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IJCMA
22,1

An examination of conflict style

preferences in India
Stephen M. Croucher

10
Received 17 May 2010
Accepted 9 July 2010

School of Communication and the Arts, Marist College, Poughkeepsie,

New York, USA

Kyle J. Holody, Manda V. Hicks and Deepa Oommen

School of Communication Studies, Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, Ohio, USA, and

Alfred DeMaris
Center for Family and Demographic Research, Bowling Green State University,
Bowling Green, Ohio, USA
Abstract
Purpose This study sets out to examine conflict style preferences in India and the predictive effects
of various demographic variables on conflict style preference.
Design/methodology/approach Data were gathered in India (n 827) among Muslims and
Hindus. Conflict was measured using Oetzels Conflict Style Measure. To answer the research
questions, repeated measures ANOVA and multiple regressions were conducted.
Findings The findings reveal that conflict style preference among Hindus in India differs
significantly and that Hindus prefer the integrating and dominating styles, whilst showing the least
inclination towards the avoiding and obliging styles. Muslims prefer the integrating and
compromising styles and least prefer the dominating and avoiding styles. Analyses of the
demographic variables predictive influence reveal that age and sex are significant predictors for all
five conflict styles for both Muslims and Hindus. Education has a mixed predictive influence on
conflict style among Hindus and Muslims.
Research limitations/implications Use of self-report instruments and the majority of the
participants coming from middle-class backgrounds could limit the generalizability of the study.
Practical implications The study calls for conflict mediators to consider the influence of group
membership and educational level on conflict management/resolution. The research also discusses
national/international conflict intervention.
Social implications This paper informs individuals regarding the way in which two large
religious and cultural groups differ in their approaches to conflict. For a nation that has experienced a
history of conflict between these two cultural/religious groups, this paper can help shed light on how to
bridge the conflict between them.
Originality/value There are no studies directly comparing the conflict styles of Muslims and
Hindus.
Keywords Conflict, Ethnic conflict, Demographics, Communication, India
Paper type Research paper

International Journal of Conflict

Management
Vol. 22 No. 1, 2011
pp. 10-34
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1044-4068
DOI 10.1108/10444061111103607

India is a religiously diverse nation: the Hindu population is 80 percent (828 million),
the Muslim population is 13.5 percent (140 million), the Christian population is 2.5
percent (24 million), the Sikh population is 2 percent (19 million) and other religious
groups including Buddhists, and Jains make up another 19.5 million (Dalal, 2006).
Religion is a major part of the political scene in India. Though India claims to be a

secular nation, politics in India has always had a rich religious flavor. This has led to
religion being a major part of many Indians identity. There are numerous instances of
religious identity being evoked in response to the politics of communalism (Akbar,
2003; Girdner, 1996; Nussbaum, 2007; Verghese, 2008). Smith (1963) defines
communalism as the functioning of religious communities or organizations, or the
organizations which claim to represent them, in a way which is detrimental to the
interests of other groups or of the nation as a whole (p. 454). Historical evidence points
out that communalism in India emerged often because of the partisan politics of
imperialist forces (Girdner, 1996). For instance, Girdner (1996) points out that
communal identity among the Sikhs arose in the late seventeenth century because of
their struggles during the Mogul rule in India. During the colonial times in India, the
British created separate electorates for different religious communities; this was
successful in engineering the Hindu-Muslim divide within the nationalist movement,
which eventually helped lead to the partition of India (Girdner, 1996).
This study is a comparative analysis of conflict style preferences in India, especially
concerned with the differences between the major religious groups within the country.
The important history of India has been heavily influenced by both religious and
ethnic conflict, yet little communication-based research has led to a greater
understanding of the effects such a history has had on Indias present. As Oetzel
et al. (2006) articulated, much of conflict communication research has focused on
Western or Eastern Asian geographic contexts, with other areas of the world left
unexplored. This study is one among few attempts to understand and explore the
conflict style preferences associated with Indias two largest religious groups (Hindus
and Muslims). As Avruch (2001, 2003) suggested, culture provides the context under
which we can understand why and how conflict exists. Additionally, culture can be an
important influence on the effectiveness of communication within a conflict. In a
country sharply divided by political and religious differences, knowledge about what
conflict styles exist and what factors are associated with those preferences is of utmost
importance.
Religious beliefs and systems are not the only determining factors of a culture, of
course, but religion has played an important role in the history, government, and
development of culture in India.
Understanding the relationship between religion, culture, and conflict styles is
beneficial on a number of levels. On a micro level, the respective conflict styles of
self-identified Hindus and Muslims living in India can inform negotiation and
mediation in interpersonal and civic matters. Recognizing the impact of gender, age,
education level, and religion on conflict styles will contribute to conflict intervention.
Interpersonal and intercultural conflict takes place when our cultural identity affects
the way we orient to conflict, and this research provides tools to identify how conflict is
affected by religious self-identification. This understanding is important in interfaith
marriages, in local disputes, in civic conduct, in the education, and in any other micro
level conflict that is impacted by religious and cultural differences. Understanding the
relationship between conflict style orientation and religion can lead to more productive
conflict transformation. The results of this study can thus have important practical
purposes in that acknowledgement of different conflict style preferences can help
facilitate future conflict management. Additionally, this studys results will also reveal
important characteristics of the various people of one of the worlds largest nations.

