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FIRST DIVISION

January 13, 2016


G.R. No. 216920
GIRLIE M. QUISAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 10, 2014
and the Resolution3dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
131968, which affirmed the denial of petitioner Girlie M. Quisay's (petitioner) Motion to
Quash before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144 (RTC).
The Facts
On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati)
issued a Pasiya4 or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, 5otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal6 or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner
of such crime.
On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the
ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of
her motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned
by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by
Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid
Sakdal was penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority,
albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or
approval from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner
claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De
La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against her. As such, the
Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be
cured.7
In its Comment and Opposition,8 the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor,
SACP Hirang, was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order
No. 32.9 Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval
of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself. 10
The RTC Ruling

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of
merit. It found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently
complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written
authority or approval by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of
Informations.12
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 13 which was, however, denied in an Order 14 dated
July 10, 2013. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a petition
for certiorari.15
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated October 10, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that
pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, 17 otherwise known as the "Prosecution Service Act of
201 O," as well as OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati
authorized SACP Hirang to approve the issuance of, inter alia, resolutions finding
probable cause and the filing of Informations before the courts. As such, SACP Hirang
may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor, approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to
indict petitioner of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610. 18
Further, it held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid
Sakdal clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary
investigation and with the prior written authority or approval of the City Prosecutor. In
this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity
accorded to a public officer's performance of official functions, in the absence of
convincing evidence to the contrary. 19
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, 20 but
Resolution21 dated January 30, 2015; hence, this petition.

was

denied

in

The Issue Before the Court


The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that the
R TC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to quash.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing
of a complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named
officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, viz.:
SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution
and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by
the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed

and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their
receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.1wphi1
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the
prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same
defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 11 7 of the
same Rules, to wit:
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, People v. Garfin22 firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an
officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity
which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. 23
In the case at bar, the CA affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to quash on the
grounds that: (a) the City Prosecutor ofMakati may delegate its authority to approve the
filing of the Pabatid Sakdal pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, as well as OCP-Makati
Office Order No. 32; and (b) the Pabatid Sakdal contained a Certification stating that its
filing before the RTC was with the prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor.
The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave
the City Prosecutor the power to "[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made and filed against the persons accused,"24 he may indeed delegate

his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the
prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which
gave division chiefs or review prosecutors "authority to approve or act on any resolution,
order, issuance, other action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for
approval,"25 without necessarily diminishing the City Prosecutor's authority to act directly
in appropriate cases.26 By virtue of the foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly
designated SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review prosecutors for the OCPMakati.27
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the
crime charged, was validly made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review
prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed
before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was approved by either the City
Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCPMakati' s division chiefs or review prosecutors. All
it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others,
that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakdal na ito ay may
nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" 28 - which
translates to "and that the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and
approval of the City Prosecutor."
In the cases of People v. Garfin,29 Turingan v. Garfin,30 and Tolentino v. Paqueo,31 the
Court had already rejected similarly-worded certifications, uniformly holding that despite
such certifications, the Informations were defective as it was shown that the officers
filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they
obtained prior written authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De
La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by
himself. Records are bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had
authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so by giving him prior written authority or by
designating him as a division chief or review prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise
nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz sought the approval of either the City
Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 in
filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how ACP De La Cruz was able
to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP Hirang but failed to
have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other authorized officer in
the OCP-Makati.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of
the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on
record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his

own; or (b) did seek the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before
filing the Information before the RTC.
In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to
quash as the Pabatid Sakdalor Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the
officer who filed the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid
Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioner.
As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of Court governs the pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts of the Philippines. For the orderly administration of
justice, the provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but especially
by the prosecution arm of the Govemment." 32
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 10, 2014 and the
Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information against petitioner
Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal case against her is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 213910, February 03, 2016
VINSON* D. YOUNG A.K.A. BENZON ONG AND BENNY YOUNG A.K.A. BENNY
ONG, Petitioners, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS REPRESENTED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 10,
2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP.

