Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CASE DIGESTS
OBLIGATIONS
1. G.R. No. L-20865, December 29, 1967
ASELA P. TACTAQUINvs.JOSE B. PALILEO
Facts:
Tactaquin filed an action for damages against
Pailileo for the death of her daughter and serious
physical injuries inflicted upon her when a car
recklessly driven by Palileo hit them. Prior to the
reservation for the institution of a separate civil
action, Palileo was charged criminally and was
found guilty of homicide, with serious physical
injuries, through reckless imprudence, and was
sentenced not only to suffer imprisonment but
also to pay for damages. Because of this, Palileo
moved to dismiss the civil case for damages,
upon the ground that the action was already
barred by the final judgment rendered in the
criminal case. Sustaining this motion the lower
court dismissed the case (for damages).
Issue:
Can Tactaquin recover damages in a separate
civil action despite a prior award for damages in a
criminal action?
Ruling:
Yes. The private prosecutor timely made a
reservation on behalf of the offended party in
connection with the filling of separate civil action;
as a result thereof, the question of civil liability
was automatically taken out of the case and was
not before the court any longer. Upon these
premises, the conclusion becomes inescapable
that the portion of the decision of the Court in the
Criminal Case concerning civil indemnity was a
nullity, and being so, it cannot be accorded the
authority of res judicata.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
act
upon which Robles
responsibility may be based.
subsidiary
civil
Ruling:
Yes. Paduas' complaint in civil case states a cause
of action against Robles whose concomitant
subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in
criminal case, subsists. The said judgment states
no civil liability arising from the offense charged
against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the
judgment in question, the situation to which it
applies, and the attendant circumstances, the
court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the
enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil
liability arising from the offense committed by
Punzalan and awarded the corresponding
indemnity therefore.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility.
In negligence cases the offended party (or his
heirs) has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa
criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for recovery of damages
based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of
the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously
instituted with the criminal action, unless
expressly waived or reserved for a separate
application by the offended party. Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission.
It is immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first
instance, an action for recovery of damages
based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176,
2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action
proved ineffectual. Allowance of the latter
application involves no violation of the
proscription against double recovery of damages
for the same negligent act or omission. For, as
hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of
the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of
execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the
amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in
the civil case.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the lower court is
proper?
Ruling:
This is not correct. We must, however, point out a
flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is stated
in the decision appealed from that the driver,
Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the
payment of damages adjudged therein, and the
appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and
operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the
accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only
in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay.
The action in the instant case was brought not to
demand civil liability arising from a crime. The
complaint makes no mention of a crime having
been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto
Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But
there is an allegation in the complaint that
Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the
truck that figured in the accident, which truck
was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in
connection with her gasoline business. The prayer
in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold
appellants jointly and solidarily liable for
damages. The instant action, therefore, was
based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict.
Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats
of quasi delicts, the liability of the owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise for
damages caused by their employees is primary
and direct, not subsidiary. The employer,
however, can demand from his employee
reimbursement of the amount which he paid
under his liability. The employer, appellant Lily
Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not
subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the
decision of the lower court. This is, of course,
without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim
Tan to demand from her co-appellant Ernesto
Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she
would have to pay to appellees.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action is an independent
one, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action.
Ruling:
No. It is the stand of herein petitioners that
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not
Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at
bar. We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111
merely refers to the institution of an independent
civil action without waiting for the filing or
termination of the criminal action and requires
only preponderance of evidence to prosper and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required
for conviction in criminal cases. However, an
acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon
which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of
an independent civil action if it is based on the
crime.
As held in Corpus vs. Paje, reckless imprudence
or criminal negligence is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein
petitioners were alleged to be the result of
criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with
malice. Hence, no independent civil action for
damages may be instituted in connection
therewith.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issues:
Whether or not respondent Davao City is guilty of
negligence. If yes, whether or not such
negligence is the immediate and proximate cause
of the death of the victims.
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
the
Issues:
In view of Sendaydiegos death and the appeal,
what happens now to his criminal liability? How
about his civil liability?
Ruling:
Sendaydiegos appeal as to his criminal liability is
dismissed. The claim of complainant Province of
Pangasinan for the civil liability survives.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
for
of
de
his
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
and
independent
action
is
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment in the criminal case
extinguished the liability of private respondent
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,
Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of
Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
Ruling:
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused,
even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi delict.
We held that the civil case for damages was not
barred since the cause of action of the heirs was
based on quasi delict.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime
and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus
driver will not bar recovery of damages because
the acquittal was based not on a finding that he
was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt.
It was thus error for the appellate court to skip
the review of the evidence in this case and
instead base its decision on the findings of the
trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the
appellate court disregarded the fact that this case
had been instituted independently of the criminal
case and that petitioners herein took no part in
the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was
filed below before the prosecution presented
evidence in the criminal action.
It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the
criminal action when the fact is that they did not
take part therein. That the witnesses presented
on behalf of the petitioners are different from
those presented by the prosecution should have
brought home to the appellate court the
fundamental unfairness of considering the
decision in the criminal case conclusive of the
civil case.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the
evidence in the civil case, this case should be
remanded to it so that it may render another
decision in accordance with the law and the
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Negative. The application of Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code requires a two-step process:
1. The Court must first determine that "the
obligation does not fix a period" (or that
the period is made to depend upon the will
of the debtor)," but from the nature and
the circumstances it can be inferred that a
period was intended" (Art. 1197, pars. 1
and 2).
2. Once the preliminary point is settled,
the Court must then decide what period
was "probably contemplated by the
parties.
Ultimately, the Court cannot fix a period merely
because in its opinion it is or should be
reasonable, but must set the time that the parties
are shown to have intended. In the case at bar,
the trial Court appears, to have pulled the twoyear period set in its decision out of thin air, since
no circumstances are mentioned to support it.
Plainly, this is not warranted by the Civil Code.
The parties were fully aware that the land
described therein was occupied by squatters,
because the fact is expressly mentioned in their
pleadings. As the parties must have known that
they could not take the law into their own hands,
but must resort to legal processes in evicting the
squatters, they must have realized that the
duration of the suits to be brought would not be
under their control nor could the same be
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
None. Bills 1298 and 1419 were not yet due and
demandable as of the date of their assignment by
MOJICA to MEVER on September 9, 1974, nor on
the date when MEVER surrendered said Bills to
CONGENERIC.
