Preterition

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation. (814a)
Art. 855. The share of a child or descendant omitted in a will must first be taken from the part of the estate not disposed of by the
will, if any; if that is not sufficient, so much as may be necessary must be taken proportionally from the shares of the other
compulsory heirs. (1080a)
Art. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that
the same be fully satisfied. (815)
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which
is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but
the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
RESRVA TRONCAL
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (871)

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his
share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies
to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct
of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix
prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the
shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed
two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her
heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first
will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that
Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto.
This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate
heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence,
this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only
of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud
Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano

Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not
acquire valid title to it.

HELD:
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's
last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really
being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of
children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does
not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for
that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than
her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or
total ommission of a forced heir.
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
(Special Proceedings Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)
Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her
legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said
will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is
void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of
preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.
Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits
the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal
institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
CONSTANTINO ACAIN V. IAC, VIRGINIA FERNANDEZ AND ROSA DIONGSON, 155
SCRA 100 (1983)
DOCTRINE: Acain resolved once and for all the issue as to whether or not a surviving spouse
could be preterited. This issue was not definitively answered in Balanay. In addition, Acain
resolved that an adopted child may be preterited. This issue was not resolved in Maninang.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court did not explain the reason why an adopted child
(while given the same rights and obligations as a legitimate child under the provisions of P.D.
603) could be preterited. It must be noted that given the said provisions, the adopted child is
not entitled to the right of representation, which is available to a legitimate child. It would
seem, however, that with the provisions of the Family Code, specifically on the status of an
adopted child, the preterition of an adopted child finds greater support.
FACTS: In May 1984, petitioner Acain filed with RTC Cebu a petition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio Acain based on the premise that the decedent Nemesio left a will in
which petitioner and his siblings were instituted as heirs.
1.
The will was allegedly executed by Nemesio in February 1960 which was written in
Bisaya and was not opposed by private respondents
2.
In the will, Nemesio bequeathed all his properties to his brother Segundo on the
condition that if Segundo predeceases Nemesio, said properties will be given to Segundos
children (herein petitioner)
3.
Segundo predeceased before Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who are
claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as petitioner
4.
Private respondents, Virigina (legally adopted daughter of the decedent) and Rosa
(decedents spouse) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
a.

The petitioner had no legal capacity to institute said proceedings

b.

Petitioner is merely a universal heir

c.

The widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited

5.

Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

6.
On appeal, IAC granted private respondents petition and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the petition for probate of the will of Nemesio
7.

Petitioner argues that:

a.
The authority of the probate court is limited only to inquiring into the intrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated, and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity therof before
it is admitted to probate
b.
The preterition mentioned in Art 854 NCC refers to preterition of compulsory heirs in
the direct line and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in
the direct line. Thus, their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs
ISSUE: WON private respondents have been preterited
HELD: Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Art 854 NCC may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance for she is
not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner. Under Art 39 of P.D. No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopted
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado, mejora o donacion" The only provisions which do not result in intestacy
are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear
terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No
legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of
annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except
that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT

The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity
of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the
will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this state of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the
will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void
as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the
obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
The trial court have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved

ACAIN vs. IAC

October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided
that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother
Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to
Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow
Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption by the
testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the

same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except
insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not
the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the
testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is
called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir.
However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the
universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased.
Dy Yieng v Reyes
In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006, there
was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as Kasulatan sa
pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs
were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result
to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2)
private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because
Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for
certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b)
cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike,
with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa(Article 783) can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property,
the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed
in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should
be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last

testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was the testators last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of his eldest son. Also, he did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners in the document did not operate to institute her as
the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between testator and his
son.
Considering that the questioned document is testators holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory. (Maninang v. CA, 114 SCRA 478).
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated.
It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. (Cuenco v. CA, 53 SCRA 360).

BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)

DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal. Among other things,
it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate of the reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is
survived by qualified reservees. As such, the reservor cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will,
nor can the reservor choose who or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the
reservable property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura v
Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable property among the
reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in Florentino and quotes substantially from the
text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to
distinguish between full-blood brothers from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.
Benito Legarda Tuason
Consuelo
Rita
+Benito Legarda de la Paz

Filomena Roces
Beatriz
Rosario
Teresa
+Filomena
Benito
Alejandro
Jose

Carmen Legarda y Fernandez

Ramon Legarda y Hernandez
Filomena Legarda y Lobregat

Jaime Legarda y Lobregat

Celso Legarda y Lobregat
Alejandro Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Teresa Legarda y Lobregat
Ma. Antonia Legarda y Lobregat
Jose Legarda y Lobregat
Rosario Legarda y Lobregat
Benito Legarda y Lobregat
Eduardo Legarda y Lobregat
Trinidad Legarda

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito I), died and was survived
by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children. The real properties left by his deceased father, Benito I, were
partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito IIs sisters and his heirs pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena, died
without issue and her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena vda de Legarda
1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties she inherited from her daughter as
a result of which she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of the properties held pro-indiviso by her
other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda executed 2 handwritten documents disposing of the properties which
she inherited from her daughter in favor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs.
Legarda and her 6 surviving children partitioned the co-owned property
2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of her daughters, filed
a motion to exclude in the inventory of the properties inherited from Filomena, the deceased daughter, on
the ground that said properties were reservable and should be inherited by Filomenas 3 sisters and 3
brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren of Mrs. Legarda, or Filomenas nephews and nieces. She also filed an
action securing a declaration that the properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
3. It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the properties to her
grandchildren, who are third degree relatives of Filomena and who belong to the paternal line, the reason
for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some
special accident of life, property that should otherwise have remained therein.
ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16 grandchildren (reservees within the third degree)
to the exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)
HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16 grandchildren the reservable properties
she inherited from her daughter because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservoir
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservoir.
Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest within the third degree
from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom to
the reservable properties should be given and deprive the other reservees of their shares therein. To allow the
reservoir to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree
and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of Art 891, this cannot
be allowed.
Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the disposition is in favor of relatives
within the third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operation of Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas 6
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from
the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor.
The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legardas death. Since at
the time of her death, there were reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not

lose their reservable character. The disposition of the properties should be made in accordance with Art 891 and in
accordance with the reservors holographic will.
Chua v. CFI
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, petitioners,
vs.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V and Susana De La Torre, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre
DOCTRINE:
The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the origin of the
reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a certain amount to a third party for
the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment obligation was not imposed by the origin, the
acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in nature.
Patricia

Jose
Ignacio
Lorenzo
Manuel

Consolacion
Juanito

FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and
Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with
whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of the second
marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.
3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the
one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the
other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and P1,550.00 in
favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion and Juanito.
4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion
succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time, Consolacion
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro- indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then on March 5,
1966, Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line
except her brother and sisters.
5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first marriage
and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo
Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI of Negros Occidental,
praying that the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed to
Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in
question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.
6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father, Jose Frias Chua,
gratuitously or not, in relation to first requisite of reserve troncal
HELD: Yes
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It
matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is

essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of theperson
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving
the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the
essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the
property in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous.
In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that
the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that
there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he
died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de
la Torre, by operation of law. When Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives
within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as
ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously,
from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose
Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous
The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose
in his last will and testament but by an order of the court. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is
free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is
gratuitous. The order of the court does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him.
As far as the deceased Jose is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This being the
case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891.
EDROSO VS. SABLAN (1913)
Marcelina Edroso, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, opponents-appellees
DOCTRINE: A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The reservor, having
inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof, subject to a resolutory condition. Thus,
a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and may institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case.
It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should intervene solely for the
purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title
issued pursuant to a decree of registration, may in the proper case extinguish the reserva.
Mariano

Ma. Rita

Victoriano

Marcelina

Pedro

FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who inherited two
parcels of land upon the death of his father.
1. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance
toh i s m o t h e r . H e n c e t h e h e r e d i t a r y t i t l e w h e r e u p o n i s b a s e d t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r
registration of her ownership.
2. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed
the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right
reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each parcel.
3. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could
only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a r e s e r v a b l e property.

