LocalCivilLibertiesProtectionAct

AnordinancetosafeguardFirstandFourthAmendmentprotectionsandensurethe
focusoflocallawenforcementagenciesontheircorepublicsafetymissionby
limitingtheirsurveillance,intelligencecollection,andimmigrationenforcement
activities,andensuringtransparencyintopotentialdiscriminatoryprofiling.
Formoreinformation,visit
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

Whereas

[listlocallawenforcementagencies]
(locallawenforcementagencies)are
accountabletothismunicipalityresponsibleforitspublicsafetywhilegrantedlimitedresources
andchargedwithamissiontoserveandprotectitslawabidingresidents,ratherthantomonitor,
harass,orintimidatethem
Whereas
theConstitutionandBillofRightsensuretherightsoflawabidingAmericanstobe
freefromarbitrarystatescrutiny,surveillance,searches,interrogations,seizures,orarrest
Whereas
publictrustinlawenforcementofficers,andtheirreciprocalrespectfortheruleoflaw,
arevitaltopromotingpublicsafety
Whereas
federalagenciesresponsibleforcollectingdomesticintelligence,suchastheFederal
BureauofInvestigations(FBI),haverepeatedlyandsystematicallyexceededtheirauthorities,
violatedtheprivacyandFirstAmendmentrightsoflawabidingAmericans,evenveterans,
subjectedtounjustifiedandunreasonablesurveillance
Whereas
neithercongressionalnorjudicialoversighthasachievedtransparencyintothe
expandingarrayofdomesticspyingandsurveillanceprogramsandpoliciespursuedbyfederal,
state,andlocalgovernmentagencies
Whereas
demonstrationsofconcernaboutpoliticalandsocialissuesbenefit
[theCityof]
andare
protectedbytheFirstAmendment
Whereas
socialmovements,suchasOccupyandBlackLivesMatter,haveoftenbeenmetwith
heavyhanded,militarizedpoliceresponsesseverelylimitingtheirFirstAmendmentrighttofree
expressionandassembly
Whereas
theInspectorGeneraloftheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)foundinMarch
2010thatlocalimmigrationenforcementunder287(g)oftheImmigrationandNationalityAct
hasledtorampantracialprofilingandwidespreadviolationsoftherightsofUScitizens
Whereas
severalStates,includingArizonaandGeorgia,havesoughttoinstitutionalizesuspicion
byassociationbyrequiringincrementalscrutinyofindividuals,includingUScitizens,basedon
theirnationalorigin

2
Whereas
ImmigrationsandCustomsEnforcement(ICE)hasincreasinglyreliedondetainersto
holdindividualssuspectedofcommittingacivilviolationbyresidingintheUnitedStates
withoutproperauthorization,andthesedetainersarenotwarrants,astheyaresignedbyICE
officers,notaneutralmagistrate,andhavebeenfoundtoviolatetheFourthAmendmentbya
growingnumberofcourts
Whereas
newelectronictechnologiesgivelawenforcementunprecedentedwaystomonitorand
collectinformationonindividuals,butarestill,despiteclaimstothecontrary,subjecttothe
FourthAmendment
Whereas
thedraftersoftheConstitutioncouldnothaveimaginedsmartphones,Twitter,oremail
whentheywroteabouttherightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,and
effects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,theynonethelessprovidedaclear
frameworkforprotectingpersonalcommunicationsfromunwarrantedgovernmentintrusion
Whereas
alackofpoliceaccountabilityhasledtofrustrationandtheriseofnewsocial
movements,suchastheBlackLivesMattermovement
Whereas
theexactnumberofpoliceinvolvedkillingsintheUnitedStatesisunknowndueto
inadequatereportingmechanisms
Whereas
federallegislationneededtocurbruleoflawabusessuchastheSurveillanceState
RepealAct,theEndRacialProfilingAct,thePRIDEActandanupdatedElectronic
CommunicationsPrivacyActhasnotbeenenactedanddoesnotappearnearthetopofthe
nationalagenda
Whereas
despiterevelationsbywhistleblowersandjournalists,theongoingsecrecysurrounding
domesticsurveillanceactivitiescontinuestoprecludetheeffectiveoperationofdemocratic
checksandbalances
Whereas
widespreadsuspicionlesssurveillancehasachillingeffectonspeech,andbothwriters
andjournalistshavereportedengaginginselfcensorshipduetodomesticsurveillance
Whereas
frustrationoverruleoflawabusessuchasmasssurveillanceandpoliceprofilingis
mounting,butsolutionsatthefederallevelareunlikelytobeenactedand
Whereas
theexperiencesoflocalitiesacrosstheUnitedStatesdemonstrateconclusivelythat
allowinglocallawenforcementagenciestofocusontheircorepublicsafetymission(withoutthe
distractionorcounterproductivepursuitoffederalimmigrationenforcementorintelligence
collectionmandates)enhancespublicsafety,

