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ATTORNEYS & ADMISSION TO BAR Rules of Court Book

BAR MATTER NO. 702 May 12, 1994
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated May 12, 1994.
Bar Matter No. 702 (In the Matter of Petition to authorize Sharia'h
District Court Judges to Appoint Shari'a Lawyers as Notaries
Public, Atty. Royo M. Gampong, petitioner)
Petitioner Royo M. Gampong, a Bachelor of Laws (LIB) graduate of
Notre Dame University who was admitted to the Philippine Shari'a
Bar on October 7, 1991, filed the instant petition praying that this
Court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order authorizing all
Shari'a District Court Judges to appoint Shari'a Lawyers who
possess the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as
notaries public within their respective jurisdictions.
On the theory that Shari'a District Courts are co-equal with the
regular Regional Trial Courts in the hierarchy of the Philippine
Judicial System, petitioner claims that by analogy, Shari'a District
Court Judges may be authorized to appoint the members of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar. Petitioner further argues that, being a
special member of the Philippine Bar and a practicing Shari'a
lawyer, notarial work is indispensable and imperative in the
exercise of his profession; therefore, he is qualified to be appointed
as notary public by Shari'a District Judge. Petitioner likewise claims
that Shari'a lawyers cannot be appointed as notaries public in their
places of residence and in cities and other pilot centers where
Shari'a courts are established because the RTC Executive Judges
in Cotabato and Maguindanao require them to secure certifications
from the IBP Secretary that there are no practicing lawyers in the
place where they are applying. Thus, Shari'a lawyers lose their
chance to be appointed as notaries public because of the policy of
the IBP chapters in Region 12 to appoint regular IBP members
practically in all municipalities and provinces.
The petition is denied.
The appointment, qualification, jurisdiction and powers of notaries
public are governed by the provisions of the Notarial Law
embodied in Sections 231 to Section 241, Chapter 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code, Section 232 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Executive Order No. 41, May
11, 1945 provides:
Section 232. Appointment of notaries public. Judges
of Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in
the respective may appoint as many notaries public as
the public good requires, and there shall be at least one
for every municipality in each province. Notaries public in
the City of Manila shall be appointed by one of the judges
of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Manila to be chosen by the judges of the branches of
said court" (Words in parenthesis supplied)

Strictly speaking, Shari'a District Courts do not form part of the

integrated judicial system of the Philippines. Section 2 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Acts of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129) enumerates the
courts covered by the Act, comprising the integrated judicial system.
Shari'a Courts are not included in the enumeration notwithstanding
that, when said B.P. Blg. 129 took effect on August 14, 1981, P.D. No.
1083 (otherwise known as "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines") was already in force. The Shari'a Courts are mentioned
in Section 45 of the Act only for the purpose of including them "in the
funding appropriations."
The fact that judges thereof are required by law to possess the same
qualifications as those of Regional Trial Courts does not signify that
the Shari'a Court is a regular court like the Regional Trial Court. The
latter is a court of general jurisdiction, i.e., competent to decide all
cases, civil and criminal, within its jurisdiction. A Shari'a District Court,
created pursuant to Article 137 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, is a
court of limited jurisdiction, exercising original only over cases
specifically enumerated in Article 143 thereof. In other words, a
Shari'a District Court is not a regular court exercising general
jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 232 of the Notarial Law.
The fact, too, that Shari'a Courts are called "courts" does not imply
that they are on equal footing or are identical with regular courts, for
the word "court" may be applied to tribunals which are not actually
judicial in character, but are quasi-judicial agencies, like the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Boards, Bureau of
Patents, Trademark and Technology, Energy Regulatory Board, etc. 1
Moreover, decisions of the Shari'a District Courts are not elevated to
this Court by appeal under Rule 41, or by petition for review under
Rule 45, of the Rules of Court. Their decisions are final "whether on
appeal from the Shari'a Circuit Court or not" 2 and hence, may reach
this Court only by way of a special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, similar to those of the National Labor Relations
Commission, or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 3
Furthermore, the qualifications for appointment as a judge of a
Shari'a District Court are different from those required of a judge of a
Regional Trial Court under Section 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
which provides:
Section 15. Qualifications No person shall be appointed
Regional trial Court Judge unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age,
and, for at least ten years, has been engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines requiring admission to the
practice of law as an indispensable requirement.
In case of Shari'a Court judges, on the other hand, a Special Bar
Examination for Shari'a Courts was authorized by the Supreme Court
in its En Banc resolution dated September 20, 1983. Those who pass
said examination are qualified for appointment for Shari'a court
judges and for admission to special membership in the Philippine Bar
to practice law in the Shari'a courts pursuant to Article 152, in relation
to Articles 148 and 158 of P.D. No. 1083. Said Article 152, P.D. No.
1083 provides, thus:

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Art. 152. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed
judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-five years
of age, and has passed an examination in the Sharia'
and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to be given by the
Supreme Court for admission to special membership in
the Philippine Bar to practice law in the Shari'a courts.
The authority thus conferred by the Notarial Law upon judges of
the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court, in their
respective provinces to appoint notaries public cannot be
expanded to cloth the judges of the Shari'a District Court with the
same statutory authority. The authority to appoint notaries public
contemplated under Section 232 of the Notarial Law and the
corresponding supervising authority over them authorized under
Section 248 thereof require the qualifications and experience of an
RTC Judge.
It must be made clear in this regard that since a person who has
passed the Shari'a Bar Examination does not automatically
become a regular member of the Philippine Bar, he lacks the
necessary qualification to be appointed a notary public. Section
233 of the Notarial Law provides for the qualifications for
appointment as notary public, thus:
Section 233. Qualifications for Appointment. To be
eligible for appointment as notary public, a person must
be a citizen of the Philippines (or of the United States)
and over twenty-one years of age. He must, furthermore,
be a person who has been admitted to the practice of law
or who has completed and passed in the studies of law in
a reputable university or school of law, or has passed the
examination for the office of the peace or clerk or deputy
clerk of court, or be a person who had qualified for the
office of notary public under the Spanish sovereignty.
In the chartered cities and in the capitals of the
provinces, where there are two or more lawyers
appointed as notaries public, no person other than a
lawyer or a person who had qualified to hold the office of
notary public under the Spanish sovereignty shall hold
said office.
In municipalities or municipal districts where no person
resides having the qualifications herein before specified
or having them, refuses to hold such office, judges of first
instance may appoint other persons temporarily to
exercise the office of notary public who have the requisite
qualifications or fitness and morality.
In an En Banc resolution of the Court dated August 5, 1993, in Bar
Matter No. 681 "Re: Petition to Allow Shari'a Lawyers to exercise
their profession at the regular courts," this Court categorically
stated that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination
is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a fullfledged member thereof even if he is a Bachelor of Laws degree
holder. As such, he is authorized to practice only in the Shari'a
courts.

Only a person duly admitted as members of the Philippine Bar in

accordance with the Rules of Court are entitled to practice law before
the regular courts. Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
This Court further emphasized in its resolution in Bar Matter 681,
that:
In order to be admitted as member of the Philippine Bar, the
candidate must pass an examination for admission covering the
following subjects: Political and International Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Civil Law and Taxation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law;
Remedial Law; and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (Sec. 11,
Rule 138) Further, in order that a candidate may be deemed to have
passed the bar examination, he must have obtained a general
average of 75% in all the aforementioned subjects without failing
below 50% in any subject (Sec. 14, Rule 138). On the other hand,
the subjects covered by the special bar examination for Shari'a
courts are: (1) Jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Customary laws (Adat); (2)
Persons, Family Relations and Property; (3) Successions,
Wills/Adjudication and Settlement of Property; (4) Procedure in
Shari'a Courts (See Resolution dated September 20, 1983).
It is quite obvious that the subject matter of the two examinations are
different. The Philippine Bar Examination covers the entire range of
the Philippine Laws and jurisprudence, while the Shari'a Bar
Examination covers Muslim personal laws and jurisprudence only.
Hence, a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar Examination, who
is not a lawyer, is not qualified to practice law before the regular
courts because he has not passed the requisite examinations for
admission as a member of the Philippine Bar. However, the Shari'a
bar lawyer may appear before the Municipal Trial Courts as agent or
friend of a litigant, if appointed by the latter for the purpose but not
before the Regional Trial Courts as only duly authorized members of
the Bar may conduct litigations in the latter court (Sec. 34, Rule 138).
Considering, therefore that a person who has passed the Shari'a Bar
Examination is only a special member of the Philippine Bar and not a
full-fledged member thereof even if he holds a Bachelor of Laws
Degree, he is not qualified to practice to qualified to practice law
before the regular courts. As a general rule, a Shari'a Lawyer is not
possessed of the basic requisite of "practice of law" in order to be
appointed as a notary public under Section 233 of the Notarial Law in
relation to Section 1, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition to authorize Shari'a District Court Judges
to appoint Shari'a Lawyers as notaries public in their respective
jurisdiction is DENIED

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BAR MATTER NO. 850

[October 02, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. - Each member shall secure from
the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under
oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that
he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such
Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than
the day after the end of the member's compliance period.
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. - Each member shall
maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy
furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be
provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of
Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of attendance at a participatory
activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be
maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. - The following
shall constitute non-compliance:
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the
compliance
period;
.
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
.
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
.
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish
evidence of such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of
non-compliance
notice;
.
(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;
.
(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or
intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain
compliance. - Members failing to comply will receive a NonCompliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given
sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response
clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing compliance with the

requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near

the beginning of the notice in capital letters:
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS
FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance
Notice may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit
units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only
be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period
requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned, in
which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever
reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period
shall pay a non-compliance fee.
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to
comply with the requirements after the sixty (60) day period for
compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The
investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by
the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. - Membership fees shall
continue to accrue at the active rate against a member during the
period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.
.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
.
SECTION 1. Process. - The involuntary listing as a delinquent
member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of noncompliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to
meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the
period the member is on inactive status. These credit units may not
be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement. Credit units earned during the period of non-compliance
in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance
period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process.
- The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative
in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.

