[WOMEN,

CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 1

GROUP 1

1. RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
IRISH SAGUD, respondents

FACTS:
Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in
Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became on-and-off sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a livein partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face
superimposed on the figure. The senders cellphone number, stated in the message,
was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he
copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He
boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her.
And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the
messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: Madali lang
ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the
police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to
meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Rustan came in a motorcycle. After parking
it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested
him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM
cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish:
Malandi ka kasi!
Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an
expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very
much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it
on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and
enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just
one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question had two distinct irregularities: the face
was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish. Finally,
Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to
a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help
her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
senders number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.

After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her
experience, prompting the court to comment: Her tears were tangible expression of
pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility
of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience. Thus, in its
Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008, affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
I.
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent
Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body
of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
II. Whether or not a dating relationship existed between Rustan and Irish as
this term is defined in R.A. 9262;
III. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude
picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

HELD:
I. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or
acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.As used in this Act,
(a) Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of
violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.
The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused
Rustan had a dating relationship with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a dating
relationship includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over
time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.

II.
(e) Dating relationship refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and
on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or
ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a
dating relationship.
Here, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved, implies that the offender and
the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, romance
implies a sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia
Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word romance used
as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make love to as in He romanced her.
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb
romance that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have
romanced the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe a
couples relationship, i.e., a love affair.
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against women x x x refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly, the law itself distinguishes
a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines
dating relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The latter refers to
a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child.
The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.
III.
Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes
any act or series of acts that constitutes violence against women. This means that a
single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object

of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
SC denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant
G.R. No. 135981, JANUARY 15, 2004

FACTS:
The case arises from the death of Ben Genosa, husband of the Appelant, Marivic
Genosa. The appellant testified that during the first year of their marriage, husband
and wife lived happily, but soon after that, Bens violent and abusive behavior began
to show, especially at times when he was drunk. He also very much into different
vices such as womanizing, gambling, and cockfighting. Furthermore, the appellant
testified, that every time Ben would come home drunk, he would provoke her to
quarrel with him and would oftentimes beat her. The appelant after getting beaten
by her husband would seek immedietly medical treatment every time her.
On November 15 1995, Ben arrived home drunk and once again quarreled with the
appellant. Their quarrel resulted to violence on Bens part which prompted the
appellant to attack him and wound him which eventually led to his death. The trial
court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and charged her with parricide
with treachery as an aggravating circumstance and was imposed the penalty of Death.
However, for her defense, appellant stated that she was able to do that out of
wanting to save her life and of her unborn child. Appellant was 8 months pregnant at
that time with their third child.
Upon review of the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of appellant by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed
her husband; and to allow a partial re-opening of the case to take the testimony of
the psychologist and psychiatrist. The motion was partly granted by the Supreme
Court. It allowed for the appellant to be examined by the experts (Dra. Dayan,
psychologist; and Dr. Pajarillo, psychiatrist) regarding the Battered Woman Syndrome
plea and allowed for their reports to be attached and admitted to the trial court and
subsequently submit to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant may invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as
self-defense and in the defense of her fetus?
HELD:
a)

Battered Woman Syndrome as defense

No, Marivic may not invoke Battered Woman Syndrome as a self-defense as
well as defense of the fetus.

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 3

The Supreme Court held that in order to consider the possibility of Battered
Woman Syndrome as self-defense, the following must hearby be established: 1) each
of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes, 2) the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force
in order to save her life, and 3) at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by
the former against the latter.
The Court failed to deduce sufficient evidence to confirm that the accused
suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome. The accused perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle (1st phase) but the defense was unable to elicit
factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the
essential characteristics of the syndrome. The Court emphasized that all the elements
of a modifying circumstance must be proved in order to be appreciated. Furthermore,
citing the expert opinions, the Court reckons that crucial to the BWS defense is the
state of mind of the battered woman. She must have feared imminent harm and an
honest belief to kill him in order to save her life. However, the Revised Penal Code
provides that one who resorts to self-defense must face a REAL threat to ones life
and not merely IMAGINARY. Thus, unlawful aggression is the most essential element
of the self-defense. In this case however, appellant herself testified that there was
ample time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon
him. Thus, he was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
and safety.
However, the Court considered mitigating factors of passion and obfuscation
that altered her penalty. The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. The second circumstance, on the other
hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the killing.
That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child was
deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn
child. Such perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without
any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal

as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
Dissenting Opinion:
The Appellant here who experienced repeated beatings and threat was under a
fearful state of mind. Her intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer
makes her continuously paranoid and alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming,
and when it will seriously threaten her survival. She was revolving around a cycle of
violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would lose her right mind and
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem
other than to fight back her batterer regardless of injuring or even killing him. She is in
a state of continuing fear of an impending aggression that may prove lethal and thus
would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to choose a less
fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.

As discussed in the case the Battered Women Syndrome has three phases;
1. The Tension Building Phase,
2. The Acute Battering instance phase
3. The Tranquil phase.

The appellant herein sufficiently established the tension-building phase when she
would ask Arano to stay over the house during the times her husband would come
home drunk and also when the appellant asked for Teros help 2 month before the
killing happened.

