I.

Comprehensive Agrarian Law Reform

1. PRINCIPLES (PRIMER)
a) Sec.2 RA 6657
1.
What are the primary objectives of Agrarian Reform?
A: PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Breakup agricultural lands to transform them into economic size
farms to be owned by farmers themselves, to uplift their economic
status.
Founded on the right of landless farmers and landless regular farm
workers to directly or collectively own the lands they till or in case of
farm workers, to receive a just share in fruits thereof.
Does not guarantee improvement in lives of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries, but it merely provides for possibility of favorable chance
of uplifting economic status of the agrarian reform beneficiaries
2.

True or False: Economic family size farm aims to provide an

above average standard of living to meet the familys need for food,
housing, clothing, education, and means with allowances for each
members of the family for payment for their personal needs, so that they
may live independently, free from poverty. Explain.
A: False. The aim is to provide a modest standard of living to meet a
farm familys needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible
allowance for payment of yearly installments on land and reasonable
reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income

3.

What then constitutes as family-size farm so as to give rise to

tenancy relationship?
A: ECONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM - area of farm land that
permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family
and will produce a sufficient income to provide for modest standard of
living to meet a farm familys needs for food, clothing, shelter and
education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments
on land and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in
income

4.

What now is the effect of the law to cultivator-tiller of a less than

family-size farms?
A: Such landholder-tiller or tiller-sharer, is at most considered as a
mere
caretaker before the eyes of the law who is not entitled to the security
of

tenure.
5.

Should the landholding be sold or alienated to a new owner, what

happens to the rights and obligations of the transferee and his heirs?
A: The transferee and his heirs are subrogated to the rights and obligations
of the former landowner. However, the change of landowner cannot be
allowed to raise the status of a mere caretaker or tiller sharer to that of an
agricultural tenant and leaseholder.

b) Sec. 4-8, Article XIII, Constitution

1.

What is the Constitutional Mandate on Agrarian Law Reform

A: Section 4.
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
Section 5.
The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers'
organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management
of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through
appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production,
marketing, and other support services.
Section 6.
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public
domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior
rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle landless
farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

Section 7.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both in land and offshore. It shall provide support to
such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish workers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Section 8.
The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of
the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment
creation, and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial
instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprises of their choice
c) The Constitutionality Issue
1.

Is CARP unconstitutional?
A: No. In the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Supreme Court held:
"The case before us presents no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and
all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmerbeneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and
manner
of
the just compensation provided for in the aforequoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative
of
the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution re-moved from the realities and
demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of
our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware
that invalidation of said section will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the specter of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and
that is not what we shall decree today."
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of
cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the
land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small
landowner will be needing it more than the big landowner, who can afford
a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly,
the government financial instruments making up the balance of the
payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which
are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent
to the amount of just compensation."

2.

PURPOSE
a. Definitions
Agrarian Reform refers to the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits
produced to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial
arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support services designed to lift the
economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the
physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit sharing, labor

administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries
to receive a just share of the fruits if the land they work.
Agrarian Dispute Refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,
or lessor and lessee.
Agricultural Land Refers to land devoted to agricultural activities. It contemplates
lands that are arable and suitable for farming.
Landless farmer a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or
the production of agricultural crops, livestock and/or fisheries either by
himself/herself, or primarily with the assistance of his/her immediate farm household,
whereby the land is owned by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy
agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.
Agricultural tenant the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both.
Means a person who by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the
latters consent.
Agricultural tenancy relationship The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy
relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Stock Distribution Option
b. Rule on Coverage

