Commentary

Trump Is the Mirror

You ought to have a special eye to what Cards are play'd out,
that you may know how to trump securely.
Cotton Gamester (1680), x. 82
In early November 1999, the world was shocked to realize how little the Republican frontrunner in the 2000 US
presidential elections knew on US foreign policy. In the infamous Boston TV interview, he had failed to name three
international statesmen in four hot spots for US interests (Chechnya, Pakistan, and Indi a). And yet, following the
Florida election recount, this inadequate nominee, George W. Bush, managed to win the so-called stolen elections.
Although Bush received fewer individual votes than Al Gore nationwide (the first person to win an American
presidential election with fewer national votes than another candidate since Benjamin Harrison in 1888), he won
the elections with 271 electoral votes against Gores 266.
Covering that election fight, the world media focused less on Bushs conservative agenda and arrogant style than
on the political thriller and the undemocratic character of the US electoral system. Ignorant of Cicero, Plotinus,
and the American Founding Fathers, French television anchors assured their listeners that the possibility of a
candidate winning the popular vote but losing the election could never happen in France. The American case
seemed problematic not because of Bushs inadequacy or unsettling political agenda at the moment the world
was too busy being happy and well-off to care but simply because democracy (in its ideal American model)
proved dysfunctional. The New York Times reported the view of a Mohammad Sharif, carpet seller in Islamabad,
Pakistan, who appeared to be puzzled over how Americans could spend his countrys budget on an election and
still not come away with a winner. This seems a bit wasteful to me, said Mr. Sharif while rolling out new rugs for
a visitor. The American people would have done better to buy some beautiful carpets.
In the 2004 presidential elections, non Americans were almost convinced of American stupidity. How is it ever
possible that he who had won in such a close presidential race in 2000; he who had failed to prevent Independence
Day and the worst of Hollywood nightmares come real; how is it ever possible that such an incompetent President
managed to increase his individual and electoral votes (from 271 to 286) and get re-elected with an absolute
majority of 50.7 percent against the Democratic nominee, John Kerry? To those who were not left dumb by the
tremors of 9.11 or too indifferent to ask in a Zeitgeist of political apathy and insecurity, this electoral behaviour
seemed idiosyncratically American, at worst, simply idiotic.
And yet the answer to this question was given almost 350 years ago in Hobbess Leviathan. Post-9.11, the American
society had returned (once again since the Red Scare and the McCarthy era) to the state of nature. The so-called
anthrax attacks and the fear of the tawny (or even suntanned) let alone Muslim neighbour corroborated this
state-of-nature feeling, that is, being afraid more of everyone else than of the sovereign who has already collapsed
de facto. Yet, Bush had done his homework on Hobbes (didnt have to study much, most came instinctively). He
surpassed Leviathans limitations by convincing the American voters that he (in 2004) was far more appropri ate
as a cowboy to lead their exodus from the state of nature and back to security compared to the milder Senator
from Massachusetts, who had been criticizing Bush on his militant agenda. One thing was clear: once found in a
jungle, one needs a gun more than reason, dialogue, or cultural exchange to convince the hungry lion.
Of course, in all this frenzy of terror and profit-making, few cared to notice how Bushs neoliberal agenda
overlapped with certain neoconservative policy measures. Indicative in this case is how Bushs own neoliberal
rhetoric of metaphorically bringing down walls in the global exchange of ideas and products (in practice, the
unhindered export of US ideas and products) coexisted with his signing of the 2006 Secure Fence Act to wall the
US-Mexico border; or how his Patriot Act that brought down the walls blocking the cooperation between the FBI
and the CIA authorities, coincided with the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp the gulag of
our times according to Amnesty International and the practices of torture and indefinite detention without trial
by his administration; or how his liberal agenda coincided with the bringing-down of the walls separating church

