Union Carbide Labor Union vs Union Carbide Philippines

Facts:

Complainants Agapito Duro, Alfredo Torio, and Rustico Javillonar, were dismissed from their employment
o premised on "willful violation of Company regulations, gross insubordination and refusal to
submit to a Company investigation
It appears that the Company is operating on three (3) shifts namely: morning, afternoon and night shifts
( 40 hours a week)
A change occurred wherein third shift employees were required to start the new work schedule from
Sunday thru Thursday.
On November 6, 1972, the night shift employees filed a demand to maintain the old working schedule from
Monday thru Friday.
In manifestation of their dissention to the new work schedule, the three respondents Duro, Torio, and
Javillonar did not report for work on November 26, 1972 which was a Sunday since it was not a working
day according to the provisions of the Collecrtive Bargaining Agreement which caused them to be
terminated.
LA ruled in favor of the laborers ( reinstatement)
NLRC reversed LA ( just pay separation pay)

Issue: Whether or not the laborers can be dismissed given that the CBA stated they cannot work on a Sunday.
Held: YES

Verily and wisely, management retained the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to
change the working hours of its employees.
And as long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise
the incident complained of took place sometime in 1972, so there is no violation of the 1973 Constitution to
speak of because the guarantee of security of tenure embodied under Section 9, Article II may not be given
a retroactive effect.
It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only,
unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.
We now refrain from doing so considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible due to the fact that the
controversy started more than 20 years ago aside from the obviously strained relations between the parties.

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union vs Interphil Laboratories Inc

Facts:

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-andfile employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and
packaging pharmaceutical products. They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 01
August 1990 to 31 July 1993.
Prior to the expiration, two union officers talked with the Vice president of the company regarding renegotiations
In the meeting, Salazar ( VP) stated that no talks can be made since it is still premature
The next day, the workers did not work properly, they left their workplace without sealing the containers
and securing the raw materials they were working on.
In the meeting, Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to
their normal work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration
of the new CBA. Salazar again told the union officers that the matter could be better discussed during the
formal renegotiations of the CBA.
The workers then filed a notice of strike
On 05 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Caday submitted his recommendation to the then Secretary of Labor
Leonardo A. Quisumbing.[8] Then Secretary Quisumbing approved and adopted the report in his Order,
dated 13 August 1997
The lower courts held that the laborers engaged in unfair labor practices and violated their CBA agreement

Issue: Whether or not working above the agreed shifts is allowed

Held: YES

It is evident from the foregoing provision that the working hours may be changed, at the discretion of the
company, should such change be necessary for its operations, and that the employees shall observe such
rules as have been laid down by the company.
In the case before us, Labor Arbiter Caday found that respondent company had to adopt a continuous 24hour work daily schedule by reason of the nature of its business and the demands of its clients.
It was established that the employees adhered to the said work schedule since 1988.
The employees are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed, without any
question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto.
The two-shift schedule effectively changed the working hours stipulated in the CBA.
As the employees assented by practice to this arrangement, they cannot now be heard to claim that the
overtime boycott is justified because they were not obliged to work beyond eight hours.
the evidence presented is equally crystal clear that the "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown"
committed by the respondents amounted to illegal strike.
Evidently, from all the foregoing, respondents' unjustified unilateral alteration of the 24-hour work schedule
thru their concerted activities of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" from April 16, 1993 up to
March 7, 1994, to force the petitioner company to accede to their unreasonable demands, can be classified
as a strike on an installment basis, as correctly called by petitioner company
More importantly, the overtime boycott or work slowdown by the employees constituted a violation of their
CBA, which prohibits the union or employee, during the existence of the CBA, to stage a strike or engage
in slowdown or interruption of work
What has just been said makes unnecessary resolution of SMCs argument that the workers concerted
refusal to adhere to the work schedule in force for the last several years, is a slowdown, an inherently illegal
activity essentially illegal even in the absence of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining contract, or
statute or rule.

Bisis Manggagawa s Tryco vs NLRC

Facts:

Tryco Pharma Corporation (Tryco) is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines and its principal office is
located in Caloocan City. Petitioners Joselito Lario, Vivencio Barte, Saturnino Egera and Simplicio Aya-ay
are its regular employees, occupying the positions of helper, shipment helper and factory workers,
respectively, assigned to the Production Department.
They are members of Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco (BMT), the exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees.
Tryco and the petitioners signed separate Memorand[a] of Agreement [2] (MOA), providing for a
compressed workweek schedule to be implemented in the company effectiveMay 20, 1996.
As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m., from Monday to Friday, shall be considered as the regular
working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during
those hours.
The MOA specifically stated that the employee waives the right to claim overtime pay for work rendered
after 5:00 p.m.until 6:12 p.m. from Monday to Friday considering that the compressed workweek schedule
is adopted in lieu of the regular workweek schedule which also consists of 46 hours.
However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such employee shall be
entitled to overtime pay.
In January 1997, BMT and Tryco negotiated for the renewal of their collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) but failed to arrive at a new agreement.
Subsequently, through a Memorandum[7] dated May 9, 1997, Tryco also directed petitioners Egera, Lario
and Barte to report to the companys plant site in Bulacan.
BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor
practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on May 26, 1997.
In August 1997, petitioners filed their separate complaints [8] for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
nonpayment of overtime pay and service incentive leave, and refusal to bargain against Tryco and its
President
On February 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit.[10] The Labor Arbiter held
that the transfer of the petitioners would not paralyze or render the union ineffective for the following
reasons:
o (1) complainants are not members of the negotiating panel; and
o (2) the transfer was made pursuant to the directive of the Department of Agriculture.
NLRC affirmed LA
The CA ruled the transfer order was a management prerogative not amounting to a constructive dismissal
or an unfair labor practice.

Issue: Whether or not there is unfair labor practice

Held: NO

We refuse to accept the petitioners wild and reckless imputation that the Bureau of Animal Industry
conspired with the respondents just to effect the transfer of the petitioners.There is not an iota of proof to
support this outlandish claim. Absent any evidence, the allegation is not only highly irresponsible but is
grossly unfair to the government agency concerned.
. While the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own
business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied
This prerogative extends to the managements right to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according
to the requirements of its business.
Managements prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another
in order to meet the requirements of the business is, therefore, generally not constitutive of constructive
dismissal
the consequent transfer of Trycos personnel, assigned to the Production Department was well within the
scope of its management prerogative.
However, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for valid and
legitimate grounds.
o The employer must show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits
Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of
salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, anchor their objection solely on the ground that it would cause them great
inconvenience since they are all residents of Metro Manila and they would incur additional expenses to
travel daily from Manila to Bulacan.
The Court has previously declared that mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of
constructive dismissal.
The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work assignments were only
transferred to another location.
More importantly, there was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an
intention to interfere with the petitioners right to organize. Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate
the workers right to organize.
Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any
inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.
Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the payment of overtime pay in
exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented
as they are written.

