Implied Consent: See US vs Ruiz(C) after Santiago vs Rep

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31635 August 31, 1971

ANGEL MINISTERIO and ASUNCION SADAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Fourth Branch, Presided by the Honorable, Judge JOSE C.
BORROMEO, THE PUBLIC HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER, and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Eriberto Seno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting First Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
What is before this Court for determination in this appeal by certiorari to review a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu is the question of whether or not plaintiffs, now petitioners, seeking the just
compensation to which they are entitled under the Constitution for the expropriation of their property
necessary for the widening of a street, no condemnation proceeding having been filed, could sue defendants
Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials without thereby
violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent. The lower court, relying on what
it considered to be authoritative precedents, held that they could not and dismissed the suit. The matter was
then elevated to us. After a careful consideration and with a view to avoiding the grave inconvenience, not to
say possible injustice contrary to the constitutional mandate, that would be the result if no such suit were
permitted, this Court arrives at a different conclusion, and sustains the right of the plaintiff to file a suit of this
character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dated April 13, 1966,
sought the payment of just compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of 1045 square meters,
alleging that in 1927 the National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and
material possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City,
without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. There was an
allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that
on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved Resolution No. 90, appraising the
reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00.

Thereafter, the complaint was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in the
alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just compensation.
In the answer filed by defendants, now respondents, through the then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice,
Antonio P. Barredo, the principal defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the
government and therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11, 1969, the
parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs are the registered owners of Lot 647B of the Banilad estate described in the Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters; That the
National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate, and used the same for the widening
of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965
fixing the price of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the possession of the
National Government the same being utilized as part of the Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National
Government has not as yet paid the value of the land which is being utilized for public use." 1
The lower court decision now under review was promulgated on January 30, 1969. As is evident from the
excerpt to be cited, the plea that the suit was against the government without its consent having been
manifested met with a favorable response. Thus: "It is uncontroverted that the land in question is used by the
National Government for road purposes. No evidence was presented whether or not there was an agreement
or contract between the government and the original owner and whether payment was paid or not to the
original owner of the land. It may be presumed that when the land was taken by the government the payment
of its value was made thereafter and no satisfactory explanation was given why this case was filed only in 1966.
But granting that no compensation was given to the owner of the land, the case is undoubtedly against the
National Government and there is no showing that the government has consented to be sued in this case. It
may be contended that the present case is brought against the Public Highway Commissioner and the Auditor
General and not against the National Government. Considering that the herein defendants are sued in their
official capacity the action is one against the National Government who should have been made a party in this
case, but, as stated before, with its consent." 2
Then came this petition for certiorari to review the above decision. The principal error assigned would impugn
the holding that the case being against the national government which was sued without its consent should be
dismissed, as it was in fact dismissed. As was indicated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, this
assignment of error is justified. The decision of the lower court cannot stand. We shall proceed to explain why.
1. The government is immune from suit without its consent. 3 Nor is it indispensable that it be the party
proceeded against. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it liable, the doctrine calls for application. It
follows then that even if the defendants named were public officials, such a principle could still be an effective
bar. This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial responsibility for the government, whether
in the disbursements of funds or loss of property. Under such circumstances, the liability of the official sued is
not personal. The party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-suability
may be interposed. 4
So it has been categorically set forth in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez: 5 "However, and this is important, where the
judgment in such a case would result not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said
citizen but also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit should be regarded as
one against the government itself, and, consequently, it cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts
except with the consent of said Government." 6

2. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary
to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of
the Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean: 7 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it
has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and
property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he
does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent." 8
3. It would follow then that the prayer in the amended complaint of petitioners being in the alternative, the
lower court, instead of dismissing the same, could have passed upon the claim of plaintiffs there, now
petitioners, for the recovery of the possession of the disputed lot, since no proceeding for eminent domain, as
required by the then Code of Civil Procedure, was instituted. 9 However, as noted in Alfonso v. Pasay
City, 10 this Court speaking through Justice Montemayor, restoration would be "neither convenient nor
feasible because it is now and has been used for road purposes." 11 The only relief, in the opinion of this Court,
would be for the government "to make due compensation, ..." 12 It was made clear in such decision that
compensation should have been made "as far back as the date of the taking." Does it result, therefore, that
petitioners would be absolutely remediless since recovery of possession is in effect barred by the above
decision? If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public
use 13 were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." 14 If there were
an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is
unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government
would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part
of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government
takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then
that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. 15
Accordingly, the lower court decision is reversed so that the court may proceed with the complaint and
determine the compensation to which petitioners are entitled, taking into account the ruling in the above
Alfonso case: "As to the value of the property, although the plaintiff claims the present market value thereof,
the rule is that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should
be the price or value at the time that it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government." 16
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of January 30, 1969 dismissing the complaint is reversed and the case
remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Barredo, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Petition, Annex H, pp. 1 and 2.
2 Ibid, Annex I, p.4.
3 Cf. Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic, L-26386, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 598;
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. United States Lines Co., L-26533, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 309;
Switzerland General Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Republic, L-27389, March 30, 1970; 32 SCRA
227.
4 Cf. Begosa v. Chairman Philippine Veterans Administration, L-25916, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA
466, citing Ruiz v. Cabahug, 102 Phil. 110 (1957) and Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949).
5 84 Phil. 312 (1949) affirmed in Marvel Building Corp. v. Phil. War Damage Commission, 85 Phil.
27 (1949) and Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954). Such a doctrine goes back to Tan Te v. Bell,
27 Phil. 354 (1914). Cf. L. S. Moon v. Harrison, 43 Phil 27 (1922).
6 Ibid., p. 319.
7 L-31135, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 368.
8 Ibid., pp. 377-378.
9 Act No. 190 (1901). According to Section 241 of such Code: "The Government of the
Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any
person, or public or private corporation having by law the right to condemn private property for
public use shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed." The next section
reads: "The complaint in condemnation proceedings shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, and describe the property sought to be condemned, showing the interest of
each defendant separately." Sec. 242.
10 106 Phil. 1017 (1960).
11 Ibid., p. 1022.
12 Ibid.
13 "According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Constitution: "Private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation."
14 Section 247 of Act No. 190 reads in full: "Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of
compensation as fixed by the judgment, or after tender to him of the amount so fixed and
payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment. In case the
defendant and his attorney absent themselves from the court or decline to receive the same,

payment may be made to the clerk of the court for him, and such officer shall be responsible on
his bond therefor and shall be compelled to receive it."
15 Cf. Merrit v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311 (1916); Compania General de
Tabacos v. Government, 45 Phil. 663 (1924); Salgado v. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724 (1937); Bull v. Yatco,
67 Phil. 728 (1939); Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281 (1952) ; Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
95 Phil. 905 (1954); Angat River Irrigation v. Angat River Workers' Union, 102 Phil. 789 (1957);
Concepcion, J., diss.; Lyons, Inc. v. United States of America, 104 Phil. 593 (1958); Mobil
Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA
1120; Hartford Insurance Co. v. P. D. Marchessini & Co., L-24544, November 15, 1967, 21 SCRA
860; Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. v. Maersk Line Far East Service, L-27189, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 519; Insurance Co. of North America v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, L-22784, March 28, 1969, 27
SCRA 780; Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, L-26386, Sept.
30, 1969, 29 SCRA 598.
16 Alfonso v. Pasay City, 106 Phil. 1017, 1022-1023 (1960).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendantsappellees.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu
City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor
of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square
meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very
narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was
begun in 1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was
transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959
upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of
land traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages
in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P25,000.00,
attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the
complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the
claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the
recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action
being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis
since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was
the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue,
plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial
court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the government; and
that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure
a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us,
there being no question of fact involved.
The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a
portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent. We there said: .
... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public
use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily
dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for

perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by
the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment
of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such
payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were
an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law
requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that
there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public
use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained,
it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.
Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and
that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However,
since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this
time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to
make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation
for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of
the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the
government should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after
hearing.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the
determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above
indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes
* Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 12.
1 G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971 (40 SCRA 464).
2 Alfonso vs. City of Pasay (106 Phil. 1017).
3 Alfonso vs. City of Pasay, supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48214 December 19, 1978
ILDEFONSO SANTIAGO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ALFREDO T. SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director, Bureau of Plant
Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, respondent,
Ahmad D. Sahak for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M.
Martinez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The first impression yielded by a perusal of this petition for certiorari is its inherent weakness considering the
explicit provision in the present Constitution prohibiting a suit against the Republic without its consent. 1 Here
petitioner Ildefonso Santiago 2 filed on August 9, 1976 an action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
City naming as defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Director of the
Bureau of Plant Industry. 3 His plea was for the revocation of a deed of donation executed by him and his
spouse in January of 1971, 4 with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the donee. As alleged in such complaint, such
Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water system on the
property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974. 5 That led him to conclude that under
the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance with such an explicit constitutional command. The lower
court, in the order challenged in this petition, was of a different view. It sustained a motion to dismiss on the
part of the defendant Republic of the Philippines, now named as one of the respondents, the other
respondent being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II. It premised such an order on the
settled "rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent. This is so, because the New Constitution of the
Philippines expressly provides that the state may not be sued without its consent. 6 Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza, 7 in the com ment on the petition filed with this Court, is for the affirmance of the order of dismissal
of respondent Court precisely to accord deference to the above categorical constitutional mandate.
On its face, such a submission carries persuasion. Upon further reflection, this Tribunal is impressed with the
unique aspect of this petition for certiorari, dealing as it does with a suit for the revocation of a donation to
the Republic, which allegedly fatted to conform with what was agreed to by the donee. If an order of dismissal
would suffice, then the element of unfairness enters, the facts alleged being hypothetically admitted. It is the
considered opinion of this Court then that to conform to the high dictates of equity and justice, the
presumption of consent could be indulged in safely. That would serve to accord to petitioner as plaintiff, at the
very least, the right to be heard. certiorari lies.

1. This is not to deny the obstacle posed by the constitutional provision. It is expressed in language plain and
unmistakable: "The State may not be sued without its consent. 8 The Republic cannot be proceeded against
unless it allows itself to be sued. Neither can a department, bureau, agency, office, or instrumentality of the
government where the suit, according to the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro in Del Mar v. Philippine
Veterans Administration, 9 may result "in adverse consequences to the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property. 10 Such a doctrine was reiterated in the following cases: Republic v.
Villasor, 11 Sayson v. Singson, 12 Director of the Bureau of Printing v. Francisco, 13 and Republic v. Purisima. 14
2. It is contended by counsel for petitioner that the above constitutional provision would be given a
retroactive application in this case if the suit for the revocation of donation were dismissed. That is not the
case at all. InRepublic v. Purisima, this Court made clear that such a basic postulate is part and parcel of the
system of government implanted in the Philippines from the time of the acquisition of sovereignty by the
United States, and therefore, was implicit in the 1935 Constitution even in the absence of any explicit
language to that effect. This it did in a citation from Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the
Philippines: 15 "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates
the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. Nor is this all. Even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not
obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. 16 That is the
teaching of the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, 17 promulgated
in December of 1966. As a matter of fact, the Switzerland General Insurance Co. decision was the thirtyseventh of its kind after Mobil. Clearly, then, the contention that to dismiss the suit would be to give the
applicable constitutional provision a retroactive effect is, to put it at its mildest, untenable.
3. Petitioner's counsel invoked Santos v. Santos, 18 a 1952 decision. A more thorough analysis ought to have
cautioned him against reliance on such a case. It was therein clearly pointed out that the government entity
involved was originally the National Airports Corporation. Thereafter, it "was abolished by Executive Order No.
365, series of 1950, and in its place and stead the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created and took over
all the assets and assumed all the liabilities of the abolished corporation. The Civil Aeronautics Administration,
even if it is not a juridical entity, cannot legally prevent a party or parties from enforcing their proprietary
rights under the cloak or shield of lack of juridical personality, because to took over all the powers and
assumed all the obligations of the defunct corporation which had entered into the contract in
question." 19 Then came National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 a 1963
decision, where the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion, as ponente, stated that a government-owned
and controlled corporation "has a personality of its own distinct and separate from that of the government. ...
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation.
(Section 13, Act 1459, as amended). 21 In three recent decisions,Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 22 Philippine National Bank v. Honorable Judge Pabalan,23 and Philippine National Railways v. Union
de Maquinistas, 24 this constitutional provision on non-suability was unavailing in view of the suit being against
a government-owned or controlled corporation. That point apparently escaped the attention of counsel for
petitioner. Hence Santos v. Santos is hardly controlling.
4. It is to be noted further that the trend against the interpretation sought to be fastened in the broad
language of Santos v. Santos is quite discernible. Not long after, in Araneta v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, 25 decided in
1957, it was held that an action [against] Government officials, is essentially one against the
Government, ... . 26 In the same year, this Court, in Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River
Workers 27 Union, after referring to the "basic and fundamental principle of the law that the Government
cannot be sued before courts of justice without its consent," pointed out that "this privilege of non-suability of