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

BEITRESOLVED:
That
[theCityof]
remainsfirmlycommittedtotheprotectionofcivilrightsandcivilliberties
forallpeople,andenactsthisordinancetosecurethoseaims.
I.

II.

Definitions
A. Observationormonitoringmeanssurveillance,monitoring,ordatacollection
facilitatedbyhumanintelligence,undisclosedparticipationbylawenforcement
agentsorinformants,warrantlesswiretaps,remoteorliveimaging,datarecorded
fromcellulartelephones,internet,andothertelecommunicationsdevices,orother
routineorspontaneousinvestigativeactivities.
B. DataCentersmeansanyfacilitiesacceptingpublicfundstofacilitatethe
collection,dissemination,oranalysisofintelligencedataconcerningnoncriminal
behaviorcollectedthroughobservationbyfederal,state,orlocallawenforcement
agencies.
C. NonCriminalIntelligenceInformationmeansinformationaboutactivitiesthat
arenotcriminalinnature,collectedoutsidethecontextofaninvestigationofa
criminalactthathasoccurred.
D. LocalLawEnforcementAgenciesinclude
[listlocallawenforcementagencies]
.
E. InvestigatoryActivitymeansanystop,interrogation,search,seizure,useof
force,orarrest.
F. Friskincludesapatdown.
G. Dronesmeansapoweredaerialvehiclecontrolledautonomouslyorremotely
thatdoesnotcarryahumanoperator.Dronesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,
poweredaerialvehiclesthatcollect,store,and/ortransmitsensordata,suchas
photos,video,thermalimages,andinterceptedwirelesscommunicationsand
unmannedaerialvehiclescapableoffiringlethaland/orlesslethalprojectiles,or
crowdcontrolmeasures.
H. Cellsitesimulators,commonlyreferredtoasastingrays,aredevicesthat
mimiccellphonetowers.Cellsitesimulatorsincludebothdevicesthatgatherthe
generallocationofcellphonesinthesurroundingarea,aswellasthosethat
interceptcommunications.
I. Protectedclassreferstorace,ethnicity,countryorregionoforigin,religion,
sexualorientation,gender,genderidentity,immigrationstatus,disability,HIV
status,age,orhousingstatus.

SafeguardsonSurveillance
A. InformationCollection:Lawenforcementagentsshallconductsearchesof
personsinthisjurisdictiononlyonthebasisofprobablecausethatacriminal
offensehasbeencommitted,oronabasispreviouslyheldbyacourttobe
consistentwithrightsundertheConstitutionsoftheUnitedStatesandStateof
[State]
.
1. Inaccordancewithfederallaw,ReasonableSuspicionthatacriminal
offensehasbeencommittedmayjustifyacursoryfriskofouterclothing,

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

III.

