Did God stop being timeless by creating the universe?

A theistic criticism to William Lane Craigs

thesis.
By Dante A. Urbina
(21/08/2016 )
William Lane Craig is definitely the best-known Christian philosopher today. This is not only due to
his great academic and intellectual work (other philosophers like Peter Kreeft, Edward Feser, Alvin
Plantinga and Richard Swiburne have an academic and intellectual stature like his), but mainly for
his numerous public debates with atheists. This, of course, makes him highly respected and
appreciated by Christian apologists, and his work is very valuated by many even I have made a
very positive biographical sketch of him in the appendix Siete filsofos: Su encuentro con Dios;
see my book Dios existe?: El libro que todo creyente deber (y todo ateo temer) leer (1).
However, admiration must never become blindness and even less in the philosophical field! Thus,
if there are doubtful or demonstrably wrong issues in Craigs approaches, that should be stated.
Behold intellectual honesty! Even if a philosopher matches ones cosmovision (in this case theism)
that does not imply that all his approaches should be uncritically taken. It is not surprising
therefore that there may be genuine intellectual debates among Christian philosophers. In fact,
even Craig has criticized St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, in the round of questions of his debate
with Sean Carroll! (2) So, it should not be unusual that a Thomist like me expresses his criticism on
certain philosophical approaches as I have done, for example, in some parts of chapter 1 of my
aforementioned book. Hence certain atheists who despise the latter along with my heated
discussion as a mere carbon copy of Craig only show a colossal ignorance on philosophy, if not s
an obvious lack of reading comprehension. Well, entering the field, the point to discuss here is a
particular thesis in which Craig contradicts not only the Thomist theism but the general classical
theism: his understanding of the relationship between God and time. While in classical theism God
is always assumed as necessarily timeless or time transcendent (in my book I have clearly
explained how eternity must not be associated with an infinite time but with a simultaneous
fullness), Craig holds what might be called the thesis of a hybrid God(3) in the sense that God
must be timeless without the universe and temporal with the universe. Is it unbelievable that he
holds this? Lets quote his own words from his most renowned work, Reasonbable Faith: On the
view Ive defended at length elsewhere, God may be conceived to exist timelessly (or in an
undifferentiated time) without the universe and in time from the moment of creation () in virtue
of his causal relation to the temporal universe (4). And if you doubt that he holds that, you can
check in detail in his book Time and Eternity (5) and his academic essay Timelesness and
Omnitemporality (6).
So, lets make the critical analysis. Craig's main argument for his vision is that God becomes
temporal because when creating a temporary universe it is added to Him a real time relationship:

Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He
nonetheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time
in virtue of His real relation to the world (7). Craig outlines his argument as follows:(8)
1. God is creatively active in the temporal world.
2. If God is creatively active in the temporal world, he is really related to the temporal world.
3. If God is really related to the temporal world, he is temporal.
4. Therefore, God is temporal.
Premises 1 and 2 are right. The problem comes with the third premise, which is a non sequitur:
that God has a real relationship with the temporal world does not necessarily imply that he is
temporal. God also has a real relationship with sinners but it does not mean that he is a sinner. Or,
to take a more direct analogy, God has a real relationship with the material world but that does
not lead us to say that he must be material from that relationship. It could be objected: "Ah, but
God must exist in time from creation anyway, because since the creation a temporal succession
occurs and therefore any relationship established also requires temporal succession. But this is
also a non sequitur. To establish a relationship the necessary condition is certain instance of
commensurability between the parties. But this instance does not have to be time: it is more
coherent to argue that it is the being. Both God and creation are. There we have an instance of
commensurability between an atemporal God and a temporal creation (and by the same route the
dilemma of the relationship between an immaterial God and a material creation is solved). Ergo, it
is no necessary that God becomes temporal in order to enter in relationship with creation.
Consequently, Craigs argument is inconclusive.
But does God not perform actions that involve him as existing within time such as miracles or
answering prayers? Yes, he performs these actions, but this does not prove him to be within
time. The application and effects of these actions occur within time with respect to the creatures
but need not to involve the temporality of God as it is perfectly rational to argue that all these
actions are simultaneous and fully in God from eternal pure act. God in His perfect eternity already
knows and has arranged simultaneous action regarding miracles, prayers and others. So at this
point rather than following Craig I prefer to follow the great St. Augustine who says that God is the
eternal Creator of all times,(9) who may not be in any way within time for He is permanent and
unchanging, while on the other hand, if time remains, it would not be time (10). Therefore, as St.
Thomas Aquinas teaches, If verbs are applied to God at different times, it is because eternity
includes all times and not because God suffers changes of present, past or future (11). In
addition, as we do not have any direct timeless theological grammar this way of speaking is due
to limitations of language and not limitations of God. We must also clearly say that God is
absolutely Subsistent in Himself and can not be brought to with creation as acquiring something
that he did not have before. So there is no a before in God's being lacking relationships with
creation or an after when he acquires them.

