JUNE,1943

BY AUTH. OF C. G.
OAT E 7 - 15 - 43
IITJ IJ 84
COpy NUMBER-'.._--
INITIALS WD

MONTHLY INT llGENCE REPORT

SHORT TITLE: 6 MIR 43

o 1944 :CLASSIFIED BY: .......i----.,;~_

E. S. 0 JS 0
Colonel, Infantry
croSTO UN

ARMY AIR FORCES ANTISUBMARINE COMMAND

90 CHURCH STREET NEW YORK, N. Y.
 r.c:sc Form 160
Ma I)

Due to the importance of anti-submarine operations

in recent months, the publication of the current issue
of this report has been intentionally delayed in order
that statistics for June could be as complete as possi
ble. Preliminary statistics as of July 8 were supplied
to these Headquarters through the courtesy of the United
states lOth Fleet and have been supplemented by addi
tional data on sinkings of merchant vessels and attacks
on submarines received from various Allied sources up
to July 20, 1943. Assessments of attacks on submarines
are, in most instances, preliminary or unofficial. For
these reasons, statistics herein may not be in complete
agreement with those shown in reports published by other
organizations.

Much of the information contained in this publication is derived from hi~h

1y sec~et s~urces and all personnel are enjoined to exercise extreme caution in
order to prevent dissemination to unauthorized persons.
Some of the information contained herein is intended for use of higher com
manders and the.ir staffs while other portions of the report are intended for use
by squadron commanders and combat crews actually engaged in anti-submarine war
fare. It is desired that the report be disseminated to the latter under condi
tions of security approved by squadron commanding officers.
Pub1 ication of the "Month1y Summary," classified confidential, has been dis
continued by the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command.
No reproduction of information contained herein may be made without specific
approval of the Commanding Ge~era1, Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command.
 JUNE. 1943

CONTENTS
--Page

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES. JUNE. 1943 2

II ANALYSIS OF SUBMARINE WARFARE

A. Allied Shipping Losses . . . . . 0 0 0

4
B. Ship Construction vs Losses ~ 0 0 0
6
C. Order of Battle - Enemy.submarines. 0 0 8

D. Disposition of Enemy Submarines .... 0 0 9

III ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

A. Antisubmarine Command Operations . . . . . 11

B. Anti-submarine Aircraft - Order of Battle. 14

C. Attacks on Enemy Submarines - June, 1943. 15

D. Probable Withdrawal of Army Air Forces from Antisubmarine

Operat ions 0 0 0 0 0 ~lq
E. The Bay of Biscay Offensive 20

F. Convoy Statistics 24

G. Attacks on U-boat Bases . . 25

IV REVIEW OF THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1943 29

V ENEMY ~CAPAB IL1T1 ES AND STRATEGY 30

VI U-BOAT CREW MORALE . 32

VII ANTI-SUBMARINE iACTICAl & TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS ...

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

A. Analysis of U-boat Fight-Back'Tactics 0 0 35

B. Modified B-24 . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . 0 0 37

C. Depth Bomb Attack on a Surfaced Submarine 40

D~ The New Rocket Weapon 0 0 0 41

E. 75 MMGun in Aircraft 0 0 0 45

YII I JNTERESTING AIRCRAFT ATTACKS

A. Night Attack. . . . 0 0 0 47
B. Afsub BlItzkrieg off Portugal 48

JX CRASH LANDING OF A B-24 0 0 0 ... . .. 5$

x WEATHER AND THE U-BOAT WAR. 59

XI OPERATIONAL STATISTICS . . .
0

60

 ISI~J~IQPIA"lrr~".~~BMARINE WARFARE - JUNE, 1943

IO'~---+--_i:'~'~

10"rn---....a---~

CHART I - Map of MV Sinkingsand Attacks on U-Boats~ June 1945

1. MERCHANT VESSEL LOSSES. Twenty-two ships totalling 120,841 tons were sunk by
enemy U-boats during June,--the smallest loss in 18 months. No vessels were sunk in
convoy and the North Atlantic Convoy Area sinkings. Losses were widely
scattered wi th the tot ~ ~ lost . rI d Indian Oceans exceeding that
in the Atlantic. ~i@~1 '1 ...
2
 .I~,~ ~ ~i\~',j ~~'[,I~'
Ii
2.
"11
SHIP CONSTRUCTION VS. ewmerc a vessels constructeo. exceeded losses
by 1,048,731 gross tons.

3. 'ORDER OF BATTLE - ENEMY SUBMARINES. As of June 1, 1943, Germany is estimated

to' have had 440 U-boats. 'Of this total, 50 were less than 500 tons, 140 to 160 were
on trials or training, 230 to 250 were operational. In addition, about 270 U-boat-swere_
under construction.

4. DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SUBMARINES. The average number of U-boats at sea in the

Atlantic declined from 112 in May to 87 in June. There were two pronounced movements:
(1) virtual abandonment of the North Atlantic Convoy routes and the establishment of
screens designed to intercept convoys on the southern Atlantic routes and (2) wide dis
persal to distant coastal areas.

5. ANTF-SUffi1ARINE AIR OPERATIONS . Arit i-submarine air operati ons were maintained at;
a high level during June. Squadrons of the AAFAntisub. Comd. flew a total of 16,879
h0urs, and CAPCP flew 13,654 hours. During the final week in June, 1439 land based air
craft were used by all anti-submarine forces in the Atlantic, of which 821 ~ere very
long range or long range, 282 were medium range and 336 were short range. An additional
127 carrier based airplanes were on convoy escort duty.

6. ATTACKS ON ENEMY SUBMARINES'. Preliminary and unofficial figures indicate that

14 enemy submarines were known sunk, 4 probably sunk, 7 seriously damaged and 6 slightly
damaged. Final figures will probably raise this total. In the- first half of 1943, 250
U-boats are believed to have been damaged and of this total III are preliminarily
assessed as either known or probably sunk.

7. BAY OF BISCAY. Operations in the Bay of Biscay continued in a highly satisfac

tory manner. In the first 27 days of June"4700 hours of flying in this area produced
62 sightings and 25 attacks.. In the four months ending with June 1943, 255 sightings
and 142 attacks were made in this area.

8. ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES. Attacks on U-boat bases and construction yards were
continued in volume during June but construction yard~ were the primary targets.

9. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

(1) Increased dispersion of U-boats With sporadiC attacks by individual U

boats on independently routed vessels and lightly protected coastal convoys in areas in
which defenses are the least well organized.
(2) Attacks on the southern Atlantic convoy routes.
(3) Resumption of mass attacks on the northern Atlantic convoy routes.
(4) Concentration of U-boats in an effort to cut the oil supply line between
the Caribbean and' the east coast of the U.S.
(5) Increased ,activity in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

3
 IJ
SUBMARINE WARFARE

A. ALLIED SHIPPIN6 LOSSES

GROSS
TON s

0 I J

---
SINKING OF ALLIED AND
NEUTRAL SHIPPING BY , /
00 I - -
ENEMY SUBMARINES

---------- OTHER
TOTAL
I

~, rV ' A
,
,,,
,
..TANKERS I:
,.,.,.
,.~
./
I~'
,:
,
,
' j' .... I ,, ",,,,' \ J: l
', ,.
00
~,
0 ~ ,\\ -
14, Ii \~ -t
W,'
\
,
~l
,.
lOOP00 ~ ~~
....f ~ ~t .'"
r l J~
~i'f
'IIi
' : .. .......
\
\/
"~ J~ ~
:"
.It: ~' ~bd; .'f"i'~
I .~ . ' T j r~ "'1 '.... ..... t--.
I"~ "'!<o

to.l.. '.11
'''~
' -"i'"
50 N 0 J F M A M J J A 5 0 N 0 J F NAN J J A SON 0
'"..L. ,., 'o,
~

J F N A M J J A 5 0 N 0 J F M A M J J A SON 0
1939 1940 1941 ' 1942 1943

CHART II

The precipitous drop In sinkings ot merchant vessels by enemy submarines which

began in April has continued throughout the month ot June. The decrease below the May
tigure was 55% in number ot vessels lost while the gross tonnage loss declined 53%.
Total losses both in units and in tonnage decreased but the average size ot the vessels
lost was somewhat greater than in May. The record tor June places sinkings at their
lowest point In 18 months ot anti-submarine wartare and is to be attributed to the c~e
tul routing ot convoys and to the continued extension ot air coverage and surtace escort.
The record tor the tirst halt ot July, however, has indicated a marked upswing in suc
cesstul attacks upon merchant vessels by submarines, thus reversing the trend which has
prevailed through the months ot April, May and June. This renewal ot activity may serve
to diminish premature optimism that the problem is as yet comp+etely under control.

Chart II records graphically the gross tonnage losses caused by enemy submarine ac
tion trom September, 1939 through June, 1943, so tar as could be determined at these
Headquarters on July 12, 1943. The red line indicates gross tonnage losses, the broken
lines show sinkings ot cargo vessels and tankers. The record tor sinkings during the
period, September, 1939 - September, 1942, is based upon British sources. The U.S.
figures include ships that may have been used tor transporting troops regardless ot
whether these vessels were classitied as commissioned auxiliaries. In June three Naval
auxiliaries totalling 20,492 tons were lost in the Southwest Pacitic and one Naval
tanker ot 6,135 gross tons was lost in the Eastern Caribbean.
 [0CJ~r~':r)C'
:.~.U.".'.i SUMMARY OF SINK I NGS
.
LJ f;':'
ifu; Vessels Sunk By Enemy Action
(Data as of July 12, 1943)

June, 1943 May, 1943

BY AREA Ships . Tonnage Ships Tonnage
North Atlantic Convoy Area o o 14 67,824

Canadian Coastal Zone. 2 3,017

o o

Eastern Sea Frontier . 1 10,172 1 7,277

Mid-Atlantic Area. . . o o 1 390
Caribbean Sea Frontier - West~rn . . o o 2 4,232

Caribbean Sea Frontier - Eastern 1 6,135

o o
Brazilian Area . . . 3 11,587 1 5,838
Northeast Atlantic - Northern. 1 5,149
5 23,185
Northeast Atlantic - Southern. 2 5,270 12 62,626
Southeast Atlantic Area. . 1 6,586 6 36,179
Mediterranean and Red Sea. 6 24,458 4 20,234
Indian Ocean Area. . . . 8 44,016 4 18,696
Central PaCific Area .
1 7,001 o o
South Pacific Area . .
2
14,357
3 28,113

Southwest Pacific Area .

~ .. 2 12,058
2 5,361

TOTAL 30 144,806 55 279,955

BY TYPES OF VESSEL
Tankers. . . _. . . . . . 5. 38,076 9 62,988
Ca~go and Passenger Vessels. 22 105,688 44 215,931
Small Vessels 50 -
1000 tons
.
3 1,042 2 1,036

TOTAL 30 144,806- 55 279,955

BY TYPE OF ACTION
Submarine. . 22 120,841 49 257,445
Aircraft. .. 3 3,166 1 1,568
Surface Vessel . 3 6,083 5 20,942
Mine. .. . . 1 7,715 o O.
Special Enemy Action 1 7,001 o o

TOTAL 30 144,806 55 279,955

AREAS: A survey of the areas of attack reveals two Significant facts. The first and
most outstanding feature ot the June-report is the complete immunity of vessels sailing
in the North Atlantic Convoy Area, a zone wherein convoys had suffered very.severe
losses in February and March. In fact, except for one vessel sunk by mine in the Cana
dian Coastal Zone and two small vessels totalling only 229 tons, neither of which were
sunk by submarines, the northern convoy routes to the United Kingdom were free of sink
ings by enemy action. This is a continuation of the trend in. this area which first
began in April, 1943.
The second factor of significance is that combined losses in the Atlantic, the
Mediterranean and the Caribbean totalled less than those occurring in the Pacific and
Indian Ocean Areas. 53.7% of the June losses were inflicted in the Pacific and in the
Indian Ocean, With the latter area suffering 30% of all losses. This figure is the
highest t~r:W~Y,,!l?sngle.zone during the period under review.

,I ~IVCi! li ~:~,\~Yj~~~ 5'

 In the sUltel ~\ Si" JJED of the previous month was sharply reversed,
the tonnage' lost be ing 81% below :May. Elsewhere the figures remained slibstantially the
same as May, except in the Brazilian Area where the loss in gross tonnage, though still
small, almost doubled.

-TYPE OF SHIPS SUNK: Enemy action caused the loss of 5 tankers as against the 9 lost in
May, With a corresponding reduction in gross tonnage in this category. In this~Ilst-ls
included one Naval tanker sunk in the' eastern portion of the Caribbean Sea Frontier
while straggling from a convoy. Three of the cargo and passenger vessels listed were
engaged in operations as Naval Auxiliaries.

TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION: Losses attributed to enemy submarines fell in June to 84% of the
gross tonnage lost, While the number of ships thus lost fell to 73% of the total. This
result continues the trend of recent months. Enemy surface craft caused only one loss
in June, the first since April and the high hopesma1ntained for its surface raiders
by the German Kriegsmarineamt have long since proved fruitless. 1 On the other hand,
three vessels fell to enemy aircraft, although the total tonnage lost in this category
,was far below that of May. Two' of these sinkings occurred off Portugal, the third was
.intheMediterranean. Losses attributed to mines were negligible. Off Halifax the
,loss of Halmo early in the month was followed by vigorous sweeping, as indicated in the
May issue of this report. This operation apparently eliminated the danger.

jLOSSES OUT OF CONVOYS: Out of a total of 30 ships lost in all areas, only 9. were out of
convoys or were stragglers from convoys. This figure compares most favorably with the re
sults shown in the May report in which 60% of the total losses either were in convoys or
were stragglers. In fact, no ships were sunk by submarines in any of the North AtlantiC,
'Middle Atlantic or East Coast convoys. This trend 1s an indication of the success which
is attending the effort 'to provide adequate escort and air coverage for the convoys.

MARINE CASUALTIES: Relatively heavy losses occurred in this category for the month of
\ . ,

June. 10 ships were lost, totalling 30,922 gross tons, - an increase of only one ship
over May but in terms of tonnage mor~ than doubling the May losse

DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK: 9 vessels suffered damage by enemy action. 5 were hit by enemy
aircraft, 3 by submarine activity, and 1 wa~ damaged by an enemy mine.
, .
AXIS REPORTS: The figures substantiate the general tone of Axis spokesmen who admit
that the success or the submarine campaign was below their expectations for June.

B. SH1P CONSTRUCTION VERSUS LOSSES

The remarkably low loss record of June served to decrease still further the net

loss of gross tonnage available to the United Nations. Whereas the tonnage lost during

the month due to all causes totalled only 175,728 gross tons, new construction equalled

'1,224,459 gross tons, which constituted a net gain of 1,048,731 tons. Should this rate

of gain continue, it is clear that within a relatively short period the existing cumu~

lative net 'loss of slightly more than three million tons will have been replaced com

pletely. '

lLate in the month Hoegh Silverda r in the Indian Ocean.