As a consequence, no legal
compensation could have taken place because,
for it to exist, the two debts, among other
requisites, must be due and demandable.
What is involved in this case is a money market
transaction where lenders and borrowers do not
deal directly with each other but through a
middleman or dealer in the open market. The
issuer necessarily knows in advance that the
commercial paper would be expeditiously
transferred to any investor without need of notice
to said issuer. Hence, it is the first paragraph of
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Judgment Debt
Orders Gabriel to
pay PHP 1746.98
with interest at 12%
per annum from the
filing of complaint
plus PHP 400 in
attorneys fees and
the costs of suit
No specific mode of
payment
No
mention
damages
Unsecured
of
Chattel Mortgage
Only PHP 1700
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of chattel mortgage
novated the judgment of the CFI.
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Under
both
indemnity
agreements,
the
indemnitors bound themselves jointly and
severally to R & B Surety to pay an annual
premium of P5,103.05 and "for the faithful
compliance of the terms and conditions set forth
in said SURETY BOND for a period beginning ...
until
the
same
is
CANCELLED
and/or
DISCHARGED."
When PAGRICO failed to comply with its Principal
Obligation to the PNB, the PNBdemanded
payment from R & B Surety of the sum of
P400,000.00, the full amount of the Principal
Obligation. R & B Surety made a series of
payments to PNB by virtue of that demand
totalling P70,000.00 evidenced by detailed
vouchers and receipts.
R & B Surety in turn sent formal demand letters
to petitioners Joseph Cochingyan, Jr.and Jose K.
Villanueva for reimbursement of the payments
made by it to the PNB andfor a discharge of its
liability to the PNB under the Surety Bond. When
petitioners failedto heed its demands, R & B
Surety brought suit against Joseph Cochingyan,
Jr., Jose K.Villanueva and Liu Tua Ben.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of R
& B Surety, ordering the Cochingyan and
Villanueva to pay the plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the total amount of their liability on
Surety Bond No. 4765, at the interest rate of 6%
per annum.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the Trust Agreement had
extinguished, by novation, the obligation of R & B
Surety to the PNB under the Surety Bond which,
in turn, extinguished the obligations of the
petitioners under the Indemnity Agreements.
Ruling:
No. It is at once evident that the Trust Agreement
does not expressly terminate the obligation of R
& B Surety under the Surety Bond. On the
contrary, the Trust Agreement expressly provides
for the continuing subsistence of that obligation
by stipulating that "[the Trust Agreement] shall
not in any manner release" R & B Surety from its
obligation under the Surety Bond.
Neither can the petitioners anchor their defense
on implied novation. Absent an unequivocal
declaration of extinguishment of a pre-existing
obligation, a showing of complete incompatibility
between the old and the new obligation (and
nothing else) would sustain a finding of novation
by implication. But where, as in this case, the
parties to the new obligation expressly recognize
the continuing existence and validity of the old
one, where, in other words, the parties expressly
negated the lapsing of the old obligation, there
can be no novation. The issue of implied novation
is not reached at all.
What the trust agreement did was, at most,
merely to bring in another person or persons-the
Trustor[s]-to assume the same obligation that R &
B Surety was bound to perform under the Surety
Bond. It is not unusual in business for a stranger
to a contract to assume obligations thereunder; a
contract of suretyship or guarantee is the
classical example. The precise legal effect is the
increase of the number of persons liable to the
obligee, and not the extinguishment of the
liability of the first debtor.Thus, in Magdalena
Estates vs. Rodriguez, we held that:
[t]he mere fact that the creditor receives
a guaranty or accepts payments from a
third person who has agreed to assume
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Yes. The right to prescription may be waived or
renounced. Prescription is deemed to have been
tacitly renounced when the renunciation results
from acts which imply the abandonment of the
right acquired. There is no doubt that prescription
has set in as to the first promissory note of
February 10, 1940. However, when respondent
Confesor executed the second promissory note
on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay
the amount covered by the previous promissory
note on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure
to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the
mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively
and expressly renounced and waived his right to
the prescription of the action covering the first
promissory note.
In a similar case, the court ruled that when a debt
is already barred by prescription, it cannot be
enforced by the creditor. But a new contract
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt
would be valid and enforceable.
Moreover, in signing the promissory note,
confessor can bind the conjugal partnership.
Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband
is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
is
Ruling:
No. It is elementary that the Statute refers to
specific kinds of transactions and that it cannot
apply to any that is not enumerated therein. And
the only agreements or contracts covered
thereby are the following:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers;
(2) Those do not comply with the Statute of
Frauds as set forth in this number, In the
following cases an agreement hereafter
made shall be unenforceable by action,
unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent;
evidence, therefore,
of the
agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its
contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) An
agreement
made
in
consideration of marriage, other
than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of
goods, chattels or things in action,
at a price not less than five
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
We find nothing unlawful, or immoral, or
unreasonable, or contrary to public policy either
in the objectives thus sought to be attained by
the Bureau, or in the means availed of to achieve
said objectives, or in the consequences of the
accomplishment thereof. The purpose of said
Article 22 is not to eliminate competition, but to
promote ethical practices among non-life
insurance companies, although, incidentally it
may discourage, and hence, eliminate unfair
competition, through underrating, which in itself
is eventually injurious to the public. The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and promotes
competition, or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable.
Furthermore, it shows that the limitation upon
reinsurance contained in the aforementioned
Article 22 does not affect the public at all, for,
whether there is reinsurance or not, the liability of
the insurer in favor of the insured is the same.
Besides, there are sufficient foreign reinsurance
companies operating in the Philippines from
which non-members of the Bureau may secure
reinsurance. What is more, whatever the Bureau
may do in the matter of rate-fixing is not decisive
insofar as the public is concerned, for no
insurance company in the Philippines may charge
a rate of premium that has not been approved by
the Insurance Commissioner.
7. G.R. No. L-27696, September 30, 1977
MIGUEL
FLORENTINO,
ROSARIO
ENCARNACION de FLORENTINO, MANUEL
ARCE,
JOSE
FLORENTINO,
VICTORINO
FLORENTINO,
ANTONIO
FLORENTINO,
REMEDION ENCARNACION and SEVERINA
ENCARNACION
vs.