orthecollectionorretentionofintelligenceinformationrelatedto
suspectedcriminalactivity.
2. Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotengageineffortstocollector
retaininformationaboutthelawfulactivitiesofpersonsorgroupswithout
reasonablesuspicionthatsuchactivitiesrelatetocriminalactivity.
3. Observationorsearchesunsupportedbyindividualizedsuspicionareper
seunreasonableandshallnotprovideabasisforarrest,prosecution,orthe
collectionorretentionofintelligenceinformation.
4. Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotpursue,engagein,orsupport
eitherelectronicorphysicalsurveillanceactivitiesunlesssupporteda
judicialwarrantbasedonprobablecauseandspecifictothetime,place,
andtargetofsuchsurveillance.
5. Intelligencecollectionactivitiesunsupportedbyreasonablesuspicionthat
acriminaloffensehasbeenormaybecommitted,orajudicialwarrant,
areperseunreasonableandprohibited.
B. InformationDissemination:
1. LocallawenforcementagenciesshallnotsupplyIntelligenceInformation
tofederalofficialsabsentreasonablesuspicionthatacriminaloffensehas
beenormaybecommitted.Incidentreportsconcerningallegedly
suspiciousactivitiesshallnotbereportedtodatabasesdirectlyor
indirectlyaccessiblebyfederalofficialsabsentreasonablesuspicionthata
criminalviolationhasbeenormaybecommitted.
2. IntelligenceInformationshallnotbedisseminatedtomilitaryorprivate
sectororganizations.Intelligencerelatedtoacriminalinvestigationthat
hasbeencollectedbylocalauthoritiesshallbedisseminatedonlytolaw
enforcementagencieslocalauthoritiesshallnotincludemilitaryor
privatesectoractors,norDataCenters(seeI.B.)throughwhichmilitaryor
privatesectoractorscouldgainaccessdirectlyorindirectlytosuchdata.
3. Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotparticipateininteragency
bodiesthatdisseminatenoncriminalintelligenceinformationunlessthose
bodiescomplywith28C.F.R.Part23anditsrequirementsregarding
informationreceipt,maintenance,security,anddissemination.

LimitsonUndercoverInfiltrationandPoliticalProfiling
A. Locallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnotengageinundercoverinfiltration,or
undisclosedparticipationofanykind,ingroupsororganizationspursuingFirst
Amendmentprotected(speech,political,orreligious)activity,absentprobable
causethatacriminaloffensemaybecommitted.
B. Anyinvestigationinvolvingreligiousinstitutionsorpoliticalorganizationsshall
bepursuedthroughthemostminimallyinvasivemethodsavailable,andshall
requireactiveandrecurringinternaloversight.
C. Locallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnotselectpersons,organizations,
associations,orinstitutionsforanyinvestigatoryactivity,toanyextent,onthe
basisoftheirFirstAmendmentprotected(speech,political,orreligious)
activities.

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

IV.

D. Localauthoritiesshallnotcollect,disseminate,ormaintainnoncriminal
IntelligenceInformationaboutthepolitical,religious,orsocialviews,
associations,oractivitiesofanypersonoranygroup,association,corporation,
business,partnership,orotherorganizationunlesssuchinformationrelatesto
criminalactivityandthereisreasonablesuspiciontobelievethatthepersonmay
beinvolved.

ProhibitionsonProfilingofProtectedClasses
A. Locallawenforcementagentsandagenciesshallnotselectpersonsfor
observation,interrogations,searches,frisks,orarrestsbasedinanypartonthe
personsrace,ethnicity,countryorregionoforigin,religion,sexualorientation,
gender,genderidentity,immigrationstatus,disability,HIVstatus,age,orhousing
status(exceptwheretrustworthyinformationrelevanttothelocalityand
timeframelinksapersonofaparticularreligion,sexualorientation,gender,
genderidentity,immigrationstatus,disability,HIVstatus,age,orhousingstatus
toaspecificcriminalincidentorscheme,andotherfactorssupportreasonable
suspicion).
B. Locallawenforcementagentsandagenciesshallnotdemandapersons
identificationabsentreasonablesuspicionofcriminalactivity.
C. MeasurestoVerifyPotentialProfilingofProtectedClasses:Followingany
observation,stop,frisk,search,interrogation,orarrestofanyperson,theagent
initiatingthatactivityshallrecordthefollowinginformationaboutthepersonona
standardizedEncounterForm:
1. thedate,time,andlocationoftheinvestigatoryactivities
2. theparticularinvestigatorytacticsemployed
3. theamountoftime,ifany,duringwhichthesubjectperson(s)ofthe
investigatoryactivitieswasdetained
4. adescriptionofanyfriskorsearch,includingtheareas,vehicles,
materials,orunitsofstored(physicalorelectronic)informationsearched
5. whetherforcewasemployed,andifso,forwhatreason,ofwhatsort,and
theeffectofsuchforceontheperson(s)
6. thenatureofthesuspicionpromptingtheinvestigatoryactivity,andthe
specificbasisorbasesforthatsuspicion
7. theapproximateageofthepersonobserved,searched,orinterrogated,as
perceivedbytheofficer
8. thesexandgenderofthepersonobserved,searched,orinterrogated,as
perceivedbytheofficer
9. thecountryorregionoforiginofthepersonobserved,searched,or
interrogated,asperceivedbytheofficer
10. thereligionofthepersonobserved,searched,orinterrogated,asperceived
bytheofficer
11. theraceorethnicityofthepersonobserved,searched,orinterrogated,as
perceivedbytheofficer
12. whethertheofficerbelievedthatthepersonobserved,searched,or
interrogatedbelongedtoanyotherprotectiveclasseddefinedinSectionI.