Linton Commercial Co vs Hellera

Facts:

Linton is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of importation, wholesale, retail and fabrication of
steel and its by-products.[3] Petitioner Desiree Ong is Lintons vice president.
On 17 December 1997, Linton issued a memorandum [5] addressed to its employees informing them of the
companys decision to suspend its operations from 18 December 1997 to 5 January 1998 due to the currency
crisis that affected its business operations.
On 7 January 1997,[7] Linton issued another memorandum[8] informing them that effective 12 January 1998,
it would implement a new compressed workweek of three (3) days on a rotation basis.
In other words, each worker would be working on a rotation basis for three working days only instead for
six days a week.
On the same day, Linton submitted an establishment termination report [9] concerning the rotation of its
workers.
Linton proceeded with the implementation of the new policy without waiting for its approval by DOLE.
The workers filed for illegal reduction of workdays
LA ruled in favor of laborers
NLRC reversed LA
o The compressed worksheet is a management prerogative
CA ruled:
o the employees were constructively dismissed because the short period of time between the
submission of the establishment termination report informing DOLE of its intention to observe a
compressed workweek and the actual implementation thereat was a manifestation of Lintons
intention to eventually retrench the employees.
o It found that Linton had failed to observe the substantive and procedural requirements of a valid
dismissal or retrenchment to avoid or minimize business losses since it had failed to present
adequate, credible and persuasive evidence that it was indeed suffering, or would imminently
suffer, from drastic business losses.

Issue: Whether or not there is illegal reduction of workdays

Held: YES

However, a year of financial losses would not warrant the immolation of the welfare of the employees,
which in this case was done through a reduced workweek that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the
periodic pay for a protracted period.
Certainly, management has the prerogative to come up with measures to ensure profitability or loss
minimization. However, such privilege is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good
faith and with due regard to the rights of labor.
As previously stated, financial losses must be shown before a company can validly opt to reduce the work
hours of its employees.
However, to date, no definite guidelines have yet been set to determine whether the alleged losses are
sufficient to justify the reduction of work hours.
If the standards set in determining the justifiability of financial losses under Article 283 (i.e., retrenchment)
or Article 286 (i.e., suspension of work) of the Labor Code were to be considered, petitioners would end up
failing to meet the standards.
for retrenchment to be justified, any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following
standards:
o (1) the losses incurred are substantial and not de minimis;
o (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent;
o
(3) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely to be effective in preventing the
expected losses; and

(4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled,
are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Linton failed in these aspects
All taken into account, the compressed workweek arrangement was unjustified and illegal. Thus, petitioners
committed illegal reduction of work hours.
o

National Development Co vs CIR

Facts:

At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts
of work.
The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the
workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours.
However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift,
petitioner instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours
only, petitioner that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in
computing compensation.
On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC,
maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of
additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
CIR ruled that that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work

Issue: Whether or not mealtime is to be considered working time

Held:

It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which
he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises 2 of his employer, is not counted as working
time only where the work is broken or is not continuous.
The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what constitutes compensable work,
rather the question is one of fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the
controverted in cases.
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was continuous and
therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.

Luzon Stevedoring Co vs Luzon Marine Department Union

Facts:

The private respondent in this case wanted to be paid for overtime pay during meal time
The laborers are seaman and not dryland
the LA ruled that the aforementioned employees are only entitled to receive overtime pay for work
rendered in excess of 8 hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays.
o However, the respondent company has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that it has paid its
employees for such overtime work

Issue: Whether or not the employees are entitled to overtime pay

Held: YES

For the purposes of this case, We do not need to set for seamen a criterion different from that applied to
laborers on land, for under the provisions of the above quoted section, the only thing to be done is to
determine the meaning and scope of the term "working place" used therein.
a laborer need not leave thepremises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be
counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will
the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the
premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall not
be counted.
the claimants herein rendered services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and
holidays, which implies either that said laborers were not given any recess at all, or that they were not
allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely.
And such resolution being on a question essentially of fact, this Court is now precluded to review the same
There was really no recess at all hence their work was continuous.

Arica vs NLRC
Facts:

This case stemmed from a complaint filed on April 9, 1984 against private respondent Stanfilco for
assembly time, moral damages and attorney's fees, with the aforementioned Regional Arbitration Branch
No. XI, Davao City.
LA ruled in favor of the private respondent Stanfilco because the 30 minute assembly time is not
compensable.
NLRC affirmed LA

Issue: Whether or not the 30-minute activity of the petitioners before the scheduled working time is compensable
under the Labor Code.
Held: NO. Lower courts affirmed

Noteworthy is the decision of the Minister of Labor, on May 12, 1978 in the aforecited case (Associated
Labor Union vs. Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation, NLRC Case No. 26-LS-XI-76 where significant
findings of facts and conclusions had already been made on the matter.
o This means there is the principle of res judicata
The thirty (30)-minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties
under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting time
within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. ...
Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply- rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and
the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to
attend to other personal pursuits.
In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their
failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.

State Marine Corp vs Cebu Seamen's Association

Facts:

Petitioners States Marine Corporation and Royal Line, Inc. were engaged in the business of marine
coastwise transportation, employing therein several steamships of Philippine registry.
They had a collective bargaining contract with the respondent Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc.
On September 12, 1952, the respondent union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), a petition
(Case No. 740-V) against the States Marine Corporation, later amended on May 4, 1953, by including as
party respondent, the petitioner Royal Line, Inc.
The Union alleged that the officers and men working on board the petitioners' vessels have not been paid
their sick leave, vacation leave and overtime pay; that the petitioners threatened or coerced them to accept a
reduction of salaries, observed by other shipowners
that after the Minimum Wage Law had taken effect, the petitioners required their employees on board their
vessels, to pay the sum of P.40 for every meal, while the masters and officers were not required to pay their
meals and that because Captain Carlos Asensi had refused to yield to the general reduction of salaries, the
petitioners dismissed said captain who now claims for reinstatement and the payment of back wages from
December 25, 1952, at the rate of P540.00, monthly.
This was the situation before August 4, 1951, when the Minimum Wage Law became effective. After this
date, however, the companies began deducting the cost of meals from the wages or salaries of crew
members; but no such deductions were made from the salaries of the deck officers and engineers in all the
boats of the petitioners.
CIR ruled in favor of the respondent Union
They also ruled that one Severito Pepito was not paid for overtime work