No. 07147, which reversed and set aside the Order4 dated July 24, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 22 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CBU-96106, finding
probable cause to indict petitioners Vinson D. Young a.k.a. Benzon Ong (Vinson) and
Benny Young a.k.a. Benny Ong (Benny; collectively, petitioners) for violation of Sections
4 (a) and (e)5 in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) 6 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9208,7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."
The Facts
On separate dates,8 members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force
(RAHTTF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), namely, PO2 Lyman N. Arsiia (PO2
Arsua) and PO2 Napoleon A. Talingting, Jr. (PO2 Talingting, Jr.), among others, conducted
surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City, and observed that its
customers paid P6,000.00 in exchange for sexual intercourse with guest relations officers
(GROs), or P10,000.00 as "bar fine" if they were taken out of the establishment. In the
course of their surveillance, they learned that: (a) petitioners were the owners of Jaguar;
(b) a certain "Tico" acted as overall manager; and (c) a certain "Ann" welcomed
customers
and
offered
them
GROs.9
On April 9, 2011, in the course of an entrapment operation, PO2 Arsua, PO2 Talingting,
Jr., and PO1 Jef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo), acting as poseur customers, handed
P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the "mamasang"/manager of Jaguar in exchange
for sexual service. At the prearranged signal, the rest of the RAHTTF members raided
Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia, recovery of the
marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), 10 and the rescue of 146 women and minor
children.11 Later, six (6) of these women - who all worked at Jaguar as GROs, namely,
AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, and FFF12 (AAA Group) - executed affidavits13 identifying
petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners. Accordingly, a criminal complaint for
violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 was
filed against them, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cebu City (OCP), docketed as
NPS
Docket
No.
VII-09-INV-IID00605.14
In defense, Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had sold his rights
and interests therein to one Charles Theodore Rivera pursuant to a Deed of
Assignment15 dated December 14, 2009 (December 14, 2009 Deed of Assignent). Not
being the manager nor owner of Jaguar, therefore, he had no control and supervision
over the AAA Group, with whom he denied acquaintance. Similarly, Benny claimed that
he was neither the owner nor manager of Jaguar and was not even present during the
raid. He raised "mistake in identity" as defense, stressing that he was not the same
person
identified
by
the
AAA
Group
in
their
respective
affidavits. 16
During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, or on May 31, 2011, the AAA
Group submitted affidavits17 stating that their previous affidavits were vitiated and not of
their own free will and voluntary deed,18 effectively recanting the same.
The OCP Ruling
In a Resolution19 dated October 27, 2011, the OCP found probable cause and ordered the
indictment of petitioners, Tico, and Ann for violation of Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation
to
Sections
6
(a)
and
(c)
of
RA
9208.
It found that the receipt and subsequent recovery of the marked money from Balili
constituted prima facie evidence that there was a transaction to engage in sexual
service for a fee.20 It also held that the documentary evidence pertaining to Jaguar's

business operations, as well as the positive identification made by the AAA Group,
sufficiently established petitioners as its owners. Besides, it noted that Vinson's defense
- i.e., that he had divested his interests in Jaguar - was evidentiary in nature and hence,
must be threshed out in a full-blown trial. Moreover, while the AAA Group had since
retracted their initial statements, their retractions were found to hold no probative value.
Finally, while the OCP ruled that the crime of human trafficking was qualified for being
committed by a syndicate, or in large scale - carried out by three (3) or more persons - it,
however, did not appreciate the minority of EEE and FFF as a qualifying circumstance,
not having been substantiated by sufficient and competent evidence. 21
Separately, both parties moved for reconsideration. 22 In a Resolution23 dated April 23,
2012, the OCP modified its previous ruling and considered the minority of EEE and FFF
based on the certified true copies of their certificates of live birth 24 as additional
qualifying circumstance. On May 29, 2012, the corresponding information 25 was filed
before
the
RTC,
docketed
as
Crim.
Case
No.
CBU-96106.
On June 18, 2012, petitioners filed an omnibus motion 26 for a judicial determination of
probable cause, praying that the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest be
held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be
dismissed for lack of probable cause. 27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
In an Order28 dated July 24, 2012, the RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed
the case for lack of probable cause. 29 It ruled that the affidavits of the RAHTTF members
and the AAA Group failed to show that petitioners had knowledge or participated in the
recruitment of the 146 women and minors who were rescued at Jaguar as sex workers. It
also found that the recantations of the AAA Group were fatal to the prosecution's case,
since it effectively cleared petitioners of any knowledge in Jaguar's operations. It further
reasoned that the December 14, 2009 Deed of Assignment - the authenticity, due
execution, and validity of which were not impugned by the prosecution - showed that
Vinson
had
already
ceded
his
rights
and
interests
in
Jaguar. 30
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for certiorari31 before the CA, docketed as CA G.R. SP. No. 07147, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. In
their Comment,32 petitioners maintained that the RTC properly dismissed the case.
Procedurally, they also pointed out that the correct remedy on the part of the OSG was to
file an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Even assuming that a certioraripetition was
the proper mode of review, the OSG's failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration
was
a
fatal
infirmity
warranting
the
petition's
outright
33
dismissal. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA Ruling
In a Decision34 dated September 10, 2013, the CA found that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Consequently, it
ordered the reinstatement of the information and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.35 The CA primarily reasoned out that the court a quo failed to
consider the other evidence proffered by the prosecution to support its finding of
probable cause, and that it delved on evidentiary issues in evaluating the affidavits
submitted by the prosecution which are matters better ventilated during the trial proper
than
at
the
preliminary
investigation
level.36

