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When a Party fails to appear During the Pre-Trial despite Due Notice, It Acquires the

risk Of Not Being Able to dispute The Evidence Presented Ex Parte by the Other
Party
G.R. No. 197970, January 25, 2016,METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
PETITIONER, VS. FADCOR, INC. OR THE FLORENCIO CORPORATION, LETICIA D.
FLORENCIO, RACHEL FLORENCIO-AGUSTIN, MA. MERCEDES FLORENCIO AND
ROSENDO CESAR FLORENCIO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:

For failure to pay the loans granted to Fadcor by Metropolitan Bank, the latter filed a
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage of ten lots which served as
security for the loans. However, the amount of P17.4M remained unpaid as
deficiency obligation. At the scheduled pre-trial, the respondents failed to appear,
hence the RTC allowed Metrobank to present its evidence ex-parte and presented its
lone witness, Senior Assistant Sih-Tan, and thereafter filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence.
The respondents moved to reconsider the order, but the RTC denied it. However,
Court of Appeals reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision.
HELD:

Yes. The petition is impressed with merit.


Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, states:
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A
similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present
his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Unfortunately, when respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due notice,
they have already acquired the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence
presented ex parte by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, dated September 19, 2011 of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated
August 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated March 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 59 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016,REPUBLIC OF THE


PETITIONER, VS. JOSE B. SAREOGON, JR., RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINES,

The Law Did Not Define What Is Meant By Well-Founded Belief In A Petition
For Declaration1 Of Presumptive Death Of An Absent Spouse Under The Family Code.
It Depends Upon The Circumstances Of Each Particular Case
FACTS

In his petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife Netchie, Jose alleged that
they were married on August 10, 1996. After living together as husband and wife, the
two went their separate ways, he as a seaman, and his wife, as an overseas contract
worker in Hongkong. He did not receive any communication from Netchie, thereafter.
When he inquired from her parents, he was also unsuccessful, as they left the place.
Netchies relatives also do not know her whereabouts.
The RTC granted the petition. To assail the RTC judgment, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the
petition, holding that the Republic used the wrong recourse by instituting a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether certiorari is the appropriate remedy to challenge a trial courts declaration of
presumptive death under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

This Court finds the Republics petition meritorious.


A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy
to question the RTCs Decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death
In the 2005 case of Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,1 we held that the RTCs Decision on
a Petition for declaration of presumptive death pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice
of appeal pertaining to such judgment.2 Concurring in the result, Justice (later Chief
Justice) Artemio Panganiban further therein pointed out that the correct remedy to
challenge the RTC Decision was to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and
not a petition for review under Rule 45.3
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, The Decision dated October 24, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 04158-MN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
respondents Petition in said Spec. Proc. No. 045-08 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
G.R. No. 188372, November 25, 2015, BEAMS PHILIPPINE EXPORT
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARIANITA CASTILLO AND NIDA QUIRANTE,
RESPONDENTS.
The Office Of The Solicitor General Is The Appellate Counsel Of The People Of The
Philippines In All Criminal Cases
The Case:

Beams Philippine Export Corporations petition for estafa against Marianita Castillo and
Nida Quirante was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the acts complained of do
not constitutes estafa. Its motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence the
company filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the dismissal

of their criminal case. On November 28, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition, holding
that the petition was defective because it was not filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, who must represent the People of the Philippines in petitions filed before the
CA or SC. It also violated Section 1 of Rule 65 for failure to attach relevant pleadings.
The company appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:

Whether or not the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the company.
HELD:\
Yes. The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is- to determine the penal
liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found
guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the
Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the
state.
Among the specific powers and functions of the Office of the Solicitor General was to
represent the Government in the Supreme and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.
As such, it is apparent that the petitioners only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondents. Since estafa, however, is a criminal offense, only
the OSG has the power to prosecute the case on appeal. Therefore, the petitioner
lacked the personality or legal standing to question the RTC decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated November 28, 2007 and
May 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03081 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 176508 January 12, 2015


SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC,
Petitioner
vs.
HON. TEODORO T. RIEL, Respondent
University of the Philippines, Intervenor
BERSAMIN, J:
FACTS: The petitioner claimed in its petition that the original copy of OCT No. 1609
had been burnt and lost in the fire that quitted the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.
Respondent Judge initially gave due course to the petition, but after the preliminary
hearing, he dismissed the petition for reconstitution.
The petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC.
Hence, the petitioner came to the court alleging that respondent judge had unfairly
abused his discretion and unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which is
specifically enjoined upon him under Rule 7, Sec. 8 of the Revised rules of Court;
that the judge acted without and in excess of his authority and with grave abuse of
discretion to the further damage and prejudice of the herein petitioner, thus, the
present petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari ad mandamus is proper.
HELD: The petition for certiorari and mandamus, being devoid of procedural and
substantive merit, is dismissed.
Certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is granted only under the conditions
defined by the Rules of Court. The conditions are that: (1) the respondent tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction means that the
court acted with absolute lack of authority; there is excess of jurisdiction when the
court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority; grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

The petition for certiorari and mandamus did not show how respondent Judge could
have been guilty of lacking or exceeding his authority, or could have gravely abused
his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Under Section 1221 of
Republic Act No. 26, the law on the judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title, the
Regional Trial Court (as the successor of the Court of First Instance) had the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to act on the petition for judicial reconstitution of title.
Hence, the RTC neither lacked nor exceeded its authority in acting on and
dismissing the petition. Nor did respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that the petition for
reconstitution involved land already registered in the name of the UP, as confirmed
by the LRA. Instead, it would have been contrary to law had respondent Judge dealt
with and granted the petition for judicial reconstitution of title of the petitioner.
The petitioner consequently did not present the duplicate or certified copy of the
OCT No. 1609. Thereby, it disobeyed Sec 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 26 that states the
provisions expressly listed the acceptable bases for judicial reconstitution of an
existing Torrens.
With the questioned orders of the RTC having finally disposed of the application for
judicial reconstitution, nothing more was left for the RTC to do in the case. As of
then, the proper recourse for the petitioner was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by
notice within 15 days from notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. B
allowing the period of appeal to elapse without taking action, it squandered its right
to appeal. Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an extraordinary
remedy like certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. The extraordinary
remedy of certiorari is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary
course of law. No error of judgement by a court will be corrected by certiorari, which
corrects only jurisdictional errors.
The filing of the instant special civil action directly in this Court is in disregard of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same.
The Court enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself
from unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. There being no special, important or compelling reason, the
petitioner thereby violated the observance of the hierarchy of courts, warranting the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 206779 April 20, 2016
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., Petitioner
vs.
ATTY. RICARDO BLANCAFLOR, Respondent
BRION, J:
FACTS: Levis is a corporation registered under the laws of the State of Delaware,
United States of America.

On Oct. 11, 1999, Levis filed an application before the Intellectual Property Office to
register the mark TAB DEVICE, which is a small marker or tab of textile material,
covering various goods. On Feb. 17, 2006, the trademark examiner rejected Levis
trademark application because there is nothing in the subject mark that serves to
distinguish Levis goods. Levis appealed the examiners rejection of the trademark
to the IPO Director of Trademarks, that also affirmed the decision of the IPO Director.
Levis filed its Appeal Memorandum with the respondent IPO Director-General, Atty.
Ricardo Blancaflor and provided a list of certificates of registration in other countries
covering nearly identical TAB DEVICE trademark registrations.
Levis then filed a petition for review to the CA. The CA first granted Levis motion
for extension, but denied the succeeding petitions for extension since CA averred
that Levis should be diligent enough, in a given ample time, to decide before the
end of the 15 days whether it would proceed with the filing or not.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in dismissing Levis petition for review on the ground that
Levis filed the CA petition beyond the extended reglementary period.
HELD: NO. The Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs the appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the IPO, to the CA.
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides for the period to appeal to
the CA from the judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies:
Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The rule is clear that an appeal to the CA must be filed within a period of 15
days. An extension of fifteen days and a further extension of 15 days may be
requested and may be granted as long as the court finds a compelling reason to do
so.
Motions for extensions are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for
extensions or postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length
of time they pray for.51 Further, the general rule is that a second motion for
extension is not granted, except when the CA finds a compelling reason to grant the
extension.

