Mediterranean Politics

ISSN: 1362-9395 (Print) 1743-9418 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmed20

The EU and the international socialization of

gender equality: a case study of Tunisias AFTURD
and Women and Citizenship (WAC)
Luca Ferreiro Prado
To cite this article: Luca Ferreiro Prado (2016): The EU and the international socialization
of gender equality: a case study of Tunisias AFTURD and Women and Citizenship (WAC),
Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2016.1254956
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1254956

Published online: 14 Nov 2016.

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Date: 14 November 2016, At: 07:22

Mediterranean Politics, 2016

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2016.1254956

The EU and the international socialization of gender

equality: a case study of Tunisias AFTURD and Women
and Citizenship (WAC)
Luca Ferreiro Prado
School of International Relations, Instituto de Empresa University (IEU), Madrid, Spain

ABSTRACT

The paper explores the impact of EU democracy promotion in the area of gender
in Tunisia. It corroborates and adds nuance to the claim found in previous literature
that the EU finances those CSOs whose leadership already embraces gender
equality. It shows that members of these CSOs are socialized to different degrees
and the internalization of gender equality differs depending on age, gender and
location. Already socialized members increased their levels of attachment and
investment. New CSO members differed in their socialization outcomes. Some
undergo a full internalization process, others develop attachment to some features,
while they reject those ideas that do not resonate in their value system. Findings
also show that the EU successfully fosters local ownership in project management.

Introduction
Since the wave of revolutions ignited the MENA region in 2011, Tunisia has been
the only country that has set up a democratic system. It is a common belief
among many European observers that Tunisia is a test case (Bartolucci, 2013)
with a meaningful chance at democratic consolidation (Brzel et al., 2015a: 4).
The EU sees in Tunisia a window of opportunity to bring about stability in the
region through regime change grounded in democracy (Noutcheva, 2014: 21;
Dandashly, 2015).
This article shares the widely held view that stability is the EUs overriding
goal in the Mediterranean having its neighbouring countries conform to its
interests. Scholarly debate centers on the purpose of those expectations. In a
successful effort to go beyond the constructivist-rationalist actorness debate,
Del Sarto argues that the EU is an empire of sorts and that through normbased behavior it is adopting a utility-maximizing strategy (Del Sarto, 2016:
215) characteristic of empires, which tend to behave in pursuit of their interests
and economic benefits vis--vis their borderlands (Del Sarto, 2016: 223). Others

CONTACT Luca Ferreiro Prado

ferreiroprado@gmail.com, lferreiro@faculty.ie.edu

2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

L. FERREIRO PRADO

such as Bicchi, state that the our size fits all foreign policy is better explained
by the EUs experience as a regional organization parlayed as a required form
of behavior for external actors (Bicchi, 2005: 293) and not by its economic or
security interests.
The process of trying to make its neighbours adopt the EUs political idiosyncrasy is carried out through three models of democracy promotion: political conditionality leverage-, democratic assistance linkage- and functional
cooperation networks governance- (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011).1
Linkage has been a constant in the EUs external policies (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig, 2011: 885). It is used to exercise leverage on a range of actors
in society, getting them to influence and pressure their governments (Natorski
& Soler, 2014). The EU strengthens civil society in the target country by using
socialization as an instrument (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011) and by financing CSOs that share its same values (European Commission, 2004). The supposed value match between the EU and the civil society organizations (CSOs)
it finances is taken for granted; the EU has no formal control mechanism to
ensure that it exists.
The article contends the assumption that the EU funds CSOs that already
embrace gender equality. This should mean that no socialization occurs within
the CSO because the members should already be socialized. This article, however, shows that this assumption is too simplistic. While the top levels and charters of such organizations might comply with EU values, this might not be true
of all members and participants or the CSOs target population. So, if we assume
gender equality socialization does, in fact, take place in these CSOs, how extensive is it? My hypothesis is that genuine value socialization takes place within
the CSOs,2 but to different degrees, which raises the further question of which
scope conditions make different socialization outcomes possible.
The idea that organizations can be viewed as sites for socialization of state
agents has been developed by Europeanists and IR constructivists (Checkel,
2005: 807). Existing socialization literature focuses on EU institutions, either at
the macro-level of nation states (Schimmelfenning, 2005, Fernndez Molina,
2013) or the micro-level of state agents,3 such as security organizations (Gheciu,
2005), the European Commission (Hooghe, 2005) the Council of Europe (Beyers,
2005) and governance cooperation (Freyburg, 2011). The micro-level socialization literature has not yet explored value internalization on the recipient side,
nor on individuals that are not state-agents. This article focuses on groups of
activist women that develop projects financed by the EU. Existing scholarship
on the EUs democracy promotion criticized its prioritization of security over
democracy (Brzel et al., 2015: 40), conceptual politics (Kurki, 2013), lack of paradigm shift in its discourse about (Teti et al., 2013) or implementation in (Bicchi
& Voltoroni, 2013) the MENA region after the 2011 revolutions.4 Little academic
attention regarding has been paid to the consistency of the EUs implementation
or to impact of the EU agenda on concrete cases. In addition to examining such