Issue: Whether or not the Pepito is to be paid

Held: Yes

Severino Pepito was found by the CIR to have worked overtime and had not been paid for such services.
Severino Pepito categorically stated that he worked during the late hours of the evening and during the
early hours of the day when the boat docks and unloads.
Aside from the above, he did other jobs such as removing rusts and cleaning the vessel, which overtime
work totalled to 6 hours a day, and of which he has not been paid as yet.
This statement was not rebutted by the petitioners. Nobody working with him on the same boat "M/V
Adriana" contrawise.
The testimonies of boatswains of other vessels(M/V Iruna and M/V Princesa), are incompetent and
unreliable.
And considering the established fact that the work of Severino Pepito was continuous, and during the time
he was not working, he could not leave and could not completely rest, because of the place and nature of
his work, the provisions of sec. 1, of Comm. Act No. 444 find no application in his case.
The provision states:
o "When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave
his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted",

Rada vs NLRC
Facts:

Petitioner's initial employment with this Respondent was under a "Contract of Employment for a Definite
Period" dated July 7, 1977, copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex
A whereby Petitioner was hired as "Driver" for the construction supervision phase of the Manila North
Expressway Extension, Second Stage (hereinafter referred to as MNEE Stage 2) for a term of "about 24
months effective July 1, 1977.
He was thereafter terminated
LA ruled in favor of RADA
NLRC reversed
Lets focus on overtime pay

Issue: Whether or not Rada is entitled to overtime pay

Held: YES

It is important to note that RADA was ruled as a project employee hence upon completion of the project he
can be validly terminated.
Anent the claim for overtime compensation, we hold that petitioner is entitled to the same. The fact that he
picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops
them off at the same points on his way back from the field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is
not merely incidental to petitioner's job as a driver.
On the contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the
employees, but primarily for the benefit of the employer, herein private respondent.
If driving these employees to and from the project site is not really part of petitioner's job, then there
would have been no need to find a replacement driver to fetch these employees.
But since the assigned task of fetching and delivering employees is indispensable and consequently
mandatory,
o then the time required of and used by petitioner in going from his residence to the field office and
back should be paid as overtime work.

Aklan Electric Coop INC vs NLRC

Facts:

Complainants alleged that prior to the temporary transfer of the office of AKELCO from Lezo Aklan to
Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, complainants were continuously performing their task and were duly paid of
their salaries at their main office located at Lezo, Aklan.

That on January 22, 1992, by way of resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO allowed the
temporary transfer holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan per information by their Project
Supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, that their head office is closed and that it is dangerous to hold office
thereat;

Nevertheless, majority of the employees including herein complainants continued to report for work at
Lezo Aklan and were paid of their salaries.

That on February 11, 1992, unnumbered resolution was passed by the Board of AKELCO withdrawing the
temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan, and that the daily operations must be held again at the
main office of Lezo, Aklan

That complainants who were then reporting at the Lezo office from January 1992 up to May 1992 were
duly paid of their salaries, while in the meantime some of the employees through the instigation of
respondent Mationg continued to remain and work at Kalibo, Aklan;

That from June 1992 up to March 18, 1993, complainants who continuously reported for work at Lezo,
Aklan in compliance with the aforementioned resolution were not paid their salaries;

LA ruled in favor of the company

NLRC reversed and ruled in favor of the workers

Issue:
Held:

Finally, we hold that public respondent erred in merely relying on the computations of compensable
services submitted by private respondents.

There must be competent proof such as time cards or office records to show that they actually rendered
compensable service during the stated period to entitle them to wages.

It has been established that the petitioners business office was transferred to Kalibo and all its equipments,
records and facilities were transferred thereat and that it conducted its official business in Kalibo during the
period in question.

It was incumbent upon private respondents to prove that they indeed rendered services for petitioner, which
they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or
complainant has to prove his affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the respondent
has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim.

Prangan vs NLRC
Facts:

Private respondent, a corporation engaged in providing security services to its client, hired petitioner on
November 4, 1980 as one of its security guards. Thereafter, he was assigned to the Cat House Bar and
Restaurant with a monthly salary of P2,000.00 until its closure on August 31, 1993.

On May 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint [1] against private respondent for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of salary from August 16-31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift
differential, uniform allowance, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from the year 1990 to
1993.

Private respondent, in its position paper,[2] rejected petitioners claim alleging it merely acted as an agent of
the latter in securing his employment at the Cat House Bar and Restaurant. Thus, the liability for the claims
of the petitioner should be charged to Cat House Bar and its owner, being his direct employer.

LA ruled in favor of the security guard saying he worked for 4 hours instead of twelve

NLRC affirmed

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner only rendered work for 4 hours
Held:
He only worked for 12 hours and NOT 4

there is no dispute that matters concerning an employees actual hours of work are within the ambit of
management prerogative. However, when an employer alleges that his employee works less than the
normal hours of employment as provided for in the law, [11] he bears the burden of proving his allegation
with clear and satisfactory evidence.

In the instant petition, the NLRC, in declaring that petitioner only worked for four hours, relied solely on
the supposed daily time records of the petitioner submitted by the private respondent.

We, however, are of the opinion that these documents cannot be considered substantial evidence as to
conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours.

As petitioners employer, private respondent has unlimited access to all relevant documents and records on
the hours of work of the petitioner.

Yet, even as it insists that petitioner only worked for four hours and not twelve, no employment contract,
payroll, notice of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any other convincing evidence which may attest
to the actual hours of work of the petitioner were even presented.

Instead, what the private respondent offered as evidence were only petitioners daily time record, which the
latter categorically denied ever accomplishing, much less signing.

In said alleged daily time record, it showed that petitioner started work at 10:00 p.m. and would invariably
leave his post at exactly 2:00 a.m.

Obviously, such unvarying recording of a daily time record is improbable and contrary to human
experience. It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same time,
day in day out.

The very uniformity and regularity of the entries are badges of untruthfulness and as such indices of
dubiety.

Another consideration which militates against private respondents claim is the fact that in the personnel
data sheet of the petitioner,[15] duly signed by the formers operation manager, it shows on its face that the
latters hours of work are from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. or twelve hours a day.

Hence, private respondent is estopped from assailing the contents of its own documents.

All told, private respondent has not adequately proved that petitioners actual hours of work is only four
hours.

Nicario vs NLRC
Facts:

Petitioner, Emelita Nicario, was employed with respondent company Mancao Supermarket, on June 6,
1986 as a salesgirl and was later on promoted as sales supervisor. However, private respondent terminated
her services on February 7, 1989.

A complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for backwages, wage differential, service incentive leave pay,
overtime pay, 13th month pay and unpaid wages was filed by petitioner before the National Labor Relations
Commission, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch X in Butuan City.

LA dismissed the complaint

NLRC reversed LA
o

It ruled that since petitioner assailed her supposed signatures appearing on the payrolls presented
by the company as a forgery, the labor arbiter should not have merely depended on the xerox
copies of the payrolls, as submitted in evidence by the private respondent but ordered a formal
hearing on the issue.

