Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Table of Contents.............................................................................................1
Art.3: Felonies.................................................................................................. 6
Classification of Felonies According to the Means of Commission.................6
Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133)......................................................6
Manuel v. People (G.R. No. 165842)..........................................................8
Mistake of Fact............................................................................................12
U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)................................................................12
Diego v. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)..................................................14
People v. Fernando (G.R. No. L-24978)....................................................16
Mala in se v. Mala prohibita.........................................................................18
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560)..........................................18
People v. Go Shiu Ling (G.R. No. 115156)................................................19
Art. 4: Criminal Liability..................................................................................20
Wrongful Act Done be Different from That Intended...................................20
Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)............................................................20
People v. Ortega (276 SCRA 166)............................................................21
People v. Pilda (405 SCRA 134)................................................................22
Impossible Crimes.......................................................................................23
People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245).......................................................23
Intod v. CA (215 SCRA 52).......................................................................25
Art. 6: Stages of Execution.............................................................................27
People v. Campuhan(G.R. No. 129433)....................................................27
Valenzuela v. People (G.R. No. 160188)...................................................29
People v. Orita (G.R. No. 88724)..............................................................31
Art. 8: Conspiracy...........................................................................................33
People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)..............................................................33
People v. Comadre (431 SCRA 366).........................................................35
Sim v. CA (428 SCRA 459)........................................................................37
Art. 11: Justifying Circumstances...................................................................40
Self-defense................................................................................................40
People v. Sanchez (G.R. No. 161007).......................................................40
Soplente v. People (G.R. No. 152715)......................................................42
Urbano v. People (G.R. No. 182750)........................................................44
Defense of Relatives...................................................................................46
Balunuecov. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)........................................46
Fulfilment of a Duty.....................................................................................48
Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)...........................................................48
Baxinela v. People (G.R. No. 149652)......................................................49
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John Aceveda
2008-0032
5 |Page
Art.3: Felonies
Classification of Felonies According to the Means of
Commission
Calimutan v. People (G.R. No. 152133)
Facts:
Victim Cantre and Saano, together with two other companions had a
drinking spree in a videoke bar at ten oclock in the morning of February 4, 1996.
Thereafter, they decided to part ways and went to their respective houses. On
their way home, Cantre and Sanano met the petitioner and Michael Bulalacao.
Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacao because he is suspecting the latter as the
one responsible for throwing stones at his house on previous night. After being
hit, bulalacao ran away. Petitioner picked-up a stone which is as big as mans fist,
ran toward Cantre, and threw it to the latter, hitting him at the left side of his back.
When Cantre turned his attention to the petitioner, Sanano tried pacify the two.
Both Cantre and petitioner calmed down and went to their houses. When Cantre
arrived at his house, he complained of the pain in the left side of his back which
was hit by the stone. At that night, he again complained of backache and also of
stomachache. Hes condition immediately became worst, and at around three
oclock in the following morning, Cantre died.
Right after his death, Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday,
the Municipal Health Officer and made a findings that the cause of death was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. Unsatisfied, the
Cantre family requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim
by the NBI. Dr. Mendez conducted an exhumation and autopsy and reported that
the cause of the death was traumatic injury of the abdomen. The victim suffered
from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his
abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by any blunt instrument,
such as a stone.
Petitioner alleged that he only attempted to pacify the victim but the latter
refused and pulled out eight-inch Balisong. When he saw the victim was about to
stab Bulalacao, he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was
able to hit the victim. He contended that the throwing of the stone was in defense
of his companion.
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The RTC rendered a decision, which was later affirmed by the CA, holding
that petitioner was criminally liable for homicide and that the act of throwing a
stone from behind was a treacherous one and the accused committed a felony
which caused the death of the victim and held that the accused is criminally liable
for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the
ultimate result had not been intended. Hence, these case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has the intent to kill the victim and thus liable
for homicide?
Decision:
While the Supreme Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC
and the CA and affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the
victim Cantre was caused by his lacerated spleen which is the result by the stone
thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, it nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC
and the CA as to the determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which
the petitioner should have been convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the
means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2)
culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other
by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender.
In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In
the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice).
The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention
to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the
offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional,
it
being
simply
the
incident
of
another
act
performed without malice." (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to
petitioner any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in
the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner
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Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The
prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the
victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the
victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans intention
to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to
protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and
smaller in built than the victim Cantre.
John Aceveda
2008-0032
Facts:
This is a case filed against Eduardo Manuel for bigamy by Tina B.
Gandalera. Complainant allege that she met the petitioner in Dagupan
City sometime in January 1996. When he visited her in Baguio, as one
thing led to another, they went to a motel where, Eduardo succeeded in
having his way with her. Petitioner proposed marriage and even brought
his parents to assure that he is single. Tina finally accepted the marriage
proposal and they were married on April 22, 1996. In their marriage
contract, it appeared that Eduardo is single. However, their happy
relationship turns into a disaster, Manuel started making himself scarce
and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. One day, petitioner
took all of his cloths, left and never returned. Out of curiousity, Tina went
to NSO in Manila where she found out that petitioner had been previously
married to Rubylus Gaa. She was so embarrassed and humiliated when
she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they
exchanged their own vows.
For his part, Eduardo testified that he informed Tina of his previous
marriage, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. He abandoned her
when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck, suspecting it that
it come from another man. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had
to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before
marrying Tina.. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter
imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage
was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than
20 years. After trial, the court rendered judgment finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It declared that Eduardos belief, that
his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year
absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy and
that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been
previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA maintaining his contentions. He
insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there
must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not
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Gil Acosta
2008-0085
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Mistake of Fact
U.S. v. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488)
Facts:
Defendant herein a chinese man named Ah Chong is employed us a cook
at Fort Mckinley. At that time there were rumours and accounts of frequent
robbing of homes in the area.
On the night of the killing, Ah chong before going to bed, and afraid of the
rumoured robberies taking place in the vicinity locked himself in their room by
placing wooden blocks and chairs for the purpose of thwarting robbers in case
they tried to rob him.
After having gone to bed, he was awakened by the noise of someone
trying to open the door. Ah Chong for his part called out twice, Who is there, but
to no avail. Fearing that the person trying to enter was robber Ah Chong leaped
from his bed and shouted If you enter the room I will kill you. But at that precise
moment, he was suddenly struck by the chair that he had placed in the door, and
believing that he was being attacked he seized a knife and struck it on the
supposed assailant/robber, who was killed by the blow. However the deceased
was not a robber not intruder it turned out that the person was his roommate,
trying to enter their room.
Issue:
Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable?
Decision:
NO. Ah Chong must be acquitted on the basis of honest mistake of fact.
Where the facts been as Ah Chong perceived them to be, he would have been
justified in killing the intruder under Article 11 of the Revised, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides for a valid self-defense of his person. If the
intruder was indeed a robber, forcing his way to enter the room, unlawful
aggression would be present. Also the necessity means to avoid or to repel the
attack would be reasonable. Using the knife to defend himself. And lastly Ah
Chong gave no provocation at all to warrant such aggression. The Supreme
12 | P a g e
Court Held that there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well in the act of Ah
Chong, his act would not have been a felony if the real scenario was the facts he
believed them to be.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
13 | P a g e
Decision:
No.
decisions that mistake of fact, which would could be a valid defense of good faith
in a bigamy case, from mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even a
lay person, from liability. In People vs. Bidtu the Supreme Court held that even if
the accused, who had obtained a divorce decree under Mohammedan custom,
honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not
14 | P a g e
committing any violation of law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same
does not justify the her act. The Court further that it is sufficient to say that
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one doe not know that
his act constitutes a violation of law does not exempt him from the consequence
thereof.
Gil Acosta
2008-0085
15 | P a g e
and after firing a warning shot, the man still did not halt his advance with bolo in
hand. In the midst of the circumstances and believing that the man was a
wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and then at the
allege intruder. At that psychological moment when the forces of far and the
sense of duty were at odds, the accused was not able to take full account of the
true situation. However, a circumstance that should have made him suspect that
the man was not only a friend but a relative when the man called Nong Miong,
and in not asking the daughter of the owner of the house who was it who was
calling to her father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution
that he should have used before talking such fatal action. Hence he is liable for
homicide through reckless negligence.
Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
18 | P a g e
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
19 | P a g e
Decision:
The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It failed to prove the guilt of the accused is criminality liable
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The
Supreme Court agreed with the trial and appellate courts that the proximate
cause of the death of the victim was not cause by any wrongful act of the
accused. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove the corps delicti which
consists of criminal act and the defendants agency in the commission of the act.
This, the prosecution failed to do.
Luis Celestino
2006-0354
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Luis Celestino
2006-0354
21 | P a g e
22 | P a g e
Impossible Crimes
People v. Domasian (219 SCRA 245)
Facts:
In the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a
classmate along Roque Street in Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man
(Domasian) who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a
medical certificate.Enrico agreed to help and rode with Domasian in a tricycle to
Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of
taking him to the hospital, Domasian flagged a minibus and forced him inside,
holding him firmly all the while. Domasian told him to stop crying or he would not
be returned to his father.
Domasian talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope
addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the
driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. The
tanods went after the two, Somehow, Domasian managed to escape, leaving
Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his
parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him.
At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra
received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million
for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra
thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some
records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI
for examination.The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.
Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.
Issue:
Whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime?
Decision:
23 | P a g e
No. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of
its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the
offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico
of his liberty.
Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the
act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and
its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other
and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective
2007-0388
Melencio S. Faustino
26 | P a g e
2008-0094
27 | P a g e
to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her
pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of
the accused touched the middle part of her vagina.
Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the
penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this
case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed
touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.
As the labias, which are required to be touched by the penis, are by their
natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface,
hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the
pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oftquoted touching of the female organ, but has also progressed into being
described as the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum,
or the bombardment of the drawbridge. But to the SC's mind, the case at bar
merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or a "strafing of
the citadel of passion."
Under Art.6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape and only of
attempted rape are present in the instant case; hence, the accused should be
punished only for it.
Melencio S. Faustino
28 | P a g e
2008-0094
Decision:
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Melencio S. Faustino
30 | P a g e
2008-0094
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Art. 8: Conspiracy
People v. Quirol (473 SCRA 509)
Facts:
On December 4, 1993, in celebration of a fiesta in Apas, Lahug, Cebu City, a
benefit disco dance was held at the local UCMA Village. Appellants, Juanito
and Mario Quirol, and the two victims, Benjamin Silva and Roel Ngujo, attended.
At the dance, Juanito, Mario and Jed were together and drank all through the
night with some friends. The dance ended just prior to 4 a.m. and prosecution
principal witness Wilson Cruz testified that it was about that time when he was
asked by Benjamin and Roel to accompany them in escorting some ladies home.
Wilson told them to go ahead and that he would just follow. Wilson was
behind them at a distance of 7 to 10 fathoms when the group passed by the
house of Jed. From his vantage point, Wilson saw Jed stop the two victims in
front of his house and frisk them.
Thereafter, Wilson saw Jed bind Benjamin and Roel together with a pair of
handcuffs and lead them towards the control tower of the old airport of Lahug,
Cebu City. There, the three were met by Juanito and Mario and together they
proceeded to the airport runway.
Wilson, hidden behind a bush, said he could hear Benjamin plead for his life.
A few seconds later, Jed took out his .38 caliber service revolver and shot
Benjamin at point-blank range on the head. As Benjamin fell, Roel was dragged
down to his knees since he was handcuffed to Benjamin. Mario then held Roel
while Juanito started stabbing him using a Batangas knife. Jed finished it by
shooting Roel.
The lower court and Court of Appeals find that there was conspiracy and
convicting them despite their defense of alibi.
Issue:
Can there be a conspiracy based on the foregoing facts?
33 | P a g e
Decision:
Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to
commit the crime.Neither it is necessary to show that all the conspirators actually
hit and killed the victim. What has to be shown is that all the participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably
indicate a common purpose and design. The conspiracy in the instant case was
sufficiently proven by Jed meeting with appellants at the old airport tower and
walking together with them towards the runway where appellants and Jed
performed acts in unison with each other as to unmistakably reveal a common
purpose and design.
Anent Marios defense of alibi, despite corroboration from Exequiel
Aranas, it is still an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over a positive
identification from a witness found credible by the trial court. Absent arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence, we will
not interfere with the credence given to the testimony of Wilson over that of Mario
and that of Exequiel, as assessments of credibility are generally left to the trial
court whose proximate contact with those who take the witness stand places it in
a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony.