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BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving
the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D.
Ching.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being
the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born
under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner
in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared
by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that
"(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age
of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions
must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be
effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election
must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be
made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains
the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18
November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing
that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered
voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B.
Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992
synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were
released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The
oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the
resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed
to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which
had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940,
Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s.
1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that
an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a
reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance
of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.
625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as
one in my school records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved
for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible
to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

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6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance

with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to
by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July
1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution,
the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose
who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose
born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are
Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on
any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe
a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9

In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the

validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior
to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The
phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12
that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years
is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under
the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstances, as when
the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to
elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on
February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,
1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15,
1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or
over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was
already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines
and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a
former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching
cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally
married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a
registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when

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he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in
the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts
are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the
present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare
was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and
procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No.
625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to
him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly
pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare
to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court
stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to
confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine
citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that
he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which
he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where we
held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and
an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of
the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age constitutes a positive act
of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement
for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a

profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where

citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for
public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person
electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national
of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would
also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of
Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of
the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed
from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason
why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can
be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. 20 One
who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with
fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept
on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY
Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

Pattee

Good Moral Character:

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS

OATH

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which

led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The
offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and
treachery.

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held
in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In
Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose
from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other
accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon rearraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated
11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months :and one (1)
day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's
application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report
dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C.
Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the
mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused
who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy
Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for
forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of
one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his
son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for
the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son
whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still
feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit
for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the
sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who
are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.
It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who
have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also
of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in
recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and
reweighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral
fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no

less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence
that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of
Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the
latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan,
father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath.

. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless

physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a
finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was
then possessed of good moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared
to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
above.

Pattee
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for
a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes
even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is
due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the
reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a
struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his
having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to
state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the
Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On
the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give
him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere
ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he
makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is
hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by
the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice
the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974

PURISIMA BARBA, complainant,

vs.
HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956
examinations, having obtained an average of 81.16%, but thus far
unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath,
which had to be deferred because of a complaint for immorality filed
against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for admission to
the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the
complainant resulting in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to
marry her, having thereafter chosen another woman for his bride.
After the lapse of eighteen years, and considering that his conduct in
the meanwhile has not on the whole shown to be blameworthy, this
Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that youthful
indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of prominence in the
municipality where he resides, did intercede on his behalf.
Accordingly the long-sought privilege of membership in the bar will
not be denied him any longer, but with this caveat. He must comply
with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock
with complainant Purisima Barba.
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to
January 15, 1969: "In the matter of the petition of Hector S. Pedro to
take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar, alleging that while he
passed the bar examinations given by this Court in 1956 with an
average of 81.16%, he was not permitted to take his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative
complaint against him filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the complaint alleging immorality in that
petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to her house and with lewd
designs succeeded in gratifying his carnal desires, an act repeated
thereafter on three different occasions accompanied by pledges to
marry, as a result of which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a
matter which when investigated resulted in a report that the
complaint was well-grounded, petitioner being prevented thus from
taking his oath; the present petition alleging further that petitioner is
now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up to the
present, he has been employed as community development worker
with the Presidential Arm on Community Development (PACD) that
he has since then conducted himself well in his relations with the
community as well as in the performance of his duties as such
official, attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior
from the Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial
Development Officer of the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas
Bar Association, and the Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos Norte Bar
Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss
Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior
and expressing that she no longer has any opposition to his taking
his oath as a lawyer this Court resolved to defer action on such
petition until petitioner has given satisfactory proof to this Court as to
the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child
who was born out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima
Barba." 1 Thereafter came this resolution of February 26, 1969:

Pattee
"Hector S. Pedro having offered proof as to the action
subsequently pursued by him with reference to the child who was
born out of his relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in
compliance with the resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court
resolved] to allow respondent Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's
oath." 2 Unfortunately, before he could do so in accordance with the
above resolution, there was a letter from the aforesaid complainant
Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer,
premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her
withdrawal of her opposition to his membership in the bar did not
represent her true feelings.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity
of its previous resolution of February 26, 1969, which would have
allowed him to take the lawyer's oath. Moreover, he was required to
comment. This he did in a pleading submitted on March 28, 1969.
He denied the allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of
complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969,
referred the matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for
investigation and report. A report was submitted on August 26,
1969. It stated that after a careful evaluation of the testimony given
by the complainant and the respondent, the conclusion is
warranted that complainant "had all along thought that the
document Exhibit "A" was an affidavit of recognition of their
daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an affidavit of withdrawal of her
opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine Bar." 3 The
parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the
complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent
respondent from taking the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has
maintained all this while. It remains her deep conviction that
respondent lacks good moral character, as proven by his failure to
marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed
out in her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was
twenty seven years old when he committed the acts complained of
and he was very much qualified to marry the complainant herein,
but he did not comply with his promise to march her to the altar.
Instead he married another
woman." 4
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be
desired. He had committed a transgression, if not against the law,
against the high moral standard requisite for membership in the
bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully
her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen years
had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a
successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral
propriety, he has not been allowed to take the lawyer's oath. It
likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that he has
behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed
to him. There is no affront to reason then in ruling that the
punishment, while deserved, has lasted long enough. He has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has been exacted, He
has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the bitterness
in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should
not prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after
a certain period. 5 Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the
frailty of flesh, the sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful
an appetite," an imperative of life closely associated with the
"recklessness and the caprice of desire," 6 this Court feels that all
the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would

satisfy the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral

standard is not to be taken lightly. It could also be said that in
offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man
alone. 7
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that
while his plea to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is
indispensable, if he expects to be a member of the bar in good
standing, that he complies with the moral and legal obligation
incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of wedlock as
a result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a
previous resolution of February 26, 1969, is set aside and in
accordance therewith, respondent Hector S. Pedro is allowed to take
the lawyer's oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969
resolution.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN,
ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for
disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their
acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter
to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the
1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in
the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of
at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p.
2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law
Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there
are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations to raise
the grades prior to the release of the results. Note that this was
without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the

Pattee 10
bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason
why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion
therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates.
Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust
treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient
reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the
records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in
five subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil
Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a
successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by
the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the
1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%,
respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade
of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the
1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination
Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the
five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements
on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant
admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement
admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by
Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a
formal investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated
March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized,
and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to
requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were
also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from

notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them"

(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38,
rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not
respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another reevaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of
Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50%
This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg
and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in
the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the
same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of
August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang
declared that he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar
examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is required
under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973
and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, partiesrespondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents

Pattee 11
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up
permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be
gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo,
who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to
the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered
as their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the
Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances
under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian,
examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in
bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather
low one in another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for reevaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on
the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really
the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for
such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the
notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction
and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades
of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7
with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his
allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:
xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not

reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos.
1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under
the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and
myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I
have always followed him and considered his instructions
as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable Supreme
Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of
the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to
get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself
from all members of the Supreme Court and specially the
chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be
identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by
me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial
Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the
original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in
his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my
residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to
review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57,

Pattee 12
whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in
remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or
re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do
so because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant
told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified
or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved
an increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the
Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as
he had assured me that the code number of the
examinee in question had not been decoded and his
name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in
the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets
of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and
the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the
grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;
emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and
replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn
statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx

regular course of express prohibition in the rules and

guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It
did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was
riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he
used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the
same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing
to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim
was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to
make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike
me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was
nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade
obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered
661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not
pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was
not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in

political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not
know him personally, and that I have never met him even
up to the present;

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar

Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names
of the candidates.