Conflict style
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India
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IJCMA
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12

Indian religion and politics

In Indias post-independence era, the role of religion in political life continues. Political
parties like the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Barthiya Janatha Party (BJP)
adopted the partisan policies of the imperialist forces to reap political dividends. The
secessionist movement that arose in the state of Punjab, and the destruction of the
Babri-Masjid in Ayodya were attributed to the vote-bank creation politics of the INC
and the BJP (the former case being attributed to the INC and the latter case to the BJP).
Thus, the Indian state has become entrenched in the politics of majoritarianism and
marginalization (Gupta, 2007). In addition, there are also instances of governments
trying to appease religious and ethnic minorities through policies that favor them.
This, in turn, leads to widespread outrage among the Hindu majority, which is
effectively exploited by competing political parties.
In addition, there is a general feeling that traditional Hindu tolerance and
acceptance have been taken for granted, and hence a need to strengthen the communal
identity has emerged (Kothari, 1989). Thus, political maneuvering along communal
lines has succeeded in creating insecurity in the minds of the various religious
communities. However, it is important to acknowledge that conflict in India involves a
variety of issues, like language, ethnicity, gender, etc. For instance, Wilson (1992)
points out that the conflict in Assam was mainly on account of ethnic and linguistic
issues. However, as Gupta (2007) points out, religion has become such an important
group symbol in India, that even conflict on nonreligious issues is often interpreted
along religious lines. In the case of Assam, Wilson reported the conflict in the following
manner:
Assamese Hindus kill Bengali Moslems, Assamese Moslems killed Bengali Moslems, tribals
killed Assamese Hindus, tribals killed Bengali Moslems, tribals killed tribals, Bengali
Moslems killed Bengali Hindus, older assimilated Bengali immigrants killed recently arrived
ones, and all the local people killed Nepalese and Biharis, every community turned on every
other community (p. 256).

Furthermore, in the wake of the November 26, 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai,
India, in which 163 civilians and nine gunmen died, understanding the roots of
religious and ethnic conflict in India has gained increased importance (Backman,
2008; Dixon, 2008; Pinglay, 2008). In such a context, it is interesting to analyze the
conflict styles of Hindus and Muslims in India. In addition, socio-historical factors
intertwined with religious factors shape conflict perspectives (Oetzel et al., 2006).
Thus, this study explores potential conflict style differences between Hindus and
Muslims in India.
Conflict
Conflict styles
Conflict is defined as an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent
parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from the
other party in achieving their goals (Hocker and Wilmot, 1991, p. 12). Despite the
particular characteristics of individual times of conflict, individuals tend to have
certain styles or patterns from which they approach any given conflict. A conflict
style is a general pattern of responses to conflict within any variety of antagonistic
interactive situations (Oetzel et al., 2003; Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). In other words, a
conflict style is the general behavioral orientation one takes toward conflict (Folger

et al., 1993). Although it is possible to alter ones conflict styles to fit specific
situations, people generally favor one conflict style over others (Ting-Toomey et al.,
2001).
Conflict styles represent the choices we make when resolving conflict. We can
emphasize our own needs, cater to the needs of others, or try to do both. These styles
represent the consistent decision of whose needs we emphasize across different types
of conflict situations (Putnam and Wilson, 1982; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001).
The literature (e.g. Rahim, 1983; Thomas and Kilmann, 1974) identifies five general
styles people tend to adopt when confronted with conflict. These five styles are based
on Blake and Moutons (1964) two-dimensional grid of concern for self and others,
which was initially designed for studying conflict styles within organizations:
(1) dominating (sometimes identified as competing);
(2) integrating (or collaborating);
(3) compromising;
(4) avoiding; and
(5) obliging (or accommodating).
The dominating style is characterized by high concern for self and low concern for
others, the integrating with high for self and others, the compromising with
moderate for self and others, the obliging with low for self and high for others, and
the avoiding style with low for self and others (Oetzel et al., 2003; Zhang, 2007).
There has been some criticism toward these five conflict styles, in part because of
concern over the typologys comprehensiveness (Conrad, 1991). In hopes of accounting
for this, Ting-Toomey et al. (2001) added three styles to the list:
(1) emotional expression;
(2) third-party help; and
(3) passive aggression (also known as neglect).
Other scholars have also attempted to add or integrate conflict style models (e.g. Leung
and Kim, 2007). However, in the present research article, we utilize a conflict style
instrument based on the five conflict style categories, which Oetzel (1998) developed to
account for some of the concerns. We decided to use an instrument measuring the
original five categories for two reasons. First, as stated, Oetzels updated version of the
instrument was specifically designed with ethnic identities in mind. As this study is
concerned with religious differences, the attention to identities in Oetzels instrument is
of utmost importance. Second, because this study is one of few concerned with conflict
in India, it is not known if the additional styles like those mentioned (e.g. Ting-Toomey
et al., 2001; Leung and Kim, 2007) would apply. Depending on the results of this study,
newer or different styles may need to be researched in the future, but the original styles
are studied here for the purposes of exploration.
Conflict styles and culture
Cultural context. There are many theories for why and how conflict styles develop.
These questions are of concern because research reveals patterns of conflict styles
across cultural, ethnic, and demographic variables. For example, Ting-Toomey and

Conflict style
preferences in
India
13

IJCMA
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14

Kurogi (1998) suggest conflict styles are learned as an individual is socialized into a
group or culture. The process of socialization can be an important influence on both
identity and learned behavior. The culture in which one is socialized is also important.
Ross (1993) stresses viewing conflict as cultural behavior may explain why similar
issues are disputed in dissimilar ways in different cultures. Ting-Toomey (1985) also
suggests Halls (1976) high- versus low-context scheme of cultural variability may
provide some explanation for why different conflict styles are adopted by individuals
from different cultures. In cultures that tend toward high-context messages, the
instrumental issue of a message is intertwined with the person who originated that
issue (Chua and Gudykunst, 1987; Hall, 1976). Unlike those from high-context cultures,
for people from low-context cultures a conflict message and its sender are not
necessarily tied to one another (Chua and Gudykunst, 1987).
Individualism-collectivism. Hofstede (1984) identified individualism-collectivism as a
fundamental dimension along which cultures vary. Individualism represents cultures
in which people tend to emphasize their individual identity over a broader group
identity. Collectivism is the tendency toward collaboration and following social norms
rather than focusing on ones own needs (Dsilva and Whyte, 1998). The self and
other by which the five original conflict styles were developed refer to whose needs
specific individuals generally emphasize in conflict situations, whereas individualismcollectivism refers to this tendency to exist in broader cultures.
Although the current study is concerned with conflict style preferences within
individuals (albeit measured in the aggregate) rather than understanding influences at
the cultural level, we must acknowledge there is conceivably a relationship between
ones culture and likely conflict style.
For example, studies comparing cultural context and individualism-collectivism
variables with conflict styles suggest that people from high-context, collectivistic
cultures tend to be more avoiding and accommodating but less competing and
confrontational than people from low-context and individualistic cultures (Dsilva and
Whyte, 1998; Zhang, 2007). Americans and Australians are generally assumed to be
individualistic, whereas people from Africa, Southeast Asia (e.g. China, Taiwan, Korea,
Vietnam, and Japan), South America (e.g. Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru) and
predominantly Muslim countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan,
Jordan, and India) are assumed to be collectivistic (Cai and Fink, 2002; Dsilva and
Whyte, 1998; Oetzel et al., 2006).
Chua and Gudykunst (1987) identified students from high-context cultures as
significantly less confrontational than students from low-context cultures. The
researchers used an a priori categorization to divide students from low-context and
high-context countries into (assumed) respectively individualist and collectivist
cultures. This implies that whether a culture is individualistic or collectivistic does
have significant bearing on how one chooses to engage in conflict (Cai and Fink, 2002).
Despite these findings, it is not known if these broad tendencies apply to the cultures
within India or across the country overall. The current study explores individual and
religious differences pertaining to conflict style preferences, but the cultural
implications of individualism versus collectivism may be a factor in a diverse nation
like India.

