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risk Of Not Being Able to dispute The Evidence Presented Ex Parte by the Other
Party
G.R. No. 197970, January 25, 2016,METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
PETITIONER, VS. FADCOR, INC. OR THE FLORENCIO CORPORATION, LETICIA D.
FLORENCIO, RACHEL FLORENCIO-AGUSTIN, MA. MERCEDES FLORENCIO AND
ROSENDO CESAR FLORENCIO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
For failure to pay the loans granted to Fadcor by Metropolitan Bank, the latter filed a
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of ten lots which served as
security for the loans. However, the amount of P17.4M remained unpaid as
deficiency obligation. At the scheduled pre-trial, the respondents failed to appear,
hence the RTC allowed Metrobank to present its evidence ex-parte and presented its
lone witness, Senior Assistant Sih-Tan, and thereafter filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence.
The respondents moved to reconsider the order, but the RTC denied it. However,
Court of Appeals reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision.
HELD:
Court, dated September 19, 2011 of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated
August 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated March 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 59 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINES,
The Law Did Not Define What Is Meant By Well-Founded Belief In A Petition
For Declaration1 Of Presumptive Death Of An Absent Spouse Under The Family Code.
It Depends Upon The Circumstances Of Each Particular Case
FACTS
In his petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife Netchie, Jose alleged that
they were married on August 10, 1996. After living together as husband and wife, the
two went their separate ways, he as a seaman, and his wife, as an overseas contract
worker in Hongkong. He did not receive any communication from Netchie, thereafter.
When he inquired from her parents, he was also unsuccessful, as they left the place.
Netchies relatives also do not know her whereabouts.
The RTC granted the petition. To assail the RTC judgment, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the
petition, holding that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether certiorari is the appropriate remedy to challenge a trial courts declaration of
presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
Beams Philippine Export Corporations petition for estafa against Marianita Castillo and
Nida Quirante was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the acts complained of do
not constitutes estafa. Its motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence the
company filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the dismissal
of their criminal case. On November 28, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition, holding
that the petition was defective because it was not filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, who must represent the People of the Philippines in petitions filed before the
CA or SC. It also violated Section 1 of Rule 65 for failure to attach relevant pleadings.
The company appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the company.
HELD:\
Yes. The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is- to determine the penal
liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found
guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the
Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the
state.
Among the specific powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General was to
represent the Government in the Supreme and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
As such, it is apparent that the petitioners only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondents. Since estafa, however, is a criminal offense, only
the OSG has the power to prosecute the case on appeal. Therefore, the petitioner
lacked the personality or legal standing to question the RTC decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated November 28, 2007 and
May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03081 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could
have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his authority, or could have gravely abused
his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 1221 of
Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the
Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title.
Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and
dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for
reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed
by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt
with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
The petitioner consequently did not present the duplicate or certified copy of the
OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Sec 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 26 that states the
provisions expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an
existing Torrens.
With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for
judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of
then, the proper recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by
notice within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. B
allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right
to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary
remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. The extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary
course of law. No error of judgement by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which
corrects only jurisdictional errors.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.
The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself
from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. There being no special, important or compelling reason, the
petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 206779 April 20, 2016
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. RICARDO BLANCAFLOR, Respondent
BRION, J:
FACTS: Levis is a corporation registered under the laws of the State of Delaware,
United States of America.
On Oct. 11, 1999, Levis filed an application before the Intellectual Property Office to
register the mark TAB DEVICE, which is a small marker or tab of textile material,
covering various goods. On Feb. 17, 2006, the trademark examiner rejected Levis
trademark application because there is nothing in the subject mark that serves to
distinguish Levis goods. Levis appealed the examiners rejection of the trademark
to the IPO Director of Trademarks, that also affirmed the decision of the IPO Director.
Levis filed its Appeal Memorandum with the respondent IPO Director-General, Atty.
Ricardo Blancaflor and provided a list of certificates of registration in other countries
covering nearly identical TAB DEVICE trademark registrations.
Levis then filed a petition for review to the CA. The CA first granted Levis motion
for extension, but denied the succeeding petitions for extension since CA averred
that Levis should be diligent enough, in a given ample time, to decide before the
end of the 15 days whether it would proceed with the filing or not.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing Levis petition for review on the ground that
Levis filed the CA petition beyond the extended reglementary period.