The CA, however, did not touch on the issue of the propriety of the certiorari petition
filed
by
the
OSG.
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration 37 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution38dated July 31, 2014; hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case
against petitioners for lack of probable cause; and (b) whether or not a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite to filing a certiorari petition.
The Court's Ruling
The

petition

Determination

of

probable

is
cause

bereft
is

either

executive

of
or

judicial

merit.
in

nature.

The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for
the purpose of filing an information in court. At this juncture, the investigating prosecutor
evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been
committed
and
that
the
accused
is
probably
guilty
thereof. 39
On the other hand, judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of
the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. At this
stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the
strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines
the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order liot to frustrate
the
ends
of
justice.40
In People v. Inting,41 the stark distinctions between executive and judicial determination
of probable cause were aptly explained, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if
the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there
should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of
the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. 42 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Pertinently, the Court declared in Santos-Dio v. CA43 (Santos-Dio) that while a judge's
determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing
arrest warrants, he is nonetheless authorized under Section 5 (a), 44 Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be
stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut

cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime
charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely
than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and
thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional
evidence.45 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut
cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when
the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. 46
Applying the standard set forth in Santos-Dio, the evidence on record herein
does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against
petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was
able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4 (a) and
(e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records,
petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them
under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this,
probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
Moreover, the Court notes that the defenses raised by petitioners, particularly their
disclaimer that they are no longer the owners of the establishment where the sex
workers were rescued, are evidentiary in nature - matters which are best threshed out in
a full-blown trial. Thus, the proper course of action on the part of the RTC was not to
dismiss the case but to proceed to trial. Unfortunately, and as the CA aptly observed, the
RTC arrogated upon itself the task of dwelling on factual and evidentiary matters upon
which it eventually anchored the dismissal of the case. Consequently, grave abuse of
discretion was correctly imputed by the CA against the RTC for its action.
Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration- is a prerequisite to the filing
of a certiorari petition, the Court finds the OSG's argument well-taken. In this regard,
jurisprudence has carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to
a certiorari petition, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.47
In this case, the assailed RTC Order was a patent nullity for being rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 48 Significantly, the
present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208, or the "AntiTrafficking in Persons Act of 2003," a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is

characterized by sexual violence and slavery. 49Accordingly, direct resort to


a certiorari petition sans a motion for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this
case.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 10, 2013 and the
Resolution dated July 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 07147 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213847

August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,


vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately
an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of
the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to
ensure that the accused appears at trial. 1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail
and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 2014 2 and August 8, 20143 issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus
Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to

post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition. 7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enriles motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile
had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the
law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. 9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , 11 and his
Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post
bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his
age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles
Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court
shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused
Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be dutybound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile
has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It
is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is
charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is
reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and
that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged
against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not
a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among
the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as
explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated
July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny
Enriles motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution. 15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter
of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if
ever he would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence
of Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk. 16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong;
and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as
he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the
lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.