2nd LA awarded Nicario

NLRC affirmed 2nd LA

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to overtime pay

Held:

Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. However in cases where there is a conflict between the factual findings of
the NLRC and the labor arbiter, a review of such factual findings is necessitated.

While private respondent company submitted the daily time records of the petitioner to show that she
rendered work for only eight (8) hours a day, it did not refute nor seek to disprove the judicial notice taken
by Labor Arbiter Macaraig-Guillen that Mancao establishments, including the establishment where
petitioner worked, opens twelve hours a day, opening at 8:00 a.m. and closing at 8:00 p.m.

This Court, in previously evaluating the evidentiary value of daily time records, especially those which
show uniform entries with regard to the hours of work rendered by an employee, has ruled that such
unvarying recording of a daily time record is improbable and contrary to human experience.

It is impossible for an employee to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same time, day in day
out. The uniformity and regularity of the entries are badges of untruthfulness and as such indices of dubiety.

The observations made by the Solicitor General regarding the unreliability of the daily time records would
therefore seem more convincing. On the other hand, respondent company failed to present substantial
evidence, other than the disputed DTRs, to prove that petitioner indeed worked for only eight hours a day.

It is a well-settled doctrine, that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising
from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the formers
favor.

The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under
the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of
labor.

This rule should be applied in the case at bar, especially since the evidence presented by the private
respondent company is not convincing. Accordingly, we uphold the finding that petitioner rendered
overtime work, entitling her to overtime pay.

Durabuilt Recapping vs NLRC

Facts:

On July 11, 1983, a complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondent Reynaldo Bodegas, against
petitioner Durabuilt, a tire recapping company.

In a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter on February 13, 1984, the private respondent was ordered
reinstated to his former position with full backwages,

The petitioner filed its opposition to the computation on the ground that it contemplated a straight
computation of twenty six (26) working days in one month when the period covered by the computation
was intermittently interrupted due to frequent brownouts and machine trouble and that respondent Bodegas
had only a total of 250.75 days of attendance in 1982 due to absences

On October 23, 1985, the Labor Arbiter denied the opposition to the computation. The petitioner appealed
to the NLRC which, in an order dated May 16, 1986, affirmed the order of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to pay in the event of a brownout
Held: NO. Only entitled to days where they worked not inclusive of brownout days.

The general principle is that an employee is entitled to receive as backwages all the amounts he may have
lost starting from the date of his dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and employee of a "fair
day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining employees' wages, and for that
matter backwages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of
course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, or suspended

The illegal dismissal of the private respondent is conceded by the petitioner. It is willing to pay backwages.
However, the petitioner argues that for days where no work was required and could be done by its
employees, no wages could have been earned and, thereafter, lost by said employees to justify an award of
backwages.

Brownouts running for more than twenty minutes may not be treated as hours worked provided that any of
the following conditions are present;
o

a) The employees can leave their work place or go elsewhere whether within or without the work
premises; or

b) The employees can use the time effectively for their own interest.

Thus, we have held that where the failure of workers to work was not due to the employer's fault, the
burden of economic loss suffered by the employees should not be shifted to the employer. Each party must
bear his own loss

Indeed, it would neither be fair nor just to allow respondent to recover something he has not earned and
could not have earned and to further penalize the petitioner company over and above the losses it had
suffered due to lack of raw materials and the energy-saving programs of the government.

The private respondent cannot be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the petitioner company.

Perpetual Help Credit vs Faburada

Facts:

On January 3, 1990, Benedicto Faburada, Sisinita Vilar, Imelda Tamayo and Harold Catipay, private
respondents, filed a complaint against the Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PHCCI), petitioner for
illegal dismissal

The private respondent who is the part-time worker is a Regular part-time Computer programmer/
operator.

LA ruled in favor of the private respondents ( workers)

NLRC affirmed LA

Issue: Whether or not the workers regular

Held:

Yes. Lower Courts Affirmed.

That Benedicto Faburada worked only on a part-time basis, does not mean that he is not a regular
employee. Ones regularity of employment is not determined by the number of hours one works but by the
nature and by the length of time one has been in that particular job.

International Pharmaceuticals vs NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, production
and sale of pharmaceutical products. In March 1983, it employed private respondent Virginia Camacho
Quintia as Medical Director of its Research and Development department, replacing one Diana Villaraza.

The government, in that year, launched a program encouraging the development of herbal medicine and
offering incentives to interested parties.

Petitioner decided to venture into the development of herbal medicine, although it is now alleged that this
was merely experimental, to find out if it would be feasible to include herbal medicine in its business.

One of the government requirements was the hiring of a pharmacologist.

Petitioner avers that it was only for this purpose that private respondent was hired, hence its contention that
private respondent was a project employee.

Indeed, after her contract expired on March 19, 1984, she remained in the employ of petitioner where she
not only performed the work of Medical Director of its Research and Development department but also that
of company physician. This continued until her termination on July 12, 1986.

On July 10, 1986, Quintia was replaced as head of the Research and Development department by Paz
Wong. Two days later, on July 12, 1986, she received an inter-office memorandum officially terminating
her services allegedly because of the expiration of her contract of employment.

LA ruled in favor of the worker

NLRC affirmed LA

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is a regular employee

Held: She is a regular employee

Petitioners second point is that private respondents tasks were not really necessary and desirable in respect
of the usual business of petitioner, the work done by Quintia being on a temporary basis only.

According to petitioner, Quintias engagement was only for the duration of its herbal medicine development
project.

In addition, petitioner points out that private respondent was not required to keep fixed office hours and
this arrangement continued even after the expiration of the written contract, thus indicating the temporary
nature of her employment.

rtainly, as the NLRC observed, these facts show complainant working not as consultant but as a regular
employee albeit a managerial one.

It should be added that Quintia was hired to replace one Diana Villaraza, which suggests that the position
to which she was appointed by petitioner was an existing one, so much so that after the termination of
Quintias employment, somebody else (Paz Wong) was appointed in her place.

If private respondents employment was for a particular project which had allegedly been terminated, why
would there be a need to replace her?

We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the fact that she was not required to report at a fixed hour or to keep
fixed hours of work does not detract from her status as a regular employee. As petitioner itself admits,

Quintia was a managerial employee and therefore not covered by the Labor Code provisions on hours of
work.

Neither does the fact that private respondent was teaching full-time at the Cebu Doctors College negate her
regular status since this fact does not affect the nature of Quintias work. Whether ones employment is
regular is not determined by the number of hours one works, but by the nature of the work and by the
length of time one has been in that particular job.

Considering the foregoing, it is clear that Quintia became a regular employee of petitioner after her contract
expired on March 18, 1984 and her services were continued for more than two years in the usual trade or
business of the employer.

Pal vs Pascua
Facts:

PAL hired private respondents as station attendants on a four or six-hour work-shift a day at five to six days
a week.