Conflict in Islam and Hinduism

It is generally understood that India is a high-context, collectivistic country (Oetzel
et al., 2006). However, in addition to the above cultural variables that are traditionally
studied in intercultural communication, religion can also influence conflict styles.
Within India, there are two major religions: Islam and Hinduism. These religions have
significant impact on Indian culture and politics, including conflicts that arise
throughout the country. As Kandath (2006) points out, religion in India tends to play a
dominant role in conflict, thanks to recent trends toward fundamentalism. In his article
on interfaith/interreligious peace building efforts, Abu-Nimer (2001) also draws
attention to the roles both positive and destructive that religion plays in conflict. It
is therefore important to understand if there are broad trends between Muslims and
Hindus living in India.
The Muslim world has received increased attention in terms of macro level analysis
through peace and conflict studies, but it has been understudied in conflict style
research (Oetzel et al., 2006). Because of this, Muslims across the world have been
labeled collectivistic and set up in contrast to the Western culture. Abu-Nimer (1996)
offers that productive conflict resolution requires attending to the beliefs, attitudes,
customs, and history within Islamic culture that serve as meaningful frameworks for
conflict transformation (p. 24). However, Muslims and Islam are seen as others
because of an imposed Western contrast, yet the Muslim world is also treated as
unidimensional (e.g. all Muslims are labeled Arab though only a small minority of
Muslims are Arab). No distinction is made between the many geographic and cultural
differences that exist in the world of Islam. Muslims across a wide number of locations
have been subjected to colonization numerous times, which has created
context-specific experiences to which people must respond (Oetzel et al., 2006).
The many different subcultures to which Muslims belong each have their own values
and traditions. These create unique interpretations of the five basic conflict styles
mentioned above. Conflict is seen in Islam as extremely negative and destructive
(Oetzel et al., 2006); this view is likely to change the type of conflict styles Muslims tend
to adopt.
Additionally, although Islam does not include such a structured system of castes,
Muslims in India live in a culture heavily influenced by the Hindu castes (Kandath,
2006). As the nations second largest religious population, Muslims have often been
portrayed as a challenge to Hindus and the caste system in India.
As with Islam, there has been little research on conflict styles and Hinduism.
However, several sources have emphasized the conflict that exists within the Indian
Hindu caste system.
Counting mechanisms utilized during the colonial period identified with great
distinction the differences between the four castes of Hindu society, which in turn
endowed peoples individual religious identities with greater substance (Kandath,
2006; Kaviraj, 1997). As Indian society grew more Western, peoples individual,
tradition-inclined religious identities became stronger. Being identified as one caste or
another encouraged the people to hold their own identities in higher regard. Because
the castes have been categorized as distinctly different from one another, and because
this has not abated even in post-colonial India, the opportunity for conflict within the
country at large continues to brew (The Economist, 1990; Kaviraj, 1997). Despite this,

Conflict style
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IJCMA
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16

however, research has not yet identified the conflict styles most prevalent among
Hindus, or even within India at large.
The above research demonstrates individuals perceive, manage, and negotiate
conflict differently between East Asian and Western cultures, but little is known about
conflict in other areas of the world. There are also few research articles on how
different people from separate religions conceptualize conflict styles. Religious
affiliation may play an important role in the development of conflict styles in Western
cultures (Polkinghorn and Byrne, 2001; Wilson and Power, 2004), but research has not
shown this to be true across all geographic locations or across cultures. The many
groups that make up the Indian population are often placed in direct conflict with one
another, so it is important to understand what methods the two largest religious
groups in India use to resolve conflict. Based on the aforementioned literature, we
explored the following research questions:
RQ1a.

What is the overall conflict style orientation for Hindus in India?

RQ1b.

What is the overall conflict style orientation for Muslims in India?

Cultural and individual differences

Cai and Finks (2002) findings reveal integrating is the most preferred of the five
conflict styles across a diverse number of cultures, followed in order by obliging,
avoiding, compromising, and dominating. Despite this, in counties like the USA, there
are subcultures (e.g. Asian Americans and Latino Americans) who regard these styles
in ways unique to the larger populations (Oetzel, 1998; Ting-Toomey et al., 2001). Even
in an overall individualistic country, people have distinct differences in how they
approach conflict. Because of such differences even within countries, Cai and Fink
(2002) express concern that conflict styles are assumed to be influenced by
individualist-collectivist cultures rather than on individualist-collectivist individuals.
Assuming a relationship from culture to conflict style may not be valid because the
conceptualization of a given conflict style in literature may not be seen in similar ways
across different cultures or types of people (Cai and Fink, 2002; Kim and Leung, 2000;
Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001). Similarly, Kim et al. (2004) point out that while there
may be broad cultural differences regarding conflict styles, individuals within cultures
are often quite different from one another.
India is a unique and ideal location for studying conflict because of its rich history,
which includes forced occupations, attempted conquests, wars, and colonization.
Indian citizens are a vast array of people belonging to different castes, religions,
ethnicities, and political ideologies.
Within this context, however, Kandath (2006) states that Indians have multilayered
and multidimensional identities that are dynamic and marked by their situatedness in
various social formations such as caste, class, religion, and tribe (p. 506). Peoples
identities and conflict styles are certainly managed by the world around them, but
India represents a unique situation in which people are influenced by a vast number of
conflicting roles and responsibilities. The rich history and experience that goes along
with being Indian means people engaged in conflict, even those within broad religious
groups, may have a wide variety of conflict styles. Being Indian is perhaps a unique
identification for every single citizen of India. For this reason, knowing the