Moreover, as correctly discussed by the Court of Appeals, the distance between
the scene of the crimes and where Mario claims he passed out is not so far away
as to prevent him from being physically present at the place of the crimes or its
immediate vicinity at the time the crimes were committed.
Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
34 | P a g e
Decision:
35 | P a g e
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to
establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere
cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make
him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have
any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free.
Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship
with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they
performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Jaypee Garcia
2007-0280
36 | P a g e
by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken
together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to
commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and
participation.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioners actions in
relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant
clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend
mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison. Notwithstanding the fact
that it was only Elison who dealt with or personally transacted with private
complainant until the time the sale was consummated, by his own testimony
petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely
acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud upon private complainant. That petitioner is
a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is evident from the fact that
as between them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle
under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered
owner.Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in
order to defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latters damage and
prejudice. In addition, the acts of petitioner in deliberately misrepresenting
himself to private complainant as having the necessary authority to possess and
sell to the latter the vehicle so that he could collect from him P480,000.00 only to
renege on that promise and for failure to reimburse the said amount he collected
from private complainant, despite demand, amount to estafa punishable under
Art. 315, par. 2 (a).
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
39 | P a g e
Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
41 | P a g e
Issue:
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Shaun Jayoma
2005-0016
43 | P a g e
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Defense of Relatives
Balunuecov. CA and People (G.R. No. 126968)
Facts:
On May 2, 1982 at around 6:00 oclock in the evening Amelia Iguico saw
accused Reynaldo, his father Juanito and brothers Ricardo and Ramon, all
surnamed Balunueco, and one Armando Flores chasing her brother-in-law
Servando Iguico. With the five (5) individuals in hot pursuit, Servando scampered
into the safety of Amelias house. Meanwhile Senando went out of the house fully
unaware of the commotion going on outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo
turned his attention on him and gave chase. Senando instinctively fled towards
the fields but Reynaldo, Ricardo, and Armando cornered him and ganged up on
him. To shield him from further violence, Amelia put her arms around her
husband but it was not enough to detract Ricardo from his murderous frenzy.
Amelia was also hit on the leg.
In his defense, accused Ricardo invoke defense of relatives. He testified
that at that time he was fetching water he heard somebody shout. When he
hurried to the place, he saw his brother Ramon embracing Senando who was
continuously hacking Reynaldo. Thereafter, Senando shoved Ramon to the
ground and as if further enraged by the intrusion, he turned his bolo on the fallen
Ramon. Ricardo screamed, "tama na yan, mga kapatid ko yan." But the
assailant would not be pacified as he hacked Ramon on the chest. At this point,
Servando, the brother of Senando, threw an axe at him but Reynaldo picked it up
and smashed Senando with it.
The trial court found the accused guilty of homicide and frustrated
homicide. According to the trial court, the denial of Ricardo was self-serving and
calculated to extricate himself from the predicament he was in. Further, the trial
court added that the wounds allegedly received by Ricardo in the hands of the
victim, Senando Iguico, if at all there were any, did not prove that Senando was
the aggressor for the wounds were inflicted while Senando was in the act of
defending himself from the aggression of Ricardo and his co-conspirators.
The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused Ricardo with
modification that his conviction for the wounding of Amelia Iguico, should be for
attempted homicide only.
46 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid defense of relatives?
Decision:
Petitioner invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under
Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of this
justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had
no part therein.
Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In
order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is
necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively
determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made;
a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the
commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption
from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a
relative. It has always been so recognized in the decisions of the courts, in
accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code.
Having admitted the killing of the victim, petitioner has the burden of proving
these elements by clear and convincing evidence. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even
if the prosecution evidence is weak it cannot be disbelieved if the accused has
admitted the killing.
In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient
proof of the existence of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of
the deceased Senando. With the exception of his self-serving allegations, there
is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
47 | P a g e
Fulfilment of a Duty
Mamangun v. People (GR 149152)
Facts:
On July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the evening, a certain Liberty Contreras
was
heard
shouting,
MagnanakawMagnanakaw.
Several
residents
responded and thereupon chased the suspect who entered the yard of Antonio
Abacan and proceeded to the rooftop of Abacans house.
At about 9:00 oclock that same evening, the desk officer of the
Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a telephone call that a robberyholdup was in progress in Brgy. Calvario, immediately contacted and dispatched
to the scene the crew including herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun. With
the permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun, and two others went to the
rooftop of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking refuge.
The three policemen, each armed with a drawn handgun, searched the
rooftop. There, they saw a man whom they thought was the robbery suspect. At
that instance, petitioner Mamangun, who was walking ahead of the group, fired
his handgun once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener Contreras
(Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.
Contreras died from the gunshot wound.
Issue:
Whether or not the shooting in question was done in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office?
Decision:
No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under paragraph 5,
Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense
successfully proves that: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and
(2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
48 | P a g e
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
49 | P a g e
Facts:
Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo L. Baxinela was in a pub drinking with two other
policemen in as early as 11:00 p.m. of October 18, 1996. At around 12:00 a.m. to
12:30 a.m. there was a minor altercation between the deceased Sgt. Lajo and
another customer at the pub but eventually the two were able to patch things up.
While on his way out, Lajo was followed by Braxinela with a gun already drawn
out. From behind, Baxinela held Lajos left arm and asked why he was carrying a
gun. Thereafter an explosion coming from Baxinelas gun was heard. Lajo, still
standing,
took
two
steps
and
then
fell
down.
Issue:
Whether or not fulfilment of duty may validly be invoked by the petitioner?
Decision:
No. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that:
1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or
office. While the first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking.
Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind
his waist in a public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he
confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the
desire to take no chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who
was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be considered due
performance of a duty if at that time Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to
Baxinela or to the civilians in the pub.The Court will, however, attribute to
Baxinela the incomplete defense of fulfillment of a duty as a privileged mitigating
circumstance. In Lacanilao v. Court of Appeals, it was held that if the first
condition is fulfilled but the second is wanting, Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code is applicable so that the penalty lower than one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Justiniano Quiza
2008-0290
50 | P a g e
arrestee under custody. But, it was not shown here that the killing of Ganancial
was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence was presented by the defense to
prove that Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from
arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as to how
Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim
to arrest the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his
house. As regards the second requisite, there can be no question that the killing
of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary consequence of the arrest to be made
on Restituto Bergante.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
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Obedience to an Order
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 103501-03)
Facts:
Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta were convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in
the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General Manager and Acting Finance
Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA.
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly
to the president's office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do
it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then
private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986
reiterating in black and white such verbal instruction, directed to pay immediately
the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of
FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of
MIAA's account with said Company signed by the then President Marcos.
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum,
Tabuena, with the help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million
of MIAA funds
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and
Peralta themselves, "out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal
procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support the
disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for
the P55 Million was presented.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners defense of good faith is tenable?
Decision:
Yes. It is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.To
53 | P a g e
constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute,
be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to
duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim
is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind
of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.Ordinarily, evil intent
must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if
he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue
otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's
superior the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA
and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had a say in matters involving intergovernment agency affairs and transactions, such as for instance, directing
payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest
official of the land no less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance,
without hesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena
therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." The
subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so
too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in the MARCOS Memorandum, as it
has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government agency
(MIAA) to another (PNCC).
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime
of malversation.
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
54 | P a g e
appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded not guilty. After due trial,
the RTC convicted him.
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he
indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing
the defense of insanity.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the
testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the
accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under
schizophrenia, paranoid type?
Whether or not the court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's
defense of insanity?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of
the commission of the crime. A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the
defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at
the very moment when the crime was committed. Only when there is a complete
55 | P a g e
deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind.
Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving it. Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime
was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of
insanity is unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant
was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the
brutal killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a
domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that
appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the
nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to
by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robios.
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his
wife. He was even bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just
killed her.
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how
he had just killed his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and
remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness
of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done.
Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant
when the latter confessed to the former and to the police officers, and even
showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Clearly, the assault of appellant
on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly
supports his claim of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his
allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the crime. Except for
56 | P a g e
appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robios, all the other defense witnesses
testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been
detained in prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the
offense, or the accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise
he would still be criminally responsible. Verily, his alleged insanity should have
pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act
was committed, not at any time thereafter.
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal
responsibility, the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had
already been completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim. Verily, the
evidence proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely
deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such,
clear and convincing proof is required to establish its existence. Indubitably, the
defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the
presumption of sanity.
Renato Segubiense
2006-0040
57 | P a g e
The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accusedappellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was
charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the
latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the
nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Yayen and Antonio
Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accusedappellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa."
(I had my revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly
left the room after stabbing the victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one
who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from
his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was
doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other
people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where
accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious
motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names
and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of
immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware
of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying;
swimming in the river with his clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not
sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the time of the commission of the
crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does not
necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." Then, too, the medical
findings showing that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder
after the commission of the crime, has no bearing on his liability. What is decisive
is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to
discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the
victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
Minority
Llave v.People (G.R. No. 166040)
Facts:
On Sept. 24, 2002, on an errand from her mother, the victim, who was
only 7 years old at that time, proceeded to their house, where the accused waited
for her, and accosted her; he proceeded to sexually abuse her, while the victim
cried for help.
A barbecue vendor nearby heard her cries and came to the scene; the
accused fled, and the vendor told the victim to tell her parents what happened.
Together with her parents, the victim went to the police and reported the
incident; the vendor also testified to what he saw during that time.
The medical examiner found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but
found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia minora; there was also fresh
abrasion of the perennial skin at 1 oclock position near the anal opening.
The trial court found the victim guilty, declaring that he acted with
discernment, but crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of
minority.
Issue:
W/N accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, and if yes, whether he
acted with discernment, being a minor of age more than 9 years old but less than
15?
Decision: YES
Penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ
into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the
penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to
the conclusion that the rape was consummated.
61 | P a g e
While it is true that medical examiner did not find any abrasion or laceration in
the private complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters
testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions
and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a
young girl as in this case.
The court have held that when the offended party is young and immature,
from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their
account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but
also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
to which they testified is not true.
Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong.
The accused, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the
pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passers-by would not
be able to discover his dastardly acts.
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65 | P a g e
Rep. Act No. 9344 only amended the disqualification of those juveniles in
conflict with law, who at the time of the promulgation of judgment, was already 18
years old, and allowed the benefits to apply to them. The other disqualification in
P.D. No. 603 remains unchanged. Hence, the accused is still disqualified under
law to benefit from such suspension of sentence.
Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should be read and construed
together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the
legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing legislations on the subject
and to have enacted the new act with reference thereto.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
Accident
Toledo v. People (439 SCRA 94)
Facts:
66 | P a g e
The accused Toledo was charged with homicide for the killing of one
Ricky Duarte. Toledo insisted that when he killed the victim, the same was purely
accidental. He claimed that the victim was so drunk that the same charged at the
door of his house. This prompted the accused to get his bolo and when he tried
to prevent Ricky from entering, he accidentally hit the latter whereby killing him.
But still the RTC and the Ca found him guilty.
And so, the accused goes to the SC wherein this time, he claims that his
actions were purely on self-defense. It was done when the victim attacked him
and in trying to defend himself, he accidentally killed Duarte.
Issue:
Should the Court find his actions exempting and/or justifying?
Decision:
The Sc ruled that there is no such thing as accidental self-defense. The
accused cannot claim the death purely accidental and when the findings of the
lower courts were unfavorable, later on change his defense by alleging that what
happened was purely self-defense.
The two defenses perpetuated by the accused are totally inconsistent with
each other. Although in the justifying circumstance of self-defense, an accused is
excused because of DELIBERATELY trying to repel an unlawful aggression
which could have killed or injure him. And so, such acts are not in tune with
ACCIDENT which presupposes an act which was not even contemplated or
planned but purely accidental.
Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
67 | P a g e
The accused Concepcion is a police officer charged with murder for the
killing of one Lorenzo Galang. According to testimonies of both parties
witnesses, Lorenzo Galang was brought to the barangay hall because he was so
drunk and unruly at the town plaza and was continually disturbing the peace.