6
 22
;r OF GROSJ' TON,f

/VET LOSS, ALL CAUSES JULY 1,/9"3. 3,080,.301

12

1Ot-++-'I-+-+-It-t-+-+-+--H-+-+-+-t-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+--bof;.r-+-+-+--1f-++-I-+~

II

IIfJ

CHART II J - Ship Construction us Destruction

The chart indicates graphically the construction record of the Maritime United
Nations. It will be noted that beginning in the Spring of 1942, the initial effects of
the vast United Nations construction program began t~ check the net loss. From Septem
ber 1939 until the early months of 1942, British and Scottish yards, with their greater
initial capacity at the opening of the war, steadily surpassed the construction effort
of the U.S. Meanwhile, U.S. and Canadian facilities were being prepared to carry the
major burden of the entire construction program. Under this plan, the United Kingdom
could continue its merchant constructton at a steady rate, but additional effort'could
now be thrown into the production of naval units for the Royal Navy.
The full weight of this extensive program begins to show in the graph by ~une of
1942. United Kingdom' construction continued to show a moderate increase. Canada, whose
launchings had not begun until November of 1941, was then well under way toward a sig
nificant.contribution to the entire program. Already the mobilization of shipyard
facilities in the U.S. was indicated and the to~al construction of the three United Na
tions was adequate to hold the net loss at a stable point through June and July of 1942.
By late summer, the net loss began its decline as the fulr construction program of the
U~S. hit its stride. This trend by now is well established and in view of the decline
in the effectiveness of enemy submarine w as indicated elsewhere in this report,
the possibility of its reversal is remote

1
C. ORDER OF BATTLE - ENEMY SUBMARINES

800,....--..-----------------~-------__,r___--___,iJoo

700 J--+---------1--------+---------t----r-tTOO
//
EST/MATED GERMAN U-BOAT ..5TRENGTH /
/
/
'iOO 1--+---------1--------+---------t/J"'~-----1600

500 J-4-----------I---------+--------:r---+------1

4001--4---------+--------+--~_r_----==il!!!'!ffiffiffi!'!!!!!!-1400

300 J--+--------+-------~~--"""2!~~~~~~~!ffiH

zoo l--..J--------I---~~-~~~~~~~~~~

CHART IV

A new official estimate of German U-boat strength nas been made by ,the British
Naval Intelligence Division as of 'June 1, 1943, and is based on a careful re-examina
tion of all the available eVidence on the subject since the outbreak of war.
The study concludes that on June 1st the Germans had a total of 440 U-boats, in
cluding all boats operating, training and working up and carrying out trials. Of this
total, 50 are believed to be under 500 tons leaving a total of 390 of 500 tons or more
in commission.
The estimate, however, indicates that of the total U-boats in commission b only
about 230 to 250 are believed to have completed training and are now at sea on opera
tions or are in operational bases in the Atlantic, Mediterranean or Norway. Thi~ fig
ure is somewhat lower than has been commonly accepted.
A recent study of the known histories of,84 war cruises by U-boats of 500 or more
tons indicates that on the average the 500 ton boats were four weeks in port for each
four weeks at sea while the 740 ton boats were rour and a half weeks in port for each
five and eight-tenths weeks at sea. Thus it appears that on the average about 58% of
the operational U-boats can be at sea or between 126 and 138 U-boats. In this report a
month ago it was estimated that 130 was the normal operating maximum that could be main
tained in the Atlantic. This British estimate Reems to be in general agreement although

8
 it app?-rentlYincludes German boats in the Mediterranean and off Norway while -::;heesti
mate in thiS report was for the Atlantic- only.
The report develops other aspects of the situation, however, that are of interest.
Chtef among these is the estimate that tp.eGermans have 140 to 160 U-boats, including
boats of less than 500 tons,-that are in training and working up or carrying out t~lals.
Many of these presumably could be quickly thrown into active operation.
In addition to U-boats in commission, the report estimates that 270 U-boats are now
bUilding.or fitting out. These are believed to be of the following types:
1600-ton Minelayers 2
1600-ton Supply 7
1200-tonOperational 17
740-ton Operational 40
500-ton Operational 204
Total building 270
It seems clear, therefore, that provided crew morale is maintained, Germany is
capable of again intensifying the U-boat war at any time and furthermore thatsinkings
per month by Allied anti-submarine forces must be maintained around the 25 per month
level to prevent further increases in U-boat strength. The situation, in spite of evi
dence of recent success, does not appear to warrant any relaxation of Allied anti
submarine. effort.
A careful but unofficial study of U-boats constructed and probably destroyed has
been made recently in the United States. As it is based on information from various
sources and on some reasonable assumptions, the figures are necessarily .estimates. While
the total number of U-boats now available for operational use is somewhat higher than
estimated by British authorities, the general trends, as shown in the accompanying
Chart, are probably quite accurate.

D. DISPOSITION OF ENEMY SUBMARINES

The May issue of this report pointed out that a major shift in submarine disposi
tionswas taking place dur1:ng the early part of June. This change in strategy consisted
primarily in a sharp decrease in the number of U-boats at sea, and Virtual abandonment
of the North Atlantic convoy routes as battle areas. The extent of this shift--one of
the most pronounced in many months--is shown in the following table:

ESTIMATED AVERAGE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY U-BOATS

Change
June, 1943 May, 1943 May to June, 1943
North Atlantic Convoy Area. . 16 58 -42
Canadian Coastal Zone . - 0 0
Eastern Sea Front ieI'. . . . . . . . . 2 1 + 1
- Gulf Sea Front ier . . . . . . . . . . I 1 1
Panama Sea rrontier . . . 0 0
Mid-AtlantiC Area. . . . . . . 14 6 +.8
Caribbean Sea Frontier (Western). 1 0 + 1
Caribbean Sea Frontier (Eastern). 2 0 + 2
Brazilian Area. . . . . 2 2
Northeast Atlantic Area . . 41 37 +4
Southeast Atlantic Area . . . 6 7 - 1
Indian Ocean. . . . . . .
TOTAL
2
87
0
'112
+ 2
-25

9
 o 20
The important change during
the month, as reflected in the
preceding table, is the decrease
of U-boats in the North Atlantic
Convoy Area that amounted to 42
U-boats or approximately 72% of
the average number operating in
this area during May. Scattered
... . ..
::::
'.~"'...
::
increases will be noted in vari

...... ..
.....
..
ous areas with a total reduction
of 25 in the estimated number of
U-boats at sea in the Atlantic
Ocean, the Caribbean Sea and
Indian Ocean. Due to the divi
o sion of areas used in the above
figures, obtained from Naval
sources, the real extent of the
movement is obscured. The
u/a ON PAT~OL "Northeast Atlantic Area" is a
... u/e IN TItANSIT
huge irregularly shaped area
40 zo o extending from the Equator to
CHART V ---- .6stimated Disposition 0/ the far North and as far west
U-boats at the end of June as 40 0 W in the Mid-Atlantic~
Thus it includes in one area
such critical points as the coast off Freetown, Gibraltar, the Azores, the Bay of Bis
cay and a large part of the passage between the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Actually in
the eastern Atlantic north of 43~ the average number of U~boats declined from a peak
in May of about ~3 to 12 at the end of June while the number south or 43 0 N rose from an
average of about 19 during May to 38 at the end of June. In the combined areas of the
Nortl!east Atlantic north of 43~ and the North Atlantic Convoy Area the total declined
from 83 in the first week in May to about 20 at the end of June, while the mid-Atlantic
area and the eastern Atlantic south of 43~ rose from 31 to 54.

Thus it is clear that the enemy disposition of U-boats involved a major change in
strategy through virtually abandoning the northern Atlantic convoy routes as a major
battle area and concentrating U-boats further south in an effort to cut the supply
lines to the Mediterranean. The decrease in total number at sea probably reflects the
number of damaging and fatal attacks made on U-boats in the past few months although a
contributing factor is the probability that an unusual number of U-boats was in port
being equipped with more powerful AA guns. It is possible that a considerable number
of German U-boats may have moved into the Mediterranean during the month but data are
lacking on U-boat density in this area.

10
 III

ANALYSIS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

A. ANTISUBMARINE COMMAND OPERATIONS

The map on page 13 shows the location. of Army Air Forces ~Antisubmarine Squadrons
as of June 30, 1943. Each dot represents an available aircraft and the length of the
line between each base and dot roughly indicates the range of the aircraft according-to
type. The area covered by the lines, however, does not indicate the actual area covered
by anti-submarine patrols which are constantly varied in each area in accordance With
the local tactical situation.
Detailed operational statistics for Antisubmarine Command Wings and Squadrons may
be found in Section IX. A summary of hours f10wn by Antisubmarine Command aircraft is
presented in the following table:
U.S.-BASED UNITS
PATROL ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL HOURS
Antisu:b Comd. . 2,959 1,391 554 4,629 9,533
Amy CAPCP. 10,844 2,810 13,654
O.T.U . . 399 42 1.163 1,604
TOTAL 14,202 4,201 596 5,792 24,791
OVERSEAS UNITS
Newfoundland Area
4th Aron . . 71 114 185
6th Aron 48 464 8 211 731
19th ArOYl 89 201 12 75 377
TOTAL 137 736 20 400. 1,293
Trinidad
7th Aron 128 165 57 650 1,000
Cuba
8th Aron 489 6 138 633
17th Aron 591 13 228 832
TOTAL 1,080 19 366 1,465
African Area
1st Aron 833 187 1,020
2nd Aron ... 816 148 964
TOTAL 1,649 . 335 1,984
TOTAL ANT I SUB COMD 17,196 5,102 692 7,543 30,533
/

EASTERN SEA FRONTIER AND GULF SEA FRONTIER

An increase in the average submarine density from 1.6 ih May to 3.0 in June was
effected in these Frontiers in June: One of two attacks on merchant vessels was success
ful, however, in the sinking of the Esso Gettysburg on June 10 at 3100N 7908W. Two tor
pedoes were fired into the stern and fire immediately broke out on the tanker. Blimp
K-45 was escorting this tanker until separated by a thunderstorm. A plane from the 25th
Aron later directed the passenger ship George Washington to the 15 survivors.
With a daily density of only 3 SUbmarines, there were few sightings and attacks. A
.PBM3C sighted a periscope at 3700N 7448W and dropped 4 DC'S, one of wh1ch exploded. No
results were visible. A r.ecord of the contacts, as far as known at this Headquarters,
1s presented in the following table:

.11
 CONTACTS, MILITARY AIRCRAFT
No,. Kind Evaluation
ESF, ANTISUB. COmAND
2 Instrument .Possible
I Instrument Probable
I Visual Possible-
ESF, NAVY
5 Visual ?u8sible
2 Instrument (Blimps) Possible
1 Instrument Possible
GSF, ANT ISUB .COmAND
1 Vlsu:al Possible
QSF, NAVY
1 Visual Posltive
2 Instrument (Blimp) Possible

The heavy coverage of.f the United States Coast continues with the Antisub
marine Command. units flying 11,137 'hours, the CAPCP 1~,654 hours and tpe Navy
29,928 hours, including blimps,:to make total flying hours for the month 54,719. Twelve
qontacts and one attack is a poor return for this amount of flying effort even after
allowance for the fact that many of the aircraft are short range or otherwise unsuited
for successful anti-submarine work. By comparison, less than 9% as many hours of'fly
ing in 27 days in the Bay of Biscay during June produced 62 sightings and 25 attacks.
Newfoundland Area: A decrease in all factors bearing on submarine warfare occurred
in thiS area in June. A decline in density of submarines has been noted since the at
tack on convoy ONS-5 of 5 May; ~d in June, as compared With May, this decline was 88.7%.
Commensurate With this decline in density, the number of ~onta.cts was few. The
Navy obtained 2 visual contacts; the RCAF one instrument contact, and Lt. Christy, 6th
Aron, one instrument contact evaluated as probable. These contacts were not attacked.
Convoys are now passing safely through lanes of former submarine' activity. The
enemy faile.d to attack any merchant vessels in the area during June, confining himself
to mine-laying activities in the Halifax area. Early in the month a large submarine,
presumably the mine-layer, was sighted in the Halifax areac
The 4th, 6th and 19th Squadrons flew 281 missions comprising convoy coverages and
anti-submarine sweeps totalling 1293 hours in spite of the fact that the 4th and 19th
departed for the United Kingdom on June2~th.
'rrinidad Area: Two submarines were estimated to have been operating in this area in
the month of June, one between Trinidad and Curacao and the other near the Guianas.
Neither submarine made a successful attack on a merchant vessel, although it is believed
a torpedo was fired at Convoy TAG-66. This is the third succeSSlve month in which there
have b~en no confirmed attacks on merchant vessels in this area.
The 7th Antisubmarine Squadron flew 409 missions totalling 1,000 hours but did not
obtain any contacts. The Navy~. which flew 7,97~ hours, obtained a visual contact be
tween Granada and Trinidad. This contact was not ~ttacked; ~ak1ng June the third suc
cessive month also in which submarines have not been attacked by aircraft in this area.
The following is a record of attacks on submarines for the past five months:

12
 CHART VI - Location 0/ A/sub Squadrons at the end 0/ June

Aircraft Surface Craft

February 3
March 2 1
April 2
May
June
Cuban Area: Anti-submarine forces were augmented bt the arrival of the 17th Antisubmar
ine Squadron in the early part of June to work in conjunct ion with the 8th Squadron.
Together these squadrons flew 1,465 hours. one contact, evaluated as "possible," was
obtained but not attacked.
Density of submarines has increased and in the first half of July 6 contacts were
attacked. The enemy has already succeeded in sinking two merchant vessels as compared
to none in June. To meet anticipated increased submarine activity in this area, addi
tional aircraft were sent to the Cuban area during July.
African Area: This month, as in May, there was only one sinking of a merchant vessel
in this area.
Seven attacks were delivered by aircraft in.June, 6 by the R.A.F. and the other
by Captain Sanford of the 2nd Squadron. The sub attacked by Captain Sanford was at
~irst believed to have been sunk, but a DF received shortly after within 40 miles of
the attack area suggests an evaluation of "probably damaged" rather than "possibly
sunk." This attack, in addition to numerous attacks in the early part of July, is
fUlly treated in Section VIII.

13
 Weather in June was less favorable than in May; but Antisubmarine Command units
flew 149 missions, (54 convoy ~overages and 94 antisubmarine sweeps) to bring the total
hours flown to 1984,--an increase of 330 hours over the May record.
A study of the course of patrols flown in this area has shown that the number of
. submarine sightings within 80 miles of the estimated Position of U-boats has been high.
Consequently, careful planning is necessary so as to place a maximum of flying.. .time
within the 80 miles of estimated U-boat positions. Without doubt this planning was a
factor in allowing these squadrons to make 12 attacks in ten days during the early part
of July--one of the most remarkable records ever establis~ed by squadrons of the Com
mand.
A British controlled base, 400 miles south of Port Lyautey, is located at Agadir.
Although this base is often fogged, the 480th Group Headquarters is investigating the
possibilities of operating from here should the situation warrant it. On June 27 air
craft With crews were dispatched along with a skeleton ground force to Agadir to oper
ate and compile the necessary information.

B. ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT--ORDER OF BATTLE

Operational aircraft engaged in-anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic during the
last week of June were as follows according to data furnished by the U.S. Navy:
TYPE AND NUMBER
VLR LR m SR
ICELAND
U.S.N. 0 21 0 0
R.A.F. 11 0 19 0
GREENLAND
U.S.A.A.F.
U.S.N. . . 0
6
8
0
0
0
0
0

NEWFOUNDLAND & NOVA SCOTIA
U.S.A.A.F. 13 0 0 0
U. S.N. 14 0 0 0
R.C.A.F. 15 99 52 0

EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
U.S.A.A.F. 20 15 67 0
U.S.N. 6 32 0 142
GULF SEA FRONTIER
U.S.A.A.F . . 14 0 32 0
U.S.N. 0 17 0 55
PANAl1A SEA FRONT IER
U.S.N. . 0 24 0 28
GUANTANAl10 SECTOR
U.S.A.A.F. 0 5 0 0
U.S.N. 0 29 0 12
~

SAN JUAN SECTOR
U.S.A.A.F. 0 0 3 2
U.S.N. 0 2 0 32
TRINIDAD SECTOR
U.S.A.A.F. 33 1
0 0
U.S.N. . 0 24 0 13

14
 VLR LR SR
CURACAO-ARUBA SECTOR
U.S.A.A.F. o o 17 23
U.S.N . - . o o o 14
BERMUDA
U.S.N. 20 6 o 14
4th FLEET
U.S.N. 6 51 o o
ASCENSION ISLAND
U.S.A.A.F . . 4 o 5 o
MOROCCAN SEA FRONTIER
AND GIBRALTAR
U.S.A.A.F . 20 o o o
U. S. N. o 20 o o
R. A.F. . . o 19 41 o
UNITED KINGDOM
U. S.A.A.F. . 13 o o o
R.A. F. . . . 209 91 13 o
TOTAL 358 463 282 336
NOTE: (1) Navy definitions differ somewhat from Army definitions as
to VLR,LR and l'1R aircraft. Navy definitions include as
VLR, Liberators (B-24-PB4Y) and Coronados (PB2Y3) i as LR,
Fortresses (B-17), Catallnas (FEY), Mariners (PBMj,

Venturas (PV-l); asl'1R, A-29 , B-18, B-25 and PV-3.