The medical records that were presented when the appellant would get herself
checked after every beating episode hereby established the actual acute battering
instance phase. Also the court should have considered the husbands threat of hitting
her with a bolo as an acute battering instance, as it would put her under constant fear
of death.

Lastly when the appellant would run to her parents for help, the husband would then
pick her up apologize and show remorse and would then be back to his old drunk
abusive self. This repetitive kiss and make up episode would constitute the Tranquil
phase.

With all three established the court should have taken into consideration the
appellants state of mind when the attack happened and ruled to acquit her of the
charges.

3. G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN, AccusedAppellant.

Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK were married on October 18, 1975. They Iived
together since then and raised their four (4) children. On February 19, 1999, KKK
executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant,
raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence and that on December
12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, finding
probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and
recommending that the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accusedappellant.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999. On
August 18, 1999, the accused appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, which was
denied by the trial court in an Order dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea
to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued. The
prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters
MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the
following events: In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually
upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with
financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at
home because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the
children. On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children
went about their nightly routine. Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and
fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and
instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him
to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order:
"You transfer here [to] our bed." KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that
she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her
reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot
and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. The accusedappellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate
with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his
hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well. The accused-appellant again
asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties,
he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by
refusing to bend her legs. The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched
her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he

held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal
desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me
because I'm not feeling well." With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden
partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were audible in
the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake. The accused-appellant's aggression
recurred the following night. The accused-appellant denied raping his wife. The
accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her
revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses. KKK
wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually
detected from her odd behavior.

Ruling of the RTC
RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and
credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters'
testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their
own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

Ruling of the CA
CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument
that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to
sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of
the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained
that physical showing of external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict
a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the accused. In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the
accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's accusations
because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it
were not true.

Issue: Whether a husband can be held liable for marital rape.

Held: Yes. The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of
the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265
and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due
to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of 'rape'. The
paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A.
No. 9262,which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode. A woman is
no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he accords himself.
He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 5

act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its
international commitments and accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on
marital activities that have lost their relevance in a progressive society. It is true that
the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion. A marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with
her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she
refuses. Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over
and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including
sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Women
do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason
that human rights are inalienable.

Comments:
In this decision, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that husbands do not have the
license to force their wives from doing things against their will. This case is a landmark
case since it put into force the laws that are suppose to protect the women against
their aggressors including their husbands.

4. Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San Diego vs Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City,
and ABC / G.R. No. 193960 / 07-Jan-2013

Facts:
Herein petitioner Karlo Dabalos was the boyfriend of private respondent
ABC, and was accused of committing personal violence on her, by pulling
her hair, punching her back, shoulder, and left eye, resulting in him
demeaning and degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being,
violating Sec. 5(a) of RA 9262:
o SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.-
The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
RTC, after examining the supporting evidence, found probable cause, and
issued a warrant of arrest against Dabalos on 19-Nov-09. He posted bail and,
on 12-Aug-10, filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
with Motion to Quash the Information, averring that at the time of the
alleged incident, he was no longer dating ABC, making RA 9262
inapplicable.

ABC, however, admitted that mentioned by Dabalos. She also stated that
on 13-Jul-09, she sought payment of money she lent to him, but he could
not pay. She also inquired if he was responsible for spreading rumors about
her, which he admitted. Afterwards, he slapped her, which caused the
physical injuries alleged in the information.
RTC ruled in favor of ABC, disregarding the fact that her relationship with
Dabalos had ceased prior to the incident, while stating that when both
admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries
already constituted an act of violence against women and children.

Issue/s:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the offense.
o Petitioner insisted that the act of physical violence should be
covered by the Revised Penal Code, instead of RA 9262, since the
proximate cause was not their dating relationship, and should fall
under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
Whether or not RA 9262 should be construed in favor of the accused.
o Petitioner alleges ambiguity in RA 9262 when the offense of slight
physical injuries under RA 9262 and the RPC are the same, giving
rise to ambiguity as to construction. Since ambiguity exists, the law
should be construed in favor of the accused.
Whether or not the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been
admitted should be quashed.
Ruling/s:
(1) The law is broad, but is limited by 2 qualifications:
(a) It is committed against a woman or her child, and the woman is the
offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child.
(b) It results in, or is likely to result in, physical harm or suffering.
(c) It is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such
relationship. As correctly pointed out by the RTC, it is immaterial
whether the relationship had ceased, as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship
between the offender and victim when the physical harm was
committed.
(d) While petitioner is correct in asserting that, as stated in Ang vs CA, the
offender should have or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
victim, nowhere in the law did it limit the offense to be only a
consequence of such relationship.