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

6
I,suchassexualorientation,genderidentity,immigrationstatus,
disability,orHIVstatus,age,orhousingstatus,aswellastheirreasonfor
thisbelief
13. withwhatcriminalviolation,ifany,anypersonobserved,searched,or
interrogated,wasultimatelycharged.
D. Privacy.
1. TheidentificationofcharacteristicsdescribedinIV.C.above(e.g.,age,
sex,gender,countryorregionoforigin,religion,andraceorethnicity)
shallbebasedontheobservationandperceptionofthelawenforcement
agentconductingthestop,search,orotherinvestigatoryactivity.The
personsubjectedtotheseinvestigatoryactivitiesshallnotbeaskedto
providesuchinformation.
2. Officersshallnotseektospeculateaboutapersonssexualorientation,
genderidentity,immigrationstatus,HIVstatus,orhousingstatus,nor
shalltheyinquireaboutthem.Anofficershallonlynoteapersons
membershipinsaidprotectedclassesiftheyhadformedanopinionabout
theindividual'sstatusintheprotectedclasspriortothestop.
3. DatacollectedpursuanttoIV.Cshall:
a) excludepersonallyidentifiableinformation
b) bestoredseparatelyfromdatabasesaccessibletooperationallaw
enforcementpersonnelfromanyagency
c) bemaintainedsecurely,protectedbyencryptionorothersecurity
measurestoprotectagainsttheftorunauthorizedaccess,and
d) beauditedandanalyzedonanannualbasisbyanindependent
entityresponsibleforanalysis.
E. Accountability.EncounterFormsshallbeidentifiablebysequentialserial
numbers.Thoseassignedtoparticularagentsshallbetrackedandrecorded.
AgentsshalldelivercopiesofeachEncounterFormtothelocallawenforcement
agency,whichshallperiodicallydeliverthemtoanindependententityresponsible
foranalysis.
F. Transparency.
1. Personssubjecttoinvestigatoryinteractionssuchasstops,frisks,
interrogations,searchesorarrestsshallreceivecopiesoftheEnforcement
Formrelatingtotheirinteraction.EncounterFormsshallincludeguidance
onhowtofileacomplaintabout,orcommendationof,theagentwith
whomtheyinteracted.
2. Personssubjecttoobservationormonitoringshallnotreceivesuch
documentation,butmonitoringactivitiesshallbedocumentedthrough
EncounterForms,andsubjectedtoaninternalaudittoensurecompliance.
3. TheinformationcollectedthroughEncounterFormsshallbeaggregated
andpubliclydisclosedeverysixmonthsinareporttothe
[locallegislative
body]
includingstatisticsreflectingtheratesatwhichpersonsofvarious
races,religions,andnationaloriginsarerepresentedateachinvestigatory
stage.
BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

V.

4. Thereport,aswellasindividualEncounterForms,shallalsobemade
availabletolitigantswhoallegediscriminatoryprofiling(SeeSection
VIII),ordefendantsseekingtoexcludefromprosecutionevidence
obtainedthroughapotentiallyunconstitutionalsearch.

