filipino working as a security officer in 1989 in Angola was
awarded his salaries for the remaining period of his 12-month contract after
he was wrongfully discharged. Finally, in Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission,[123] an OFW whose 12-month contract was
illegally cut short in the second month was declared entitled to his salaries
for the remaining 10 months of his contract.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
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The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect

classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of
fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other
OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject
clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected
by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict
judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state
interest through the least restrictive means.
What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.[124] It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state[125] for which some individual liberties
must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards,[126] or in maintaining access to information on
matters of public concern.[127]
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed to
protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting the
liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting
hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest of local
placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder millions of
pesos in "termination pay."[128]
The OSG explained further:
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Often, placement agencies, their liability being solidary, shoulder the

payment of money claims in the event that jurisdiction over the foreign
employer is not acquired by the court or if the foreign employer reneges on
its obligation. Hence, placement agencies that are in good faith and which
fulfill their obligations are unnecessarily penalized for the acts of the foreign
employer. To protect them and to promote their continued helpful
contribution in deploying Filipino migrant workers, liability for
money are reduced under Section 10 of RA 8042.
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare
the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement
agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly
deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions.
[129]
(Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the
source of its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the
subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep. Bonifacio
Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from which the
law originated;[130] but the speech makes no reference to the underlying
reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only natural for none of
the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on
money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the
complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
ELS: Labor Law 1
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employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The liability of the principal and the recruitment/placement agency or any
and all claims under this Section shall be joint and several.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on any money
claims exclusive of damages under this Section shall not be less than fifty
percent (50%) of such money claims: Provided, That any installment
payments, if applicable, to satisfy any such compromise or voluntary
settlement shall not be more than two (2) months. Any
compromise/voluntary agreement in violation of this paragraph shall be null
and void.
Non-compliance with the mandatory period for resolutions of cases provided
under this Section shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the
following penalties:
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or
resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld
until the said official complies therewith;
(2) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive
public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however, That the penalties herein provided shall be without
prejudice to any liability which any such official may have incurred under
other existing laws or rules and regulations as a consequence of violating the
provisions of this paragraph.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on the
computation of money claims.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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A rule on the computation of money claims containing the subject clause was
inserted and eventually adopted as the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.
No. 8042. The Court examined the rationale of the subject clause in the
transcripts of the "Bicameral Conference Committee (Conference Committee)
Meetings on the Magna Carta on OCWs (Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill
No. 2077 and House Bill No. 14314)." However, the Court finds no discernible
state interest, let alone a compelling one, that is sought to be protected or
advanced by the adoption of the subject clause.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the
existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of
the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is
to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be
rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden
on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private
businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution
commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the
level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary
liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are
mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose
without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002,
imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers
who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their
Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary
ELS: Labor Law 1
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disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations

Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23,
2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring
foreign employers.
Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive
means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of
their foreign principals.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone
perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under
Section 3,[131]Article XIII of the Constitution.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed selfexecuting,,[132] there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one,[133] particularly Section 3 thereof, the
nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[134] has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of
tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are
automatically acknowledged and observed without need for any enabling
legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough
to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the
realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical, if not
unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of
being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of "full protection to
labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket
shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of
ELS: Labor Law 1
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circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to

continued employment-a utopian notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define
the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and
promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers' as
well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a
loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the
Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be
a source of a positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an
employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve proper notice or
hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the
provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their
enforceability.[135] (Emphasis added)
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct
enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be
declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of
litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so
broad a concept as social justice for labor.
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the
working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the
status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through
executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda
that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate
Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept
that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection
ELS: Labor Law 1
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-- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize
the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict
judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial
scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the
significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central
Bankapplied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause.
Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause,
has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject
clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives
him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.[136]
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject
clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case
of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign
employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in
the text of the law or the records of the deliberations leading to its
enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate that there is
an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a
pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1,[137] Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries
for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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On the Third Issue

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay.
For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic
inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's
monetary award, unless there is evidence that he performed work during
those periods. As the Court held in Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz,
[138]
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed
in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission, to
wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that
said was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman
could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of
30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees
the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be
established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion
ELS: Labor Law 1
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of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual
service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision
and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the
effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired
portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days
computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, andPeralta, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., join J. Carpio's opinion.
Carpio, and Brion, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
[1]
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sgsm11084.doc.htm.
[2]
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, effective July 15,
1995.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by

Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo; rollo, p.
231.
[4]
Id. at 248.
ELS: Labor Law 1
[5]
Rollo, p. 57.
[6]
Id. at 58.
[7]
Id. at 59.
[8]
Id. at 48.
[9]
Id. at 55.
Twenty19 135
[10]
According to petitioner, this amount represents the pro-rated difference

between the salary of US$2,590.00 per month which he was supposed to
receive as Chief Officer from March 19, 1998 to April 30, 1998 and the salary
of US$1,850.00 per month which he was actually paid as Second Officer for
the same period. See LA Decision, rollo, pp. 107 and 112.
[11]
Position Paper, id. at 53-54.
[12]
The LA awarded petitioner US$45.00 out of the US$1,480.00 salary

differential to which petitioner is entitled in view of his having received from
respondents US$1,435.00 as evidenced by receipts marked as Annexes "F",
"G" and "H", id. at 319-321.
[13]
Id. at 114.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 111-112.
[15]
Id. at 124.
[16]
Id. at 115.
[17]
G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998, 299 SCRA 608.
ELS: Labor Law 1
[18]
Appeal Memorandum, rollo, p. 121.
[19]
Id. at 134.
[20]
NLRC Decision, rollo, p. 140.
[21]
Id. at 146-150.
[22]
Id. at 153.
[23]
Id. at 155.
[24]
Id. at 166-177.
[25]
CA Decision, id. at 239-241.
[26]
Id. at 242.
[27]
Id. at 248.
[28]
Petition, rollo, p. 28.
[29]
Id. at 787.
[30]
Id. at 799.
[31]
Rollo, p. 282
[32]
Memorandum for Petitioner, id. at 741-742.
[33]
Id. at 746-753.
[34]
Twenty19 136
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ELS: Labor Law 1
[35]
Rollo, pp. 763-766.
[36]
Petition, id. at 735.
[37]
Memorandum of the Solicitor General, rollo, p. 680.
[38]
Memorandum for Petitioner, id. at 755.
[39]
Id. at 761-763.
[40]
Rollo, pp. 645-646 and 512-513.
Twenty19 137
[41]
Alfredo L. Benipayo was Solicitor General at the time the Comment was
filed. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court) was Solicitor General when the Memorandum was filed.
[42]
Memorandum of the Solicitor General, id. at 662-665.
[43]
G.R. No. 113658, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 190.
[44]
G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002, 385 SCRA 306.
[45]
Memorandum of the Solicitor General, rollo, pp. 668-678.
[46]
Id. at 682.
[47]
The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the

Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591 October 14,
2008.
[48]
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157509, January

18, 2005, 449 SCRA 1.
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 138
[49]
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
[50]
Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136.
[51]
Moldex Realty, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R. No.
149719, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 198; Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No.
156078, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 409.
[52]
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49.
[53]
Rollo, p. 145.
[54]
Id. at 166.
[55]
Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission,

G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003, 408 SCRA 678.
[56]
Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No.

152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
[57]
Memorandum for Petitioner, rollo, pp. 741-742.
[58]
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4,
2000, 346 SCRA 748.
[59]
Picop Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, G.R.

No. 163509, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 400.
[60]
Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. 314 (1873); Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362,
370 (1941); Intrata-Assurance Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 156571, July 9, 2008; Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of Davao, G.R.
No. 155491, September 16, 2008.
[61]
Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004,
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 139
429 SCRA 81, citing JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319.
[62]
Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
[63]
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
[64]
Section 3, The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and

equality of employment opportunities for all.
[65]
See City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA
308; Pimentel III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178413, March 13,
2008, 548 SCRA 169.
[66]
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. No.

176951, November 18, 2008; Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No.
139147,November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168.
[67]
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of

Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
[68]
Los Angeles v. Almeda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); Craig v. Boren,
429 US 190 (1976).
[69]
There is also the "heightened scrutiny" standard of review which is less

demanding than "strict scrutiny" but more demanding than the standard
rational relation test. Heightened scrutiny has generally been applied to
cases that involve discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy,
such as in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, where a heightened scrutiny standard
was used to invalidate a State's denial to the children of illegal aliens of the
free public education that it made available to other residents.
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 140
[70]
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Parents Involved in Community

Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. (2007);
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-908.pdf.
[71]
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pea, 515 US 230 (1995).
[72]
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306 (2003); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 US 216

(1984).
[73]
The concept of suspect classification first emerged in the famous footnote

in the opinion of Justice Harlan Stone in U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938), the full text of which footnote is reproduced below:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370;
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73; on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, see Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 713-714, 718-720, 722; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233;
Lovell v. Griffin, supra; on interferences with political organizations, see
Stromberg v. California, supra, 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380; Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, and see
Holmes, J., in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673; as to prohibition of
peaceable assembly, see De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365.
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 141
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, or national, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, or racial minorities, Nixon v.
Herndon, supra; Nixon v. Condon, supra: whether prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
428; South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184, n 2, and cases
cited.
[74]
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Regents of the