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

an example, this research also considers whether there is an emerging trend

toward community building and partnership (Kourtikakis & Turkina, 2015: 602)
as a result of the learning process the EU has undergone since the Arab Spring,
resulting in minor changes that have increased efficiency on the ground due
to increased local ownership and engagement with actors (Bicchi & Voltolini,
2013: 84).
This work will not engage with the debate on the conceptual politics of the
EUs approach to democracy promotion, nor ask if it is desirable. Theoretically,
I draw on Checkels framework on process tracing (Checkel, 2005) to identify
socialization outcomes and Johnstons methods to observe identity change
(Johnston, 2005: 1034). The aim is to see the degree to which socialization occurs
and the conditions that foster different outcomes.
I draw upon two methods proposed by Johnston for observing identity
change: the intensity of the agents identification with the group and display of
appropriate behaviours (Johnston, 2005: 1034).5 I have developed two empirical
indicators to operationalize Checkels categorization of degrees of socialization
(Type I and Type II socialization) based on attachment (intensity of identification) and investment (behaviours). The paper makes three empirical contributions. First, it explores the procedures that the EU uses to select CSO projects for
founding and if there are value matches and increased local ownership. Second,
it examines which conditions trigger different socialization outcomes in such
groups. Third, it compares and contrasts two modernist6 oriented CSOs that
receive EU funding, AFTURD and Women and Citizenship (WaC). AFTURD has a
history of anti-regime feminist activism during the Ben Ali regime (19892011).
It has received EU funding on a number of occasions and is an example of an old
CSO. WaC was created in April 2012, in the inland region of El Kef and reflects
a type of new feminism that has developed since the Revolution, and is more
locally grounded.
The paper is structured as follows. I begin by embedding the theoretical
framework in Checkels socialization outcomes. I then describe the reasons and
methodology for the case selection of AFTURD and WaC as case studies. In the
subsequent sections, I introduce the empirical evidence about the EUs CSO
selection procedures, the conditions that increase attachment and investment
in Type II socialization, incomplete Type II socialization in young members and
the CSOs impact on society.

International socialization
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) acknowledge the difficulties of studying identity
change, as there was a theoretical void on process tracing to see exactly how
persuasion exercises its leverage in norm transformation (Finnemore & Sikkink,
1998: 914). Checkels seminal work contributed to fix this lacuna by distinguishing between two socialization outcomes that are substantially different in their

L. FERREIRO PRADO

degree and intensity. Socialization is defined as the process of inducting actors

in the norms and rules of a given community (Checkel, 2005: 804) and it is
based on the sustained compliance to a set of norms. In contrast to material or
rational approaches that follow a logic of consequence, socializations logic is
one of appropriateness whereby the behavior of an actor is independent from
a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions (Checkel, 2005: 804).
Socializations endpoint is internalization, which is when the community norms
and rules become taken for granted and there is no conscious instrumental
calculation going on (Checkel, 2005).
Role playing is the mechanism that makes possible Type I socialization and is
based on the actors acquisition of the knowledge needed in order to act according to expectations, irrespective of whether the socialized actor likes or agrees
with the role it has been assigned (Checkel, 2005: 804). He points out that the
key is that agents know what is socially accepted. In this kind of socialization, the
logic of appropriateness is quite superficial. It merely means the act of conscious
role playing. Type II socialization is made possible through normative suasion
and this kind of value internalization can be detected when agents actively and
reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness (Checkel, 2005:
812) and organizational norms have been accepted as the right thing to do.
In this case, agents adopt the interests and even, possibly, the identity of the
community they belong to (Checkel, 2005: 804). Within international organizations, both outcomes have different scope conditions that make them possible.7
Checkel identifies outcomes, studies the mechanisms operating for the different types of socialization and spells out the conditions that make them more
likely to occur. But Checkel does not measure the actual occurrence of each
outcome and offers no way of doing so. Another concern is that according to
Checkels framework, resistance to socialization is the same as no socialization
at all. He does not consider resistance might occur within an overall process
of value internalization. For this reason, the articles theoretical contribution is
the operationalization of both socialization outcomes through two indicators,
attachment and investment. Attachment is understood as gender equalitys support among activists. The indicator for attachment was constructed by adapting
Johnstons dimensions on intensity of agent identification (Johnston, 2005).
The components selected where: (a) the persons normative beliefs; (b) beliefs
about the social purpose of the CSO and how the individual relates to them; (c)
individuals worldviews (Johnston, 2005: 10321033). Investment is operationalized by looking at the time and effort devoted to the CSO and to supporting
gender equality in general. It was designed to audit for consistence between
the intensity of the beliefs and/or the behaviours.
Prior research points out to several conditions that are most likely to favour
internalization. Beyers and Hooghes results show that prior national socialization of EU officials explains supranational norm adoption. Their findings
have resulted in a call to bring the domestic back in (Zrn & Checkel, 2005). By

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

looking at the conditions that facilitate gender socialization within a national

setting case study, we can evaluate if this is a necessary precondition for international norm acquisition. Freyburgs work shows that positive attitudinal change
towards democratization correlates with age and gender. Females and young
people are more prone to acquire democratic values (Freyburg, 2011: 1012).
Does gender equality follow the same lines as democratization more generally?
Are novices more inclined towards persuasion and hence identity change as
Gheciu (2005) points out? All the above-mentioned criteria will be taken into
consideration when delving into the conditions necessary to evaluate socialization outcomes.

Case selection and methodology

Case selection
During the period 20112013, the EU financed three womens rights CSOs:
AFTURD, WaC and the Tunisians Womens Coalition. The latter is a post-2011
CSO made up of smaller associations. It received EU funding for a project carried
out in Tunis. Initial fieldwork suggested that there were few differences between
pre and post-revolutionary modernist womens rights groups. It mattered more
whether they were from Tunis or from the regions. This study focuses only on
projects that were actually funded by the EU rather than those which applied
unsuccessfully.8 I therefore chose AFTURD as an example of Tunis and pre-revolutionary CSO and WaC, as an illustration of a modernist post-revolutionary
regional CSO.
Fieldwork showed that an important number of activists come from the same
background: feminist contestation in the 1970s. Most of the members that make
the executive offices of modernist EU founded womens rights CSOs are mainly
urban, educated women in their 50-s and 60-s. Differences between leading
members in these associations are not ideological. They all have the UN womens rights agenda as their leitmotif. Disagreements are rooted in two different
issues. First, the strategies feminism should adopt and implement outside Tunis.
Second, their personal ties. These pre-existing circumstances, the Revolution
and the increase of interest in civil society, plus a growing foreign financing
since 2011 explains the mushrooming of many different womens CSOs that
are very similar in nature.
AFTURD. Founded in January 1989 by a group of women who belonged to
the Tadar Haddad cultural club in the 1970s, it is mostly composed of educated and staunchly secular pro-democratic urban, middle-class Tunis women.
Together with the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) it shares
a common leftist ideology and views feminism as grounded in human rights
and international norms. The ATFD and AFTURD both see the feminist cause
as, linked to the larger struggle for democracy, pluralism and social justice