LimitsonLocalImmigrationEnforcementActivities
A. Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotparticipateinactivitiesrelatedto
enforcingfederalimmigrationlaws.
1. Localimmigrationenforcement.Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnot
engageinagreementswiththeDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)
components,includingImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement(ICE),to
facilitatetheenforcementoffederalimmigrationlaw.Programsforwhich
suchengagementisprohibitedinclude,butarenotlimitedto:agreements
undersection287(g)oftheImmigrationandNationalityActtheCriminal
AlienProgramandNextGenerationIdentification.
2. Detainers.Facilitiesunderthejurisdictionofthisbodyshallnotbeusedto
detainpersonsheldforsuspectedimmigrationviolations.Law
enforcementagentsshallnotmakearrestsordetainpersonsbasedon
administrativewarrantsorrequestsbyfederalagenciesforremoval,
includingthosegeneratedbythefederalImmigrationandCustoms
Enforcementagency(ICE)ortheNationalCrimeInformationCenter
(NCIC)database.Localofficialsshallnotholdpersonsbasedondetainers
requestedbyICE.
3. SharingArrestData.Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotsharearrest
data(includingbutnotlimitedtofingerprints)withstateorfederal
counterparts,includingtheFederalBureauofInvestigations(FBI),unless
itrelatestosuspectedviolentfelonies.Datapertainingtopersons
suspectedofmisdemeanorsornonviolentfeloniesshallnotbesharedwith
otherlawenforcementagenciesabsentanexpressdutyunderfederalor
statelaw.
B. Privacy.
1. Locallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnotmonitor,stop,detain,
question,interrogate,orsearchapersonsolelyforthepurposeof
determiningthatpersonsimmigrationstatus.Theuseofanotherwise
validcriminalinvestigationorarrestasapretexttoascertaininformation
aboutapersonsimmigrationstatusisprohibited.
2. Locallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnotinquireabouttheimmigration
statusofanycrimevictimorwitness,orsuspectsofalleged
misdemeanors,norshalltheyrefersuchinformationtofederal
immigrationenforcementauthorities.
3. Locallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnotinitiateacriminal
investigationbasedsolelyoninformationorsuspicionthatapersonhas
committedacivilviolationbyresidingintheUnitedStateswithoutproper
authorization.

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

VI.

VII.

4. Locallawenforcementagenciesshalltowavehicleofanunlicensed
driveronlyaftergrantinganopportunitytoallowtheunlicenseddriverto
securehisorhervehicleonthescene,ortocontactanothersourceto
recoverthevehicle.

LimitsonCooperationwithFederalorMilitaryOfficials
A. Activitiesundertakenbylocallawenforcementagenciesincoordinationwith
federalcounterparts,includingjointintelligenceanalysisactivitiesinvolvingData
Centersorfederalintelligenceagencies,shallbestrictlylimitedto:
1. Criminallawenforcement,or
2. Disasterpreparednessandrecoveryactivities.
B. Locallawenforcementagenciesshallcoordinatetheiractivitieswithmilitaryor
NationalGuardpersonnelonlytotheextentthattheiractivitiesrelatespecifically
todisasterpreparednessandrecovery.
C. DisasterResponse.Undernocircumstanceswilldueprocessbesuspended:even
intheeventthatanaturaldisasterprecludesthenormaloperationofcourts,local
agenciesordeputizedprivatecontractorsshallnotbeauthorizedtoimpose
summarypenaltieswithoutjudicialprocess(as,forexample,occurredinNew
Orleansin2005).

LimitstoProtectDissent
A. Lawenforcementactivitiesundertakeninthecontextofpoliticaldemonstrations,
orotheractivitiesprotectedbytheFirstAmendment,shallbesubjecttothe
followinglimitations:
1. Crowdmanagement:Policeshallapproachnonviolentprotestsfroma
crowdmanagement,notacrowdcontrol,perspectiveandpractice
deescalationtechniquesasmuchaspossible.
2. FreeSpeechzones:Personsandgroupshavearighttoorganizeand
participateinpeacefulFirstAmendmentprotectedactivityonthestreets,
sidewalks,andotherpublicways,andintheparksof
[theCityof]
,andto
engageinFirstAmendmentprotectedactivityneartheobjectoftheir
protestsotheymaybeseenandheard,subjecttoreasonablerestrictions
designedtoprotectpublicsafety,persons,andproperty,andto
accommodatetheinterestofpersonsnotparticipatingintheassembliesto
usethestreets,sidewalks,andotherpublicwaystotraveltotheirintended
destinations,andusetheparksforrecreationalpurposes.Noticeandplan
approvalprocessforFirstAmendmentprotectedactivitymayonlybe
establishedtoavoidsituationswheremorethanonegroupseekstousethe
samespaceatthesametimeandtoprovidelocallawenforcement
agenciestheabilitytoprovideappropriatepoliceprotection,traffic
control,andothersupportforparticipantsandotherpersonsandmaynot
discriminateonanticipatedviewstobeexpressed,orprefernonFirst
AmendmentactivitiesoverFirstAmendmentactivities.However,itshall
notbeanoffensetoassembleorparadeona
[theCityof]
street,sidewalk,
orotherpublicway,orina
[theCityof]
park,withouthavingprovided

