Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(2) If trying to look at books and records: Burden on shareholder to find proper
purpose and that formalities of request has been complied with.
(3) If trying to look at SHr list or ledger: Burden on corporation to show
inspection is for improper purpose.
b. Other Statutory Considerations
RMBCA 7.20, 16.01-16.04: as DE, except some records must be disclosed
regardless of purpose.
2. Obtaining Corporate Records
Saito v McKesson HBOC, Inc (Del. 2002): SH's proper purpose for inspection was to
ferret out possible wrongdoing in connection with merger. Holding below: (1) proper
purpose only extended to potential wrongdoing after the date on which SH acquired
his stock, (2) SH did not have a proper purpose to inspect documents relating to
potential claims against third party advisors who counseled BODs in connection
with merger, and (3) SH was not entitled to pre-merger documents of target because
he was not stockholder of pre-merger target, and, with respect to post-merger target,
he did not establish basis on which to disregard separate existence of wholly-owned
subsidiary
Held: allowed inspection of records reasonably related to proper purpose (1)
before date shareholder acquired his shares, (2) irrespective of source of
records, and (3) given to corporation by target before or after merger, and
otherwise affirmed decision. Broad view of what information can be obtained.
Albee v. Lamson (General Rule for inspection) Stockholder acting in good faith for
purpose of advancing interests of corporation and protecting his own interest as
stockholder has right to examine corporate books and records at reasonable times.
Shareholder has burden of proving good faith and proper purpose.
3. 220 Actions (Tools at hand) Steps (also see Saito)
File Case
Show Proper Purposepreponderance of evidence that you have credible basis for
believing there is mismanagement.
The scope of production -- a 220 proceeding should result in an order
circumscribed with rifled precision.
a. NOTE: 220 actions generally precursor to derivative suits. But you need to have
previously required the documents from the corporation (i.e., exhaustion).
b. Other proper purposes
o Determining financial condition of the corporation
o Ascertaining the value of a stockholders shares
c. NOTE: Mixed purpose (one proper/one improper) are OK.
4. Record Ownership and the Ownership-Identification Problem
a. Dematerialization of Stockholding
o Proxy solicitations are a result of the previously tedious process for conducting
shareholder votes. The current process, while complicated, facilitates
decisionmaking through shareholder votesbut it neutralizes it for small
investors, though useful for institutional investors.
o The process begins with determining who has the right to receive proxy
materials and vote on matters presented to shareholders for a vote at shareholder
meetings.
o Record holders are the ones listed on the issuers of shares, and their ownership
is listed on records maintained by the issuer or its transfer agent. And state laws
vest voting rights with the record holder/registered owner. The beneficial
owners are the ones who own the shares traded on exchanges.
o Issuing corporations notify DTCsholding positions in its securitiesof the
impending vote. The Issuer must send a search card to each DTC participant to
determine whether they are holding shares for a beneficial owner and if so the
number of sets of proxy packages needed to be forwarded to those beneficial
owners.
o Once the registered owners and beneficial owners have received the proxy
materials, the voting begins. But the voting process proceeds in this manner: the
beneficial owner received a voting instruction form (VIF) from a securities
intermediary, which permits the beneficial owner to instruct the securities
intermediary how to vote the beneficially owner shares.
b. NOBO (Non-objecting beneficial owner) (SEC Law): Brokers must report to issuer
companies the name, address and security position of clients holding the companys
shares in broker name, as long as client doesnt object. Shareholder doesnt have a
right to require a company to produce a NOBO list when it doesnt have one in its
possession.
c. Consent Solicitations
o Unless otherwise provided in the [COI], any action required . . . to [or may] be
taken at any annual or special meeting of stockholders of a corporation . . . may
be taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent
or consents in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the
holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes
that would be necessary to authorize or take such action . . . . DGCL 228(a).