the Government" covers with the mantle of its protection "an entity," in this case, the Angat River Irrigation
System. 28 Then, in 1960, came Lim v. Brownell, Jr., 29 where there was a reaffirmation of the doctrine that a
"claim [constituting] a charge against, or financial liability to, the Government cannot be entertained by the
courts except with the consent of said government. 30 Bureau of Printing v. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association 31 came a year later; it reiterated such a doctrine. It was not surprising therefore that in 1966,
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. was decided the way it was. The remedy, where the liability is based on
contract, according to this Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, is for plaintiff to file a claim with the
general office in accordance with the controlling statute, Commonwealth Act No. 327. 32 To repeat, that
doctrine has been adhered to ever since. The latest case in point is Travelers Indemnity Company v. Barber
Steamship Lines, Inc. 33 Justice Aquino's opinion concluded with this paragraph: "It is settled that the Bureau of
Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service,
is immune from suit under the doctrine of non-suability of the State. The claimant's remedy to recover the loss
or damage to the goods under the custody of the customs arrastre service is to file a claim with the
Commission in Audit as contemplated in Act No. 3083 and Commonwealth Act No. 327. 34 With the explicit
provision found in the present Constitution, the fundamental principle of non-suability becomes even more
exigent in its command.
5. The reliance on Santos v. Santos as a prop for this petition having failed, it would ordinarily follow that this
suit cannot prosper. Nonetheless, as set forth at the outset, there is a novel aspect that suffices to call for a
contrary conclusion. It would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, alleged to have violated the
conditions under which it received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put as a barrier the concept of
non-suitability. That would be a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's sense of justice. Such
conduct, whether proceeding from an individual or governmental agency, is to be condemned. As a matter of
fact, in case it is the latter that is culpable, the affront to decency is even more manifest. The government, to
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, should set the example. If it is susceptible to the charge of having acted
dishonorably, then it forfeits public trust-and rightly so.
6. Fortunately, the constitutional provision itself snows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed.
Consent need not be express. It can be implied. So it was more than implied in Ministerio v. Court of First
Instance of Cebu: 35 "The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. 36 The fact that this decision arose from a suit against the Public
Highways Commissioner and the Auditor General for failure of the government to pay for land necessary to
widen a national highway, the defense of immunity without the consent proving unavailing, is not material.
The analogy is quite obvious. Where the government ordinarily benefited by the taking of the land, the failure
to institute the necessary condemnation proceedings should not be a bar to an ordinary action for the
collection of the just compensation due. Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions under which a
donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being
presumed. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that while a donation partakes of a contract, there is no
money claim, and therefore reliance on Commonwealth Act No. 327 would be futile.
7. Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of
its agency being the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such
donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental postulate of non-suability
cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is
the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby
manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the
confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power. The judiciary under this circumstance has the
grave responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law.

Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one of the departments of a
litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command respect and be entitled to acceptance.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is
nullified, set aside and declared to be without force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City,
Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
No costs.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 According to Article XV, Section 16 of the Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent.
2 He is represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alfredo T. Santiago.
3 Ildefonso Santiago v. Republic of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 249 of the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch 11.
4 The exact date is January 20, 1971.
5 Record on Appeal attached in the Petition for Certiorari, Their Amended Complaint, par. 3, 40.
6 Order of October 20, 1977 by respondent Court, through District Judge Alberto V. Seneris 1-2.
This Order was included in the petition without counsel for petitioner taking the trouble of
Identifying it as one of the annexes.
7 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano M.
Martinez.
8 Article XV Section 16 of the Constitution.
9 L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340.
10 Ibid, 345-346. The quotation is from Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,
L-25916, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 466.
11 L-30671, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 466.
12 L-30044, December 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 282.
13 L-31337, December 20, 1973, 54 SCRA 324.
14 L-36084, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 470.
15 L-27389, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 227.