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

VIII.

noticeorobtainedanapprovedassemblyplan.FirstAmendmentprotected
activitythatwilltakeplaceonpublicsidewalksandcrosswalksandwill
notpreventotherpedestriansfromusingthesidewalksandcrosswalksor
havefewerthan50anticipatedparticipantsorisforthepurposeofan
immediateandspontaneousexpressionofviewsinresponsetoapublic
eventshallbeexemptfromanynoticeandapprovalprocess.
3. Massarrests:ArrestsofpersonsengagedinFirstAmendmentprotected
activitymustrelyonarticulablefactssupportingprobablecausetobelieve
thateverypersonsubjectedtoarrestcommittedacriminaloffense,beyond
theirpresenceinaparticularlocationataparticulartime.Arreststo
preemptcriminalactivityarenotauthorized.Anypersonarrestedfor
failuretoobeyatime,place,ormannerrestrictionmustbeallowedan
opportunitytodepartfromthearea.
4. Policecheckpoints:Noscreeningcheckpointshallsubjectanypersontoa
searchabsentreasonablesuspicionofcriminalactivity.
5. Conditionofconfinementduringmassarrests:Personssubjectedtoarrest
forparticipationinFirstAmendmentprotectedactivityshallnotbe
subjectedtoshacklingabsentaspecificthreatofviolence,shallbeallowed
accesstocounselwithinsixhours,andshallbegivenacopyofany
incidentreportrelatingtotheirarresttouseforexculpatorypurposes.
6. Useofforce:Nononlethalweaponsshallbeuseduntilafteranactof
proportionateviolenceiscommitted,norshallundercoverlaw
enforcementagentscommittheactservingasapredicateforthe
deploymentofnonlethalweapons,norinanycircumstancesshallrubber
bullets,beanbags,orwoodendowelsbeaimedatareasabovethethighs.
7. Crowdcontroltechnology:Anypurchasebylawenforcementauthorities
ofequipmentforcrowdcontrolpurposes(includingbutnotlimitedto
tasers,teargas,pepperspray,andLongRangeAudioDevices(LRADs))
shallrequirepriornoticetothepublic,ameaningfulopportunityto
comment,andtheaffirmativeapprovalofthe
[CityCouncil]
.

TwentyFirstCenturyProtectionsAgainstUnreasonableSearchesandSeizures
A. EquipmentPurchases.Anypurchaseacquisition,includingbutnotlimitedto
purchase,lease,orcontract,bylocalauthoritiesofelectronictechnologiesto
enablemonitoringorinformationcollection(includingbutnotlimitedto
electronicbodyscanners,droneaircraft,licenseplatescanners,police
bodyworncameras,cellsitesimulators,andclosedcircuittelevisioncameras)
shallrequirepriornoticetothepublic,ameaningfulopportunitytocomment,and
theaffirmativeapprovaloftheCityCouncil.
B. NewTechnology.Anyelectronictechnologyusedtomonitorspecificpersons
shallonlybeusedafterseekingajudicialwarrantbasedonprobablecause.
C. Trackingdevices.Anydevicewiththecapabilityofmonitoringapersonsprecise
movementsandlocationshallnotbeusedwithoutajudicialwarrantbasedon
probablecauseunlessajudiciallyrecognizedexceptiontotheFourth
Amendmentswarrantrequirementexists.Anyevidenceobtainedbyuseofasuch

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

10

D.

E.

F.