combination of individual characteristics, like the demographics listed below, that

come together to influence conflict styles among Indians is important to understand.
Conflict styles and demographics
Research has revealed differences across demographic variables. Ting-Toomey et al.
(2001) argue that there is a paucity of systematic research explaining relationships
among ethnic variability and sex differences. Among the paucity of systematic
research exploring sex differences in conflict styles, it is generally understood that
womens preferences for conflict styles are distinct from mens. For example,
Shockley-Zalabak and Morely (1984) identified females as being generally less
competitive in conflict than males. Zhang et al. (2005) and Zhang (2007) explored
inter-generational differences in China, finding young and old within that country
indeed have distinct conflict styles. In other words, conflict styles differ between ages
or generations. Additionally, Schaubhut (2007) indicates there are significant
differences between working professionals with different levels of education.
These findings and others indicate that religion, sex, age, and education level are
related to differences in conflict style preference across multiple cultures. Like
Ting-Toomey et al. (2001) suggest, however, these findings are only known for East
Asian and American cultures. Unfortunately, because little conflict style research has
been done in areas like India, it is not possible to offer hypotheses based on previous
literature. Although the literature at large does suggest patterns on which to base
hypotheses in general, we offer the following research question based on not being
absolutely certain if such patterns would apply in India:
RQ2.

To what extent do an individuals religion, age, sex, and level of education

predict his or her conflict style orientation?

Method
Participants
A total of 526 self-identified Hindus and 301 self-identified Muslims (n 827) in India
participated in a self-reported survey. The survey instrument included both
demographic questions and the conflict style instrument described below.
Participants ages ranged from 18 to 62 years of age (M 30:63, SD 9:61). For a
breakdown of sex, and educational level of participants, see Table I. Participants were
recruited at various nonprofit organizations and businesses/companies throughout
India. In some cases, a snowball sampling of participants took place through social
networks established over a three-year period by the principal investigator.
Such a sampling strategy represents sampling to as opposed to sampling from a
population.
Sampling to a population represents a hypothetical population, whose nature can be
understood only based on the socio-demographic characteristics. However, it does
represent a larger group to which results may be generalized (DeMaris, 2004).
Instrument
Surveys were administered in English. Numerous contacts in India suggested English
or regional languages were likely to be more understood by potential participants.
As the survey was administered in various Indian states, and as each state generally
has different languages, it was deemed best to use one unifying language. English is

Conflict style
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India
17

IJCMA
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18

Table I.
Characteristics of
participants

Characteristic

Hindu (n)

Muslim (n)

Sex
Male
Female

276
250

192
109

Highest education achieved

Grade school
Some high school
High school graduate
Some university
Completed Bachelors
Some graduate education
Completed graduate education

40
189
168
96
30
3

59
113
125
4

one of the official languages of India; thus English and not regional languages were
used for the instrument.
Conflict styles. Conflict styles were measured using Oetzels (1998) Conflict Style
Instrument. This 38-item instrument combines Rahims 28-item Organizational
Conflict Inventory II (ROCI-II), and ten additional items on ethnic identity and conflict
styles from Ting-Toomey et al. (1999). The ROCI-II measures individuals overall
conflict style and determines whether a person is prone to a more dominating, obliging,
avoiding, integrating, or compromising conflict style. For each of the 38 combined
items, individuals were asked on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
agree to strongly disagree to evaluate how they would react in conflict situations.
Cronbachs a for the combined measure in Oetzel (1998) ranged between 0.75 and 0.90.
In this study, the combined a was 0.90 for the Hindu population and 0.89 for the
Muslim population. See Table II for alphas for each conflict style orientation for Hindus
and Muslims.
To test RQ1a and RQ1b, repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted.
To test RQ2, multiple regression models were constructed for each conflict using each
conflict style as the criterion variable and the following predictor variables:
.
age;
.
sex;
.
education; and
.
religion.
Dummy variables were created for sex, and religion. Sex was dummy coded with
female as the reference group, and religion was coded with Muslim as the reference
group. Cross-product terms were created to test for interaction effects. Hierarchical
regression analysis was then used to test for possible interaction effects (DeMaris,
2004; Pedhazur, 1997).
Results
For RQ1a, a repeated measures analysis of variance revealed a significant difference
among the five conflict styles for Hindus in India (F 1; 040:05, p , 0:0001, a 0:42).
Tukeys multiple comparison procedure was used to find the conflict styles that

1.00
2 0.42 *
0.80 *
0.43 *
0.31 *
5.96
0.56
0.83
1.00
2 0.67 *
2 0.43 *
2 0.36 *
5.84
0.83
0.87

1.00
0.76 *
0.59 *
5.08
0.81
0.87

Hindus
3

1.00
0.91 *
4.28
0.85
0.88

1.00
4.01
0.93
0.88

5
1.00
2 0.69 *
0.74 *
0.66 *
0.60 *
6.13
0.63
0.81

1
1.00
2 0.34 *
2 0.17 *
2 0.08
5.78
0.32
0.72

1.00
0.92 *
0.92 *
6.03a
0.62
0.91

Muslims
3

1.00
5.89
0.52
0.71

1.00
0.89 *
6.01a
0.51
0.69

Note: *p , 0.001, all means are significantly different at the 0.05 level or less determined as by Tukey post hoc analysis; ameans are not significantly
different

(1) Integrating
(2) Dominating
(3) Compromising
(4) Obliging
(5) Avoiding
Mean
SD
Alpha reliability

Conflict style
preferences in
India
19

Table II.
Means, standard
deviations, correlations
and alpha reliabilities for
conflict styles