(2) In addition to the above aircraft, CV and ACV engaged in

convoy escort carried the folloWing aircraft:
VSB
VF VTB
U. S.N. 33 52
R.N. . . 15 27

C. ATTACKS ON ENEMY SUBMARINES

While the June record of attacks on submarines falls ,substantially below the record
month of May, it was nevertheless a highly successful month in terms of U-boats destroyed
- or damaged. The lack of sinkings of merchant vessels indicated that U-boats were cau
tious in exposing themselves to attack.
The record of June attacks'is the best available at Headquarters of the Antisubmar
ine Command as of July 17th. The figures ,are based upon data supplied by the U.S. Navy
and supplemented by preliminary reports ot attacks made by the Coastal Command up to the
20th of June which were not included in the orMsinal information from the Navy. SUbse
quent to June 20th the Coastal Command made 20 attacks on which insufficient data are
available to allow any assessment or even plotting on the map at the beginning of this
report. The map shows all attacks in which the position is known and in which it is
believed that a submarine was actually present.
A total of 96 attacks is known to have been made during June - 69 by aircraft and

27 by surface craft. Assessments in nearly all instances are pre~-tminary and in many

cases, unofficial. The intention in this cqmpilation is to present a reasonably up-to

date and fairly accurate picture of activity against submarines during them9nth; it is

not intended as an absolutely accurate historical record. Thirty-one of the known

15
attacks made during the month are believed to have resulted in some damage to U-boats
and are divided as follows:

By By By
Extent of Damage Aircraft Surface Craft Submarine Total

Known Sunk. . . .. 6 8 0 14_

Probably Sunk. .. ..
. 3 0 1 4

Probably Severely Damaged 6 1 0 7

Probably Slightly Damaged 5 1 0 6

- - - -
TOTAL 20 10 1 31

Thus it appears that on the basis of preliminary figures 14 submarines were known
to have been sunk during the month while four additional were probably sunk. Thirteen
others are thought to have been damaged. It 1s not 1mprobable that the total will be
greater as more complete reports become available. For example, the similar tabulation
in this report for May written a month ago showed 27 submarines known or probably sunk
whereas current information raises this total to 38.

Aircraft, according to current records, made two-thirds of the damaging or lethal

attacks while ,of the eighteen tentatively assessed as known 'or probably sunk nine were
by aircraft, eight by surface craft and one by submarine.' The bulk of the attacks, as
i~dicatedbY the chart at the beginning of the report, were in the approaches to the Bay
of Biscay and in the Rese Garden where traffic to and from the Baltic or Norwegian
bases was heaVily attacked.

Just as air power has become an iI!lportant, if not the determinative, factor in
land warfare, so has it come to dominate the war against the submarine. At the begin
ning of the war the anti-submarine methods were largely a continuation of those that had
been proved successful in the last, war, that is, convoys protected by surface escort
vessels. The enemy, however, introduced new elements in the form o~ faster, double
hUlled U-boats and through developing the new pack tactics. It was clear that the
Allied Nations must develop neY\' counter weapons and,methods -- aircraft have proved to
be the needed new weapon.

Because little thought had been given to aircraft as an anti-submarine weapon,

progress was very slow for a long period and surface craft were almost solely respon
sible for the limited number of U-boats destroyed up to the beginning of 1942. By the
slow process of trial and error, the most suitable type of aircraft had to be selected;
new types of depth bombs had to be produced; crews had to be trained in new tactics
that were developed only With experience; new detection devices were slowly invented

OPPOSITE PAGE: Th is one was not sunk. Th is

series of photographs of a reoent attaok illus
trates bombing error of two types: first, the
pilot led, the sub by too great a distanoe;
?eoond, the bombardier overshot with his depth
bombs. The U-boat turned into ,the attaok or
away from the oamera and is hidden by the spray
in the last pioture.

16


11
 /YO. OF U/B'.s
100'F~F======I==========r===~~~~~~~~~
90

I 2
/943

CHART VII - ZnBmy Submar inBS Sunk or Probably Sunk

'and produced and even the fundamentals of the proper use of aircraft as to close escort
and protective sweeps were not clear to Allied authorities until experience h~d clearly
developed the facts. This delay in using aircraft effectively for the first two and a
half years of the war proved most unfortunate since it enabled the Germans to bUild up
their U-boat fleet from an estimated 50 at the end of 1939 to about 320 by the middle
of 1942, -- an increase of more than six fold.

The accompanying chart shows the means by which submarines have been destroyed in
each quarter year since the beginning of the war according to records supplied to this
Headquarters by the U.S. Navy lOth Fleet. In making' the comp1lat10n only U-boats as
sessed as "known sunk" or "probably sunk" have been considered. In coordinated attacks
cred1t for a k1ll has been g1ven to both surface craft and a1rcraft. AS has been pre
v10usly p01nted out in these reports th1s method places a1rcraft at a stat1st1cal d1s
advantage s1nce these h1gh assessments are not granted w1thout tang1ble proof and 1t 1s
usually d1ff1cult for a1rcraft to obtain eV1dence such as 011 samples, surv1vors or
parts of human bodies wh1le surface craft can pick up such mater1al with ease. It 1s
also clear that many more damag1ng attacks have been made by a1rcraft than surface
craft and no cred1t for these are reflected in the chart.

In spIte of these stat1stical disadvantages, however, the rap1d rise in the effec
t1veness of aircraft 1n the past year is obv10us from the chart. Dur1ng 1940 and 1941
surface craft accounted for the bulk of the submar1nes destroyed. The other classif1ca
tions such as U-boats destroyed by Allied sUb~r1nes and destroyed by other causes such
as m1nes or unknown causes, in some per10ds accounted for large proport10ns,but as 1nd1
cated by the black curve the total destroyed was so small the proport1ons are not very

18
significant. For axample, in the third quarter of 1940 aircra~t destroyed 23% of the
total but actually the total for the entire quarter was only 13 enemy submarines and
aircraft destroyed an average of only one each month. By the middle of 1942, however,
this situation was changing rapidly. In the past twelve months, 94 kills are credited
to aircraft and 98 to surface craft while in the last nine months aircraft kills have
exceeded surface craft kills and in the final quarter on the chart (that ended ~une
30, 1943) aircraft accounted for 56% aud surface craft 40% of the kills. These air~
craf~ successes have been diVided primarily between the R.A.F. Coastal Command, the

R.C.A.F'. the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Forces. Due to its longer experience and
greater opportun1ties,the Coastal Command has contributed the most to the record.

D. PROBABLE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMY AIR FORCES

FROM ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

Upon the outbreak of the present war, a serious situation developed off U.S.
coasts, due to the operations of enemy U-boats. During this emergency, the Army Air
Forces detailed the First Bomber Command on the Atlantic coast and several Bombardment
Groups that were stationed in the Pacific coastal area to anti-submarine work. Although
these Army units had not been trained in anti-submarine operations and were not proper
ly equipped for the mission, they did carry out active anti-submarine patrols and con
voy escort missions in cooperation with the Navy, and at the same time, these Army Air
Forces 'units pioneered in the development of anti-submarine tactics, equipment, train
ing, communications and control procedure. Ultimately, First Bomber Command became the
nucleus of the Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command.

As' a result of anti-submarine operations by aircraft and surface craft, by mid

summer of 1942, sinkings of merchant vessels along our coasts had almost completely
ceased and Squadrons of this Command then began to reinforce other critical areas,
until currently operations are being carried out from seven countries on both sides of
the Atlantic.

Wherever the local defenses have been augmented by Squadrons of this Command,
there has been an almost immediate decrease in U-boat activitY,and at the present time
it appears as if the tide of submarine warfare has tu~ned definitely in favor of the
Allies. 'The U.S. Navy, R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. Coastal Command are rapidly acquiring addi
tional VLRaircraft and experience in their operation. With the number of land-based
VLR aircraft in anti-submarine work rapidly increasing, and With the use of new smal~
converted aircraft carriers which.are helping to close the mid~ocean gap, it is probable
that this Command will shortly be able to Withdraw from the present defensive anti
submarine operations and return to its normal offensiye bombardment mission.

,19
E. THE BAY OF BISCAY OFFENSIVE
It is a well known fact that a considerable portion of the German submarine fleet

is based on ports on the western coast of France, resulting in an habitually high con

centration of U~boats in the Bay of Biscay and its approaches. Moreover, in crossing

this transit area the U-boats must spend an appreciable portion of their time on the

surface in order to recharge their batteries.

Accordingly, as aircraft began to playa larger and more effective part in anti

submarine warfare, it was recognized that this was an ideal area in which to conduct

offensive anti-submarine operations. Throughout the first six months of 1942 the

Coastal Command of the R.A.F. flew a small but a steadily increasing number of hours

in the Biscay transit area. During the past year, however, the flying effort in this

area has been maintained at a relatively high level, averaging between three and four

thousand hours per month.

Chart VIII shows, the flying hours and also t~e s1ghtings and attacks on U-boats

by months. It will be noted that the fluctuation in the sightings (and, therefore,

the attacks) achieved has been out of all proportion to the variation in the number of

hours of flying. Closer examination of the nature of the flying yields an explanation

of thiS fact. Since it was safest for the U-boats to take their charge on the sur

face only by night, it was essential for the anti-submarine force to be properly "bal

anced", that is, capable of attacking equally by day or by night. Prior to May, 1942,

night operations were inadequate but when Wellington aircraft, equipped With radar and

the Leigh searchlight, were introduced, the results improved quite noticeably.

During the summer of 1942, however,theGermans fitted their U-boats with search
receivers, capable of detecting the Mark II radar which the British were using. As a
reSUlt, the effect of the Wellingtons specially equipped for night operations was nulli
fied, since the U-boats could now detect. the presence of the aircraft and sUbmerge be
fore the aircraft detected the U-boat. Sightings and attacks fell off badly and not
until February and March of this year was there any substantial improvement. The magni
tude of the recent success has been such that the Bay Offensive 1s now regarded'as one
. of the most important parts of the anti-submarine war.
Early in 1943, a plan was drawn up, based on comprehensive theoretical studies,

calling for an increased and better balanced :flying effort in the Bay. An area in the

approaches . to the Bay of Biscay sufficiently.

.
wide that every U-boat crossing it wo~ld

have to surface for an appreciable period to recharge its batteries having been deter
mined, the expected density of surfaced U-boats in the area was calculated. The number
of sorties reqUired ofj specially equipped airplanes, by day and by night, to insure
that every U-boat in transit would be harried and subjected to attack was then deter
mined. It .was planned to make extensive use of Mark III radar, which the Germans were
apparently unable to detect with their search receivers, in conjunction with the Leigh
searchlight in order to make the night operations effective. It was claimed that a
force of 260 suitably equipped operating aircraft could account for about 25 U-boats
killed and 34 damaged per month.
Although opera.tions have not been carried out on as large a scale as planned, the

success of the efforts that have been made is excellent and supports the conclusions

reached in the theoretical studies. In the following table the fundamental figures

20
NO. OF HilS. /VO.OF U/8~

100

80

fiRS OF FlYING 60

40

J F A All J J A S ON/) J F .M A AI J
/942 /943
O?.RATION,s ElY THE .BAY OF BISCAY

CHART VIII

have been summarized for the period March 1 through June 27. Only depth charge and
rocket attacks were included, - attacks by cannon or machine gun having been omitted.
It was assumed that traffic in the Bay mnounted to 120 transit U-boats each month, that
is, about 60 outgoing and 60 incoming U-boats on the average. It 1s believed that this
figure is accurate within about 10%.
Approx. Flying Hours U-Boats V-Boats Flying Hours % of Transit
Month (Operational Area) Sighted* Attacked. per Sighting U-Boats Attacked
March. 4100 42 24 97 20%
April. 3600 52 28 69 23%
May. 4600 99 65 46 54%
June .... 4700 62 25 76 23%
(27-1/3 days)

17000 255 142 67 30%

* A dispatch received as this report goes to press indicates a

total of 68 sightings in June. Moreover, in the first nineteen
days of July, there were 85 s1ghtings by aircraft in the Bay.

There is a sharp contrast between this rate of sighting U-boats and the number of
hours of flying which experience has shown are required to obtain a sighting in other
operational areas.
Hours of Flying
per Sighting
Area Jan.-April, 1943
Newfoundland & Nova Scotia. 763
San Juan Sector . . 790
Trinidad Sector . . . . . . . 2175
Guantanamo Sector . . . 12194
Eastern Sea Frontier. . . . . 20663
Gulf Sea Frontier . . 59216
21
 Admttt~dly some of the planes that are used in these areas would not be sUitable
for operations in the Bay, and in this respect the comparison drawn above is not valid.
Nevertheless, the contrast between the flying effort required to obtain a sighting in
the Bay and elsewhere is eVidento

An indication of the 'extent of the agreement between the results achieved@d

those expected from theoretical calculations may be obtained from the following table
which presents some of the details pertaining to the first four operations in this of
fensive. Enclose I took place between dusk of March 20 and dawn of March 28, Enclose
II lasted from dusk of April 5 to dusk of April 12, Derange I from dawn of April 13 to
dusk ot May 2, and Derange II from the close of the preceding operation to dusk of
,Hay 20. The areas selected for this offensive extended from 44030'N to-48 030'N and
from 7 0Wto 100W in the Enclose operations, from 8030'W to 120W in the Derange opera
tions. Approximately 140-160 aircraft were used.

Hours of Sightings
Operation Type of Search - Flying Area Swept Expected Achieved

Enclose I Day 763 450,000 sq. rut. 17 17

Night-Mark 260 364,000 13 9
III Radar

Enclose II Day 392 231,000 6 4

Night-Mark 193 270,000 7 2

III Radar

Derange I Day 1612 950,000 19 20

Night-Mark 321 450,000 9 14
III Radar

~~~i*
Derange II Day 1300 770,000 21 42
Night-Mark 250 350,000 9 1
III Radar

*See text.

In calculating the expected sightings it was assumed that the U-boats would spend
as much time submerged as possible and that the necessary surfacing would be done at
random throughout the entire day. These were the best assumptions that could be made,
but actual conditions never completely' conformed to them. In the .first operation the
area was flooded With Mark II radar at night provoking day su~facingand night sub- .
merging to such an extent that the Mark III radar did not obtain as many contacts as
expected. During Enclose II, t~e flying was not sufficiently thorough at dawn and at
dusk during which periods the U-boats tended to do their surfacing. Mark II flooding
was hardly used during Derange I, and the flying was more uniformly distributed
throughout the day. As a result the expected number of sightings was more than .
achieved, indicating that the theoretical calculations are, when the operations are
properly carried out, if anything, on the conservative side. The rather greater
proportion of sightings achieved at night than expected may mean that the U-boats
surfaced more by night than by da~

22
 In the period during which Derange II took place, a new tactic was adopted by the
U-boats. The scarcity of night contacts and the increase in day sightings suggests
that the U-boats, fearing attack by 'the specially equipped night,planes, were surfacing
almost entirely by day. The assNmption of surfacing only by day results in 34 expected
sightings by day and none at night. The record Of 42 and 1 achieved compares very
fayorably with this. This new tactic is by no means unfortunate, for the operati~
strength of day planes engaged in the Bay offensive is in excess of the operating
strength of night planes with the result that an even greater overall offensive can
now be achieved.

Another new tactic on the part of the U-boats, the final results of w4ich are not
y'et clear, was eVident during the latter half of June. For some time now, the U-boats
have, on occasion, elected to stay on the surface and fight back when attacked by air
craft rather than to submerge. In order to make this procedure more effective they
have ~ow adopted the tactic of crossing the Biscay transit ~rea in groups rather than
singly. There are also reports that these groups are accompanied by special submarines
equipped With an increased amount of armament. Certainly the use of such escort vessels
1s not unreaSonable. The following table shows the extent of this practice of traveling
in groups.

No. of Groups of Composition No. of U-boats Total No. of

Date U-boats Sighted of Groups Sighted in Groups U-boats Sighted

June 1-6 0 5
7-13 1* 5 5 6

14-20 12 2,2,3,3,3,3 36 38
3,3,3,3,3,5
21-27 4* 3,3,3,5 14 19
June 28
July 4 6 2,2,2,3,3,3 15 24

~~ The sightings of' 5 U-boats, one during the week of' June 7~12 and the
other during the week of' June 21-27, were made by,transit aircraf't
and hence have not been included in previous sighting f'igures.

Other countermeasures which the Germans may adopt include:

1. The installation of search receivers capable of detecting the Mark III radar.

2. The installation of radar capable of detecting aircraft.

3. The dispersal of radar decoys throughout the transit area.

4. The shifting to the south of the normal routes across the Bay, out of the
. area most completely patrolled by aircraft.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that as yet, the enemy has found no way of defeat
ing the Bay offensive. Apparently, the dream of stopping the orderly floW of U-boats
from the Bay of Biscay is close to being realized. Considering the tremendous task
that would be entailed in starting this flow again, once stopped, the extra effort re
quired on the part of the Allies seems eminently worthwhile.
23
F. CONVOY STATISTICS

In the rollowing tab~es there is a comparison of convoy data for the months of May
and June covering the three major Atlantic areas. Stattstics were not available for
other zones.

North Middle East-Coast

1 0 May Atlantic Atlantic of U.S.-
Number of SUip Crossings .. .
922 279 2009
Number of Convoy Crossings.
Average Number of M/v's per Convoy.
. 21
44
10
28
316
6.3
Av~rage Number of Escorts per Convoy. 7.7 10.2 2.4
Average Number of M/v's per Escort. 5.7 2.7 2.6
Number of M/v' s Sook. ....
18 0 3
Percentage of M/v's Sook.
2.2 0 .0014

2~ June
Number of Ship Crossings. 727 342 2176

Number of Convoy Crossings. 13 10 382
Average Number of WV's per Convoy. 56 34 5.7
Average Number of Escorts per Convoy. 9 8.9 2.2
Average Number of M/v's per Escort. 6.2 3.8 2.5
Number of M/v's Sunk. .. . .. 0 0 0
Percentage of M/V's Sook. . 0 0 0

It is significant that the upward trend in size of convoys has continued through the
month of June. This increase over the May figure amoooted to 27% in the North Atlantic
area and 24% In the Middle Atlantic area. In general it bears out the suggestion of the
May Report that convoy size could be increased even further without a corresponding in
crease in the number of sinkings. As indicated elsewhere in the pres~nt Report, the.se
northern convoys suffered no losses whatsoever. In this respect an interesting compari
son may be made with the figures of December, 1942, and January, 1943. At that time
convoy size was roughly only 60% of the June average for the North Atlantic Area and the
losses were far heavier.

The' June tables ind icate a trend away from the North Atlant ic Area. While_ it is
tru~ that most vessels still cross to European ports over the northern route, it will
be noted that the total number of crossings in this area declined from 922 to 727, for
a decrease of 21%. Even more remarkable is the 38% decline in number of convoys cross
ing the North Atlantic. On the other hand, as traffic fell off in the North it gained
somewhat in the Middle Atlantic, a fact which may account in part for the increase of
submarine activity in the area. However, this gain, amounting to 12%, was not propor
tionate to the decline occurring along "the older route nor was it accompanied by an in
crease in number of convoys, which remained the same for both May and Jooe. It will be
seen that the gain was in the size of the convoys rather than in their number.

A significant increase in the number of escorts occurred in the North Atlantic,a

factor which doubtless contributed materially to the complete" success of all crossings
24
in the area. A l~ increase 1n the number of escorts will be noted over the May figure,
which affords some1ndication of the steady advance of the Un1ted Nations' surface es
cort program.

A study of the figures for :May and June indicates an increase of 8% in the number
of M/v's per escort, further eVidence that the size of convoys is being advanced some
what more rapidly than is the provision of additional escort.

In the Mid-Atlantic Zone this position would s~em to be sUbstantiated to a sur

prising degree when the average f1gures are considered. In this case the average
number of escorts per convoy actually suffered a drop which amounted to 13%, whereas
the average number of M/v's per escort increased 40%. A superficial examination might
lead to the conclusion that the convoys in this area were crossing with less pr.otection
than those to the north. However, a more complete analysis of activity in this area
indicates that even with the 40% increase, the number ofM/V's per escort is still very
low. And furthermore, since this Mid-Atlantic zone is the principal route for supply
ing the heavy activity in North Africa, the passage of one or two heavily guarded per
sonnel convoys may serve to throw the monthly average figures somewhat out of line. A
case in point 1s the fact that in June, two important high speed convoys comprising
only 10% of the total ships crossing were protected by 39% of the total number of
escorts. The ratio of ~V's per escort 1n this case was approximately one to one. At
the opposite extreme, in the same area 4 smaller and l~SS important convoys were able
to make the crossing safely with only 4.5 escorts per, convoy. Yet because these were
relatively small convoys, the number of ~V's per escort in this group was 2.5.

AS a general rule it might be assumed that coastal convoys would require fewer
escorts than those sailing offshore, due to the greater ease of providing adequate air
cover and patrol. However, most of these are very small in size, a factor which in
itself serves greatly to decrease the average number of M/v's per escort. A mitigating
fact is that the escort craft used along the coast can be produced in greater numbers
and in less time than those destined for offshore duty.

On the whole, the data for June still further substantiate the theory that small
convoys require far more protection per unit than do the larger convoys, and this seems
to be valid regardless of area.

G. ATTACKS ON U-BOAT BASES

On the afternoon of June 5 a part of the Itqlian fleet steamed into tpe naval base
at Spezia; less than an hour latera striking force of USAAF Fortresses flew over Speziq
and damaged a Littorio class battleship, torpedo stores in ,the port area and workshops.
While the principal target was evidently the surface elements, this rai~was but one
example of the harassment that awaited the Axis submarine fleet in the ports of Italy
during the month of June, for submarines are based at. Spezia too. The seacoast instal
lations of Sardinia and Sicily were attacked as frequently as those on the mainland, and
the resultant damage and confusion must have had a definitely deleterious effect on
U-boat operations in the Mediterranean area.

25
 Over western Europe it was not until the 11th of the month that large scale bomb
ing got under way. On t~at day the Eighth Air Force sent more than 200 Fortresses on a
double mission against Wilhelmshaven andCuxhaven. Eight of the bomb~rs were lost in
these operations, but the score against the heavy Nazi-fighter opposition was 54 des
troyed, 25 probably destroyed and 18 damaged. The heavier conflict took place over
Wilhelmshaven, while opposition at Cuxhaven was less vigorous than expected.
The 450 tons of bombs dropped on W~lhelmshaven led observers to conclude that this
port's usefulness as a naval base was materially reduced. Harbor installations were
heavily damaged and the arsenal blown up. The U~boats based in the port were reported
transferred to the mouth of the Weser River where they were dispersed in anticipation
of further air raids. At Cuxhaven 175 tons of bombs released resulted in hits on the
U-boat yards and harbor installations.
Two days later another large formation of Fortresses attacked two more German
naval objectives, Bremen and Kiel. The-unescorted bombers met heavy opposition from
enemy fighter craft over Kiel, and the day's loss of 26 USAAF planes was the largest
suffered up to that time. Evidenc.e of a shift in German fighter strength from the
Brittany bases to northwest Germany waS seen in the. fact that more than 225 enemy
fighters rose to' meet the attackers, of which number a sUbstantial portion was shot
dQwn, for the day's tally was 50 destroyed, 15 probably destroyed and 20 damaged.
APparently, however, the Germans were hammering harder at the minor striking force, for
while 175 tons of bombs were effectively loosed on Kiel's U-boat installations, at
Bremen, where fighter opposition was light, 450 tons were dropped. TheAA fire was
characterized,as very heavy. Photographs of the raid'S effects show extensive damage
done: there was a heavy concentration of bomb bursts in Harbor No. 1 (part of the
shipbuilDing yards), a dozen hits.on buildings in the Atlaswerke yards and more on the
nearby warehouses. In the operations of June 13 the principle of attacking multiple
objectives at the same time seems justified.
Flying a diversionary mission on the 2?nd, 13 B-25s of the Eighth Air Force carried
out a minor attack on the Wilton Shipbuilding Yards at Rotterdam. Heavy AA fire was en
countered and enemy aircraft added to the defenses of the city. This raid is one of the
comparatively rare excursions by American medium bombers and may perhaps presage more
frequent employment of this type of aircraft in the western European theater. Another
notable innovation was seen on the 23rd when52RAF Lancasters dropped 400 tons of bombs
on Spezia on the return portion of a shuttle from England to North Africa and back. De
fense of the Italian port was comparatively weak, and no losses were sustained. Aside
from the report that large oil stores were set afire, no details on the raid's results
are available.
On the 28th of June the RAF's secondary target was the port and U-boat construction
center of Hamburg. Hits were scored in the target area, but the greater part of the
striking power of the hundreds of RAF bombers was felt at Cologne. The tota~ lost in
this double operation was 25 bombers.
On the same date the ninth raid on St. Nazaire by USAAF bombers took place, With
results that merited the praise it received as "a perfect example of high altitude pre.,...
cision bombing". The first wave of 73 Fortresses flew in from the sea and attacked the
U-boat base from the south; the 122 Fortresses which made up the second wave'flew

26
overland,'escorted for some distance inland by P-47s, and approached the target from the
northwest.' AA was intense, but bomber losses from the day's operations (including a
smaller .attack on the enemy airfield at Beaumont-Ie-Roger) were only six. Seventeen
enemy fighters were destroyed, five probably destroyed, and five more damaged. 290 tons
of bombs were dropped With good results. A new German bomb-proof construction over the
submarine lock was hi t hard, and there were many direct hits on all three of the_~locks
in this occupied French port.
Further information is now available on the effects of the two raids on Kiel last
month. Nearly a~l of the buildings in the shipyards were hit, a floating dock and a
floating workshop were badly damaged. Moreover, one U-boat suffered a direct hit and
it is probable that seven others were damaged. But there is a warning against over
estimating the results of such raids in a recent report on the Vegesack U-boat yards,
which were heaVily damaged by the USAAF raid on 18 March. It was originally estimated
in some quarters that the resultant delay in production might bE? as much as 12 months.
But photographs taken less than three weeks after the raid showed the rapid progress
being made in repairing the slips and shops in the yards. In April one U-boat had
already been launched, six others were being completed, and there were additional signs
of a return to normal activity. All this 1s eVidence of the importance Germany at
taches to her U-boat building program.
There is eVidence, however, showing that Germany's shipbuilding program as a whole
is under stress. Germany is experiencing difficulties in replacing her merchant vessel
losses. The first countermeasure employed to meet this shortage of bottoms - the
requisitioning of Dutch, Norwegian and Danish ships - has apparently proved ineffective,
for Germany recently ordered certain shipyards to halt naval construction and build
merchant vessels instead. While it is dOUbtful if.this order affected the construction
of U-boats, it is nonetheless interesting to'see the enemy burdened With a problem she
forced on the Allies early in the war. And it is possible that continued and increas
ing demands for merchant shipping might eventually force a reduction in U-boat construc
tion on Germany.
However, Axis submarine power has found another source of supply in Toulon, the
French Mediterranean naval base. Submarines of the French fleet scuttled here when the
Germans moved to acquire the city are being refloated, and the plan is to tow them to
Italy as soon as possible, where they will presumably be refitted for future operations.
The success of "skip-bombing" against surface craft in the Battle of the Bismarck
Sea first revealed the potentialities of this horizontal bombing technique against other
surface targets. 'Such minimum-altitude bombing was later adapted to the difficult pr0b
lem of destroying underground aircraft hangars on Pantelleria, where the bombs were
"skipped" over land, wrecking the entrances to the hangars. In applying' this method or
that of torpedo bombing to the Bay of Biscay U-boat pens new and considerable difficul
ties would certainly be met. For example, U-boat pens are located ,usually on a narrow
inlet, canal or basin (sometimes at right angles to the course of such water), and as
a result there is very little space for launching the projectile effectively. Moreover,
some Bay of Biscay bases are already equipped with anti~torpedo nets. But With such a
pliable weapon and the careful planning that went into the successful attack on the
Mahne and Eder dams a technique might yet be developed for attack on U-boat shelters.

21
 IV
REVIEW OF U-BOAT WARFA~E - JANUARY-JUNE~ 1943

The record of attacks on U-boats changes from day.to day_as additional data become
available and as preliminary or unofficial assessments are replaced by final assessments.
Current data, admittedly incomplete for recent periods and based in part on preliminary
or unofficial assessments, giV~ the following record of damaging or lethal attaekson
U-boats.
ATTACKS ON U-BOATS
January-June, 1943
Known Probably Probably Severely Probably Slightly
Sunk SUnk Damaged Damaged Total
January 0 7 Z 3 9 21
February-. 11 6 14 11 42
March 7 6 10 17 40
April 11 5 9 14 39
May 20 18 25 14 77
June 14 4 7 6 ~,
TOTAL 70 41 68 71 250

The accompanying chart indicates the most essential factors in U-boat warfare during
the first half of 1943. ,The chart indicates the average number of submarines estimated
to be at sea in the Atlantic, the number of attacks on submarines, the number of U-boats
known or probably sunk as the result of such attacks, and the number of merchant vessels
sUnk. The chart is plotted daily sinc.e the first of January and each point represents
the average or the total for the past thirty days. Thus for any given date it is possible
to read a total box score for the past thirty days. For example, if one reads the data
for March 31, 1943, he Will find that during the preceding thirty days, the enemy sank
101 merchant vessels. In accomplishing this result he had an average ot III U-boats at
(

sea in the Atlantic but on these III U-boats Allied forces made 166 attacks of which 10
resulted in known or probable destruction.
While a box score of this sort may be read for any day on the Chart, its primary
purpose is to show changing trend~ in both enemy and Alliedactivities. Thus during Jan
uary the enemy maintained an average of slightly more than 100 U-boats at sea and he grad
ually increased this number to an average of about 120 during the thirty days ended the
latter part of May. Although this effort in terms of number of U-boats remained reason
.ably constant with a slowly rising trend, enemy effort in utilizing them obviously in
creased sharpJy. Sinkings of merchant vessels dropped down during January, recovered in
February and reached a peak of 115 by the middle of "March.
After March, enemy successess fell off very sharply and the reason is clearly ,shown
in the Allied anti-submarine efforts. Attacks on U-boats mounted in conjunction With U
boat aggressiveness in the early spring campaign but pressure was continued thereafter at
an accelerating rate. Thus from 45 attacks on U-boats in the thirty days ended. January
31st, this record rises to 109 at the end of February, 166 at the end of March, 180 at the
end of April and to the astonishing total of 228 at the end of May. The curve of U-boats
destroyed also rose from 7 at the end of January to a peak of 39 in the thirty days ended
May 23rd.

28
 280 r------.,.....---~---____t_---____,...---~---__,Z80

The curves /'or A1/J/'s sonk l

U/8~ attacked ond VIOls

240 sl/nlr show 30 'day cUnJula 1------+- -+-------t240
fions plotfed ot end or'.30
do!! period
The curve T'or tlIB:S at sea
shows a .30 do!,/ oYer09~
200 I-------ip/ort~d or end or' 30 day ---tZOO
period.

160 +-----+-------+ ------t/fDO

'/8~ ATTACK.

120 t-------t-----+-+H- ---u20

..."...".,-........ I_....._....-.
,II
IVI. :.r AT SEA
BO

40

o
JAN. FEB. MA~. AP~. MAY JUNE
/943

CHART IX

During June, the enemy appeared badly hurt. Not only was the total of U-boats at
sea decreased but their aggressiveness was sharply diminished. The result is clear. Dur
ing June the curve of U-boats destroyed actually ran higher than that of merchant vessels
sUnk. A nearly similar situation has been maintained in July,
As the purpose of this chart is to show trends on an up to the minute basis, figures
on it should not be taken as final nor official. It is, however, a picture of serious de
feat for the enemy in submarine warfare.

29
 V
ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGY

In the May issue of this report, the primary reasons for the withdrawal of U-boats
from the Northern Atlantic Convoy routes were listed as (1) damage sustained by the U-boat
fleet; (2) formation of screens on southem convoy routes; (3) recall to port to rej)lenish
supplies; and (4) recall to port for fitting with new devices. The record of the past-
, thirty days seems to confirm all of these hypotheses. The damage sustained by the fleet
was, of course, obvious and is now reflected in the lowered estimates of available U
boats; s'i:;rong U-boat screens were thrown across the normal routes f.or southern convoys;
some recall for replenishment of supplies is indicated by the fact that the number of U
boats at sea has been increasing during July and confirmed reports indiCate that numer
ous U-boats are being equipped with new guns that increase AA fire-power.
There is little evidence, how~ver, of serious deterioration in U-boat crew morale
and no indication that the will to fight has been broken. While it is true that U-boats
on the southern convoy routes are less subject to attack from land-based aircr~ft,the
area has not been safe for U-boats since the most strategic convoys on the southern routes
have had very heavy escort protection combined With aircraft protection from carriers.
In July, a concentration of U-boats was known to exist off the Portuguese Coast presumably
in an attempt to intercept troop convoys between Britain and the Mediterranean. In spite
of frequenv attacks, many of which were fatal to U-boats, the concentration was main
tained in face of this danger for a considerable period.
The enemy has sufficient U-boats to resume intense-warfare at any time; there is no
indication that he lacks determination. His primary capabilities appear as follows:
(1) Increased dispersion of U-boats with sporadic attacks by indiVidual
U-boats on independently routed vessels and lightly protected coastal
convoys in areas in which defenses are the least well organized.
(2) Attacks on the southern Atlantic convoy routes.
(3) Resumption of mass attacks on the northern Atlantic convoy routes.
(4) Concentration of U-boats in an effort to cut the 011 supply line
between the Carribean and the east coast of the U~S.
(5) Increased activity in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
(1) The most likely enemy capability is the dispersion of his forces and a return to
the former strategy of attacking isolated shipping in widely separated co~stal areas. It
is probable that such a policy would result in sinking more ships--perhaps as many as two
or three per day--than have been sunk by pack attacks on convoys in recent months. On
the other hand, it is a futile strategy that is really an admission of failure in accom
plishing the primary mission of protecting Europe against- invasion. The destruction of
even three ships a day lOaded with non-strategic cargoes is of little value with new con
struction running at nearly double that rate. The coastal areas are far from home ports
which necessitates inefficient expenditure of time in transit, and operations in coastal
areas are highly dangerous. The entire history of German U-boat warfare has indicated an
unwillingness to face strong and organized opposition. The enemy has repeatedly withdrawn
from area after area as soon as his losses began to mount and moved on to some safer spot.
Since losses have been heavy in connection with attempts to interdict convoys on both the
northern and southern convoy routes, it appears that widely dispersed attacks on .lightly

30
protected shipping in coastal areas is a leading capability in spite of its futility as

affecting ~he outcome of the war.

(2) Attempts by the enemy to attack the convoy lines in the southern Atlantic con
tinue as a capability despite his lack of success in this effort in recent weeks. Traffic
is 'heavy on these routes with over 340 ships making the crossing in June; the cargoes of
men and supplies to support the Sicilian campaign are of the highest strategic importance;
the distances from battle areas to home ports are not excessive; the hours of darkness
compared with those of daylight are more favorable to U-boat attacks in these latitudes
than further north at this time of year; danger of attack by land based pianes is much
smaller than.on the northern routes .. For these reasons, continued pressure on the south
ern convoy routes should be regarded as an important enemy capability.
(3) While the enemy appears to have abandoned, temporarily at least, his efforts on
the northern Atlantic Convoy routes, resumption of attacks in this area should be regarded
as a capability. It 'is still the area of maxi~ traffic of high strategic value as in
dicated by the fact that in spite, of substantial 'decrease during June more than twice as
many ships crossed the Atlantic on the northern routes as did on the southern routes.
Nights are growing longer and days shorter in this area--a factor that will soon favorU
boats. Moreover, fog conditions tend to improve rapidly during August and September which
assists U-boats in sighting convoys although it also allows more efficient aircraft opera
tion. A surprise campaign in the Eastern Sea Frontier area between New York and Nova
Scotia would have much to commend it from the enemy's viewpoint.
(4) It has long been recognized that the flow of oil to Europe is vital. Second
front efforts and even aerial attack on Europe could be gre~tly hampered if the flow of
oil from the Caribbean and the United States coUld be cutoff. The supply of tankers is
not great since nearly five times as many were sunk as were built in 1942 and this,
diminished supply has been strained by the necessity of diverting many ships to the long
trans-Pacific routes in order to replace the oil formerly available in the Far East.
While the opening of the Mediterranean will allow some oil to move westward from the Near
East, lack of refining capacity lessens the strategic value of thlsoil source. The
primary oil movement will be from the Caribbean east to Europe and north to the eastern
United States Coast. Heavy and determined attacks on tankers heading east and north from
the Caribbean is an important enemy capability and one which if vigorously,pressed could
be seriously'damaging to the Allied war efforts. Recent increases in actiVity in the
Caribbean area indicate that'this capability is being given increased attention by the
enemy.
(5) The final capability 1s that of moving a large proportion of the U-boats to the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. The exercising of this capability on a large scale pre
s~pposes either that. operations in the Atlantic have become too dangerous to continue or

that an agreement has baen made to extend aid to the Japanese in return for a Japanese
second front against Russia. While the exercising of such a capability may appear im
probable at the present time,it bears close scrutiny. In recent weeks there has been,a
, considerable increase in enemy attacks in the Indian Ocean which may mean experimental
operation in this area and it is possible that these U-boats are based at Singapore or
at ports in Java. The stressing in German propaganda of dangers and difficulties now
faCing U-boats in the Atlantic could be the first stc~ in preparing the German people
for a sharp reduction in Atlantic operations.

31
 VI
U-BOAT CRFW MORALE

INTRODUCTION
What, by now, is the morale--the confidence and the will to fight--of the crews in
the German operational U-boats?
In examining this question one must be careful not to confuse on the one hand, the
psychological status of crews still operating at sea in relative ignorance of the over
all results of the last few months, and on the other hand the state of mind of individuals
who recently have been subjected to a harrowing attack resulting in the sinking of the
U-boat and the loss of a number of their crew. The former has tactical and strategic
importance-~the latter has not, except insofar as it may throw light upon means of under
mining the former. Above all Wishful thinking shOUld play no part in the assessment. A
conservative evaluation of any weakening in thlS, as in other aspects of the enemy's con
dition, is the only safe course.
MORALE BACKGROUND
In any appro~ch .to the morale situation in the U-boat service full cognizance must

ever be taken of the speCial indoctri~atlonand extra build-up to which the Germans

have subjected this important group of personnel.

Selected predominantly from definite Nazi adherents and former members of the "H.J."
(Hitler Youth) both officers and men of the U-bootwaffe have long been nurtured upon lec
. tures and literature extolling the glories of their service.
In the conclusion of his book "Die U-bpotwaffe," written in 1939 by Karl Doenitz,

then Kapitaen zur See, for the obvious purpose of building its prestige and attracting

volunteers to this serVice, he says:

"It is hoped that the knowledge has been gained. that the Submarine Service is a

special service which requires highly developed technical naval materiel, but above all

things, need~ well prepared tough crews wi t'h the best of training and broad knowledge ..

The submarine man loves his Service. They proved their daring spirit in the World War

and today's Submarine Service cultivates this courageous will for the best endeavors."

Later in command of the U-bootwaffe, Admiral Doeni tz made the practice of visiting
from time to time the various U-boat bases to address the officers and men and confer
decorations. The dangers of the service have always been emphasized and participation
therein glorified. Crews have been psychologically conditioned to expect sinkings of
other crews from time to time and to experience attacks themselves when on war cruises.
The U-boat sailor,usually ranging from 19 to 23 years of age,has been particularly
schooled in discipline, loyalty, and security with respect to naval matters. Tangible
rewards in this Service include higher pay levels, better food $.nd 10!lger leaves between
crUises, than are enjoyed by other branches of the Navy.
RECENT HIGH U~BOAT ATTRITION RATE
While the game was running in their favor,--while sinkingsof merchant vessels were
numerous and U-boat kills were relatively few--all reports tended to indicate a high
level of morale in the German Submarine SerVice.
However, what effect has the Tecently hfgh attrition rate had upon this enemy morale?
 With ,German U-boat kills estimated at one a day for the '2~ months since the first of
May, serious inroads undoubtedly have been made in the supply of qualified and experienced
German -submarine commanders and crews. To maintain an operational fleet of 225 U-boats
will thus require the assimilation into the command and crew personnel of 33-1/3% of new
~fficers, specialists and seamen to counteract losses for this period alone.

In order to continue absorbing such a large proportion of men without battle- experi
ence, ac'omplete reshuffling of older crews returning to port must inevitably take place. -
Men from a given U"':boat with one or more war cruises to their credit must be spread around
and placed in charge of their particular type of activity in several U-boats, supported of
course by new men with no previous battle-seasoning. This di1utingprocess is undoubtedly
having a weakening effect on the actual efficiency of the crews, on their mutual confi
dence and on their composite fortitude'under the most frequent and severe attacks that
even the older crews have had to endure. Thus the newer commanders and crews alike hq.ve
certain definite handicaps as compared with previous'commanders and crews, while at 'the
same time they are being subjected to far greater tests and strains.
It seems obvious then that if Germany attempts to 'continue aggressive subnarine war-

fare on the same scale as heretofore, U-boat destruction should continue to mount at an

increasing rate, assuming of course no slackening in the Allied effort and no unforeseen

technical developments favorable to the enemy.

When however will this increased attrition rate begin to have a direct effect on the

morale of operational U-boat' crews 'about to put to sea?

RELATIVE ISOLATION OF U-BOAT UNITS

If any substantial portion of the army ground forces is destroyed or captured in
battle, the matter cannot be concealed from the remainder of the participating troops.
The same ts true, although to a less extent, in the case of the Luftwaffe and of the sur
face naval craft which 'usually operate in sizeable task forces with numerous escorts and
aUXiliary vessels. Thus in the African campaign of the German ground and air forces, both
officers and enlisted personnel, could Witness for themselves the gradual destruction or
capture of large portions of their fellow combatants as theyfo~nd themselve~ being
steadily defeated and forced into disastrous retreats. The effect of this obvious trend
of events w~s to weaken the confidence, and will to fight of the surVivors,finally resulting
in a discouraged surrender of the entire ground forces while plenty of ammunition and food
supplies remained available. Both officers and men saw the utter futility of further pro
a
longing the campaign and showed no interest in martyring themselves in vain operation~
In contrast to such a general kno~ledge of the trend of events on land, in the air
and on the surface of the sea, U-boats function principally as isolated units. True, they
have tactical contacts with each other in relatively small groups at sea, but these con
tacts are held to a minimum for security reasons and whether a given U-boat drops out of
an engagement because of mechanical failure, damage or -actual destruction may never be-
come known to other U-boats, but probably only to the Commander of U-boats, or B~D.U.,
, and the Flotilla Chief involved.
B.D.U.'S. DELAY IN LEARNING U-BOAT LOSSES
Barring a few exceptional cases where the destruction or abandonment of a U-boat may
take place within the sight of another U-boat, or of an enemy air or surface craftwhlch

33
will report the event, or where U-boat surv~vors may be saved by enemy or neutral vessels,
the Commander of U-boats must rely upon a radio message from the doomed U-boat for speedy
information regarding its fate.
Considering that a U-boat must be surfaced to send such a message and that it would
not be sent except in the lastextremi ty, it is probable that all submarines attacked
following a crash dive and destroyed without the opportunity of resurfacing are un~ble to
notify U-boat headquarters of their fate.
On the other hand, if a U-boat stays on the surface during attack or subsequently
resurfaces, it may not have time, after it knows it has received mortal wounds, to radio
'B~D.U. of its proposed abandonment. Therefore in the great majority of cases definite
information of the sinking of a U~boat probably is not promptly received by B.D.U.
DELAY IN SPREADING NEWS OF LOSSES
While losses of particUlarly famous or popular U-boat commanders and their crews must
eventually be announced ~o thepublic,other U-boat losses are not customarily so an
nounced, even wi thin the U-boat Service., It is only by grapevine that news of such other
losses gradually filters back to the U-boat bases from next of kin of the missing or cap
tured crews.
It is believed that in the absence of specific information, an additional period of
at least 16 days is allowed to elapse after a U-boat was due to return to port, before the
next of kin are notified that the U-boat and its crew are missing. How promptly these
presumed sinkings and the other known sinkings of U-boats are in reality made known to tl1e
,next of kin involves a matter of policy and it is conceivable that there may still be some
delays in an effort to avoid too many such announcements in a short space of time.
When'it is considered that war cruises last ordinarily from one to'three months, it

can be seen that the particularly heavy losses of May, for instance, are not likely to be

known generally throughout the operational U-boat crews until at least August, those of .

June only by September and so on through the year.

EVENTUAL EFFECT ON MORALE

Thus while the serious U-boat losses may involve a lag of some three months ,in their
morale effects, the results are likely to be, of doubled significance in'the end. The
crews among whom such bad news will eventually be disseminated will no longer be the well
integrated,battle-seasoned "veterans" who formerly predominated in the service. They
will be crews already considerably weakened in their effiCiency, confidence and esprit de
corps'by ever-increasing proportions of replacements,and crews which are being subjected
to more nerve-shattering attacks per cruise than ~he veterans ever had to Withstand in
the past.
The foregoing discussion has been limited to aspects affecting U-boat crews in parti
cular. However signs of growing impatience with Nazis on the part of the people at home
have been multiplying. The Home Front is growing tired of the war and its attitude is
bound to affect gradually the troops and Navy per/90nnel as a result of their periodic visits
home as well as their correspondenc~. I

The effect will be cumulative as the months go by and may in the end prove an import~