1.
Bail
protects
the
right
due process and to be presumed innocent

of

the

accused

to

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, 19 and further binds the
court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. 20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should
be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. 22 Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional
liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds
presence at trial.23
2.
Bail
may
matter of right or of discretion

be

granted

as

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 24 of the Rules of Court , as
follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is

strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the
Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. 27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior
to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. 28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of
the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission
to
bail
by
death,
or
life
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

in
offenses
imprisonment,
or

punished
reclusion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as
the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma , 30 "such discretion may be exercised
only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic,

therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part
of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. 31 The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v.
Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People
vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an
accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any
hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its
conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong objections. The court
granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three policemen, not
one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time
it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or
not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless
the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate
the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or
heard. It is equally entitled as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond
in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court
can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither
present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court,
should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as
is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try
the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry
may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in
the examination and cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected
to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, 34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two
mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he
voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to
the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed
upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating
circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of mitigating
circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore,
the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor. 36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the
presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua , 37 simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the
earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of
the Philippines responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting
and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In
other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every
person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. 38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. 39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan, 41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found
during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the
following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug
therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral
artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter
monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome;
(Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina,
s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes
3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on
recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because
it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially
under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery
disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could
cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD. 43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health
required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at
his own instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the
internist doctor of that medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support
at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator
Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you
happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the
facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition
of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor. 45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration
is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court: 46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of
the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law
makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ; 47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that
the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have
seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and
medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioners
previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the
petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify
whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in
deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has
adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution,
in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno
Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the
ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold
that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the
petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation
of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail,
which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already
consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. 49 The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail
to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave
abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. 51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition
for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14,
2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the
Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from
custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212865

July 15, 2015

HORACIO SALVADOR, Petitioner,


vs.
LISA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal proposes to undo the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013 in CAG.R. SP No. 131486,1whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the respondent's petition
for certiorari and nullified the orders dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City respectively giving due course to the petitioner's
notice of appeal, and allowing him to post bail for his provisional liberty; and the
resolution the CA promulgated on June 4, 2014 denying his Motion for Reconsideration. 2
Antecedents
The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa
penalized under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code docketed as Criminal Case No.
R-PSY-08-04689-CR.3 On March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for the promulgation of the
judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the promulgation inasmuch as the
petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. 4 Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC
proceeded to promulgate its decision,5 and disposed as follows:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both
spouses are further ordered to indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of Pl 7,371,
780.00 with interest of eight percent (8%) per annum until fully paid, plus the amount
of P50,000.00, as and by way of moral damages, and .P.50,000 as attorney's fees.
xxxx

Costs against accused spouses Horacio Salvador and Marinel Salvador.


SO ORDERED.6
The RTC then issued a warrant for the petitioner's arrest. He was apprehended on April 7,
2011, or eight days from the promulgation of the judgment finding him guilty. 7
The petitioner filed his Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal dated April 13,
2011,8 and attached thereto the medical certificate dated March 3 0, 2011 purportedly
issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel A. David, 9 certifying that the petitioner had submitted himself
to a medical consultation at the Rizal Medical Center on March 30, 2011 and had been
found to be suffering from hypertension. 10
In his order dated July 1, 2011, 11 RTC Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz initially denied the
petitioner's Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on the ground of non-compliance
with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Thereafter, the respondent, who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-0804689-CR, filed her Motion for Execution dated July 29, 2011 praying for the issuance of
the writ of execution on the civil aspect. 12
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the July 1, 2011 order. 13 Judge Dela Cruz
granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on October 26, 2011, thereby giving
due course to his notice of appeal.14
On October 27, 2011, the RTC, acting on the respondent's Motion for Execution, issued
another order,15 to wit:
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the subject Motion for Execution and Motion to Commit
the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to
Serve his Sentence are both granted and hereby orders as follows:
1) Let Writ of Execution issue to implement the following, to wit:
a) Indemnify the victim Lisa Chua the sum of P17,371,780.00 with interest
of 8% per annum until fully paid;
b) Pay the victim Lisa Chua P.50,000.00 as moral damages and P.50,000 as
attorney's fees.
2) The Motion to Commit the Person of Accused Horacio Salvador to the National
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, to Serve his Sentence is hereby granted without
prejudice to the appropriate action of the Executive Judge where the accused is
detained pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 68-2005. 16
On its part, the Prosecution, represented by the private prosecutor, filed its Motion for
Reconsideration against the order issued on October 26, 2011, 17 attaching to the motion
the affidavit executed by Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David 18 affirming that he had not examined

the petitioner on March 30, 2011; that he had not issued any medical certificate in favor
of the petitioner; that his name of Paolo had been misspelled Paulo in the medical
certificate submitted by the petitioner; that the signature appearing in the medical
certificate was not his; and that the Rizal Medical Center did not officially issue the
medical certificate in question.
The petitioner opposed the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration, 19 and prayed that
he be allowed to post bail pending appeal. He submitted another medical certificate
issued by Dr. Ma. Concepcion Santos-Enriquez, an OB-Gynecologist, 20 to the effect that
she had seen the petitioner on March 28, 2011 for headache and dizziness; and that she
had advised him to see a cardiologist because of his elevated blood pressure.
Meanwhile, Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was re-raffled to Judge Francisco G.
Mendiola, Presiding Judge of Branch 115, due to Judge Dela Cruz's inhibition. 21 In his
order dated August 8, 2013,22 Judge Mendiola denied the Prosecution's Motion for
Reconsideration, and fixed bail of F80,000.00 for the provisional liberty of the petitioner.
Consequently, the respondent commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to
nullify the October 26, 2011 order (giving due course to the petitioner's notice of
appeal), and the August 8, 2013 order (allowing him to post bail for his provisional
liberty).23
In the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013, the CA granted the respondent's
certiorari petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders
dated October 26, 2011 and August 8, 2013 giving due course to respondent's Notice of
Appeal and allowing him to post bail, respectively, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The Order dated July 1, 2011 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its resolution promulgated
on June 4, 2014.25
Issues
Hence, this appeal, whereby the petitioner contends that the CA erred in rendering its
December 12, 2013 decision because: (1) the respondent had no legal personality to
challenge the assailed orders of the RTC because only the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) could appeal in a criminal case in behalf of the State; (2) she had no legal
personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA because her Motion for Execution in
respect of the civil aspect of the criminal case had already been granted by the RTC; and
(3) his hypertension on the date of the promulgation of the decision by the RTC
constituted a justifiable cause for him to regain the right to avail himself of the remedies
under the Rules of Court against the judgment of conviction.

The issues are, therefore: (1) whether the respondent as the complainant in the criminal
case had the legal personality to file the petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the
orders of the R TC despite the lack of consent of the OSG; and (2) whether the petitioner
had lost his standing in court for his failure to appear at the promulgation of his
conviction.
Ruling of the Court
We DENY the petition for its lack of merit.
1.
The
respondent
had
the questioned orders through certiorari

legal

standing

to

assail

The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings pending in this
Court and in the CA. This is explicitly provided in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, viz.:
Section 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party.
xxxx
The Court has stressed that the People of the Philippines, being the real party in interest
in every criminal proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in criminal
proceedings in the CA or in this Court. 26 Yet, this rule admits of exceptions, for as
pronounced in Rodriguez v. Gadiane:27
A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court. In a long line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include
the State and the private
offended party or complainant.
As early as in the case of Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that the offended parties in
criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the
special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.
Apropos thereto is the case cited by petitioner, De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, wherein it

was categorically stated that the aggrieved parties are the State and the private
offended party or complainant.
It was further held in De la Rosa that the complainant has such an interest in the civil
aspect of the case that he may file a special civil action questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. He should do so and
prosecute it in his name as such complainant. In the same vein, the cases of Martinez v.
Court of Appeals, Santos v. Court of Appeals, and Chua v. Court of Appeals adhere to the
doctrines mentioned above.
Yet, although the respondent's Motion for Execution had already been granted by the
RTC, the CA still held that she. continued to have an interest in the litigation, observing
as follows:
x x x [W]ith the public respondents' questioned Orders both granting him leave to appeal
the Decision dated March 30, 2011, the whole case is rendered open for review by Us,
including the civil aspect of the case. An appeal throws the case open for review. Under
Section 11, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm or
modify the judgment. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on
any question, including one not raised by the parties.
A mere cursory reading of the herein Petition will readily reveal that petitioner desires to
question the propriety of public respondents' ruling giving due course to private
respondent's appeal and subsequently allowing him to post bail. We do not, however,
perceive the same as a procedural misstep thus divesting the petitioner the personality
to file the instant Petition. We still lean towards giving due course to the instant Petition
in the interest of substantial justice and considering what to Us are abuse of discretion
committed by public respondents resulting to denial of due process. As ordained by the
Supreme Court in Carmencita G. Carino vs. Merlin De Castro, there can be cases where a
private offended party is allowed to prosecute as an aggrieved party in the interest of
substantial justice for a party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive
issue in law.
As to whether or not there was a clear disregard of basic precepts pertaining to an
accused who did not appear for promulgation of judgment despite notice is a query of
substance both factual and legal.28
We affirm the CA's holding on the respondent's legal standing to institute the special civil
action for certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC. For sure, her
interest in the criminal case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for Execution
because the questioned orders opened the possibility of defeating the judgment in her
favor should the CA reverse or modify his conviction. She remained an aggrieved party
like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she had as much right as anyone else in
the criminal proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary procedural steps within the
bounds of the Rules of Court to serve and protect her substantial interest. Although it is
true that she could be represented by the OSG if it wanted to, she would be reckless at

that point to be disinterested in the appellate proceedings. Moreover, we would violate


her fundamental right to due process of law if we were to deny her the opportunity to
assail and set aside the improperly resurrected appeal of the petitioner.
2.
Petitioner
has
lost
his
right
to
appeal
his
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:

conviction

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the


presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of
his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
xxxx
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of conviction may be
done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a period of 15 days from notice of
the judgment to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision
becomes final.29 The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment,
specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule 121), and
(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules of Court
permits him to regain his standing in court in order to avail himself of these remedies
within 15 days from the date of promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon: (a) his
surrender; and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the
remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence. Should the trial court find that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he should .be allowed to avail himself of the
remedies within 15 days from notice of the order finding his absence justified and
allowing him the available remedies from the judgment of conviction. 30
Under Section 6, supra, the personal presence of the petitioner at the promulgation of
the judgment in Criminal Case No. R-PSY-08-04689-CR was mandatory because the
offense of which he was found guilty was not a light felony or offense. 31 He was charged

with and actually found guilty of estafa, and meted the indeterminate sentence of four
years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment was on
March 30, 2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet
the mandatory requirements under Section 6, supra.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the Rules of
Court, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of Appeal, and attached
thereto the medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel David. Yet, he did not thereby
establish that his absence had been for a justifiable cause because the purported issuer
himself, Dr. Paolo Miguel A. David, directly impugned the credibility of this certificate by
denying to have issued the certificate, and to have examined the petitioner on March 30,
2011, or to have signed the certificate, or that the Rizal Medical Center issued the
certificate. The petitioner later submitted another medicate certificate, which, aside from
being belatedly issued, went unsupported and unauthenticated by the testimony of the
alleged issuing physician, who turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA justly
discredited the certificates.32
Even assuming that he had suffered hypertension, which could have validly excused his
absence from the promulgation, the petitioner did not fulfill the other requirement of
Section 6, supra, to surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender used in the
rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against him. 33
In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner to have lost
his standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section 6, supra. His failure to
fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction final and immutable. 34 He ought to be
reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural right nor a part of due process,
is a merely statutory privilege that should be exercised in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law establishing the right; otherwise, it is lost. 35
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 12, 2013; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
JOSE PEPE SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND JENNIFER
SON-TENIO, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The dismissal by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an appeal by an accused on the ground
of his failure to submit his memorandum on appeal should be nullified because the
pertinent rule of procedure governing the appeal specifies such submission as optional
on his part, and commands the resolution of the appeal by the RTC on the basis of the
records of the trial court and of any memoranda of appeal as the parties may file in the
case.
The Case
This appeal directly assails the resolution promulgated on April 14, 2011 in C.A.-G.R. CR
UDK No. 0019 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepe Sanico, et al.,1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioners petition to review and undo the
dismissal of his appeal by the RTC; and the subsequent resolution promulgated on
September 15, 2011,2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Antecedents
The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing (Criminal
Case No. 3433-CR) and theft of minerals (Criminal Case No. 3434-CR) in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC). In due course, the MCTC
rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009, convicting the accused, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case
No. 3434-CR finding the accused Jose Pepe Sanico and Marsito Batiquin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known
as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and they are hereby both sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to
Two (2) Years Four (4) Months and One (1) day of Prision Correccional, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The truck with Plate No.GAX-119, as an instrument of the crime is hereby ordered
confiscated in favour of the government.
In addition, both accused are hereby ordered to solidarily pay private complainant
Jennifer S. Tenio actual damages in the amount of Four Million Forty Two Thousand and
Five Hundred Pesos (P4,042,500.00), Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Exemplary Damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), Attorneys Fees in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) and Litigation Expenses in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 3433-CR Trespassing, the Court finds accused Jose Pepe Sanico
and Marsito Batiquin not guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.3
On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. 4 Consequently,
on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered Sanico to file his
memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC ruled on March 16,
2010,5 as follows:
The motion of plaintiff is impressed with merit. The failure of the accused-appellants to
file Memorandum on Appeal is a ground for dismissal of the Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the accused is ordered dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.6
On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Caete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a
motion for reconsideration7 vis--vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had
not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to
his wifes debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel,
Atty. Barings own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case
and whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.
On June 1, 2010, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its lack of
verification and affidavit of merit; and because the supposed sickness of Sanicos wife
and the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons. 8
On June 23, 2010, Sanico, through Atty. Caete, filed a petition for review in the
CA,9 contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file
the memorandum on appeal.10
On April 14, 2011, the CA denied the petition for review on the following grounds,
namely: (a) the docket fees were not paid; (b) there was no proper proof of service of a
copy of the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the petitioner did not furnish to
the RTC a copy of the petition for review; (d) there was no affidavit of service; (e) no
written explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed; (f) the documents
appended to the petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies; (g) no
copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record were attached; (h) the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to
contain a statement that the allegations therein were based on the petitioners personal
knowledge; (i) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not contain
competent evidence of identity of the petitioner; and (j) the serial number of the
commission of the notary public and the office address of the notary public were not
properly indicated.11
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied on September 15,
2011,12 with the CA holding:
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements in regard to the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the legal requirement to pay docket and appeal fees. Without
such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executor.
Further, the other infirmities of the Petition, insofar as the lack of proper proof of service
and failure to append material portions of the record, necessarily warrant the dismissal
of the Petition, given the mandatory language of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
xxxx
Petitioner invoked that it could not be bound by the gross and inexcusable negligence of
his counsels. However, a client is generally bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. In cases where the negligence of counsel
is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court, the
appropriate recourse is provided under the Rules: x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, appellants Motion for Reconsideration
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary injunction dated 31
May 2011 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.13
In the meantime, the counsel for respondent Jennifer S. Tenio filed an Ex Parte Motion for
Entry of Judgment, which the RTC authorized the issuance of on March 28,
2011.14 Thence, Sanico filed an omnibus motion to recall the order and to quash the
entry of judgment,15 but the RTC denied the omnibus motion on August 22, 2011, noting
that Sanico did not provide the RTC with a copy of his petition for review; hence, the RTC
had no way of knowing about the pendency of his petition for review in the CA; and that
in any case, the CA had already denied his petition for review, while his motion for
reconsideration had yet to be acted upon by the CA. 16 Sanicos motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC on October 3, 2011. 17
The records show that the entry of judgment was issued on March 30, 2011, 18 and the
writ of execution on April 19, 2011;19 and that execution sales covering several personal
properties of the petitioner were made on June 14 and June 16, 2011, and the certificates
of sale were issued in favor of Tenio.20
Issues
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding against him his former counsels
gross and inexcusable negligence, thereby depriving him of his right to have the
conviction reviewed by the RTC; that the CA committed reversible error in not nullifying
the RTCs order dismissing the appeal for failure to file a memorandum, and in not
nullifying the entry of judgment issued by the RTC despite the pendency of the petition
for review in the CA; and that the CA further erred in not remanding the case to the RTC
for the review of the legal infirmities committed by the MCTC in rendering its judgment of
conviction.21
In her comment,22 Tenio avers that the appeal seeks to evaluate, assess and examine the
findings of the lower courts, which cannot be done in this appeal; and that the petitioner
already lost all his opportunities to contest the decision and orders by which he was
aggrieved through the usual process by not complying with the requirements under
the Rules of Court to submit his appeal memorandum to the RTC, and by filing a petition
for review that was plagued with congenital infirmities. 23

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), 24 submits that the CA did not
err in dismissing the petition for review for failure to comply with procedural
requirements; that the petitioner was bound by the mistakes of his counsel in the realm
of procedural technique; that there was no compelling reason to warrant the relaxation
of the rules of procedure in favor of the petitioner because, firstly, the dismissal of his
appeal was in accord with Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court; secondly, the
decisions of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction were
immediately executory without prejudice to an appeal; thirdly, the MCTC validly acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal case; and, finally, the variance in the mode of commission
of the offense was binding on the accused if he did not object to the evidence showing
that the crime was committed in a manner different from what was alleged. 25
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
To start with, the RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of
Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the
appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC
wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal
of the appeal once the appellant fails to file the memorandum on appeal, viz.:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court.
(a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to
submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court,
a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the appellants memorandum, the appellee may file his
memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground
for dismissal of the appeal.
(c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to
do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall
decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda as are filed.
The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed
appeals in criminal cases. The relevant portions of Rule 122 are the following:
Section 3. How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by
the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
xxxx
Section 8. Transmission of papers to appellate court upon appeal.Within five (5) days
from the filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the court with whom the notice of