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was

authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority
as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It

had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know
the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with
him before or rather the review and even up to the present
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pattee 13
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver
and collect examination books to my residence at 951
Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law
would be raised a few points to 75% then he would make
the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,
that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated
that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit
dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part
of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He requested me to review
the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that
I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given
him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me

that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously

given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority
as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that
the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr.
Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and
every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my reevaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the
same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given
after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my
subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing
the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from
63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well
be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman
of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request
made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he
was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant,
that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers
by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that
the said examine failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade
than that previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer

Pattee 14
written by the examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed
that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile
Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be
willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his
final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the
changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo
restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state
that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No.
1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct
compliance with the agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should
make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned,
which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant
Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize
all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited

re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized

to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers,
substantial weight should then be given
to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately
after the release of the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they
be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for
re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have
some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading
for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just
the same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such
instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks back
to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the
examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or
not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation
but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general average
but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of
raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee
to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that
his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

Pattee 15
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed only in
their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on
the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked
as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-aLanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving
to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early
part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I
think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and
the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first
number that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the
MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right
sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court
building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent
to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo
High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-aLanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta.
Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose
last three digits corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all
the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that
is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with said number
whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code
numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968
when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number
"27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master
List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the
figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-aLanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the

figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-aLanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of
these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941
while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was
still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot
children the youngest of whom was born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the
ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on the
checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came
upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954".
As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of the
notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of the answers and,
thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited reevaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to
them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving
absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have
reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of
the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed
to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code
No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code
No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general
average of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and

Pattee 16
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political
and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or reevaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only
Political and International Law in the latter, under the facts and
circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to
which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered
to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but
that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that
the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate
the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn
statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going
over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August
27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted,
among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except
once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain
papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in
his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as
having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these
questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the
other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the reevaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others,
then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee
to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were reevaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be
unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant
Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar
confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year, as
also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from
the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show
said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would
make this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners
implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is contended
that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and
that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not
to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why
should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation
where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent

Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly

manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly
entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations
which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of

December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made
the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a

Pattee 17
candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and
a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp.
3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline
of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondentexaminer Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the
belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court
and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number
95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not
know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the
said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang
failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given
said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the
general average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation
that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent
Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to
the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention
of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee
expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in
the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent
Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make

such request and further believing that such request was in order,
proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that
particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang
could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political
Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent
Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's
Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.),
informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the
said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in
Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at
least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of
the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar
Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the
re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an
increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges
made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general
average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing
marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished
correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject
Criminal Law that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade.
Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from
64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also
revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same.
The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code

Pattee 18
Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any
memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for
this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring
to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing
average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the
Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in
the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a
copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the
re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was
received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's
general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in
three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent
Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme
by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for
the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the

Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee.
respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's
notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo,
after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and
re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to
respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84%
in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated
the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of
grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 &
2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30,
rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February

8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & BMontecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol.
Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee,
respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the
order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the
information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject
and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make
the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the
last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the

A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF
EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL
FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his
own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25%
to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted
points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing
average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty
percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's
oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the
Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said reevaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned
that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or
was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4
of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4,
rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee.
He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was
left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

Pattee 19
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation,
the said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the
examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is
not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz,
Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the
respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by
extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation
and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent
likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue
advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court
and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well
as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating
the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that
resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling
him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made,
Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor
subjects while his general average was only 66.25% which
under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed
that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred
back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only
one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased
to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage
and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was reevaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is
to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken
and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then
prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar
Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees
and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request
for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same
should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act
thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself
to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the
image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to
Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief

Pattee 20
in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's
papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety
(90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to
73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.),
which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This
fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good
faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for reevaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average
of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more
deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was
inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or
the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of reevaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of
grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension
of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law
and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over
ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would
not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement
of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to reevaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects
respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code
number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of
Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a
man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support.
Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first
time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it
was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ
NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF
47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL
LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION,
RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred
back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided
to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in
the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were
contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first
meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by
respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet
containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of
the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk
in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of
the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that
the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record
(Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22,
29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that
there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that
the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was
changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said
examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner
Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in
evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code
number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out,
replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo
as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp.
23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any
objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 1516, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is
not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of
passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was
taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner
Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent
Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated

Pattee 21
it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs
to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose
problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee.
He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol.
V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political
Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on
February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo,
allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. AMontecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and
Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a
grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee
had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade
was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

Labor Laws 3%

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the

answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of
the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation
was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the reevaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted)
73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law
was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification
grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades.
These are:

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in

Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects,
Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His reevaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75%
under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the
record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by
Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of
having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be
disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be
disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, respondent.

Pattee 22
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is
a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile
Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates
to the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers'
Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required
passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar
Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who
acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as
examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the
Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same
time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must
always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to
the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct
of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the
Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already
clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without
any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to
pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any
discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to
the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or
not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And
whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a
privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the
proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to
the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in
connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant
for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral

character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court

satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules
of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to
lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending
or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's
personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations
provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or
pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of
which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application
form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first
time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit
in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And
undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court
will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character;
for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any
criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or
applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character
or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that
"he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took
the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form
prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not.
In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to
declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical
injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the
same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969
and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is
guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no
pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court

Pattee 23
that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the
Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his
license to practice law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS
741). Thus:

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang,

alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations
and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have
no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's
certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion.
The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties
of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary
to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer
of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its
confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a
duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the

respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and
from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a
felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the
judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true
situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would
have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v.
Podell, 207 N W 709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he
was required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to
him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of
matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the
time of his motion, were facts which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence
respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court
(165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in
any criminal case despite his having been apprised by the
Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was
called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about
thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the
present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming
a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent
Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to
reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer
any explanation for such omission.

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.

Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar
on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court
striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on
the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their
report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao,
7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101
Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In
the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that
the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were
convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and
Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the
re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of
the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so
declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the reevaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.

Pattee 24
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter
of admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar
examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised
greater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive
before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant
Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the
Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have
required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented
by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully
satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so
circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on
the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"
(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo

claimed and so declared under oath that the answers of
respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased
grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the reevaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With
respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that
they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject
solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me
one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost
passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points
higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that
because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V,
pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can reevaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at
least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so
I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is
the practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and
said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it
with me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as
lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers
was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had
a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading
sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought

back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned
will get passing mark;

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable reevaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were
to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own
words:

Pardo

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under
the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is
representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that
the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Montecillo

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I

corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of

the paper?

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by

respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-

Pattee 25
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's
memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of
the respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that
their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers
of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the
imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein
respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of
members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest absolute purity of the
proceedings and so are required to exercise the greatest or
utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties
relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian
"in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance
or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's)
alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm.
Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the
honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who
passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute
Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not
bring this out during the investigation which in his words is
"essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this
charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still
alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice
Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the
latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended
as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of
respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he
does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived
them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent
Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations,
went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar
Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner
Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of

the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in
his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the
1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from
the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square
meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale
was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On
the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed
two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF
Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972,
date of inscription April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of
inscription April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00,
which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and
P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted
for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he
filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a
bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement,
his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00,
which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his
1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used
or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under
Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the
transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of
Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol.
VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Pattee 26
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent
from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first
place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his
1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment
was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was
not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is
no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among
the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to
him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable
under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged
their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of
P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 date of inscription). On February
28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently
cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on
March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.).
Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS
mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as
part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as
an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real
estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired
this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was
listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the
years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was
P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement,
his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00,
including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the
1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the
illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the
money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above
properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his
passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971
Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his
sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent
Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13,
1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he
was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a
consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a
part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol.
VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No.
1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to
perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec.
8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not
presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts
between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.

Pattee 27
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill
of Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board
from his high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law
studies at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From
1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position
of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising
Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service
Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants
and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive
as of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father
who all the time attended to the availment of the said educational
benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his prelaw at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955,
respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to
1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on
the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went
to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of
the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the
G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the
Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had
gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that
he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol.
V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the
City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the
Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several
benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the
course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has
never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged
to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,

Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which
Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his
guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the
country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his
chapter in Samar only and does not remember having attended its
meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of
Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined
there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo
dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He
was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January
16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was
attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army,
43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in
the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945
date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947,
Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong
disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative
Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162,
RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS
HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Resolution

March 18, 1954

Pattee 28
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio
Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly
known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar
examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness
with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed
and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per
cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per
cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in
Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in
bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying
with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter
the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially
the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court
reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President
allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election
year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR
BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of

the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a

general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and fortysix up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per
cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of
seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination
after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court
has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted
to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners,
properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more
detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more
readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set
forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

Pattee 29
1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

1953

2,555

968

284

12,230

5,421

1,168

TOTAL

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent

examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission
to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however,
their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations,
with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic
Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of
these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of
1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972,
although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on
the practice of the legal profession and the administration of
justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its
validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions
for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act
No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply
argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the
question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E.
Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and
Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of
the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs.
Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos,
Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from
the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court
have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence
on the matter. The question has been the object of intense
deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a

new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all

suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of
the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable
Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade is the tremendous handicap which students during
the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has
to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials
and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took
up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to
1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy
of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had
inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and
efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times
become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the
vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted
the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve
officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of
legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies
were made available to the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered
without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with
revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those
periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since
1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty
ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous

Pattee 30
judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of
those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the
validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its
validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE
646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President
which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the
postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately
declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to
offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined
carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable
precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court
of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court
of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the
practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the
school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with
the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of
public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective
office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not
exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good
moral character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p.
93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power
of appointing them had previously rested with the judges,
and this was the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied
with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed
upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory
clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the
admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing
indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to
preserve any portion of their power over this subject,
unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it
draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must
be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the power

of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether

the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to
entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the
validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of
the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.
Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge
of able professors, the students in which department were
not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period
of study before being entitled to a diploma of being
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly,
considered this examination, together with the preliminary
study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of
legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the
court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no
definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the
learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere
purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could have
had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the
Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and
explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act
contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma.
The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college diploma competent
evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution
itself in order to determine the present condition of the law
on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Pattee 31
The Legislature has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has
simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in
certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of
Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted
to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper,
has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the
Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the
practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys
at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of
this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise
by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six
centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and
proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function,
properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of
the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and
not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240
NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing
that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power
without parallel in the history of the English speaking
people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There
has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power
of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications
of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the

courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded

as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a
Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its
constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those
qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose
of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court
to impose other and further exactions and qualifications
foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative
departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate
branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the
powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to
embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel.
Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for
the plane upon which the administration of justice is
maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the
judicial department of our state government, under 42a
scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of
government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the
manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed
to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and
intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts.
The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no
small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar
may easily bring scandal and reproach to the
administration of justice and bring the courts themselves
into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution

Pattee 32
of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the
most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded
as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult
to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a
part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate
branch of the government. They took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its
attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution
was to make the three great departments of government separate
and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature
might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant
purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature
may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect
the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute
only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court
must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot
go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the
course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons
deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise
the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that
the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial
function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83
N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as
members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed.
285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally
held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is
the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no

matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.

(p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725,
said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation
of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability,
adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the
need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners,
whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz,
C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162
N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something
more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and
,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of
justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at
law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission
to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission
to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision
of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the
Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary
to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief
Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe,
19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the
court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to
secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366,
the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's
office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted
as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has
always been the general practice in this country to obtain
this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for,
three years preceding their application, is regarded as

Pattee 33
sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite
legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their
admission sufficient evidence that their private and
professional character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgment of the court that the parties possess the
requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes
therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the
court, and are responsible to it for professional
misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior,
and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte
Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise
of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial
power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was
so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter
of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22
N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are
not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial
nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety,
be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his
duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this
opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission
to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the
inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172
Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack,
vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative
and the judicial departments is that it is the province of
the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and
govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to
the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are
past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of
judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not
subject to alteration or change either by legislative action
or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be
invaded by either of the other departments of the
government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of

the courts by requiring of them construction of the law
according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so
directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them
to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or
directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass
to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned;
and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court,
and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13,
article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec.
13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress
and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to
the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not
signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit,
suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the

Pattee 34
matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of
the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to
promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of
law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to
the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which
the nature of each department requires. These powers have
existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and
should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar
endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental
rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,
which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a
Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities
of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guaria took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the
practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a
remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of
provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as
follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders
of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United
States and are in good and regular standing as members of the
bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of
the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court,
judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of

the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the

position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney
General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General,
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the
Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points
short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in
the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face
of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the
Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held
and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of
Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides
for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of
the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles
13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that
under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word
"may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing,
defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed
to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case
of Guaria, the Court held:

Pattee 35
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the
bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered
heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had
been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the
applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that
the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of
their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears
that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney
in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment
as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last
applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of
the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time
he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province
of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability
in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general
rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a
special examination which will be given him by a committee of the
court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 4849.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for
the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of
the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license
for the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a
law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had
studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the
aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law

was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The

Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants.
The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act
entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in
the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for
a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in
regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a
license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the
laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years,
and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in
each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is
that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such.
If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the
courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the
court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to
practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is
a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer
of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to
argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process
while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to
the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66,
35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co.
vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

Pattee 36
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired
by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs.
People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician
has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based
upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here
the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of
fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification
must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to
engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of
persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting
diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December
31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two
years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a
law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects
specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the
rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is
made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the
proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason,
or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is
suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W.
441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate
Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those
applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through
general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,
121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the
right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful
calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a

distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations

are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as
sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great
learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is
sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right
to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to
establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the
exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at
the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle.
State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the
right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a
mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had
once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle
him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual
upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded
the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the
United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within
the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known
as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at
least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act."
This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly
violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re
Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable
is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between
the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must
be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one
class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be
defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between
the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and
the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in

Pattee 37
relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents
a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities
and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and
not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average
of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per
cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none,
and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average indicated, were not included
because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates
of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 19461951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those
who failed before said years under the same conditions justified.
The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the
Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not
obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who
obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per
cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed
by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is
desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will
or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law
is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing
each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that
said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in
the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend
and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment
of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing
directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power

exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which

continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to
Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been
confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system
is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are
already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness.
The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the
article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only
from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent
system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article
VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely;
and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because
they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and
without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who
failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are
certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found
by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the
Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become
members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something
contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having
examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and
alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should

Pattee 38
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal
shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in
the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice
of law according to existing rules.

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of

the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight
members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the
authority of the same:

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of

candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of
general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to
the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law
are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of

the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article
1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to
be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article

1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article
1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates

who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied,
and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

RESOLUTION

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

Civ. Land Merc.

Int. Pol. Crim.

Rem.

Leg. Gen.
Av.

76

75

65

72

72

74

70

70

71.45

AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENTS ( 12 Cases)

A.C. No. 2473 February 3, 1993

AURORA M. GUIANG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARDO B. ANTONIO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
This is a petition for suspension and disbarment from the practice of
law on the ground of negligence and mal-practice of Atty. Leonardo
B. Antonio who was admitted to the bar on March 12, 1971.

Sometime in May 1981, petitioner retained the services of Atty. Antonio as

her counsel in connection with civil case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 62250,
"Heirs of Rita Reyes vs. Brigido Valencia", then on appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals had rendered a decision on February 27,
1981 adverse to plaintiffs, one of whom was the petitioner. The Court of
Appeals granted Atty. Antonio's motion for Reconsideration on April 22,
1981 and giving petitioner up to May 27, 1981 to file the motion. On May
26, 1981,
Atty. Antonio filed another motion for extension which was granted. On
June 26, 1981, respondent filed the Motion for Reconsideration which the
Court of Appeals denied on July 27, 1981. Respondent failed to file the
appeal within the 15-day period from receipt of the denial by the Court of
Appeals. The adverse decision of the Court of Appeals became final;
hence, this petition for disbarment.

Pattee 39
The case was referred to the Bar Confidant as Adm. Case No. 2473
for evaluation, report and recommendation. In his comments to the
petition for disbarment, respondent claimed that the appeal was not
perfected within the 15-day period because:
(1) Petitioner failed to furnish and deliver to him all the necessary
documents;
(2) Petitioner was nowhere to be found when she was needed and
she could not be contacted;
(3) Respondent had to send petitioner to Davao City to get some
documents, and by the time she returned, the period for appeal had
expired.
A careful scrutiny of the records discloses the following:
(1) Respondent claims that the records of the case were incomplete
yet the complete records were turned over to respondent by the
CLAO counsel when his services were retained by petitioner;

No formal, trial-like, hearing was conducted by the Bar Confidant wherein

Atty. Leonardo B. Antonio could been given an opportunity orally to explain
his side. However, written comments on the administrative complaint
clearly present to the Court his reasons for his omission in attending to his
client's cause. All the material facts are on record, thus this case can be
decided without need for a trial-type hearing.
We find the recommendation of the Bar Confidant holding the respondent
guilty of negligence and malpractice, in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to be well-taken.
Accordingly, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for six (6) months effective upon receipt of this decision. Let
this Resolution be spread on the personal record of respondent Atty.
Leonardo B. Antonio in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof
furnished to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. No. 94457 March 18, 1991

(2) Respondent asked for extension of time to file a motion for

reconsideration because the records were voluminous;

VICTORIA LEGARDA, Petitioner,

(3) Respondent blames petitioner for not returning on time from
Davao City yet in his Answer to the letter-complaint of petitioner,
Guiang (petitioner) was in her house a week or so before the lapse
or the period for appeal. He could have informed petitioner that the
period for filing the appeal was soon to lapse or he could have
adopted steps to prevent default.
(4) In his entry of appearance before the Court of Appeals, he
complained that important documents were still with the CLAO
lawyer in Manila, which was not true because the CLAO lawyer
turned over the complete records to him.
If it were true that the records furnished by the CLAO counsel were
incomplete, respondent should have requested for the copies of the
missing records from the Court of Appeals, where the originals were
kept.
We take note of the fact that the intended appeal to the Suprerne
Court could only raise questions of law, and petitioner may not raise
questions of fact nor present new or additional facts which are
evidentiary in nature.
The Bar Confidant found the respondent guilty of negligence and
malpractice for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Added to this offense are the highly improper statements in
respondent's pleadings describing his client's case as "hopeless or
beyond legal remedy" after neglecting to file the appeal on time.