ant factor in the termination of the Battle of the Atlantic.
 VII
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

A. ANALYSIS OF U~BOATFIGHT';"'BACKTACTICS

Reports have been received of an increasing number of instances where U-boats have
elected to remain on the surface and fight an attacking aircraft. From the information
contained in these reports some general and preliminary conclusions may be stated cohcern__
ing these enemy tactics.
1. The adoption of the fight-back tactics attests to the efficiency of aircraft as
an anti-submarine weapon. It is apparent
,
from studies and statistics that the balance in
U-boat warfare has swung away from the submarine to the side of the airplane. The number
of attacks on U-boats by aircraft is .continually increasing as more long range planes are
made available for anti-submarine operations. As a result, not only are more submarines
sunk and damaged but they are continually harassed in their operations.
Camouflage and effective use of sun and cloud cover have enabled the aircraft time
and again to catch the U-bo~t before he could dive to safety. In the North Atlantic'very
long range aircraft have extended their patrol areas further and further toward the center
until finally at no point can U-boats be said to be secure from air attack. Submarine
operations have become unprofitable for the enemy. Some measure to counter the aircraft
attack ,is a vital necessity. From the point of view of Admiral Doenltz then, the fight
back tactics are at least worth a try.
2. The final decision as to whether the submarine on patrol will dive or Tight '!jack
is apparently the responsibility of the individual commander. If it is certain that the
U-boat will have sufficient time to SUbmerge to a safe 'depth before the aircraft can
attack,then a crash dive is likely. If the time element is doubtful, the submarine will
probably fight back hoping to bring down the plane or at least hold him,off until a favor
able opportunity to dive is presented. In June and July a slight decline has been noted
in the number of instances where the individual U-boat commander decided to fight it out
on the surface, 'suggesting that single U-boats have not .b!3e~ very successful in these
engagements. In the Bay of Biscay 'and its approaches, however, where the .submarines are
now travelling in small groups and are probably directly controlled by head,quarters, there
has been a decided increase almost to the po~int of consistency in the use of fight back
tactics. In this area, then, it seems that higher authority and not the individual com
mander determines the tactics to be followed ..
3. Fight-back tactics do not appear to be confined to any particular geographical
location or to certain operational groups of U-boats. Both lone U-boats and those operat
ing in packs from Greenland to Ascension Island 'have attacked aircraft. The marked in
crease of these incidents in the Bay, however, suggests that anti-s~bmarine operations in
that area have been highly effective. A detailed study of operations in the B~y is pre
sented in section III-E.
4. Neither armament nor tactics appear to be standardized. U-boats have been
sighted with as few as one gun on the conning tower and as many as five. These guns range
in size and 'type from the 7.9 millimeter light machine gun to the 20 millimeter AA gun.
Instances have been reported where the dual purpose deck guns have fired upon attacking
aircraft usually from long range. It seems that the enemy is experimenting with different

35
 SIN6LE ZO MM AA GUN
,
QUADI2l./PL 20 MM AA GUNS
'\..
J I
2 PRo HEAVY MGS.
QVAO~UPLE ZO MM AA Gl./NS
,~ '\..../ .#,,' 0 '/
~h 1

combinations of armament to determine which is most effective. At the present time, how
ever, it is estimated that only a small number has been equipped with addi tional guns.
The majority of the U-boats has, been armed With the standard 2 em. AA gUl)- in the basket,
two 7~9 millimeter or 13 millimeter machine guns on the conning tower and one or two dual
purpose guns on the deck. The shells of these deck guns cannot be fused at less than
about 5,000 feet, so that under this range a 'direct hit 1s required. Moreover this type
of gun is manually directed and operated, has a relatively s.low rate of fire and is dif
ficult to train on fast, low flying aircraft. Its greatest asset,..fS its nuisance value
in attacks of this kind. Furthermore, statements from prisoners of war indicate that AA
training for U-boat crews is hurried and inadequate--which undoubtedly contributes to the
relative ineffectiveness of AA fire.
No specific tactics have been discernible except, perhaps, to throw up as heavy a
barrage as possible. This is being accomplished by mounting additional guns on the con
ning tower, by U-boats travelling in twos and threes and possibly, by the employment of
a heavily armed U-boats to escort other U-boats thro~gh t~ansit areas. Information has
been received of escort sUbmarine~mountingquadruple20;mm.guns forward and aft of the
conning tower and one 20 mrn. in addition to machine guns in the basket. Other reports,
as yet unconfirmed, indicate that many U-boats are being equipped in ~hiS manner. A con
centration of AAfire from these well armed submarines directed at/a single airplane'may
well prove to be an effective defensive measure. It may necessitate aircraft patroll~ng
in flights instead of a.lone to divide the enemy fire and bring a.dditional fire to bear
against the U-boats. Increased armament in anti-submarine aircraft described in detail
in the following section is the first step in that direction.
5. Counter measures:
In an encounter between a submarine' and an adequately armed airplane the odds are on
the side of the aircraft despite the discrepancy '1nthe size and number of guns. Al
though the fire power from the U-boat may be more than double that from the plane, the
latter is ,~:~kely to be more accurate. A fast nioving B-:-24 is a particularly difficult
:\"
target from the rolling gun platform of a submarine's deck or conning tower. On the other
hand U....boat personnel are extremely vulnerable to 50 calibre ~ire from the aircraft. 'The
installation of a nose turret and additional armor plate in B-24 aircraft of this command,
,will increase their, effectiveness in reducing enemy flre o
Since the enemy appears to be experimenting with tactics and equipment in his use of
AA fire, no standard counter measures can. be advanc~d. Certain general principles, .how
36
 ever, are suggested. When attacking out of the sun, 'for instance, the aircraft is pro
bably most secure regardless of the angle of attack in. relation to the U-boat. When the
sun is high or in the absence of ,sun, ahead-on attack 'seems to afford the best possibili
ties at the present time. Most AA guns at present are mounted in the after end of the con
.ning tower and cannot be sufficiently depressed to meet low fiying aircraft attacking from
dead ahead~ While personnel in the cO?lling tower will be somewhat protected in an attack
from this angle, they will at t he same time be unable to make any effort to prevent -it.
It is possible that certain guns will be placed close to the forward end of the conning
tower to obtain an unobstructed field of fire over the top of it. An attack from the
stern might then be most advantageous since these guns could probably not be directed aft
and personnel would be completely exposed to the fire from the airplane. A beam attack
would probably permit all the U-boat armament to be brought to bear against the aircraft.
When.the submariMe is beam on .to the sea, however, AAfire is likely to be particularly
inaccurate in proportion to the force of the sea.
As soon as the aircraf.tapproaches the minimum range of the de'ck guns it comes wi th
in the maximum range of the remaining armament. The AA gunners on the submarine usually
fire a burst when the plane is about 6000 feet distant. Aim is th~n corrected and firing
resumed. Evasive action by "Jlnking" especially after the initial burst and succeeding
trial bursts will prevent the gunners on the U-boat from ever sighting on their targets.
As soon as the aircraft's 50 caliber machine guns have found. the deck and conning tower
of the submarine, the pilot can level off for the bombing run.
Accuracy and volume of fire from the plane on the run in is of the greatest impor

tance. The lives of the air crew as well as the success of the attack may 'depend upon it.

If U-boat personnel are either'ki~led or kept away from the guns, the attack on the sur

faced submarine should be successful With no damage to the aircraft.

B. MODIFIED 8... 24.

As soon as U-boat anti-aircraft actiVities were confirmed several months ago, the re
search and technical staff of the Antisubmarine Co~and began to plan and design changes
in the B~24 Which would enable it to counter these tactics. The result is a new modified
B-24 believed to be the best antisubmarine weapon existing at the present time.

The primary purpose of the modifications is to increase the fire power forward. As
a secondary result, however, these changes automatically eliminate the present congested
working conditions in the nose and permit the utilization of space heretofore a~cepted as
a total loss due to an unfavorable center of gravity.
It is expected that presently assigned aircraft will be modified as, soon as possible
while future deliveries or' B-24s for anti-submarine work will have all the changes already
incorporated. The exact rate of modification is not yet known but pressure is being ex
erted to have the necessary depot facilities diverted to this work. It is hoped that the
maximum number of aircraft will be processed in the minimum amount of time lest the coun
ter measures by the enemy slow up the accelerating Allied offensive 'against the U-boats.
Chief among the modifications is the removal o'f the t ail turret and its reinstalla

tion in the nose. At the same time the lower part of the hose is reworked to afford ap

prOXimately a one foot drop in the floor. It isfaired into the fuselage affording visi

bility for approximately 1200 and'providing ~ roomy bombardier's compartment prot~cted by

armor plate a~d a bullet proof glass shield. Equal use of the Type A-I low altitude or

31
w
00

PLEXIGLAS WINDOWS

':=,":. ", ~ .
BOMBARDIER'S SIGHT/Nfl WINDOW .....:.
BUllET PROOF GLASS .. ,.: ... ,.,.:':.'
G \( UPWARD POSITION) .,-::,
\\\ \ \

A-17 CAMERA-MOUNT
~

---
CONSOLIDATED lURREl
(HYDRAUUC CONTROL UNIT
UPPER R/6HT SIDE OF
BOMBARDIERS COMPARTMENT
POSITION
POSITION

MODIFIED 8-24
 i;4

/
4/

Nose Turret Ta il st inge r

the Norden bombsight is permitted. The accompanying photographs of an already modified B-24
illustrate the nose turret installation and the bombardier's compartment. In the tail,
twin .50 calibre machine guns replace the turret. All necessary equipment such as inter
phone jack box, oxygen regulator, etc., have been relocated for use of the tail gunner.
These same changes have been made where other stations have been moved. The cross section
diagram indicates the new positions of the navigator and radar operator as well as other
changes. It will be noted that the navigator and radio operator sit back to back with the
pilot and co-pilot respectively. This arrangement was found necessary because of the
location of the upper turret in the after end of the flight deck. In areas where enemy
fighter opposition will not be encountered, the upper turret can be temporarily replaced
by the astrodome assembly. The radar operator has been moved back to a new position over
the rear bomb bay. Windows have been cut into the fuselage at this station and a venti
lator has been installed. In the tunnel a twin mirror camera mount has been set in and
is interchangeable with the tunnel gun.
The total modification has increased somewhat the weight of the aircraft. The center
of gravity, however, has been changed in such a manner as to render the plane slightly
nose heavy, a condition never before obtainable in a combat type B-25, and invariably
accompanied by a small increase in speed. The new B-24 then, although a little heavier,
is a slightly faster airplane.
The most important change, of course, is the increase in forward fire power. The
former installation of one, two and sometimes three hand held .50 calibre machine guns in,
the nose provided practically no fire power that could be directed against submarines.
At best, the navjgator might bring one gun to bear. The new installation, therefore, is
in actuality even a more significant improvement than appears on paper. This together
with additional armor in the nose is expected to provide the necessary offensive and de
fensive elements to insure success in action against fight-back U-boats.
39
c. DEPTH BOMB ATTACK ON A SURFACED U-BOAT
The increasing number of cases in which U-boats have elected to remain on the s~rface
when attacked by aircraft and fight back with AA guns makes it necessary to re-consider
the best ways to utilize the 11K 47 depth bomb (350 Ibs. Torpex filled) in such instances.
The depth bombs are set to explode at 25 feet but it is known that actual explosion usual
ly takf?S place -at 30 to 35 feet. Most authorities estimate the lethal range at alJout -22
feet, and the following statements are based on thiS estimate.
The bottom of a surfaced submarine is about 13 feet below the surface and consequent
ly even a perfect hit would place the bottom of the U-b'oat near the extreme .lim"1 t of the
lethal radius. The pressure hUll, ,however, tapers at each end so that the further away
from amidship the depth bombs explode, the smaller the chance for a certain kill. Even if
the bombardier has a perfect straddle in a beam attack with a train of MK 47 depth bombs
spaced at 50 feet, theoretically it may not produce a certain kill. Doubtless the enemy
realizes this factor and it probably was one consideration in leading him to adopt the
fight-back policy. This situation 1s illustrated by the following diagram.

VERTICAL SECTION
TOP A-A'

!-"---t--I---+--f---1--I----I----I Pressure
lIull

A- - 1---+----fIf---+--HIIH--+---II.f-~.!.._....N

This unfortunate possibility can be corrected, however, through. making the attack 45 0
from the beam which nas the effect of bringing the lethal radii closer together relative
to the longitudinal axis of the submarine. This effect is shown in the diagram below:

VER.T'CAL SECTIONS
TOP VIEW A-A: B-B~ C-C; 0-0'

-A'

-B'
OCEAN

14+-+---1-+----+--1- C'

0-. ----- --0'

Even if the train spacing is opened up tolOO feet the attack can still be lethal but
with such spacing the attack should be made from 20 from the track. Thus, even a rather
40
large dispersion can be lethal if the explosions are accurately-placed. The diagram. below
illustrates an attack of this. kind

. TOP VIEW

A ,

A -~- {- -~--
\ } o./'
--- --- ---- - VERTICAL SECTIONS
A-A', B-B', C-C'I 0-0'
.......
f"O
\ \.
1---+--+-:--+ 1---+--+-:--+--+-:--+-+--+--1 Pressure
.J-~HlJ/I
\ rsU~RFAcE I I I I
/ 1,'\ ~
B- - j .. 8'
\. -...\ I.
\
~
\
'.

~ -
~
c- - - - ~\ \ \ - -- .~
I
C I.

~.J /
~ ,
\
EACH BOX = 25/
~ -... r = LETHAL RADIUS
D ----- ...,.- - (- {~ -.~ D'
'-... :

By choosing an angle of attack 15 0 - 30 0 from the track,the pilot el.1minates the

chance of having depth bombs of a straddle explode too deepto be effective, and also
takes advantage of the length of the U-boat to minimize range errors. He may also length
en the train by increasing spacing to laO' without destroying the lethal character of the
train.

D. THE NEW ROCKET WEAPON

On May 28, 1943, an aircraft of the Northwest African Coastal 'Command made the first
attack on a.U-boat in which the new rocket weapon was used~ As ot June 21, eight attacks
using rockets had been carried out. Four of these resulted in known kills. Two more pro
bably sunk the U-boat, one probably damaged the enemy submarine and the other attack was
a complete miss. This remarkable record speaks for itself.
In the first attack mentioned above, that which took place on May 28, the plane, a_
Hudson aircraft of the 608th Squadron, RAF Station, Blida, was flying at 4000 feet when
the enemy U-boat was sighted at a distance Of eight miles, bearing 100 0 from the aircraft .
The U-boat was on a course of 030 0 and making a spee~ of 12 knots.
The attack was made from 10 0 abaft the U....boat's port beam and the rocket projectiles
were aimed at t he conning tower, the U-boat being still fully.surfaced. The aircraft was
armed With eight rockets, each with a 25 pound armor-piercing head. Seven of the projec
tiles were fired in making the attack; one did not discharge.

41
Salvo of Rocket Hits
 U-Boat out of Contro.Z U-Boat Settl ing at stern
No damage was seen as the rockets struck but after about a half minute, two spurts of
flame appeared just aft of the conning tower hatch. Also there was a small amount of smoke
similar to that from a small ship's funnel. The U-boat was now almost stopped, having
made a full circle to port as if out of control, and was starting to settle by the stern,
the decks aft of the conning tower now being awash. The two smaller pictures show clearly
these two situations,--the circling out of control, and settling by the stern.
The U-boat was firing at the aircraft during most of this time, not stopping until
the stern began to settle, but no damage was sustained by the aircraft. Both the forward
gun, which was about a three inch gun, and a machine gun on the conning tower platform
took part in this anti-aircraft fire.
The aircraft circled the U-boat four times. On the third time around, some of the
U-boat's crew were seen diving overboard while others were leaving the- conning tower in
panic. While some of the U-boat's crew were still on the conning tower, the aircraft
went in low firing the front guns. The turret guns were fired as the aircraft pulled
away. On the fourth turn the crew saw the U-boat sink by the stern at an angle of 80 0 .
A full circle of swirl and foam was left and about 30 or 40 of the U-boat crew were seen
swimming in it.
Several technical errors occurred in the execution of this attack as well as one me~
chanical failure. However, the attack was completely successful and indicates the lati
tude from an ideal attack which will still produce a kill.
This new weapon is nothing more or less than a super rocket. It is in fact the same
sort of an unrotating projectile as is used by the British Army for anti-tank purposes.
The only differences lie in the form of head which is carried on the front of the rocket;
and the somewhat larger fins to make the projectile more accurate for aircraft use.
The head which is being used in attacks on submarines is a solid armor-piercing shell
3 inches in diameter and 25 Ibs. in weight. The head is screwed into a steel tube four
feet long containing cordite. The cordite is ignited electrically and propels the whole
as a rocket.
The ordinary load consists of eight proj~ctiles, four under each wing hanging from
projector rails attached to the wing. The most practical installation for a B-24 aircraft
43
 has not yet been determined.
4,eP'.s F/~EO SIMULTANEOU:5LY IN Experiments are being carried
A ",sPACED SALVO" IN A ZOo OIVE
out, however, with rails at