The primary duty was to load cargo to departing, and unload cargo from arriving PAL international flights
as well as flights of Cathay Pacific, Northwest Airlines and Thai Airlines with which PAL had service
contract.

PAL compelled private respondents to work overtime because of urgent necessity.

the private respondents filed for regularization but during the said case they were made into regular-part
time employees from temporary part-time.

private respondents dropped their money claim then pending before the Office of Executive Labor Arbiter
Guanio, thus leaving for consideration their complaint for regularization

, the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondents complaint because the cause of action was
moot and academic.

the NLRC, finding for private respondents, declared them as regular employees of PAL with an eight-hour
work-shift.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the lower courts.

Issue: Whether or not the flight attendants could be considered as regular full time employees despite the fact that
they were hired initially as a part-time worker
Held: Yes.

It must be borne in mind that the exercise of management prerogative is not absolute. While it may be
conceded that management is in the best position to know its operational needs, the exercise of

management prerogative cannot be utilized to circumvent the law and public policy on labor and social
justice.

That prerogative accorded management could not defeat the very purpose for which our labor laws exist: to
balance the conflicting interests of labor and management, not to tilt the scale in favor of one over the other,
but to guaranty that labor and management stand on equal footing when bargaining in good faith with each
other.

By its very nature, encompassing as it could be, management prerogative must be exercised always with
the principles of fair play at heart and justice in mind.

equally borne by the records, is the fact that respondents employment was extended for more than two
years. Evidently, there was a continued and repeated necessity for their services, which puts to naught the
contention that respondents, beyond the one-year period, still continued to be temporary part-time
employees.

Cebu Institute of Technology vs Ople

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

UST vs NLRC
Facts:

On June 19, 1989, the University of Sto. Tomas (UST), through its Board of Trustees, terminated the
employment of all sixteen union officers and directors of respondent UST Faculty Union on the ground that
"in publishing or causing to be published in Strike Bulletin No. 5 dated August 4, 1987, the libelous and
defamatory attacks against the Father Rector, (each of them) has committed the offenses of grave
misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a faculty member."

As a result of the dismissal of said employees, some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence on
June 28, 1989 and several days thereafter, disrupting classes in all levels at the University.

On July 5, 1989, the faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the
Department of Labor and Employment.

Franklin Drilon stated in an order that UST readmit its faculty members

UST could not follow the order because it was given during the middle of the 1st semester and some of the
teaching assignments of the professors were already being handled by other professors

If the teachers were given back their usual load, it would be in violation of the contract UST had and would
be impracticable.

Issue:
Held:

The reinstated faculty members' refusal to assume their substantially equivalent academic assignments does
not contravene the Secretary's return-to-work order. They were merely insisting on being given actual
teaching loads, on the return-to-work order being followed. We find their persistence justified as they are
rightfully and legally entitled to actual reinstatement. Since the petitioner University failed to comply with
the Secretary's order of actual reinstatement, we adjudge that the NLRC's award of backwages until actual
reinstatement is correct.

The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of employees are traditionally Identified as
management prerogatives. However, these are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations
found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general principles of fair play and justice.

The petitioner manifests the fear that if the temporarily reinstated faculty members will be allowed to
handle actual teaching assignments in the classroom, the latter would take advantage of the situation by
making the classroom the forum not for the purpose of imparting knowledge to the students but for the
purpose of assailing and lambasting the administration

However, such a fear is speculative and does not warrant a deviation from the principle that the dismissed
faculty members must be actually reinstated pending resolution of the labor dispute. Unpleasant situations
are sometimes aftermaths of bitter labor disputes. It is the function of Government to fairly apply the law
and thereby minimize the dispute's harmful effects. It is in this light that the return to work order should be
viewed and obeyed.

Although we pronounce that the dismissed faculty members must be actually reinstated while the labor
dispute is being resolved, we have to take into account the fact that at this time, the first semester for
schoolyear 1990-1991 is about to end.

To change the faculty members around the time of final examinations would adversely affect and prejudice
the students whose welfare and interest we consider to be of primordial importance and for whom both the
University and the faculty union must subordinate their claims and desires.

This Court therefore resolves that the actual reinstatement of the non-reinstated faculty members, pending
resolution of the labor controversy before the NLRC, may take effect at the start of the second semester of
the schoolyear 1990-1991 but not later.

With this arrangement, the petitioner's reasoning that it will be violating contracts with the faculty members
who took over the dismissed professors' teaching loads becomes moot considering that, as it alleges in its
petition, it operates on a semestral basis.

St. Marys University vs CA

Facts:

Respondent Marcelo Donelo started teaching on a contractual basis at St. Marys University in 1992. In
1995, he was issued an appointment as an Assistant Professor I.

Later on, he was promoted to Assistant Professor III. He taught until the first semester of school year 19992000 when the school discontinued giving him teaching assignments. For this, respondent filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the university.

LA ruled in favor of the school kulang sa units na tinuro

NLRC reversed LA and ruled in favor of the teacher

o

It held that respondent was a full-time teacher as he did not appear to have other regular
remunerative employment and was paid on a regular monthly basis regardless of the number of
teaching hours.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is a full-time teacher and whether or not he has attained permanent status
Held: He was only a part-time teacher. LA reinstated and NLRC reversed

The evidence on record reveals that, except for four non-consecutive terms, respondent generally carried a
load of twelve units or less from 1992 to 1999. There is also no evidence that he performed other functions
for the school when not teaching.

These give the impression that he was merely a part-time teacher.[10] Although this is not conclusive since
there are full-time teachers who are allowed by the university to take fewer load, in this case, respondent
did not show that he belonged to the latter group, even after the university presented his teaching record.

With a teaching load of twelve units or less, he could not claim he worked for the number of hours daily as
prescribed by Section 45 of the Manual.

Furthermore, the records also indubitably show he was employed elsewhere from 1993 to 1996.

Since there is no showing that respondent worked on a full-time basis for at least three years, he could not
have acquired a permanent status.

A part-time employee does not attain permanent status no matter how long he has served the school.

And as a part-timer, his services could be terminated by the school without being held liable for illegal
dismissal.

Moreover, the requirement of twin-notice applicable only to regular or permanent employees could not be
invoked by respondent.

Yet, this is not to say that part-time teachers may not have security of tenure. The school could not lawfully
terminate a part-timer before the end of the agreed period without just cause. But once the period, semester,
or term ends, there is no obligation on the part of the school to renew the contract of employment for the
next period, semester, or term.

That petitioner did not give any teaching assignment to the respondent during a given term or semester,
even if factually true, did not amount to an actionable violation of respondents rights. It did not amount to
illegal dismissal of the part-time teacher.

Lacuesta vs ADMU
Facts:

Respondent Ateneo de Manila University (Ateneo) hired, on a contractual basis, petitioner Lolita R.
Lacuesta as a part-time lecturer in its English Department for the second semester of school year 19881989. She was re-hired, still on a contractual basis, for the first and second semesters of school year 19891990.