L. FERREIRO PRADO

(Antonakis-Nashif, 2016: 133). Leading norm entrepreneurs in AFTURD consider

embedding change in UN criteria as a strategy to strengthen their position in
domestic debates (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998: 893). According to one activist,
AFTURD always conceived its activism from a more reflective point of view9 than
the ATFD and focused on research. They believe that in spite of having equality
between the sexes proclaimed in the 2014. Tunisian constitution, there are still
many laws hampering effective citizenship.10 In their view, these inequalities are
overcome by widening womens participation in society. To achieve this, they
strive to end all forms of gender-based marginalization in the different spheres
of life: cultural, social, economic and political, albeit they are mainly focused
on the political (encouraging women to run for office at the local level or for
parliament) and economic (same wage for same job) spheres.
2011 was a turning point as AFTURD decided to significantly increase its
activist commitment on the ground and its work on the regions. Between 2011
and 2013, it had two on-going projects in the interior regions of Kasserine and
Jendouba (financed by other non-EU Western donors), but its scope of action is
still heavily based in Tunis. This locus of activity in the capital has been criticized
by regional delegations. Local civil society in Kasserine counted on AFTURDs
capabilities of know-how transfer, which according to their view, they have failed
to deliver.11 More serious criticisms have come from the office in the Jendouba
region, where the disagreement around inclusion or exclusion of hijabi veiled
women as organization members, initially led to internal conflicts and later to
a split followed by the formation of a new CSO by the dissidents.12
The sociological profile of the executive office members is that of women in
their 50s and 60s. The youngest lay activists tend to be in their thirties, albeit
they also have a Youth Club for undergraduates in university. In all, it has 120
members and only women can become members.
WaC. El Kef is an inland, agricultural region bordering with Algeria. In the
past years, jihadists have settled around the frontier creating security concerns
among Tunisians. In the town, salafists were increasingly gaining the control of
the local mosques, posing a problem for those that did not share their views.
In 2011, AFTURD conducted several seminars in El Kef to promote womens
empowerment. Kerima Brinni, a local high school French teacher, attended
AFTURDs sessions and it sparked her drive to constitute an association for
women led by Kefians. In the process, she was provided with initial training by
AFTURD and their project partner Cideal.13 Brinni led this initiative with some
friends as the result of their shared concerns about the impact of increasing
conservative values in Tunisian society. The following quote illustrates her fears:
Since the Revolution, we were afraid of Islamists and of the social conservatism
that suddenly arose. Discrimination against women can be seen on the TV, among
young people, educated young people! People that have been to university. I
remember being specially shocked when listening to the Labour Minister on
TV saying that if women did not work there would be full employment. I never

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

thought Tunisians would say that. Tunisian conservatism jumped at my face.

Women are in danger.
Interview with Kerima Brinni, president of WaC.14

WaCs members are younger than those of AFTURD. The president is in her forties and she set up the executive office of the organization with friends of her
same age, who belonged to a francophone literary reading group initially set
up by French missionaries during the colonial era and which had survived after
decolonization. Her teaching job in the local high school makes her a popular
individual among non-Islamist Kefian society. In addition to her good reputation,
her natural leadership qualities have made it possible for her to recruit former
students, now recent college graduates, who are strongly motivated by the idea
of developing their community. WaC has 117 members aged between 18 and
35, out of which 30 per cent are men.15 As everyone in the association is Kefian,
members are well acquainted with the region.
When compared to AFTURD, WaC activists do not have such a secularist ideology; its members do not necessarily ascribe to the political left and there is
a broader range of worldviews among its associates. Whether women use the
headscarf or not is not a ground for dispute, as long as wearing it is their own
choice.16
The women in the executive bureaus of both CSOs have similar outlooks
regarding feminism. They conceive themselves as full citizens with equal rights
to men. Hence, they see that whatever event concerns the public sphere is also
a matter concerning women. The purpose of their work is to provide a gender
perspective to every matter they deem appropriate.
When fieldwork was conducted, both CSOs were focused on fostering womens participation in the October 2014 elections. Although they both denied
affiliation with any of the many political parties that had been formed after
2011, they definitely consider that ushering womens vote was necessary to stop
Islamists from winning the elections again. Indeed, their anti-Islamist views are
explicit and manifest.

Methodology
The specific methodological techniques were semi-structured interviews and
observation. A total of twenty-five in-depth interviews were carried out in Tunis,
El Kef and Kasserine between June and August 2014 with women aged 18 to
60. Interviews were held with members of AFTURD and WaC, the responsible
officers of civil society promotion in the European Commission Delegation in
Tunisia, as well as diverse civil society agents that broadened my perspective
of civil society and feminism in Tunisia.
Observation was conducted in two specific events. In AFTURD, I attended the
annual General Assembly that took place in the headquarters of the association

L. FERREIRO PRADO

in Tunis on July 3 2014. In WaC, I joined the training that twenty-year-old activists
were receiving to raise rural womens awareness of gender violence on the 27
and 28 June 2014.
Data was processed using the Atlas Ti programme and analysed using
a thematic analysis17 approach that combined an inductive and deductive
perspectives.18
Deductively, we created families based on the following concepts: democracy, gender equality, civil society, the European Union and the current situation
in Tunisia. So, for example, within the gender equality family there were codes
for Islamic gender equality or UN-gender equality. These rubrics corresponded
to a superficial reading of the interviews that enabled labelling and classifying
their contents (Conde Guitrrez del lamo, 2009: 26) and aimed to conduct a
basic thematic analysis that listed and synthesized the main elements of the
text (Paill & Muchielli, 2003: 136).
The perspective applied to inductive coding was based on major themes and
served the purpose of beginning a thematic analysis based on a level of analysis
that sought to understand (Paill & Muchielli, 2003: 52). The following categories
were created, age, gender and location. Then, Johnstons dimensions for identity
change were also included as part of this inductive process. Each dimension
had a series of questions that were asked of the interviewees. Regarding the
dimension of normative beliefs, individuals were asked: What does equality
mean to you? Does equality between men and women have contested features?
If so, what are they? Since when have you been an advocate of womens rights?
Why did you get involved in feminist activism? Interviewees beliefs about their
CSOs social purpose was examined by asking why they chose to engage with
this association in particular. Lastly, with respect to their worldviews, activists
were asked several questions on general topics such as their view of Tunisia after
the Revolution, democracy and how they imagined their country in the future.
In addition, as coding advanced, the issue of threats to ones way of life
emerged in different topics and through choice of vocabulary. The frequency
of its occurrence resulted in the creation of a specific code for this issue and
another for identity blaming. Both emerged as major themes in the modernist
discourse of contemporary Tunisia.