tached to stub wings on either
side of the fuselage, and with
a bomb bay installation.
The Coastal Command of
the RAF has developed the tac
tics to be employed in these
attacks, a brief summary of
which is presented below.
As a result of trials in
the United Kingdom it has been possible to estimate the underwater travel of the rocket
with the 25 lb. armor piercing head with some accuracy. This information has been sum
marized in the drawing at the bottom of this page. It is seen that the steeper the angle
of dive, the deeper will the rounds go and the further underwater they viill travel. It
is known that a round which strikes the pressure hUll at a velocity of less than about
600 feet per second is unlikely to be lethal, although it may do superficial damage. It
is believed that the best angle of dive at which to attack is 20 degrees, this being the
most satisfactory for all-round performance.
The attack should be made as broad on the beam as poss~ble so that the pilot's errors
in deflection estimation, necessary for target speed or cross wind, will be covered by the
length of the pressure hull.
Aircraft which carry eight rockets are expected to fire first two pairs and then a
spaced salvo of four. The two pairs can be regarded as either an anti-flak measure if the
U-boat is fighting back (in which case they can be fired anywh~re between 500 and 800
yards), or can be reserved until the last possible moment before firing the salvo, when
they will be more likely to have a lethal effect on the U-boat. The salvo should be fired
at the minimum possible range that can be achieved with the particular aircr~ft concerned
before it is necessary to pUllout of the dive. This has been taken as between 350 and
400 yards.

UNOE,('WAT~ ~AJECTO!?YOF ,e.R'" R~EO INTO TilE SEA ATOIFFE.eENT ANGLES OF DIVE
R.e's ,FITTED WITH. 25 LB. A.P.IfEAO
NOTE I. PERCENTA6E5 5IVEN AI?E THE PROPOR nON OF H~A05 WHICH BEHA VE IN THE MANNER SHOWN
2 . .5PE05 QUOTOARE Tl10sE ATWHICH THE HEADS EMERGE F,Ii!OM THE SEA
3 TH ZS LB. A.P, HEAO FI/(EO FIi!OM J,S0-400 YARDS Ii!ANtS WILL PENET,Ii!AT THE 1/-80l'lT
PKE551/IlE HULL UP ro ~PPl(oll 100FT. UNOE~ WATER TRI'IVEL

44
 Aim is to be taken on the base of the conning tower when the U-boat is fully surfaced
and upon an.:r visible part of the conning tqwer when the U-boat.has started to sUbmerge.
No .attempt should be made to aim short to allow for the underwater travel. The spacing
of the salvo should cover any errors in range estimation and at the same time it will en
sure that provided the aim is correct, all four rockets will obtain hits on the pressure
hull of the U-boat. This is shown in diagrammatic form in the chart at the, top of~the-
opposite page.
When the aircra.ft is fitted With one or more free front guns, fire should be sus
tained during the approach to help neutralize any return fire from the U-boat. When
anti-aircraft opposition is encountered evasive action should be taken during the early
stages of the approach, but if hits ar~, to be obtained it is essential that the aircraft
should be in steady flight for at least 2 seconds before the rocket is fired ..
It will be seen from the diagram that even With a diving angle of 35 degrees, one
third of the rockets fired emerge fr~!ll the sea; at decreased angles the percentage emerg~
ing is naturally increased. Pilots should anticipate this occurrence and should invari
ably turn one way or the other immediately after firing. The rockets often come out of
the sea at a steep angle and may ascend to 200-300 feet. They should alwayS<be avoided
by turning rather than by climbing or diving.
In order to take full advantage of the excellent underwater travel of these projec
tiles it is essential that pilots should be able to dive at correct angles' (of dive) and
judge their ranges correctly. ExtenSive and continuous practice is required to maintain
the necessary standard of angle of dive and range estimation.

Eo 15 MM GUN IN AIRCRAFT
For many months all belligerents have devoted considerable effort to the problem of
installation in 'aircraft of heavier guns firing explosive shells. The British have had
success in adaptin~ two 40 mm guns to their Hurricane, the U.S. has lo~g used a 37 mm in
. .
the Airacobra, While the Russian Stormovik is reported to mount ,cannon of even heavier
caliber.
Initial U.S. experiments have revolved around a gun of 75mm. Exhaustive tests have
been conducted with several models, and in several different types of aircraft. The
experiments brought to light a large 'number of technical problems, but the. greatest was
that connected with recoil and its effect upon the aircraft.
This problem has been. solved and the 11-4 75 mm gun is the result of the experimenta~
tion. Due to a variety of factors, it was found that the B-25 was the most satisfactory
aircraft for the installation .. This gun is .now.mounted in the strengthened bombardier's
crawl tunnel, directly below the pilo-t's posi tion.From a short distance the installation
becomes unnoticeable, due to the fact that the gun is carried inboard; only a short sec
tion of the muzzle projects beyond the aircraft and this is recessed into a faired aper
ture. It was necessary to replace the regular transp~rent'nose section With a heavier
all-metal unit, which was strengthened even.further as testing proceeded.
The 11-4 has a bore of. 75 rnm and is 37.5 calibers in length, which gives the tube a
length of 110.65 inches. As originally installed the entire assembly including the muz
. zle cover weighed 1236 Ibs. However subsequent improvements in the equipment altered this
weight to a slight extent, but the aircraft i-s still able to carry part of its original

45
 .50 caliber equipment in addition to a limited bomb 'load. Several types of projectiles
are available, including explosive A.P., chemical, solid shot, and explosive shell. The
average initial muzzle velocity of these is approximately 1970 ft/sec. to which must be
added the velocity of the plane itself. The p~ojectile averages about 14.7 Ibs., and the
complete round approximately 20 Ibs. Test results indicate that' an aircraft making a pass
at a target 1400- 1500 yards distant will be able to fire 3 aimed shots. From a distance
of 750 - 800 yards 2 shots can be fired.
Some thought has been given to the adaptation of these aircraft to the anti-submarine
campaign .. It was felt that a heavy weapon of this type might be of some value when used
against U-boats wh~ch remain on the surface and fight back. Undoubtedly in those cases
where the U-boat is moving on the surface With considerable freeboard, hits from an ex
ploSive shell of this type ~ould cause serious damage, ~f not destruction of the craft.
In general, however, U-boats present a very limited target; the greater p~t of their vul
nerable area is submerged at all times, An additional factor is the tendency of the pro
jectiles to' ricochet When fired at the maximum angle at Which the aircraft is capable of
'diving, which causes them to pass over the low target.
A comparison of the characteristics of this gun With those of the rocket might be ,of
inte~est with respect to use against submarines. It should be remembered that projectiles
propelled by an external charge have a very limi tedunderwate.r trajectory. Explo~ i ve .
shells will detonate upon contact with the water surface and armor piercing shells will
not cause any damage once the U-boat has submerged. On the other hand, as discussed else
where in this Report, the rocket projectile maintains an underwater trajectory since it
carries its own propellant. A further point to be considered is the fact that the rocket
equipment adds less additional weight to the aircraft, a factor of major importanoe in
view of the maximum ranges necessary for successful operation against U-boats. Informa
tion available at the present time indicates that an aircraft equipped with rockets can
deliver up to'8 aimed shots during one run over the target, regardless of the time of the
run, Which is almost three times the rate of'theheavier 75 mrn gun. In both cases the
weapon is aimed by the pilot of the aircraft. The fact that the initial velocity of the
75 mm gun is approximately tWice that of the rocket
" ,
is of more importance against land or
air targets than against relatively slow moving U-boa~s.
In general this weapon should find greater usefulness in attacks upon surface ship
ping, ground targets, armored vehicles and tanks, than upon subma~ines. In some cases,
explosive shells fitted with contact fuses might be employed at considerable range against
deck personnel of a U-boat, which was using"its AA guns. Test results indicate., however,
that accuracy falls off rapidly at ranges in excess of 1000 yards. At present no statis
tics are available on firing tests conducted against a target resembling a surfaced U
boat. Following is a brief surmnaryof the results of firing:
1. Range -- 500 yards or less, average of 415 yds.
% direct hits to shots fired 37.4%
% near hits to shots fired 24.5%
2. Range -- over 500 yds. to 1000~yds., averate of 734 yds.
%. direct hits to shots fired ". 29.3%
% near hits to shots fired . 32.0%
.3. Range -- Over 1000 yds. to 1500 yds., 'average of 1433 yds.
% 'direct hits to shots fired 10.7%
% near hits to shots fired 42.8%
It is interesting to note that at ranges of 1400 yds. or over, out of 28 Shots, only
3 were direct hits, and these were made upon a target much iarger than a U-boat running on
the surface. Additional training of personnSlno doubt would'serve to improve this per
formance.
 VIII

INTERESTING AIRCRAFT ATTACKS

A. NI GHT ATTACK!

On June 19 a B-24D of the 2nd

Antisubmarine Squadron, piloted by Capt.
William Sanford, took off from Port Ly
autey on convoy escort duty in the early
morning hours. 'At 0622, with visibility
Ii miles (still restricted by darkness),
at an altitude of 1200 feet, the radar
operator reported two indications at 20
22 miles, in a position about 10 miles
behind the' convoy. Capt. Sanford lost
altitude as he neared the area and opened
the bomb bay doors, but the contact was
lost. Turning to starboard, he climbed
again to 1500 feet, and soon another in
dication was picked up 80 0 to starboard
at 7 miles.

As the plane started its run, .i t

let down to 400 feet, and from a dis
tance of one mile sighted a 517-t~n
German U-boat with decks awash, making
a speed of 12-15 knots on a course of
90 0 The submarine immediately opened
fir~ on the plane with cannon and ma
chine guns, to which the plane's navigator replied with 25 rounds from the nose gun,
scoring hits on the deck and conning tower. The U-boat's fire ceased when the B-24 came
wi thin 100 yards, but the navigator fired another burst for good measure.

The U-boat was still on the surface, making no attempt to crash-dive, when the bom~
bardier released six M:l.rk 47 350-lb. depth bombs, with a 60-foot spacing and 25-foot set
ting. The plane, which was flying 200 mph at 100 feet, attacked from the starboard beam
at an angle of 1000 to the course of the submarine. The tail.and left waist-gunners re
ported the explosions were seen 10-20'feet ahead of the U~boat's stern with numbers 3 and
4 straddling the hull. The force of the explosions lifted five feet of the submarine's
stern out of the water at a 30-400 angle. As the plane passed over, the U-boat's guns
fired again, but less heavily' this time; and a few seconds later the submarine ,slid under
the surface bow first. The German gun crew was evidently left in the water, for they
were still firing when the U-boat submerged. The screws were apparently damaged or de
stroyed in the attack, for there was no sign of churning when the stern sank. A large
piece of debris was left on the surface.

47
 Having dropped a flame float and circled to port, the plane made a second attack up
the U:"'boat's track 40 seconds later. This time the remaining two depth bombs were re
leased, gUiding on the flame float, and the debris left from the first attack was scat
tered by the explosion. An 011 slick 300-400 feet long and 30 feet wide was seen, but
darkness obscured the scene, making observation of further results impossible. The B-24
reported to the convoy and after re-surveying the area resumed its patrol.

The difficulties of attacking in the dark were met With assurance by this experi
enced crew, and although the .photographs were unsatisfactory due to darkness, the testi
mony of the gunners as to the position of the explosions indicates probable severe damage
to the U-boat.

B. AFSUB BL IT'ZKR IEG OFF PORTUGAL

During the ten day period from July 5th to July 14th the 1st and 2nd Antisubmarine
Squadrons delivered thirteen attacks on enemy submarines. Preliminary reports indicate
four sunk or probably sunk, four or five in the various damaged classifications and an
equal number resulting in no damage or in insufficient eVidence of damage. Further in
formation will alter the final assessments but it is believed that these unofficial fig
ures are reasonably accurate.

The unusually large number of attacks in so short a period and the high percentage
of success in these attack~are worthy of note. All of the attacks occurred from 200 to
400 miles west of Portugal. Various factors contributed to the establishment of a con
centration of U-boats in this area.

1. Formation of a screen to intercept U. K. to Gibralter convoys.

2. U-boats in transit between the Azores region and Biscay bases passed through
this area.

3. Extended use of the southern portion of the Bay of Biscay by all U-b,oats to
avoid air patrols from England.

Since the submarines were
for our units to locate them.
explained only by pointing out
enced and best trained in this
country and England as well as
within range of the B-24D aircraft it was not difficult
The high degree of success obtained in the attacks can be
that the squadrons concerned are among the most experi....
command, having operated against the U-boats from this
North Africa.

Complete information on all the attacks has not yet been received but accounts of a
number of them follow.

48
1. 1st Lt. Isley

On July 7, a B-24D airplane of the 1st Antisubmarjne Squadron was out hunting about
250 miles southwest of Lisbon with ceiling and visibility unlimited and scattered c19uds
at 1500 feet. The aircraft was flying at 170 miles per hour in and out of the base of
the clouds, when a radar contact was obtained at a distance of 15 miles. Lt. Isley, the
pilot, immediately altered course and a fUlly surfaced V-boat was sighted at 8 miles dis
tance, making 8-9 knots on a course of 20 0 ' true. As the aircraft let down still about 4
miles away, the V-boat was observed crash-diving. It was obvious that an attack could
not be made While the V-boat was still on the surface, with the result that careful jUdg
ment was required if the attack,was to be a success.

Lt. Isley estimated that fully 10 seconds had elapsed since the conning tower disap
peared when 6 Mark 47 depth bombs were released by intervalometer. The bombs were spaced
at 60 feet, fused at 25 feet and released from 200 feet. All 6 explosions straddled the
advance track of the V-boat approximately 20'0 feet ahead of the swirl at a target angle
of 260 0 . It 1s readily apparent that this angle of attack afforded a broad coverage of
the submerged course of the V-boat and soon indications,of results appeared. About 45
sesonds after the explosions, a large, black oil bubble rose to the surface, continued to
erupt oil for 5 minutes and spread over an extensive area 600 to 700 feet in diameter, as
shown in the photographs. Lt. Isley remained in the area for 40 minutes after the attack
but observed no further evidence of damage.

This attack on a submerged submarine was skillfully executed. Judgment of the ne

cessary lead was very accurate and attests to the ability of the pilot and bombardier in
particular.

Active Oil Slick Following Isley Attack

49
2. 1st Lt. McDonnell

On the same day and in the same

general area, another aircraft of the
1st Antisubmarine Squadron, while pa~
trolling at 3000 ft., obtained a radar
contact at 7 miles. Almost simultane
ously, Lt. McDonnel, the pilot, sight
ed a fUlly surfaced 517 ton U-boat
proceeding northwesterly at about 8
knots. He immediately altered his
course to starboard and let down to
make the attack.

As he approached, the U-boat swung

off to starboard and opened fire from
the conning tower with its 20 rom. gun.
The pilot pressed the attack despite
the AA fire, and as the aircraft passed
over the U-boat from the port side at a
target angle of approximately 27CjO, 7
Mark 47 depth bombs, spayed at 60 feet,
were released by the bombardie~. Both
the navigator and the top turret gunner
returned the fire of the U-boat, straf
ing the conning tower and the deck. As
shown in the photographs on the oppo
site page. the explosions of the bombs
straddled the target, which was seen to break in two abaft the conning tower. Members
of the air crew then observed the after section of the U-boat rise 10 or 12 f~et into
the air, roll to starboard, then settle and sink wi thno forward motion.

'As the aircraft was attacking, a 20 mrn. shell from the U-boat struck the top center
panel of the nose. Several memb'ers of the crew were ,s~r.1ously injured by the burst, in
cluding the navigator, bombardier, radio ~nd assistant radio operator. In addition, the
aircraft itself suffered minor damage, as the shell knocked out the radio compass, hydrau
lic system and most of the engine instruments. With the plane damaged and most of the
crew injured, Lt. McDonnell headed. for home.

This action. deserves special credit, in vi~w of the accurate AA fire directed against
the aircraft, the apparent success of the attack and the added difficulty of bringing the
plane safely back to its base. Although Lt. McDonnell was not able to remain in the area
to observe !Urther results, photographic eVidence (see opposite page) indicates a perfect
straddle, and the testimony of the crew suggests that the U-boat was destroyed.

The addition of a nose turret and strategically located armor plate now being in
stalled in B-24 aircraft of this Command (see Section VII-B), will provide the airplane

50
 Hits and Detonations - - McDonnell Attack

with vastly increased fire power forward and adequate defensive armor to Drotec~ the crew
from AA attacks. Successful attacks in the face of AA fire with present equipment is a
tribute to the skill and determination of the air crew.
Lt. McDonnell, it is noted, was on patrol again four days later with a pick-up crew
and encountered another U-boat that fought back. No assessment of this attack is includ
ed in the preliminary report, but debris and oil were observed.

3. 1st Lt. Darden

The following day, July 8, another attack was maGe by a plane of the 2nd Antisub
marine Squadron, about 150 miles north of the previous day's action. The aircraft was
flying at 3000 ft. through a broken overcast when a radar contact was made on a V-boat
off to starboard, and 18 miles distant. Approaching through the base of the clouds, Lt.
Darden, the pilot, planned the attack so that he would come down out of the sun in a
steep dive. The maneuver worked out according to plan. Upon sighting the U-boat ahead