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC.,
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 94, Respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Nothing is more settled than the rule that the mistake of a counsel binds
the client. It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel
when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered
thereby.
The present case is a typical example of such rare exception.
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the
improvements thereon located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On
January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint
against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction
and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Quezon City alleging,
among others, that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the
private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of
the aforestated property of petitioner effective January 1, 1985 until
December 31, 1989 or for a period of five (5) years; that the rental is
P25,000.00 per month with 5% escalation per year; that on November 23,
1984, private respondent deposited the amount of P72,000.00 with
petitioner as down payment of rentals; that respondent drew up the written
contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to
execute and sign the same despite demands of respondent; and that the
respondent suffered damages due to the delay in the renovation and
opening of its restaurant business. The private respondent prayed that
pending the resolution of the case a restraining order be issued against
petitioner or her agents enjoining them from stopping the renovation and
use of the premises by private respondent. It was also prayed that after

Pattee 40
due hearing the petitioner be ordered to execute the lease contract;
to pay actual compensatory, exemplary and other damages in such
amount as may be proved during the trial including P30,000.00
attorney's fees plus P300.00 per appearance of counsel, and to pay
the expenses of litigation. 1
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said
counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of
time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. 2
However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended
period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte
motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial
court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial
court rendered its decision, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant
Victoria G. Legarda to execute and sign Exhibit "D":, the lease
contract for the premises at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction earlier issued on January 31,
1985 is hereby made permanent.
Judgment is likewise rendered ordering defendant to pay exemplary
damages in the sum of P100,000.00 to serve as example and
deterrent for others, and actual and compensatory damages as
follows:
1. For loss and destroyed goodwill and reputation in the amount of
P100,000.00;
2. The sum of P61,704.40 as adjustments in the costs of labor and
materials for the renovation of the premises;
3. The sum of P50,000.00 as unearned income for the delay of
plaintiff 's operations from January 1, 1985 up to February 25, 1985
or a period of almost two (2) months;
4. The sum of P16,635.57 and P50,424.40 as additional
compensatory damages incurred by plaintiff for the extension of the
lease of its premises at Makati and salaries of idle employees,
respectively;
5. The sum of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and

his favor. Cabrera registered the same in the office of the Register of
Deeds on July 11, 1986.
Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon
her counsel, to seek the appropriate relief. On November 6, 1986 said
counsel filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment
calling attention to the unjust enrichment of private respondent in securing
the transfer in its name of the property valued at P 2.5 million without
justification; that when the complaint was filed in court by private
respondent against the petitioner, the parties came to an agreement to
settle their differences, the private respondent assuring petitioner that the
complaint it filed shall be withdrawn so petitioner advised her lawyer that
there was no longer any need to file an answer to the complaint; that on
February 22, 1985, private respondent nevertheless filed an ex-parte
motion to declare the petitioner in default; that petitioner was deprived of
the right to present her defense through false pretenses, misrepresentation
and fraud practiced upon her by private respondent warranting the
annulment of the judgment; that the documentary evidence presented by
private respondent, which served as the basis of the decision, is falsified
and tampered with; that as an example, the voucher filed by petitioner,
contains typewritten entries to the effect that the term of the lease is for five
(5) years to which petitioner never agreed, and that the option to buy the
property was given to the private respondent; that the fact that the property
worth P2 million was sold at public auction at a shockingly and
questionably low price of P376,500.00 is by itself a sufficient basis for
annulling the sale for being grossly inadequate to shock the conscience
and understanding of men, giving rise to a presumption of fraud. 6 Thus, it
was prayed that a preliminary mandatory injunction issue ordering the
private respondent to surrender the property to petitioner and to enjoin the
former from further harassing and threatening the peaceful possession of
petitioner; and that after hearing, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-43811 and the sheriffs certificate of sale 7 be likewise annulled; that
private respondent be adjudged to pay petitioner no less than P500,000.00
actual and moral damages, as well as exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit. 8
On February 2, 1987 an amended petition was filed by counsel for
petitioner in the Court of Appeals raising the additional issue that the
decision is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings or by the
evidence submitted. 9
In due course, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals on
November 29, 1989. 10 The appellate court made the following
observations:

6. The costs of suit. 3

Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner
but he did not take any action. Thus, the judgment became final and
executory. On May 8, 1985, upon motion of private respondent, a
writ of execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court. 4
At public auction, the sheriff sold the aforestated property of
petitioner to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. for the sum of P376,500.00 to
satisfy the judgment. The sheriff issued a certificate of sale dated
June 8, 1985 covering the said property. 5 After the one year
redemption period expired without the petitioner redeeming the
property, ownership was consolidated in the name of Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr. The sheriff issued a final deed of sale on July 8, 1986 in

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly

practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is so improbable as to inspire
belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as
petitioner's counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already
agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said law office would have
asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint
with the Court, and if plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed
defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in default.
Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement
embodying the conditions imposed by their client in the lease contract in
question which plaintiff had allegedly already accepted, so that the same
could have been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise
could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of lesser stature than

Pattee 41
the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean,
Dean Antonio Coronel, or even a new member of the bar, would
normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests
of their client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to
withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly
promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of-pure
and simple negligence on the part of defendant's counsel who
simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant, But counsel's
negligence does not stop here. For after it had been furnished with
copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then
have appealed therefrom or file a petition from relief from the order
declaring their client in default or from the judgment by default. [sic]
Again, counsel negligently failed to do either. Hence, defendant is
bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard
to complain that the result might have been different if it had
proceeded differently (Pulido vs. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon vs.
Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of
this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an
end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent, or experienced, or learned" (Fernandez vs. Tan Tiong Tick,
1 SCRA 1138). 11
Despite these findings, the appellate court nevertheless dismissed
the petition for annulment of judgment with costs against the
petitioner. A copy of the said judgment appears to have been served
on counsel for the petitioner. However, said counsel did not file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom, so it became final.
It was only in March 1990 when the secretary of counsel for
petitioner informed the latter of the adverse decision against her
only after persistent telephone inquiries of the petitioner.
Hence, petitioner secured the services of another lawyer who filed
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is prayed that the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-43811, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10487 and the sheriff's sale at public
auction of the property in question be annulled, as the same are
attributable to the gross negligence and inefficiency of petitioner's
counsel, whose blunder cannot bind the petitioner who was
deprived of due process thereby. It is further prayed that private
respondent Cathay House, Inc. be ordered to reconvey to petitioner
the property covered by TCT No. 270814, which was sold at public
auction to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. and in whose favor its ownership
was consolidated, and thereafter ownership appears to have been
transferred to private respondent.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a
law school. It is to be expected that he would extend the highest
quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately,
counsel appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. After
agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by
private respondent, said counsel did nothing more than enter his
appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was
declared in default on motion of private respondent's counsel. After

the evidence of private respondent was received ex-parte, a judgment was

rendered by the trial court.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no
steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the
judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold
at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The
property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private
respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The
redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued
by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred
the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she
learned, to her great shock, what happened to her case and property, she
nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel
to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment
and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an
adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was
duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not
even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before
this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated
telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from
his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every
remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause,
regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to
his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may
displease the judge or the general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably
failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining
his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by
the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that
his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
In People's Homesite & Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco and Escasa, 14 this
Court ruled as follows:
Procedural technicality should not be made a bar to the vindication of a
legitimate grievance. When such technicality deserts from being an aid to
justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular
case. Where there was something fishy and suspicious about the
actuations of the former counsel of petitioner in the case at bar, in that he
did not given any significance at all to the processes of the court, which
has proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients, under a lame and flimsy
explanation that the court's processes just escaped his attention, it is held
that said lawyer deprived his clients of their day in court, thus entitling said
clients to petition for relief from judgment despite the lapse of the
reglementary period for filing said period for filing said petition.