EU civil society strengthening in Tunisia (20112013)

In 2011, the EU Commission Delegation in Tunisia issued its first call which
was exclusively focused on democracy including transparency and feasibility
of democratic practices, democratization processes, independent media and
civil society strengthening (Bicchi & Voltolini, 2013: 9293). From 2011 to 2013,
the EU has financed 55 EU civil society initiatives in Tunisia that amount to 17
million euro (Lidou, 2014: 63). The EU believes civil societys empowerment19
as the best way to maintain a status quo that will assure social cohesion and

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

Table 1. AFTURD and WAC's EU project funding (20112013).

CSO
Afturd
Afturd

Afturd

Women and
Citizenship

Project
Reinforcement of womens
rights and their participation in
the democratic transition
Promotion of equality through
strengthening civil society and
citizen participation in north
west Tunisia
Solidarity Women Centre:
support for the inclusion of
women into the economy in
the Jendouba region
Prevention of gender violence
and accompanying of women-victims in North East Tunisia
(201316)

Partner
ATFD/ONU
Femmes

Cost
300,000
euro

Project duration
01/03/2011
31/08/20012

Cideal

198,040
euro

9/08/2011
8/08/2013

Cospe

463,550
euro

02/05/2012
02/05/2014

Cideal

570,000
euro

201316

Source: Author from EU data.

thus stability to the country (PASC, 2012). Its role is to be a non-adversarial

one (European Commission, 2012: 4). Quite the contrary, its expected to act
as partner and occasional watchdog to the State on a framework based on
consultation (PASC, 2012).20
In the period ranging from 2011 to 2013, the EU has funded the following
AFTURD and WaC projects (Table 1).
Consistent with the Istanbul Process and the EUs strong commitment to
gender equality in the Mediterranean (European Commission, 2011b: 5) as an
inherent constituent to democracy (Jnnerman, 2013: 42), the EU has supported projects that deal with topics related to political rights, such as participation in elections, gender equality in civil society, enhancing the economic
participation of women and helping women in vulnerable situations.
The specific procedure to obtain EU funding works as follows. Associations
go through a selection process which is channelled via a Call for Proposals published in the European Commission Delegation website for Tunisia.21 The Call
establishes the guidelines and criteria for CSOs application.
The Call for Proposals is based on a prior assessment by the EU officers of
the local and political needs of the country. According to Michel Mouchiroud,
responsible for civil society projects at the European Delegation in Tunis from
2008 to 2014, the principles that ground the criteria for funding projects are
competition, transparency, ownership and respect for human rights as understood within the UN system.22 This means that no association practicing any
kind of political or religious proselytism will be financed. The first criterion is
therefore ideational. There must be a common set of shared values based on
liberal assumptions, hence Islamist oriented CSOs are not even considered for
funding. As mentioned by EU officers and corroborated in fieldwork, Islamist

10

L. FERREIRO PRADO

leaning CSOs do not even try to apply.23This anti-Islamist stance is however

viewed as apolitical as the following quotes illustrate24:
Michel Mouchiroud: If you read any of the Call for Proposals, youll see we dont
fund any groups that do political proselytism, or religious proselytism or any type
of proselytism that promotes [nothing is mentioned] we are not allowed to do
so. We are apolitical [italicised by the author] we do not discriminate, but we will
not finance a group that is promoting the Sharia.
Melanie Bride: We dont have the problem because they dont come to us
[Islamists]. These people thsey know our values and they dont invest their time
to do that [Apply for funding]. Actually, we dont have that problem [having to
discard Islamist groups from funding].

EU officers and members from EU founded CSOs report that values between
donor and recipients are consistent. As such, value socialization is taken for
granted and there is no formal control mechanism to cross-check this specific
information.25
The second criterion is so-called technical, revolving around eligibility
requirements. EU officers in Tunisia agree that the Call for Proposals is complex.
It means counting on people in the CSO that are familiar with EU know-how
and can speak French at a high level of fluency. The organization also needs to
have an administrative structure capable of managing a project that will last a
minimum of a year and manage a budget of at least 100.000. This means only
robust CSOs carrying out big enough initiatives can be funded. The implication of the so-called technical criteria is the tendency to empower the already
empowered.
Once an organization submits a project proposal and receives a good evaluation, the EU civil society team proceeds to assess the eligibility of the applicant, first via its network of people in the field that provide information on the
organization and by cross-checking candidates with other international donors.
In addition, the EU has developed the Paddock system through which every
funded entity gives information on their bank account details for annual verification and other types of financial authentication. Once the project has started,
verification is done regularly through feedback and exchange of information
between the EU and the organization. There is also monitoring carried out by
external experts. Indicators of performance, progress and results are applied to
the project in its different stages. Officers have reported, however, the lack of
common criteria applied equally to all projects; the only common assessment
criterion is whether the CSO actions have had a social impact.
According to Mouchiroud, CSO strengthening and development in Tunisia
started from scratch in 201126 because during Ben Alis regime, civil society
was limited and its purpose was to be an instrument for the legitimation of the
State, although a number of feminist CSOs kept their distance from the State
(Moghadam, 2017). In this post-revolutionary context, strengthening civil society means creating a structure for the CSO enabling the organization to operate

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

11

under new conditions. For the EU, strengthening civil society in Tunisia means
providing know-how in terms of skills and experience so that CSOs may be
able to operate autonomously in about five years. This expressed aim raises
two questions. First, is it not the case that many CSOs, in particular those who
were independent of the state during the Ben Ali period, already acquired such
know-how? Second, for those that are indeed dependent on outside funding,
what will happen when the EU and other international donors leave the country
and stop pouring money into CSOs?