SALVADOR
ENCARNACION,
SR.,
SALVADOR
ENCARNACION,
JR.,
and
ANGEL
ENCARNACION
Facts:
Herein petitioner appellants and appellees filed
with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur an
application for the registration under Act 496 of a
parcel of agricultural land located at Barrio
Lubong Dacquel Cabugao Ilocos Sur. The
application alleged among others that the
applicants are the common and pro-indiviso
owners in fee simple of the said land with the
improvements existing thereon; that to the best
of their knowledge and belief, there is no
mortgage, lien or encumbrance of any kind
whatever affecting said land, nor any other
person having any estate or interest thereon,
legal or equitable, remainder, reservation or in
expectancy; that said applicants had acquired the
aforesaid land thru and by inheritance from their
predecessors in interest, lately from their aunt,
Doa Encarnacion Florentino who died in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur in 1941, and for which the said land
was adjudicated to them by virtue of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated August 24, 1947; that
applicants Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel
Encarnacion acquired their respective shares of
the land thru purchase from the original heirs,
Jesus, Caridad, Lourdes and Dolores surnamed
Singson one hand and from Asuncion Florentino
on the other.
The crucial point in controversy in this
registration case is centered in the stipulation
marked Exhibit O-1 embodied in the deed of
extrajudicial partition (Exhibit O) dated August
24, 1947. The applicant Miguel Florentino asked
the court to include the said stipulation (Exhibit
O-1) as an encumbrance on the land sought to be
registered, and cause the entry of the same on
the face of the title that will finally be issued.
Opposing its entry on the title as an
encumbrance,
petitioners-appellee
Salvador
Encarnacion, Sr., Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and
Angel Encarnacion filed on October 3, 1966 a
manifestation
seeking
to
withdraw
their
application on their respective shares of the land
sought to be registered. The withdrawal was
opposed by the petitioners-appellants.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
two
the
for
TCT.
sale
and
option
to
rescind
the
contract
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
1. Yes. The rule that the injured party can only
choose between fulfillment and rescission of the
obligation, and cannot have both, applies when
the obligation is possible of fulfillment. If, as in
this case, the fulfillment has become impossible,
Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek
rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment.
2. No. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that
the injured party may also seek rescission, if the
fulfillment should become impossible. The cause
of action to claim rescission arises when the
fulfillment of the obligation became impossible
when the Court of First Instance of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. 174 declared the sale of the land to
defendants by Juan Porciuncula a complete nullity
and ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 69475 issued to them.
Since the two lots sold to plaintiff by defendants
form part of the land involved in Civil Case No.
174, it became impossible for defendants to
secure and deliver the titles to and the
possession of the lots to plaintiff. But plaintiff had
to wait for the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 174, According to the certification of the clerk
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
(Exhibit "E-2"), the decision in Civil Case No. 174
became final and executory "as per entry of
Judgment dated May 3, 1967 of the Court of
Appeals." The action for rescission must be
commenced within four years from that date, May
3, 1967. Since the complaint for rescission was
filed on August 16, 1968, the four year period
within which the action must be commenced had
not expired.
10. G.R. No. 72727, July 30, 1987
BENITO DILAG, SUSETTE DILAG, SUSSIE
DILAG and SUSAN DILAG vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
AND
MARCIANO
ARELLANO
Facts:
Marciano Arellano, as parent of the late Herminio
Arellano who had died in a vehicular accident
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
or service
supplied.)
by
the
other.
(Emphasis
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Basic Books (Phil.), Inc filed a complaint for
recovery of sum against Emilio Lopez and Isidro
Kintanar. Lopez, as agent of BBPI, received on
consignment various books for sale on
commission basis which he failed to account. In
order to secure the payment thereof, the Lopez
and Kintanar entered into an agreement with the
BBPI wherein they bound themselves, jointly and
severally, to pay but was unable to pay.
Lopez confessed judgment, but Kintanar denied
liability under the contract which, he averred, was
void because it was executed for the purpose of
stifling Lopez' prosecution for estafa. Kintanar
contends that he and Lopez signed it in
consideration of BBPIs promise to "petition the
Court for the absolute dismissal" of the estafa
case against Lopez and that the contract thus
executed is of the type declared to be against
public policy. On the other hand, the Basic Books
argues that the agreement was executed in
settlement of Lopez' account and not in
consideration of the dismissal of the estafa case.
Issue:
Facts:
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Ruling:
Issue:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
TRUSTS
1. G.R. No. L-19012, October 30, 1967
VICTORIA JULIO vs. EMILIANO DALANDAN
and MARIA DALANDAN
Facts:
Clemente
Dalandan,
deceased
father
of
defendants Emiliano and Maria Dalandan,
acknowledged that a four-hectare piece of
riceland in Las Pias, Rizal belonging to Victoriana
Dalandan, whose only child and heir is plaintiff
Victoria Julio, was posted as security for an
obligation which he, Clemente Dalandan,
assumed but, however, failed to fulfill. The result
was that Victoriana's said land was foreclosed.
Clemente Dalandan promised to Victoria Julio a
farm of about four hectares to replace the
aforesaid foreclosed property. An affidavit was
executed by Clemente which herein petitioner
accepted. One of the condition laid were neither
delivery of the land nor the fruits thereof could
immediately be demanded from his children.
After the death of Clemente Dalandan, Victoria
Julio requested from defendants, Clemente's
legitimate and surviving heirs who succeeded in
the possession of the land thus conveyed, to
deliver the same to her; that defendants "insisted
that according to the agreement", neither
delivery of the land nor the fruits thereof could
immediately be demanded, and that "plaintiff
acceded to this contention of defendants and
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
An express trust was made over the properties in
question.
Paragraph 8 of the complaint state: That as the
said two haciendas were then the subject of
certain transactions between the spouses
Eduardo Cuaycong and Clotilde de Leon on one
hand, and Justo and Luis D. Cuaycong on the
other, Eduardo Cuaycong told his brother Justo
and his nephew, defendant Luis D. Cuaycong, to
hold in trust what might belong to his brothers
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Ruling:
OF
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Emilio and Jose Escay, now both deceased, were
brothers. In his lifetime, Emilio mortgaged his
properties now in question, to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). He died before he could pay
his obligation with the bank which had mounted.