University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
[75]
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996).
[76]
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[77]
[78]
Rollo, pp. 727 and 735.
[79]
371 Phil. 827 (1999).
[80]
Id. at 840-841.
[81]
G.R. No. 131656, October 20, 1998, 297 SCRA 727.
[82]
Id.
[83]
Supra note 17.
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 142
[84]
G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639.
[85]
G.R. No. 162195, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 600.
[86]
G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008.
[87]
G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 279.
[88]
G.R. No. 157534, June 18, 2003 (Resolution).
[89]
G.R. No. 153750, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 100.
[90]
G.R. No. 148418, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 314.
[91]
G.R. No. 148407, November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 720.
[92]
[93]
G.R. No. 157373, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 342.
[94]
G.R. No. 144786, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 732.
[95]
G.R. No. 177948, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 712.
[96]
G.R. No. 151303, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 313.
[97]
Asian Center v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 81.
[98]
G.R. No. 143949, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 571.
[99]
[100]
G.R. No. 109390, March 7, 1996, 254 SCRA 457.
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 143
[101]
[102]
[103]
G.R. No. 123901, September 22, 1999, 315 SCRA 23.
[104]
G.R. No. 157975, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 586.
[105]
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary visited on November 22, 2008 at
3:09.
[106]
See also Flourish, supra note 95; and Athena, supra note 96.
[107]
It is noted that both petitioner and the OSG drew comparisons between
OFWs in general and local workers in general. However, the Court finds that
the more relevant comparison is between OFWs whose employment is
necessarily subject to a fixed term and local workers whose employment is
also subject to a fixed term.
[108]
Promulgated on August 6, 1888 by Queen Maria Cristina of Spain and

extended to the Philippines by Royal Decree of August 8, 1888. It took effect
on December 1, 1888.
[109]
No. 1133, March 29, 1904, 3 SCRA 519.
[110]
No. L-8431, October 30, 1958, 104 SCRA 748.
[111]
See also Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor, No. L50734-37, February 20, 1981, 102 scra 835, where Madrigal Shipping
Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie is cited.
[112]
No. L-10422, January 11, 1916, 33 SCRA 162.
[113]
No. L-15878, January 11, 1922, 42 SCRA 660.
ELS: Labor Law 1
[114]
7 Phil. 268 (1907).
[115]
See also Knust v. Morse, 41 Phil 184 (1920).
Twenty19 144
[116]
Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, No. L-48494, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA
702.
[117]
No. L-22608, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 699.
[118]
The Labor Code itself does not contain a specific provision for local
workers with fixed-term employment contracts. As the Court observed
in Brent School, Inc., the concept of fixed-term employment has slowly faded
away from our labor laws, such that reference to our labor laws is of limited
use in determining the monetary benefits to be awarded to fixed-term
workers who are illegally dismissed.
[119]
No. L-65545, July 9, 1986., 142 SCRA 542.
[120]
G.R. No. 100399, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 132.
[121]
[122]
G.R. No. 113363, August 24, 1999, 313 SCRA 1.
[123]
[124]
See Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1.
[125]
Id.
[126]
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1971); see also Carey v. Population Service
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 145
[127]
Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318, 174177, October 16, 2006,
504 SCRA 704.
[128]
Comment, rollo, p. 555.
[129]
Memorandum of the Solicitor General, id. at 682-683
[130]
Id. at p. 693.
[131]
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
[132]
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No.

122156, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408.
[133]
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649,
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 146
May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

[134]
[135]
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 134, at 686.
[136]
Associated Communications and Wireless Services, Ltd. v. Dumlao, G. R.

No. 136762, November 21, 2002, 392 SCRA 269.
[137]
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
[138]
G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008. See also PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission. G.R. No. 153031, December 14,
2006, 511 SCRA 44.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:
I concur that the provision "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 10, paragraph 5,[1] of Republic
Act (RA) No. 8042[2] is unconstitutional, but on a different ground. The
provision violates the prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law. It is an invalid exercise of police power.
Section 1, Article III, of the Constitution states that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. Protected property
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 147
includes the right to work and the right to earn a living. In JMM Promotion
and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[3] the Court held that:
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning
of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the
right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which
normally constitutes an actionable wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
The right to work and the right to earn a living necessarily includes the right
to bargain for better terms in an employment contract and the right to
enforce those terms. If protected property does not include these rights, then
the right to work and the right to earn a living would become empty civil
liberties -- the State can deprive persons of their right to work and their right
to earn a living by depriving them of the right to negotiate for better terms
and the right to enforce those terms.
The assailed provision prevents the OFWs from bargaining for payment of
more than three months' salary in case the employer wrongfully terminates
the employment. The law may set a minimum amount that the employee can
recover, but it cannot set a ceiling because this unreasonably curtails the
employee's right to bargain for better terms of employment. The right to
bargain for better terms of employment is a constitutional right that cannot
be unreasonably curtailed by the State. Here, no compelling State interest
has been advanced why the employee's right to bargain should be curtailed.
The claim that that the three-month salary cap provides an incentive to
service contractors and manning agencies is specious because such
incentive is at the expense of a protected and disadvantaged class -- the
OFWs.
The right to property is not absolute -- the prohibition against deprivation of
property is qualified by the phrase "without due process of law." Thus, the
State may deprive persons of property through the exercise of police power.
[4]
However, the deprivation must be done with due process. Substantive
due process requires that the means employed in depriving persons
ELS: Labor Law 1
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of property must not be unduly oppressive. In Social Justice Society v.