16 Ibid, 228-229.
17 L-23139, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1120.
18 92 Phil. 281.
19 Ibid, 285.
20 118 Phil. 782.
21 Ibid, 788.
22 L-32667, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 314.
23 L-33112, June 15, 1978.
24 L-31948, July 25, 1978.
25 101 Phil. 328.
26 Ibid, 340.
27 102 Phil. 789.
28 Ibid, 801.
29 107 Phil. 344 (1960).
30 Ibid, 351.
31 110 Phil.952 (1961).
32 Cf. 18 Phil. 1120, 1127.
33 L-27019, May 6, 1977, 7 SCRA 10.
34 Ibid, 12.
35 L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464.
36 Ibid, 470.

See US vs Ruiz(C)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners,
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo
City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official
duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once
this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer
than it already has.
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S.
Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval
Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both
employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having been
hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from
permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction was to protest this
conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the
U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the
proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an
autocratic form of supervision."7
In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed
with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter
contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs.
Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to
supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they)
placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear."
On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint)
purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay
was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status
and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr.
"by direction," presumably of Moreau.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo
City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters
contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that
the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal
capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the
acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently,
the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated March 8,
1977, 9 on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in
nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted
maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the
filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was
then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner
Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the
default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some
misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed
by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977.
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the
contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private
capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal
capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate,
the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to
insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in
excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state
but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present
case.
The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious,
decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be
submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to
substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary
restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the
court a quo.
In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from
the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them
to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair
to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience.

Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the
Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for
which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United
States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we
sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain
officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government.
The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of
America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages
filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was
governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court
found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not
prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is
not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other
petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 Moreover, even in the
absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a
direct attack against him-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."
As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with
the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had
even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in
matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and
budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the redesignation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.
Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were,
legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that
government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a
right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover
the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be
held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other
decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but
also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. 15
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. 16 In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet
imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." 17 Our adherence to this
precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous

charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land.
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the
state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be
sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a
deed of sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be
unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated
assurance fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already
available for the purpose; 21 or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by
himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where
the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government
even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state
immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22
This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a
bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he
did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state,
nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's
unauthorized act.
The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The
government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners,
who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself
that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the
presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes
concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 24 This, to, is well settled . 25 Furthermore,
applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are
not punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems
the private respondents have overstated their case.
A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the
petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American
citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this
matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they
were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these
decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own
jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people,
particularly since we became independent in 1946.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from
Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not

place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without
which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice.
The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in
accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the
alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States
government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the
competence to act on the said claim,.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and
September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our
Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquio and Medialdea, JJ., Concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2, 26.
2 Ibid.
3 Id.
4 Id., p. 319.
5 Id., pp. 4, 27, 91.
6 Id., pp. 5, 91.
7 Id., p. 5, 28, 91.
8 Id., pp- 26-34.
9 Id., pp- 90-94.
10 57 SCRA 1.
11 84 Phil. 312.
12 136 SCRA 487.
13 Lim v. Brownell, et al., 107 Phil. 344; Parreo v. McGranery, 92 Phil. 791; Lim v. Nelson, 87
Phil. 328; Marvel Building Corp. v. Philippine War Damage Commission, 85 Phil. 27.

14 Rollo, pp. 35-40.

15 Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, supra; Marvel Building Corp. v. Philippine War Damage
Commission,supra; Lim v. Nelson, supra; Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, 89
Phil. 568; Parreo v. McGranery, supra; Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807-all cited in Baer case;
United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.
16 Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349.
17 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 QB 171.
18 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461.
19 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30: Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
20 Treasurer of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-42805, August 31, 1987.
21 National Development Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 151 SCRA 472.
22 Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, reiterating Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 40
SCRA 464.
23 50 O.G. 1556.
24 Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et al., 109 Phil. 233.
25 Cabungcal, et al. v. Cordova, et al., 11 SCRA 584, cited in Mabutol v. Pascual, 124 SCRA 867;
Mindanao Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814; U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853. 2'
26 Art. 354, par. 1, Revised Penal Code; see also U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; and Deano v.
Godinez, 12 SCRA 843.