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of

tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands
shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
b) All lands of the public domain in excess to the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;
c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture;
d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural
c. Rules of Acquisition
All remaining agricultural lands during the 5 yr extension period up to June 30,
2014, in the following order of priority:
a. Lands with an area of more than 50 hectares, specifically:
1. Those subjected to Notice of Coverage on or before 12-10-08
2. Rice and corn lands
3. Idle or abandoned lands
4. Private lands voluntarily offered
5. Lands foreclosed
6. Lands acquired by the PCGG
7. All other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture
b. Lands with an area of 24 hectares up to 50 hectares, specifically:
c. Lands with an area of more than 10 hectares up to 24 hectares
d. Lands from the retention limit up to 10 hectares.
Qualified beneficiaries only farmers and regular farmworkers actually tilling the
lands, as certified under oath by the BARC and attested under oath by the
landowners.
Sec. 16 Land Acquisition (Compulsory Acquisition)
Procedure:
1. Identification by the DAR of the land, landowner and beneficiary;
2. Notice by the DAR to the landowner about the compulsory acquisition and the
price offer by mail and posting in brgy hall and municipal hall
3. Reply by the landowner about his acceptance or rejection of the offered price.
-If LO accepts price, LBP will pay LO within 30 days from execution and
delivery of Deed of Transfer
-If LO rejects, DAR will determine just compensation thru administrative
proceedings;

If LO disagrees with the decision of the DAR, he may bring the matter to the
regular courts of justice for final determination of just compensation.
4. Taking of immediate possession of the land by the DAR.
- If LO receives the corresponding payment; or
-If LO does not respond to the Notice of Acquisition.
5. Request by the DAR to the Registry of Deeds to issue a TCT to the Republic of
the Phil.
6. Distribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
NOTICES required for the validity of implementation:
1. Notice of Coverage pursuant to DAR AO No. 12, s. 1989
2. Notice of Acquisition pursuant to Sec 16 of CARL
Failure to comply with the proper procedure would be a violation of constitutional
due process and should be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Sec. 19: Land Acquisition (Voluntary Offer to Sell)
Incentives: LO is entitled to an additional 5% cash payment.
Documentary Requirements:
1. Title or proof of ownership, if untitled;
2. Tax declaration; and
3. Approved survey plan
If LO fails to submit, the land will be subjected to compulsory acquisition.
LANDS NOT COVERED BY LAND ACQUISITION
Sec. 6 Retention Limits
Landowner has the right to retain not more than 5 hectares of his landholdings. The
retained area need not be personally cultivated by the LO cultivation can be done
indirectly through labor administration.
d) Rules of Distribution
The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless
residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farm workers;
(c) seasonal farm workers;
(d) other farm workers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collective or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under
Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of
their parents; and: Provided, further, that actual tenant -tillers in the landholding
shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed
of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under their
program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and ability
to cultivate and make land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a
system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any
beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to
him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit
periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
If, due to landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or
workers on the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some of
them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for distribution
under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of
privately-owned lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of lands
from the public domain.
Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3)
hectares of agricultural land.
II.

What was extended? What are the reforms introduced?

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

7.

III.

RA 4113 Sugar Tenancy Act

RA 1199 Agricultural Share Tenancy Act
Repealed all the earlier tenancy laws except the Sugar Tenancy Act.
RA 3844 Agricultural Land Reform Code
Abolished share tenancy. It established the agricultural leasehold system.
Ra 6389 Code of Agrarian Reforms
PD No. 27 Tenant Emancipation Law
RA 6657 CARP
Effectivity date is June 15, 1988
RA 9700 CARPER (Extensions with Reforms)
Effective date is August 7, 2009

Case Digests

HLI vs. PARC

Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing
public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of

the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agriculturalindustrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda
Luisita was bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development
Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group.
Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against
TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR)
so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment
ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the
approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to
ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative
modes in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is
the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda
Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers.
Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the
farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote
letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of
the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that
HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the
promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of
the SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of
the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution
89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory
acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and
subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under
the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of
distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of
agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
ISSUES:

Issue 1: Whether or not PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or
SDP
Issue 2: Whether or not the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
Issue 3: Whether or not Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitutions concept
of agrarian reform
Held:
1. Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve
the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. It may be
that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest
the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP, but such power or
authority is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication,
a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which
is expressed.
Following this doctrine, the conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock
distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the
power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
2. No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenged the constitutionality of RA 6657,
Sec 31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov
21, 1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before
the SC, the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the
original positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis
mota is the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be
revoked. Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA
6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the
executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.
3. Yes. The wording of the Art XIII, Sec 4 of the Constitution is unequivocal: the
farmers and regular farmworkers have a right to own directly or collectively the lands
they till.
The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution: direct and indirect
ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method
by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the

agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by

individual farmers. Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers.
No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits
corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which
collective ownership can be exercised.
The word collective is defined as indicating a number of persons or things considered
as constituting one group or aggregate, while collectively is defined as in a collective
sense or manner; in a mass or body. By using the word collectively, the Constitution
allows for indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer.
This is in recognition of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is
done through the medium of juridical entities composed of farmers.
The stock distribution option devised under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the
agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of
the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the landless appears to be the dominant
theme of that policy, the Court emphasized that Sec. 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution, as couched, does not constrict Congress to passing an agrarian reform
law planted on direct land transfer to and ownership by farmers and no other, or else
the enactment suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the intention were
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have worded said section in a
manner mandatory in character.

Bonifacio vs Judge Dizon

Facts:
The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed
on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian Relations,
Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from
Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor
was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (CAR Case No. 2160-B '68).
On September 18, 1970, judgement was rendered on the merits by Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant
PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question situated at Patubig, Marilao,
Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and consequently, ordering said
defendant to vacate the same landholding and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff
for the latter's personal cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A 3844
and dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties.
Respondent Pastora San Miguel appealed and the Court of Appeals modified said
judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the
amount of P1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Private respondent Pastora San Miguel was still dissatisfied, sought relief from this Court
claiming that during the pendency of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio
died and no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the substitution of
his heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private
respondent's petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and all the children and
heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No.
2160-B '68 before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution
was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy Sheriff submitted his
Report (Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof
occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he had
delivered the land subject matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of
Olimpio Bonifacio.
Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. This was
opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an
order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering the
subject land.
After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986,
stating that the writ of execution of the Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the
Sheriff of this Court is declared null and void and the "Motion for Demolition" filed by
plaintiff is denied and the "Petition for Contempt" is likewise denied.
Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of
Appeals, which as stated earlier, was certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e], Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and
Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68
can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and therefore
cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs. They assert that CAR
Case No. 2160-B '68, being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided
by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party. Furthermore, as under Rule
39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties
but also on their successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in
CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.
Private respondent places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not an
ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee.
She theorizes that the right being asserted in the action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio,
which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the non-substitution of
Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and
void. She also points to certain supervening events which allegedly prohibit execution of

the judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, the amendment of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844
by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No. 27.

Issue:
Whether or not the favorable judgment obtained by the descendant is inherited by the
compulsory heirs, thereby vesting to the latter, all the rights conferred by the judgment to
the decedent.
Held:
YES, the favorable judgement obtained by the decedent is inherited by the compulsory
heirs.
Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 as more than an
ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural
lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is more closely and strictly
regulated by the State. But this does not operate to bar the application to the instant case
of the general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.
Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for
ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave
the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when
the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise
to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the
landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844
however readily demonstrates the fallacy of this interpretation which provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. Notwithstanding any agreement as to
the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1)
The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will
personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located,
into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes.
Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when
the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his
immediate family so desired. This provides that the law clearly did not intend to limit the
right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to extend the exercise of
such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly, the right of cultivation as a
ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To
say otherwise would be to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon
the landowner's immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members
evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was
(and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this
regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding with
the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged
in "personal cultivation.
Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal
cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and
exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of the
lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
In this case, petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the
immediate family members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to
cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 not being a purely
personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners
as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the
judgment in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