Conditions that increase attachment and investment in Type II

socialization
There is a value match between the normative beliefs of CSO executive bureau
members and the EUs expectations. Socialization (Type I or Type II) has not
happened because internalization pre-existed. There is a shared meaning on
the conception of gender equality grounded in the fact that equality is believed
to be common to humankind and not a Western acquis. The UNs criteria is seen
by the EU and CSOs executive bureaus as the natural way of understanding
equality. Technical meetings between EU officials and CSO bureau members
are not occasions for spillover of values, but rather a time for reaffirming these
assumptions.
These results are consistent with AFTURDs trajectory as its leading members
have been committed to democracy and womens rights for decades. In WaC, it
was precisely this strong attachment to gender equality that sparked Brimmis
initiative to look for the necessary training that would enable WaC to apply for
EU funding. Already socialized UN-like gender equality activists in both CSOs are
mostly around or over forty years old. For them, gender equality socialization
happened at home, at school and through the media. They decided to work
for womens rights as a result of their prior awareness with the issue. Especially
for older members in this group, since 2011, activists report a deepened sense
of attachment. The intensity of their beliefs and interpreting women were in
danger increased investment in different activities beyond specific projects. The
increase in time and effort invested has fed back and intensified attachment.
The following circumstances have been found to reinforce attachment and
consequently act as a catalyst for investment.
(1) Fear and rejection of an alternative society model: Modernists reject the
way of life they believe Islamists will impose to society if they ever come to
power again. These views about Islamists contribute to the polarization that
has defined the different sectors of the Tunisian socio-political context during
the Transition (Farmanfarmarian, 2014: 74).
(2) Identity blaming: As a consequence of the fear and rejection of a society
model which they perceive could be imposed upon them, the assessment of
the situation is made in identity terms. Despite Nahdas pragmatism on the

12

L. FERREIRO PRADO

constitutional debate on identity (Dalmasso & Cavatorta, 2013: 233), Islamists are
believed to be successfully instilling their theocratic worldview among the most
vulnerable layers of the population. Islamization is understood as the adoption
of Eastern religious forms coming from the Arabian peninsula, alien to Tunisias
way of practicing Islam.
Essentializing and Othering Islamists goes hand in hand. The Other is not
seen as an actor in equal footing, meaning that their strategies and goals evolve
through time and adapt to the context. Quite the contrary, Islamists are regarded
in a fixed way that leaves no ground for social change taking place. For example,
in the modernist discourse, Islamists are regarded as having just one identity,
defined as a non-changing Arab-Muslim category. In contrast, Modernists depict
the identity of Tunisian society as Mediterranean and the proud descendant of
a cross-fertilization between Berbers, Carthaginians, Romans and Arabs. They
consider themselves Muslim but not Islamist. Moreover, Political Islam is not
regarded as endogenous. The upshot of this situation is Othering Islamists as
foreign, hence constructing them as estranged to true Tunisian ways of thinking
and feeling. This discourse aims at their minoritization. The following quotation
is an example of this us versus them discourse found among secular afturdists:
Their [Islamist] discourse is not what they tell you [to the interviewer]. For us, for
women that fought for freedom, the right to our own body, the right to equality,
the right to a women statute, the right to our own identity as women and not to
just to be the wife of Mr. X or Xs mother [few seconds silence]. Their [Islamist]
discourse about women in Islam, what they interpret is womens place in society is
from imported Wahabite Islam from Qatar. Its not the culture of Maghrebian countries. Our identity is an Arab Muslim identity that has also been influenced by the
outside world. They defend a narrow vision of Islam, an Islam that is political. We
distinguish between Islam as a faith and Islam as culture. Islamists are Easterners
[emphasis on word stressed by the interviewee].
Interview with Khaliya Belhassi, AFTURD secretary general.27

Incomplete Type II socialization in young activists

For most CSO members that started their activism after the Revolution, the
post-Ben Ali era offered an opportunity to engage in associations that seek to
empower women as a means of improving their community. For them, democracy is not just about regime change, it means they can play an active role
in trying to change their society and have a meaningful impact on it. For the
first time, they felt they had agency to shape events. These scope conditions
were more relevant to men and youth in the provinces, than the perceived
Islamist threat. For many of this new cohort of young lay activists,28 gender
equality resonance is not underpinned by the UNs criteria. Differences can
be found in normative beliefs, beliefs about the social purpose of the group
and worldviews. These discrepancies do not completely follow the same line

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

13

as Freyburgs findings on democratization more generally (Freyburg, 2011), as

the older generation is more secularized. Age has an impact, but being younger
does not imply a deeper attachment to the UNs criteria. At the same time, the
results corroborate the impact of gender. Generally speaking, women are more
socialized into gender equality than men. Lastly, in the Tunisian context, the
divide between Tunis and the rest of the country has a marked influence on
value internalization. The factors mentioned above, plus the perception of a
threat to their way of life, suggest that socialization in society is more relevant
in shaping beliefs, worldviews and behaviours than any value internalization
occurring within the CSO. A certain family upbringing together with a specific
historical and sociopolitical context are meaningful factors that determine the
kind of value internalization the agent is probably going to go through. Prior
socialization is not just a necessary condition for international norm acquisition,
it is also influential in determining whether or not to get involved in activism
and the lines along which commitment will unfold.
In our case study, four scenarios were observed. First, there is no type I socialization as no individual was acting according to expectations (Checkel, 2005:
804). Individuals act or not according to their personal convictions, not their
pre-assigned role. Second, as with older members, type II socialization is prior
to deciding taking on activism. This situation was mostly found in Tunis with
women on their early thirties that had undergone a similar socialization process as the previous generation. Third, type II socialization unfolds as a result
of activist commitment to the CSO. Young members, previously unaware of
gender equality as an important element for a democracy, assume the value as
an asset to be defended at home and in society. In these cases, internalization
involves a change in ideas and sometimes too, a transformation of behaviour.
For example, a female novice in WaC decided to take off her hijab after some
months of activism in the CSO. However, the fact of undergoing an internalization process that involves a change in beliefs, worldviews and behaviour does
not mean sharing the international tenets that underpin the UNs conception of
gender equality. Type II socialization happened when the individuals were able
to fit equality into their identity in a way they perceived was not in contradiction to their ideas about Islam. For example, regarding the contentious issue of
equality of inheritance between men and women, veiled WaC women do not
invoke international norms to contest this inequality. Their attachment to Islam
as a faith that they apply in their daily life as practicing Muslims encourages
them to look for ways of embedding change from inside the Islamic tradition.
Defenders of this contention consider that Islamic law needs to be contextualized in todays socio-historical situation. They argue that women with their
salaries support the material well-being of the family as men do. Hence, as
the conditions regarding womens obligations within the family have changed,
current circumstances make possible an egalitarian reading of Islamic law. The
women interviewed emphasized that it was not a question of changing Islam