He does not pass from being not Creator to be Creator based on a momento of creation, but in
his eternal atemporality the effect of a temporal created world is included. As Olsson has stated in
his interesting dissertation: Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two
Classical Divine Attributes: God maintains a relation to the creation as its Creator. But He does
not become the Creator if by becoming one means that an earlier, creation-less interval of His
life connects by way of an and then relation to a later with-creation interval (12). It is about
the creation time goes by, not about the Creator. But it happens that Craig is too committed to the
A-series theory of temporal ordering -according to which there is an objective succession of events
in terms of past, present and future-, and is strongly critical to the B-series theory which the
temporal distinctions are just subjective, being all simultaneous events (13). Now, I tend to agree
with the A-series theory which Craig holds. But understanding that time is something that only
applies to what is created, I do not have to bring God into the same scheme: time is a physical
dimension and God is not a physical object. Thus, given the difference in status between God and
the creation, it is perfectly possible that what in creation appears in terms of objective succession
according to the A-theory of time, appears in the mind of God simultaneously, as analogously to
the points made by the B-theory. However, Craig can insist on absolute temporality of God
bringing up the so-called tensed facts, i.e., events that, according to the A- theory, are given in
an objective temporal location scheme known as such in the mind of God.
Thus he brings into discussion the following reasoning:
1. God is timeless.
2. God is omniscient.
3. A temporal world exists.
4. If a temporal world exists, then if God is omniscient, God knows tensed facts.
5. If God is timeless, He does not know tensed facts.
Then Craig says: Since 2 is essential for theism and 3 is evidently true, 1 must be false (14). I
answer to Craig: Excuse me, but since (1) is true, then (5) is false. And Craigs presupposition is
that since tensed facts can only be known by a temporal being, God must therefore be temporal
(15). But this is not necessarily true, as it is perfectly feasible that God knows timelessly the reality
of temporal events without removing their quality of such neither in their reality as created things
nor in the divine intellect.
As the great Catholic apologist Dave Armstrong pertinently says:
In true eternity (Gods perspective) there is no before and after. Though God experiences and
knows all things outside of time, as now, it doesnt follow that the things themselves are outside
of time. God would, for example, see me typing these very words. To Him it is now; it is

present for Him before it happens () But the fact that He experiences it as now doesnt mean
that it itself is a timeless event. It did happen in earthly time (16).
To put it with an analogy: So that Shakespeare knows the different events that occur in his work of
Romeo and Juliet, does he have necessarily to know them since the time schedule of the work?
No. Shakespeare is in a scheme transcendent to that of the work and can know the course of the
same without getting into the story. Well, it is perfectly consistent to say something similar
about God.
Finally, it should be noted that, apparently, Craig falls into a double standard. Indeed, when it
comes to the future contingent" Craig simply states that God can know them by virtue of his
omniscience without going to problematize questions as if God must become a (or enter a
scheme) future contingent for it. He writes: As perfect, the largest being conceivable, God
simply has essentially knowledge of (...) all truths; future contingent propositions are among the
truths there; therefore God has essential knowledge of future contingent (17). Perfect. Very
good. Here Craig says that God, as a perfect being, () simply possess essentially knowledge ()
of future contingents without problematizing temporality, but why does not he apply the same to
the tensed facts? It is therefore clear that Carigs position is arbitrarily selective.
In any case, regardless of this, it is clear that his thesis of the hybrid God (timeless before
creation, temporal since creation) is inconclusive, and the position of the Thomist theism looks as
sounder posture (To affirm the full atemporality of God)
References:
1. Dante A. Urbina, Dios existe?: El libro que todo creyente deber (y todo ateo temer) leer, Ed.
CreateSpace, Charleston, 2016, pp. 230-234. (http://danteaurbina.com/dios-existe-el-libro-quetodo-creyente-debera-y-todo-ateo-temera-leer/)
2. William Lane Craig vs. Sean Carroll, God and Cosmology, Greer Heard Forum (New Orleans
USA), 21 de febrero del 2014.
3. Cfr. Philip Olsson, Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense Of Two Classical
Divine Attributes, Claremont Graduate University Theses & Dissertations, Paper 38, 2012, pp. 2425.
4. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Ed. Crossway Books, Weathon, 2008, p. 156.
5. William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity, Ed. Crossway Books, Wheaton, 2001.
6. William Lane Craig, Timelessness and Omnitemporality, en: Gregory Ganssle ed., God and
Time: Four Views, IV Press, Downers Grove, 2001.
7. William Lane Craig, Timelessness and Omnitemporality, en: Gregory Ganssle ed., God and
Time: Four Views, op. cit., p. 141.

8. William Lane Craig, Ibdem, p. 141.

9. San Agustn, Confesiones, Lib. XI, cap. 30.
10. San Agustn, Confesiones, Lib. XI, cap. 14, n. 1.
11. Santo Toms de Aquino, Suma Teolgica, Ia, q. 10, art. 2, sol. 4.
12. Philip Olsson, Timelessly Present, Compassionately Impassible: A Defense of Two Classical
Divine Attributes, Claremont Graduate University Theses & Dissertations, Paper 38, 2012, p. 290.
13. William Lane Craig and James Sinclair, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, in: William Lane
Craig and J. P. Moreland eds., The Blackwell Companion To Natural Theology, Blackwell Publishing,
2009, p. 114.
14. William Lane Craig, Omniscience, tensed facts, and divine eternity, Faith and Philosophy, n
17, 2000, pp. 225241.
15. William Lane Craig, Omniscience, tensed facts, and divine eternity, Faith and Philosophy, n
17, 2000, pp. 225241.
16. Dave Armstrong, Theology of God, Lulu Press, 2012, ch. 8.
17. William Lane Craig, What Does God Know? Reconciling Divine Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom, Ed. RZIM, Norcros, 2002, p. 40.