The accused then came to the barangay hall
apparently to question
Galang. But herein lies the differences in the testimonies. The prosecution
witnesses (2 of them) testified that while interrogating Galang, Concepcion
suddenly fired two shots past the ear of the victim without injuring him. But later
on, he hit the victim in the abdomen and fired a shot which wounded Galang in
the thigh and then Concepcion fired three more shots which hit the victim in the
chest and killed him.
But according to the accused, he was merely pacifying Galang when the
victim became so unruly that the accused fired two warning shots. But instead of
scaring Galang, the latter tried to grab the gun from the accused. Two shots were
accidentally fired which hit Galang thus causing his death.
The accused claims that he should be exempted because he was just
performing his lawful duty as a police officer and that the shooting was purely
accidental.
The trial court found Concepcion guilty.
Issue:
Should the accused be exempted from criminal liability due to accident?
Decision:
Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the prosecution has
theburden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused. However, once the
defendant admits the commission of the offense charged, but raises an
exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. By
invoking mere accident as a defense, appellant now has the burden of proving
that he is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the
Code.
68 | P a g e
Unfortunately for the accused, his testimony was too full of inconsistencies
which failed to discharge the burden . For one, Concepcion claims that when the
victim tried to grab his gun, said rifle was hanging on his shoulder on a swivel.
But then he claimed that Galang tried to rest the rifle away by grabbing the
BARREL OF THE GUN. This was very inconceivable. Furthermore, it was not
believable that a person so drunk would try to take away a rifle from a police
officer who also had a handgun tucked by his waist.
Lastly, the prosecution witness categorically testified that he saw
Concepcion shoot the victim with the M-16 rifle.
And so, the finding of guilt by the lower court was proper.
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
This case stemmed from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P. 22
against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The said accused drew and issue to Manila
Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino several
post-dated checks. The said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she
did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such checks in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital
the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear
of a greater injury. She claims that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain
release of her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated, and
would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid.
The trial court rendered judgment against Ty. Ty interposed an appeal
with the CA and reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater
evil or injury. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty
to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos P 60,000.00 equivalent to double the
amount of the check, in each case.
Issue:
Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability?
Decision:No.
Uncontrollable fear - For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an
injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
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Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Entrapment v. Instigation
People v. Sta. Maria (G.R. No. 171019)
Facts:
71 | P a g e
72 | P a g e
Decision:
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and
capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the
instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense,
and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from
the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from
him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The
legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation
does.
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done
at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one
habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course
of conduct.
The solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the
police merely furnishes evidence of the course of conduct. The police received
an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs.
They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
offering to sell kilo of shabu for the amount of P950 per gram or a total of
P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust
operation. Atty. Yap and Sr. Agent Congzon, Jr. were assigned to handle the
case. The two officer and an informant went to the house of the appellant at 375
Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. They negotiated the sale
of kilo of shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed
that the payment and delivery of shabu would be made the next day at same
place.
On April 17, 1998, NBI agents and the informant went to appellants
house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag, the latter saw a transparent
plastic with white crystalline substance inside. Appellant asked for the payment.
Atty. Yap introduced Congzon to get the money from the car. When Congzon
returned, he gave the boodle money to Atty. Yap who handed to the appellant.
Upon receipt of payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and
arrested him.
The trial gave full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation that led to the appellants arrest
was valid?
Decision:
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In
instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would- be
defendant into the commission of the offense and become co- principals
themselves. It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is
sanctioned by law as legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements
engage in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs.
The records show that the operation that led to the arrest of the appellant
was indeed an entrapment, not instigation. Courts generally give full faith and
credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties
74 | P a g e
Arlyn Barcelon
2006-0021
Makati and determine the sufficiency and insufficiency of the income tax
assessed on them and collect payments, San Mateo was the Chief Operations,
Business revenue Examination, Audit division, Makati Treasurers office.
The examiners found that Group Developers, Inc. (GDI) incurred a tax
deficiency inclusive of penalty in the amount of P494,601.11. The assessment
notice was received by Mario Magat, Chief Operating Officer of GDI. Magat was
later able to talk to San Mateo via phone. On May 15, 1991, Magat and San
Mateo met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. Chang later joined the two, the
three agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end of May 1991, the
assessment would be resolved.
On June 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch with San Mateo and Chang at
the Makati Sports Club. Magat tried to convince the two that GDI wanted to pay
the correct amount of tax to the municipality. He was advised by San Mateo and
Chang, however, that GDI had only two options: Pay the P494,601.11 to the
municipality or P125,000 to them.
On June 12, 1991, Magat met with the NBI Deputy Director Epimaco
Velasco who advised him to file a complaint with the NBI. Magat thus gave a
sworn statement. After several days, Magat contacted San Mateo and asked him
if their position was still the same to which the latter said yes. Magat thereafter
told San Mateo that he would deliver the P125,000 on June 19,1991 at the
Makati Sports Club.
On June 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI that payment was to be made
that day around lunchtime. The NBI formed a team to conduct an entrapment.
The genuine money as well as the boodle money and the envelope where the
money was placed were then laced with fluorescent powder.
San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his table. Chang arrived and joined
the two. Magat told Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and asked
them if they could give him the Certificate of Examination showing that GDI has
no more tax liability. Chang handed the Certificate while Magat gave the brown
envelope. At that instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being
arrested.
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Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
Facts:
On December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone
on Roxas Boulevard heading south and Generoso Miranda was driving his car in
the same direction with his uncle, Manuel Miranda. Generoso was moving ahead
of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him
to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times.
Generoso, slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook
Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four
or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane.
When Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn, Generoso passed him, pulled over
and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out.
Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Then Tangan went to his car
and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat.
According to the prosecution witnesses, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia
Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda
and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at
Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso
Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter.
The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall. Manuel
Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling,
Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has
taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The
man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun
where the man in red T-shirt placed it.
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness
by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the
accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of
the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to
wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the
accused. The accused lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of
his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting
Generoso Miranda.
Tangan ran away while Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. Manuel looked for
the gun and ran after Tangan. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to
78 | P a g e
enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just
shot his nephew. Manuel went back to where Generoso lay and there found two
ladies, Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi.
Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was
rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way.
Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. However, the information was amended to homicide with the use of a
licensed firearm, and he was separately charged with illegal possession of
unlicensed firearm. Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case, but
moved to quash the information for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm on
various grounds. The motion to quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. On November 5, 1987, said petition was dismissed
and the joint trial of the two cases was ordered.
After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal possession of firearm, but
convicted him of homicide. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
on the part of the offended party and of passion and obfuscation were
appreciated in his favor; Tangan was released from detention after the
promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the
trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity to P50,000.00. His
subsequent motion for reconsideration and a motion to cite the Solicitor General
in contempt were denied by the Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the prosecution, alleging grave abuse of
discretion, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, naming as respondents the
Court of Appeals and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's judgment
be modified by convicting accused-appellant of homicide without appreciating in
his favor any mitigating circumstance.
Issue:
Whether or not Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense?
Decision:
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aggression,
there
can
never
be
self-defense,
complete
or
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
80 | P a g e
Elbert S. Callet was charged and found guilty of the crime of Murder in the
death of Alfredo Senador. Callet used a 9-inch hunting knife in stabbing the
latter on the left shoulder near the base of the neck causing Senadors death
shortly thereafter. Callet appealed his conviction claiming that the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City (Branch 30) gravely erred in failing to
consider the mitigating circumstance of the fact that he had no intention to
commit so grave a wrong thereforehis liability should be mitigated.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability of Callet be mitigated in that he had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The lack of intent to commit a
wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the weapon used, the
part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact
that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind,
without giving him an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he
intended to do what he actually did, and he must be held responsible therefore,
without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance.
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
81 | P a g e
In the evening of October 11, 1997, Anthony went to the house of Dennis
and invited the latter for a drinking spree. Afterwards both left the house of
Dennis and went to a nearby store and started drinking with a companion named
Porboy Perez. The three proceeded to Shoreline. In a cottage, Anthony tried to
let Dennis drink gin and as the latter refused, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin
and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table and Anthony
tried to stab him with a 22 fan knife but did not hit him. Dennis got up and ran
towards their home.
Upon reaching home, he got a knife. Alarmed by the action of Dennis, his
mother shouted. Manuel, his father, tried to scold his son and confiscate from
him the knife but failed to do so, resulting to Manuels incurring a wound in his
hand. He went back to the cottage. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony ran towards
the creek but Dennis blocked him and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony
ran but got entangled with fishing net and fell on his back. Dennis then mounted
on him and continued stabbing him resulting to the latters death. After stabbing,
Dennis left and went to Camp Downes and slept there. The next morning, Dennis
voluntarily surrendered himself to Boy Estrera, a well-known police officer.
The trial court rendered a judgment convicting Dennis for the crime of
Murder qualified by treachery or evident premeditation and appreciating three
mitigating circumstances. His father Manuel was acquitted. Not satisfied with the
judgment, Dennis appealed his case.
Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense is appreciated?
Decision:
The Supreme held that the mitigating circumstance of having acted in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense was properly appreciated. Dennis was
humiliated, mauled and almost stabbed by the Anthony. Although the unlawful
aggression had ceased when Dennis stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a
grave offense for which the Dennis may be given the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance.
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Passion or Obfuscation
People v. Lab-eo (G.R. No. 133438)
Facts:
83 | P a g e
minutes after, Segundina was sitting on a low rattan stool. In front of her were
Nancy and Julie, they did not notice appellants return, especially Segundina who
had her back to appellant. When Julie saw appellant approach Segundina from
the back, Julie thought that he would just box his aunt because she did not see
the knife, which was wrapped in his blue jacket. Then appellant suddenly made
a thrusting motion and he stabbed Segundina on the left portion of her back. He
then ran away leaving the knife at the victims back with the jacket he had
covered it with, hanging by the knifes handle. Appellant surrendered to the
police authorities. The appellant was indicted for murder. The appellant does not
deny stabbing Cayno. However, he maintains that neither treachery nor evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime. The Trial Court found the
appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the actuation of the accused can be properly appreciated
as passion or obfuscation in his favour?
Decision:
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humiliated by the victims utterance. Nor was it shown that the victim made that
remark in an insulting and repugnant manner. The victims utterance was not the
stimulus required by jurisprudence to be so overwhelming as to overcome reason
and self-restraint.
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obfuscation must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of
lawlessness or revenge or from anger and resentment. In the present case,
clearly, Marcelo was infuriated upon seeing is brother, Carlito, shot by Jose.
However, a distinction must be made between the first time that Marcelo hacked
Jose and the second time that the former hacked the latter. When Marcelo
hacked Jose right after seeing the latter shoot at Carlito, and if appellant
refrained from doing anything else after that, he could have validly invoked the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. But when, upon seeing his
brother Carlito dead, Marcelo went back to Jose, who by then was already
86 | P a g e
prostrate on the ground and hardly moving, hacking Jose again was a clear case
of someone acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge.
87 | P a g e
88 | P a g e
Voluntary Surrender
People v. Beltran (G.R. No. 168051)
Facts:
On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information for Murder
allegedly committed as follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around
10:00 oclock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with
the qualifiying circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without
warning one Norman Conception y Habla while the latter was unarmed and
completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body,
which directly caused the victims death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999,
appellant pleaded Not Guilty to the charge therein. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Appellant, on his defense admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but
insisted that he did the same in self-defense.
claimed that Norman is taller than him; that he was forced to kill Norman because
the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City
to surrender to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa
City.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Honorato Beltran, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran, Jr. is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Decision:
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voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or
apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that
the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the
barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a
certain Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to
the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the
hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went
to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the bext day, to his
sister in Lipa City.
authorities. Moreover, the flight of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was
apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with
the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circcumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
90 | P a g e
1987, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to
the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Peter Andrada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused Peter Andrada is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Decision:
91 | P a g e
Evidence for the prosecution shows that petitioner, after attacking the
victim, ran away.
For
Maricris Ella
2007-0030
92 | P a g e
counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond without surrendering his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the motion had been
acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a
condition set by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing
his subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
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Confession of Guilt
People v. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)
Facts:
On 18 November 1996, William Montinola, armed with an unlicensed Cal .
380 Pistol Llama deliberately, willfully and criminally with violence against or
intimidation of persons, with intent of gain, take and carry away cash amount of
P67,500.00 belonging to Jose Eduardo Reteracion. Montinola shot the victim on
the neck, killing Reteracion. Two criminal cases were filed against Montinola and
he was later on sentenced to reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide and
death for illegal possession of firearm.