14

L. FERREIRO PRADO

to adapt it to international norms, but to do a reading based on what they conceive to be the spirit of the text on the specific contemporary circumstances.
Equality between men and women is conceived as something endogenous to
Islam and not a westernized tradition to be imported and applied. This kind of
standpoint has been identified as Islamic feminism (Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Badran,
2009). Some, however, might argue that this is a legitimizing framework appropriate in an environment resistant, or openly hostile, to values perceived as
Western. I contend that explaining social change from within Islam by women
self-defined as practicing Muslims, as well as advocates of womens rights, is
a pragmatic strategy that multiplies the chances equality has of resonating in
Tunisian society, especially in the socially conservative interior regions.
The fourth possible scenario involves type II socialization along with resistance to other non-resonant identity dimensions. Paradoxically, when resistance
is found it does not entirely prevent socialization or lead to a more superficial
outcome, as Checkel suggests for type I socialization. Rather, true value internalization, where some norms and rules are taken for granted, combines with
outward rejection of other non-resonant features. This suggests that norm diffusion is not monolithic with people falling into one internalization category or
another depending on how deep their convictions are. Checkels socialization
categories should be seen as ideal types. The extent to which value internalization happens when there is dissonance between prior beliefs and gender
equality depends on the individuals ability to embed this feature in a context
coherent with his or her understanding of the world. Islam is an explanation to
norm acquisition or to resistance, depending on the individuals interpretation
of religion. Islam as a means of resistance to full gender equality was found in
the provinces and with men.
Equality is that women and men have the same rights and obligations. Quite,
frankly, I am against equality in inheritance, even if I work for AFTURD. AFTURD
defends equality in inheritance. I dont. Luckily, I have not been forced to work on
such a related topic. If I were, I wouldnt do it. It is against my principles because
the Koran says so. Not me, not anyone can change that. Its God that said that
women should or not have this or that other thing.
Afturd personnel outside Tunis. July 2014.

The quote depicts a difference in beliefs, the social purpose of the group and
worldviews by the interviewee. This apparent weak attachment affects investment, as she sets the limits to the activities in which she is willing to participate. However, this same woman also expressed a growing overall commitment
to gender equality since she had started working in the CSO two years ago.
Knowing better a reality she was previously unaware of had increased her investment of time and effort in the CSO.
Since I am an activist and collaborate with AFTURD, I am in contact with more
young people, with more women. I am increasingly committed to society. Much
more than before. Each day, I am more and more convinced. Before the Revolution,

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

15

I was just concerned about my studies but since I am in contact with underprivileged people and marginalized women, I feel more and more empathy for peoples
problems. I am ever more interested in womens equality.
Afturd personnel outside Tunis. July 2014.

Mens view on womens rights is based on the idea of helping and protecting
women from situations regarded as unfair. Their engagement is grounded in
justice, more than gender equality.29 For example, none of the men interviewed
shared the standpoint of grounding in the Islamic tradition a conception of
complete equality between men and women that included equality in inheritance. In fact, men were quite adamant in expressing their contrasting view
on this issue.30

AFTURD and WaCs socializing impact

In all, the study partially endorses the idea found in the EU democratic promotion implementation literature regarding increased local ownership by civil
society associations. CSOs propose and carry out the projects they deem appropriate. EU supervision is related to achieving the goals set by the CSO. The problem lies in the fact, that despite an existing heterogeneity in individuals degree
of value socialization within the CSOs, the EU has a tendency to empower the
already empowered. Under the guise of technical criteria its financing a certain
stratum of society: the French-speaking, university-educated31 classes-those
that are more or less acquainted with and sensitive to gender equality, although
they may refer to it in other terms, such as gender justice.
Fieldwork shows that in the provinces people prefer local CSOs to work for the
region. Designing and developing projects is something done by the CSO without any EU involvement. The research shows that local ownership also affects
which CSOs are carrying out which projects. AFTURD is seen as a norm carrier
of secular and Western ideas and this perception seriously limits its impact outside the capital, even among its own activists. These power dynamics within
the CSO have not seriously been considered by the executive bureau. Project
implementation should resonate with, at least, the sector of the local population
its targeting.32
Empirically, the paper shows that members are socialized into gender equality, albeit not necessarily sharing international norms. The findings reveal a
power hierarchy difference between the executive bureaus composed by the
most socialized members and many of the rest of the activists. This duality is
an important issue that has an impact on the projects the CSO can design and
implement; these tend to be focused on issues perceived as non-controversial
in Tunisian society, such as enhancing electoral participation or empowering
women against gender violence. The boundaries for equality in other domains,
such as inheritance, remain unchallenged.