The bank then filed a foreclosure suit against the
estate of Emilio represented by the administrator,
Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. Pending the said suit, a
contract hereafter referred to as original
contract was entered among PNB, Jose Escay, Sr.,
and the administrator, Atty. Arboleda, under
which Jose assumed the mortgage indebtedness
of his deceased brother Emilio. This was agreed
to by Magdalena Vda. de Escay, widow of Emilio,
in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of
their children. When it was discovered that the
original contract failed to state the transfer of the
ownership of the properties in question to Jose
Escay, Sr., in consideration of his assumption of
the mortgage indebtedness of Emilio (subject to
the right of repurchase of the heirs of Emilio
within five (5) years after the mortgage
indebtedness
had
been
fully
paid), a
supplementary contract was entered into among
PNB, the administrator, Atty. Arboleda and Jose
Escay, Sr. This was approved by the probate court
taking cognizance of the estate of the deceased
Emilio Escay. Magdalena Vda. de Escay, Roberto
and the other children filed a complaint against
Jose Escay, Sr. and Atty. Arboleda, for the
recovery of the ownership and possession of the
properties in question. This case was provisionally
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not a trust relation arose between the
testate estate of Emilio Escay and under Jose
Escay, Sr.
Ruling:
No. The evidence is clear that the original and
supplementary contracts were the result of a
series of negotiations by the testate estate of
Emilio Escay through its Judicial Administrator
and legal representative; its creditor, the PNB; the
heirs represented by their guardian ad litem,
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
1. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. Since the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope,
Baseliza, Procopio, and Francisca in Lot No. 6180
and Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor
during his marriage with Maria, and there is no
proof that these were acquired with his exclusive
money, the same are deemed conjugal
properties. Not forming part of the conjugal
partnership are: (1) the 1/9 share inherited by
Maria which remained as her exclusive property
pursuant to Article 146 (2) of the Civil Code; (2)
the 1/9 share of Gaudencia which was not sold to
Pastor; and (3) the 1/9 share of Pelagia which was
acquired by Pastor five years after the death of
his wife and which was therefore his exclusive
property. CA should have excluded from the
conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which
Pastor had acquired after his wife's death.
Upon Maria's death, the conjugal partnership of
gains was dissolved. Half of the conjugal
properties, together with Maria's 1/9 hereditary
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
In the double sale of an immovable property
under Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, does
prescription bar an action by the first buyers, who
are in possession of the said property, against the
second buyer for the annulment of a TCT over the
property procured by the latter who has
knowledge of the first sale and who recognizes
the first buyers' possession?
Ruling:
No. The petition of Berico is denied.
Berico's act in causing the cancellation of OCT
No. P-671 and securing a new TCT No. T-1346,
knowing that his transfer certificate included a
property not his but belonging to plaintiff Flores
makes him a holder in bad faith of a certificate
and is not to be accorded the protection of the
law.
TCT No. T-1346 in the name of Lorenzo Berico is
ordered annulled.
Insofar as prescription is concerned, petitioners
(Berico, et al.) may only acquire ownership of the
questioned property assuming that they did
not register the deed of sale in their favor
through extraordinary acquisitive prescription
under Art. 1137 of the Civil Code, and not by
ordinary acquisitive prescription since they
cannot claim just title or good faith.
Finally, the complaint for annulment of title filed
by the private respondents is substantially one
for the Quieting of Title to quiet their title
against a cloud cast by the claim of the
petitioners. It is settled that an action to quiet
title does not prescribe.
3. G.R. No. L-24772, May 27, 1968
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
vs.
Facts:
Philippine
Acetylene
Co.
purchased
from
Alexander Lim a motor vehicle described as
Chevrolet 1969 model for P55K to be paid in
installments. As security for the payment of said
promissory note, the Filinvest Credit executed a
chattel mortgage over the same motor vehicle in
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
vs.
Facts:
Castor Tobias bought on installment a Dodge
truck from Leelin Motors. To answer for his
obligation he executed a promissory note in favor
of the latter, for the sum of P29,070 payable in 36
equal installments with interest at the rate of
12% per annum. To secure payment of the
promissory note, Tobias executed in favor of
Leelin Motors a chattel mortgage on the Dodge
truck.
Leelin Motors indorsed the promissory note and
assigned the chattel mortgage to Industrial
Finance Corporation. As a consequence Tobias
paid 6 installments on the promissory note
directly to Industrial Finance.
When Tobias was in arrear in the payment for
more than 2 installments, Industrial Finance sent
a final demand letter to Tobias for him to either
(a) pay the arrear and balance amounts; or (b)
surrender the Dodge truck.
Tobias responded with a letter saying that he was
voluntarily surrendering the truck to Industrial
Finance for the following reasons: (a) the truck
has been with Leelin Motors ever since the truck
met an accident; (b) there is too much delay in
the repair of said truck because until now the
truck is not yet completely finished; (c) upon
seeing said truck, Tobias is not satisfied with the
repair of the finished portions. In the same letter,
Tobias gave full authority to Industrial Finance to
get said truck at Leelin Motors.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Aquino
vs.
Spelled
Facts:
Mariano Velasco bought from Universal Motors
Corporation a Mercedes-Benz truck on installment
basis. To the balance of the purchase price, he
executed a promissory note and executed a
chattel mortgage over the truck. He defaulted in
his payments and as a consequence Universal
Motors asked him to surrender the truck in
accordance with the term and conditions of the
chattel mortgage contract.
He failed and refused to surrender the truck.
Universal Motors instituted an action in the lower
court to recover the truck as preparatory to
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. As an
alternative, in case the truck could not be
recovered, Universal Motors asked for the
payment, among other things, of the balance of
purchase price plus legal interest.
By virtue of a writ of replevin issued by said
court, Universal Motors was able to re-possess
the truck.
Lower Court held that Universal Motors is entitled
to the possession and Velasco was ordered to pay
Universal Motors the costs of suit plus attorneys
fees. However, it held that all these sums may be
enforced only against the proceeds of the sale of
the truck on the ground that, in proceedings for
foreclosure of mortgages executed on chattels
which have been sold on installments, the
mortgagee is limited to the property included in
the mortgage. Hence, this appeal by Universal
Motors.
Issue:
Whether or not the costs of suit and attorneys
fees are limited to the property included in the
mortgage and thus be enforced only against the
proceeds of the sale of the truck.
Ruling:
No. Velasco should be made to pay the costs of
suit and attorneys fees independently of the
proceeds of the auction sale of truck.