and state through the infamous Faith-Initiative Programs in the context of his policy of compassionate
republicanism.
In the 2008 presidential elections, it was the Democrats turn to win. Left with no alternatives, Republicans dug up
an old-school nominee and faithful supporter of Bushs War on Terror. Quite expectedly, John McCain proved a
failed response to the Obama momentum and rather disproportional to a changing society, already critical to the
Iraq War and Bushs policy options, a society that needed to recover from the turbulent consequences of the 2008
financial crisis.
In the 2012 presidential elections, things seemed different. Yet, few again noticed the similarities between the
profiles and agendas of Bush Jr. and the new Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney. Both were wealthy,
conservative, (conveniently) devout Christians (a Methodist and a Mormon, respectively), and disconnected with
working-class voters. Yet Romney had something that Bush lacked: besides a politician, he was also a businessman,
approaching his presidential campaign as a management consulting exercise. In a way, Romney presented himself
as a more improved conservative presidential model in neoliberal times, but the time was still not ripe enough to
accommodate him. His business-like approach to politics led him to often compromise his social conservatism and
ideological purity thus earning the characterization of the flip flopper or the phony. Romney was not
convincing. Obama was, and he re-won the elections.
All these have led us to the 2016 US presidential elections and the current predicament. After 99.1% of voting
districts, Trump is winning 279 electoral votes against Hilary Clintons 228. Once again as in the 2000 presidenti al
elections, Trump is elected President although he is currently losing the national popular vote by 0.2 percent to
Clinton. As this commentary is written, Clinton is ahead by more than 200,000 individual votes. Yet this time the
only one who has spoken of stolen elections was Trump himself almost a month before the Election Day.
The dominant sentiment today is perplexity. The world media keep asking why?, whereas academics remain once
again dumb. Until the very last moment, pre-election polls and detailed forecasts and analyses indicated that
Clinton had an 85 percent chance to win! It seems for a moment that only The Simpsons had long predicted the
electoral result as early as 2000. Nevertheless, to borrow one of Obamas famous quotes, somehow we all knew
this, or at least we should have known. All the evidence was there for us to see: a) an electorate that has been
hungry, angry, and depressed especially in those industrial states (i.e. of the Upper Midwest) most hit by the crisis
and neoliberal options; indifferent to everyday politics, and tired of politicians lies; too distant from Washington,
DC, and the centre of political decision-making; depoliticized and segmented into self-interested individual
monads; b) a Clinton who has been neither appealing nor convincing enough; and c) a Trump who is Trump.
In a way Trump is a hybrid of both G.W. Bush and Mitt Romney. He has what both and each of them had plus more,
and at the right moment. He is a successful businessman, a tycoon, his views mix elements of neoconservatism,
neoliberalism, nationalism, and intolerance, all in a duck soup that tastes awful but makes absolute sense to half
the US electorate. His political incompetence and ignorance is but an insignificant variant, weve learned that from
Bush Jr. Unlike Romneys case, his ideological inconsistencies are now all excused in the name of political
functionalism. His reality TV persona is enough to guarantee public recognition, further confusing the political
content of public life as the realm of appearances. His business perspective on politics is what is needed at the
moment of social and economic collapse. Most importantly, unlike Bush Jr. and Romney, Trump proved to be not
disconnected with working-class voters. To the contrary, his unique absurdism, hatred, intolerance, arrogance, and
immoderacy did not introduce but responded to an already existing discourse of a disenchanted polity.
Interestingly enough, this discourse appears to upset the fundamentals of both liberalism and conservatism. The
open reactions of both Democrats and Republicans (the neocons included) to the Trump phenomenon before the
elections attest to this. This discourse remains however the offspring of the (only seemingly) paradoxical
coincidence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism that has led us to the contemporary predicament in the United
States and abroad.
In that sense, it is of little significance who Trump is. He is but the mirror of a society embroiled by the aporias
born from this historical conjuncture. What is of significance and truly worrisome is that this rising discourse
presents itself as the most powerful mobilizing force especially for the (so far conveniently left) depoliticized
masses. This implies that even if Trumps own threatening maxims get compromised (once turned into concrete
policy measures in the future), the recipe for political success in difficult times is now clear to future demagogues
within and outside the US polity.
Dimitrios E. Akrivoulis for Politics First
D.E. Akrivoulis is Assistant Professor, Dept of Balkan, Slavic & Oriental Studies, University of Macedoni a;
coordinator with Professor Kyriakos Kentrotis of the Politics First Open Lectures; and administrator of the Politics
First page.