IJCMA
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20

differed significantly from each other (a 0:05). Overall, Hindus in India significantly
prefer the integrating and dominating styles more than other styles and the avoiding
and obliging styles were the least preferred styles; see Table II for means and standard
deviations of Hindu conflict styles.
For RQ1b, similar analysis revealed a significant difference in the mean scores
among the five conflict styles for Muslims in India (F 1; 034:55, p , 0:0001,
a 0:38) and a Tukeys multiple comparison procedure (a 0:05) revealed
significant differences between the five conflict styles.
Moreover, these tests demonstrate Muslims significantly prefer the integrating and
compromising styles the most and the dominating and avoiding styles the least; see
Table II for means and standard deviations of Muslim conflict styles.
Results by conflict style
RQ2 asked to what extent does religion, age, sex, and level of education predict his or
her conflict style orientation. The multiple regression equation for the avoiding conflict
style is: R2adj: 0:60; Y 0.69 1.15(Muslim) 0.07(Age) 0.52(Female)
0.38(Education) 2 0.19(Age*Muslim) 2 0.43(Female *Muslim) 2 0.31(Education *
Muslim). Nested F-tests were conducted to ascertain the explanatory power of each
regression model. Overall, while model 4 was the most significant model with
F 762:36, p , 0:0001, model 5 was retained as it predicts 60 percent of the variance
in the avoiding conflict style, DF 40:90, p , 0:05. In model 5, all variables were
statistically significant except for age and the cross product of age and religion. See
Table III for the complete regression models for the avoiding style.
For the compromising conflict style, the multiple regression model is R2adj: 0:50:
Y 1.41 1.44(Muslim) 2 0.26 (Age) 1.10 (Female) 1.19(Education) 0.01
(Age*Muslim) 2 0.78(Female*Muslim) 2 0.78(Education*Muslim). While model 4
was the most significant model with F 552:31, p , 0:0001, model 5 was retained
as the final model as it predicts 51 percent of the variance in the compromising conflict
style, F 100:16, p , 0:05. All variables were significant in model except the cross
product of age and religion. See Table IV for the complete regression models for the
compromising style.
Regressor

Table III.
Regression model for
variables predicting the
avoiding conflict style

Intercept
Age
Female
Education
Muslim
Age*Muslim
Female*Muslim
Education*Muslim
F
DF
R2
R2adj

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

4.66
0.02

4.66
0.03
0.00

5.73
0.00
20.05
20.44 * * *

1.69
20.13 * * *
0.17 * * *
0.09 * *
0.83 * * *

0.48

0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

65.23 * * *
192.81 * * *
0.19
0.19

284.75 * * *
762.36 * * *
0.58
0.58

0.69
0.07
0.52 * * *
0.38 * * *
1.15 * * *
2 0.19
2 0.43 * * *
2 0.31 * * *
175.86 * * *
40.90 *
0.60
0.60

0.00
0.00

Notes: *p , 0:05; * *p , 0:001; * * *p , 0:0001

Regressor
Intercept
Age
Female
Education
Muslim
Age*Muslim
Female*Muslim
Education*Muslim
F
DF
R2
R2adj

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

5.42
0.01

5.37
20.11 * *
0.25 * * *

5.66
20.12 * *
0.24 * * *
20.16 * * *

2.80
20.24 * * *
0.45 * * *
0.35 * * *
0.81 * * *

1.41
2 0.26 *
1.10 * * *
1.19 * * *
1.44 * * *
0.01
2 0.78 * * *
2 0.78 * * *
120.98 * * *
100.16 *
0.51
0.50

0.09
0.00
0.00

21.46 * * *
43.32 *
0.05
0.05

22.55 * * *
26.80
0.08
0.07

167.02 * * *
552.31 * * *
0.45
0.45

Notes: *p , 0:05; * *p , 0:001, * * *p , 0:0001

Conflict style
preferences in
India
21

Table IV.
Regression model for
variables predicting the
compromising conflict
style

For the dominating style, the multiple regression model is R2adj: 0:20:
Y 7:39 2 0:41Muslim 0:12Age 2 0:36Female 2 0:52Education. Model 4
was retained as it had the most significant explanatory power of the models, with
F 92:36, p , 0:05. All variables were significant in model 4. See Table V for the
complete regression models for the dominating style.
For the integrating style, the multiple regression model is R2adj: 0:42:
Y 3.99 1.03(Muslim) 2 0.12(Age) 1.38(Female) 0.78(Education) 2 0.29(Age*
Muslim) 2 1.04(Female*Muslim) 0.40 (Education*Muslim). Model 5 was retained,
F 126:93, p , 0:05, as it predicts 42 percent of the variance in the integrating
conflict style. All variables except for age were statistically significant predictors in
this model. See Table VI for the complete regression models for the integrating style.
For the obliging style, the multiple regression model is R2adj: 0:61:
Y 1.30 1.05(Muslim) 2 0.20(Age) 0.72(Female) 0.35(Education) 0.20
(Age*Muslim) 2 0.60(Female*Muslim)0.20(Education*Muslim). Model 5 was retained

Regressor
Intercept
Age
Female
Education
Muslim
Age*Muslim
Female*Muslim
Education*Muslim
F
DF
R2
R2adj

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

5.86
20.04

5.89
0.07
20.23 * * *

6.25
0.06
2 0.25 * * *
2 0.26 * * *

7.39
0.12 * *
2 0.36 * * *
2 0.52 * * *
2 0.41 * * *

1.16

17.84 * * *
34.29
0.04
0.04

32.66 * * *
64.65 *
0.11
0.10

52.12 * * *
92.36 *
0.20
0.20

7.88
2 0.29 *
2 0.60 * * *
2 0.64 * * *
2 0.68 * * *
0.45 *
0.26 *
0.18
33.26 * * *
20.97
0.22
0.22

0.00
0.00

Notes: *p , 0:05; * *p , 0:001; * * *p , 0:0001

Table V.
Regression model for
variables predicting the
dominating conflict style

IJCMA
22,1

22

Table VI.
Regression model for
variables predicting the
integrating conflict style

Regressor
Intercept
Age
Female
Education
Muslim
Age*Muslim
Female*Muslim
Education* Muslim
F
DF
R2
R2adj

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

6.21
20.23 * * *

6.16
2 0.41 * * *
0.37 * * *

6.02
20.40 * * *
0.38 * * *
0.12 * * *

4.78
2 0.48 * * *
0.52 * * *
0.45 * * *
0.52 * * *

47.21 * * *

78.97 * * *
107.77 *
0.16
0.16

57.95 * * *
9.90
0.17
0.17

99.17 * * *
196.06 * *
0.33
0.32

3.99
2 0.12
1.38 * * *
0.78 * * *
1.03 * * *
2 0.29 *
2 1.04 * * *
0.40 * * *
85.50 * * *
126.93 *
0.42
0.42

0.05
0.05

Notes: *p , 0:05; * *p , 0:001; * * *p , 0:0001

for analysis, F 41:95, p , 0:05, as it explains 61 percent of the variance in the

obliging conflict style. All variables except age and the cross product of age and
religion were statistically significant. See Table VII for the complete regression models
for the obliging style.
Results by demographic variables
Age was a statistically significant predictor for the compromising (b 2 0.26,
p , 0.05) and dominating (b 0.12, p , 0.001) styles. Therefore, an increase in age is
related to a decrease in the tendency to compromise, an increase in the tendency to
dominate, and no change in the tendency for other conflict styles.
Sex was a statistically significant predictor for all conflict styles: avoiding
(b 0:52, p , 0:0001), compromising (b 1:10, p , 0:0001), dominating (b 20:36,
p , 0:0001), integrating (b 1:38, p , 0:0001), and obliging (b 0:72, p , 0:0001).
Females are less likely than males to prefer a dominating conflict style and more likely
than males to prefer the other conflict styles.
Regressor

Table VII.
Regression model for
variables predicting the
obliging conflict style

Intercept
Age
Female
Education
Muslim
Age*Muslim
Female*Muslim
Education*Muslim
F
DF
R2
R2adj

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

4.79
0.08 *

4.79
0.07
0.03

5.72
0.04
2 0.02
2 0.42 * * *

1.87
2 0.09 * *
0.21 * * *
0.13 * * *
0.86 * * *

4.91 *

2.67
0
0.00
0.00

1.30
2 0.20
0.72 * * *
0.35 * *
1.05 * * *
0.20
2 0.60 * * *
2 0.20 *
184.41 * * *
41.95 *
0.61
0.61

0.00
0.00

Notes: *p , 0:05; * *p , 0:001; * * *p , 0:0001

58.94 * * *
0.822 * * *
0.18
0.17

295.63 * * *
410.50 * * *
0.59
0.59

Education was a statistically significant predictor for all conflict styles: avoiding
(b 0:38, p , :0001), compromising (b 1:19, p , 0:0001), dominating (b 20:52,
p , 0:0001), integrating (b 0:78, p , 0:0001), and obliging (b 0:35, p , 0:001).
Therefore, an increase in education relates to a decrease in the tendency to dominate
and an increase in the tendency to prefer other conflict styles.
Religion was a statistically significant predictor for all conflict styles: avoiding
(b 1:15, p , :0001), compromising (b 1:44, p , 0:0001), dominating (b 20:41,
p , 0:0001), integrating (b 1:03, p , 0:0001), and obliging (b 1:05, p , 0:0001).
Thus, Muslims are less likely than Hindus to prefer a dominating conflict style and
more likely than Hindus to prefer the other conflict styles.

Conflict style
preferences in
India
23

Interpretation of interactions
The effect of education on the avoiding conflict style as a function of sex and religion.
Education has a stronger effect for Hindus than Muslims. At lowest education,
Muslims are higher on avoiding, but at higher education, this reverses, and Hindus are
higher. Females are higher on avoiding than males, and this gender gap is greater
among Hindus. See Figure 1 for the interaction model for the avoiding conflict style.
The effect of education on the compromising conflict style as a function of sex and
religion. Education has a stronger effect for Hindus than Muslims. At lowest education,
Muslims are higher on compromising, but at higher education, this reverses, and
Hindus are higher. Females are higher on compromising than males, and this gender

Figure 1.
The effect of education on
avoiding conflict style as a
function of gender and
religion

IJCMA
22,1

24

Figure 2.
The effect of education on
compromising conflict
style as a function of
gender and religion

gap is greater among Hindus. See Figure 2 for the interaction model for the
compromising conflict style.
The effect of age on the dominating conflict style as a function of sex and religion. At
lowest age, sex is more significant than religion, with males of both religions higher on
dominance than females, and with no effect of religion among the females. At older
ages, religion trumps gender somewhat, with Muslims greater on dominance than
Hindus, and, within religion, with males more dominating than females. The gender
gap is greater for Hindus. Age has a positive effect on dominating for Muslims, but a
negative effect for Hindus. See Figure 3 for the interaction model for the dominating
conflict style.
The effect of education on the integrating conflict style as a function of sex and
religion. Education has a stronger effect for Muslims than Hindus. At low education,
female Hindus are highest on integrating, but at higher education male and female
Muslims are higher than Hindus. Females are higher on integrating than males; the
gender gap is greater among Hindus. See Figure 4 for the interaction model for the
integrating conflict style.
The effect of education on the obliging conflict style as a function of sex and religion.
Education has a stronger effect for Hindus than Muslims. At lower education Muslims
are higher than Hindus on obliging, but at the highest educational level, female Hindus
are the most obliging. Females are more obliging than males, and this gender gap is
greater for Hindus. See Figure 5 for the interaction model for the obliging conflict style.

Conflict style
preferences in
India
25

Figure 3.
The effect of age on
dominating conflict style
as a function of gender and
religion

Discussion
There has been a long history of conflict in India. This has been influenced by
colonialism, a caste system structured to emphasize differences, a large population,
diverse geography, competing political interests, and multiple cultures all occurring
within a single country (Akbar, 2003; Verghese, 2008). The two largest religious groups
in India are Hindus and Muslims, and it is important to understand the conflict styles
toward which people from these two religions gravitate. However, it is also important
to understand the specific characteristics that make an individual within these larger
groups tend towards one style over others. This study was an attempt to understand
cultural differences and individual influences on peoples preferred conflict styles.
Ethnic group vitality
Muslims are less likely than Hindus to prefer a dominating conflict style and more
likely than Hindus to prefer the other conflict styles. The fact that Hindus are more
likely than Muslims in India to prefer the dominating style can be partially explained
by the ethnic group vitality (Giles et al., 1977; Giles and Johnson, 1981; Jackson, 1999) of
the Hindu population in India.
As this group is the dominant cultural, political, economic, and religious group in
India, they are more likely to be comfortable dominating in conflict situations. Their
dominant status, demographic, and institutional support inherently gives Hindus more
agency, and helps them remain a stronger ethnic and/or religious collective. If this
study were conducted in Pakistan, it is likely the dominant cultural group (Muslims)