On July 13, 1990, the petitioner was first appointed as full-time instructor on probation, in the same
department effective June 1, 1990 until March 31, 1991. Thereafter, her contract as faculty on probation
was renewed effective April 1, 1991 until March 31, 1992. She was again hired for a third year effective
April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1993. During these three years she was on probation status.

In a letter dated January 27, 1993, respondent Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia, Dean of Ateneos Graduate School
and College of Arts and Sciences, notified petitioner that her contract would no longer be renewed because
she did not integrate well with the English Department.

Petitioner worked as editor in the University Press from April 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994 including an
extension of two months after her contract expired.

Upon expiry of her contract, petitioner applied for clearance to collect her final salary as editor. Later, she
agreed to extend her contract from June 16, 1994 to October 31, 1994.

Petitioner decided not to have her contract renewed due to a severe back problem. She did not report back
to work, but she submitted her clearance on February 20, 1995.

La ruled in favor of the petitioner

NLRC reversed and ruled in favor of Ateneo

CA affirmed NLRC

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed

Held: NO

The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, and not the Labor Code, determines whether or not a
faculty member in an educational institution has attained regular or permanent status.

As previously held, a part-time teacher cannot acquire permanent status. [17] Only when one has served as a
full-time teacher can he acquire permanent or regular status. The petitioner was a part-time lecturer before
she was appointed as a full-time instructor on probation.

As a part-time lecturer, her employment as such had ended when her contract expired. Thus, the three
semesters she served as part-time lecturer could not be credited to her in computing the number of years
she has served to qualify her for permanent status.

Completing the probation period does not automatically qualify her to become a permanent employee of
the university. Petitioner could only qualify to become a permanent employee upon fulfilling the reasonable
standards for permanent employment as faculty member.

Consistent with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of higher learning has the
prerogative to provide standards for its teachers and determine whether these standards have been met.

At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee on probation, belongs to the
university as the employer alone.

We reiterate, however, that probationary employees enjoy security of tenure, but only within the period of
probation. Likewise, an employee on probation can only be dismissed for just cause or when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer at
the time of his hiring.

Upon expiration of their contract of employment, academic personnel on probation cannot automatically
claim security of tenure and compel their employers to renew their employment contracts. In the instant
case, petitioner, did not attain permanent status and was not illegally dismissed. As found by the NLRC, her
contract merely expired.

Pan-Am AIrways vs Pan-Am Employees

Facts:

No facts were stated. Straight to the decision. NOTE this as Sir may want to trick into stating facts

Issue: Whether or not the one-hour meal period of the workers were to be counted as overtime pay

Held: Yes. Lower Court affirmed

Petitioner herein claims that the one-hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work (after
deducting 15 minutes), because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were not
in any manner under the control of the company during that period.

The court below found, on the contrary, that during the so called meal period, the mechanics were required
to stand by for emergency work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were
reprimanded by the leadman; that as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called
from their meals or told to hurry Employees Association up eating to perform work during this period.

Similarly, this Court is satisfied with the finding that there was no agreement to withdraw Case No. 1055-V
in consideration of the wage increases obtained by the, union and set forth in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Exhibit "A".

As reasoned out by the court below, such alleged agreement would have been incorporated in the contract if
it existed.

The fact that the union filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice, after the Collective Bargaining Contract
had been signed, did not necessarily mean that it had agreed to withdraw the case in consideration of the
wage increases.

It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute
the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an
incomplete decision.

We do not believe so.

Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most.

And the report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of
the order itself.

That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it incomplete,
since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the decision

The Industrial Court's order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period was
but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest, but was actually a work
hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call.

Pal vs NLRC
Facts:

Private respondent ( DR FABRIOS) was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was
assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic at Nichols and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00
midnight.

On February 17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, private respondent left the clinic to have his dinner at
his residence, which was about five-minute drive away.

A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its
employees, Mr. Manuel Acosta, had suffered a heart attack.

The nurse on duty, Mr. Merlino Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the
emergency.

The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the
hospital.

When private respondent reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with
the patient. Mr. Acosta died the following day.

After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, petitioner company decided to
suspend private respondent for three months effective December 16, 1994.

LA ruled in favor of the private respondent

NLRC affirmed

Issue: Whether or not meal time is considered a part of the 8 hour work time
Held: NO. Meal time is an exception to the 8 hour work time

The facts do not support petitioners allegation that private respondent abandoned his post on the evening
of February 17, 1994. Private respondent left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house,
which was only a few minutes drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on
duty so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acostas

condition, private respondent immediately left his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie
petitioners claim of abandonment.

Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company
premises for not less than eight (8) hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time,
even to take his meals.

We do not take his side

Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred
that employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited from
going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondents act, therefore, of
going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment.

National Development Co vs CIR

Facts:

At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts
of work.
The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the
workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours.
However, since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift,
petitioner instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours
only, petitioner that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in
computing compensation.
On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose members are employed at the NDC,
maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order the payment of
additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
CIR ruled that that mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work

Issue: Whether or not mealtime is to be considered working time

Held:

It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which
he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises 2 of his employer, is not counted as working
time only where the work is broken or is not continuous.
The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what constitutes compensable work,
rather the question is one of fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the
controverted in cases.
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was continuous and
therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.

Sime Darby Inc vs NLRC

Facts:

Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other
rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association (ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an
association of monthly salaried employees of petitioner at its Marikina factory.

Prior to the present controversy, all company factory workers in Marikina including members of private
respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30 minute paid on call lunch break.

On 14 August 1992 petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its
monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse and Quality
Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work schedule effective 14 September 1992

Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule and discontinuance of
the 30-minute paid on call lunch break, it filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter

for unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability pursuant to the resolution of this Court
in Sime Darby International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC.

LA ruled in favor of the company

o

The Labor Arbiter further held that the factory workers would be justly enriched if they continued
to be paid during their lunch break even if they were no longer on call or required to work during
the break. He also ruled that the decision in the earlier Sime Darby case[3] was not applicable to the
instant case because the former involved discrimination of certain employees who were not paid
for their 30-minute lunch break while the rest of the factory workers were paid; hence, this Court
ordered that the discriminated employees be similarly paid the additional compensation for their
lunch break.

NLRC reversed LA
o

The public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits
of time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break
resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code,
as amended

Issue: Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break
constitutive of unfair labor practice?
Held: NO. We find for petitioner ( Company)

T he right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In the instant case
petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations
and its improved production.

It rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute paid lunch break, the employees
could be called upon to do jobs during that period as they were on call.

Even if denominated as lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working time because the
factory employees were required to work if necessary and were paid accordingly for working.

With the new work schedule, the employees are now given a one-hour lunch break without any interruption
from their employer.

