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Paper records will not prevent programming errors, software bugs or the introduction
of malicious software into voting systems. If paper is to have any real security value, it
must be used to check, or audit, the voting systems electronic records. [Emphasis
added.]
According to State statute 163-182.1(b)(1) the Board is required to provide for the hand-to-eye
sample count of the paper ballots or paper records of a state-wide ballot item in every county which
includes the real time audit log (RTAL) produced by the iVotronic voting machines. We have been
advised that Mecklenberg County conducted its hand-to-eye sample count using electronic images of
the ballots taken from the iVotronics, rather than the voter-verified paper record provided on the
RTAL. We have independently confirmed that this was the practice in at least one other county
following the November 8, 2016 elections.
Using the electronic image to conduct a hand-to-eye sample count does not conform to state
requirements nor to best practices. It cannot confirm the correctness of the vote count; the electronic
image was not visible to the voter at the time it was recorded and printed, and the law clearly intends
for the voter-verified paper record not a record no voter has seento be used for the sample count.
In addition, an electronic image could be altered undetectably by a programming error, bug, glitch
malfunction or malicious attacker after it is recorded, therefore it is not a reliable or meaningful
record of voter intent. Conducting the hand-to-eye count by using the electronic ballot image
undermines the usefulness and effectiveness of the sample count and subverts the intention of the
statute.
We further note that the task of reviewing the paper record verified by the voter is a feasible one; we
have not only helped develop protocols for such audits using identical equipment in other states, we
have observed the conduct of those audits, and note that they were successful. In one audit we
observed in a county of comparable size, only a very small number of the RTAL printouts were
unreadable. In such instances, best practices would require both RTAL records of voter intent and
non-voter-verified printouts should be used, not the latter instead of the former.
Verified Voting urges the Board to conduct a full investigation into the hand-to-eye counts performed
by all counties that use the iVotronics for voting in either early voting or Election Day voting (or
both). To protect the intent of the State statute and to ensure the integrity of the vote count in North
Carolina, the hand-to-eye sample count should be conducted using the voter-verified paper record.
We urge the Board to determine if counties opted to use the electronic record instead of the paper
record when the paper record was available, and to provide clear guidance to counties to conduct all
hand-to-eye sample counts with each paper record unless it is absolutely impossible. In such cases
we strongly recommend guidance as suggested above, to examine every available RTAL and
supplement with a review of the non-voter-verified printouts only where unreadable records
exist.
Sincerely yours,
Pamela Smith
President
Verified Voting