Art. 184 of the Civil Code is NOT applicable in the
case at bar for two reasons: (1) The action
instituted in the lower court was not foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage, but for replevin; and (2)
Amounts adjudged in favor of Universal Motors
were not part of the unpaid balance of the price,
or in the concept of a deficiency judgment, but
were for the expenses of the suit.
This case is for the delivery of personal property
under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The mere
fact that Universal Motors has secured possession
of the truck does not necessarily mean that it will
foreclose the mortgage. Indeed, there is no
showing at all that Universal Motors is causing
the sale thereof at public auction or even in
preparing to do so.
As held in the Tajanlajit & Manila Motors case, it is
the actual sale of the mortgaged chattel that
would bar the creditor from recovering any
unpaid balance.
Justice Aquinos concurring addendum (may
be skipped, for oral purposes):
The action filed by the (mortagagee) was a
collection suit with replevin as a provisional
remedy. The action was not judicial foreclosure of
the (mortagage). Repossession of the truck by
means of replevin was a preliminary step to
extra-judicial foreclosure.
The extrajudicial foreclosure would be conducted
in accordance with Act No. 1508 which indicates
how the proceeds of the sale should be disposed
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not a chattel mortgagee, after opting
to foreclose the mortgage but failing afterwards
to sell the property at public auction, may still
sue to recover the unpaid balance of the
purchase price.
Ruling:
Yes. The instant case is covered by the so-called
"Recto Law", now Art. 1484 of the New Civil Code,
which provides:
"In a contract of sale of personal property
the price of which is payable in
installments, the vendor may exercise any
of the following remedies: (1) Exact
fulfillment of the obligation, should the
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
aforementioned
agreement,
promise
and
undertaking is supported by a consideration
"distinct from the price" stipulated for the sale of
the land. The lower court relied upon Article 1354
of the Civil Code when it presumed the existence
of said consideration, but the said Article only
applies to contracts in general.
However, it is not Article 1354 but the Article
1479 of the same Code which is controlling in the
case at bar because the latters 2nd paragraph
refers to "sales" in particular, and, more
specifically, to "an accepted unilateral promise to
buy or to sell." Since there may be no valid
contract without a cause or consideration, the
promisor is not bound by his promise and may,
accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice of its
withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes,
however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if
accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.
Upon mature deliberation, the Court reiterates
the doctrine laid down in the Atkins case and
deemed abandoned or modified the view adhered
to in the Southwestern Company case.
9. G.R. No. L-35272, August 26, 1977
FLORENCIA
CRONICO,
substituted
by
LUCILLE E. VENTURANZAvs.J. M. TUASON &
CO., INC., and CLAUDIO R. RAMIREZ
Facts:
JM Tuason was the registered owner of Lot 22.
Florencio Cronico offered to buy the lot from JM
Tuason with the help of Mary Venturanza. Cronico
was required to present proofs of her rights to the
lot, and indeed presented certain documents
showing her priority rights to buy the lot. Claudio
Ramirez also learned that said lot was being sold.
Both Cronico and Ramirez then sent individual
letters to JM Tuason expressing their desire to
purchase the land and requested information
concerning the area, the price, and other terms
and conditions of the contract to sell. JM Tuason
sent separate reply letters to the prospective
buyers. Cronico was able to obtain the letter the
next day and thus presented the letter to the
Head of the Real Estate Department of JM Tuason;
and requested Venturanza to issue a check as
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
to
buy
vs.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Maximo Abarquez made known through this
agreement that for the services rendered by Atty.
Alberto B. Fernandez, who is his lawyer, that if
the appeal is won up to the Supreme Court, the
former promise and guaranteed that if he won he
would give to said lawyer one-half (1/2) of what
he may recover from the estate of his father in
Lots No. 5600 and 5602 which are located at
Bulacao Pardo, City of Cebu.
The case having been resolved and title having
been issued to Abarquez, Atty. Fernandez waited
for petitioner to comply with his obligation under
the document executed by him on June 10, 1961
by delivering the one-half () portion of the said
parcels of land. Abarquez refused to comply with
his obligation and instead offered to sell the
whole parcels of land covered by TCT No. 31841
to petitioner-spouses Juan Larrazabal and Marta
C. de Larrazabal. Upon being informed of the
Issue:
Is the validity or nullity of the registration of the
adverse claim of Atty. Fernandez, resolution of
which in turn hinges on the question of whether
or not the contract for a contingent fee, basis of
the interest of Atty. Fernandez, prohibited by the
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code?
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Was the first sale of the property in question
made by Petre Galero in favor of Atty. Benito Laig
void ab initio, for being in violation of Article
1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code?
Ruling:
No. The first sale of the one-half () of the
property in question in favor of Atty. Laig was not
in violation of Art. 1491, paragraph 5. The
prohibition in said article applies only to a sale or
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Both petitioner and respondent Romana Yap Vda.
de Aguilar (substituted by her heirs and
hereinafter referred to as respondent Aguilar), are
adjoining owners of Lot No. 268; that lot 268 was
sold by the Pestejos to respondent Aguilar; that
prior to the sale of lot 268, petitioner tried to
exercise her right of pre- emption over the said
lot, as early as 1963, from respondents Pestejos
as a portion of her ancestral home occupies a
part of the same, but she failed as the price
demanded was exorbitant and was fixed at
P9,000.00; that sometime in July 1971,
respondent Aguilar bought lot 268 from her corespondents, the Pestejos, for only P1,500.00;
that immediately upon learning of the sale of lot
268, petitioner sought the redemption of the
property in her favor from the private
respondents but it was flatly denied.
Plaintiff has part of her house standing on the
same lot. The defendants also claim the lot but
have no improvement standing thereon.
Issue:
Who has the preferential right of pre-emption or
redemption among the contending adjoining
owners in regard to their intended use of the land
in question?
Ruling:
Petitioner has the preferential right of preemption and/or redemption over Lot 268 as
against private respondent Aguilar.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU COLLEGE OF LAWPage 95
LLB 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
No. The law grants unto the co-owner of a
property the right of redemption. But in so
granting that right, the law intended that the
offer must be valid and effective, accompanied by
an actual tender of an acceptable redemption
price;
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the
appellees had offered only P10,000.00 in check
with which to redeem the property with a promise
to pay the balance by means of a loan which they
would apply for and obtain from the bank. We
hold that the offer was not in pursuance of a legal
and effective exercise of the right of redemption
as contemplated by law; hence, refusal of the
offer on the part of the appellants is justified. The
conditions precedent for the valid exercise of the
right do not exist.