Pagtalunan vs Tamayo
Facts:
Respondent Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for expropriation of a parcel of
land located in Bo. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned by the Aldabas as evidenced by a
TCT issued by the Register of Deeds of the province of Bulacan.
The CFI issued a writ of possession placing the Republic in possession of the land, upon
its deposit of P7,200.00 as provisional value of the land. Petitioners filed a supplemental
motion for leave to intervene, with complaint in intervention attached thereto, alleging
that petitioner Celso Pagtalunan has been the bona fide agricultural tenant of a portion of
the land. Petitioners asked the trial court to order payment to Celso Pagtalunan of just
compensation for his landholding or, in the alternative, to order payment of his
disturbance compensation as bona fide tenant in an amount not less than P15,000.00 per
hectare.
The December 8, 1978 order respondent Judge Roque A. Tamayo denied the petitioners'
supplemental motion, holding that to admit petitioners' complaint in intervention would
be tantamount to allowing a person to sue the State without its consent since the claim for
disturbance compensation is a claim against the State.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by respondent judge.
Thus, the petitioners filed an instant petition, which was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, limiting the discussion on the issue of lack
of jurisdiction of the trial court over the expropriation case. The Court granted the motion
for reconsideration and gave due course to the petition.
On December 22, 1978, the OSG (appealing from the portion of the December 8, 1978
decision of the CFI which fixed the compensation for the land expropriated at P30.00 per
square meter) filed in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines a notice of appeal and a
first motion for extension of 30 days from January 12, 1979 within which to file record
on appeal which was granted by respondent court. Counsel for private respondents filed
an objection to the public respondent's record on appeal claiming that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period. The CFI dismissed the appeal interposed by the
Republic.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit.
The public respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking the annulment of the CFI orders. The CA dismissed public
respondent's petition.
The public respondent filed a petition asking this Court to annul the CA decision and to
direct and compel the lower court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to
elevate the same to the CA. In a decision dated August 10, 1981, the Court granted the
petition and directed the trial court to approve the Government's record on appeal and to
elevate the same to the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners had the right to intervene in the expropriation proceedings
instituted by the State against the Aldabas (private respondents) as registered owners of
the subject property.
Held:
No. Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts when the
applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.
Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to
intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or an officer thereof. Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not
simply contingent and expectant.
Petitioners claim that Celso Pagtalunan possesses legal interest in the matter in litigation
for he, not private respondents, is the party entitled to just compensation for the subject
property sought to be expropriated or, in the alternative, disturbance compensation as a
bona fide tenant. Petitioners base their claim for just compensation on the certificate of
land transfer issued to them, where the tenant farmer/grantee is deemed owner of the
agricultural land identified therein. Petitioners contend that the certificate is evidence of

their legal ownership of a portion of the subject property. Thus, they conclude that they
are entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation proceedings instituted
over the subject property.
The Court is fully aware that the phrase "deemed to be the owner" is used to describe the
grantee of a certificate of land transfer. But the import of such phrase must be construed
within the policy framework of Pres. Decree No. 27, and interpreted with the other
stipulations of the certificate issued pursuant to this decree. Pres. Decree No. 27 (Tenant
Emancipation Decree) recognized the necessity to encourage a more productive
agricultural base of the country's economy. To achieve this end, the decree laid down a
system for the purchase by small farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the
economy, of the lands they were tilling. A careful study of the provisions of Pres. Decree
No. 27, and the certificate of land transfer issued to qualified farmers, will reveal that the
transfer of ownership over these lands is subject to particular terms and conditions the
compliance with which is necessary in order that the grantees can claim the right of
absolute ownership over them.
And under Pres. Decree No. 266 which specifies the procedure for the registration of title
to lands acquired, full compliance by the grantee is required for a grant of title under the
Tenant Emancipation Decree and the subsequent issuance of an emancipation patent in
favor of the farmer/grantee [Section 2, Pres. Decree No. 226]. It is the emancipation
patent which constitutes conclusive authority for the issuance of an Original Certificate of
Transfer, or a Transfer Certificate of Title, in the name of the grantee.
Hence, the mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the
farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein. The certificate simply evidences
the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under
Pres. Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Failure on the
part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or
amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner
or agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer [Section
2, Pres. Decree No. 816].
It is only after compliance with the above conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an
emancipation patent that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the
landholding (a right which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy). At best, the farmer/grantee, prior to compliance with these
conditions, merely possesses a contingent or expectant right of ownership over the
landholding.
Petitioners have not been issued an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they do not dispute
private respondents' allegation that they have not complied with the conditions
enumerated in their certificate of land transfer which would entitle them to a patent.
Petitioners do not even claim that they had remitted to private respondents, through the