Pattee 42
In Escudero vs. Judge Dulay, 15 this Court, in holding that the
counsel's blunder in procedure is an exception to the rule that the
client is bound by the mistakes of counsel, made the following
disquisition:
Petitioners contend, through their new counsel, that the judgments
rendered against them by the respondent court are null and void,
because they were therein deprived of their day in court and
divested of their property without due process of law, through the
gross ignorance, mistake and negligence of their previous counsel.
They acknowledge that, while as a rule, clients are bound by the
mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be applied
automatically to their case, as their trial counsel's blunder in
procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed
their cause of action and violated their substantial rights.
We are impressed with petitioner's contentions.
Ordinarily, a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
will not be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for
review on certiorari (appeal) under Rule 45 of the Rules. Where,
however, the application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, the rule may be relaxed.
xxx xxx xxx
While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will
suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of
competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity,
exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts
and circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule
would, in the instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their
property through a technicality.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of
Appeals found, in no uncertain terms, the negligence of the then
counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to
dismiss or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they
agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an answer;
and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the
court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from
the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances the
appellate court found said counsel negligent but his acts were held
to bind his client, petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this
case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was
compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel
another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a
petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again
counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a
copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do
anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment.
He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless
and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner.
Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease
agreement of the property of petitioner, private respondent went to

court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel for the
petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the
property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the
owner of the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned
to penury all because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not
once but repeatedly.
The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to prevail. It cannot tolerate
such unjust enrichment of the private respondent at the expense of the
petitioner. The situation is aggravated by the fact that said counsel is a
well-known practicing lawyer and the dean of a law school as the Court at
the beginning of this discourse observed. His competence should be
beyond cavil. Thus, there appears to be no cogent excuse for his repeated
negligence and inaction. His lack of devotion to duty is so gross and
palpable that this Court must come to the aid of his distraught client, the
petitioner herein.
As member of the Philippine Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of
his client. He should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases.
This is the reason why a practicing lawyer should accept only so many
cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any
less, then he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated March 25, 1985 in Civil Case
No. Q-43811; the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487; the Sheriff 's Certificate of Sale dated
June 27, 1985 of the property in question; and the subsequent final deed of
sale covering the same property, are all hereby declared null and void.
Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is directed to reconvey said
property to the petitioner, and the Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel
the registration of said property in the name of private respondent and to
issue a new one in the name of petitioner. Costs against private
respondent. Said counsel for petitioner is hereby required to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be held administratively
liable for his acts and omissions hereinabove described in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116208 July 5, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESMAEL SALIDO, MANNY BULOD, TENG CODALEZ, CAMARUDIN
SILANGAN, ROBERT BALABAGIN, ALLAN KAWASA, FAHAD
ZACARIA alias "Alvin", ALEX INEDAL, MOLIBAS SINDAD,
BARTOLOME MABUTI, ROBERTO DIVINA and JOHN DOES, accused.
ALLAN KAWASA, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:p
Allan Kawasa is before us on appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, convicting him, together with
two others, Fahad Zacaria alias "Alvin" and Molibas Sindad (who did not
appeal), of the crime of kidnapping and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally with the other

Pattee 43
two above-named accused, the offended party in the sum of
P20,000.00. He now seeks a retrial.
Accused-appellant, with ten others and several John Does, was
charged in an Amended Information which reads as follows:
That on about 06 January 1993 at around 7:00 in the morning along
Taft Avenue, Pasay City . . . the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, after introducing
themselves as CIS agents, did then and there, by force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and
thereafter, detain Elizabeth Luega, a female, in the middle of a
sugar cane field at Sitio Malipa, Barangay Malaking Pulo, Tanauan,
Batangas against her will and consent thereby depriving her of
liberty.
(pp. 10-11, Rollo.)
Following a plea of not guilty and full-blown trial, the lower court
rendered a decision on September 15, 1993, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused Allan Kawasa, Molibas Sindad and Fahad
Zacaria, alias Alvin, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping, as charged in the aforequoted Amended
Information: and they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the offended
party, Elizabeth Luega, the sum of P20,000,00, as moral damages.
Accused Esamel Salido, Manny Bulod, Alex Inedal, Bartolome
Mabuti and Roberto Divina, for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, are acquitted of the charge
against them.
As aforesaid, only Allan Kawasa interposed an appeal, and in his
brief, he assigns a single error, asserting that there was a mistrial
resulting in a miscarriage of justice insofar as he is concerned due
to the inefficiency and negligence of his counsel.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 6, 1993 at around 7 o'clock in the morning, Loreta
Chua, her two sons Stanley and Jermyn, and her housemaid
Elizabeth Luega, were on board Mrs. Chua's car, driven by
Bartolome Mabuti, when they were blocked by another car, along
Taft Avenue. Three unidentified men, later found to be Allan
Kawasa, Molibas Sindad, and "Alvin" Zacaria alighted from the
blocking car, introduced themselves as Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) agents and boarded Mrs. Chua's vehicle. Sindad took
the wheel from Mabuti, Zacaria sat beside Mabuti and Stanley in the
front seat, while Kawasa sat beside Luega, Jermyn, and Mrs. Chua
at the back seat. They then proceeded towards South Super
Highway, with the car that blocked them and another back-up car
following them.
Upon reaching Susana Heights at around 9 o'clock, the three
vehicles stopped. Mrs. Chua alighted from her car, with Kawasa
following. They talked for a while. Then Kawasa returned and
boarded Mrs. Chua's car. They drove away with the occupants of

the two cars, leaving Mrs. Chua behind. Luega, Mabuti and the two
children were then blindfolded and their hands tied. They were brought to a
nipa hut in the middle of a sugar field where they were kept. Here, Luega
was raped by one of the men whom she was not able to identify.
On January 7, 1993, the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) conducted an operation in Bongo, Laguna for the
rescue of the kidnapped individuals. At about 7 o'clock of the same
evening, police operatives rescued Mabuti, Luega, and the Chua children,
from the hands of their abductors after a brief gunfight.
On January 8, 1993, a team led by Chief Inspector Allen Fortes of the PNP
from Camp Crame apprehended accused Bulod, Silangan, Balabagin, and
Codalez in Bacoor, Cavite and brought them to Camp Crame for
questioning.
On their way to Camp Crame, Fortes and his team met a speeding Ford
Cortina car with Plate No. NKV 997, which was suspected as one of the
cars used by the kidnappers. Upon intercepting said vehicle, the peace
officers found Kawasa, Sindad, Zacaria, Salido, and Medal, who were
thereupon arrested and subsequently charged with kidnapping and serious
illegal detention.
Accused-appellant denies involvement in the crime and claims he was
deprived the opportunity to submit his evidence and to disprove the
evidence for the prosecution due to the inefficiency and negligence of his
counsel, for which reason, accused-appellant urges us to reopen the case
with respect to him.
Such submission is not acceptable.
It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by his counsel's conduct,
negligence, and mistakes in handling the case and the client cannot be
heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer
proceeded differently (Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597 [1991];
Alabangas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 304 [1991]). Aguila
vs. CFI of Batangas, Br. 7, 160 SCRA 352 [1988], Pulido vs. CA, 122
SCRA 63 [1983], Aylion vs. Sevilla, 156 SCRA 257 [1987], Legarda vs. CA,
195 SCRA 418 [1991]
In Tesoro vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 296, 304 [1993], this Court,
reiterating the rule on the effects of counsel's acts upon his client,
categorically declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of
his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is
bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted
and reasons for reopening case, there would never be an end to a suit so
long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and shown that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or
learned . . . . Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof, . . . failure to introduce certain evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper grounds for a
new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is
prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case" (Vol. 2,

Pattee 44
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 218-219-220; citing
Rivero vs. Santos et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504; Isaac vs. Mendoza,
89 Phil. 279; Montes vs. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People vs. Manzanilla,
43 Phil. 167; U.S. vs. Dungca, 27 Phil. 274; U.S. vs. Umali, 15 Phil.
33; see also People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1968 case
of Palanca vs. American Food etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828), this
principle was reiterated.
It is only in cases involving gross or palpable negligence of counsel
when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who has
suffered thereby (Legarda vs. CA, 195 SCRA 418 [1991]; Alabangas
vs. IAC, 204 SCRA 304 [1991]).
In the case at bar, accused-appellant has not shown such
carelessness or negligence in his lawyer's discharge of his duties, or
that his counsel was singularly inept or motivated by bad faith or
excusably misled by the facts, so as to justify us in not applying the
rule that clients are bound by the acts of their counsel, including his
mistakes.
The record shows that accused-appellant's counsel attended the
hearings, cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, presented
accused-appellant to testify and introduced his own evidence which
to him was sufficient and relevant, and after an adverse decision,
appealed the case.
If there is anybody to blame, it is accused-appellant himself.
Accused-appellant, in his testimony and in his brief, admitted having
accosted of blocked the car driven by Mrs. Chua's driver, Bartolome
Mabuti, allegedly because he was requested to help arrest Mabuti
(Appellant's brief, p. 14). Such testimony and related evidence were
considered by the trial court (Decision RTC, par. 3, p. 4). This belies
accused-appellant's claim that his counsel did not present evidence.
This is perhaps the reason why accused-appellant does not
challenge the decision of the trial court, but opted to train his guns
on his former counsel.
If indeed accused-appellant felt and believed that his counsel was
inept, then he should have taken action, such as discharging him
earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision was handed, and
thereupon heap all blame and condemnation on his counsel, who
cannot now be heard to defend himself. This cannot be allowed, for
to do otherwise would result in a situation where all a defeated party
would have to do to salvage his case is to claim neglect or mistake
on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing an adverse
judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as
every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by
his client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting,
would likewise be disowned by the same client through another
counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This would render court
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any
time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel (Aguila vs. CFI of
Batangas, Br. I, supra; Tupas vs. CA, 193 SCRA 597 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed form is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the slight modification that the civil indemnity of P20,000.00
which accused-appellant was ordered to pay offended party in
increased to P50,000.00 in consonance with current jurisprudence.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74697 November 29, 1991
LINO ALABANZAS and NELLY ALABANZAS, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL BRANCH XLII, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ALICIA PALMA and ADORACION PALMA,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the judgment of respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) 1 dated July 29, 1983,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 49537, with prayer for a restraining order.
The records of the case reveal that Alicia Palma (now private respondent),
filed a complaint for recovery of possession damages against Lino
Alabanzas as and NELLY Alabanzas before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental, Branch XLII, presided
over by then Nestor Alampay, docketed as Civil Case No. 8612. The trial
court, after hearing, rendered judgment on June 18, 1971 in favor of
defendants Alabanzas, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing plaintiffs complaint as well as the counter-claim of the third-party
defendant, Adoracion Palma, with respect to the defendants' counterclaim
plaintiff Alicia Palma herein is hereby ordered to pay the defendants Lino
Alabanzas and Nelie Alabanzas the sum of P4,000, as moral and
exemplary damages; and likewise the sum of P2,000, for defendant's
attorney's fees and their expenses of litigation and this award shall be
increased to P3,000 in case of appeal and to pay the costs.
Upon payment to the plaintiff herein by the defendants of the sum of
P8,323.40 representing the remaining balance still unpaid for the stated
purchase of the portion of Lot 37-A occupied by them or the deposit of this
sum with the clerk of court for delivery to the plaintiff, said plaintiff is hereby
directed to execute the corresponding deed of transfer of all her rights and
interests covering said portion of Lot 37-A to the defendants spouses
herein and/or upon her failure to do so, the clerk of court is hereby
authorized to execute such deed of transfer pursuant to Rule 39, section
10 of the Rules of Court.
From the aforesaid amount of P8,323,40 may be subtracted or set off
whatever sum of money may be due the defendants herein under this
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Alicia Palma appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). Private respondent
having failed to file her brief within the reglementary period, and after an
extension of ninety (90) days, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution 2 dated
June 14, 1977, dismissed her appeal.