G.

adevicewithoutawarrantbasedonprobablecauseisnotadmissibleinany
criminalproceeding,civilproceeding,administrativeproceeding,arbitration
proceeding,orotheradjudicatoryproceedingnorshallitbeusedtoestablish
reasonablesuspicionorprobablecausetobelievethatanoffensehasbeen
committedunlessajudiciallyrecognizedexceptiontotheFourthAmendments
warrantrequirementexists.Thisincludesbothlawenforcementdevicesthatare
placedonapersonoranobjectintheirpossession,suchasaGPStrackingdevice,
aswellaselectronictechnologythatusedevicesalreadyinthepossessionofa
persontotracktheirlocation,suchascellsitesimulators.
Drones.Locallawenforcementagenciesmustfirstobtainawarrantbasedon
probablecausebeforeusingdronesforsurveillanceunlessajudiciallyrecognized
exceptiontotheFourthAmendmentswarrantrequirementexists.Anyevidence
obtainedbyuseofadronewithoutawarrantbasedonprobablecauseisnot
admissibleinanycriminalproceeding,civilproceeding,administrative
proceeding,arbitrationproceeding,orotheradjudicatoryproceedingnorshallit
beusedtoestablishreasonablesuspicionorprobablecausetobelievethatan
offensehasbeencommittedunlessajudiciallyrecognizedexceptiontotheFourth
Amendmentswarrantrequirementexists.Undernocircumstancesshalllocallaw
enforcementagenciesdeployaweaponizeddrone.Weaponizationincludes,lethal
weaponsaswellasnonlethalorlessthanlethalweapons.Underno
circumstancesshalllawenforcementusedronestomonitororcollectinformation
onpoliticaldemonstrationsorotheractivitiesprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.
Weaponizeddronesshallneverbeusedasacrowdcontroldevice.
ProhibitedDevices.Locallawenforcementagenciesshallnotuseanyelectronic
technologiestoenablemonitoringorinformationcollection,includingcellsite
simulators,thatcannotlimittheircollectionofdatatospecifictargetsnamedbya
judicialwarrantbasedonprobablecauseandinsteadcanonlybeusedby
collectingdatafrompersonsnotundersuspicion.
PublicDisclosure.Anyinformationobtainedthroughelectronictechnologiesto
enablemonitoringorinformationcollectioncanonlybeusedincourtiflocallaw
enforcementagenciesdisclosetheirusetothedefendant.Whenseekingajudicial
warrantorothercourtorder,locallawenforcementagenciesmustdisclosetothe
magistratewhichelectronictechnologiestoenablemonitoringorinformation
collectionwillbeused.Failuretodisclosesuchinformationtothemagistrate
rendersthewarrantvoidandthesearchperseunreasonable.
SocialmediaandlawenforcementLocallawenforcementauthoritiesshallnot
accessinformationinanpersonscellularphone,computer,email,socialmedia
accounts,oranypersonalelectronicdeviceoraccountunlesssupportedbya
judicialwarrantbasedonprobablecauseandspecifictothedeviceoraccount
unlessajudiciallyrecognizedexceptiontotheFourthAmendmentswarrant
requirementexists.Anyevidenceobtainedwithoutawarrantbasedonprobable
causeisnotadmissibleinanycriminalproceeding,civilproceeding,
administrativeproceeding,arbitrationproceeding,orotheradjudicatory
proceedingnorshallitbeusedtoestablishreasonablesuspicionorprobablecause

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

11

IX.

X.

tobelievethatanoffensehasbeencommittedunlessajudiciallyrecognized
exceptiontotheFourthAmendmentswarrantrequirementexists.
H. Socialmediaandpublicemployment.Employmentwith
[theCityof]
shallnotbe
conditionedontheapplicantoremployeeprovidingthepasswordtotheirpersonal
emailorsocialmediaaccountsoranyinformationinpersonalemailorsocial
mediaaccountsnotavailabletothepublic.Notavailabletothepublicincludes,
butisnotlimitedtosocialmediaaccountsthatareprivateorthatmaybeviewed
onlybypersonsapprovedbytheapplicantoremployeeorinformationonan
otherwisepublicsocialmediaaccountthatissetasprivateoraccessibleonlyto
personsapprovedbytheapplicantoremployee.