Land Bank of the Philippines, even a single amortization payment for the purchase of the
subject property.
Under these circumstances, petitioners cannot now successfully argue that Celso
Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the expropriation
proceedings corresponding to the value of the landholding. Therefore, considering that
petitioners are not entitled to just compensation for the expropriation of the subject
property, nor to disturbance compensation under Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, the
Court finds that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying petitioners'
motion for leave to intervene in the expropriation proceedings.
Gonzales vs. Landbank
Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Talavera vs. Laxamana

Facts:
On August 8, 1981, Ramos Plantation Company, Inc. executed a Deed of Assignment in
favor of petitioner Ramon Gonzales. Petitioner filed a case to compel public respondent
Land Bank to issue Land Bank Bonds in the name of petitioner instead of the aforesaid
corporation as the original and registered owner of the property. Defendant corporation
was declared in default for failure to file an answer. Meanwhile, defendant bank filed its
answered stating that the corporation failed to comply with 6 of the requirements. The
lower court granted the plaintiff the issuance of the Land Bank bonds. By an appeal of
Land Bank, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner appealed by
certiorari to set aside the decision of the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Land Bank can be compelled to issue Land Bank bonds in the
name of petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Held:
The determination of the issue was guided by Resolution No. 75-68 entitled PROPER
PARTIES TO RECEIVE LAND TRANSFER PAYMENT.
Thereunder the Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. It
is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be required to
make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee.

Thereunder the Land Bank can only issue bonds in the name of the assignor-landowner. It
is only after the issuance of bonds in the landowner's name that he shall be required to
make the necessary indorsement of the bonds to his assignee.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Natividad Bito-on Deita gratuitously entrusted farm lots by way of dugo to her brother
Benigno Bitoon so he could support the schooling of his children in Manila. Benigno
then engaged Graciano Bernas in a production sharing agreement; the former shouldered
the expenses while the latter provided labor. Natividad knew nothing of this arrangement.
When Benigno returned the lots to his sister, Bernas contested their possession, claiming
he was an agricultural leasehold lessee. In the RTC, the issue was whether or not Bernas
was a leasehold lessee. RTC ruled in his favor using RA 1199and 3844.In her appeal to
the CA, the issue was whether or not the Benigno-Bernas arrangement was binding upon
her. Natividad argued that since their agreement was one of commodatum, Benigno
cannot lend nor lease theproperties contested. CA agreed with her since she knew nothing
of the Benigno-Bernas arrangement.
Issue:
Whether or not the Benigno-Bernas arrangement is binding upon Nativida.
Held:
Yes it is. RA 3844 made Benigno the LEGAL POSSESSOR, granting him the authority
and capacity to institute agricultural leasehold lessees. Natividad did not raise the issue of
terminating the leasehold so this court cannot decide on that. Natividad changed the
theory of her case from court to court, this is not allowed. Even if there was lack of
authorization, no evidence established the specifics of Natividads dugo with her
brother.

Nisnisan vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao
del Sur. Policarpio, the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of said land since
1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a
sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino sold two (2) ha of the
land, including the land tenanted by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of the
sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed an action for reinstatement of
tenancy against the Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered that spouses
Nisnisan have no cause of action because they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.

Issue:
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered subject landholding?
Held:
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents failed to present any evidence to
show that petitioners-spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after the private
respondents purchased the subject property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-spouses against private respondents
before the CAR militates against the private respondents' claim that petitioners-spouses
voluntarily surrendered their landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be
convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's intention to
surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere
implication.
Effect of death or permanent incapacity of tenant-lessee on leasehold relation
Under Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death or permanent incapacity, the leasehold
relation continues between the lessor and the person who can cultivate the land
personally, chosen by the lessor within one month from such death or incapacity, from
among the following:
a) The surviving spouse;
b) The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
c) The next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of age.
The age requirement is applied under the presumption that all heirs/successors are
qualified.
The leasehold relation is not terminated by death or permanent incapacity of the
landholder-lessor. It binds his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9).
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that the mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding does not extinguished leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the lessor.
Dispossession of Tenants
Under Sec. 36 of RA 3844, dispossession of tenants may be authorized by the Court in
a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
a) The lessee failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the contract
or with pertinent laws unless the failure is caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure;

