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.MAR 1 7 7n1fi

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R.. No. 208071

Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
DEL CASTILLO,*
PEREZ, and
REYES,JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
EDGARDO PEREZ y ALA VADO,
Acussed-Appellant.

~~

x------~-----------------------------------------:--~-----------~~ x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated February 2 7,

2013 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00176-MIN which
affirmed the Decision2 dated May 15, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), 9th Judicial R~gion, Branch 15, Zamboanga City, in Criminal Case
No. 17071 for rape.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In an Information3 dated June 23, 2000, accused-appellant Eduardo
was charged with the crime of rape, committed by having carnal knowledge
oesignated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated
February 29, 2016.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices Romul~o
V.
Borja and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla cor.curring; rollo, pp. 5-18.
.

2
Penned by Judge Vicente L. Cabatingan; CA rollo, pp. 19-29.
3
Id. at 8-9.
.

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G.R. No. 208071

of his niece, AAA, 4 a 13-year-old girl, against her will and to her damage
and prejudice, the accusatory portions of which read:
That on or about January 3, 2000, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the j~risdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one AAA,
a girl, 13 years old, against her will; furthermore, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the victim is under eighteen ( 18) years
old and the accused is an uncle by affinity of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Upon arraignment on September 6, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty

to the offense charged. 6 Thereafter, during trial, the prosecution presented
the testimonies of the victim AAA, p@lice investigator P02 Maria Enriquez,
Dr. Marian Calaycay, the examining physician, and BBB; the father of the
victim. 7
AAA testified that she was born on August 18, 1986 to her parents
who, at that time, were already separated-from each other. She stayed with
her father in his house in Tugbungan, Zamboanga City. On December 24,
1999, however, she spent Christmas with her mother who was in the house
of her uncle, appellant herein, also situated in Tugbungan, Zamboanga.
AAA stated that appellant is the husband of her mother's sister. 8 According
to AAA, when she woke up at about 4:00 a.m. on January 3, 2000, she was
already on the cemen~ floor inside the room of appellant, who was wearing
only a white towel wrapped around his waist. She tried to get out of the
room but appellant pushed her to the floor and shut the door with a kick. He
then pulled out her skirt, raised her shirt, and removed her underwear, baring
her breasts and vagina, which he kissed. Thereafter, he removed his towel,
mounted her, and inserted his penis. into her vagina, thereby causing her
pain. While doing this, he continued on kissing her lips and breast. She cried
and kicked him, but he did not stop. 9 Afterwards, he removed his penis and
cleaned her vagina with a shirt. He wore his towel again and told her to put
on her underwear. He then gave her ~10.00 .which she used to buy
"chippy." 10

In line with the Court's ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006,
502 SCRA 419, 426, citing Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children, Sec. 40, Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9262, Rule XI, Sec. 63, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act," the real name of the rape victim will not be disclosed.
5
CA rollo, p. 8.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20.
10
Id.

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G.R. No. 208071

On January 5, 2000, she went home to her father. She did not tell him
about the incident untjl confronted by him. BBB testified that at about 2:00
p.m. on February 10, 2000, his son, AAA's brother, told him that he saw
appellant holding the hair of AAA and kissing her. Consequently, BBB
confronted AAA about what he had heard from her brother. She then told
him what transpireJ on the alleged incident. Thereafter, he brought her to the
barangay officials who advised them .to have her examined by a doctor and

obtain a Medico-Legal Certificate. 11

Said testimonies were corroborated by Dr. Marian Calaycay who
conducted a medical examination on AAA and issued a Medico-Legal
Certificate thereon. Dr. Calaycay testifid that the certificate states that
AAA's hymen had complete healed lacerations at 4 o'clock and 8 o'clock
positions, that her labia majora and labia minora were apposed, that the
introitus admits one finger with ease, that her pubic hair were sparsely
distributed, her breasts were not yet fully developed and that she tested
negative for spermatozoa. 12 Dr. Calaycay further gave many possible agents
that may have caused ~AA' s lacerations, one of which is an erect penis. 13
Thereafter, P03 Maria Enriquez, who was assigned at the Women and
Children's Desk of the Tetuan Police Station, Zamboanga City, testified that
she received a complaint assignment sheet registering the complaint of BBB
that his daughter had been raped, together with the medicp-legal certificate
and birth certificate of AAA. After taking the statements of AAA and BBB,
she was convinc~d that rape was, indeed, committed. Thus, she prepared a
case report, and submitted the same to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
the filing of the appropriate charge. 14
.

In contrast, appellant essentially interpose.cl a defense of denial and

alibi. He testified that at the time of the alleged rape, he did not sleep in his
room that he shared with his wife because he was out driving his passenger
tricycle. He added that during those times, they had many relatives from
Curuan, Zamboanga .City, composed of the families of his in-laws, visiting
them who all slept in the living room of their house, together with the other
members of their household. They all stayed in his house because they came
to know that the sister of his mother-in-law had just died. Thus, it was highly
unlikely for him to transport AAA to his room without waking anybody up.
Appellant further testified that the only reason why AAA and her father filed
the rape charge against him was becattse BBB had a personal grudge against
him. This was because occasionally, appellant would scold AAA and BBB~s
other children. Moreover, appellant testified that ~e also incurred the i r e d

11
12

13

14

Id. at 21.
Rollo, p. 7.
CA rollo, p. 20.
Rollo, p. 7.

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Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

BBB because he .made it known that he did not like the presence of BBB' s
children in his house due to their "itchy hands." 15
Aside from appellant's testimony, the defense also presented six ( 6)
other witnesses to corroborate his defense of alibi, namely, Anabel Perez,
daughter of appellant; Khoki Uwano Perez, nephew of appellant who lived
with him; Clarita Perez, wife of appellant; Abigail Perez, another daughter
of appellant; Edwin Andico, brother-in-law of appellant; and Mercedita
Marquez, sister of appellant. 16
On May 15, 2002, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, having weighed the evidence on both sides, the
Court finds Eduardo Perez y Alavado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of RAPE, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of
Republic Act No. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, as principal and as
charged, and in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the offense, does hereby sentence him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the
offended party the sum of --J!l 00,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED. 17

The R TC found that the prosecution sufficiently proved, beyond

reasonable doubt, that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA. Even though
AAA was subject to a stringent cross-examination, she remained steadfast,
committing no material inconsistency which may adversely affect her
credibility. She clearly and convincingly described the manner by which she
was deflowered against her will. The fact that it took Ak.A more than one
month to report the incident to her father does not affect her credibility.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings stating that delay in reporting the rape
incident in the face of threats of physical violenc.e cannot be taken against
the accused. As to the theory that it is highly improbable for the accused to
commit the crime of rape because there were several other per_sons present in
the house at that time, the trial court rejected th~ same in view of multiple
case law finding it possible for one to rape another even in the presence of
third persons. The RTC also rejected appellant's imputation of ill motive on
the part of BBB due to his personal grudges against him in ruling that it is
unthinkable that a high school student would endure the shame and
humiliation of being publicly known that she has been ravished, allow an
"
16

17

CA 'ollo, p. 25.
Rollo, p. 8.
CA rollo, p. 29.

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Decision

G.R. No. 208071

-5-

examination of her private parts and undergo the trouble and expense of a
court proceeding if het motive was not to bring justice to the person who had
grievously wronged her. 18
Furthermore, while the R TC took notice of the fact that the defense
presented numerous testimonies to support appellant's allegations of denial
and alibi, it refused to give credence to the same. According to the trial
court, the defense's witnesses were all appellant's direct relatives, either by
consanguinity or affinity, who depend on appellant and reside in his house,
save for his sister. As such, it is possible that their loyalty to appellant may
have some influence on their testimonies. The court ruled that it would have
made a difference had two or three of the visitors from Curuan come to court
to testify for the defense as they were the ones who supposedly occupied the
living room at the time of the alleged incident. Their presence could have
easily been requested considering that Curuan is very near the City proper. 19
In the end, the RTC ruled that the defense of absolute denial interposed by
the accused, which can easily be fabricated, does not hold water in view of
the positive identification of the accused by the offended party and the lack
of clear and convincing evidence to back it up.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the R TC Decision finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having carnal knowledge of AAA. According to
the appellate court, the trial court did not err in granting full weight and
credence to the uncorroborated testimony of AAA for she positively
identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime in a straightforward and
clear manner. It is unlikely that she would accuse appellant, her uncle, of so
serious a crime as rape if this was not the plain truth as youth and immaturity
are generally badges of sincerity. As to appellant's asseverations that AAA's
testimony contained significant inconsistencies, the CA ruled that the same
only pertained to minor details of the case. 20 A victim of a savage crime
cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account
of every lucid detail of a frightening experience. Thus, the appellate court
found no reason to qisturb the factual findings of the trial court, which are
entitled to the highest degree of respect.
It, however, modified the trial court's award of damages from the sum
of Pl 00,000.00, to 1!75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 1!75,000.00 as moral
damages, and !!30,000.00 as exemplacy damages in the following wise:
The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon
the finding that rape took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are
awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape,

18

19
20

Id. at 27.
Rollo, p. 14.

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Decision

G.R. No. 208071

under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent. In line with current jurisprudence, appellant
Edgardo Perez should be ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of
PhP75,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php~5,000.00 as moral damages.
We also deem it proper to award exemplary damages to the victim.
It finds support in People v. Dalisay. Art. 2229 of the Civil Code serves as

the basis for the award of exemplary damages as it pertinently provides,

"Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages." Being corrective in nature,
exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of
an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offerider.
Consistent with the cited jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary
damage, in the sum of Php30,000.00 be granted. 21

Consequently, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 22 on March 14,

2013. Thereafter, in a Resolution23 dated September 4, 2013, the Court
notified the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties, however,
manifested that they are adopting their respective briefs filed before the CA
as their supplemental briefs, their issues and arguments having been
thoroughly discussed therein. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
In his Brief, appellant assigned the following error:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
.THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 24

Appellant essentially argues that he should not be convicted of the

crime charged herein on the basis of AAA' s testimony as it is loaded with
serious inconsistencies. He likewise asser.ts that it is beyond human nature
how AAA can be transported to appellant's room without being noticed by
those who were asleep in the same living room as AAA. Appellant also
found surprising why AAA did not immediately report the alleged incident
to her parents or other relatives when she had every opportunity to do so. 25

21

22
23
24

25

Id. at 17. (Citations omitted).

Id. at 19.
Id. at 24.
CA roflo, p. 173.
Id. at 37.

Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

We affirm appellant's conviction, with modification as to the award of

damages.
Article 266-A, paragraph one (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
provides the elements of the crime of rape:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape 1s
committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting
his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. 26

Time and again, the Court has always given primordial consideration
to the credibility of a rape victim's testimony. This is because rape is a crime
that is almost always committed in isolation, usually leaving only the
victims to testify on the commission of the crime. Thus, for as long as the
victim's testimony is logical, credible, consistent and convincing, the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. 27 Here, the trial court
found AAA' s testimony to be categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank. In spite of her stringent cross-examination, AAA remained steadfast,
committing no material inconsistency which may adversely affect her
credibility, clearly and convincingly describing the events that transpired
during the rape incidents.
As to appellant's contention that serious inconsistencies in AAA' s
testimony render it unreliable and present problems as to her credibility, the
Court is in agreement with the appellate court that the same pertained only to
minor inconsistencies. In People v. Sanchez, 28 the Court provided the
following guidelines when confronted with the issue of credibility of
witnesses:
26
27

28

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (1930), as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (199CI).
People v. Alfredo Galiano y Jaranilla, G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015.
681Phil.631 (2012).

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Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation
of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the
reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are
shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA
concurred with the RTC. 29

In this case, the appellate court expressly found no reason to disturb

the factual findings of the trial court in view of the absence of any clear
showing that some fact had been overlooked. Neither does the Court's own
perusal of the records of the case present any reason to depart therefrom.
Indeed, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give
an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she had
undergone. 30 Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in her testimony are generally
expected. 31 Thus, such fact, alone, cannot automatically result in an
accused's acquittal.
There is, however, a need to modify the award oLP75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. In prescribing said amounts as
damages, the CA cites the ruling in People v. Delos Reyes 32 which states:
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v.
Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil
damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the
Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states:
As to damages, we have held that if the rape is
perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying
circumstances that require the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall be
Php75,000.00 ... Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need of proof other than the fact of
rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered
moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the
trial court's award of Php50,000.00 as moral damages
29
30

People v. Sanchez, supra, at 635-636.

People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014, 714 SCRA 131, 148.

31

Id.

32

697 Phil. 531 (2012).

fl

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Decision

G.R. No. 208071

should also be increased to Php75,000.00 pursuant to

current jurisprudence on qualified rape.
It should be noted that while the new law
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty provided for by la~ for a heinous offense is still
death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the
civil indemnity for the victim is still Php75,000.00.

People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:

With respect to the award of damages, the
appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,
correctly awarded the following amounts; Php75,000.00
as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is
qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty; Php75,000.00 as moral damages
because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral
injuries, . hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages e.ven without proof thereof,

xx xx.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No.
9346, the civil indemnity o( Php75,000.00 is still proper
because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,
the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting th~ imposition of
the death penalty attended t!J.e commission of the
offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the
court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. 33

Thus, the award of !!75,000.00 as damages is dependent on the

existence of a qualifying circumstance that would warrant the imposition of
the death penalty. In this case, however, while the CA ordered appellant to
pay AAA the amounts of !!75,000.00 as civil indemnity and !!75,000.00 as
moral damages, it made no mention of any attending qualifying
circumstance in the commission of ,the crime. It simply stated that "the
award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding
that rape took place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape
victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injurie~ from the experience she
underwent." In fact, a perusal of the dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision would reveal an "absence of any aggravating . or mit/igating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the offense."
33

People v. Delos Reyes, supra, at 554-556. (Emphasis ours)

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Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

It is worthy to note, moreover, that even the following accusatory

portion of the Infmmation charging app"ellant herein does not warrant a

conviction of rape in its qualified form:
That on or about January 3, 2000, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one AAA,
a girl, 13 years old, against her will; furthermore, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the victim is under eighteen ( 18) years
old and the accused is an uncle by affinity of the latter.

Jurisprudence is replete with rulings requiring that Informations

charging an accused with the crime of rape qualified by relationship must

succinctly state t~at said accused is a relative within the third civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity, to wit:
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article
335 (old rape provision) and Article 266-B was sufficiently proven, the
allegation of the relationship between AAA and a:ccused-appellant Roxas
is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus
held:
However, as regards the allegation in the
Informatio. that appellant is an uncle of the victim, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not
sufficiently satisfy the requirements of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by
consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that appellant
admitted that the victim is his niece. In the same manner,
it is irrelevant that "AAA" testified that appellant is her
uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez:
However, the trial court erred in
imposing the death penciJty on accusedappellant, applying Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659. We have consistently held
that the circumstances under the
amendatory provisions of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7659, the attendance of which
could mandate the imposition of the
single indivisible penalty of death, are in
the nature of qualifying circumstances
which cannot be proved as such unless
alleged in the information. Even in cases
where such circumstances are proved, the
death penalty cannot be imposed where
the information failed to allege them. To
impose the death penalty on the basis of a
qualifying circumstance which has not been

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Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

alleged in the information would violate the

accused's constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

While the informations in this case

alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle
of the two victims, they did not state that
he is their relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
testimonial evidence that accused-appellant's
wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is
immaterial. The circumstance that accusedappellant is a relative of the victims by
consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree must be alleged in the
information. In the case at bar, the
allegation that accused-appellant is the
uncle of private .complainants was not
sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship. It was
necessary to specifically allege that such
relationship was within the third civil
degree. Hence, accused-appellant can only
be convicted of simple rape on two counts,
for which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua in each case. 34

.Similarly in this case, the Information merely alleged that "the

accused is an uncle by affinity of the latter," failing to clearly state that
appellant herein is AAA's relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, as expressly required by the aforecited ruling.
Appellant herein cannot, therefore, be properly convicted of rape in its
qualified form resulting in a higher award ~f damages.
Hence, in view of the failure of the Information to expressly allege the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, as well as the absence of any
discussion as to the existence of such qualifying circumstance that would
warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the Court finds the award of
damages in the amolil).t of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as
moral damages improper. Accordingly, both awards of civil indemnity and
moral damages are reduced to PS0,000.00 each, in line with existing
jurisprudence. 35 The exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
awarded by the CA, however, is maintained. Moreover, said amounts shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per. annum from date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid. 36
34
People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 181, 197-198. (Citations omitted;
emphases ours)
35
Id. at 199, citing People v. Manigo, G.R. No. 194612, Januar/27, 2014, 714 SCRA 551.

36

Id.

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Decision

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G.R. No. 208071

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court AFFIRMS the

Decision dated February 27, 2013 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00176-MIN insofar as it (1) found
, . accused-appellant Edgardo Perez y
Alavado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and (2) ordered said accusedappellant to pay .AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
with MODIFICATION as to the following amounts: (a) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus' 6% interest per annum of
all the damages awarded from finality of decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO f. VELASCO, JR.

Assocfate Justice

/~~~
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOS

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

REZ

Decision

G.R. No. 208071

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ATTESTATION

I .attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the firoinion of the
Court's Division.

J. VELASCO, JR.
Assfciate Justice
Chairp'son, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Con'stitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's.Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

-.-1~T~F~ED TRUE COPY

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MAR l 7

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