Atienza, Jr.,[5] the Court held that:
[T]he State x x x may be considered as having properly exercised
[its] police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the exercise of police power, to be valid, must be reasonable and
not repugnant to the Constitution.[6] InPhilippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,[7] the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own
limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the
purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
(Emphasis supplied)
The assailed provision is unduly oppressive, unreasonable, and
repugnant to the Constitution. It undermines the mandate of the
Constitution to protect the rights of overseas workers and to promote their
welfare. Section 3, Article XIII, of the Constitution states that the State shall
(1) afford full protection to overseas labor, (2) promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all, and (3) guarantee the rights of
all workers to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. Section 18, Article II, of the Constitution states that, "The State affirms
labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers
and promote their welfare."
The assailed provision also undermines the declared policies of RA No. 8042.
Section 2 of RA No. 8042 states that (1) the State shall, at all times, uphold
the dignity of Filipino migrant workers; (2) the State shall afford full
ELS: Labor Law 1
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protection to overseas labor and promote full employment opportunities for

all; (3) the existence of overseas employment program rests solely on the
assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of
Filipinos shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated; and (4) it is
imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure that the
rights and interest of distressed Filipino migrant workers are adequately
protected and safeguarded.
The assailed provision is the reverse of the constitutional mandate and the
declared policies of RA No. 8042: (1) instead of protecting the rights and
promoting the welfare of OFWs, it unreasonably curtails their freedom to
enter into employment contracts; (2) instead of empowering OFWs, it
prevents them from bargaining for better terms; (3) instead of setting the
minimum amount that OFWs are entitled to in case they are terminated
without just, valid or authorized cause, it provides a ceiling; (4) instead of
allowing OFWs who have been terminated without just, valid or authorized
cause to recover what is rightfully due, it arbitrarily sets the recoverable
amount to their three-month salary.
OFWs belong to a disadvantaged class, are oppressed, and need protection.
In Olarte v. Nayona,[8] the Court held that:
Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them
come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in
suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and
in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our
country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to
avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure
slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they
will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the
minimum. The least we can do is to protect them in our laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.,[9] the Court held that:
ELS: Labor Law 1
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What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that x x x employment

be above all, decent, just, and humane.It is bad enough that the country
has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it
cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our
toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and
economically, while away from home. (Emphasis supplied)
With the inclusion of the assailed provision in RA No. 8042, the OFWs, whom
the Constitution and the law particularly seek to protect, end up even more
oppressed.
In her ponencia, Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez held that the assailed
provision violated the equal protection clause. The application of the equal
protection clause is improper because local workers and OFWs are
differently situated. Local workers who perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer are
deemed regular after six months of service. This is true even if the workers
are for a fixed term. In Glory Philippines, Inc. v. Vergara,[10] the Court held
that:
[W]e cannot give credence to petitioner's claim that respondents
were fixed term employees. x x x In the instant case, respondents'
original employment contracts were renewed four times. x x x
In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, we held that such a
continuing need for respondents' services is sufficient evidence of
the necessity and indispensability of their services to petitioner's
business. Consequently, we find that respondents were regular
employees defined under Article 280 of the Labor Code as those who have
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of petitioner. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, OFWs are never deemed regular. In Brent School, Inc. v.
Zamora,[11] the Court held that:
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Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may

be neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed
term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment
contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement,
the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not
appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code
notwithstanding. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, I vote to declare the provision "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 10, paragraph 5, of
Republic Act No. 8042 as unconstitutional for violation of the due process
clause.
[1]
Section 10, paragraph 5, of RA No. 8042 provides:

authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
[2]
Otherwise known as "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."
[3]
G.R. No. 120095, 5 August 1996, 260 SCRA 319, 330.
[4]
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, No. L-81958, 30

June 1988, 163 SCRA 386, 390.
[5]
[6]
G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 138.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,