16

L. FERREIRO PRADO

Conclusion
This research has targeted individuals to examine whether and how socialization happens within two womens rights CSOs in Tunisia. By focusing on the
categories of attachment and investment, I contribute to Checkels framework
by distinguishing different degrees of value internalization within the Type II
socialization outcome. Type II socialization can be understood as a form of deep
socialization that can happen wholeheartedly or along with resistance to other
non-resonant features. The more superficial Type I socialization could not, however, be traced on this research.
As expected, there is a value match between the EU and the two CSOs studied, albeit not of the kind or degree that the EU assumes. The UNs understanding
of gender equality is shared by the older activists, those that are now in office in
the executive bureaus of both CSOs. There is also a generational bound to a specific trigger of increased attachment and investment to gender equality, namely
the perception of a threat to ones way of life. These interpretations and motives
are not shared by many of the lay activists. Most younger and male members
do not undergo the same process as their motivation is mostly grounded in
helping women out of unfair situations and thus rooted in a rejection of gender
injustice, more than a commitment to gender equality.
These conclusions reflect the unsurprising fact that CSOs are less effective
mechanisms of socialization than the factors which drive people into activism in
the first place. Nonetheless, associations have a positive effect on gender socialization, as no interviewee mentioned feeling less inclined to support female
empowerment than before engaging in activism. As illustrated in the article,
the impact of CSOs varies with age (individuals in their late thirties and onwards
are more socialized than activists in their twenties); gender (women are more
committed to gender equality) and location (there is a gap between Tunis and
the interior provinces). The scope conditions that got young people involved
in fighting for womens rights are not so much related to a perceived Islamist
threat, but to regime change. The end of authoritarianism brought a sense of
awareness of their own country to many youths, along with high expectations
of what a democratic Tunisia could achieve. Hence, they have decided to invest
their hopes, energy and time in improving their society.
There is significant scope for future research on EU democracy implementation to
further scrutinize the EUs ability to channel bottom up social-movement pressure
on states (Johnston, 2005: 1028). Modernist CSOs devoted to gender equality in
Tunisia have had an impact on the post-revolutionary Constitution. But their ability
to influence the general population seems to be curtailed by what they represent
in the eyes of most Tunisians: empowered, urban-middle class women. In Tunisia,
gender norm diffusion mostly happens via localization and the ability of local agents
to reconstruct foreign norms in such a way that those norms fit with the agents
cognitive priors and identities (Acharya, 2004: 239).

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

17

Notes
1.
Leverage is a top-down approach of intergovernmental frameworks addressed
to governmental elites. Its instrument is political conditionality. The governance
model is based on functional cooperation between administrations operating
in different policy fields (Lavenex & Schimmelfenning, 2011: 887). For more
information about how the EU has mainstreamed good governance and the
toolkit it uses for its promotion, see Brzel et al., (2008).
2.
There is some scepticism on the ground about this assumed correspondence
of values. The worry is that it actually reflects a fundraising strategy intended
to take advantage of the post-revolutionary influx of money from international
organizations, rather than a real commitment to gender equality. However, as
Johnston has suggested, being deeply committed to principles is coherent with
strategic behaviour in an ends justify the means way (Johnston, 2005: 1031).
3.
The major contribution to this topic was made by an issue of International
Organization in 2005 devoted to international institutions and socialization in
Europe.
4.
In 2011, the EU proclaimed a new era and committed itself to the promotion
of deep democracy which would be based not just on regular elections, but
also on a set of preconditions including freedom of association, expression, the
rule of law, anti-corruption measures and democratic control of security forces
(European Commission, 2011a: 3). An extensive literature argues that the EU
has not lived up to this commitment. Some relevant examples can be found in
Dandashly (2015), Noutcheva (2014), Pace (2014), Buy and Vlkel (2014).
5.
The other methods Johnston suggests for observing identity change are:
to isolate the characteristics that respondents believe are central to group
identity, the degree of difference they believe exists between their own group
characteristics and others and the appropriate behaviours associated with those
different identity memberships (Johnston, 2005: 1034).
6.
This paper uses the term Modernism and cognates as it is most often understood
in Tunisia, namely as a broad concept defined essentially in opposition to tradition
which is associated to Nahda and the Salafi movements. This does not necessarily
mean that modernists defend a progressive model of society.
7.
Type I socialization is more likely when the following conditions hold: agents are in
settings were contact is long, sustained, has a significant duration and is intense
(Checkel, 2005: 811). In addition, agents have previous professional experience in
policymaking (Checkel, 2005: 811). Type II socialization occurs when: the agent
is a novice, the actor has few prior, engrained beliefs, the socializing individual
is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target wants to belong,
the socializing agent acts out principles of serious deliberative argument and the
interaction happens in less politicized settings (Checkel, 2005: 813).
8.
Within the broad category of modernist CSOs the fact that some have been
financed by the EU and others not is related to the consistency of the projects
presented, the number of people working in each association and the means to
carry out the stated goals. Initially, the study wanted to compare and contrast
CSOs that had been funded versus others that had not. This information is not
public and hence difficult to obtain. However, interviews with EU officials, CSO
members of other associations and journalists stated that the criteria were not
ideological, but technical. More on this issue can be found in the section on civil
society strengthening.
9.
Interview with Khaliya Belhassi, secretary general of AFTURD, Tunis, 25th June.