IJCMA
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26

Figure 4.
The effect of education on
integrating conflict style
as a function of gender and
religion

would probably score higher on the dominating conflict style than Hindus, who are a
minority in Pakistan. This result would be attributed to the relative political,
social/cultural, historical, and economic power of each religion in Pakistan as opposed
to India. In this study, Hindus in India are more likely to prefer a dominating conflict
style; religion is intrinsically linked to political, social/cultural, historical, and economic
power structures. A lack of vitality would also explain why female Muslims are less
likely than female Hindus to prefer the avoiding, compromising, integrating, and
obliging styles. Differences between how the two genders and religions differ in
conflict styles warrant further investigation.
Age, education, and caste
Respondents are more likely to prefer the dominating conflict style as they age.
Additionally, as Muslim respondents age, they are less likely to prefer the integrating
conflict style. In other words, respondents in general are more likely to prefer
dominating to integrating as they grow older, although Hindus prefer the integrating
style over Muslims. Education, which generally goes hand in hand with age, influenced
conflict style preferences differently. As Muslim respondents gain more education,
they are less likely to prefer the avoiding, compromising, and obliging styles when
compared to Hindus, and more likely to prefer the integrating style than Hindus.
Additionally, respondents in general are less likely to prefer the dominating style as
they gain more education. In other words, Hindu respondents seem to be more likely to

Conflict style
preferences in
India
27

Figure 5.
The effect of education on
obliging conflict style as a
function of gender and
religion

accommodate to the needs of others when in conflict, while Muslims are more likely to
prefer a conflict style in which their needs are accommodated.
An interesting finding appeared for the dominating conflict style. While an increase
in age is related to a higher preference for dominating, an increase in education (which
for practical reasons is related to an increase in age) is related to a decreased preference
for dominating. We suspect the caste system may explain the different results for age
and education. Hindus in India generally stay within the same caste system, while
Muslims have more ability to gain or lose status with age. We acknowledge not all
Hindus subscribe to the caste system and this system is not omnipresent in India.
However, many Hindus tend to be tied to a particular caste (or class) with stronger ties
than a Muslim would be. A person may grow more confident with age in their abilities
to handle conflict, and thus may be more likely to prefer a dominant conflict style.
However, a Hindu with higher education is closer to a higher caste than he or she
would be otherwise. As such, that person may interact with members of a higher caste
more regularly and would likely prefer the non-dominating conflict styles so as to not
offend the higher caste members or step outside of social expectations.
Kandath (2006) argues conflict is a defining feature of any social system. The caste
system in India is unique. We believe this system plays a defining role in conflict
differences in India. Castes, as a system, have increased the level of intensity some
people hold for their own religious and cultural identities (Akbar, 2003; Dalal, 2006;
Kandath, 2006; Nussbaum, 2007; Verghese, 2008). Generally, Hindus interact most

IJCMA
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28

often with other members of their caste, thus making integration the most preferable
method of conflict. Dominating may occur when a member of a higher caste is in
conflict with a member of a lower caste, or in contact with a person who is not part of
the caste system. Muslims may interact in similar (but not identical) ways because of
the influence the caste system has on Indian culture. Integration and compromise may
be the most preferable styles when dealing with people from the same status as oneself
(or, perhaps with people from ones religious group). Class and caste are important
features of Indian society. Regardless of whether or not an Indian is part of the caste
system, opportunities for conflict arise when diverse groups of people interact and live
with one another.
Cross-validity estimation
A formula-based estimation of the cross-validity coefficient was conducted to further
test predictive power of the final regression models for each conflict style.
A cross-validity coefficient is an estimation of how likely the regression equation for
each conflict style in this sample is to occur in other samples from the same population
(Pedhazur, 1997). The retained models for each conflict style had a significant R2CV . See
Table VIII for a comparison of the R 2 and R2CV values. These cross-validations reveal
the regression equations from this sample would perform similarly in other samples
from the same population in India. This cross-validity analysis gives further support to
the predictive strength of the variables in this study.
Future research
This study highlights opportunities for research from a critically oriented and a
practical perspective. Research regarding power distribution and reproduction,
majority and minority populations, as well as matters of dominance and
marginalization are suggested in the findings of the study. Since Hindus make up
the majority of the population in India, we can speculate some of the differences in
conflict styles may be indicators of majority/minority dynamics and relations. We
observe from this research, a clear and significant difference between the conflict style
preferences of Hindus in India and the conflict style preferences of Muslims in India.
We can legitimately deduce that because Hindus prefer a dominating conflict style and
Muslims prefer an integrating conflict style, that perhaps these preferences are a
manifestation of population dynamics in India. Perhaps a majority would naturally
favor a dominating conflict style due to the majoritys position of power and privilege.
For example, studies on nationalism and gender show a populations dominant
identities and ideologies tend to be in service to those already in power (Nagel, 1998).
In other words, groups in power prefer to keep, as well as exercise their power. We can
observe this same pattern of dominance through the ideological center or central

Table VIII.
Cross-validity estimation
for conflict styles based
on retained model

Conflict style

R2

R2CV

Avoiding style
Compromising style
Dominating style
Integrating style
Obliging style