B. Shareholder Informational Rights Under Federal Law and Stock Exchange Rules
(Structured Disclosure)
1. Statutory Overview
a. The Securities Act of 1933governs issuance of securities
b. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934governs trading of securities (all public
but not closed corps covered)
SEA 12(a) General Requirement of Registration--It shall be unlawful for
any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any security (other
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2.
3.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
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(1)
(2)
(3)
merger into M. Materials expressed BOD approval of the merger, but didnt
disclose that M had named all of the directors. The state laws required
minority SH approval
1. There is an implied private cause of action under Borak.
2. What is materially misleading? Anything that a reasonable shareholders
would think is important in making a decision on the vote (TSC). What
else do you need to prove? Reliance on misrepresentation -not required
3. Court says this is misleading, looks to what type of causal relationship
must be shown
a. Cir. Ct: Is there harm? If not, the existence of defect doesnt matter.
The price was fair even though the process was bad (no monetary
harm, no foul).
b. SCOTUS: Use of solicitation that is materially misleading is itself
violation of law.
c. Test: If there has been a finding of materiality (of the misleading
statement), a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal
relationship between the violation and the injury for which he
seeks redress if he proves the proxy solicitation (rather than the
particular defect in the solicitation materials) was an essential
link in the accomplishment. Note no mention of intent to deceive.
d. Thus, if you can prove that there was defect (i.e., suffrage was
harmed by defect), you have established a common benefit to ALL
shareholders. Thus, you can get the attorneys fee.
e. Rationale: Unless there is an award for the attorneys fee, there isnt
going to be private enforcement of 1934 SEA (rational apathy). SEC
may not be enough for its gate-keeping role.
d. Notes:
What incentive does a single shareholder have to bring an action? The individual SH
bears all of the cost and must share the potential gain, so there are times when no
rational shareholder would sue - its a version of the traditional tragedy of the commons
(prisoners dilemma), because even of they all agree to pay, the individual shareholder
has the incentive to free ride.
SC response in Mills left the individual shareholder with no better incentives, because if
the disclosure was found not to be material, the shareholder will bear all of the costs.
However, by awarding attorneys fees, lawyers have an incentive to find cases of material
nondisclosure and bring them to court - the corporation bears the cost of the lawsuit (i.e.,
each individual shareholder is forced to pay his share of the corporations attorneys fees).
The fourth section of the courts opinion in Mills is the most important, because its
where the court tries to solve the prisoners dilemma (by providing an interest to a third
party - lawyers - in order to induce behavior that will benefit the collective
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shareholders). This is a different role for lawyers than the Rules of Professional
Responsibility implicate, but its the only way that the laws will get enforced.
e. The [Lack of] Scienter Requirement: Gerstle v. Gambel-Skogmo, Inc.
(Negligence suffices to establish liability under Rule 14a-9)
3. Requirements For Action: Misrepresentation (no Scienter), Materiality; Reliance to
Detriment (Causation); Damages
6. Shareholder Proposals
Hypothetical: Parent owns $10,000 in stock, after the stock price drops he wants to introduce a
shareholder proposalno future re-pricing. Is there any basis under 14a-8 to exclude this
proposal? What if he wants to elect Dean Fitts to BOD? (14a-8(i)(8)yes, this can be excluded
under the rule)
Hypothetical: Mr. G wants to lobby the shareholders, he has prepared material on this proposal
that he wants to send out to the 100 largest shareholders. He is planning on doing it on his own,
and pick up the cost of mailing. Does he have a right to have the company do this? See 14a-7.
1. Shareholder Comment on Management Proposal Rule 14a-7 Obligations of Registrants to
Provide a List of, or Mail Soliciting Materials to, Security Holders (also see 219
shareholder lists above)
a. If shareholder is willing to bear costs of printing and postage, 14a-7(a) requires
corporation to either mail SHs solicitation OR give shareholder a shareholder list so
that he can mail it himself. Decision is up to BOD
b. Requirements:
i. Shareholder proxy materials must relate to a meeting in which corporation will be
making its own solicitation 14a-7(d): Prevents dissident shareholder from using the
rule to require that his communications get mailed when no meeting has been called.
ii. Shareholders must be entitled to vote on the matter.
iii. SH must defray expenses the corporation will incur in mailing the materials. Mainly
postage and printing costs
c. Corporation cannot impose lengthy limitations or censor the materials in any way.
d. Timing
i. Materials must be mailed with Reasonable promptness so that management cant
gain any advantage by delaying the mailing.
ii. Management can only delay the mailing until either:
1. A day corresponding to the first date on which managements proxy materials
were mailed in connection with the prior annual meeting OR
2. The first day on which management makes its solicitations this year
2. Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: provides an opportunity for a shareholder owning
relatively small amount of a companys securities to have his proposal placed alongside
managements proposals. If management believes a shareholder proposal can be excluded
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from the proxy statement under rule 14a-8(i)(7), it must submit to the SEC staff a statement
of reasons for omission. If the staff agrees, they will send a no action letter
a. Corporation Bears Expense
b. When this rule applies, shareholder has access to the Boards actual proxy statement.
Proposal doesnt have to be related to anything that the Board intends to raise at the
meeting.
c. Eligibilityshareholder MUST:
i. Own at least 1% or $2000 in market value of securities AND
ii. Have held the share for at least one year prior to the submission
d. Lengthshareholder may submit only one proposal for inclusion in managements proxy
materials.
i. The proposal and supporting statement together may not exceed 500 words.
ii. Thus, Rule 14a-7 enables a shareholder to send out a longer and more extensive
statement.
e. Excluding Proposals Rule 14a-8(i)
Exclusions Related to Proposal Itself
i. (1) The proposal is not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law.
Rephrasing proposal from demand for action to request or recommendation for action
would make proposal proper.
ii. (2) The proposal would violate state or federal law.
iii. (5) Relevance to companys business: Less than 5% of total asset and of net
earnings and gross sales and is NOT otherwise significantly related to corporations
business (most compensation proposals are not covered by this provision, b/c they
relate to corps business).
iv. (6) The company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal.
v. (7) Management functions: proposal deals with a matter relating to the companys
ordinary course of business operations (debate about proposals that focus on equity
compensation plans that may be used to compensate senor executive officers,
directors, and the general workforce) (See DuPont case)
vi. (8) The proposal relates to election of the Board or analogous government body.
vii. (10) The company has already substantially implemented the proposal.
viii. (13) The proposal relates to specific dividends. (Declaration of dividends is for
BOD to decide, shareholders have no right to dictate this). Also see DGCL 170
Dividends Asset
Exclusions Relating To Procedure
i. (3) The proposal is in violation of the proxy rules (especially 14a-9)
ii. (4) The proposal is related to a personal claim or grievance, or is designed to further
a personal interest. (similar to 14a-2(b)(9))
iii. (9) The proposal conflicts with companys proposal that is to be submitted to
shareholders at same meeting.
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tender offer + proxy fight, (2) just say no campaign, where SHs will withhold authority
from nominees for directors to signal displeasure, (3) SHs are not trying to replace current
slate entirely, they, instead, nominate one respectable person to be director)
b. Built in Advantages For Management
i. Shareholders tend to vote for management
ii. Management can use corporate funds to pay for its arguments.
iii. Management knows who the SH are and how much each owns so that they can plan
accordingly. Insurgents have to litigate to get those lists.
2. SEC RegulationsRule 14a-7: Requires management to tell insurgents how many
shareholders of record exist, how many beneficial owners exist and how much it will cost to
mail insurgents proxy materials.
3. Right To Inspect Shareholder Lists
a. Insurgents dont have right to inspect lists under SEC Rules, but under most state laws,
they have that right:
i. DGCL 220(b): Any SH has right to inspect list if he has a purpose reasonably
related to his interest as a shareholder.
ii. RMBCA 16.02: Allows inspection if it is requested in good faith and for a proper
purpose.
4. Disclosure Requirements
a. A written proxy statement must precede any solicitation.
b. Additional disclosures are required for proxy contests involving election of directors.
Insurgent must file special information about each participant in solicitation. Participant
= Anyone contributing more than $500 to the contest.
c. Schedule 14B must be filed by each participant in the contest, at least 5 days before the
group starts its solicitation. Gives management a warning of the impending action.
5. Costs
a. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane (Reimbursement For Proxy Fights): During
proxy fight, board uses $106,000 to defend itself and insurgents spend $124,000. When
insurgents win, new board pays old board unreimbursed costs and pays itself its costs.
Payments approved by shareholders 16 to 1, but attorney-shareholder challenges it. Under
14A-8(i)(8), dissidents have to send out their own proxy materials in proxy battle b/c it
relates to election of the Boardno right to reimbursement under proxy rules, BUT
i. Rule: In proxy contests, corporate funds may be used to pay reasonable and necessary
expenses incurred in proxy fight: (1) in contest over policy (cannot use corporate funds
for proxy fights resulting from personal differences), corporate directors acting in good
faith have right to make reasonable and proper expenditures from corporate treasury
for purpose of persuading stockholders and soliciting support (2) SHs have right to
ratify reimbursement for such expenses incurred by non-directorsno right to get
money upfront, but if he wins, SHs may decide to reimburse. The reason for
submission to SH vote is concern regarding self-dealing. One way to justify it is
through SH vote. Here, transaction would be still conflicted b/c dissidents are now
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running corporate machinery and are voting to finance their own campaign, but SH
ratification renders transaction rightful.
b. Proposed rule 14a-11in order for a rule to become effective SEC has to approve it. If
this rule in its current form becomes law, how does it change current state of affairs?
Hypothetical: Under current law if you put in proposal to put Dean Fitts onto ballot, it can be
excluded by the company under 14a-8. If 14a-11 is passed, can we then put Fitts on the ballot?
14a-11(a)(1)applicable state law does not prohibit the registrants security holders from
nominating a candidate for election as director. The rule does not purport to provide openended right in security holders to put nominations onto the corporations ballot.
i. One of the following events has occurred (triggers)(1) just vote no campaign and
more than 35% votes cast at the annual meeting has been withheld 14a-11(a)(2)(i) and
(2) under (a)(2)(ii) a shareholder proposal submitted pursuant to 14-a8 by a security
holder who held more than 1% of the securities entitled to vote on this proposal for a
year as of the date the proposal was submittedit is a proposal to opt into the
nomination right by the shareholders who receive more than 50% of the votes cast on
that proposal at the annual meeting. What are some other triggers for nomination
right? A precatory proposal that was approved but not implemented by BOD.
ii. Nominating security holder eligibility: Suppose one of these triggers is satisfied, what
then is the right? 14a-11(b)(1) nominating holder must be 5% holder of registrants
securities or must be a member of a 5% group.
iii. Procedure for nomination: 14a-11(c) requires nominating shareholder to provide
notice of its intent to require that the registrant include that security holders nominee
on registrants proxy card no later than 80 days before the registrant mailed its materials
for the prior years annual meeting. This notice must include some 14a-11(c)(1)
representation (you cannot nominate yourself or somebody who works for your group
(c)(3)ii) that the nominees candidacy or board membership would not violate
controlling state or fed law.
iv. Number of security holder nominees (depends on the size of the BOD): 14a-11(d)(1)(i)
registrant is not required to include more than one security holder nominee where the
total number of members of BOD is 8 or fewer, (ii) two if BOD is 20 or fewer (iii) and
three if BOD is more than 20
v. Liability for false or misleading statements: registrant is not responsible for any
information in the notice of the nominating security holder
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