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Module 5
DIFFICULTIES IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION
Lectures (21- 23)
Topics
5.1 Median Voter Theory
5.2 Potential Inefficiency of the Median Voter Outcome
5.3 Inefficiency of the Median Voter Outcome: Intuition
5.4 Representative Democracy: Vote-Maximizing Politicians
5.5 Vote-Maximizing Politicians
5.6 Median Voter Choice: Evidence
5.7 Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
5.8 Complication of Public Provision: Crowd Out
5.9 Optimal Second Best Provision of Public Goods
5.10 The Problem of Crowd-Out
5.11 Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) Model of CrowdOut
5.12 Private Responses to Public Provision: Partial Crowd-Out
5.13 Public Goods with Endogenous Private Provision
5.14 Empirical Evidence on Crowd-Out
5.15 Kingma 1989
5.16 Kingma 1989(Contd)
5.17 Hungerman 2005
1
Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur
NPTEL-Economics-Public Economics
2
Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur
NPTEL-Economics-Public Economics
Module 5
Lecture 21
Topics
5.1 MEDIAN VOTER THEORY
When preferences are single-peaked, then majority voting will deliver a consistent
aggregation of preferences of the individual voters.
The Median Voter Theorem states that majority voting will yield the outcome
preferred by the median voter if preferences are single peaked.
The median voter is the voter whose tastes are in the middle of the set of
voters, so an equal number of other voters prefer more and prefer less of
the public good.
Voting equilibrium is characterized by preferred level of voter whose preferred
level of PG spending is at the median of the distribution
Compute preferred spending for each individual, Gh
Majority voting will select median of distribution of Gh
Figure 21.1
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Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur
NPTEL-Economics-Public Economics
[Note that:
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Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur
NPTEL-Economics-Public Economics
Figure 21.2
A is trying to appeal to those who dont want much education spending, so he
places himself at A1. While B chooses a much higher level of education, B1. In
this case, the candidates split the vote equally.
But now imagine that A changes his position to A2. By doing so, A now gets a
majority of the votes.
But now imagine that B changes his position to B2 in response to A2. By doing so,
B now gets a majority of the votes.
This process will continue until the median voters preferences are arrived at.
5
Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur
NPTEL-Economics-Public Economics
6
Indian Institute Of Technology, Kanpur