18

L. FERREIRO PRADO

10.
Interview with Khaliya Belhassi, secretary general of AFTURD, Tunis, 25th June
and Vission et mission http://www.afturd-tunisie.org/a-propos (retrieved in June
2014).
The interviewee specifically highlighted several issues. Firstly, according to
the law, even if childrens custody is shared between the parents, only the father
has the authority to allow offspring to leave the country or manage their assets,
even when the couple has divorced. Mrs Belhassi also stressed that Tunisian
women that do not work do not have a right to their own social security benefits
as these are dependent on their husbands, or that the current penal code allows
a rapist to marry his victim, if she is under 18years old, as a means of avoiding
prison for his crime.
11.Interview AFTURD activist, July 2014, Kasserine, Tunisie.
12.Informal conversation with NGO Cospe worker in Kasserine, July 2014, Kasserine,
Tunisia. Interview AFTURD activist, July 2014, Kasserine, Tunisia.
13.Cideal is a Spanish foundation that has worked as the European partner of several
EU funded projects in Tunisia.
14.Interview conducted in French and translated into English by the author. El Kef,
Menara Centre, Friday 27th June 2014.
15.Interview with Kerima Brinni, president of Women and Citizenship, El Kef, Menara
Centre, Friday 27th June 2014.
16.Niqab was not mentioned, hence we cannot describe their opinion regarding
this issue. We can assume that their flexibility is limited to the headscarf as there
was not a single woman wearing niqab in the association. In fact, hijabi women
were a minority in this CSO.
17.Thematic analysis aims to mark out representative contents of the text that, at
the same time, are relevant for the research. The text is usually segmented into
more or less homogeneous themes in a way that is suitable for the topics dealt
it covers (Conde y Gutirrez del lamo, 2009: 24) Translation: LFP.
18.About Thematic Analysis. School of Pyschology, The University of Auckland, New
Zeland. https://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/our-research/researchgroups/thematic-analysis/about-thematic-analysis.html (retrieved in July 2016).
19.
CSOs have mushroomed in Tunisia in the 20112013 period and many have
become institutionalized. According to the Centre of Studies and Documentation
of Associations (IFEDA), 9.000 associations have been created since 2011. In 2014,
there were 16. 500 associations in contrast to the 8.500 that existed in the Ben Ali
period, although many are not actually active. Women associations have soared
from 173 in 2010 to 700 according to Credif (Gribba & Depaoli, 2014: 42).
20.This EU view of civil society as a partner to the State is consistent with article 139
of the Tunisian Constitution.
21.Retrieved on <http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/projects/overview/
civil_society_fr.htm> [11/01/2013].
22.Interview with Michel Mouchiroud and Melanie Bride, Delegation of the European
Commission in Tunisia, Berges du Lac, Tunis. 15 July 2014.
23.Interview with Jamila Kssikssi, president of Civic Pole, Tunis, 4 July 2014.
24.Interview with Michel Mouchiroud and Melanie Bride, Delegation of the European
Commission in Tunisia, Berges du Lac, Tunis. 15 July 2014.
25.Interview with Lila Rebai, project coordinator in the EU-TN project at the EuroMediterranean Human Rights Network, Tunis, 10 June; interview with Michel
Mouchiroud, Delegation of the European Commission in Tunisia, Berges du Lac,
Tunis. 15 July 2014.

MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS

19

26.
Interview with Michel Mouchiroud, Delegation of the European Commission in
Tunisia, Berges du Lac, Tunis. 15 July 2014.
27.
Bourghiba Avenue, Tunis, 25 June 2014.
28.
By young members, I mostly refer to those activists born in the late 1980s or
1990s.
29.
Gilligans work illustrating how males frame morality on an ethic of justice that
is grounded in equality and according to which everyone should be treated
the same (Gillingan, 1982: 174) resonates in the young mens opinion on why
they should commit themselves to womens rights. I would like to thank the
anonymous reviewer that made this comment because it helps clarifying how
the human experience of justice is gendered.
30.
Informal conversation with three young men. WAC. El Kef, Menara Centre, Friday
27 June 2014.
31.
French is the language for scientific and technical instruction in Tunisia. Higher
education is free, provided students pass the Bac exam at the end of high school.
According to the European Commission, 38 per cent of the population in the
1924 age bracket studies in university (Chacker, 2010: 3).
32.This is not to say AFTURD has not played an important role in womens rights
during the Transition. Their activism has proved highly effective when focusing
on advocacy to pressure MP-s, when raising national or international awareness
towards injustices against women or when empowering local CSO entrepreneurs
like Brinni to acquire the necessary know-how to set a CSO and apply to EU
funding.

Acknowledgments
This paper has received extensive feedback and comments from the following people:
Irene Fernndez Molina, Betty S. Anderson, Shamiran Mako, Andrea Teti and Santiago
Petschen. Beatriz Tom, ric Pardo and Evangelos Liaras have read and re-read the paper
in its different drafts. I am indebted to all of them and to the three anonymous reviewers
that significantly helped in improving the draft to publishing standards. I specially want
to thank Valentine Moghadam for reading this work on multiple occasions and for the
mentorship offered whilst being a Carnegie visiting scholar at the International Affairs
department of Northeastern University from September to December 2014.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Interviews
The following are the on the record interviews cited on the paper. Another formal ten
interviews were conducted off-the record with different CSO activists. Fieldwork also
comprised informal conversations and observation material. With the exception of
Michel Mouchiroud and Melanie Bride, all interviews were conducted in French. With
these EU officials, the meetings were held in English and/or Spanish. No translators
were needed.
Interview with president of Coalition des Femmes de Tunisie network, Aida Chaabane,
network headquarters, Tunis, 30 June 2014.
Interview with Hella Skhiri, ONU Femmes, Mutuelville, Tunis, 31 July 2014.
Interview with Karim Essifi: Nahda vice president of relations with civil society. Party
Headquarters, Montplasir, Tunis. 3 July 2014.
Interview with Kerima Brinni, president of Women and Citizenship, El Kef, Menara Centre,
Friday 27 June 2014.
Interview with Jamila Kssikssi, president of Civic Pole, Tunis, 4 July 2014.
Interview with Khaliya Belhassi, secretary general of Afturd, Tunis, 25 June 2014.
Interview with Lila Rebai, project coordinator in the EU-TN project at the EuroMediterranean Human Rights Network, Tunis, 10 June 2014.
Interview with Michel Mouchiroud and Melanie Bride, Delegation of the European
Commission in Tunisia, Berges du Lac, Tunis. 15 July 2014.
Interview with Michel Mouchiroud, Restaurant Aquatique, Berges du Lac, Tunis. 3 June
2014.
Interview with Saloua Guifa, former president of Coalition des Femmes de Tunisie network,
Hotel Afrique, Tunis-Centre Ville, 24 June 2014.
Interview with Selim Ben Hassen and Aida Doggui, co-authors of the report: Les cadres
formels de concertation: un instrument pour enraciner la dmocratie participative en
Tunisie (PASC, March 2014), Tunis, 7th June 2014.