8 miles distant, proceeding at 12 knots in a southeasterly direction, the plane dove
steeply, levelled off and passed over the submarine at an altitude of 50 feet. The tar
get angle was 270 0 and 4 Mark 37 650 lb. depth bombs were observed to straddle the U-boat
between the boW and the conning tower. The tail gunner observed the surfaced V-boat run
ning directly into the center of the explosion. In the photo on the next page the sil
houette of the submarine is just discernible in the center of the explosions.
This attack had not been delivered without opposition; once agaln, the U-boat Com
mander elected to remain on the surface and defend himself with AA fire. From 300 yards
on in, the B-24D was under fire, suggesting that the use of the sun almost achieved a
complete surprise attack. As the aircraft passed over, however, one burst struck the
starboard side of the nose, but caused only minor damage. Fire was returned during the
attack by the top turret, nose and tail guns. Lt. Darden made a sharp climbing turn to
port after delivery of the first attack and prepared for another run. The enemy craft
was now circling out of control in a series of tight turns, gradually.losing speed and

51
trailing a long stream of brown oil. A large cloud of dark smoke poured from a point di
rectly abaft the conning tower, and in addition, the stern was submerged completely with
the bow rising higher out of the water, as indicated in the second photograph below.
The aircraft returned for a second attack at a 50 ft. altitude and a target angle
of 80 0 . On this occasion the U-boat's AA fi're was more effective, scoring numerous hits
on the wing, fuselage and bomb bay, cutting the hydraulic and fuel lines and damaging the
radio equipment and the Co~~and radio transmitter. Unfortunately, the damage to the bomb
bay doors now made it impossible to release the additional two depth bombs as the air
craft passed over on this run. 11achine gun fire from the plane, however, continued to rake
the U-boat, which now had slowed to two or three knots, making tight turns and gradually
losing all forward motion. Finally it disappeared, stern first, settling slowly with no
churning or other surface indications. There were still two depth bombs aboard, however,
and the crew prepared for a third attack.
The bombardier, Lt. C. J. Froccaro, succeeded in opening the doors of the bomb bay
despite the damage and two more Mark 37s were dropped upon the settling U-boat, which was
silhouetted beneath the surface. The explosions of these bombs straddled the conning
tower and were accompanied by a third blast of greater intensity. This third plume ap
peared to be higher than normal, thick and dark in color.
This series of attacks had consumed approximately 20minutes. It was skillfully
executed, beginning with the use of the sun and cloud cover and ending with a successful
release of the remaining two depth bombs. Heavy and accurate enemy AA fire did not deter
the pilot from completing very accurate runs over the target and the bombardier released
the bombs in both instances with superior skill. The results of the attack were visible
on the surface for heavy oil spread over the entire area. Due to the damage sustaineu
and to minor injuries suffered by one crew member, the pilot was unable to remain in the
vicinity to observe further indications of success.
The entire action was one more illustration of what can be achieved by an alert and
aggressive crew in the face of serious enemy resistance.

Detonations Around U-Boat - Darden Attack U- Boa t Down at Ste rn - Da rden At tack

52
 250 Ton U-Boat

4. 1st Lt. Pomeroy

On the 9th of July three attacks were delivered by units of the 480th Group. All
were within 150 miles of each other about 300 miles west of Lisbon. Because of the large
amount of V-boat traffic in the area and the circumstances of the attack it 1s believed
that three separate submarines were involved.

One of the attacks was frustrated when the bomb bay doors failed to open. Lt.Pomero~
the pilot, was flying at 3,000 feet through 5/10 cloud cover when the bombardier sighted
a long wake on the port bow about 10 miles away. As the aircraft dived to attack, a ful
ly surfaced V-boat was seen. It was a small, brown-colored 250 tonner (see photo), a
type whose operations are usually restricted to coastal waters.

As the B-24 approached the V-boat opened fire with its AA guns in the conning tower.
As soon as the plane's guns opened up, however, strafing the deck and conning tower, fire
from the V-boat ceased. The bomb bay doors then failed to open so that the airmen had to
pass over the still surfaced V-boat with nothing but machine guns to use against it.

As the pilot quickly circled for a second attack the radar operator succeeded in
opening the doors. Six MK 47 depth bombs were dropped about 100 feet ahead of the swirl
approximately six seconds after the V-boat disappeared. Only four explosions were noted.
No signs of damage appeared. The submarine's position at the time of the explosion may
have coincided with a gap in the stick.

Lt. Pomeroy then employed gambit tactics followed by a square search pattern but nQ
further action developed. It is unfortunate that a mechanical failure should have
spoiled so promising an attack.

53
 \l\l

1st Lt. Kuenning

On the same day a second B-24 of

the same squadron attacked and probably.
destroyed a second submarine. The plane
was flying at 3200 feet taking advantage
of 3/10 cloud cover when Lt. Gerhart,
the bombardier, sighted a U-boat appar
ently just surfacing about four miles
dead ahead. It was the 517 ton type,
camouflaged slate grey 0

Lt. Kuenning, the pilot, immediate

ly put the aircraft into a dive, level
ing off at 50 feet. Six Mk 11 250 lb.
Torpex filled depth bombs were released,
straddling the bow.with one short and
five over as indicated in the diagram.
The explosions occured just aft of the
conning tower. No enemy fire was en
countered. No one was seen on deck,
confirming the supposition that the sub~
marine may have been surprised just as
it surfaced.

The pilot circled immediately and

as the spray subsided, came in again for
a second attack on the still surfaced U-boat. This attack was almost head-on and two more
Mk II's were released, exploding aft of the conning . tower on the port side as the enemy
.

craft appeared. to be attempting a crash dive. As the plane climbed away to port, siX crew
members saw the bow rise 15 feet out of the water at an-angle of 45 0 , then the hull slid
backwards sinking stern first.

The entire action was over in two minutes. The prompt follow up of the first attack
attests to the alertness and efficiency of the crew and resulted in the probable destruc
tion of the submarine.

6~ 1st Lt. Damann

The third attack on the ninth was by a B-24D of the 2nd Antisubmarine Squadron
piloted by Lt. Damann, a newcomer to the 480th Group, formerly assigned to the 22nd
Squadron at Wilmington, N.C.

Lt. Damann was flying at 4200 feet when Lt. Manning, the bombardier, sighted what
appeared to be a "persistent wave" about 15 miles off the port bow. It was quickly
identified as a 517 ton U-boat, camOUflaged grey, running with decks awash. Unlimited
visibility and complete absence of cloud cover made a concealed approach impossible
wit~ the result that the pilot chose to d.his altitude and course until within close

54
 Damann Attack

range. As the ~ircraft let down, however, in a steep diving turn, the U-boat crash dived
and had been under 17 seconds (timed) when the release point was reached. The run was
planned for a beam attack but as the submarine went under, it turned toward the plane. The
result was a stick of 4 MK 37 650 lb. depth bombs spaced at 60 feet straddling the
track 200 feet ahead of the leading edge of the swirl at an estimated target angle of
about 330 0 .

As the plumes from the explosions rose into the air a dark black mass was observed
in the base of the third eruption as indicated in the accompanying photograph. After
the plumes had subsided, a dark, thick oil slick 'formed spreading over an area 500' feet
long and 200 feet wide.

The actions of the air crew in a difficult attack of this nature were particu
larly commendable. Split second precision in guiding the aircraft and dropping the
depth bombs apparently resulted at least in damage to the submarine.

Four days previous this same crew had the unfortunate and exasperating experi
ence of passing over a completely surfaced U-boat in a surprise attack only to have
the bomb bay doors jam in a partially opened position. The pilot immediately circl~d

55
 for a second attack but still no
bombs could be released. In the
meantime the U-boat had completely
sUbmerged. The accompanying
photographs of the "one that got
away" give some indication of the
rapidity of the crash dive.
In this recent series of at
tacks, failure of bomb bay doors
to funQtion properly has caused
the personnel of the 1st and 2nd
Antisubmarine squadrons some con
cern. It should not be inferred,
however, that this failure is a
frequent occurrence, but in at
least two instances it deprived
the air crew of an opportunity to
deliver what might otherwise have
been a successful attack.
Considerable attention has
been devoted to this problem.
Maintenance men consistently have
demonstrated very high standards
of performance at Port Lyautey and
the air crews operating from that
station are among the most skil~ed
in the Antisubmarine Command.
Nevertheless, failures continue to
occur in this and other organiza
tions using the same equipment.
Information available in these
Headquarters at the present time is
not adequate to form definite con
clusions as to the causes of the

56
malfunctions. I t must be borne in mi'!iJ'\,l" eviation from the prescribed
routine in handling the bomb equipment can quickly cause a failure in the hydraulic sys
tem with the result that bombs will not release because the doors have not been fully
opened.
It is clear that the problem arises because of a failure either of the mechanical or
the human elements involved. Some preventative measures are presented in Afsub cireular
65-21 dated June 11, 1943. MeanWhile, further research is going on which may result in
modification of the bomb release equipment. It is expected that through further experi
ence and technological improvement the number of instances of this type will decrease
considerably or cease altogether.

7. 2nd Lt. Sa 1m

A very unusual attack in which radar played a very important role occurred on the
12th of July about 200 miles northwest of Lisbon. Lt. Salm, the ,pilot, was flying at
5600 feet over a solid overcast using radar continuously when a contact was obtained
about 13 miles dead astern. The pilot turned and descended through the overcast on in
struments at 240 mph., constantly receiving headings from T/Sgt.Williams, the radar
operator.

The B-24D finally broke through at 200 feet and a surfaced U-boat was sighted~ on
the starboard bow one mile away. Immediately the navigator and top turret gunner opened
fire and tracers wer.e seen to rake the entire conning tower area. No enemy personne~
were seen, but at least lookouts must have been present. Seven 11k. 11 250 lb. Torpex
filled depth bombs were released while the aircraft was still in a slight dive. Because
of the angle at the time of release the spacing of the bombs was somewhat shortened, but
in this case the shorter spacing probably resulted in maximum effectiveness; due to the
accuracy with which the bombs were released.
The crew saw the explosions straddle the submarine and as the pilot made a vertical
turn at 100 feet, the U-boat broke in two and sank. The entire area was covered with 011
and large bubbles appeared for several minutes. While Lt. Salm continued to circle low
and very tightly because. of the limited ceiling and restricted visibility, 15 survivors
were counted in the water. The air crew dropped a dinghy and smoke flares and took'many
photographs, none of which are available as yet. As the plane departed seven survivors
were still seen in the water.
It should be pointed out that this was Lt. Salm1s first mission ~n command of,his
own aircraft. His actions and those of the entire crew are deserving of the highest
commendation not only on the basis of results- the sinking of an enemy submarine- but
also because of .the skill and coordination which achieved this success despite adverse
weather conditions.

57
 IX

CRASH LANDING OF A 8-24

An account of the mishaps Which bedeviled the crew of a B-24 from the moment of
take-off until their skillful crash landing is reported by Captain Lawrence A. Herman
ofthe 8th Ant1submarine Squadron, Batista Field, Cuba. It began as a routine flight-on
May 14, 1943.
The B-24 started down the runway at 2345 with a seven man crew, then developed a
violent vibration in the nose section as it reached an airspeed of 100 mph. As Captain
Herman lifted the nose wheel and was about to reach flying speed the left wing dipped
slightly. The co-pilot suggested the plane,might have suffered a blowout.on the take
off, but this could not be ascertained. After flying for twenty minutes toward the patrol
area it was discovered that the cap on the No.4 gas tank was loose, allowing an exces
sive loss of fuel, but hardly accounting for the other troubles.
Captain Herman turned back toward the field and after lowering the landing gear,

di{3covered the left landing gear strut had been bent backward, pulling the wheel into a

\
posl~ion perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. During the take-off,
t~e collar had cracked and the scissor joint which holds the oleo strut and the wheel in
astrai~t forward and aft position While the strut moves up and down, had broken allow~
ing the wheel to turn.
Captain Herman asked the tower to call the Commanding Officer and in the meantime

flew out over the water to unload the depth charges and ammunition. Immediately after

this was done the sky behind them lighted up with a fiery glow. The crew had forgotten

they were carrying two flares in the bomb bay.

'B2 this time commuNication had been established with Major Bailey, Commanding Of

ficer, who instructed Captain Herman to proceed to Morrison Field, West Palm Beach,

Florida. The B-24 arrived over Morrison Field at 1400 and flew until 0815 when the crew

was instructed that a landing strip had been prepared for them on the sad. Captain

Herman chose to land on the south end of the north-south strip, a position which would

avoid a partially completed runway and other obstructions in the event of skidding.

The captain then gave his crew an opportunity to bailout, but all men stayed with

their plane. In preparation for the crash they padded the radio room with parachutes

and cushions and removed all loose equipment. Two fire extinguishers were placed ready

at hand.

After two dry runs Captain Herman broughithe B-24 in under power at an airspeed
of 120 mph and full flaps. He ordered the mixture and master switch cut out and touched
the sod strip at about 110 mph. The left wheel touched, the fuselage skidded roughly
. and the plane came to a qUick, swerving stop.
The drag of the left wheel caused the plane to skid to the left and touch the right
wing. Number four engine was washed out and number three propeller was. bent. The crew
was unhurt.
Preparations for. the landing were made by Colonel Halverso~, Wing Commander, who
asked Morrison Field to prepare for the possible crash. The commanding officer of the field
gave excellent cooperati 'a.t'ioned ana~dl;t~Q~QffiCer in the tower to help Captain
Herman land. Skillful h Ih.~',~.i.'i...<1.\' . \ -"<:b:jn".J-r':."" ~Dt.;).'ed injury to the' personnel'.
. .
58 Litill ".~ .. ' , .' .
 The areas patrolled by AFSUB aircraft reported the following average percentages-oJ."
contact flyi~g weather for the month of June:

25th AWIG 91.3

26th AWIG 96.2
Newfoundland 7402
Caribbean 94.8
NW'Africa 84.2

The relatively low percentage in the Newfoundland area was caused by the continuation
of the persistent fogs which practically cover the Grand Banks during June and July.
However, a decrease in the frequency of fogs will occur in August. An average of eight
days of fog occur in that month compared with 15 days in July, the foggiest month, and 10
days in June~ A considerable portion of the fog bank extends southwestward along the
Atlantic Coast 'of the United states as far as Hatteraso In general, its density and fre
quency decrease as it moves south. The presence of fog in important New England ports in
creases the possibility of mining operations or sporadic raids in these areas.

HURRICANES IN THE CARIBBEAN 0

Among the unusual weather conditions to be encountered during the next few months,
tropical disturbances in the Caribbean area are perhaps most noteworthY. Three times as
many cyclones in West Indian and neighboring waters occur in Augu~tas in July and the
percentage of those of hurricane intensity is greatest in August, about four-fifths being
severe 0 Most of these cyclones originate to the eastward of the Leeward or Windward
Islands, some as far east as the Cape Verde Islands. Many cross the Caribbean Sea and
the Gulf of Mexico, but a greater number recUrve nqrthward east of the United State.s.
An average of 80 hurricanes occur in August, compared with 26 in July, 122 in September
and 98 in October.

During the summer, tropical showers in the Caribbean are likewise mbre frequent.
Each shower covers a small area, usually about 10 miles in diameter,and moves at a slow
pace. Within the rainy area, horizontal visibility is reduced nearly to zero. These
conditions afford excellent protection for U-boats,especially when on the surface in
the daytime. From the point of view of favorable weather conditions then, it is not
surprising that a concentration of submarines 1s developing in the Caribbean at this
time. It is expected that they will take full advantage of the cover provided by local
squalls in their operations in this region. It 'is also expected, however , that radar
equipped aircraft will make the best use of their special equipment in tracking down
the undersea raiders.

59
11~~~~[~f1~~IDI~.~~!jlA f ....
<~f;tJEIl Xl

. NAL STATISTICS

HOURS OF FLYING - JUNE. 1943

25th- Wing
PATROL ESCORT SPECIAL TRAINING TOTAL
3 ARON 158 128 44 237 567
* 4 MON 71 114 185
*
5 MON. . 224
48
77
464
15
8
386
211
702
731
6
11
MON .
MON 204 158 35 466 863
12 MON . 377 41 20 308 746
634
13 MON 125 509
14 MON 240 70 205 752 1267
16 MON . 82 235 407 823
*19 MON . 89 201
99
12 75 377
20 MON - 282 72 123 -477
22 MON 141 281 9 233 664
24 MON 0

356 356
TOTAL 25th WING. 1970 '1798 447 4177 8392

26th Wing
* 7 MON 128 165 57 650 1000
* 8 MON 489 6 138 633
9 MON . 377 39 11 125 552
**10 ARON .
**15 MON
*17 MON 591 13 228 832
21 MON 339 102 305 746
23 MON. 268 9 14 248 539
25 MON 142 281 174 597
TOTAL 26th WING. 2334 494 203 1868 4899

4-80th Gp
1 MON
2 MON. . 833
816
187
148
1020
964
0

TOTAL 480th GP 1649 335 1984

O. T. U.
18 ARON 399 42 1163 1604
T01af AFSUB.
-
6352
-
2292
-692
~

7543
-
16879
CAP. CP 10844 2810 13654
-
Grand Total 17196 5102 692 7543 30533
* Detached service. ** O.T.U.

CLINTON A. BURROWS,.

Lt. Co1.,G.8.C., A.C. of S., A-2.

60