Pattee 45
The dismissal became final on July 25, 1973. (See entry of
judgment, Annex "C", Petition; p. 18, Rollo).
On October 4, 1973, the case was remanded to the trial court for
execution (Letter Transmittal, Annex "D" to Petition, p. 20, Rollo).
The trial court ordered the execution of its judgment on October 27,
1973 but said order was not fully complied with until August 20,
1975 when the corresponding deed of sale was executed by the
Clerk of Court and duly annotated at the back of the title (Last part
of par. 2, Petition, p. 2, Rollo).
More than three (2) years after the dismissal of the appeal, upon
motion of herein respondents' counsel, the respondent Court of
Appeals resolved to recall the records, reinstate the appeal and
grant appellant another extension of thirty (30) days within which to
file her brief, on the basis of the following grounds:
1. The appellant herein did not know about the dismissal of this
appeal by the Court of Appeals until recently when she was
informed that the defendants-appellees in this case held a victory
party to celebrate their "winning of the case";
2. That failure to file brief was due to the gross misconduct of
appellant's counsel to whom appellant had paid P300.00 for printing
expenses of brief, and such negligence is not attributable to
appellant;
3. That the Decision appealed from the lower court is patently
unjust, irregular and a travesty of justice in the new society. (p. 21,
Rollo)
[CA resolution dated September 23, 1976, Annex "E", Petition,
Rollo, pp. 21-22)]. Thereafter, on July 29, 1983, respondent
Appellate Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
reversed and another one is entered ordering the defendantsappellees to vacate the property in question, to demolish their house
standing thereon and to pay the sum of P100.00 a month from July
10, 1966, all to be complied with within ten (10) days from the
issuance of the order of execution by the court of origin.
Defendants-appellees are also ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the
sum of P2,500.00 as counsel fees. In turn, party defendant
Adoracion Palma is hereby ordered to reimburse the sum of
P3,756.60 to the third-party plaintiffs representing installment
payments she had received from the latter. No costs.
The sole issue in this petition is whether the Court of Appeal has
jurisdiction to reconsider its own resolution dismissing appeal long
after said resolution had become final and executory and render
another decision on the merits.

410 [1983]; Javier v. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA 495 [1989]; Galindez v.
Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc., 175 SCRA 132 [1989]; Olympia International,
Inc. v. CA, 180 SCRA 353 [1989]). Decisions which have long become final
and executory cannot be annulled by courts (United CMC Textile Workers
Union v. Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 [1987]) and the appellate court is
deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court's final judgment (Carbonel v.
CA, 147 SCRA 656 [1987]; Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 [1987]).
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public and sound practice that at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date
set by law (Tarquieza v. Hernando, supra; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra;
Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344 [1989]). Reopening of
a case which has become final and executory is disallowed (Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, 148 SCRA, 433 [1987]; Edra v.
Intermediate Court, supra.). The subsequent filing of a motion for
reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of a judgment and restore
jurisdiction which had already been lost (Pfleider v. Victorino, 98 SCRA 491
[1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).
After the judgment has become final, no addition can be made thereto and
nothing can be done therewith except its execution; otherwise, there can
be no end to litigation, thus setting at naught the main role of Courts of
Justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiceable controversies with
finality (Farescal Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 95 SCRA 470 [1980]; Heirs of
Patriaca v. CA, supra).
Moreover, it is an equally well-settled rule that the client is bound by his
counsel's conduct, negligence and mistake in handling the case, and the
client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different
had his lawyer proceeded differently. (Vivero vs. Santos, 52 O.G. 1424;
Tupas vs. CA, 193 SCRA 597).
It is only in case of gross or palpable negligence of counsel when the
courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.
(Legarda vs. CA, 195 SCRA 418). In the present case, the private
respondents have not shown such carelessness or negligence in their
lawyer's discharge of his duties to them as to justify a deviation from the
rule that "clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his
mistakes."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the respondent Court of Appeals' resolution
dated September 3, 1976 and decision dated July 29, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV
No. 49537 are SET ASIDE as null and void and the decision of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Occidental, Branch XLII
dated June 18, 1971 in Civil Case No. 8612, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED, and the restraining order earlier issued is MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.

The petition is impressed with merit.

G.R. No. 89571 February 6, 1991

It is well-settled that once a decision becomes final and executory, it

is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the Court which
rendered it to further amend, much less revoke it (Turquieza v.
Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, 124 SCRA

FRANCISCO LIM TUPAS and IGNACIO LIM TUPAS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Pattee 46
CRUZ, J.:p
In its resolution dated October 12, 1989, the Court denied the
petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court for failure
to show that the respondent court committed reversible error in its
resolution dated May 31, 1989. 1 The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on November 23, 1989, to which we required a
Comment, which was followed by a Reply and later a Rejoinder.
After considering the issues and the arguments of the parties in their
respective pleadings, we affirm that the respondent court was,
indeed, correct when it held that the appeal had been tardily made.
The record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City on April 3, 1989,
and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed on April 17,
1989, or fourteen days later. The order of May 3, 1989, denying the
motion was received by the petitioners' counsel on May 9, 1989.
Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of Appeals
within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, on
May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14
days later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy.
In Lacsamana v. Court of Appeals, 2 which was promulgated on
August 26, 1986, before the case at bar arose, we held:
APPEALS BY PETITION FOR REVIEW TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
The final judgment or order of a regional trial court in an appeal from
the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court and municipal circuit trial court may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with
Section 22 of BP no. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules. The reason for extending the period for
the riling of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals. If a motion for
reconsideration is filed with and denied by a regional trial court, the
movant has only the remaining period within which to file a petition
for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the
Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for review
(emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners' counsel did not file the petition for review within the
remaining period, which he should have known was only one day.
Neither did he move for an extension that would have been granted
as a matter of course. The petition for review being indisputably late,
he could not thereafter ask that it be treated as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed
within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a
substitute for a lost appeal. 3 It follows that for having themselves
forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners cannot now plaintively
claim that they have been denied due process.
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration
of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and
extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to suppose that substantive
law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has
often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should

never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the

litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a
matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law,
as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive and
procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule
of court. 4
The petitioners' argument that they should not be prejudiced by the
mistakes of their counsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the
intricacies of the law is not acceptable. If clients could disauthorize their
counsel on this ground, the administration of justice could be hopelessly
encumbered. The petitioners have not shown that their counsel was
exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the
facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients
should be bound by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes 5
The petitioners' submission that their counsel's failure to appeal on time
should be regarded as excusable neglect or honest error is not compatible
with his impressive credentials. He is a prestigious member of the bar and
his conduct at the trial demonstrated his experience and skill as a trial
lawyer. The petitioners themselves describe him as "a graduate of one of
the top law schools in the country, a bar examiner in Remedial Law, a law
professor in Remedial Law and other law subjects, a former National
Officer of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and a seasoned practitioner
for more than 30 years." 6 The procedural mistake might have been
understandable in an ordinary lawyer but not in the case of the petitioners'
former counsel.
Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and
recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification that
his counsel was grossly inept. Such a reason is hardly plausible as the
petitioner's new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party
would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the
part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There
would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every shortcoming of
counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another
counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by
the same client through another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This
would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to
reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. 7
It has not escaped the attention of the Court that the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court was filed on the fourteenth
day of the reglementary period and that the petition for review was filed,
presumably under the belief that a new 15-day period had begun, fourteen
days after the petitioners' counsel was notified of the denial of the motion.
This smacks of a dilatory tactic. It would seem to the Court that if the
petitioners felt so strongly that the said decision was erroneous they would
have demonstrated more spirit and promptitude in assailing it. Instead, they
waited to move for reconsideration until the last hour and, ultimately, when
the motion was denied, filed the petition for review only when it was
already too late. Under these circumstances, equity cannot be extended to
them to soften the rigor of the law they have not chosen to observe.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law
and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality,