0.60
0.51
0.20
0.42
0.61

0.59
0.50
0.18
0.41
0.60

position (Nakayama and Krizek, 1995, p. 292) occupied by whiteness and masculinity
in the USA. Conversely, minorities may tend to favor an integrating conflict style in
order to procure and share power. These assumptions serve as a reasonable reading of
the data. However, because of the varying influences of different socio-historical
frameworks, additional data is necessary to link specific claims regarding power,
majority and minority Muslims and Hindus in India. Therefore, a critical and
qualitative contribution to this research area could examine ways in which power
plays out within and between Muslims and Hindus in India.
Practical implications
From a practical perspective, this research demonstrates the importance of recognizing
group identification, and age/educational level when conducting conflict management/
resolution.
As the results reveal, members of the dominant culture, Hindus are more likely to
dominate in conflict situations, as they have more ethnic group vitality and security
than Muslims, this should be taken into consideration during conflict mediation.
Moreover, as individuals age and many achieve higher educational levels, their
approaches to conflict change depending on whether they are Muslim or Hindu. These
changes need to be taken into consideration and further analyzed to effectively conduct
conflict mediation between and within these groups. For example, Coleman and Raider
(2006) argue for the need to infuse intercultural training into negotiation and conflict
resolution, stating all conflict resolution training is by definition cross-cultural and
should thus purposefully integrate a cross-cultural perspective. Understanding the
differences between how Hindus and Muslims, in general, approach conflict, is
important part of mediating conflict in any context. This research specifically has
practical implications for conflict at the national and international level and at the
interpersonal level.
National and international conflict. In discussing the study of conflict within India,
Kandath (2006) argued conflict is a defining feature of all social systems (p. 510), for
the presence of political interests necessitates the presence of conflict. Therefore,
understanding conflict is key to understanding society and order. Kandath (2006) also
suggested that India serves as a unique and important case for the study of conflict, for
its long history of colonization, language and dialectical differences, and nuanced
system of castes, religions, and classes, have created a context in which understanding
conflict (and negotiation or collaboration) is essential. While conflict is necessary for a
social system to exist, so too is the ability for peoples of different interests, ethnicities,
classes, religions, or otherwise to be able to function for the greater good.
Thus, understanding people of different religions (a core aspect of Indian society) is
essential for negotiations related to, for example, the border disputes of Kashmir.
Indeed, Pavri (2009) suggested increased understanding and better communication has
helped in international negotiations between India and Pakistan, while Roy (2004)
suggested nationalistic Hindu rhetoric has specifically treated Muslims as other in
Indian society. In other words, ethnic and religious differences do exist in India, and
conflict has been affected by or even specifically caused by those differences. Because
cultural differences matter in conflicts that exist in international contexts (Avruch and
Wang, 2005), it is necessary to understand if there are differences between major ethnic
and religious groups regarding how they generally approach conflict. Important to the

Conflict style
preferences in
India
29

IJCMA
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30

current study, Kandath (2006) also argued conflict between the Hindu majority and
Muslim minority has resulted from the politicization of ethnic identities. By
understanding how the two groups, in general, tend to approach conflict, researchers,
mediators, and negotiators would be better served as they work toward peaceful
collaboration.
Interpersonal conflict. The impacts of age, sex, and religion have practical
implications for conflict intervention, particularly at the interpersonal level. In
pursuing mutually satisfying outcomes, understanding a partys orientation to conflict
is just as important as understanding the source or desired outcome of conflict.
Therefore, we can employ scholarship on approaches to conflict style in counseling,
mediation, negotiation, and conflict transformation. For example, recognizing that
gender may impact conflict styles can assist in finding productive methods for conflict
resolution. Additionally, an understanding of the impact of education level and
religious identification on conflict orientation can lead to language choices and framing
of terms that lead to a more agreeable resolution. Future research should work with
conflict mediators in India to better understand how such conflict takes place and take
steps to build intervention models.
Limitations
Some limitations exist in the current study and should be addressed in future research.
First, while the sample size utilized was large and diverse (geographically,
educationally and sexually), it is not representative of the Indian population overall.
The overwhelming majority of the participants in this study come from the middle to
upper middle-class income brackets and from urban areas. As such, generalizations to
a large population should be done with some caution as the Indian population also
includes a large economically disadvantaged population and a large rural population.
Studying a more diverse and truly generalizable sample would indicate if there are
other important distinctions to be found across India. Similarly, the history and
geography of India has created a wide and diverse set of cultures and subcultures.
Because this survey was one of the first and few related to India, it sought to
understand only a few variables influencing conflict styles. Important differences may
exist that were not studied here, some of which may hold important sway in
determining how or why an Indian from one area, religion, or culture reacts differently
to conflict situations compared to an Indian living in another context. For example, the
strength and salience of ones religious identification (religiosity) may play a part in
which conflict style one prefers. This study was exploratory in nature, with the
understanding that Western understanding of concepts like religiosity may not apply
in the cultural context under study here. Future research would do well to explore
whether religiosity is a universally understood concept and, if so, if religiosity does
have an influence on conflict style preference. A second limitation is the variation in
education levels between the two groups (Hindus and Muslims). The Hindu sample
was significantly more likely to have a university education than the Muslim sample.
Future work should strive for a more balanced educational sample, especially since
education influenced approaches to conflict. The third limitation is the use of
self-report measurements, which are regularly used in communication research (Oetzel,
1998). Given the nature of questions on the revised ROCI-II (Ting-Toomey et al., 1999)
individuals may have the tendency to answer questions in ways to make themselves

appear more favorable. However, not employing self-reports would be extremely

difficult. As Cai and Fink (2002) also found in their study:
[U]sing self reports allowed the comparison of this studys results with previous research that
has, in fact, employed such paper-and-pencil measures. Therefore, what may ordinarily
appear as a limitation is here actually a necessity (p. 83).

This study represents one of the first and only attempts to understand differences in
conflict styles in India. It is also one of the few to explore differences in conflict style
preference for religions like Hinduism and Islam. These variables provide ample
opportunity for further research regarding India, conflict, and communication
practices. Although they may not be entirely surprising, the findings of this initial
exploration demonstrate there are important differences and similarities in conflict
styles among Indians. These results have now been explored and should continue to be
investigated in the future.
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About the authors
Stephen M. Croucher (PhD, University of Oklahoma, 2006) is an Associate Professor in the
School of Communication and the Arts, Marist College, USA. Stephen M. Croucher is the
corresponding author and can be contacted at: stephen.croucher@marist.edu
Kyle J. Holody (MA, Virginia Tech, 2006) is a doctoral student in the School of
Communication Studies at Bowling Green State University
Manda V. Hicks (MA, Boise State University, 2006) is a doctoral student in the School of
Communication Studies at Bowling Green State University
Deepa Oommen (MA, Morehead State University, 2006) is a doctoral student in the School of
Communication Studies at Bowling Green State University.
Alfred DeMaris (PhD, University of Florida, 1982) is a Professor of Sociology and Statistician
for the Center for Family and Demographic Research at Bowling Green State University.

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