b) The lessee planted crops or used the land for a purpose other than what has been
previously agreed upon;
(Note: Under DAR AO 5 [1993], the lessee is now allowed to intercrop or plant
secondary crops after the rental has been fixed, provided the lessee shoulders the
expenses.)
c) The lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices necessary to conserve the land,
improve its fertility, and increase its productivity taking into consideration the lessee's
financial capacity and the credit facilities available to him;
d) There has been substantial damage, destruction or unreasonable deterioration of the
land or any permanent improvement thereon due to the fault or negligence of the lessee;
e) The lessee failed to pay lease rental on time except when such non-payment is due to
crop failure to the extent of 75% as a result of a fortuitous event;
f) The lessee employed a sub-lessee; or
g) The landholding is declared by the DAR to be suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or some other urban purposes subject to payment of disturbance compensation
to the lessee.
(Note: Under Sec. 36 [1] of RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, disturbance
compensation is equivalent to five [5] times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five [5] preceding calendar years.)
In the case of Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA 338 (1962), it was held that when
non-payment of lease rentals occurs for several years, said omission has the effect of
depriving the landowner of the enjoyment of the possession and use of the land.
Under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, a lessor who ejects his tenant without the
court's authorization shall be liable for:
a) fine or imprisonment;
b) damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to the fine or imprisonment for
unauthorized dispossession;
c) payment of attorney's fees incurred by the lessee; and
d) the reinstatement of the lessee.
Determination of Lease Rentals
The lease rental shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average normal
harvest during the three (3) agricultural years preceding the following dates:

10 September 1971, the date of effectivity of RA 6389for tenanted

rice and corn lands;

15 June 1988 or date the tenant opted to enter into leasehold

agreement, whichever is sooner, for tenanted sugar lands; or
15 June 1988 or date of leasehold agreement by the parties
concerned, whichever is sooner, for all other agricultural lands after
deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting,
threshing, loading, hauling and processing whichever is applicable
(DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).

DAR AO 5 (1993) defines "normal harvest" as the usual or regular produce obtained
from the land when it is not affected by any fortuitous event like drought, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, and the like. If there had been no normal harvest, the estimated normal
harvest during the three (3) preceding agricultural years shall be considered as the normal
harvest.
"Agricultural year" refers to the period of time required for raising a particular
product, including the preparation of the land, sowing, planting and harvesting of crops
and, whenever applicable, threshing of said crops: Provided, however, That in case of
crops yielding more than one harvest from one planting, "agricultural year" shall be the
period from the preparation of the land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to
harvest. In both cases, the period may be shorter or longer than a calendar year.
The law states that only the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting,
threshing, loading, hauling, and processing, whichever is applicable, are considered
allowable deductions from the normal harvest in order to determine the lease rental.
The lease rental shall cover the whole farmholding attended to by the lessee.
Computation of lease rental shall include both primary and secondary crops existing as of
15 June 1988. Secondary crops which are planted to an aggregate area of half a hectare or
less shall not be included in the computation of the lease rental (DAR Adm. O. No. 5
[1993]).
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three agricultural years prior to
15 June 1988, the initial rental shall be based on the average normal harvest during the
preceding agricultural years when the land was actually cultivated.
After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests, the final rental shall be based on
the average normal harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural years.

Cecilleville Realty vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty owns a parcel of land, a portion of which is occupied by
Herminigildo Pascual. Despite repeated demands, Herminigildo refused to vacate the
property and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping his mother,
the corporation's tenant, to cultivate the property.