Levis, by its own admission, only decided to proceed with the filing of the CA
petition for review after the lapse of the first fifteen-day period for filing.54 Levis
late decision necessarily delayed the execution and notarization of the SPA and,
consequently, the Philippine Consulate Offices authentication of the SPA. Levis
cannot excuse its delay by citing its failure to anticipate the Philippine Consulate
Offices closure due to the observance of the Philippine holidays. Certainly, Levis
own delay is not a compelling reason for the grant of a second extension to file a CA
petition for review.
G.R.NO. 170679 March 9, 2016
TUNG HUI CHUNG and TONG HONG CHUNG, Petitioners
vs
SHIH CHIU HUANG, Respondents
BERSAMIN, J:
FACTS: The petitioners both Australian citizens, filed in the RTC in Manila an
amendment complaint to recover from the respondent a sum of money and
damages. The suit is against herein respondent, which is a vendor who undertook to
deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, certain amount of shares of stocks in
Island Information and Technology, Inc., a public corporation.
The RTC issued an amended order granting the Petitioners application for the
writ of preliminary attachment. Respondent then submitted his counterclaim.
Thereafter, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise
Agreement which was signed by the respondent and the attorney-in-fact of the
petitioners with the assistance of their respective counsels. It is stipulated in the
agreement that the parties agreed to settle their claims and counterclaims and the
respondent agreed to pay to the petitioners an amount of $250,000 which he
promised to pay in US$ currency.
Upon the payment of the first instalment, both parties agreed to file a Joint
Motion to Partially Lift the Preliminary Attachment. However, on the second
schedule of payment, the respondent did not pay the certain amount, instead he
filed in the CA for annulment of the judgment. The petitioners then filed a petition
for execution which was affirmed by the RTC. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court but later on withdrew the motion. He then filed
a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution which was denied by the RTC. The respondent
then alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and he claimed that the compromise agreement was patently unjust,
fraudulent and unconscionable. The CA promulgated the assailed decision of the
RTC, denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to set aside a judgment
based on compromise agreement.
WON there was fraud and lack of consent in the execution of the
compromise agreement.
HELD: The appeal is meritorious. The annulment by the CA was legally and factually
unwarranted.

To start with, compromise agreement is a contract where parties make


reciprocal concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already
commenced. It is an accepted, nay, even highly encouraged practice in the courts
of law of this jurisdiction. It attains the authority and effect of res judicata upon the
parties upon its execution, and becomes immediately final and executory, unless
rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent. Once stamped with judicial imprimatur,
it ceases to be a mere contract between the parties, and becomes a judgment of
the court, to be enforced through writ of execution.
When CA recognized that what it was asked to annul and set aside was no
longer the compromise agreement of the parties but already the judgement based
on the compromise agreement. In doing so, the CA acted without jurisdiction. First
of all, the action before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari that had been
brought on March 7, 2005, which was way beyond the period of 60 days from the
rendition of the judgment based on the compromise agreement. The long delay had
violated Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which allowed the petition for
certiorari to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgement being
assailed. The grounds of grave abuse of discretion, fraudulent and unconscionable
compromise agreement that was the basis of the CA to deny the petitioners motion
were not proper for assailing the judgement based on the compromise agreement.
The indecency of the petition for certiorari to demand an annulment of the
compromise agreement was blatant and unquestionable. And if the ground of the
respondent to assail the judgement based on the compromise agreement was
extrinsic fraud, his action should be brought under Rule 47 of the rules of Court.
G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS
MANALANG, Petitioners
vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, Respondents
BERSAMIN, J:
FACTS: The Petitioners were co-owners of a lot in Guagua Cadastre. Adjacent to their
land was the herein respondents lot. In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation
and verification survey and found out that respondents lot had encroached theirs. It
was confirmed by the by the survey conducted by DENR. When the respondents
refused to vacate, the petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer on April 21,
1997 in the MTC.
The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC reversed the
decision of MTC and remanded the case. Upon remand, the MTC ultimately
dismissed the complaint and counterclaim for lack of merit through the ruling that
the petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the
respondents had encroached on their property. Once more the petitioners appealed
to the RTC. By that time, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation
survey to determine their allegation of encroachment and also heard the testimony
of the surveyor Engr. RTC then set aside MTCs decision. The respondents moved for

reconsideration and had been subsequently denied by the RTC for lack of merit. The
respondents then appealed.
The CA decided to reinstate the decision of the MTC that the order of the RTC
is unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial which was not
allowed under Sec. 13 (3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: (1) WON the RTC can conduct relocation and verification survey in a lot in
question.
(2) WON an action for lawful detainer is proper.
HELD:
1