Issue:
Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by
reason or on occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as
an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide?
Decision:
Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said
Presidential Decree was however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinolas
case was still pending. R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held In
recent cases, we ruled that there could be no separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar
as the new law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a
separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive
effect. Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by R.A. No. 8294, use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. At any rate, even assuming
that the aggravating circumstances present in the commission of homicide or
murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty for robbery with
95 | P a g e
96 | P a g e
97 | P a g e
Exuperancia
accompanied the two to his fathers house and both recognized the cow but Florentino
was not home. Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay that he would call them the next day
to talk about the matter with his father. Exuperancio never called. The matter was
reported to the police and Narciso and Exuperancio were called for investigation.
Exuperancio admitted taking the cow but claims that he was the real owner of the cow
and that it was lost on December 3, 1985. However, Narciso presented a certificate of
ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow
was described as two years old and female. Then, the petitioner also presented a
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 and a statement
executed by Franklin Telen, who was the janitor at the treasurer's office of the
municipality, that he executed the certificate of ownership in favor of Exuperancio. The
trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
Exuperancio filed a Motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals
and affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio to ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay
the costs?
Decision:
No. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty
98 | P a g e
of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and
applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
However, as held in People v. Macatanda,P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty
for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was to amend the
Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10 of the
law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its
minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e.,prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which is prision
mayor in its maximum period.
Katrina Garcia
2006-0127
99 | P a g e
100 | P a g e
Palaganas and Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista arrived. The two
groups occupied separate tables. After the Ferrers singing Jaime Palaganas
started singing and was joined by Tony Ferrer who sang loudly and in mocking
manner. This insulted Jaime and soon a fight ensued between Ferrers and
Palaganas. Ferdinand ran towards his house and sought help from his brother
Fuijeric, the latter went outside however he was stoned by the Ferrer brothers.
As they were continuously stoned the appellant Ferdinand suddenly pulled the
trigger with the gun in his hands. The trial court rendered a decision finding the
petitioner guilty of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated homicide but not guilty of
violation of COMELEC RES. 2958.
Issue:
Whether or not violation of COMELEC RES. 2958 may be considered as
Special aggravating circumstances which will negate consideration of mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender?
Decision:
With the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.68
Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the
commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and
appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not merely a generic
aggravating circumstance.
Katrina Garcia
2006-0127
101 | P a g e
A qualifying circumstance
Whether or not the trial court erred in determining the nature of the crime
committed and the corresponding penalty to be imposed?
Decision:
Yes. The prosecution failed to positively prove the presence of
anyqualifying aggravating circumstance whereby the crime committed is only
homicide for which the imposable penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code is
Reclusion Temporal.
Being the case, Indeterminate Sentence Law may now be applied and
absent any aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty that may be
imposed
Kristine Gonzales
2008-0192
103 | P a g e
Lourizza Genabe
2008-0154
105 | P a g e
106 | P a g e
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
108 | P a g e
Decision:
The issue of credibility raised in the three assigned errors should be
109 | P a g e
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
111 | P a g e
Facts:
Juan Ancheta was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan,
with the crime of robbery with arson, committed in conspiracy with two other
persons who could not be tried with him because they were then at large. He
asks for a reversal of the decision convicting him of the crime of arson and
sentencing him to the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua plus civil indemnity
in the sum of P40,000.00 for the properties burned.
On 25 August 1980, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, Ancheta and his
two companions awakened Teresa Gorospe, forced their entry into her house,
demanded the amount of P1,000.00, and burned her house when the money was
not delivered. Later, while the house was in flames, the Ancheta, brandishing a
bolo, prevented the people from approaching and putting out the fire by warning
them that he had thirty companions.
Issues:
Whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused?
Whether or not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper?
Decision:
On whether or not there was conspiracy between and among the accused.
The Supreme Court agreed that there was a conspiracy among the accusedappellant and his two companions when they forcibly entered the house of
Teresa Gorospe and burned it after their demand for P1,000.00.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act
through the physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. It is
settled that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts
charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be
accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of
inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance
of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them.
112 | P a g e
The conspiracy having been established, it should follow that the accusedappellant is as guilty as his companions of the crime of arson, even if it be
conceded that he was not the one who actually poured the kerosene and ignited
it to burn Teresa Gorospe's house. When there is a conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all and visits equal guilt upon every conspirator.
On whether or not the penalty imposed on Ancheta was proper. Under
Article 321 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed "if the offender shall set fire to any building,
farmhouse, warehouse, hut, shelter, or vessel in port, knowing it to be occupied
at the time by one or more persons. .... "
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was correctly appreciated
because it was sought by the defendants to facilitate the commission of the
offense and their subsequent escape. Evident premeditation should also have
been applied because the offenders had deliberately plotted the crime, as early
as 9 o'clock of the night in question, or two hours before they actually burned the
house.
With these aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances to
offset them, the proper penalty as imposed by the trial court is reclusion
perpetua. The civil indemnity of P40,000.00 is allowed, but the costs of the suit
shall be adjudged in toto against the accused-appellant and not to be shared, as
ordered by the trial court.
Cheryl Navarro
2007-0026
113 | P a g e
Facts:
The Supreme Court, in its Decision promulgated on 9 May 2002, affirmed
the conviction of both appellants for three counts of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon. The penalty imposed upon them by the trial court was, however,
reduced from death to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, because
aggravating circumstances had neither been alleged in the Information nor
sufficiently proven during the trial.
Appellant Alfredo Baroy has since then filed a Motion for a partial
reconsideration of the Courts Decision. He claims that he is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and, hence, to a penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. He presented various pieces of
conflicting documentary and testimonial evidence during the trial. He now prays
for the consideration and giving weight to his Birth Certificate as the best
evidence of his age. His Birth Certificate shows that he was born on 19 January
1984, while the crimes in question were committed on March 2, 1998.
Issue:
Whether or not Baroy's Certificate of Live Birth sufficiently proves his
minority when he committed the crimes?
Decision:
The Motion has merit.
Baroys Birth Certificate -- the authenticity of which was confirmed by the
NSO -- outweighs the other evidence submitted to prove his date of birth. A birth
certificate is the best evidence of a persons date of birth.
The earlier evidence submitted by appellant during the trial did not
conclusively prove his age. However, since the OSG did not object to the belated
appreciation of Annex A and left the matter to the sound discretion of this Court,
we resolve to rule in favor of the accused.
If the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his
claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact.
114 | P a g e
Based on his Birth Certificate, it is clear that Baroy was only fourteen (14)
years old when he committed the crime of rape. Hence, a reconsideration of the
Courts 9 May 2002 Decision is proper.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the offender is a
minor x x x under fifteen years x x x a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but
always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime
which he committed. The penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed by
Baroy is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision
mayor.Additionally, Baroy is entitled to the benefits granted by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Christine Perez
2006-0104
115 | P a g e
Recidivism
People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368)
Facts:
Appellant Dacillo together with Joselito Pacot were indicted for murder in
an information and that the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
The case against appellants co-accused, Joselito Pacot, was provisionally
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to identify him with certainty.Appellant
was arraigned on February 21, 2001 and, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Pre-trial was conducted on March 1, 2001 and trial ensued thereafter.
When the body was discovered in the evening of February 11, 2000,
appellant immediately left for Cebu City, arriving there the next day, February 12,
2000. He stayed in Cebu City until his arrest the following year.
On May 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty
of murder and imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death. The Court finds
the accused Francisco Dacillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, as defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Considering the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he
is hereby sentenced to the extreme penalty of death.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary, in recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance, to be alleged in the information?
Decision:
The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that
he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that
appellant was a recidivist was appreciated by the trial court as a generic
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Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
117 | P a g e
Reiteracion
People v. Cajara (G.R. No. 122498)
Facts:
On 18 May 1994 16-year old Marita Cajote, a resident of Manila, arrived in
Basey, Samar, and stayed with her sister Marie. The following day, Marita was
fetched by another sister, Merly Tagana also known as Meling, and by the latters
common law husband, accused Elmedio Cajara also known as Elming. Upon
being told by Meling that they would be going to Sulod to get copra, Marita went
with Meling and Elming to the couples house in Sitio Catuhaan in Barangay
Serum. Since then until 30 May 1994 Marita stayed with Meling and Elming
together with their two (2) small children in a house consisting of only one room
without any partition.
In the evening of 30 May 1994 complaining witness Marita Cajote slept at
one end of the room with the two (2) children, with Meling and Elming at the other
end. At about two oclock the following morning Marita was awakened by the
weight of accused who was already on top of her. The accused who was holding
a bolo told her to keep quiet or he would kill her. He then placed his bolo aside
and held Maritas hands with his right hand. With his left hand accused lowered
Maritas pants as well as her panty down to her knees. Marita shouted for help
but her sister Meling just wrapped her head with their mosquito net and
pretended to be asleep. Marita struggled continuously against the advances of
the accused but he was much stronger, while she was getting weak. The
accused first inserted his fingers into Maritas private part and later succeeded in
inserting his penis into her vagina. Meling then pulled Elming away from Marita
and hit Elming in the eye. Elming boxed Meling on the mouth and kicked her
when she fell on the floor. Elming went back to Marita and continued with his
beastly acts. By this time, Marita was already too weak to resist. Elming inserted
his fingers first and then his penis into her private organ. The older of the two (2)
children of Meling cried. Meling who was holding her youngest child helplessly
watched the accused rape her younger sister.
The trial court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to death. The
Office of the Solicitor General, in its brief, belittles the accused for failing to show
any compelling or justifiable reason to set aside his conviction for rape and his
118 | P a g e
penalty of death, citing Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of Qualified Rape.
Decision:
The Solicitor General is correct in finding the accused guilty of rape. The
bare denial of the accused and his common-law wife cannot overcome the
categorical testimony of the victim. Denial when unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative
matters. No woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert
herself by being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. The Court likewise agrees
with the finding of the trial court that Maritas positive identification of the accused
as the person who raped her was given in a categorical, straightforward and
spontaneous manner which rendered it worthy of faith and belief.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court and the stand of the Solicitor
General, the accused can only be convicted of simple rape punishable by
reclusion perpetua. It was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of death.
Although the circumstance of relationship by affinity within the third civil degree
was alleged in the Information, evidence for the prosecution clearly showed the
lack or absence of such circumstance to qualify the rape because the accused
and Merly Tagana, sister of the victim Marita Cajote, were mere common-law
husband and wife and were not legally married at the time of the rape. The
accused and the victim cannot be said to be related by affinity within the third civil
degree at the time of the commission of the crime.Neither can the accused be
convicted of qualified rape on the basis of the circumstance that the rape was
committed in full view of the relatives of the victim within the third degree of
consanguinity because this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the
Information or in the Complaint against the accused.
119 | P a g e
The records show that the crime was aggravated by reiteracion under Art.
14, par. 10, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused having been convicted of
frustrated murder in 1975 and of homicide, frustrated homicide, trespass to
dwelling, illegal possession of firearms and murder sometime in 1989 where his
sentences were later commuted to imprisonment for 23 years and a fine of
P200,000.00. He was granted conditional pardon by the President of the
Philippines on 8 November 1991.Reiteracion or habituality under Art. 14, par. 10,
herein cited, is present when the accused has been previously punished for an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty than that attached
by law to the second offense or for two or more offenses to which it attaches a
lighter penalty. As already discussed, herein accused can be convicted only of
simple rape and the imposable penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua. Where the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant to the crime, such as in the
instant case.
The Decision of the trial court convicting the accused ELMEDIO CAJARA
alias Elming of Qualified Rape is MODIFIED to the effect that he is convicted
instead only of Simple Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
120 | P a g e
Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
122 | P a g e
123 | P a g e
Decision:
Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The
information alleges that both treachery and the use of explosive attended the
crime.
Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is
perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be
considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudencesupport
this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack,
reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense
instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio
Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement
or performed any act to assist him.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It
must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make
him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have
any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free.
Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship
with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they
performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. There being no conspiracy,
only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
124 | P a g e
Issue:
125 | P a g e
Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341
126 | P a g e
Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341
128 | P a g e
Facts:
Information was filed dated September 15, 1998 against appellant
charging him with murder for shooting Victoria Tacla at her left chest with the use
of a gun, thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of her untimely death.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as eyewitness Pilar Evangelista Tacla, the
appellants wife and the victims own mother as well as Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra,
Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), also testified.
On the witness stand, Pilar said that on July 9, 1998, at around 9 oclock
in the morning, she had a heated altercation with appellant.Appellant warned
Pilar that once they moved out, she could never set foot in her daughters house
again and he added in a threatening manner, with his eyes bulging that if Pilar
came back to Victorias house, he would beat her up.
However, when appellant presented, he declared that the shooting was
unintentional.
The court disbelieved appellants claim of accidental shooting whereby
convicting the appellant based on the evidence of the parties.Furthermore, the
court concluded that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the
crime.
.
Issue:
Whether or notthe killing was attended by abuse of superior strength to
qualify the crime as murder?
Decision:
Yes.The prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
129 | P a g e
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation
of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
In the present case, the victim was a woman with a smaller build. She was
unarmed. Appellant was a fifty-one-year-old male, in the prime of his life, and
armed with a deadly weapon. The killing indubitably constitutes an instance of
abuse of superior strength, hence the offense is qualified to murder, and not
merely homicide.Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
as alleged in the information, attended the fatal shooting of Victoria Tacla.
Sheryll Tablico
2008-0341
130 | P a g e
Facts:
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1990, appellant Francisco
Calpito armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to gain did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation on the
person of Florentina Villas rob, take and carry away a shoulder bag containing
cash in the amount of P15,000 and jewelries amounting to P30,000 belonging
to Florentina Villas.
The appellant attack and stab with the said weapon Florentina Villas and
Israel Montilla inflicting wounds on Florentina Villas which caused her death
and a wound on Israel Montilla which necessitated medical attendance on him
for a period of 5-7 days and which incapacitated him from performing his usual
work for the same length of time.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty and waived pre-trial. But
on June 15, 1993, appellant was re-arraigned and after being appraised of the
consequences of the nature of his offense, he changed his plea to one of guilty.
The
court a
quofinding
the
charge
of
Robbery
with
Homicide
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
Treachery
People v. Piedad (393 SCRA 488)
132 | P a g e
Facts:
On the night of April 10, 1996, victim Mateo Lactawan, and his friend
Andrew were drinking beer when he got involved in a fist fight with other people
drinking alcohol in the nearby store. That was when Luz, Mateos wife arrived in
the scene of the crime and saw that a group of men were attacking his husband.
Among the other aggressors who continuedly boxed Mateo whos already lying
on the ground, Luz saw Niel struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Lito
stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab
wound which eventually led to Mateos death. Niel Piedad claims that the attack
on the victim was made upon an impulse of the moment and was not the product
of deliberate intent; while Lito Garcia contends that treachery cannot be
appreciated inasmuch as the attack was preceded by a quarrel and heated
discussion.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance?
Held:
Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to
be appreciated, the prosecution must prove: a) that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
While it is true that the victim herein may have been warned of a possible danger
to his person, since the victim and his companion headed towards their
residence when they saw the group of accused-appellants coming back for them
after an earlier quarrel just minutes before, in treachery, what is decisive is that
133 | P a g e
the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim
to retaliate.
In the case at bar, Mateo did not have any chance of defending himself
from the concerted assault of his aggressors, even if he was forewarned of the
attack. Mateo was obviously overpowered and helpless when accusedappellants group numbering around eight, ganged up and mauled him. More
importantly, Mateo could not have actually anticipated the sudden landing of a
large concrete stone on his head. The stone was thus treacherously struck.
Neither could the victim have been aware that Lito came up beside him to stab
his back as persons were beating him from every direction. Litos act of stabbing
the victim with a knife, inflicting a 15-centimeter-deep wound shows deliberate
intent of using a particular means of attack. Considering the location of the
injuries sustained by the victim and the absence of defense wounds, Mateo
clearly had no chance to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, treachery was
correctly appreciated by the trial court.
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
134 | P a g e
murder. The two other accused, Yu and Caballes were acquitted for insufficiency
of evidence.
During the stage of appeal, Piliin argues that the prosecution failed to
establish the existence of treachery. According to him, the witness failed to see
the inception of the attack because she was in the act of opening the gate for her
husband when the latter was shot. She lacked knowledge of the attending
circumstances prior to the shooting incident. Hence, the trial courts finding of
treachery becomes speculative.
Issue:
Whether or not treachery must be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance?
Decision:
Yes. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in their execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defenses which the offended party might make. To
establish treachery, two elements must concur: (1) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed. The essence of
treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the
latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and
severity of the attack. Appellants wife witnessed the incident from its inception
up to its consummation.
In this case, the victim was about to park his car when appellant suddenly
appeared and shot him without any warning. The attack was so sudden that the
135 | P a g e
Eileen S. Tan
2007-0027
136 | P a g e
Amadeo, a witness declared that on the night of July 23, 1997 he and the
accused had a drinking spree in the latters house. Moments later, appellant and
his live-in partner Virginia had a heated argument. Accused Ilo kicked her several
times.Ilo rushed to the kitchen, got hold of an old frying pan and struck Virginia
with it. She fell on the floor. Amadeo tried to placate his friend but was rebuffed
anew. Ilo got hold of a stone used as tripod in cooking and smashed Virginias
head with it. Consequently Virginia died. Thereafter the trial court rendered a
decision finding the Ilo guilty of Murder. On appeal, Appellant argues that the
injuries inflicted by him on the victim were spur-of- the- moment reflexes during a
passionate lovers quarrel, spawned by jealousy. He avers that the prosecution
failed to prove that the killing of Virginia by the Ilo was the product of a
preconceived plan. He further contends that his actuations were triggered by the
provocation emanating from the victim herself. Hence, appellant contends that he
is guilty only of homicide and not of murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the
killing of the victim ?
Decision:
NO.Treachery is not presumed. The circumstances surrounding the
murder must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. To constitute treachery,
two conditions must be present, namely: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or to retaliate;
and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The
Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated if the assailant did not make any
preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it
impossible or difficult for the victim to defend herself. The prosecution must prove
that the killing was premeditated or that the assailant chose a method or mode of
attack directly and especially to facilitate and insure the killing without danger to
himself. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. There
is no treachery where the attack is neither sudden nor preconceived and
deliberately adopted but just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the
offender. To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the offender made
137 | P a g e
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of
the crime or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend
himself. The mode of attack must be planned by the offender and must not spring
from the unexpected turn of events.
results from a verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant such that
the victim was forewarned of the impending danger.
The prosecution failed to discharge its burden. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence as to the relative positions of appellant vis--vis the victim.
Taking into account the sequential continuity and rapidity of the events resulting
in the death of Virginia, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant made preparations to
kill Virginia and adopted a mode of attack as to make it impossible or difficult for
her to defend herself.
Ignominy
People v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 148712-15)
138 | P a g e
Facts:
On December 28, 1999, at 6:00PM, two armed men suddenly entered
Barnachea residence in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union. The two
ordered a 12-year old boy, Jessie E. Barnachea, to drop the floor by hitting him in
the back with the butt of a long gun. They hurriedly proceeded to the living room
and shot Jessies uncle, Victorino Lolarga, and continued shooting in the kitchen
hitting his mother Carmelita Barnachea, his brother Felix Barnachea, Jr., and his
cousin Rubenson Abance.
His eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea, who then was in his uncles
house, noticed a stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking "fruits and vegetables
dealer," and with the description of the "El Shaddai" parked in front of the fence
of their house. Also, the jeep did not go unnoticed by the neighbors, Russel
Tamba and Francisco Andrada.
The incident was immediately reported to the police and at around 7:45
p.m., the jeep was intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police
force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants. No firearms were
found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight appellants were thereafter brought to
the Aringay police station and then turned over to the Bauang police. Jessie was
able to identify two of the eight appellants by the name of Cachola and Amay as
the two assailants who entered the house. The next day a paraffin test was
conducted on the appellants.
The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and merciless killings.
Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on her head and three on her body;
Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on
his chest and arms; Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his
body, and with his penis excised;Rubenson, one gunshot wound on his head and
a stab wound that lacerated his liver.
RTC convicted all the eight appellants but the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) recommended the affirmance of the conviction for murder of
appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the other appellants for failure
of the prosecution to establish their identity and participation beyond reasonable
doubt.
139 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not excising of penis amounts to ignominy that can aggravate
the offense charged?
Decision:
NO. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be
committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus
adding to the victims moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when
his body or a part thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against
the accused.
In this case, the information states that Victorinos sexual organ was
severed after he was shot and there is no allegation that it was done to add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider
ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
SC sustained the conviction of Cachola and Amay but the rest of the six
appellants were acquitted for the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.
Melencio Imbat (father of the victim) to open the latters door. Melencio, an
octogenarian who was sleeping at that time, hurriedly opened the door as the
accused threatened to kill them if the door was not opened. The accused entered
and asked the old man to bring him upstairs where he and his 56-year old
unmarried daughter Gloria was sleeping. When they were in the room, the
accused got a spear at the side of Melencios bed and ordered the latter to lie in
a prone position as he headed the daughters bed. Gloria arose and screamed
for help but his old father was in no strength to help her and remained in a prone
position as told by the accused.
The accused approached Gloria and poked the spear at her. She recognized
him because he was lighting the room with a flashlight. The accused ordered her
to stand up and removed her pajama, with the panty going along with it. While
the accused was removing her clothes, she sat and struggled. The accused then
removed his short pants and became completely naked. He used the flashlight to
examine her genital. He placed the spear beside her and whenever she
attempted to move, he would point the spear at her. The accused then went on
top of her, inserted his penis into her pudenda, held her breasts and kissed her
until he became sated. The accused threatened the father and daughter that he
will kill them if they will report it to the authorities. Then he went to the door and
left after satisfying his lust.
Despite the threats, Gloria reported the incident to a Kagawad who handed a
note to be given to the authorities (security). The accused was immediately
arrested.
On October 1, 1996, Gloria submitted herself to a vaginal examination of Dr.
Quines, confirming a laceration of the hymen at 6:00 o'clock but no spermatozoa
were obtained. The laceration was about 3 to 5 days old at the time of the
examination.
On 8 October 1996, a complaint for rape was filed before the MCTC of
Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya, and found a prima facie case against
Bumidang. The records were forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
When it reached RTC, it rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of
rape with the use of a deadly weapon under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code
141 | P a g e
SC sustained RTCs decision finding Baliwang guilty of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
143 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of
rape, is attendant to justify the award of exemplary damages?
Decision:
144 | P a g e
YES. The RTC overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating
circumstance of ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It has been held that where the accused
in committing the rape used not only the missionary position i.e. male superior,
female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from behind, as
was proven in the case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the
commission thereof.
Still, SC respected RTCs finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in
the witnesses testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial
matters w/c have nothing to do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape
that is carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. Ergo, even if it was
pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a span of less than 30
mins, w/c does not conform to common experience, rape was still present from
the evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of
the female genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not
ejaculation, is what constitutes rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied
by many people at the time of the crime, rape was still committed because lust is
no respecter of time and place. And Estrellas and Gimenas decision not to flee
proves only the fear and intimidation that they were under because Siao was
after all their amo or employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they
did not succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly
weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the offended party moral damages, w/c is
automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof, in the amount of
PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of ignominy
justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment
affirmed w/ modification of damages awarded.
145 | P a g e
Facts:
Based on the accusatory portion of the Information filed against Rufino
Mallari, he was accused of hitting and bumping one Joseph Galang with an Isuzu
Canter Elf truck on or about July 7, 1996. The evidence for the prosecution
showed that the said incident was preceded by an altercation between Rufino
Mallari and Joseph Galang when the latter admonished the former not to drive
fast while passing by the latters house. To end the situation Joseph, together
with his brothers, who were also present at that time, asked for apology from
Rufino. However, the conflict did not end there because when dusk came and
while Joseph was watching basketball game with his wife, Rufino arrived with
some companions and attacked Joseph with bladed weapons. They chased him
and when Joseph was able to run away, Rufino pursued him with the use of the
Isuzu Canter Elf truck. When he caught up with him, he bumped him which
resulted in his instant death. The doctor who conducted the medico-legal
inspection of the cadaver testified that Josephs cause of death was crushing
injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident. The trial court found Rufino
liable with murder and sentenced with the penalty of death after considering the
qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle in committing the crime. The case
was brought to the Supreme Court pursuant to the requirement of automatic
review of cases penalized with death penalty based on Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code. Rufino argued that the use of a motor vehicle was only incidental,
considering that he resorted to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he
failed to catch up with the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle was
correctly appreciated by the trial court in imposing the death penalty?
Decision:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of
which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
146 | P a g e
of evident
premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not
proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the
prosecution.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence
of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the
penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
147 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
should be considered in this case?
Decision:
148 | P a g e
stopped but admitted having "stopped farther than the police mobile". SPO3
Catiil further testified that appellant did not surrender but only stopped his vehicle
when its right tire was already flat. His testimony was corroborated by PO3
Makiling who was patrolling the portion of Marcos Bridge. He testified that he saw
the vehicle being driven by accused-appellant already destroyed and the right
portion of the vehicle a little bit lower as it was running flat. Clearly, accusedappellant could have eluded arrest but his situation became futile when his
vehicle suffered a flat tire.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a
mitigating circumstance in the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be
imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime committed
by accused-appellant is the complex crime of murder with less serious physical
injuries. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex
crime shall be the maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The
crime was committed in 1992 where the penalty for the crime of murder, which is
the most serious crime, was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The death penalty being the
maximum period of the penalty for murder should be imposed for the complex
crime of murder with less serious physical injuries considering that under Article
63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance. And, consonant with the ruling in People vs. Muoz
that Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution did not change the period
of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals was
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
Cruelty
People v. Guerrero (389 SCRA 389)
Facts:
150 | P a g e
Orlando Guerrero, Jr., also known as Pablo, together with his father
Orlando Guerrero, Sr., nicknamed Dino, was accused of murder. The accuseds,
conspired, confederated and mutually helped one another, with deliberate intent
to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and without justifiable cause, attack, assault, club,
beheaded and cut off the penis of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, which caused his
death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his lawful heirs.
Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Orlando interposed selfdefense while his father, Dino, denied any complicity in the killing.
According to the the witness, Jacalne, he was informed that one Dino
Guerrero was inside the house nearby. Dino Guerrero came out with his hands
extended forward. SPO1 Emilio Taracatac immediately frisked and handcuffed
him. Before Dino was handcuffed, according to the witness, he said that it was
his son who had killed the victim. Thereafter, Dino was brought to the police
station for custodial investigation.
Further, Jacalne testified that appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr., was not at
the scene of the crime during their investigation. But upon their return to the
police station, appellant was already there.[11 Appellant admitted killing the
victim, according to Jacalne, by clubbing the victim first with the wooden stick,
and then cutting his head and his penis with a knife.
Another withness, Ireneo Acierto, appellants brother-in-law, testified that
while he was resting in his house at past 11:30 in the morning of July 7, 1997, he
heard someone screaming. When he looked out from his window, he saw that
the person screaming was his sister-in-law, Ana. He went out of the house and
went near the porch of the Guerreros, where he saw Ernesto Ocampos head
about to be severed by appellant. When the head was cut off, appellant placed
the same on the right side of the victims trunk. After that, appellant cut off
Ernestos penis. Ireneo noticed that while the head was being severed, the victim
was lying down on the floor, but not moving. Ireneo then told appellant, That is
enough, bayaw. Stop it. According to the witness, his wife Ana was also saying,
That is enough, Manong. Appellant angrily turned to Ireneo, telling him not to
interfere or else he might also be implicated. Ireneo hurriedly went away after
151 | P a g e
that. Ireneo did not see his father-in-law, Dino, at the time of the incident and did
not know where Dino was.
The trial court convicted Orlando Guerrero, Jr. of murder while his father
Dino was acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of cruelty and/or outraging and scoffing the corpse in order to
classify the killing as murder despite failure of the prosecution to allege the same
in the information
Decision:
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of (1) treachery and
(2) evident premeditation. It also states that there was cruelty in the perpetration
of the crime, where there was deliberate and inhuman suffering of the victim and
the offender had scoffed at the victims corpse.
On treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court found that the
evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the requirements of the law.[
we hold that in the present case, the trial court did not err when it found neither
treachery nor evident premeditation. However, the trial court found there was
cruelty as well as outraging or scoffing at the corpse, thus, qualifying the crime to
murder.
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
152 | P a g e
Katherine Yarte
2011-0296
153 | P a g e
Joseph Oseo
2006-0350
Facts:
Calonqui was found guilty for two counts of rape. On January 1, 1998
about 2 am in Tagbong, Camarines Sur, Calonqui was able to rape the 13 year
old girl Maricel in the latters house. On September 26, 1998 at about three in the
morning, the accused again raped the victim. Both rape incidents were witnessed
by the brother of Maricel.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and relationship
be appreciated against Calonqui and the latter circumstance as an alternative
circumstance?
Decision:
Calonqui and Maricel live under the same shelter as they are first cousins.
At the time of the incident, both are living in the same house and in the same
room. Therefore, the supposed aggravating circumstance of dwelling cannot be
appreciated as there was no trespass to the sanctity of the house of the victim on
the part of Calonqui, while the aggravating circumstance of relationship is
likewise cannot go against Calongui, even as an alternative circumstance, as
being first cousins is not within the concept contemplated in Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, his conviction is nonetheless affirmed.
Joseph Oseo
2006-0350
155 | P a g e
the
Alternative
Circumstance
of
relationship
considered as Aggravating.
Intoxication
People v. Marquita (G.R. No. 137050)
156 | P a g e
shall
be
Facts:
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo
was sitting on a bench outside her house. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa
came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed that
Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to
go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn was about to go upstairs, accused followed
her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried to help Edlyn, but
was overpowered by the accused. Junilla shouted for help and the accused run
away. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
On August 12, 1998, the provincial prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, an Information for murder against accused
George Cortes y Ortega. Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn and enter the
plea of guilty of the said crime. The prosecution presented evidence to prove the
presence of intoxication as aggravating circumstances. The accused on the other
hand presented evidence proving the alternative mitigating of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court rendered decision finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and sentence to suffer
the penalty of Death.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by the accused was aggravated by
reason of intoxication?
Decision:
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand,
when it is habitual or intentional, it is considered an aggravating circumstance. A
person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having
taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime,
sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the same time, that
person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the
alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
157 | P a g e
Ligas, Malolos, Bulacan. Anthony (damasos another son) joined the group. At
around 6:00 p.m., Mondigo, using a "jungle bolo," suddenly hacked Anthony on
the head, causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Appellant next attacked
Damaso. A witness who was in the vicinity, Lolita Lumagi, hearing shouts coming
from the scene of the crime, rushed to the area and there saw appellant
repeatedly hacking Damaso who was lying on his back, arms raised to ward off
appellants blows. Damaso later died from the injuries he sustained. Anthony
sustained wound on his left temporal area.Appellant was charged before the
RTC with Murder and Frustrated Murder. TheRTC found appellant guilty of
Murder for the killing of Damaso and Serious Physical Injuries for the hacking of
Anthony, mitigated by intoxication.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in giving credence of alternative circumstance
of intoxication to mitigate the crime?
Decision:
The trial court erred in crediting appellant with the circumstance of
intoxication as having mitigated his crimes because "the stabbing incident
ensued in the course of a drinking spree." For the alternative circumstance of
intoxication to be treated as a mitigating circumstance, the defense must show
that the intoxication is not habitual, not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony
and the accuseds drunkenness affected his mental faculties. Here, the only
proof on record on this matter is appellants testimony that before Damaso,
Anthony, and Delfin attacked him, he drank "about 3 to 4 bottles of beer." The
low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor appellant imbibed, and the
absence of any independent proof that appellants alcohol intake affected his
mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was intoxicated enough at
the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
Eugenios wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and
saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their compound, looking towards her and
her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened
its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil
as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed
the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards
the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.
When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering
his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his
waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his
eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards,
and the latter landing on top of her.
Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between the
parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine
who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that
Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na."
Issue:
Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as
principal by inducement?
Decision:
The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This
finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that
Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting:
"Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice were credible and
sufficed to prove Castors indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio.
Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as
Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.
While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be
considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun.
It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and
urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on
160 | P a g e
cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for
possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses.
As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castors
utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to
stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to
Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in
committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted
"Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil a crystal-clear
expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a
felony.
Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.Even if we pursue the
theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same.
Castors argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo
na cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he
cannot be considered a principal by inducement.
Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or
agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have
actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held
that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The
moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of
a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no
impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castors words were the
determining cause of the commission of the crime.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
161 | P a g e
The appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board
looking for Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the
opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo.
And when Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When
the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney
and drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged
them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts,
leaving the hapless Geronimo mortally wounded.
After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting
the appellant of murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for
attempting to kill Luis.
The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon had no motive to kill
Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were
not in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The appellant noted that according
to the testimony of the witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely
yelled to his companions who ganged up on Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo,
patayin ninyo na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!"
The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even
in accord as to where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant argues that
because of the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges.
Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the
witnesses testimony didnt confirm who chased and stabbed the victims?
Decision:
Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred
by Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the
jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the
determination of his liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of the
jeepney has been established.
162 | P a g e
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are,
in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs
radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. When a
conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his
chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them."
All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between
the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus,
criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he
did not actually stab the latter.
Alexander Santos
2006-0205
164 | P a g e
Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder for the
death of Rosemarie Tallada, with aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and sentenced to the extreme penalty
of death.
In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized
his participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemaries legs to
prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he
identified as Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement.
He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation
(DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could
spend the night. He offered his brothers house which was under his care. In the
evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the
house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City.
After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later
that evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had
ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with
each other and Pacot was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of
heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he
was going to be implicated just the same so he closed the door as ordered and
helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls."
The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless.
Pacot wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low
tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which
Pacot gave appellant P500.Pacot left the house at dawn the following day,
February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and
cast the dead body in cement.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is liable as a principal?
Decision:
165 | P a g e
The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor.
Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any
such disclaimer by appellant.
Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting
his involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. Assuming for
the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellants admission that
he participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries legs made him a
principal by direct participation.
Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are
considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present:
1.) they participated in the criminal resolution and 2.) they carried out their plan
and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the
same end.
Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to
have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the
time of the commission of the crime. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential
that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime,
it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective.
It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of
another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and
intention in the commission of the crime charged. Conspiracy need not be proved
by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the
same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after
the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other
pursuant to a common purpose or design.
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Accomplices
People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)
166 | P a g e
Facts:
An information for the murder of Roderick Ferol was filed against accusedappellant Restituto Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore, Francisco
Gregorio, and one John Doe. The Court found that the prosecution evidence has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Restituto Roche for
the crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the guilt of
accused Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could not
be arraigned.Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of
accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore, both accused were acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant should held liable for the killing of
Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy?
Decision:
No. In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see
Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol.Apart
from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no
other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated
in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show
community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that
accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick
Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accusedappellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes.
For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of
the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the
accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the
crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the
167 | P a g e
168 | P a g e
Mark Vergara
2008-0323
Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
Accessories
People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)
Facts:
172 | P a g e
On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila
Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca,
Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When
asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his
house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo
immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo
explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of
the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go
back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and
gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for
Hernan.
Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the
kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila
and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece
of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the
kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately
walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and
falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and
Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the
house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped
his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the
creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on
different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing the
victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called
Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other people,
he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told them.
On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of
Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied
killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed
Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also
fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.
However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become
final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently consciencestricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of
173 | P a g e
must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That,
precisely, is wanting in the present case.
In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his coaccused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying
the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise
indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his
conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not
incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from
assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril.
The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.
Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
175 | P a g e
In the evening of December 5, 1990, ten (10) armed robbers raided the
compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The
Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of the family-owned business,
were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia and two of
his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be
identified as they had flour sacks over their heads. The robbers carted away cash
and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They also blindfolded
and forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter
of the Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for
her release.Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the
afternoon of the next day at an arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was
released to her father.
Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they
reported the kidnapping to the Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan
District Command (Cebu Metrodiscom). The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security
Team (MIST) conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim identified one of the
suspects as Toto Garcia.
Toto Garcia was known as the leader of a group of armed robbers called
the Baong Gang. The gang's base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo,
Cebu. When the police learned that Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo,
Cebu City, they decided to interrogate him.
Upon Basingan's interrogation, he identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia
and Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two
(2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a
certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed
outside the Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as the chief plotter of the
crime at bar, and revealed that his neighbor and close family friends, the spouses
Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to
join the plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he
would be placed at gun point together with the other members of the Lim
household when the crime is committed. However, he refused to join the plot
during the December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the residence of the Cuis in
Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as godfathers
of each other's children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia,
Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis.
176 | P a g e
Jasmine Calaycay
2005-0049
178 | P a g e
John Kirvy
2008-0032
That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being
then appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor,
Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the municipality and authorized
to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use
and benefit of said municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the following
items with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making
delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused
Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from
complying with his aforesaid obligation and in spite of repeated demands, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence
and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use
and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the said
USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said sum of
$717,50 or P4,797.35. On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his
counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information on the following grounds:
1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense
charged or of the person of the defendant;
2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification.
In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the
subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which
Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under
a charge of malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had
been found guilty and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had
already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him.
On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the
motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows:
Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of
the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter
in its concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the case involving the subject
properties had already been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the
181 | P a g e
Military Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass upon
anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied)
Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to quash on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction but did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion
to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano can be held liable for estafa?
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent court gravely erred when it
ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with
the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military
Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and
in the case now before the SC the accused in one is different from the accused in
the other.
The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived
exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of
jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to
be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it
is provided that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction In all
criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more
than six months,or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.The offense
of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in
its
maximum
period
to prision
correccional in
its
minimum
period,
or
imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims
in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military
commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to take cognizance of
the subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of
182 | P a g e
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
Facts:
Gerardo Evina was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City (Branch 9) of two counts of simple rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
hands with a big handkerchief and poked a knife at her. This special aggravating
circumstance of the use of a weapon and the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling were both proven during the trial. However, these were not alleged in
the information.
Issue:
Whether or not the aggravating circumstances be considered in fixing the
penalty?
Decision:
The aggravating circumstances cannot be considered in fixing the penalty
because they were not alleged in the information as mandated by Rule 110,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the
crimes charged were committed before the effectivity of the said rule,
nevertheless, the same should be applied retroactively being favorable to the
appellant.
appreciated for the purpose of fixing a heavier penalty in this case, they should,
however, be considered as bases for the award of exemplary damages,
conformably to current jurisprudence.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
1866 which was the governing law at the time the crime was committed in 1991.
The two separate cases, Criminal Case No. 91-3487 (for homicide) and Criminal
Case No. 91-3483 (for illegal possession of firearm) were not tried jointly,
although filed in the same trial court. Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended
P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of
illegal possession and considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. R.A. 8294 took effect on July
6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was committed on May 5, 1991.
In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act 8294 to Presidential
Decree 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no
longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be rightfully convicted of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms separately from the crime of homicide under RA
8294 (amending PD 1866).
Decision:
No.
application except where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In
this case R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant Lazaro from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law
should be given retroactive application.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Lazaro should be spared from a separate
conviction for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of
the present review. Accused-appellant Lazaro was hereby acquitted of the said
crime and the case was dismissed.
Heide Olarte-Congson
2007-0316
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The crime was committed from December
6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila by Pacificador.
After his
186 | P a g e
Lorenzo Ballecer entered into a joint business venture with Arnold Sta.
Catalina involving importation of Jute sacks from China. Petitioner told that he
had a ready buyer in the Philippines which was willing to buy the jute sacks at
P12.25 per piece. Convinced, Ballecer ordered one container to Sta. Catalina.
Thereafter, Ballecer and Sta. Catalina proceeded to Citytrust Bank to open
a letter of credit. They were required to post a marginal deposit amounting to
P100, 000. The two went to United Coconut Planters Bank to encash a check.
After the encashment, they went back to Citytrust but arrived after banking hours.
Sta. Catalina suggested that the money be deposited in his account which
Ballecer agreed.
Few days after, while preparing the supporting documents for the letter of
credit, Ballacer found that there was an overpricing on the cost of the jute sacks.
Realizing that his business venture was losing proposition he asked Sta. Catalina
to return the P100, 000, however, the latter failed to return the money despite
repeated verbal and formal demands made by the former.
Sta. Catalina as defense alleged that there was no misappropriation of the
money. He further claimed that the said money was spent and used for the office
expenses, salaries and other expenses of the office which both of the occupy.
The trial court convicted Sta. Catalina for the crime of Estafa. Aggrieved,
he appealed the decision of the trial court before the Court of Appeals. However,
the public prosecutor filed a manifestation stating that Ballecer is no longer
interested in pursuing his complaint and the case should be decided based on
Ballecers Affidavit of Desistance. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
affirming the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Ballacer will justify
the dismissal of the action?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. In the
187 | P a g e
case at bar, Ballecer made the so-called pardon of Sta. Catalina after the
institution of the action, almost two years after the trial court had rendered its
decision.
The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when
executed as an afterthought. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who had given it
later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a
solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses.
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
operator of SJ Taxi. On July 14, 1992, the team of Flying Squad flagged down
one taxi owned by Armamento. They impounded the taxi on the ground that its
meter was defective, however, upon inspection and testing by the LTO the
results showed that the meter was functioning normally.
Feeling aggrieved, Armamento filed a complaint for Bribery and violation
of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. He alleged that
prior to the impounding of his taxi, the four LTO officers had been collecting
protection money from him in exchange of non-apprehension and nonimpounding of his vehicles.
Eventually, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
nine (9) Information for violation of Direct Bribery and Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. During the pendency of the action, accused De Jesus died. The
cases against him were dismissed but the hearing proceeded against
Balderama, Nagal and Lubrica.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, convicting Balderama, Nagal
and Lubrica for the above violation. They filed a motion for reconsideration but
were denied by the former. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Armamentos affidavit of recantation will result to the
dismissal of the complaint?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that the complaint shall not be dismissed. A
recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation.
The court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after
conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention.
189 | P a g e
The rationale for the rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can easily be
secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which
when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.
In this case, there is indubitably nothing in the affidavit which creates doubts on
the guilt of the accused Balderama and Nagal.
Ozelle Dedicatoria
2006-0406
one count of attempted rape. Maricar alleged that she was only 10 years old
when her father Edgardo started sexually abusing her. It was only on November
of 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother. The last sexual
assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996.
Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame upon the advised of a
relative. The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the
complainant and found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations
and was in a non-virgin state.
On the other hand, the accused denied such accusations. He contended
that he could not have raped Maricar because he was always in the office. He
claimed that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter because there were
other people in the house. He further argued that had he raped Maricar, then she
would have not accompanied him to the Paranaque Police Station to apply for
police clearance.
The trial court rendered its Decision, convicting Edgardo of the crime of
Rape. Aggrieved, he appealed his case before the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the Affidavit of
Desistance by Maricar is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint against
Edgardo?
Decision:
The Supreme Court held that by itself, an Affidavit of Desistance is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court.
A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the
191 | P a g e
rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must
therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.
The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when
executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the
fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of
having the accused arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts and recounting her anguish in detail, will
suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the
case.
In the case at bar, Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open
court by stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and
had shown her resolve to continue with the prosecution of the cases.
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
192 | P a g e
Facts:
On September 23, 1994, 13-year-old Maricel B. Talisay, together with her
minor brothers Jun and Joey slept side-by-side at their store. Their parents were
caretakers of a beach house and needed to sleep there at that time. At 3:00 in
the morning, a ticklish sensation and stabs of pain in her vagina awakened
Maricel. When she woke up, she saw the accused, Noli Novio, naked on top of
her. Her duster was rolled up to her neck and her panty has already been
removed by the accused. Noel Novio was able to penetrate his penis inside
Maricels Vagina.
Meanwhile, Maricels parents were awakened by their neighbor and
reported to them that a man was inside their store. Nenita, Maricels mother
immediately got hold of her bolo and flashlight and proceeded to their store.
Nenita saw a mans sandals at the doorstep. Nenita knocked and called out to
Maricel and ordered her to open the door. Despite repeated demands to open
the door, Maricel was not able to do so. Nenita was able to forcibly open the
door and beamed the flashlight to Maricel and saw Noel Novio on top of her. The
accused was holding the hands of Maricel with his left hand and covered her
mouth with his right hand. Nenita mounted to hack Novio with her bolo but the
accused immediately took his jogging pants and ran away leaving his shirt,
wallet, underwear and sandals.
barangay and went to the police for investigation. Maricel submitted herself to
medical examination right after the incident.
Noli Novio denied the allegations and argued that Maricel and him are
sweethearts. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of rape and sentenced him to 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the victim the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost of these
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the proper penalty
for the crime of rape?
Decision:
193 | P a g e
No, the Supreme Court held that the penalty imposed by the trial court is
void. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, the prescribed penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. However, the
trial court sentenced the appellant to thirty years of reclusion perpetua. The
penalty imposed by the trial court is void.Although under Article 27 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic 7659, reclusion perpetua has a range of
twenty years and one day to forty years, by nature, the penalty remains a single
and indivisible penalty. It cannot be divided into periods or equal portions. If the
law prescribes reclusion perpetua as a single and indivisible penalty for a felony,
the trial court is mandated to impose said penalty, absent any privileged
mitigating circumstances conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court is not authorized to vary the penalty provided for by law either in
the character or the extent of punishment inflicted.
There was no need for the trial court to specify the duration of thirty years
of reclusion perpetua whenever it is imposed as a penalty in any proper case.
The Court is not impervious to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which
pertinently provides that, in applying the so-called three-fold rule, i.e., that
(w)hen the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, . . . the maximum duration
of the convicts sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him the
duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty
years. The imputation of a thirty-year duration to reclusion perpetua in Article 70
is, as this Court recently held, only to serve as the basis for determining the
convicts eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the
service of multiple penalties.
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
194 | P a g e
Sergio Pelicano, Sr., on direct examination, testified that on June 23, 1993
at about 12:30 in the morning while waiting for his son, he heard a commotion
outside his house. When he looked outside, he saw Christopher Sacay, son of
his long-time friend, being chased by Sammy Zacarias, Rodel Zacarias, Wally
Ticalo and Rene Matugas. The boy ran towards the Seventh Day Adventist
Church. Pelicano followed the group and when he was only about 10 meters
away from the four men, he saw Rodel Zacarias hold the victim while the rest
took turns in stabbing and hacking the boy.However, Ticalo claimed that on the
day of the said incident, he was working in the farm and had a drinking spree
with the owner of the farm until 10:00 in the evening. The owner of the farm even
contended that the town where his farm was was far distant from the town where
the stabbing incident took place. The trial court sentenced Ticalo to serve the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for the death of Christopher Sacay
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding Ticalo guilty of the
crime charged?
Decision:
No, the Supreme Court is not convinced with the contention of Ticalo,
however, a word, in passing, about the manner the trial court imposed the
penalty. In the scales of penalties under the Revised Penal Code, reclusion
perpetua is the penalty immediately higher than reclusion temporal which has a
duration of twelve years and one day to twenty years. The minimum range of
reclusion perpetua should then, by necessary implication, start at 20 years and 1
day while the maximum thereunder could be co-extensive with the rest of the
natural life of the offender. Article 70, however, provides that the maximum
period in regard to the service of sentence shall not exceed 40 years. Reclusion
perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty and, when it is the prescribed
penalty, should be imposed in its entirety, i.e., reclusion perpetuasans a fixed
period for its duration, regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
that may have attended the commission of the crime. In prescribing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua,its duration in years, in fine, need not be specified.
Maria Garalde
2008-0326
On May 23, 1993, at 7:30 in the evening in Bgy. San Jose, Ormoc City,
Montano Banez, while strolling in the plaza, saw the victim Jonathan Jojo
Alkuino. Since Jojo was a former resident of the barangay, Banez invited him to
have a drinking spree in the nearby store. The two sat side-by-side and were
exchanging stories when Pedro Ramirez suddenly came up to them. Ramirez hit
Jojo on the right side of his body just below his ribs. Jojo was immediately
brought to the hospital and was still alive on arrival but died the next day due to
hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss. The trial court found Ramirez guilty of
murder and sentencing him to "suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion
perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court was correct in specifying the length of
imprisonment in the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua?
Decision:
No, the Supreme Court held that in sentencing appellant "to suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua." There was no justification or
need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental principle
was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit, "Since reclusion perpetua is an
indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is
imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal
Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to
suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years,
unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be
considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal
Code)."