For a full one-hour undisturbed lunch break, the employees can freely and effectively use this hour not
only for eating but also for their rest and comfort which are conducive to more efficiency and better
performance in their work.

Since the employees are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more
need for them to be compensated for this period.

We agree with the Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily work period of
eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code.

Besides, the new schedule applies to all employees in the factory similarly situated whether they are union
members or not.

Shell Oil Co of the Phil vs National Labor Union

( THIS CASE IS NOT IN ENGLISH MOSTLY) Below is the English portion. Note that only the rationale of night
work is explained

There is sharp difference of opinion concerning the relative merits of these systems. Advocates of the
weekly change of shifts contend that the strain of nightwork and the difficulty of getting adequate sleep
during the day make it unwise for workers to remain on the"graveyard" shift for more than a week at a
time. Opponents urge that repeated changes make it more difficult to settle down to either kind of shift and
that after the first week nightwork becomes less trying while the ability to sleep by day increases.

Workers themselves react in various ways to the different systems.

Outside of continuous industries, nightwork can scarcely be justified, and, even in these, it presents serious
disadvantages which must be recognized in planing for industrial efficiency, stabilization of the working
force, the promotion of industrial good-will, and the conservation of the health and vitality of the workers.

Nightwork cannot be regarded as desirable, either from the point of view of the employer or of the wage
earner. It is uneconomical unless overhead costs are unusually heavy.

Frequently the scale of wages is higher as an inducement to employees to accept employment on the night
shift, and the rate of production is generally lower.

The lack of sunlight tends to produce anemia and tuberculosis and to predispose to other ills. Nightwork
brings increased liability to eyestrain and accident. Serious moral dangers also are likely to result from the
necessity of traveling the streets alone at night, and from the interference with normal home life

From an economic point of view, moreover, the investigations showed that nightwork was unprofitable,
being inferior to day work both in quality and in quantity.

Wherever it had been abolished, in the long run the efficiency both of the management and of the workers
was raised. Furthermore, it was found that nightwork laws are a valuable aid in enforcing acts fixing the
maximum period of employment.

Nightwork has almost invariably been looked upon with disfavor by students of the problem because of the
excessive strain involved, especially for women and young persons, the large amount of lost time
consequent upon exhaustion of the workers,
o

the additional strain and responsibility upon the executive staff, the tendency of excessively
fatigued workers to "keep going" on artificial stimulants,

the general curtailment of time for rest, leisure, and cultural improvement, and

the fact that night workers, although precluded to an extent from the activities of day life,

do attempt to enter into these activities, with resultant impairment of physical well-being.

It is not contended, of course, that nightwork could be abolished in the continuous-process industries, but it
is possible to put such industries upon a three- or four-shifts basis, and to prohibit nightwork for women
and children.

Nightwork. Civilized peoples are beginning to recognize the fact that except in cases of necessity or in
periods of great emergency, nightwork is socially undesirable. Under our modern industrial system,
however, nightwork has greatly aided the production of commodities, and has offered a significant method
of cutting down the ever-increasing overhead costs of industry. This result has led employers to believe that
such work is necessary and profitable. Here again one meets a conflict of economic and social interests.
Under these circumstances it is necessary to discover whether nightwork has deleterious effects upon the
health of laborers and tends to reduce the ultimate supply of efficient labor. If it can proved that nightwork
affects adversely both the quality and quantity of productive labor, its discontinuance will undoubtedly be
sanctioned by employers. From a social point of view, even a relatively high degree of efficiency in night
operations must be forfeited if it is purchased with rapid exhaustion of the health and energy of the
workers.

From an economic point of view, nightwork may be necessary if the employer is to meet the demand for his
product, or if he is to maintain his market in the face of increasing competition or mounting variable
production costs.

Industrial experience has shown that the possession of extra-ordinary physical strength and self-control
facilitates the reversal of the ordinary routine of day work and night rest, with the little or no unfavorable
effect on health and efficiency.

Unusual vitality and self-control, however, are not common possessions. It has been found that the most
serious obstacle to a reversal of the routine is the lack of self-discipline. Many night workers enter into the
numerous activities of day life that preclude sleep, and continue to attempt to do their work at night.
Evidence gathered by the British Health of Munition Workers' Committee places permanent night workers,
whether judged on the basis of output or loss of time, in a very unfavorable positions as compared with day
workers.

Systems of nightwork differ.

There is the continuous system, in which employees labor by night and do not attend the
establishment at all by day, and

the discontinuous system, in which the workers change to the day turn at regular intervals, usually
every other week.

There are, of course, minor variations in these systems, depending upon the nature of the industry and the
wishes of management

Continuous nightwork is definitely less productive than the discontinuous system. The output of the
continuous day shift does not make up for this loss in production.

The case against nightwork, then, may be said to rest upon several grounds.
o

In the first place, there are the remotely injurious effects of permanent nightwork manifested in the
later years of the worker's life.

Of more immediate importance to the average worker is the disarrangement of his social
life, including the recreational activities of his leisure hours and the ordinary associations
of normal family relations.

From an economic point of view, nightwork is to be discouraged because of its adverse

effect upon efficiency and output.

A moral argument against nightwork in the case of women is that the night shift forces
the workers to go to and from the factory in darkness.

Recent experiences of industrial nations have added much to the evidence against the
continuation of nightwork, except in extraordinary circumstances and unavoidable
emergencies.

The immediate prohibition of nightwork for all laborers is hardly practicable; its discontinuance in the case
of women employees is unquestionably desirable. '

The night was made for rest and sleep and not for work' is a common saying among wage-earning people,
and many of them dream of an industrial order in which there will be no night shift.

Dacut vs CA
Facts:

Petitioners Lazaro V. Dacut, Cesario G. Cajote, Romerlo F. Tungala, Lowel Z. Zubista, and Orlando P.
Taboy were crew members of the LCT BASILISA, an inter-island cargo vessel owned by private
respondent Sta. Clara International Transport and Equipment Corporation.

On November 29, 1998, Dacut discovered a hole in the vessels engine room. The company had the hole
patched up with a piece of iron and cement.

Despite the repair, Dacut andTungala resigned in July 1999 due to the vessels alleged unseaworthiness.

On the other hand, Cajote went on leave from April 12-28, 1999 to undergo eye treatment.

Since then, he has incurred several unauthorized absences. Fearing that he will be charged as
Absent Without Leave (AWOL), Cajote resigned in June 1999.

On September 22, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for constructive dismissal amounting to illegal
dismissal (except for Zubista and Taboy); underpayment of wages, special and regular holidays; nonpayment of rest days, sick and vacation leaves, night shift differentials, subsistence allowance, and fixed
overtime pay; actual, moral and exemplary damages; and litigation costs and attorneys fees.