(e) As the offense clearly falls under RA 9262, the RTC, designated as a
family court, had original and exclusive jurisdiction over such case.
(2) The Court cannot construe RA 9262 in favor of the accused due to ambiguity
(under the rule of lenity, any court construing an ambiguous criminal statute
should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused), since there is nothing
ambiguous in that statute that would require any construction. Although the
degree of physical harm in the RPC and RA 9262 are the same, a higher
penalty is imposed under the latter for violent acts done to women with
whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their
children, with the purpose of promoting the protection of women and
children.
(3) RTC gave the prosecutor 2 days to amend the Information to reflect the
cessation of the dating relationship between the offender and the victim. As
the accused had not been arraigned, the RTC was correct in directing the
amendment of the Information, and denying the Motion to Quash.
(a) Under Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, any information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea.
5. Del Monte Philippines, Inc. vs. Velasco (517 SCRA 511)

Facts:
Lolita Velasco was employed by Del Monte on 21-Oct-76, as a seasonal
employee, and was regularized on 1-May-77. She was assigned as Field
Laborer.
During her employment, she incurred various periods of absences, and was
given written warnings regarding absences without permission.
Subsequently, her leaves for the year 90-91 were forfeited.
From 90-91, she also incurred absences without permission. She incurred
more such absences from 91-92.
Velasco received a notice of hearing regarding her alleged absences without
permission and those considered excessive, for violation of the Absences
without Official Leave rule. Particularly, a hearing was set regarding her
absences for Aug 15-18, 29-13, and Sept. 1-10, 1994. Said hearing was set on
23-Sep-94, and was subsequently reset for 30-Sept, and finally on 5-Oct-94,
due to her failing to appear on those dates.
Del Monte terminated her employment on 10-Jan-95.
Feeling aggrieved, she filed a case for illegal dismissal, asserting that she was
suffering from a pregnancy-borne urinary tract infection, which was the
reason for her alleged absences. She retorted that she had applied for leave
to Prima Ybanez, her supervisor, for the dates 15-18 Aug., and went to the

company hospital for checkup, and was advised to rest in quarters for four
dates, on 27-30 Aug. She was advised a further 2 days of rest when she
failed to report for work on 1-Sept., and rested in quarters on 2-3 Sept. She
consulted an outside doctor, who advised her to rest further from 5-9 Sept.
She also failed to report to work on 10-Sept. but filed an application for
leave for the same date, but was not anymore accepted. She declared,
though, that an application that a medical certificate, as per company policy,
was sufficient.
The Labor Arbiter, on 13-Apr-98, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit,
stating that she was an incorrigible absentee, that she failed to file leaves of
absence, and that she was not able to justify her failure to appear during the
scheduled hearings, and failed to explain her absences.
The NLRC however, on 29-May-99, reversed the decision, declaring that she
was indeed illegally dismissed. It held that as per company rules, employees
may make a subsequent justification of her absenteeism, which Velasco was
able to do. Petitioner Del Monte also admitted the fact that respondent had
been pregnant, negating any assertion that she failed to give any
explanation to her absences. Del Monte also admitted that it has received
hospital records showing the cause of her absences. It also admitted that
Velasco was under RIQ advice, but insisted in including these dates as part of
her unexplained absences. The NLRC also held that for a plain laborer with
unsophisticated judgment, it was sufficient notice for her to send word to
her employer through a co-worker. Finally, it held that Del Monte was guilty
of unlawfully discharging Velasco on account of her pregnancy, under Art.
137(2) of the Labor Code.
CA upheld the NLRCs decision.

Issue/s: Whether or not Lolita Velasco was illegally terminated.

Del Monte argues that Velasco only offered evidence for some of the dates,
making her guilty of ten unjustified absences.
Following the ruling in Filflex vs NLRC, if the Med. Cert. fails to refer to a
specific period of the employees absence, then such absences are not
supported by competent proof, and considered unjustified.
Respondents string of absences, taken together with her history of
absenteeism without permission, established gross and habitual neglect of
duties. Hence, she was not dismissed due to her pregnancy, but due to such
gross and habitual neglect of duties.
Her pregnancy could not excuse her from filing prior notice for absence.
Ruling: Her dismissal was illegal as per the Labor Code provisions on discharge of
employees on account of pregnancy.

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 7

(1) The Filflex case cannot be applied since the illness involved in that case
chronic asthmatic bronchitis is different from Velascos case, which is
pregnancy and related illnesses. Such pregnancy-related illness is a
continuing condition, and due to the nature of such illness, it can be safely
assumed that the absences that are not covered by the dates stated in the
Discharge Summary and Med. Cert. are also covered due to the continuing
condition, and are considered justified absences. Petitioner Del Monte
cannot also consider those absences as unjustified when it admitted that she
was pregnant during the days she actually failed to report for work.
a. Tardiness and absenteeism are recognized forms of neglect of
duties, and justifies the dismissal of an erring employee. Rule
followed by Del Monte of discharging any employee incurring 6 or
more absences, without permission or with subsequent
justification, is within standards.
b. However, while Velasco incurred absences exceeding 6 days (15-18
Aug., 23-26 Aug., 29-31 Aug., 1-3 Sep., 5-10 Sep., 12-17 Sep., 21-24
Sep., 26-30 Sep., and 1-3 Oct., all in 1994), her being pregnant
during these absences was admitted by Del Monte.
c. It cannot anymore assert that she failed to satisfactorily justify her
absences (specifically 16-18 Aug., 29-31 Aug., 1-3 Sep., and 5-10
Sep., all in 1994) when it reconsidered all the other absences for
being covered with rest-in-quarters advice from hospital
personnel, as said advice was issued in consideration of the
physiological and emotional changes Velasco developed.
d. Numerous medical reports disclose that during the first trimester
of pregnancy, expectant mothers are plagued with morning
sickness, frequent urination, vomiting, and fatigue, all of which
Velasco was suffering from. In fact, she was still not feeling well
when the investigations were conducted (5-Oct-94).
e. Del Monte still considered unjustified Velascos absences on 15-18
Aug., even though supervisor Ybanez already received, for
reference, an RIQ advice for 19-20 Aug. It also considered 2-3 Sep.
among those unexplained absences justifying Velascos
termination, even though these were also covered by an RIQ
advice.
(2) Petitioner Del Monte stresses that many women go through pregnancy yet
manage to submit prior notices to their employer. However, under
petitioners company rules, absences may be subsequently justified, and
upheld the NLRC and CAs ruling that respondent Velasco was indeed able to