HELD:
A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous title), and
it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what
he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired
them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial
court's ruling that they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the
law.
The person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He
has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he
has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate,
although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and
have title to it, although a limited and recoverable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that
only when the person who must reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it.
The SC reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to
register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application, recording in the
registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, should they survive her.
CONSTANCIO
SIENES,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellee

Doctrine:
The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2) the survival of the
reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to the first as a resolutory condition, it
would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the
reservees may alienate the reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the
timeliness or untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to herein from the
concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem fairly clear that the
reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said sale, she was the registered owner of the
property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale executed by the reservees may be viewed from a different
perspective. Since the reservor was still alive at the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could not
have validly sold the same parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the parcel
of land, then the sale should properly be construed as a conditional sale - the condition being the survival of the
seller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to construed this sale of the
reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence the subject matter of the sale would not be
the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees thereto, which is conditional.

Teresa

Sps. Esparcia

Saturnino

Agaton
Fernando
Paulina
Cipriana

Andrea

Sps. Sienes

Francisco

FACTS:
1. Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso (origin). With his first wife, Teresa Reales, he had 4 children,
named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana.
2. With his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco (propositus).
3. Upon Yaesos death, said lot was left to Francisco and title was issued in his name. Because Francisco was then a
minor, his mother administered the property for him and declared it in her name for taxation purposes.
4. When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, Andrea Gutang (reservista) as sole heir,
executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of the Sps. ConstancioSienes and
GenovevaSilay (Sps. Sienes).
5. Thereafter, the Sps. Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband, Jose Esparcia, the surrender of the
original certificate of title (which was in their possession). The latter refused.

6. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios), the surviving half-sisters of Francisco as such, declared the property
in their name and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor of the Sps. Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Sps.
Esparcia), who in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured title in their name.
7. ConstancioSienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana,
the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.
8. Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of
the Sps. Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was void since Andrea had no right to dispose of the
property.
9. The trial court declared that the sale of Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was void and that the sale by Paulina and
CiprianaYaeso to the Sps. Esparcia was also void. The land in question was reservable property and therefore, the
reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came, if any, survived her.
10. The records show that the lone reserve surviving was CiprianaYaeso.
ISSUE:
WON the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whether the reservoir or the reserve can alienate the same
HELD: Yes, the lot is reservable property.
1. On Franciscos death, unmarried and without descendants, the property was inherited by his mother, Andrea
Gutang, who was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which said property came, if any, survived her.
2. Being reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutory conditions:
a.

the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and

b.
the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came.
In connection with this, the court has held that the reservista (reservor) has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. Hence, he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservista, the right
acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatorios (reserves) at the time of the
death of the reservista .
3. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
4. On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the Sps. Esparcia was
subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale was made by Cipriana and her sister
prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition.
Florentino v. Florentino

ENCARNACION
FLORENTINO,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO G.R. No. L-14856

ET

AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

November 15, 1919

Doctrine:
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation accorded the reservee,
the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if he himself is a relative within the third degree
of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of
strangers, then the reserva is not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property was devised or willed by
the reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable nature of the
property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that the reservable property is not part of the estate of the
reservor upon his demise. Third, there is an affirmation that the title of the reservor to the reservable property is not
in the nature of full dominion, by reason of the reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to
the validity of this proposition in the light of the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is a
mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing the title of the
reservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an error in the
distribution of the reservable property.
Antonia

Apolonio II
+Jose
Ramon
Miguel
Victorino
Antonio
Rosario

Severina
Mercedes
Apolonio III

Juan
+Maria
Encarnacion
+Isabel
+Espirita
Emilia
Jesus
Lourdes
Caridad
Dolores
Gabriel
+Pedro
Jose
Asunsion
Magdalena

FACTS:
1. ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino II married Antonia Faz, with whom he had 9 children. When his wife died, Apolonio
married Severina, with whom he had 2 children- Mercedes and Apolonio III.
2. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and the ten children, Apolonio III, being born after
Apolonio II died.