We are now asked by petitioners Conejero to
reverse and set aside the foregoing decision of
the Court of Appeals, on the basis of two
propositions advanced by them, to wit: (a) that
no written notice of the sale to the Raffians
having been given by Enrique Torres to his sister
and co-owner, Paz T. de Conejero, the latter's
light to exercise legal redemption has not
expired, in fact, it has not even started to run;
and (b) that in legal redemption no tender of the
redemption price is required, mere demand to
allow redemption being sufficient to preserve the
redemptioner's right.
With regard to the written notice, we agree with
petitioners that such notice is indispensable, and
that, in view of the terms in which Article of the
Philippine Civil Code is couched, mere knowledge
of the sale, acquired in some other manner by the
redemptioner, does not satisfy the statute. The
written notice was obviously exacted by the Code
to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms
and its validity, and to quiet any doubts that the
alienation is not definitive. The statute not having
provided for any alternative, the method of
notification prescribed remains exclusive.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
The
indispensability
of
notice
of
cancellation to the buyer was to be later
underscored in Republic Act No. 65856,
entitled "An Act to Provide Protection to
Buyers of Real Estate on Installment
Payments."
which
took
effect
on
September 14-15). when it specifically
provided:
Ruling:
Yes. The decision in the recent case of Palay, Inc.
vs. Clave, G.R. No. L-56076, September 21, 1983,
124 SCRA 7,1969, factions the resolution of the
controversy. In deciding whether the rescission of
the contract to sell a subdivision lot after the lot
buyer has failed to pay several installments was
valid, the Court said:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
1. Affirmative.
At all events, under Article 1678, it is the lessor
who is given the option, upon termination of the
lease contract, either to appropriate the useful
improvements by paying one-half of their value at
that time, or to allow the lessee to remove the
improvements. This option solely belongs to the
lessor as the law is explicit that [s]hould the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. It appears that the lessor has opted not
to reimburse.
2. G.R. No. 171891, February 24, 2009
HERNANIA "LANI" LOPEZ vs. GLORIA UMALECOSME
Facts:
Umale-Cosme is the owner of an apartment
building at 15 Sibuyan Street, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, while the Lopez is a lessee of one of
the units therein. She was paying a monthly rent
ofP1,340.00 as of 1999.
No written contract of lease existed between
Umale-Cosme and Lopez. The rent was paid by
Lopez to Umale-Cosme on a month-to-month
basis. Umale-Cosme sent written notices of
termination of lease and to vacate to Lopez.
Lopez, however, refused to vacate. Umale-Cosme
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Lopez on the ground of termination of the lease.
Lopez argued that the contract of lease between
her and Umale-Cosme lacked a definite period
and, therefore, she may not be evicted on the
ground of termination of period.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the contract of lease had a
period.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease has
already expired.
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
PHOENIX
ASSURANCE
MACONDRAY & CO., INC.
Facts:
COMPANY
vs.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Affirmative.
Facts:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
that it would pay only P100 for any lost item not
initially declared.
LA MALLORCAvs.HONORABLE COURT
APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL.
Issue:
Facts:
Ruling:
Affirmative PAL, being a common carrier, is
liable.
Its contention that the liability limitation to P100
cannot be enforced. The Court ruled that there is
nothing wrong in limiting the liability but first
there must be a contract which is just and
reasonable under the circumstances and must
fairly be agreed upon, citing Art. 1750 of the Civil
Code.
In this case, the print at the back of the ticket
was so small and there was no signature at the
back of the ticket to manifest a fairly agreed
contract. Hence, PAL is liable for the whole
amount of the objects although they were not
initially declared.
To establish negligence, the Court based its ruling
on Arts. 1734 and 1735 of the Civil Code, which
provide for is an exclusive enumeration where
common carriers are exempted from liability.
These are the following:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or
other natural disaster
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
goods
4. The character of the goods or defects in
the packing or in containers; and
5. Order or act of competent public
authorities.
Since in the case at bar, none of these fall in the
categories cited, PAL is considered negligent and
liable.
4. G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966
OF
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Herminio L. Nocum, who was a passenger in
appellants Bus No. 120 then making a trip within
the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna,
was injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said
bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a copassenger. The findings of fact of the trial court
are not assailed. The appeal is purely on legal
questions.
Appellee has not filed any brief. All that the Court
had was the appellant's brief which contained this
assignment of error: Based on the facts the lower
court found as established, it erred as a matter of
law in not absolving appellant from liability
resulting from the explosion of firecrackers
contained in a package, the contents of which
were misrepresented by a passenger.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff upon
the main basis that appellant did not observe the
extraordinary or utmost diligence of a very
cautious person required by Articles 1733, 1755
and 1756 of the Civil Code. It stated that the
service manual of the common carrier prohibits
the employees to allow explosives, such as
dynamite and firecrackers to be transported on
its buses. To implement this particular rule for
'the safety of passengers, it was therefore
incumbent upon the employees of the company
to make the proper inspection of all the baggages
which are carried by the passengers.
It further discussed the unlikeliness of the
accident to be one caused by a fortuitous event
since to be considered as caso fortuito, the cause
of the unexpected event must be independent of
the will of man or something which cannot be
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
upon,
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes. The provisions of the Civil Code on this
question of liability are clear and explicit. Article
1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature of
their business and by reasons of public policy, ...
to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance ... for the safety of the passengers
transported by them according to all the
circumstances of each case." Article 1755
establishes the standard of care required of a
common carrier, which is, "to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all
the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the burden
of proof by providing that "in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that
"the responsibility of a common carrier for the
safety of passengers ... cannot be dispensed with
or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of
notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The prescribed airway of plane that afternoon
with Capt. de Mesa, as the pilot, was IloiloRomblon-Manila, denominated as airway "Amber
l," and the prescribed elevation of the flight was
6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the
designated route because it was some 30 miles
to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco.
According to defendant's witness, Ramon A.
Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have not
happened had the pilot continued on the route
indicated. Assistant Director Cesar Mijares of the
Facts:
On January 8, 1951, respondent flew as co-pilot
on a regular flight with Captain Delfin
Bustamante as commanding pilot of a plane
belonging to defendant Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
now the herein petitioner; that on attempting to
land the plane at Daet airport, Captain
Bustamante due to his very slow reaction and
poor judgment overshot the airfield and as a
result, notwithstanding the diligent efforts of the
plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the airplane
crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt
caused the head of the plaintiff to hit and break
through the thick front windshield of the airplane
causing him severe brain concussion, wounds and
abrasions on the forehead with intense pain and
suffering.
Defendant instead of giving plaintiff expert and
proper medical treatment called for by the nature
and severity of his injuries, defendant simply
referred him to a company physician, a general
medical practitioner, who limited the treatment to
the exterior injuries without examining the severe
brain concussion of plaintiff; that several days
after the accident, defendant Philippine Air Lines
called back the plaintiff to active duty as co-pilot,
and inspite of the latters repeated request for
expert medical assistance, defendant had not
given him any; that as a consequence of the
brain injury sustained by plaintiff from the crash,
he had been having periodic dizzy spells and had
been suffering from general debility and
nervousness; that defendant airline company
instead of submitting the plaintiff to expert
medical treatment, discharged the latter from its
employ on grounds of physical disability, thereby
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their
daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3)
airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA). The
tickets
of
the
spouses
were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their
daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of
their reservations for said flight. On the appointed
date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter checked an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight but were placed on the wait-list
because the number of passengers who checked
in before them had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Facts:
INSURANCE
&
SURETY
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU COLLEGE OF LAWPage 118
LLB 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Facts:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction
over the matter to conduct judicial review.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot
rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was
ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would
be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the
only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the
place indicated in the Convention such as in San
Francisco, USA.
The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of
Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In the
first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by
the
legislative
and
the
executive.
The
presumption is that it was first carefully studied
and determined to be constitutional before it was
adopted and given the force of law in this country.
In this case, Santos was not able to offer any
compelling
argument
to
overcome
the
presumption.
16. G.R. No. L-42926, September 13, 1985
PEDRO VASQUEZ, SOLEDAD ORTEGA, CLETO
B. BAGAIPO, AGUSTINA VIRTUDES, ROMEO
VASQUEZ and MAXIMINA CAINAYvs.THE
COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS PIONEER
LINES, INC.
Facts:
When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu"
left the Port of Manila in the early morning of May
15, 1966 bound for Cebu, it had on board the
spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo
and a four-year old boy, Mario Marlon Vasquez,
among her passengers. The MV "Pioneer Cebu"
encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a reef
on the southern part of Malapascua Island,
located somewhere north of the island of Cebu
and subsequently sunk. The aforementioned
passengers were unheard from since then.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association, a civicnon-profit association, incorporated under the
Corporation Law, decided to construct an office
building on its 840 square meters lot located at
the comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets,
Intramuros, Manila. The construction was
undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. on an
"administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan
J. Carlos, the president and general manager of
said corporation. The proposal was approved by
plaintiff's board of directors and signed by its
president Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant
in this case. The plans and specifications for the
building were prepared by the other third-party
defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building
was completed in June, 1966.
Issues:
1. Whether or not it is a fortuitous event.
2. Whether or not respondents are liable.
Ruling:
1. No. It is not a caso fortuito. The elements to
consider in sustaining a case of caso fortuito are
the following:
1) the event must be independent of the human
will,
2) the occurrence must render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner,
3) the obligor must be free of participation in,
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor,
2. Petitioners are liable as it is not a caso
fortutito. There is no caso fortuito when the ship
captain proceeded en route despite a typhoon
advice close to the area where the vessel will
pass. Moreover, the Board of Marines inquiry
conclusion that the ship captain was not
negligent is not binding on the Court when said
finding is not complete. The liability of the ship
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
CONTRACT FOR A PIECE OF WORK
1. G.R. No. L-47851, October 3, 1986
JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL
vs.THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
UNITED
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J.
CARLOS,
and
the
PHILIPPINE
BAR
ASSOCIATION
Facts:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lumauig was
Ruling:
Issue:
Issue:
Ruling:
Their liability is pro-rata pursuant to Article 1816
of the Civil Code. But it should be noted that
since there were 5 partners when the purchase
was made in behalf of the partnership, the
liability of each partner should be 1/5th (of the
companys obligation) each. The fact that the
complaint against Lumauig was dismissed, upon
motion of the Island Sales, does not unmake
Lumauig as a general partner in the company. In
so moving to dismiss the complaint, Island Sales
merely condoned Lumauigs individual liability to
them.
2. G.R. No. L-25532, February 28, 1969
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.
WILLIAM J. SUTER and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS
Facts:
Facts:
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU COLLEGE OF LAWPage 123
LLB 4 (S.Y. 2015-2016)
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
OPPEN,
ESTEBAN,
INC.
vs.
ISABELA
SAWMILL, MARGARITA G. SALDAJENO and
her husband CECILIO SALDAJENO LEON
GARIBAY, TIMOTEO TUBUNGBANUA, and THE
PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF
OF
NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, defendants, MARGARITA G.
SALDAJENO and her husband CECILIO
SALDAJENO
Facts:
Petitioners filed in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental against Respondents a
complaint praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the Sheriff from proceeding
with the sales at public auction, and to declare
null and void the Chattel Mortgage executed by
defendants in favor of defendant Saldajeno, being
in fraud of creditors of the defendant partnership.
Defendants Leon Garibay, Margarita G. Saldejeno,
and Timoteo Tubungbanua had entered into a
Contract of Partnership under the firm name
"Isabela Sawmill. Civil Case No. 4797 was filed
by the spouses Cecilio Saldajeno and Margarita G.
Saldajeno against the Isabela Sawmill, Leon
Garibay, and Timoteo Tubungbanua. The same
defendants executed a document entitled
"Assignment of Rights with Chattel Mortgage".
Thereafter, the defendants Leon Garibay and
Timoteo Tubungbanua did not divide the assets
and properties of the "Isabela Sawmill" between
them, despite the withdrawal of defendant
Saldajeno, they continued the business of said
partnership under the same firm name "Isabela
Sawmill".
Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental executed a
Certificate of Sale in favor of the defendant
Margarita G. Saldajeno, as a result of the sale
conducted for the enforcement of the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 5223 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants. Thereafter,
defendants appealed to the CA. CA certified the
records of this case to the Supreme Court
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental did
no err in exercising jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
5343.