Inc., G.R. No. 170656, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341, 362.
ELS: Labor Law 1
[7]
Supra note 4 at 391.
[8]
461 Phil. 429, 431 (2003).
[9]
Supra note 4 at 397.
[10]
G.R. No. 176627, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 253, 262.
[11]
G.R. No. 48494, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA 702, 714.
Twenty19 152
CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act (R.A. No. 8042), is
unconstitutional insofar as it provides that
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
My conclusion, however, proceeds from a different reason and constitutional
basis. I believe that this provision should be struck down for violations of the
constitutional provisions in favor of labor[1] and of the substantive aspect of
the due process clause.[2] Given these bases, I see no necessity in invoking
the equal protection clause. Underlying this restraint in invoking the equal
ELS: Labor Law 1
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protection clause is my hesitation to join the ponencia in declaring a

classification as "suspect" and in using the strict scrutiny standard without
clearly defined parameters on when this approach applies.
I begin by reading the assailed provision - Section 10, R.A. No. 8042 - in its
constitutional context. Section 18, Article II of the Constitution declares it a
state policy to affirm labor as a primary social economic force and to protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare. This policy is emphatically
given more life and vitality under Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution
which reads:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
On June 7, 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8042 "to establish a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant
workers, their families and of overseas Filipinos in distress."[3] The
ELS: Labor Law 1
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express policy declarations of R.A. No. 8042 show that its purposes are
reiterations of the very same policies enshrined in the Constitution. R.A. No.
8042, among others, recites that:
(b) The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, the State shall provide
adequate and timely social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant
workers.[4]
xxx
(e) Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. In this
regard, it is imperative that an effective mechanism be instituted to ensure
that the rights and interests of distressed overseas Filipinos, in general, and
Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are
adequately protected and safeguarded.
These declared purposes patently characterize R.A. No. 8042 as a direct
implementation of the constitutional objectives on Filipino overseas work so
that it must be read and understood in terms of these policy objectives.
Under this interpretative guide, any provision in R.A. No. 8042 inimical to the
interest of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW) cannot have any place in the
law.
Further examination of the law shows that while it acknowledges that the
State shall "promote full employment," it states at the same time that "the
State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain
economic growth and national development. The existence of overseas
employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and
fundamental human rights and freedoms of Filipino citizens shall not, at any
time, be compromised or violated." In blunter terms, the overseas
employment program exists only for OFW protection.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Having said all these, the law concludes its Declaration of Policies with a
statement the lawmakers may have perceived as an exception to the law's
previously declared policies, by stating - "[n]onetheless, the deployment of
Filipino overseas workers, whether land-based or sea-based, by local service
contractors and manning agencies employing them shall be encouraged.
Appropriate incentives may be extended to them." Thus, in express terms,
the law recognizes that there can be "incentives" to service contractors and
manning agencies in the spirit of encouraging greater deployment efforts. No
mention at all, however, was made of incentives to the contractors' and
agencies' principals, i.e., the foreign employers in whose behalf the
contractors and agencies recruit OFWs.
The matter of money claims - the immediate subject of the present case - is
governed by Section 10 of the law. This section grants the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) jurisdiction over OFW money claims. On
liability for money claims, the sections states:
SECTION 10. Money Claims. -- Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency
for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This
provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be
filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
ELS: Labor Law 1
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themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership

for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the
employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution,
amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said
contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money
claims inclusive of damages under this section shall be paid within four (4)
months from the approval of the settlement by the appropriate authority.
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less.
Under these terms, the law protects the OFW as against the employer and
the recruitment agency in case of illegal termination of service, but limits
this liability to the reimbursement of the placement fee and interest, and the
payment of "his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less." After earlier declaring the principal/employer and the
contractor/recruitment agency jointly and solidarily liable, the limitation of
liability appears to be a step backward that can only be justified, under the
terms of the law, if it is an "appropriate incentive." To be "appropriate," the
incentive must necessarily relate to the law's purpose with reasonable
expectation that it would serve this purpose; it must also accrue to its
intended beneficiaries (the recruitment/placement agencies), and not to
parties to whom the reason for the grant does not apply.
These considerations bring us to the question - can the disputed portion of
ELS: Labor Law 1
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Section 10 stand constitutional scrutiny?