NO. The RTC, in an appeal of an ejectment case, shall not conduct a


rehearing or trial de novo. In connection with this, Sec. 18 of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 18. Judgement conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership. xxx

Hence, the RTC violated the preceding rule in ordering the conduct of the
relocation and verification survey, and for its doing is the same to its holding of a
trial de novo. The CA correctly held that the accion reinvidicatoria must be the
action taken to resolve the case and not the ejectment case. The boundary dispute
is not about possession, but an encroachment. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are
limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or
termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or
implied.
2 NO. MTC was correct in dismissing the action because it did not have jurisdiction
over the case. It is important that the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is
an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or
implied.
However, the allegations of the petitioners complaint did not show that they
had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by the
respondents. All that the petitioners had alleged is the illegal use and occupation
of the property. Thus, the action was not unlawful detainer.
G.R. No. 216920 January 13, 2016
GIRLIE QUISAY, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
FACTS: On December 28, 2012, Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City issued
Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of
Section 10 of R.A No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act) Consequently a Pabatid or Information was filed
to RTC charging petitioner such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground
of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support to
her motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal were issued
without the approval or authority from the City Prosecutor. As such, the Information
must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.
The RTC ruled to deny the petitioners motion to quash due to the lack merit
since it found that the certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal have sufficienty
complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior
written authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but denied. Petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA that consequently, affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA correctly held that RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
dismissing petitioners motion to quash.
HELD: NO. CA erred in affirming CAs ruling.
Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval
of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before
the courts, to wit:
Sec. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the
information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the
complaint.
xxxx
(3) No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.

Xxxx (Emphases supplied)


Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts
without prior written authority or approval of the authorized officers renders the
same as defective and therefore subject to quashal.
In this case, there was no proof that a certain officer was authorized to
perform the written authority with the approval and in behalf of the City Prosecutor.
In the prior circumstances, the CA erred in affirming RTCs ruling, that the officer
who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Thus, Paabatid Sakdal
must be quashed resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
Finally, it must be stressed that the Rules of Court governs the pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For an orderly administration
of justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but
especially by the prosecution arm of the Government.
Concorde Condominium vs Baculio
Case Digest: GR 203678 Feb 17, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC Makati a petition for injunction (with damages with
prayer for issuance of a TRO, writ of preliminary injunction, and writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction) against the respondents seeking to enjoin them from
misrepresenting to the public that they are the owners of the Concorde
condominium building, and to prevent other certain individuals and government
officials from doing particular acts. The case was docketed as a civil case and
raffled to a Makati RTC branch which was designated as a special commercial court.
The respondents moved to dismiss claiming that the said RTC branch, as a special
commercial court, has no jurisdiction over the case because it is merely an ordinary
civil action and not those cases such as intracorporate disputes over which special
commercial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed the
case.
Issue: W/N the RTC branch erred in dismissing the case
Held:
Yes. The designation of the said branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means
diminished its power as a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings. The matter of whether the
RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited

jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do


with the question of jurisdiction.
The petition for injunction with damages is clearly an ordinary civil case. As a court
of general jurisdiction, the RTC branch still has jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.

Concorde Condominium vs Baculio


Case Digest: GR 203678 Feb 17, 2016
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC Makati a petition for injunction (with damages with
prayer for issuance of a TRO, writ of preliminary injunction, and writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction) against the respondents seeking to enjoin them from
misrepresenting to the public that they are the owners of the Concorde
condominium building, and to prevent other certain individuals and government
officials from doing particular acts. The case was docketed as a civil case and
raffled to a Makati RTC branch which was designated as a special commercial court.
The respondents moved to dismiss claiming that the said RTC branch, as a special
commercial court, has no jurisdiction over the case because it is merely an ordinary
civil action and not those cases such as intracorporate disputes over which special
commercial courts have exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the RTC dismissed the
case.
Issue: W/N the RTC branch erred in dismissing the case
Held:
Yes. The designation of the said branch as a Special Commercial Court by no means
diminished its power as a court of general jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings. The matter of whether the
RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do
with the question of jurisdiction.
The petition for injunction with damages is clearly an ordinary civil case. As a court
of general jurisdiction, the RTC branch still has jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.

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