TransparencyandAccountabilityProvisions
A. Training.Locallawenforcementagenciesshallconducttrainingactivitiesto
ensurethatallofficersareknowledgeableabouttheprovisionsofthisordinance.
Trainingshallincludeantioppressionanddiversitytraining.
B. EquipmentPurchases.Anypurchasebylocalauthoritiesofelectronic
technologiestoenablemonitoringorinformationcollection(includingbutnot
limitedtoelectronicbodyscanners,droneaircraft,licenseplatescanners,and
closedcircuittelevisioncameras)shallrequirepriornoticetothepublic,a
meaningfulopportunitytocomment,andtheaffirmativeapprovaloftheCity
Council.
C. RecordingofPoliceInvolvedKillings.Locallawenforcementagenciesshall
keepstatisticsonpoliceinvolvedkillings,includingthenumberofkillings,the
race,sex,andgenderofthedeceased,andwhethertheofficerwascharged.
Statisticsshallbeaggregatedandpubliclydisclosedeverysixmonthsinareport
tothe
[locallegislativebody]
includingstatisticsreflectingtheratesatwhich
personsofvariousraces,religions,andnationaloriginsarekilledbythepolice.
Localauthoritiesshallprovidestatisticsonpoliceinvolvedkillingstoallrelevant
stateandfederalbodies,suchastheFBIsUniformCrimeReportingProgram.
D. AccountabilityforPotentialAbuses.Lawenforcementofficialsshallnotengage
intheunnecessaryuseofforce,norshalltheytamperwithevidenceorhide
exculpatoryevidence.Allegationsthatofficialseitheremployedunnecessary
force,tamperedwithevidence,withheldpotentiallyexculpatoryevidence,or
engagedinbiasedpolicingpracticesviolatingSectionIII.B.,shallbecauseforan
independentinvestigationbyacivilianreviewboardand,wherejustified,
appropriatedepartmentaldisciplinarymeasuresordismissal.
E. PublicRighttoObservePoliceActivities.Lawenforcementofficialsshallrespect
therightsofmembersofthepublictoobserveandtocapturevideoand/orsound
recordingsofpoliceactivitiesduringthedischargeoftheirpublicduties.In
exercisingtheserights,membersofthepublicdonothavearighttophysicallyor
otherwiseinterferewiththedischargeofofficersduties,nordomembersofthe
publichavearighttootherwiseviolatethelaw.

CivilActionandInjunctiveRelief

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA

12

XI.

XII.

A. Anypersonsubjectedtolawenforcementactivityexceedingthelimitsimposed
bythisOrdinancemayfileinacourtofcompetentjurisdictionacivilactionfor
declaratoryorinjunctivereliefagainsteither
1. thelocallawenforcementagencyemployingtheindividualagentwhose
conductconstitutedaviolation,
2. theindividualagent(s)responsiblefortheinjury,orboth.
B. LitigantsshallbeallowedaccesstoaggregatedatacollectedunderSectionIII.A.
C. Adisparateimpactonaprotectedclassshallconstituteaviolationofthis
Ordinance.
D. AttorneysFees.Alitigantwhosuccessfullybringsacivilactionfordeclaratory
orinjunctivereliefunderthisactshallbeawardedattorneysfees.

Severability
A. TheprovisionsofthisOrdinanceshallbeseverable.Ifanyphrase,clause,
sentence,orprovisionofthisOrdinanceisdeclaredbyacourtofcompetent
jurisdictiontoviolatetheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesortheConstitutionof
theStateof
[State]
,orifitsapplicabilitytoanyagency,personorcircumstanceis
heldinvalid,thevalidityoftheremainderoftheOrdinanceanditsapplicabilityto
anyotheragency,person,orcircumstancesshallnotbeaffected.

Distribution
A. LocalagenciesshalltrainallofficersontheimplicationsofthisOrdinancefor
theirrespectiveresponsibilities.Agenciesshallalsoconductwrittenand
behavioralassessmenttoensurethatthismeasureisunderstoodandfollowedby
officers.
B. The
[cityexecutiveofficial]
shallsendcopiesofthisordinancetoourUS
CongressionalandSenaterepresentatives,theUSSenateCommitteeonthe
Judiciary,theUSSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,theUSHouseof
RepresentativesCommitteeontheJudiciary,theUSHouseofRepresentatives
PermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,theUSAttorneyGeneral,andthe
PresidentoftheUnitedStates.

BillofRightsDefenseCommittee/DefendingDissentFoundation:
http://bordc.org/LCLPA