appeal was filed must transmit to the clerk of court of the appellate court the complete
record of the case, together with said notice. The original and three copies of the
transcript of stenographic notes, together with the records, shall also be transmitted to
the clerk of the appellate court without undue delay. The other copy of the transcript
shall remain in the lower court. (8a)
Section 9. Appeal to the Regional Trial Courts.
(a) Within five (5) days from perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the
original record to the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
(b) Upon receipt of the complete record of the case, transcripts and exhibits, the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact.
(c) Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said notice, the parties may submit
memoranda or briefs, or may be required by the Regional Trial Court to do so.
After the submission of such memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of
the period to file the same, the Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on
the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as
may have been filed. (9a) (Emphasis supplied)
The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the
appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because
Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal on the basis of
the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been
filed upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration
of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioners appeal cannot be
properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal.
Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the
petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course,
whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the
appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a manner
that occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his
first-time appeal being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared
to have attained finality, causing the execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.
We are appalled that the CA turned a blind eye to the egregious error of the RTC by
limiting its attention to the supposedly patent defects and shortcomings of the
petitioners petition for review. The foremost noted defect was the non-payment of the
docket fees, which, in other circumstances, would have alone warranted the outright
rejection of the petition for review due to the mandatory and jurisdictional character of
the payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period. 26 Such
payment was the condition sine qua non for the perfection of the appeal by petition for
review, and only by such payment could the CA have acquired jurisdiction over the
appeal.27 But the appeal of the conviction before the RTC had not yet been completed,
and, as such, the petition for review of the petitioner was logically premature. In other
words, it was plain to the CA that it could not validly act on the petition for review. To
insist otherwise would be unjust against the petitioner, considering that the wrong turn
in procedure that had generated the whole problem had been caused by the RTC.
The parties have argued on whether or not the negligence of the petitioners counsel
should be binding on the petitioner. In our view, however, we do not need to belabor the
point with a lengthy discussion. Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect

that his counsel would afford to him competent legal representation. The mere failure of
the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection of the interests
of the petitioner as the client as manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings
discovered in the petition for review was gross negligence in any language because the
defects were plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines
existing in the Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error
committed as a result was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day
in court, the litigation ought to be re-opened to give to the client another chance to
present his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have
his conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in
the altar of technicalities.
The Court notes that the petitioner has raised several issues against the award of
damages in favor of Tenio.28 We defer from making any findings on such issues at this
stage, however, because the logical outcome is to remand the case to the RTC for
appellate review as if the appeal was filed on time, which it was. Meanwhile, the
petitioner is entitled to be restored to his situation at the time when the RTC wrongly
dismissed his appeal. The RTC should quash the execution enforced against him; order
the restitution of whatever properties were levied and sold on execution; and assiduously
review the conviction.
Finally, it behooves the Court to remind all lower courts and their judges to be alert in
safeguarding the right of the parties to appeal. Although the right to appeal is statutory,
it must be respected and observed because it is an essential component of due process.
What happened herein was the uncharacteristic oversight of the RTC in the application of
the proper governing rules. There should have been no difficulty to discern the applicable
rules, given the clear distinction between the civil and the criminal procedures. The
alertness could have avoided the oversight, and prevented the waste of time by the
petitioner who had to come all the way to this Court to safeguard his right to appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDEthe resolutions promulgated on April 14, 2011
and September 15, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR UDK No. 0019
entitled People v. Jose Pepe: Sanico, et al. respectively dismissing the petitioners
petition for review assailing the dismissal of his appeal by the Regional Trial Court, and
denying his motion for reconsideration; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the orders issued on
March 16, 2010, June 1, 2010, and August 22, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
25, in Danao City respectively dismissing his appeal, denying his motion for
reconsideration, and denying his omnibus motion to recall the order issued on March 28,
2011 for the issuance of the entry of judgment and to quash the entry of
judgment; QUASHES and VACATES the entry of judgment dated March 30, 2011 for
lack of legal basis; NULLIFIES all acts taken by virtue of the entry of
judgment; REMANDS the records to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings as
outlined in this decision; and ORDERSthe private respondent to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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