justify her absences in accordance to company rules and policy. The fact of
pregnancy and related illnesses were duly proven through substantial
evidence, and that she attempted to file leaves of absences but the
supervisor Ybanez refused to receive them, and that she could not have filed
prior leaves due to her continuing condition.
(3) Petitioner Del Monte cannot rely on respondent Velascos long history of
unauthorized absences committed several years prior to create a pattern of
absenteeism and habitual disregard of company rules to justify the dismissal.
Since her last string of absences were justified, petitioner had no legal basis
in considering these absences together with her prior infractions.
NLRC ruling was upheld by both the CA and SC, in toto. NLRC ruled that Velasco be
reinstated with full backwages from the date of her termination to her actual
reinstatement.

GROUP 2

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and GASPAR OLAYON, Respondents
GR No. 171863; 20 August 2008

FACTS:
Gaspar Olayon was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112571-72 with violation of Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children against Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act) for having sexual intercourse with the alleged
victim, the then 14-year old AAA. Olayon was also charged for acts of lasciviousness
docketed as Criminal Case No. 116350. The three cases were jointly tried.
The RTC acquitted Olayon in Criminal Case No. 116350, but convicted him of violation
of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610. The trial court noted that although
the sexual liaisons were with the consent of AAA, Olayon cannot escape responsibility
because he took advantage of AAAs minority, even if they were with her consent.
Consent is not an accepted defense in this special law. He violated Republic Act No.
7610, Section 10(a).
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and acquitted respondent,
reasoning that the acts of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610 refers to those
acts listed under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 7610, which reads as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms

(b) Child Abuse refers to maltreatment, whether habitual or not,
of the child which includes any of the following:

1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual

abuse and emotional maltreatment;

The CA ratiocinated that the consensual sexual intercourse between Olayon and AAA
does not fall under the sexual abuse definition [in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610] which is
a completely distinct and separate offense from child abuse, [under Section 10]
because sexual abuse pertains to and is associated with child prostitution [as defined
in Section 5]. Sexual abuse is defined separately under Section 5 of R.A. 7610. To be
considered sexual abuse [under Section 5], such intercourse should have occurred
due to coercion or intimidation. In the case at bench, neither coercion nor
intimidation were found to have been present, consent having been freely given.

ISSUE: Whether or not Olayon is guilty of child abuse under Section 10(a) of RA 7610

HELD: No.

Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse,
cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Meanwhile, Section 5(b), provides:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.

As Section 10 refers to acts of child abuse prejudicial to the childs development other
than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5, sexual abuse [as
defined under Section 5 is a completely distinct and separate offense from child abuse
[as defined under Section 10].
Consensual sexual intercourse or even acts of lasciviousness with a minor who is 12
years old or older could constitute a violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. For
Section 5(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases, promulgated to implement R.A. No. 7610, defines sexual abuse as

including the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a

child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
For consensual sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a minor, who is not
exploited in prostitution, to thus fall within the purview of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of the child must be present.
Even if respondent were charged under Section 5(b), instead of Section 10(a),
respondent would just the same have been acquitted as there was no allegation that
an element of the offense coercion or influence or intimidation attended its
commission.

CONCURRING OPINION:
Criminal laws must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. This elementary rule
in statutory construction is what the High Court observed in the case at bar.

2. Micheal John Z. Malto vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 164733, First Division, J. Corona

Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give.
(Final preambuar clause of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child)

FACTS
Sometime during the period starting the month of November 1997 to 1998,
Micheal John Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, and engaged in sexual
congress several times with her. Antecedent to the incidents of sexual intercourse,
Malto and AAA had a mutual understanding and apparently, thereafter started a
relationship, becoming sweethearts. With Malto threatening to end their relationship,
AAA, pressured and in fear, succumbed and gave in to Maltos sexual advances and
demands.
Having discovered of what her daughter, AAA, went through, AAAs mother,
BBB, filed a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. The Assistant
City Prosecutor charged Malto in an Information for violation of Section 5(a), Article
III, RA 7610. The Information reads:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November
1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or
seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused
has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 9

Thereafter, the trial court found the evidence for the prosecution more than
convincing and sufficient to sustain a conviction, rendering a decision thus finding
petitioner Malto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him and
sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgement of conviction though
it found that the acts for which petitioner Malto was charged were not covered by
paragraph (a) of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610, but rather by paragraph (b) of the same
section; and accordingly sentenced petitioner Malto to an indeterminate penalty
prision mayor.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioner Maltos conviction considering
that, as petitioner contends, there could not have been any rape committed against
AAA since the sexual intercourse they engaged in was consensual by reason of their
sweetheart relationship; that the CA failed to apply the Sweetheart Theory to
petitioners case.