3. He was able to execute a will instituting as universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his
widow, Severina, and declaring that all of his property should be divided among all of his children in both
marriages.
4. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given 6 parcels of land and some personal property of Apolonio II.
5. Apolonio III later died and his mother, Severina, succeeded to all these properties. She subsequently died,
leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes.
6. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, including the property
inherited by Severina from Apolonio III, which is said to be reservable property. Accordingly, Mercedes had been
gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
7. The children of Apolonio II by his first wife, as well as his grandchildren by the first marriage, instituted an
action for recovery of their share of the reservable property. The defendants contend that no property can be
reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a forced heiress and the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty
to respect the legitime.
8. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers has been
avoided.
ISSUE:
WON the property is subject to reserve troncal or not
HELD: Yes, it is subject to reserve troncal
1. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her only daughter and forced heiress, nevertheless, this property
has not lost its reservable nature. The posthumous son, Apolonio III, acquired the property by lucrative title or by
inheritance from his legitimate father.
2. Although such property was inherited by Severina, nevertheless, she was duty bound to reserve the property thus
acquired for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree of the line from which such property came.
Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment , use and trust merely for the reason that the law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve the same for certain designated persons, who on the death of said
ascendants- reservoir, acquire the ownership of said property in fact and operation of law in the same manner as
forced heirs.
3. There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III, to wit:
a.

Apolonio IIs 3 children from his first marriage

b.

The children of Apolonio IIs deceased children, 12 in all

c.

Mercedes, Apolonio IIIs sister.

All of the plaintiffs are relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree (four as half-siblings and
12 as his
nephews and nieces). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the others by
right of representation, all are entitled as reservees.
4. The properties in question came from the common ancestor, Apolonio II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III
without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina; it became
reservable property with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of the property.
5. Severina could have disposed in her will all her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes, as
forced heir. But the provision concerning the reservable property reducing the rights of the other reserves is null and

void inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the right to
deliver the same to the reserves.
6. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and
receives the same from his descendant, therefore, it does not form part of his property nor become the legitimeof his
forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case all the relatives of his descendant died, in which case, the
said reservable property loses such character.
Maria Cano v. Director of Lands
FACTS:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of
Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, nder the following terms and
conditions:
1. lands be registered in the name of Maria Cano
2. with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in
favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil code.
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were
issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero.
In October 1955, counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the
Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria
Cano, on September 8, 1955, and praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered
cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered
to place her in possession of the property.
The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of the reservista Maria Cano
with the following contentions:
1. the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary
contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the
motion.
2. the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112
of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee,
as the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared.
3. the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the
following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant
or from a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and

(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which
said property came.
RULING:
Appeal is untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared to
exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal
were expressly recognized.
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was
acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of
the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other
private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil
Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from
contesting the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for
the passing of the title from the reservista to the appellee are:
(1) the death of the reservista; and
(2) the fact that the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and
their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption
that the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista.
This is not true. The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the
reservable property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as
a conditional heir of the descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's
lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life interest in the
reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario
nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by
operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no
part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter.
Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property records without
necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is
equally well settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to
her or his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as a reservatario

within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the property
came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the
property, without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among
themselves, further proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of
the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere
claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that
the heirs of the reservista are merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the
reservable property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
Mendoza v Delos Santos (Succession)

Mendoza v Delos Santos

GR No 176422, March 20, 2013
MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,
DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT,
MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P.
DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No.
1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza
(Dominga). Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas
properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel.
After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After
Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without
issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and
Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by
respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of
TCT and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners. CA also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES
ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON
RESERVA TRONCAL.
APPLICABLE LAW:
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property
came. (Emphasis ours)
RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview
of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. It was also
immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came.
Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by
gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant
or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous
or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired
the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant
(also known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not
Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within

the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the
degree should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from
which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is
Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first
cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or
reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article
891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of
nephews and nieces of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the
third degree.
OTHER NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous
title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant
called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to
the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is
from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third
degree from which the property came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct
line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not
ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the
property on the title. In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus,
whether by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a
title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively.