TOPIC: General jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-23942

March 28, 1969

CARMEN DEVEZA, DOROTEA CABRERA and FELINO CABRERA, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
HON. JUAN B. MONTECILLO, as Justice of the Peace of Tiaong, Quezon and PATERNO
CHUMACERA,respondents-appellees.
FACTS
On February 5, 1960, petitioners Carmen Deveza, Dorotea Cabrera, and Felino Cabrera filed
with the Justice of the Peace (now MTC) Court of Tiaong, Quezon, an unlawful detainer suit
against private respondent Paterno Chumacera. According to the complaint petitioners are the
owners of a parcel of riceland in San Isidro, Quezon, evidenced by TCT. The petitioners averred
that the respondent owns a piece of land which adjoins the northwest portion of their property.
A relocation survey took place on June 1959, during which it was discovered that private
respondent Chumacera had been occupying, knowingly or unknowingly, about 3,000 square
meters of the northwest portion of petitioners' land.
When informed by the petitioners of his unlawful possession and asked to vacate the land,
Chumacera refused.
Complaint prayed for the respondent to vacate the land and turn over possession to petitioners;
plus payment of reasonable compensation worth P1,000, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
costs.
Chumacera moved to dismiss complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
MTCs ruling:
MTC respondent judge Montecillo dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners then commenced a petition for mandamus in the CFI of Quezon to compel
respondent judge to hear and decide on the merits of the case.
CFIs ruling:
CFI found that respondent judge acted properly, and thus dismissed petition for mandamus.
Petitioners appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the case
HELD:
The MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or

building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor,

vendee, or other person against whom the possession, of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.....
There is nothing in the complaint that would indicate that petitioners were deprived of possession
of the disputed land "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" which would bring them
within the definition of forcible entry nor is there an allegation that respondent withheld
possession of the land "after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue
of any contract, express or implied.
Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further provides that an action for unlawful detainer must
be brought within 1 year after such deprivation or withholding of possession. The period is to be
counted from the start of the illegal possession.
There was no mention in the complaint as to when the unlawful possession began, except that
the plaintiffs discovered such on June 16, 1959. There is thus no way of knowing, upon the
averments of the complaint, how defendant's (respondent Chumacera's) possession started or
continued. The complaint, accordingly, does not show facts which would give the municipal court
of Tiaong jurisdiction to entertain this case, either as forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
However, respondent Chumacera in his brief pointed out that, based on the oral arguments,
petitioners made an admission that respondent had been in possession of the land for more than
one year prior to the filing of the complaint. Petitioners did not deny said averment of fact. For
this very reason and the fact that the period of such unlawful deprivation does not clearly appear
on the complaint, this case should be dismissed,
The proceedings under Rule 70 are essentially summary in nature. The present case does not fit
into the summary nature of the remedies envisioned in Rule 70. The situation here presented
requires a full-blown inquiry to determine who has the better right to the possession or ownership
of the land.
As the court declared in a previous case, an inferior court should reject a complaint for forcible
entry and detainer "right at the outset", if it is already clear that that court has no jurisdiction
thereon.
Petition denied. CFI decision affirmed.