HELD: NEGATIVE. Petitioner is gravely wrong.

RATIO DECIDENDI
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III
of RA 7610.
[P]etitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and
consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of
mutual love and affection. But may the sweetheart theory be invoked in cases of child
prostitution and other sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA
7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies
committed against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that
the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim were
lovers and that she consented to the sexual relations.

For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse
cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of
their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.

The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter
may be infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law
should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behaviour. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy
under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or
even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In
other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.

This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State
policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of
the youth. This is consistent with the declared policy of the State:
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for
their commission and carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination.

as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is
unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed
by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and
custody of the same.

This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the childs best interests in
all actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with
the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be

exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their

opportunities for a useful and happy life.
FALLO
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z.
Malto is hereby found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as
amended, for which he is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal
as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to
pay AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

3. People v. Larin
297 SCRA 309 | G. R. No. 128777 | October 7, 1998

Facts:
On April 17, 1996, after a practice swim at the university pool in Bakers Hall, U.P. Los
Baos, Carla Lenore Calumpang, fourteen years old, proceeded to the bath house to
shower and dress up. Ernesto Larin y Bondad followed her and then instructed her to
remove the towel wrapped around her; clad in her swimsuit, Larin again ordered her
to undress to allow him to shave her pubic hair which he allegedly noticed was visible.
Larin went outside while she undressed and wrapped a towel around her body. When
the Larin came back, he asked her to sit down while he took a squatting position in
front of her holding on to a shaving instrument; but instead of shaving her pubic hair
as he committed to do, he performed the act of cunnilingus, asked her to stand up
and told her to simply pretend that he was her boyfriend and thereupon removed the
right cap of her brassiere and licked her right breast while touching her vagina at the
same time, she was then told to lie down but she sat down instead and again he
performed the act of cunnilingus on her. All the while she repeatedly said Nandidiri
ako. Larin then told her to stand up as he pulled down his shorts and forced her to
hold and squeeze his penis; thereafter, accused left after instructing her to shave her
pubic hair.
The next day, she went to see the accused to return a book and there she told him
that she was confused, bothered and terribly upset with what happened and accused
replied Ako rin. Hindi ako nakatulog kagabi at para mawala ang kaba mo, halik lang
ang kailangan. and forced her to kiss him on the right cheek and on the lips. The
succeeding night after the incident, she experienced a nightmare about rape and she
then decided to quit swimming; she told her mother about her decision as she
narrated what happened. She was then brought to Dr. Nectarina Rabor Fellizar and
thereafter in the company of her parents, went to the National Bureau of
Investigation where she filed her complaint
The Trial Court found the testimony of Calumpang worthy of full faith and credence. It
reasoned that, unless motivated by a genuine desire to seek justice, a young girl like
her will not fabricate a story, undergo medical examination, appear in court and
announce to the whole world that she was sexually abused. The trial court also found

that the defense failed to prove ill motive on the part of the private complainant and
to overcome the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in finding Larin guilty of a violation of Sec. 5(b)
of R.A. No. 7610.

Ruling:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, states: Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period
The elements of the offense penalized under this provision are as follows:
The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group.
Under RA 7610, children are persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or condition.
Larin sexually abused Carla Lenore Calumpang, in violation of RA 7610. During the
trial, the allegations in the Information were proved and established by the victim
who testified. No proof of ill motive on her part to falsely accuse and testify against
appellant has been offered. We stress that no young and decent girl like Carla would
fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to medical examination and undergo
public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not motivated by a
sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her. In sum, the
prosecution presented proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant, through his
moral ascendancy and influence over the fourteen year old Carla, committed
lascivious conduct upon her.

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 11

In this case, appellant shaved the pubic hair of the victim, performed cunnilingus on
her, licked her breast, touched her genitalia, and forced her to hold his sexual organ.
These actions cannot be brushed aside as innocent; rather, they manifest sexual
perversity and lewd intentions. Larin was the swimming instructor or trainor of Carla,
a mere child.
We find no justification for Larins conduct. Furthermore, the prosecution established
that appellant employed moral and psychological coercion on the victim, bolstered by
the professional assessment given by the psychologist, Dr. Elizabeth Ventura. It is an
accepted rule that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation. One cannot reasonably expect uniform reactions from victims of sexual
assault. Carlas submissiveness to Larins lascivious conduct does not exonerate him
from criminal liability, as the law does not require physical violence on the person of
the victim. Moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.

4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EDUARDO DAHILIG
651 SCRA 778 | G.R. No. 187083 | June 13, 2011

FACTS:
On December 17, 2000, at around 4:00 oclock in the morning, AAA was lying
in bed with her fellow helper, Roxanne. As it was hot and humid that morning, AAA
moved to the floor. While on the floor, she felt someone touching her. At that instant,
she found out it was the accused. She tried to resist his advances, but he succeeded in
pinning her down with his weight and he told her not to move. She shouted for help
from Roxanne but to no avail because the latter was sound asleep. Eventually, the
accused was able to remove her shirt, shorts and undergarments and afterwards was
able to get on top of her. Then, he forced his penis into her vagina which caused her
pain. After he was done with her, he returned to his quarters on the third floor.
The following day, AAA angrily confronted the accused and asked him why
he did such an act against her. He reacted by getting all his belongings and
immediately left their employers house. AAA then informed her employer what the
accused did to her. Their employer immediately assisted her in filing a case against
him. This caused the arrest of the accused and, at this point, he offered to marry her.
His offer, however, was rejected because AAA was determined to seek justice for the
ordeal she suffered in his hands.
A few days after the incident, AAA was medically examined. The
medico-legal examination disclosed that there was a healing laceration in her hymen
although no spermatozoa was found. It was also stated in the medico- legal report
that AAA could have lost her virginity on or about December 17, 2000.
The accused denied the allegations and contended that the sexual congress
that transpired between them was consensual as she was then his girlfriend.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of

Rape as what he laid before the court for its consideration was a mere self-serving
claim of their relationship. In convicting the accused, the RTC reasoned out that, in its
observation, AAA never wavered in her assertion that the accused sexually molested
her against her will. According to the trial court, her narration bore the earmarks of
truth and was consistent throughout. As to his sweetheart defense, the accused
failed to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. What he laid before the court for
its consideration was a mere self-serving claim of their relationship. It fell short of the
rule that a sweetheart defense cannot be given credence in the absence of
corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, and pictures, to name a few.
Bolstering AAAs story was the medico-legal finding that there was a deep-healing
laceration which was consistent with the charge that she had been raped.
The CA affirmed the RTCs decision but clarified that the crime charged
should have been "Child Abuse" as defined and penalized in Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610, based on the fact that the complainant was a minor, being 16 years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was Rape (Violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in
relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353), or is it Child Abuse, defined and penalized by Sec. 5, (b), R.A. No. 7610.

RULING:
The trial court observed that AAA never wavered in her assertion that she
was molested by the accused. There is no dispute that the accused had sexual
intercourse with AAA, a fact which he clearly acknowledged. Furthermore, the
sweetheart defense proffered by the accused likewise deserves scant
consideration. For the said theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce
such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value.
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. In People v. Abay, the Court said that
if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused
of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be

prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act.

Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA
7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony
under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense
penalized by a special law.

In the present case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the crime
was committed against her. The Information against accused stated that AAA was 16
years old at the time of the incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either
for violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either Rape or Child
Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering, however, that the information
correctly charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A par. 1 in relation
to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely affirmed the conviction.

5. Araneta vs. People
556 SCRA 323, G.R. No. 174205 July 27, 1008

FACTS:
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610
for trespassing with violence into the room of the 17-year-old offended
party and forcibly holding and embracing the latter against her will and
consent.
The RTC held that such acts wrought injury upon the offended partys honor
and constituted child abuse under the aforementioned statute.
Petitioner appealed to the CA contending that according to Section 3(b)(2),
Article I of RA 7610, which defines child abuse as any act by deeds or words
which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being, read in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI, which
punishes any person who shall commit any other acts of abuse, cruelty, or
exploitation, or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development, should be taken to mean that an accused can only be
convicted of child abuse if it is proved that the victims development had
been prejudiced.
The OSG, however, interpreted Section 10(a) as contemplative of two
classes of other acts of child abuse: 1) other acts of child abuse, cruelty,
and exploitation; and 2) other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development, and that the first class (abuse, cruelty, exploitation) do not
require that the act be prejudicial to the childs development.
The CA agreed with the OSG and affirmed the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE: W/N Petitioners contention regarding the interpretation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of RA 7610 is correct.

HELD: No

RATIO:

Section 10(a), Article VI punishes FOUR DISTINCT acts: 1) child abuse, 2)

child cruelty, 3) child exploitation, and 4) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the childs development.
The first three acts are different not only from one another but also from
acts which are prejudicial to the childs development.
In other words, acts of child abuse, child cruelty, or child exploitation need
not be shown to have resulted in the prejudice of the child since such
prejudice is not a qualifying condition for the other three acts.
Section 3(a), Article I defines children as persons below 18 years of age;
or those over that age but are unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
Section 3(b)(2), Article I defines child abuse as any act by deeds or words
which debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being.
The three provisions taken together, it is clear that Petitioners acts
constitute child abuse.

GROUP 3

1. People vs Mantalaba
Facts:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan
City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who
was 17 years old at the time, was selling shabu.
A team of police officers conducted a buy-bust operation. Using marked
money, two poseur-buyers approached Mantalaba and bought shabu from
him.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the
police officers made an inventory of the items recovered from Mantalaba
which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-0103; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03;
and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso
(P50) bill.
The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for
the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the
crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-110-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Two separate Informations were filed (eventually consolidated) before the
RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA
9165.
RTC found Mantalaba guilty. CA affirmed Ruling of RTC

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 13

ISSUES:
1. Is he Guilty?
2. Can he avail automatic suspension of his sentence, following RA9344

HELD:
Yes. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt proved through evidence procured from buy-bust
operation and testimony of witnesses, plus all the requirements for the proper chain
of custody had been observed.
The appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer
avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of
sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this
would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction,
suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed
his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in
2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the
latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already
entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the
suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to
the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled
to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities.