Issue:
Held:
Only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain
a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner's
tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm
household. Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a homelot.
Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same
within the very small landholding of petitioner. . . . Thus, if the Court were to follow
private respondent's argument and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm
household to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one
thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted this
Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of
houses.
In sugarcane lands, the lessee shall have the following rights to be exercised by him
personally or through a duly registered cooperative/farmers' association of which he is a
bona fide member (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]):
a) To enter into a contract with the sugar central millers for the milling of the
sugarcane grown on the leased property;
b) To be issued a warehouse receipt (quedan) or molasses storage certificate by
the sugar central for the manufactured sugar, molasses and other by-products;
c) To have free access to the sugar central's factory, facilities, and laboratory for
purposes of checking and/or verifying records and procedures in the processing of
sugarcane through professional representation;
d) To be furnished a weekly statement of cane and sugar account showing, among
other things, the tonnage of the delivered cane and analysis of the crusher juice;
e) To be given 30 days notice in writing before the sugar and other by-products
are sold through public auction; and
f) To be provided with the standard tonnage allocation by the miller/sugar central.
Rights and responsibilities of lessor
The lessor shall have the following rights:
a) To inspect and observe the extent of compliance with the terms and conditions of the
leasehold contract;
b) To propose a change in the use of the landholding to other agricultural purposes, or in
the kind of crops planted;

c) To require the lessee, taking into consideration his/her financial capacity and the credit
facilities available to him/her, to adopt proven farm practices necessary to the
conservation of the land, improvement of the fertility and increase in productivity; and
d) To mortgage expected rentals (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 29):
The lessor may propose a change in use but the change shall be agreed upon by the
landowner and the lessee. In case of disagreement, the matter may be settled by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), or in his absence the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993])
The lessor shall have the following obligations:
a) To keep the lessee in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land; and
b) To keep intact such permanent useful improvements existing on the landholding at the
start of the leasehold relation (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 30).
Sec. 31 of RA 3844 provides that the lessor is prohibited to perform any of the following acts:
a) To dispossess the lessee of his/her landholding except upon authorization by the
Court;
b) To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, the payment of the taxes or part
thereof levied by the government on the land;
c) To require the lessee to assume, directly or indirectly, any rent or obligation of the
lessor to a third party;
d) To deal with millers or processors without written authorization of the lessee in cases
where the crop has to be sold in processed form before payment of the lease rental;
e) To discourage, directly or indirectly, the formation, maintenance or growth of unions
or organizations of lessees in his/her landholding; and
f) For coconut lands, indiscriminate cutting of coconut trees will be deemed prima facie
evidence to dispossess the tenant of his/her landholding unless there is written consent of
the lessee and there is PCA certification, copy of the findings and recommendations of
which shall be furnished to affected tenants or lessees, or a resolution from the Municipal
Board allowing the cutting for valid reasons (DAR Adm. O. No. 5 [1993] and DAR Adm.
O. No. 19 [1989]).
Termination of Tenancy Relation
Causes for termination of leasehold relation
Section 8 of RA 3844 provides that agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished
by the following acts or omissions:
a) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;

b) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of

which shall be served three months in advance; or
c) Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of his/her death or permanent
incapacity.
Conversion of the land to non-agricultural uses also extinguishes the leasehold relation
because the subject land is no longer an agricultural land and the purpose is no longer
agricultural production. However, under Sec. 16 of DAR AO 1 (1999), the tenant affected
by the conversion is entitled to disturbance compensation which must be paid within
sixty (60) days from the issuance of the order of conversion.
Abandonment
In the case of Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, supra, it was held that the word "abandon," in its
ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. "The emphasis is
on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the control
of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to
resume or claim one's rights or interests." In other words, the act of abandonment
constitutes actual, absolute and irrevocable desertion of one's right or property. . . .
Likewise, failure to cultivate the land by reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a
third party cannot also amount to abandonment, for abandonment presupposes free will."
(at 19-20; underscoring supplied).
Voluntary surrender of property
The tenant's intention to surrender landholding cannot be presumed, much less
determined by mere implication, but must be convincingly and sufficiently proved.

Quino vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Issue:
Held:

Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB

Facts:
On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for
the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future
campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein
parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the
program, CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension

of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU
a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no
tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.
When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution,
DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for
distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's
determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not
"actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue:
Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public
use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and
necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?
Held:
The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the
question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided
the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on the basis of "CMU's present needs."
The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating that for the land to be exempt it must
be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present
educational program with its present student population and academic faculty"
overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.