LA ruled in favor of the company

NLRC and CA affirmed LA

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to their money claims ( night shift differential)
Held: No. Insufficient Proof

Apropos the monetary claims, there is insufficient evidence to prove petitioners entitlement thereto.

As crew members, petitioners were required to stay on board the vessel by the very nature of their duties,
and it is for this reason that, in addition to their regular compensation, they are given free living quarters
and subsistence allowances when required to be on board.

It could not have been the purpose of our law to require their employers to give them overtime pay or night
shift differential, even when they are not actually working.

Thus, the correct criterion in determining whether they are entitled to overtime pay or night shift
differential is not whether they were on board and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working
hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours.

In this case, petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof that overtime and night shift work were actually
performed to entitle them to the corresponding pay.

Mercury Drug Co Inc vs Dayao

Facts:

This is a verified petition dated March 17, 1964 which was subsequently amended on July 31, 1964 filed by
Nardo Dayao and 70 others against Mercury Drug Co., Inc., and/or Mariano Que, President & General
Manager, and Mercury Drug Co., Inc., Employees Association praying, with respect to respondent
corporation and its president and general manager:
o

1) payment of their unpaid back wages for work done on Sundays and legal holidays plus 25c/c
additional compensation from date of their employment up to June 30, 1962;

2) payment of extra compensation on work done at night;

3) reinstatement of Januario Referente and Oscar Echalar to their former positions with back
salaries; and, as against the respondent union, for its disestablishment and the refund of all monies
it had collected from petitioners.

Respondent court ordered the company to pay its 69 employees

Petitioner argued that the employees cannot claim night differential pay because they waived their right to
it

Issue: Whether or not the employees are entitled to the night differential pay
Held: Yes. It is not waivable

On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is necessary. To be read as controlling here is
Philippine Engineers' Syndicate, Inc. vs. Hon. Jose S. Bautista, et al., L-16440,

And this Court in that case said that while there was no law actually requiring payment of
additional compensation for night work, the industrial court has the power to determine the wages
that night workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the
additional compensation in the Shell case for 'hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and sociological
reasons.

After the passage of Republic Act 875, this Court has not only upheld the industrial court's assumption of
jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay or for payment of additional compensation
for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work

but has also supported such court's ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done
at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the worker's regular hours of duty, he should also be paid
additional compensation for overtime work.

Besides, to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the powers of the industrial court
to decide, would amount to a further curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may
defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor.'

The petitioner-company's arguments on the respondent court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over additional
compensation for work done at night by the respondents is without merit.

The respondent court's ruling on additional compensation for work done at night is, therefore, not without
evidence.

Moreover, the petitioner-company did not deny that the private respondents rendered nighttime work. In
fact, no additional evidence was necessary to prove that the private respondents were entitled to additional
compensation for whether or not they were entitled to the same is a question of law which the respondent
court answered correctly.

The "waiver rule" is not applicable in the case at bar.

o

Additional compensation for nighttime work is founded on public policy, hence the same cannot
be waived.

National Semi Conductor Distribution vs. NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner
National
Semiconductor
(HK)
Distribution,
Ltd.
(NSC
for
brevity),
a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, manufactures and assembles electronic parts
for export with principal office at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City.

Private respondent Edgar Philip C. Santos was employed by NSC as a technician in its Special Products
Group with a monthly salary of P5,501.00 assigned to the graveyard shift starting at ten o clock in the
evening until six o clock in the morning.

On 8 January 1993 Santos did not report for work on his shift. He resumed his duties as night shift
Technician Support only on 9 January 1993. However, at the end of his shift the following morning, he
made two (2) entries in his daily time record (DTR) to make it appear that he worked on both the 8th and
9th of January 1993.

His immediate supervisor, Mr. Joel Limsiaco, found out what Santos did

Informal Investigations ensued until Santos was dismissed

LA ruled in favor of the company but stated that Santos be paid for lack of due process and his night
differential.

NLRC affirmed

Issue: who has the burden of proving a claim for night shift differential pay, the worker who claims not to have been
paid night shift differentials, or the employer in custody of pertinent documents which would prove the fact of
payment of the same?
Held:

The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate his claim for night shift differentials is not prejudicial to his
cause. After all, the burden of proving payment rests on petitioner NSC.

Santos allegation of non-payment of this benefit, to which he is by law entitled, is a negative allegation
which need not be supported by evidence unless it is an essential part of his cause of action.

It must be noted that his main cause of action is his illegal dismissal, and the claim for night shift
differential is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal.

Thus, the burden of proving that payment of such benefit has been made rests upon the party who will
suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party.

As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must
allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than
on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.

For sure, private respondent cannot adequately prove the fact of non-payment of night shift differentials
since the pertinent employee files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents - which will
show that private respondent rendered night shift work; the time he rendered services; and, the amounts
owed as night shift differentials - are not in his possession but in the custody and absolute control of
petitioner.

By choosing not to fully and completely disclose information to prove that it had paid all the night shift
differentials due to private respondent, petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof.

We rule therefore that complainant should be awarded a night shift differential but limited to three (3) years
considering the prescriptive period of money claims.

( Side Note) Santos due process was not violated. He was given the chance to be heard. In case lang
tanungin.

Seaborne Carriers Corporation vs NLRC

Facts:

The private respondent began working for Seaborne Carriers Corporation (Seaborne) on April 8, 1983 as
Tug Master with a monthly salary of P2,475.00. On September 15, 1987, the tugboat he was manning met
an accident. Half of the cost of repairs totalling P5,000.00 was shouldered by Seaborne.

Private respondent was required to pay for the other half, and an initial salary deduction of P250.00 was
actually made by Seaborne.

On September 24, 1987, he sought permission to go on leave of absence to ask from the Department of
Labor and Employment if such deduction was legal, but this request was not granted.

Instead, he was asked by petitioner Gatan, Seaborne's president and manager, to tender his resignation.
When he refused to resign, as he had not yet received any separation pay, he was dismissed.

A complaint was then filed by the private respondent against Seaborne for illegal dismissal, illegal
deduction, and unpaid wages, which was later amended to include petitioner Gatan as party-respondent and
to embrace claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, sick leave pay, damages, and attorney's
fees.

LA ruled in favor of the private respondent

NLRC affirmed

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled

Held:

The private respondent's allegation of non-payment of these benefits, to which he is by law entitled, is a
negative allegation which need not be supported by evidence unless it is an essential part of the cause of
action.

It must be noted that the main cause of action of the private respondent is his illegal dismissal, and the
claim for the monetary benefits is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal.

Thus, the burden of proving that payment of said benefits has been made rests upon the party who will
suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party, that is, the petitioners as private respondent's
employer.

With regards to petitioner Gatan and his personal liability

These factors are simply not sufficient to convince this Court that petitioner Gatan acted with malice and in
bad faith in the termination of private respondent's employment.

In this regard only, the assailed decision dated March 21, 1989 should be accordingly modified.