HELD: NO. The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the IPO, to the CA.
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides for the period to appeal to
the CA from the judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies:
Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period of 15
days. An extension of fifteen days and a further extension of 15 days may be
requested and may be granted as long as the court finds a compelling reason to do
so.
Motions for extensions are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for
extensions or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length
of time they pray for.51 Further, the general rule is that a second motion for
extension is not granted, except when the CA finds a compelling reason to grant the
extension.
Levis, by its own admission, only decided to proceed with the filing of the CA
petition for review after the lapse of the first fifteen-day period for filing.54 Levis
late decision necessarily delayed the execution and notarization of the SPA and,
consequently, the Philippine Consulate Offices authentication of the SPA. Levis
cannot excuse its delay by citing its failure to anticipate the Philippine Consulate
Offices closure due to the observance of the Philippine holidays. Certainly, Levis
own delay is not a compelling reason for the grant of a second extension to file a CA
petition for review.
G.R.NO. 170679 March 9, 2016
TUNG HUI CHUNG and TONG HONG CHUNG, Petitioners
vs
SHIH CHIU HUANG, Respondents
BERSAMIN, J:
FACTS: The petitioners both Australian citizens, filed in the RTC in Manila an
amendment complaint to recover from the respondent a sum of money and
damages. The suit is against herein respondent, which is a vendor who undertook to
deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, certain amount of shares of stocks in
Island Information and Technology, Inc., a public corporation.
The RTC issued an amended order granting the Petitioners application for the
writ of preliminary attachment. Respondent then submitted his counterclaim.
Thereafter, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise
Agreement which was signed by the respondent and the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners with the assistance of their respective counsels. It is stipulated in the
agreement that the parties agreed to settle their claims and counterclaims and the
respondent agreed to pay to the petitioners an amount of $250,000 which he
promised to pay in US$ currency.
Upon the payment of the first instalment, both parties agreed to file a Joint
Motion to Partially Lift the Preliminary Attachment. However, on the second
schedule of payment, the respondent did not pay the certain amount, instead he
filed in the CA for annulment of the judgment. The petitioners then filed a petition
for execution which was affirmed by the RTC. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court but later on withdrew the motion. He then filed
a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution which was denied by the RTC. The respondent
then alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and he claimed that the compromise agreement was patently unjust,
fraudulent and unconscionable. The CA promulgated the assailed decision of the
RTC, denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to set aside a judgment
based on compromise agreement.
WON there was fraud and lack of consent in the execution of the
compromise agreement.
HELD: The appeal is meritorious. The annulment by the CA was legally and factually
unwarranted.
reconsideration and had been subsequently denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The
respondents then appealed.
The CA decided to reinstate the decision of the MTC that the order of the RTC
is unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial which was not
allowed under Sec. 13 (3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: (1) WON the RTC can conduct relocation and verification survey in a lot in
question.
(2) WON an action for lawful detainer is proper.
HELD:
1
Hence, the RTC violated the preceding rule in ordering the conduct of the
relocation and verification survey, and for its doing is the same to its holding of a
trial de novo. The CA correctly held that the accion reinvidicatoria must be the
action taken to resolve the case and not the ejectment case. The boundary dispute
is not about possession, but an encroachment. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied.
2 NO. MTC was correct in dismissing the action because it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It is important that the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is
an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.
However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show that they
had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents. All that the petitioners had alleged is the illegal use and occupation
of the property. Thus, the action was not unlawful detainer.
G.R. No. 216920 January 13, 2016
GIRLIE QUISAY, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
FACTS: On December 28, 2012, Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued
Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of
Section 10 of R.A No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Consequently a Pabatid or Information was filed
to RTC charging petitioner such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground
of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support to
her motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal were issued
without the approval or authority from the City Prosecutor. As such, the Information
must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
The RTC ruled to deny the petitioners motion to quash due to the lack merit
since it found that the certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficienty
complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior
written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but denied. Petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA that consequently, affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing petitioners motion to quash.
HELD: NO. CA erred in affirming CAs ruling.
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval
of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before
the courts, to wit:
Sec. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint.
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(3) No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.