Appellants contention is devoid of merit because
all the plaintiffs also asked for the nullity of the
assignment of right with chattel mortgage
entered into by and between Margarita G.
Saldajeno and her former partners Leon Garibay
and Timoteo Tubungbanua. This cause of action is
not capable of pecuniary estimation and falls
under the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance. Where the basic issue is something
more than the right to recover a sum of money
and where the money claim is purely incidental to
or a consequence of the principal relief sought,
the action is as a case where the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation
and is cognizable exclusively by the Court of First
Instance.
The jurisdiction of all courts in the Philippines, in
so far as the authority thereof depends upon the
nature of litigation, is defined in the amended
Judiciary Act, pursuant to which courts of first
instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over any case the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. An action for the
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Issue:
Whether or not the foreclosure by the Bank under
its power of sale is barred upon death of the
debtor, because agency is extinguished by the
death of the principal.
Ruling:
No. The ruling in Pasno vs. Ravina not having
been reiterated in any other case, We have
carefully reexamined the same after mature
deliberation have reached the conclusion that the
dissenting opinion is more in conformity with
reason and law. Of the three alternative courses
that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the
mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the
mortgage and claim the entire debt from the
estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2)
to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove
any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to
rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the
same at any time before it is barred by
prescription, without right to file a claim for any
deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno vs.
Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually
wipes out the third alternative conceded by the
Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would
precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by
contrast with the second alternative. This result
we do not consider warranted by the text of the
Rules; and, in addition, the recognition of
creditor's right to foreclose extra-judicially
presents undoubted advantages for the estate of
the mortgagor, as pointed out by the dissenting
opinion in Pasno vs. Ravina, supra. In the light of
these considerations, we have decided to
overrule the majority decision in said case, and
uphold the right of the mortgage creditor to
foreclose extra-judicially in accordance with
section 7, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules (old Rule
87).
The argument that foreclosure by the Bank under
its power of sale is barred upon death of the
debtor, because agency is extinguished by the
death of the principal, under Article 1732 of the
Civil Code of 1889 and Article 1919 of the Civil
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
CARRIED
LUMBER
COMPANY
vs.AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT
AND
COOPERATIVE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION
(ACCFA)
Facts:
Sta. Barbara Farmers Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. (Facoma) purchased on credit
from the lumber company materials used in the
construction of its warehouse. Facoma made
partial payments but was unable to pay the whole
amount due. Thus, a suit for recovery of the
amount was filed by the lumber comp against
Facoma and obtained a writ of execution over the
warehouse and ricemill building.
However, here comes ACCFA alleging that said a
mortgage over the same warehouse plus the
improvements on a certain parcel of lot was
already extra-judicially foreclosed for Facomas
failure to pay the loan contracted by it from
ACCFA.
Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
lumber company ruling that it had a preferential
lien over the warehouse and ricemill of Facoma
than ACCFA. ACCFA, contends, however, that the
company waived its lien when it filed an ordinary
action to recover its claim instead of enforcing its
lien.
Issue:
Whether or not the materialmans/mechanics
lien (lumber companys lien) is superior to that of
the mortgage lien (ACCFAs lien).
Ruling:
The materialmans lien is not superior to that of a
mortgage lien.
It is not correct to say that the materialmans
(mechanics) lien or refectionary credit of the
lumber company, being listed as No. 4 in article
2242, is superior to the ACCFAs mortgage credit
which is listed as No. 5. The enumeration in
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Facts:
Issue:
In
the
voluntary
insolvency
proceedings
commenced in May 1977 by private respondent
Quality Tobacco Corporation (the "Insolvent"), the
following claims of creditors were filed:
i. P2,806,729.92, by the USTC Association of
Employees and workers Union-PTGWO
USTC as separation pay for their members.
ii. P53,805.05 by the Federacion de la
Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores
de Filipinas ("FOITAF), as separation pay
Ruling:
We are unable to subscribe to the view urged by
the Solicitor General.
The resolution of the issue of priority among the
several claims filed in the insolvency proceedings
instituted by the Insolvent cannot, however, rest
on a reading of Article 110 of the labor Code
alone. Rather, Article 110 must be read in relation
to the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the
classification, concurrence and preference of
credits,
which
provisions
find
particular
application in insolvency proceedings where the
claims of all creditors, preferred or non-preferred,
may be adjudicated in a binding manner.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Ruling:
DBP correctly points out that its mortgage lien
should not be classified as a preferred credit. The
issue raised was settled in Republic vs. Peralta
(150 SCRA 37 [1987]) and reinforced in DBP vs.
NLRC (183 SCRA 328 [1990]) wherein we held
because of its impact on the entire system of
credit, Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot be
viewed in isolation but must be read in relation to
the Civil Code scheme on classification and
preference of credits. Thus, a distinction should
be made between a preference of credit or a lien.
A preference applies only to claims which do not
attach to specific properties, A lien creates a
charge on a particular property. The right of first
preference as regards unpaid wages recognized
by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the
property of the insolvent debtor in favor of
workers. It is but a preference of credit in their
favor, a preference in application. It is a method
adopted to determine and specify the order in
which credits should be paid in the final
distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent's
assets. It is a right to a first preference in the
discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor.
In fine, the right to preference given to workers
under Article 110 of the Labor Code cannot exist
in any effective way prior to the time of its
presentation in distribution proceedings. It will
find application when, in proceedings such as
insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be paid in
full before the "claims of the Government and
other creditors" may be paid. . . . (DBP vs, NLRC,
supra; pp. 337-339.)
The NLRC, therefore, erred in holding DBP liable
"to the extent of the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale." And making such liability dependent on a
bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings is really
beside the point, for these proceedings are
relevant only to preferred credits, which is not the
situation in the case at bar. To equate DBP's
mortgage lien with a preferred credit would be to
render inutile the protective mantle of the
mortgage in DBP's favor and thus in the process
wreak havoc to commercial transactions.
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent
Lynn
Abing, Patrick
Caputol, Danica Patricia
Cortes, Angeli Victoria
Magdoza, Bregette
Maglasang, Laarni
Niere, Sherlyn
Tirado, Adrianne
Tomonglay, Noel
Ursal,
April
Tabuag,
Vincent