2. People vs Court of Appeals, February 25, 2015

FACTS:
AAA, a 16 year old from Lanao del Norte, graduated highschool in March 25, 2004 and
celebrated the night out with friends, including the defendants: Carampatana,
Alquizola (watcher of Alquizola Lodging House), and Oporto (also a minor). They drank
shots of Emperador Brandy with Pepsi. AAA, refusing at first, consumed more or less
five glasses of Emperador Brandy.
AAA, laid her head on Oportos lap, after feeling dizzy. Oporto started kissing her,
which angered AAA, but her companions just laughed at this. The accused continued
to kiss and give her shots of liquor. Things escalated and the next thing AAA knew was
she found herself naked on a bed, in Alquizola Lodging House, with Oporto on top of
her, kissing her and having intercourse with her. Carampatana and Alquizola were also
in the room. She cried and fell asleep. She woke up again and this time Carampatana
was having intercourse with her. When she went home that morning, she told her
parents she was raped. Her mother beat her but also sent her to the hospital for an
examination. Hospital noted that there were old lacerations found in AAAs hymen
(suggesting this was not her first time for intercourse) and semen.

The RTC found Carampatana, Alquizola (as an accomplice by providing the venue),
and Oporto guilty of rape. The CA reversed the RTC decision and based their reason
entirely on the defendants testimonies (that AAA was promiscuous and consented to
the sexual acts by not showing physical resistance, discounting the fact that they got
her intoxicated deliberately). CA also stressed that AAAs mothers unusual reaction of
hitting her was inconsistent with that of a parent who found out her daughter was
raped.

ISSUE:
WON the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion

HELD:
YES. The CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process. The CA acted in grave
abuse of its discretion when the prosecutions right to due process was denied or that
the trial conducted was a sham. It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA
merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly disregarded that
of the prosecution.
The CA easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own
flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole
ordeal. The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for
help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the
latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual. But the CA seemed to forget that
AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. the elements of rape are: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused
intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still
forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never
denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of
reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA,
however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did
not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was
rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the
crime.
The defenses testimonies were seemingly unusual and incredible. The defense of
consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to have been a last ditch
effort to avoid culpability. The SC also noted the defense having a rehearsed witness.
SC revered the CA decision but this time finding all three guilty of conspiracy to rape
AAA. Since Oporto was a minor during the time he raped AAA, RA 9344 must apply to
him. For this reason, the case is remanded to the lower court for proper application.

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities.A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Comments: CICL are entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, RA 9344,
which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of 21 years, so long as he
committed the crime when he was still a child. The case took more than ten years to
be resolved. This is an unfortunate speed, and not uncommon in the country.
Curiously, the Court of Appeals was quick to reverse the findings and decision of the
RTC (even though the investigation and facts laid out were strong and clear.)

G.R. No. 176102 November 26, 2014
3. ROSAL HUBILLA y CARILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

FACTS:
Around seven in the evening of March 30, 2000, petitioner Rosal Hubilla stabbed the
victim Jason Espinola in front of Dalupaon Elementary School in Camarines Sur using a
bladed weapon. The victim was later brought to the Bicol Medical Center where he
stayed for more than a month. Later, however, when the victim went back to the
hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that his stab wound had a complication.
The victim was subjected to another operation, but died the day after. According to
the testimony of a medico-legal expert, the cause of death of the victim was organ
failure overwhelming infection, and that the underlined cause of death was a stab
wound.

The petitioner was charged with homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, and
after trial was found guilty and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
P81,890.04 as actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioners
conviction but modified the penalty and the civil liability. Thus, the petitioner has
imputed grave error to the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not
suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law pursuant to the mandate
of Republic Act No. 9344.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Petitioner was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344?

2.

W/N imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the provisions of

Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements?

RULING:

1. No, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefits of probation. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty. The
petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence
of eight years and one day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six
years of prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968. The petitioners insistence is bereft of legal
basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any
other relevant law or rules support or justify the further reduction of the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be
to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately
violate the law. Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and
appellate courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even
for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law to qualify for
probation.

2. The petitioner is also not entitled to the suspension of his sentence. As held
in the case of People v. Sarcia (G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009),
although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the
sentence of a child in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the
suspension is available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age,
pursuant to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344. Thus, even if the petitioner
here was then a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, being 17
years, four months and 28 days old when he committed the homicide, he
was already well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction for
homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence
was no longer legally feasible or permissible.

No, the penalty of imprisonment did not violate the provisions of RA 9344 because
the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from
probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment
was for the shortestduration permitted by the law. International agreements on the
administration of juvenile justice are also consistent in recognizing that imprisonment
is a valid form of disposition, provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the
minimum necessary period. Following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the
petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp
or other training facilities to be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by
the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and

[WOMEN, CHILDREN AND THE LAW, 2016] 15

Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs best interest. Such
service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.

4. SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 173822 (2010)

FACTS:
Petitioners Atizado and Monreal are accused of killing and murdering one Rogelio
Llona on April 1994. It was said that both petitioners barged in on the house of one
Desder, where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona. After the shooting,
they fled. The whole incident was over in a 5 minutes.
For their defense, the petitioners interposed the alibi that they were at their family
residence.
The RTC convicted Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and sentenced them
with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to the CA, the court affirmed the conviction in
2005.
It appears that Salvador Monreal was a minor of 17 years at the time of the
commission of the crime, as proved by his counter-affidavit, the police blotter, and
the testimony of one of the defense witnesses, and also the fact that the RTC minutes
on the trial hearing on March 9, 1999 stated that Monreal was 22 years old (thus
making his age at the commission of the offense 17 years old), including the fact that
the main prosecution witness, Mirandilla, stated that Monreal was a teenager and
young looking at the fateful day. However no Birth Certificate was ever presented
during trial.
RTC found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, which the CA
affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the lower courts erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to Monreal despite his minority at the time of the offense.

HELD:
Yes, the penalty imposed on Monreal is incorrect in view of his minority.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Atizado. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty
for Monreal due to his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and
the CA did not appreciate Monreals minority at the time of the commission of the
murder probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial. Yet, it
cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age when the crime
was committed on April 18, 1994 as attested to by the numerous evidences in support
thereof, though not expressly claimed in court.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter

and trial records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the commission.
Monreals minority was legally sufficient, for it conformed with the norms
subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the
child in conflict with the law.
Per Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, when a minor commits an offense, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. Hence, it should be reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty should be
prision mayor in any of its periods, as a minimum period, up to reclusion temporal in
its medium period, as the maximum.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest on
May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreals detention
should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41 of Republic
Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty warranted his immediate release from the
penitentiary.
This is in consonance with the retroactivity of the law (RA 9344) for children who have
been convicted and are currently serving their sentences pursuant of Section 68
thereof.

COMMENTS:
This case illustrates the application of retroactivity of the law insofar as it benefits the
minor even though he is already serving his sentence. This is but proper given the
benevolent purpose of the law, which is to express the application of restorative
justice to children in conflict with the law. Restorative justice is a system focusing on
the rehabilitation of the offender and their reintegration into society.
Furthermore, this case illustrates the mandate of the courts, and the prosecution, in
exerting all efforts to ascertain the age of the accused. Even despite the failure of
presenting a birth certificate, the fact of minority can be established by other facts,
and should be properly appreciated by the courts.
However, despite the express provision of the law, personally it seems more
appropriate to limit the extent of the application of this leniency to minors depending
on the severity of the crime committed. In this case, willingly committing and
conspiring to commit murder, using treacherous tactics, without provocation
whatsoever, is a heinous crime that deserves the maximum extent of punishment of
the law. However, such matter is best left to the discretion and wisdom of the
legislature.

5. People vs. Gambao

706 SCRA 508
October 11, 2013
FACTS:
Lucia Chan was a fish dealer based in Manila and was expecting fish deliveries from
her suppliers in the province. On August 11, 1998, Theng Dilangalen and another
person arrived at her house to inquire about a certain passport allegedly misplaced in
one of the fish delivery boxes. The passport was not found. The next day, Dilangalen
with another person, Tony Abao returned to the house. On the same evening,
Dilangalen returned to the house with an unidentified person and kidnapped Chan.
Chan was forced to board a van and taken to a certain house and was transferred to
another house. The group demanded P400,000 as ransom and instructed Chans son
to deliver it at Chowking, Buendia Avenue. On August 14, 1998, the group took the
ransom money but were intercepted by the police. On October 16, 1998, the RTC held
the group including Perepenian who was 17 years old, for Kidnapping for Ransom. On
June 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction but modified Perepenians conviction
from penalty of death to penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that she was only
17 years old at the time the offense was committed.

ISSUE: w/n the criminal liability of Perpenian is proper pursuant to RA 9344?

HELD:
No. According to RA 9344, there is a need to determine whether Perenian acted with
or without discernment. The Court took note of the RTCs observation during
Perenians trial that she lied about her real name, age, address because she was
scared of being identified with the group. The lying and the fear of being identified
with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She
knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort
while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of
the unlawful act. Her minority cannot be considered as an exempting circumstance
but a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art. 68 of the RPC. Pursuant to section
40, RA 9344, sentence cannot be suspended as the maximum age is 21 years old,
where as Pernian was 31 years old at the promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court held that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to
hold her liable as a principal since Perpenian entered the room where Chan was being
held and just conversed with the other members of the group that was not related to
the kidnapping. However, for being present and giving moral support, she liable as an
accomplice.
As an accomplice, the imposable penalty under the RPC is Reclusion Temporal and
applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of Prision
Mayor should be imposed. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the Court imposed
a minimum of 6 months and one day of Prision Correcional to 6 years and one day of
Prision Mayor as maximum. The Court held that while section 51 of RA 9344 would
have been applicable in confining Pernian in an agricultural camp, Pernian had already

served her actual term and exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense and
ordered her immediate release from detention.