I submit that it cannot as it violates the constitutional provisions in favor of
labor, as well as the requirements of substantive due process.
The best indicator of the effect of the disputed portion of Section 10 on OFWs
can be seen from the results of the pre-R.A. No. 8042 rulings of this Court
that the ponencia painstakingly arranged in tabular form.
The ponencia'stable shows that by our own past rulings, before R.A. No.
8042, all illegal dismissals merited the payment of the salaries that the
OFWs would have received for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
[5]
After R.A. No. 8042, our rulings vary on the computation of what should
be paid to illegally dismissed OFWs, but in all cases the principal's/agency's
adjudged liability was for less than the unexpired portion of the OFW's
contract.[6]
Anyway viewed, the situation of illegally dismissed OFWs changed
for the worse after R.A. No. 8042. In this sense, the disputed portion of
Section 10 is one that goes against the interests of labor, based on R.A. No.
8042's own declared purposes and, more importantly, on constitutional
standards. Section 10 diminished rather than enhanced the
protection the Constitution envisions for OFWs.
The more significant violation, however, that the disputed portion of Section
10 spawns relates to its character as a police power measure, and its failure
to meet the substantive due process requirements of Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
By the Office of the Solicitor General's (OSG) own representations, the
disputed Section 10 is a police power measure adopted to mitigate the
solidary liability of placement agencies. It "redounds to the benefit of the
migrant workers whose welfare the government seeks to promote. The
survival of legitimate placement agencies helps [assure] the government
that migrant workers are properly deployed and are employed under decent
ELS: Labor Law 1
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and humane conditions."[7] To constitutionally test the validity of this

measure, substantive due process requires that there be: (1) a lawful
purpose; and (2) lawful means or method to achieve the lawful purpose.[8]
I see nothing inherently unconstitutional in providing incentives to local
service contractors and manning agencies; they are significant stakeholders
in the overseas employment program and providing them with
encouragement - as R.A. No. 8042 apparently envisions in its Declaration of
Policies - will ultimately redound to the benefit of the OFWs they recruit and
deploy for overseas work. The Constitution itself also expressly
recognizes "the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and
the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth."[9] As entities acting for the principals/employers in
the overseas employment program, the recruitment/manning agencies
deserve no less. Viewed from this perspective, the purpose of encouraging
greater efforts at securing work for OFWs cannot but be constitutionally
valid. Thus, the issue before us in considering substantive due process is
reduced to whether the means taken to achieve the purpose of encouraging
recruitment efforts (i.e., the incentive granted limiting the liability of
recruitment/manning agencies for illegal dismissals) is reasonable.
The first significant consideration in examining this issue is the question of
liability - who is liable when a foreign principal/employer illegally terminates
the services of an OFW? Under Philippine law, the employer, as the
contracting party who violated the terms of the contract, is primarily liable.
[10]
In the overseas employment situation, the protective measures adopted
under the law and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) rules to protect the OFW in his or her overseas contract best tell us
how we regard liability under this contract.
First, POEA Rules require, as a condition precedent to an OFW deployment,
the execution of a master contract signed by a foreign principal/employer
before it can be accredited by the POEA as an entity who can source its
manpower needs from the Philippines under its overseas employment
ELS: Labor Law 1
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program.[11] The master contract contains the terms and conditions the
foreign principal/employer binds itself to in its employment relationship with
the OFWs it will employ. Second, signed individual contracts of employment
between the foreign principal/employer or its agent and the OFW, drawn in
accordance with the master contract, are required as well.[12] Third, the
foreign aspects or incidents of these contracts are submitted to the
Philippine labor attachs for verification at site.[13] This is a protective
measure to ensure the existence and financial capability of the foreign
principal/employer. Labor attaches verify as well the individual employment
contracts signed by foreign principals/employers overseas.Fourth, the POEA
Rules require the issuance by the foreign principal-employer of a special
power of attorney authorizing the recruitment/manning agency to sign for
and its behalf, and allowing itself to sue or be sued on the employment
contracts in the Philippines through its authorized recruitment/manning
agency.[14] Fifth, R.A. No. 8042 itself and its predecessor laws have always
provided that the liability between the principal and its agent (the
recruitment/manning agency) is joint and solidary,[15] thus ensuring that
either the principal or the agent can be held liable for obligations due to
OFWs. Finally, OFWs themselves can sue at the host countries with the
assistance of Philippine embassies and labor offices.[16]
These measures collectively protect OFWs by ensuring the integrity of their
contracts; by establishing the responsible parties; and by providing the
mechanisms for their enforcement. In all these, the primary recourse is with
the foreign principal employer who has direct and primary responsibility
under the employment contract.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in
fact provides a hidden twist affecting the principal/employer's liability. While
intended as an incentive accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law,
as worded, simply limits the OFWs' recovery in wrongful dismissal
situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be liable,
including the principal/employer - the direct employer primarily liable for the
wrongful dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 - read as a grant of incentives to
ELS: Labor Law 1
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recruitment/manning agencies - oversteps what it aims to do by effectively

limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign
principals/employers.Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the
wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its
liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation of
liability under Section 10 cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the
term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to describe the incentive it envisions
under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive:
instead of a grant that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is
directly related to extra efforts undertaken, the law simply limits their liability
for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a
legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely
by the law's intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the
incentive, from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme
to sell Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting
the market. Ironically, the OSG unabashedly confirmed this view in its
Comment when it represented that "[b]y limiting the liability to three
months, Filipino seafarers have better chance of getting hired by foreign
employees."[17]
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the
OFWs - the benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their
principals are taken from the pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries
for the unexpired portion of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the
principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from
their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract
embodies. Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only
because of the lessened recovery afforded him or her by operation of law,
but also because this same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal
easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino
will always be a consideration a foreign employer will take into account in
termination of employment decisions. This reality, unfortunately, is one that
ELS: Labor Law 1
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we cannot simply wish away with the disputed Section 10 in place. Thus, this
inherently oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory and inimical provision should be
struck down for its conflict with the substantive aspect of the constitutional
due process guarantee. Specifically, the phrase "for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired terms, whichever is less" in the fifth and
final paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042 should be declared
unconstitutional.
With these conclusions, I see no need to further test the validity of the
assailed clause under the equal protection guarantee. My restraint in this
regard rests on two reasons.
First, I believe that the ponencia's use of the strict scrutiny standard of
review - on the premise that the assailed clause established a suspect
classification - is misplaced. Second, I do not see the present case as an
occasion to further expand the use of the strict scrutiny standard which the
Court first expanded in Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,[18]
A suspect classification is one where distinctions are made based on the
most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human
rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious
affiliation, and to a certain extent, sex and sexual orientation.[19] With a
suspect classification, the scrutiny of the classification is raised to its highest
level: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and
government carries the burden of proving that its challenged policy is
constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must show that
its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; if this is proven,
the state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to
achieve the intended result.[20]
In the present case, I do not see the slightest indication that Congress
actually intended to classify OFWs - between and among themselves, and in
relation with local workers - when it adopted the disputed portion of Section
ELS: Labor Law 1
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10. The congressional intent was to merely grant recruitment and manning
agencies an incentive and thereby encourage them into greater deployment
efforts, although, as discussed above, the incentive really works for the
foreign principals' benefit at the expense of the OFWs.
Even assuming that a classification resulted from the law, the classification
should not immediately be characterized as a suspect classification that
would invite the application of the strict scrutiny standard. The disputed
portion of Section 10 does not, on its face, restrict or curtail the civil and
human rights of any single group of OFWs. At best, the disputed portion
limits the monetary award for wrongful termination of employment - a tort
situation affecting an OFW's economic interest. This characterization and
the unintended classification that unwittingly results from the incentive
scheme under Section 10, to my mind, render a strict scrutiny
disproportionate to the circumstances to which it is applied.
I believe, too, that we should tread lightly in further expanding the concept
of suspect classification after we have done so in Central Bank,[21] where we
held that classifications that result in prejudice to persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution[22] requires a stricter judicial
scrutiny. The use of a suspect classification label cannot depend solely on
whether the Constitution has accorded special protection to a specified
sector. While the Constitution specially mentions labor as a sector that needs
special protection, the involvement of or relationship to labor, by itself,
cannot automatically trigger a suspect classification and the accompanying
strict scrutiny; much should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the
impact of the illegal differential treatment on the sector involved, on the
needed protection, and on the impact of recognizing a suspect classification
on future situations. In other words, we should carefully calibrate our moves
when faced with an equal protection situation so that we do
not misappreciate the essence of what a suspect classification is, and
thereby lessen its jurisprudential impact and value. Reserving this approach
to the worst cases of unacceptable classification and discrimination
highlights the importance of striking at these types of unequal treatment and
ELS: Labor Law 1
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is a lesson that will not be lost on all concerned, particularly the larger public.
There is the added reason, too, that the reverse onus that a strict scrutiny
brings directly strikes, in the most glaring manner, at the regularity of the
performance of functions of a co-equal branch of government; intergovernment harmony and courtesy demand that we reserve this type of
treatment to the worst violations of the Constitution.
Incidentally, I believe that we can arrive at the same conclusion and similarly
strike down the disputed Section 10 by using the lowest level of scrutiny,
thereby rendering the use of the strict scrutiny unnecessary. Given the OSG's
positions, the resulting differential treatment the law fosters between
Philippine-based workers and OFWs in illegal dismissal situations does not
rest on substantial distinctions that are germane to the purpose of the law.
No reasonable basis for classification exists since the distinctions the OSG
pointed out do not justify the different treatment of OFWs and Philippinebased workers, specifically, why one class should be excepted from the
consequences of illegal termination under the Labor Code, while the other is
not.
To be sure, the difference in work locations and working conditions that the
OSG pointed out are not valid grounds for distinctions that should matter in
the enforcement of employment contracts. Whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, the integrity of contracts - be they labor, commercial or political is a zealously guarded value that we in the Philippines should not demean by
allowing a breach of OFW contracts easy to undertake. This is true whatever
may be the duration or character of employment; employment contracts,
whatever their term and conditions may be subject only to their consistency
with the law, must be respected during the whole contracted term and under
the conditions agreed upon.
Significantly, the OSG could not even point to any reason other than the
protection of recruitment agencies and the expansion of the Philippine
overseas program as justification for the limitation of liability that has
effectively distinguished OFWs from locally-based workers. These reasons,
ELS: Labor Law 1
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unfortunately, are not on the same plane as protection to labor in our