Pattee 47
which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often
happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case, and we
repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity
should yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such
persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the
heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law
as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes
back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists and is now still
reverently observed is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis." 8
It is clear that the respondent court did not commit any reversible
error in dismissing the petitioners' appeal on the ground of
tardiness. On the contrary, the challenged resolution is conformable
to the applicable law and jurisprudence that, despite the confusion
of the petitioners' former counsel, carried no esoteric meaning not
available to the ordinary practitioner.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with
finality. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-48335 April 15, 1988
JUAN AGUILA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, BRANCH I,
SPOUSES JUAN HERNANDEZ and MAGDALENA MALALUAN,
GAVINA HERNANDEZ and BONIFACIO LIMBO, et al.
CRUZ, J.:
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico
Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming
the disputed property as the only surviving child of the second marriage.
The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria
Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage. 1
In an earlier action between them, docketed as Civil Case No. 1552 in
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the private respondents had
sued for partition and damages against the herein petitioner and his
wife, alleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first
marriage as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything
during their marriage. Judgment was rendered on January 7, 1974, in
favor of the plaintiffs after the defendants were precluded from
presenting their own evidence owing to what they later called "the gross
ineptitude of their counsel," who had failed to appear at two scheduled
hearings. 2 A motion for reconsideration and a second motion for
reconsideration and/or to present their evidence were both denied by
the trial court. On September 5, 1974, the defendants were given an
extension of twenty days to file their record on appeal and on
September 24, 1974, another extension of fifteen days was granted. On
November 21, 1974, the trial court denied the defendants' record on
appeal and appeal bond on the ground that the decision had already
become final and executory. On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court
then issued a writ of execution on December 2, 1974, amended the
following day, pursuant to which the properties held by the defendants
were levied upon and sold at public auction to the plaintiffs as the
highest bidders. 3
The acts of the trial court were questioned by the defendants in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, which
was denied by the Court of Appeals. So was their motion for

reconsideration. The defendants then came to this Court in a petition for review
by certiorari which was also denied. An "amended" petition was considered a
motion for reconsideration and was likewise denied. On August 16, 1976,
another motion for reconsideration was also denied with finality, with the
warning that no further motions would be entertained . 4
Nothing daunted the defendants tried again, this time by filing on June 8, 1977,
a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the defendants in
the earlier action for partition. This new complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1728 in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In their answer, the
defendants alleged res judicata as one of their affirmative defenses, arguing
that the complaint was barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 1552.
After preliminary hearing of this defense, the trial court considered the
objection well-taken and dismissed the case. 5 The petitioner then came to this
court to challenge the order.
The petitioner does not seriously dispute that requisites of res judicata are
present, to wit: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the court
rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) the former judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the two cases, Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and
Identity of causes of action. 6 He says in fact that "he does not seek to do away
with the rule of res judicata but merely proposes to undo a grave and serious
wrong perpetuated in the name of justice." 7
What he does contend in his brief is that, as a mere technical defense, res
judicata showed not prevail over his right to substantial justice, and specifically
to due process. The petitioner claims he was denied this constitutional
protection when the defendants were deprived of the opportunity to submit their
evidence in the said Civil Case No. 1552 and later to appeal the decision of the
trial court.
As a matter of fact, he was not denied that opportunity, which is precisely and
only what due process guarantees. The records show that he did have that
opportunity to be heard and to have the decision reviewed but forfeited the
right because of his own counsel, whom he criticized as follows:
Clearly, it was through the gross ineptitude of petitioner's original counsel that
he was precluded from presenting his evidence in Civil Case No. 1552; that he
lost his right to appeal; and that the Decision in the Id case became final,
executory and executed.
xxx xxx xxx
There is also no dispute that the Decision in Civil Case No. 1552 has already
become final, executory and executed, and this, all because of the gross
ineptitude of counsel for the defendants (herein petitioner and his wife) who did
not file the record on appeal within the extended period of time granted by the
Court and who later on pursued a wrong remedy before the Honorable Court of
appeals in CA. G.R. No. SP-04698 and before the Honorable Supreme Court
in G.R. No. L- 43388 thereby allowing the period for availing of the remedy of
Relief judgment judgment to lapse. 6
Counsel are supposed to represent their clients by virtue of a valid
authorization from the latter and act on their behalf with binding effect. Persons
are allowed to practice law only after they shall have passed the bar petitions,
which merely determine if they have the minimum requirements to engage in
the exercise of the legal profession. This is no guaranty, of course, that they
will discharge their duties with full fidelity to their clients or with full mastery or
at least appreciation of the law. The law, to be fair, is not really all that simple;

Pattee 48
there are parts that are rather complicated and may challenge the skills
of many lawyers. By and large, however, the practice of the law should
not present much difficulty unless by some unfortunate quirk of fate the
lawyer has been allowed to enter the bar despite his lack of preparation,
or, while familiar with the intricacies of his , is nevertheless neglectful of
his duties and does not pay proper attention to his work.
In the instant case, the petitioner should have noticed the succession of
errors committed by his counsel and taken appropriate steps for his
replacement before it was altogether too late. He did not. On the
contrary, he continued to retain his counsel through the series of
proceedings that all resulted in the rejection of his cause, obviously
through such counsel's "ineptitude" and, let it be added, the clients"
forbearance. The petitioner"s reverses should have cautioned him that
his lawyer was mishandling his case and moved him to seek the help of
other counsel, which he did in the end but rather tardily.
Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and
recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification
that his counsel was grossly inepet. Such a reason is hardly plausible
as the petitioner's new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated
party would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake
on the part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse
judgment. There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as
every shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his
client through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would
likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and
so on ad infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite,
tentative and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of
replacing counsel.
On the effects of counsel's acts upon his client, this Court has
categorically declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action
of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to
complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded
differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such
grounds were to be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there
would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. ... Mistakes of attorneys
as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of
proof, ... failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses
and to argue the case are not paper grounds for a new trial, unless the
incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is prejudiced and
prevented from properly presence his case." (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v. Santos, et al.,
98 Phil. 500. 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279; Montes v. Court,
48 Phil. 64; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v. Dungca, 27 Phil.
274, U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner 28 SCRA 1151,
1164). In the 1988 case of Palanca v. American Food, etc. (24 SCRA
819, 828), this principle was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54
SCRA 296, 304).
At that, it is not even exactly true, as the petitioner claims, that his
evidence was not considered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1552.
The record shows that when the defendants filed their second motion
for reconsideration and/or to allow them to present their evidence,
which was attached, it was examined by the court "in fairness to the
defendants" but found to be "so vague and not appearing to be
indubitable as to warrant reopening of the case." 9 This conclusion was

reached by the late Judge Jaime R. Agloro after he had made a careful and
lengthy analysis of such evidence, dwelling on each of the disputed properties,
their antecedent, description, and the basis of the defendants' claims therefor.
A mere reading of such discussion, which covered two single spaced
typewritten pages, will show that, although the judge could have simply denied
the second motion for reconsideration, he nonetheless took the time and
exerted painstaking efforts to study the proffered evidence. The meticulous
consideration of such evidence commends the trial judge's thoroughness and
sense of justice and clearly belies the petitioner's complaint that he had been
denied due process.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does not strongly attack the
decision, preferring to train his sights on his own former counsel. As he says in
his petition, he "does not seek the nullity of the judgment rendered in Civil
Case No. 1552 which has already become final due to legal technicality." 10
What he does ask for is a reconveyance of the subject properties which he
says were udjustly taken from him as a result of his lawyer's mistakes. Such
blunders, he contends, are correctable in an action for reconveyance which the
Court should allow in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled.
This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud,
property is registered in the name of a person not its owner. 11 Clerical error in
designating the real owner is a valid ground for reconveyance after the decree
shall have become final following the lapse of one year therefrom.
Reconveyance may also be sought where it is established that a person not
entitled to the property succeeded in registering it in his name to the prejudice
of the real owner. However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a
valid decision of a court of justice determining the conflicting claims of
ownership of the parties in an appropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No.
1562. The decision in that case was a valid resolution of the question of
ownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through
the remedy of reconveyance.
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and
not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality, which
simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often happens,
supplement the law. We said in an earlier case 12 and we repeat it now, that all
abstract arguments based only on equity should yield to positive rules, which
pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions. Emotional appeals for justice,
while they may wring the heart of the Court, cannot justify disregard of the
mandate of the law as long as it remains in force. The applicable maxim, which
goes back to the ancient days of the Roman jurists and is now still reverently
observed is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.
We find it unnecessary to rule on the other arguments raised by the petitioner
as they will not affect the decision we reach today. This decision must again be
adverse to him although he may this time be represented by able counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.