Christine Perez
2006-0104
196 | P a g e
197 | P a g e
Decision:
The trial court, erred in convicting accused-appellant of the "complex
crime of double murder" and separate offenses of serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
The instant case does not fall under any of the two mentioned instances
when a complex crime is committed. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose
Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a
single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. "Where the death of two
persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."
Thus, accused-appellant is liable, not for a complex crime of double
murder, but for two separate counts of murder, and separate counts of physical
injuries.
198 | P a g e
Christine Perez
2006-0104
199 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not there should be one information, either for the complex
crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with
multiple homicide and frustrated homicide or should the five indictments remain
as they are?
Decision:
Four separate crimes of murder and a frustrated murder result from the
firing of several shots at five victims. The crimes are not complex. Five
information should be filed. There is a complex crime where one shot from a gun
results in the death of two or more persons, or where one stabbed another and
the weapon pierced the latters body and wounded another, or where a person
plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a
number of persons are killed. When various victicms expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
200 | P a g e
Christine Perez
2006-0104
and
without
warning
unleashed
volley
of
shots
at
the
201 | P a g e
The trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused and
convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder,
and sentenced them to death.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of complex crime of murder
and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon then the supreme penalty of
death?
Decision:
The Supreme Court fully agreed with the lower court that the instant case
comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking
of complex crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in
its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are
actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well
as in the conscience of the offender.
Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in
firing separate shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover,
there is no evidence that accused-appellants intended to fire at each and every
one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the contrary, the
evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as
a whole. Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in frustration after the
ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in
pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense.
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Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
Delito Continuado
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 169727-28)
Facts:
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen. Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past
AFP-RSBS President, who had signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering
the acquisition of certain parcels of land, Ombudsman Investigators Ricardo
Sullano, Rodil Buenaventura and Anatolio Alejandrino of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military conducted a fact-finding investigation. They
executed a Joint Affidavit-Complaint, stating that based on their findings, the
following may be charged with falsification of public documents and violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019: petitioner B/Gen. Jose
Ramiscal, Jr., former AFP-RSBS president; Atty. Meinrado Enrique Bello, Head
of the AFP-RSBS Legal Department in charge of Land Acquisition; Capt.
Perfecto Enrique Quilicot, AFP-RSBS Project Officer, Tanauan, Batangas, Land
Acquisition; and Notaries Public Alfredo Nasser and Manuel Satuito.
The matter was further looked into by a panel of Ombudsman
Investigators, which issued on March 30, 2001 a Joint Resolution finding
probable cause to file the corresponding Informations for 148 counts of violation
of Article 315, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
and Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Meinrado Bello and Atty. Manuel
Satuito. However, it was likewise recommended that the complaint against
petitioner be dismissed, without prejudice to a thorough fact-finding investigation
on his liability.
After conducting clarificatory hearings, the investigating panel issued a
Memorandum, recommending to the Ombudsman that petitioner be charged with
148 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents, and one count
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the
recommendation of the Panel of Prosecutors. Petitioner and his co-accused filed
their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the investigating panels June 15,
2004 Memorandum.The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It likewise denied the
203 | P a g e
motion for the consolidation of the cases, considering that the other cases filed
were pending in its other divisions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution which was
denied again by the Sandiganbayan. Motion to Quash was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not only one information for estafa should be filed for all these
cases?
Held:
The petition has no merit.The Sandiganbayan, for its part, sustained the
contention of respondents and ruled that the determination of (a) the charge/s
and the person/s against whom the charge is filed are addressed to the sound
discretion of the Prosecutors based on the facts before them; and (b) the crimes
committed by petitioner are separate, and not a single crime consisting of series
of acts arising from a single criminal resolution.
When required to comment on the motion of petitioner and his coaccused for a consolidation of the charges filed against them before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Prosecutor objected thereto, insisting that there
were as many crimes committed by the accused as there were sales contracts
forged by them.
Indeed, the determination of what charges to file and who are to be
charged are matters addressed to the discretion of the Ombudsman, including
the matter of whether the crime perpetrated by petitioner and his co-accused
under the Informations pending in the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan constitute
delito continuado or classified as concurso de delitos; orinvolve separate crimes
under the category of concurso real delito involve factual issues. Such factual
issues should be resolved after trial on the merits, and not in this case. The Court
is being tasked to determine whether the several sales contracts executed by
petitioner and his co-accused were set afoot or triggered by a single impulse and
operated by an uninterrupted force however long a time it may occupy, which,
however, is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court, in this case,
the Sandiganbayan.
204 | P a g e
Bernadette Remalla
2007-0392
The Court find that, technically, there was only one crime that was
committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information
to be file against her.The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as
delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous
crime."
The original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act - that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not
qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also
averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law
-
Executive
Order
No.
324
dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the
Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the
original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original
information each amended information states the name of the individual whose
stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on
the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of
the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public prosecutors
manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government
suffered a single harm or injury.
The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11,
1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the
32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one
information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No.
16698.
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Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
Habitual Delinquency
People v. Espina (G.R. No. 43556)
Facts:
The appellant was charged in the lower court with the crime of theft of
articles valued at P 585.15 and, having pleaded guilty, was sentenced to six
months and one day of prision correccional and, being a habitual delinquent, to
an additional penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional. The appellant is a recidivist and plead guilty to the crime of theft. He
is also a habitual delinquent, this being his third conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not recidivism, as inherent in habitual delinquency, should still
be taken into consideration in fixing the principal penalty?
Decision:
Yes, recidivism should still be taken into consideration in fixing the
principal penalty even though it is inherent in habitual delinquency. The appellant
in this case is a habitual delinquent, this being his third conviction. Recidivism,
although inherent in habitual delinquency, should still be considered in fixing the
principal penalty. There is no doubt that the purpose of the law in imposing
additional penalty on a habitual delinquent is to punish him more severely.
However, the result would be otherwise if, for imposing the additional penalty,
recidivism could not be considered as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the
principal penalty. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty is present. If the aggravating circumstance of recidivism is not to be
taken into consideration for imposing the additional penalty for habitual
delinquency, the mitigating circumstance would require that the penalty
prescribed by law be imposed in it minimum period. The imposition of the
additional penalty would make the penalty lighter, instead of more severe,
contrary to the purpose of the law.
207 | P a g e
Michelle Ricaza
2008-0040
As to the principal penalty, there is the rule that in cases in which the
penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the courts must take into
consideration, in the application of said penalty, the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances established at the trial if they do not appear to be compensated by
other circumstance. It is reiterated in People vs. Melendrez that the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, even in cases of habitual delinquency, should be
taken into consideration in the application of the principal penalty in the
corresponding period.
The proposition that if recidivism is considered an inherent or qualifying
circumstance of habitual delinquency it should not be taken into account in the
imposition of the principal penalty, seems to be untenable because it is based
upon the erroneous assumption that habitual delinquency is a crime. It is simply
a fact or circumstance which, if present in a given case, gives rise to the
imposition of the additional penalties prescribed therein.
As to the additional penalty, if we must rely upon the spirit and letter of the
law, we would say that the purpose of the latter in establishing it was to prevent
those for the second time or more commit the crimes from relapsing thereafter at
least during the period fixed thereby. The lower court correctly ruled in imposing
the additional penalty.
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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
211 | P a g e
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action
for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against
the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case,
conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
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Ranvylle Albano
2008-0052
Prescription of Offenses
Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)
Facts:
Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton
(petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of
them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation.Panaguiton
made demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24,
1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutors Office.
Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were
allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding
that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state prosecutor
directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.Tongson moved for
reconsideration but denied.
In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has
prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of
statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the
complaint on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law
refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolled
the prescriptive period?
Decision:
Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolls the prescriptive
period for violations of BP22.When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary
investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the
executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is
214 | P a g e
that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process).
However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to
the function of the executive department.
Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either
executive or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of
investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription.
To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case,
various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who
do not sleep on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of
circumstances beyond their control.
215 | P a g e
Three
216 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the
information was filed?
Decision:
No. Prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be
invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash
the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise
the same anytime thereafter including during appeal.
Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed.
The
petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already
prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable
therefore, which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos.
Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional penalty in the
same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty
and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that
the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive
period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period
necessarily started at the time the crime was committed.
This is inaccurate.
Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents.
217 | P a g e
total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the
second Information was filed in court.
Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code,
the crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual
-the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presently charged - prescribes in ten
(10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further:
Theperiod of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the
crime is discovered by theoffended party, the authorities, or their agents,
andshall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint orinformation, andshall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted,or are justifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
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Alvin Ocampo
2011-0386
Amnesty
People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)
Facts:
On August 16, 1990, an Information for murder was filed
against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka
Jessie," et al., for killing Alfredo Arevalo.
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with
Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer
Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665
and 2672, respectively.
On January 20, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision
convicting the herein accused-appellant.
Thus, Accused-Appellant filed his appeal. However, while his
appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation
No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994,
entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other
Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public
Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends,
and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by
the National Amnesty Board.
After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of
the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities
were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It, thus,
recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for
amnesty.
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Renato Segubinese
2006-0040
Thus,
on
October
6,
1977,
[petitioner]
deposited
all
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Decision:
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an
offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2)
as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves
the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to
be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime). What gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether
done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil
liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under
the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not
necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal
prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil
liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from
civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit
the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused
may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act
complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense
charged.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not
criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from
or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to
respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been
fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate
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court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges
against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from
petitioner on a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest
payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent]
with an exorbitant rate of interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash
payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
[petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her
employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash
payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had
already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of
July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized
that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total
payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which
is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed
from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove
that there was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on
her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished
long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for
account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the
pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by
[respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence
of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.
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Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
During trial, the father of So and the mother of Castro were both called on to
testify as to the earning capacity of the two. Sos father claimed that his son was
earning P80,000 a month while Castros mother said that his son was bringing in
P8,000 a month. Sos father additionally testified that the funeral expenses
incurred by them was P87,000 while Castros mom stated that they spent
P30,000 for the funeral.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
The court based the amount of loss of earning capacity based on the
formula used by the Supreme Court as illustrated:
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As to the civil liability, particularly the indemnity for the loss of the earning
capacity of the victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme Court is:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living
expenses annual (50% of
gross annual
income)
Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was earning P80,000 a month at the
time of his death when he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity
should be computed as follows:
x = 2 (80 30) x [P960,000.00 P480,000.00)
3
x = 33.4 x P480,000.00
x=
x P16,032,000.00
With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was earning P8,000.00 a month
when he died at the age of twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were:
x = 2 (80 26)
[P96,000.00 P48,000.00]
3
x = 36 x P48,000.00
x = P1,728,000.00
As a result, petitioner appeals to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court regarding the damages, Consequently, the CA declared
that Vallacar Transit Inc., should not yet be held subsidiary liable for the liability
of the petitioner as its driver. Thus, this petition for review with the SC.
Issue:
Was the award of damages amounting to P8 million proper?
Decision:
The SC modifies the award of damages mostly to the fact that loss of
earning capacity should be properly adduced and supported by competent
evidence to prove the same. This rule also applies to the funeral and burial
expenses. In the case at bar, the lower courts based their award for damages
solely on the testimony of SOs father and Castros mother, even though both of
them never substantiated the amounts claimed with receipts, papers and other
evidence. And so the award is modified as follows:
To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the following:
P 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto
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enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against Vallacar
Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.
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Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
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Eddie Tamondong
2009-0178
2)
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intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if
the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear
and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence,
there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period.
The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the
terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to
probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment
for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated
capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit.
Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but
taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should
have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified
after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was
ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability.
Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost
his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies.
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By
perfecting
their
appeal,
petitioners ipso
facto relinquished
the
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to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of
an application for probation.
Maria Criselda Fojas
2010-0226
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Macario Linghon testified that he sold the jewelry to petitioner. Although the wellentrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be
credible and reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be
dubious; hence, barren of probative weight. The Court further held It bears
stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge
that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and
circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have
known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two
basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b)
to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since
the penalty depends on the value of the property.
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propellers
and
brass
screws.
Manuelito
Mendez
asked
for
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4)
there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The
Supreme Court stated that there was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of
anothers property. The theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did
not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She
sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole
certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to
petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus
delicti.The Court held that accused Tan could not be held guilty because there
was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very
stolen articles were the ones sold to him.
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