constitutional hierarchy of values. Even RA 8042 repeats that "the State does
not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth
and national development." Under RA 8042's own terms, the overseas
employment program exists only for OFW protection. Thus viewed, the
expansion of the Philippine overseas deployment program and the need for
incentives to achieve results are simply not valid reasons to justify a
classification, particularly when the incentive is in the form of oppressive and
confiscatory limitation of liability detrimental to labor. No valid basis for
classification thus exists to justify the differential treatment that resulted
from the disputed Section 10.
In light of all these, I vote to strike down the disputed portion of Section 10 of
R.A. No. 8042.
[1]
CONSTITUTION, Article II, Section 18 and Article XIII, Section 3; see p. 2 of

this Concurring opinion.
[2]
Id.; Article III, Section 1 contains both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, as follows: Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[3]
Long title of R.A. No. 8042. Its short title is "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995." The law came soon after the Gancayco Commission
rendered its report on the situation of overseas Filipino workers. The
Commission was convened following the execution of Flor Contemplacion, a
Filipino domestic helper executed in Singapore on March 17, 1995.
[4]
See and compare with Section 3, Article XIII of the Constituion
[5]
See: Ponencia, p. 23.
ELS: Labor Law 1
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[6]
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[7]
OSG Memorandum, rollo, pp. 668-678; cited in the ponencia, p. 11.
[8]
See: City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA
308; Planters Committee v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 79310 and 79744, July 14,
1989, 175 SCRA 343; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R. No. L-38429,
June 30, 1998, 163 SCRA 182.
[9]
CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3.
[10]
LABOR CODE, Article 279; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc and Elkano Ship
Management, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 113911, January 23, 1998; Tierra
International Construction, et al., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 101825, April 2, 1996.
[11]
POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment

of Land-Based Workers (POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers), Part III, Rule 1,
Sections 1 to 4; Rule 2, Section 2.
[12]
POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part V, Rile I, Sections 1 to 4; POEA

Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers
(POEA Rules for Seafarers), Part IV, Rule I, Sections 1 and 2.
[13]
POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Section 1; POEA Rules
for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 1 to 4
[14]
POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2 (a) to 3,
and Rule 2, Section 2 (a); POEA Rules for Seafarers, Part III, Rule 1, Sections 2
(b) and 4, and Rule 2, Section 2(a).
[15]
POEA Rules for Land-Based Workers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (f) (3); POEA
Rules for Seafarers, Part II, Rule 2, Section 1 (e) (8); Datuman v. First
Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, G.R. No. 156029,
ELS: Labor Law 1
Twenty19 166
November 14, 2008; See: Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code (1976), Book I, Rule V, Section 10; See also: Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No.
77279, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 691, and Royal Crown International v. NLRC,
[16]
Assistance is provided by Labor Attaches who report to the DOLE

functionally and to the Philippine Ambassador at the foreign post. Assisting
him are welfare officers of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration
(OWWA) and the POEA representatives, all of them functionally reporting to
the DOLE.
[17]
OSG Comment; rollo, p. 555.
[18]
[19]
City of Cleburn, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 413 U.S. 432

(1985); Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
[20]
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
[21]
Supra note 18.
[22]
In the Central Bank case, the classification was based on salary grade or
officer-employee status. In the words of the decision, "It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades."

Full 2nd Batch Stolt To Serrano

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ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

Republic of the Philippines

January 18, 2012

STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC. AND CHUNG GAI SHIP

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

second contract.8 However, he ruled that there was no substantial evidence

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

1. There must be a previous valid obligation,

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

b. Thirty (30) calendar days from the date of processing by the

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

It took the agency several weeks to repatriate the respondents to the

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

Underpaid Salary Placement Salary for the

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

US$3,200 64,800 AED

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

Ordovez, LOUIE 2 years

Again, the agency moved for reconsideration, reiterating its earlier

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

The CA stressed that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

their submission that because of their unbearable living and working

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

v. Thenamaris Ships Management.[26] Further, the respondents take

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

We find no merit in the petition. The CA committed no reversible

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1

Full Cases batch 2 (stolt to serrano)

ELS: Labor Law 1