1. Ilusorio vs.

Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club. In 1942, he married Erlinda Kalaw. They lived together for
a period of thirty (30) years until they separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in
Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about
five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, alleged that
during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg
Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor. As a consequence, Potencianos
health deteriorated.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that respondents Sylvia and
Bildner refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. The CA allowed visitation rights to
Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
their conjugal dwelling?
Held: No. a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify
the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be
the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his
right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to
visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best
left to the man and womans free choice.

2. Arroyo v Vasquez (1921)

FACTS:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They
lived together with a few shortintervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores
went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her
husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of
their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate
maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also
other fees
Plaintiff
then
asked
for
a
restitution
of conjugal rights,
and
a
permanent
mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with
him as his wife.
ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or
permanent mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff
to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy
towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be
necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the
domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good
husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes (Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the
case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as
England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without
sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

3. Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that
respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.
Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and
valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and
deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in
favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation
or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill
the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at
his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced
to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

4. Pelayo vs. Lauron

12 Phil 453
FACTS:
Petitioner Pelayo, a physician, rendered a medical assistance during the child
delivery of the daughter-in-law of the defendants. The just and equitable value of services
rendered by him was P500.00 which the defendants refused to pay without alleging any
good reason. With this, the plaintiff prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as
against the defendants for the sum of P500.00 and costs.

The defendants denied all of the allegation of the plaintiff, contending that their
daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the child-birth, and that when she was alive, she
lived with her husband independently and in a separate house, that on the day she gave
birth she was in the house of the defendants and her stay there was accidental and due to
fortuitous circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are obliged to pay the petitioner for the medical
assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law.
HELD:
According to Article 1089 of the Old Civil Code (now 1157), obligations are created
by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, by illicit acts and omissions or by those which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the Code or in special law, etc., are the only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the
mutual obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support as provided by
the law or the Code. Consequently, the obligation to pay the plaintiff for the medical
assistance rendered to the defendants daughter-in-law must be couched on the husband.
In the case at bar, the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable
services of a physician at such critical moments is especially established by the law and the
compliance therewith is unavoidable.

5. RELUCIO VS LOPEZ (legal wife)

FACTS:
1. Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC., against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio.
2. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who
is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate
children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the
conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total
exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after
abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner
since 1976. 3. A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground
that private respondent has no cause of action against her. 4. Respondent Judge denying
petitioner Relucios Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or
indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and
defendant Lopez, or solely in her name. 5. MR denied. CA likewise denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for
a complete adjudication of the controversy.
HELD: NO The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administrator of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. The
administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of
all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her
first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between
petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. The second cause of
action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The accounting of conjugal partnership
arises from or is an incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage
between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner
on this ground. The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez share
in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the
co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The respondent also sought support.
Support cannot be compelled from a stranger. Finally, as to the moral damages,
respondents claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. If petitioner

is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is
one without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Petitioners participation
in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a
judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with
respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez
conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez share in property coowned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable
against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party
if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her petition in the lower court,
respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for
his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and
her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal
partnership or absolute community property with respondent. WHEREFORE, the Court
GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court
DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as
against petitioner.
6. THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents
from the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After
some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of
payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with
assurance from him that he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on
surprised when she was informed that respondent spouses were backing out of the
agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's
written consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to
sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent
Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been
aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not
sufficient to demonstrate consent.

7. AYALA INVESTMENTS vs. CA

G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed
security agreements on December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly
and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
Alfredo Ching. The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly pay
AIDC the principal amount of P50, 300,000.00 with interests.

Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on three of
their conjugal properties. Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership
levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

The auction sale took place, being the only bidder, AIDC was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo, which was registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption
period, issued the final deed of sale which was registered on August 9, 1983.

ISSUES:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband
alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are chargeable
against the conjugal partnership?

HELD:
Article 122 of the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession, by
which he contributes to the support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and
private debts.

If the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot be categorized as
falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor (Corporate Debt
of PBC) and not for the surety or his family. Therefore, the spouses Chings conjugal
properties cannot be executed in favor of AIDC.

8. Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of
June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US.
On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the
State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September
13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him
in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on
August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and
damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escao are undeserving of an
award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up
proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband
Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory
cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is
no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of
affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while
alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was
issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escao may be given to Tenchavez on the
grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion
of her husband.
Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law,
under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal
separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent
violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC.
Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them
to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our
law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings
in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for
which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal
separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages
attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded
to individual liberty
in
civil
cases.
Thus,
a consort who
unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the
Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is
no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other
obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred
under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".

9. MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES

38 SCRA 284

FACTS:
In 1956, Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, Petronila
Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of
donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.

Cornelia Matabuena, being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased,
filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon.

The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made
at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil
Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.

HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result
in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

10.Ching vs Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006

Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they acquire a
certain property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor
of his common-law-wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his children with Epifania
discovered the sale. They thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for
recovery of property and damages against Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of
sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in favor of their father Goyanko.

Issue: Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?

Held:
No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law
relationships.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or
purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and
inexistent from the very beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce
no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other
subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are
prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed
during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in
civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over
the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family
law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union.

As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife, it
was null and void. (Ching vs Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006 citing
Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun, G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984)
11.VILLANUEVA V. CHIONG
FACTS:
Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been
separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated
at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)2325,3 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985,
Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners forP8,000, payable in
installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy 4 the lot and build a store, a

shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13,
1986,5 petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor.
Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of
respondents?
(2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?
RULING:
(1) That the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his
wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit.
Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced
Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature. All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners' mere insistence as to the lot's
supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against
all the evidence for respondents.
(2)The sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void. We held that
without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely
voidableArticles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the effect of annulment of the
contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as legally and
equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract was entered into. Strictly
applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to respondents the land
with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return to petitioners the sum ofP8,000, which
he received as the price of the land, together with interest thereon.On the matter of fruits
and interests, we take into consideration that petitioners have been using the land and have
derived benefit from it just as respondent Florentino has used the price of the land in the
sum of P8,000. Hence, if, as ordered by the lower court, Florentino is to pay a reasonable
amount or legal interest for the use of the money then petitioners should also be required to
pay a reasonable amount for the use of the land. Under the particular circumstances of this
case, however, it would be equitable to consider the two amounts as offsetting each other.

12.JOAQUINO v. REYES 434 SCRA 260

FACTS: Respondent Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes. Reyes had illicit relations with
petitioner Joaquino. A property in BF Homes Paranaque was executed in favor of Joaquino.
Joaquino had no means to pay for this property. The funds used to purchase this property
were earnings of Reyes from his position as corporate executive and from a loan secured
from
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation. Joaquino and Reyes had 3 illegitimate children.
HELD:
Article 148 is the property regime that will apply in case where the partners have a legal
impediment to marry each other. In this property regime, only the
property acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. The registration of a property in the name of the paramour who had no
income whatsoever at the time of the donation by a
husband is tantamount to a donation which is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The
paramour then holds the property under a constructive trust
under Article 1456 in favor of the conjugal partnership of the husband with the legitimate
spouse. Status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate
could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action such as in a case for recovery of property.

13.FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA vs. ROBERTO PRADO, ET. AL.

[G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO
FACTS:
The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential
Quezon City and covered by TCT No. 71344 issued in the name of Narcisa Prado and her
children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria,
Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein. After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa
married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband,
Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed an Agreement of Purchase
and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the
property for the sum of P10,500. A Deed of Absolute Sale was subsequently executed by the
parties.
In 1976, Tomas' daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex with
firewall on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the
southern half portion of the land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora paid the
corresponding taxes on the property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas' cousin,
built a small house on the northern portion of the property.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners
Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the RTC.
Respondents alleged that the transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale
between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa's children
tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which
their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could
not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering that she was prohibited
from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the
condition annotated at the back of the title; that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children,
had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children
co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by
Tomas.
In their answer, petitioners countered among others, that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the
property, consisting of as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and
1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband; and that the consideration of the
sale in the amount of P10,500 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968.
On April 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid;
that the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed;
and that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there
being no demand for the payment of the remaining balance. The CA affirmed the RTCs
decision with the modification the sale in dispute is declared valid only with respect to the
one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-Narcisa Prado in the subject property. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
a. Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal?
b. Was the transaction a sale or a mortgage?
c. How should the property be divided among the heirs of Patricio Prado, Sr.?
HELD:
a. CONJUGAL. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time
the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought
the subject property from People's Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds, she,
however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale
that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr.
b. SALE. Public or notarial documents may be presented in evidence without further
proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a
public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and not
of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents also failed to
controvert the presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular.

Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing
spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey duplex
and her house sometime in 1976. While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was
never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of
petitioners of the northern half portion of the property.
c. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in
the conjugal partnership. Patricio's rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his
death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as
that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of
co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heir in relation to the property. The
remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on
intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh
(1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's
conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half () thereof as her conjugal
share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey
her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are
deemed co-owners of the subject property.
Conjugal property; Alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and
not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned if
the latters consent was not secured

14.SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
[G.R. No. 111547. January 27, 1997]

FACTS:
A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia.
Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a
case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the
case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are
the respondents here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo
Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that
they own 9/10 of the land. The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence
Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her
husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina
owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties appealed. The CA modified the judgment.
The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held
that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.

ISSUES: (1) Is the property exclusive or conjugal?

(2) Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan?

HELD:

(1) Property is the exclusive share of the deceased Santiago

(2) 10% and 90%, respectively. SC affirms CA. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Here,
Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage.
Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The
TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property. Acquisition of property
and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot.
Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of
Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.

15.TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and CONCHITA

EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F. MARILLA and
Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO
FRANCISCO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998]

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse respondent appellate courts
decision[1] promulgated on October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court which ruled,[2]thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the administrator of the properties described
in paragraph eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his
second marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio
Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal,
and; (2) a house and lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that
these properties were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of
tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer
them. Petitioner also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to

sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said
general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to
be declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. In due course, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to
adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal
partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court ruled that
those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer
them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 160 AND 158, UNDER TITLE VI
OF THE (NEW) CIVIL CODE BECAUSE SAID TITLE, TOGETHER WITH THE OTHERS,
HAVE (SIC) ALREADY BEEN REPEALED BY ARTICLE 253 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
RESPONDENT COURT FURTHER ERRED IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 124 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.[3]
But in her reply, petitioner posed the sole issue whether or not Article 116 of the Family
Code applies to this case because Article 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals
Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code.[4]
To our mind, the crucial issue in this petition is whether or not the appellate court
committed reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that the properties, subject
matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties of Eusebio exclusively.
Indeed, Articles 158[5] and 160[6] of the New Civil Code have been repealed by the Family
Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. The aforecited articles fall
under Title VI, Book I of the New Civil Code which was expressly repealed by Article
254[7] (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the Family Code.
Nonetheless, we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights
pursuant to Article 256[8] in relation to Article 105 [9] (second paragraph) of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate
to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said
provisions were in force.[10] Hence, the rights accrued and vested while the cited articles
were in effect survive their repeal.[11] We shall therefore resolve the issue of the nature of the
contested properties based on the provisions of the New Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer
these on account of the incapacity of her husband. On the other hand, private respondents
maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by petitioner as conjugal are capital
properties of Eusebio exclusively as these were acquired by the latter either through
inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage.Moreover, they stress that
Eusebio is not incapacitated contrary to petitioners allegation.
We find petitioners contention lacks merit, as hereafter elucidated.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove

that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. [12] Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. [13] The party who asserts this presumption
must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to
when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. [14] Moreover, this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be
a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.[15]
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties
which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
With respect to the land at Col. Cruz St., Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, petitioner failed to
refute the testimony of Eusebio that he inherited the same from his parents. Interestingly,
petitioner even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the
concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his second marriage
is inconsequential. The property should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of
law, pursuant to Article 148[16] of the New Civil Code.
Essentially, property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to
the marriage, is considered his or her separate property. [17] Acquisitions by lucrative title
refers to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during
the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. [18] Hence, even if it be assumed
that Eusebios acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage,
the land would still be his exclusive property because it was acquired by him, during the
marriage, by lucrative title.[19]
As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store, private respondents aver that these
properties were either constructed or established by their father during his first marriage. On
the other hand, petitioner insists that the said assets belong to conjugal partnership. In
support of her claim, petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the
apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the
business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone.
It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no way prove that the
improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that one is the
applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is
conjugal or not. As the appellate court aptly noted:
x x x. And the mere fact that plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] is the licensee of
the sari-sari store (Exhibit F-3; Exhibit G, pp. 44-47, Record) or is the supposed
applicant for a building permit does not establish that these improvements were
acquired during her marriage with Eusebio Francisco, especially so when her
exhibits (D-1, E, E-1, T, T-1, T-2, U, U-1 and U-2; pp. 38-40; 285-290, Record; TSN,
January 17, 1989, page 6-7) are diametrically opposed to her pretense as they all
described Eusebio Francisco as the owner of the structures (Article 1431, New Civil
Code; Section 4, Rule 129, Revised Rules on Evidence).
Neither is it plausible to argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of
Eusebio Francisco has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the
proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (second
paragraph, Article 158, New Civil Code). Normally, this absence of evidence on the
source of funding will call for the application of the presumption under Article 160 of
the New Civil Code that the store is really conjugal but it cannot be so in this
particular case again, by reason of the dearth in proof that it was erected during the
alleged second marriage (5 Sanchez Roman 840-841; 9 Manresa; cited in Civil Code
of the Philippines by Tolentino, Volume 1, 1983 Edition, page 421).[20]

Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert
that their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner
claims ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name
of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco.
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is
inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of Eusebio Francisco, married
to Teresita Francisco, is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. [21] It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
[22]
The phrase married to preceding Teresita Francisco is merely descriptive of the civil status
of Eusebio Francisco.[23]
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court cannot be said to have
been without valid basis in affirming the lower courts ruling that the properties in
controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
Now, insofar as the administration of the subject properties is concerned, it follows that
Eusebio shall retain control thereof considering that the assets are exclusively his capital.
[24]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the properties are conjugal, petitioner
cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not incapacitated. Contrary to the allegation
of petitioner, Eusebio, as found by the lower court, is not suffering from serious illness so as
to impair his fitness to administer his properties. That he is handicapped due to a leg injury
sustained in a bicycle accident, allegedly aggravated when petitioner pushed him to the
ground in one of their occasional quarrels, did not render him, in the Courts view,
incapacitated to perform acts of administration over his own properties.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

16.ISAAC VILLEGAS vs. VICTOR LINGAN

G.R. No. 153839
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision[1] dated November 28, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55837, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated December 19, 1996
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5036; and
the CA Resolution[2] dated June 10, 2002, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Isaac Villegas (petitioner).
This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument with Damages
filed by the petitioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and Atty. Ernesto Carreon as the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The respondent filed his Answer and pre-trial ensued. The RTC
issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal
issue to be resolved is:
Whether or not the power of attorney is a general power of attorney or a special power of
attorney. Corrolarily, whether upon the terms thereof, the attorney-in-fact Gloria Roa Catral,
had authority, or none at all, to execute the deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor
Lingan.[3]
On the basis of the pre-trial order and upon motion of counsel for petitioner, without any
objections from respondent, the case was submitted for summary judgment.
As found by the RTC and confirmed by the CA, the undisputed facts are as follows:

[Petitioner] Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, known as Lot 2637-C of the Subdivision plan Psd.2-01-019664, being a portion of
Lot 2637, Cad. 151, containing an area of 1,267 square meters, more or less, situated at
Bgy. Pengue, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-63809 of
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the [petitioner] constituted a real estate
mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was
subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF). When
the [petitioner] failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the
property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself
the highest bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued and,
thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue of a power of
attorney executed by [petitioners] wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the
latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. x x x[4]
On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed
a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.[5]
Petitioner claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, petitioners motherin-law, created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Villegas
(Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to administer the
properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties,
particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of
attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey any specific real property.[6]
On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the tenor of the power
of attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any property of the
principal, who, in this case, is the petitioner; that the act of the agent, Catral, in executing
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent was within her power or authority; that the
power to enter into any and all contracts and agreements qualified the said power of
attorney as a special power of attorney; that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the
principal, herein petitioner; that the authority to sell came from both the petitioner and his
wife, Marilou, since the petitioner himself signed the power of attorney affirming the
authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral in fact exceeded her authority, the act
is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agents authority if such is within
the terms of the power of attorney as written.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the CA claiming that the trial
court erred in finding that there was a principal-agent relationship between petitioner and
Catral; and that the trial court erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a special
power of attorney with an authority to sell.[7]
On November 28, 2001, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, affirming in toto the
RTC Judgment and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.[8]
The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by Catral by virtue of
a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by Marilou, it follows that the petitioner is
no longer the owner of the subject property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to
whether the power of attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the
petitioner was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any
disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the petitioner himself; that the
petitioner signed the General Power of Attorney above the word conforme, connoting an
implied admission that he was not anymore the owner of the said property; and, finally, that
the Deed of Sale between Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid.
Hence, herein Petition, on the following grounds:
I.IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND THAT PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF

THE CASE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT DID NOT MATTER WHETHER OR NOT THE GENERAL
POWER OF ATTORNEY OR A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS ISSUED IN THIS INSTANT
CASE.
II.IT IS FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF VICTOR LINGAN.[9]
In his Memorandum, petitioner argues that the general power of attorney of Catral did not
clothe her with authority to sell the property of petitioner; and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed between the respondent and Catral was not valid.[10]
On the other hand, respondent, in his Memoranda, contends that the petitioner has no cause
of action against him. He maintains that petitioner lost his ownership of the property after it
was extra-judicially foreclosed and sold to HMDF; that what was left for petitioner was only
the right of redemption, a right he shared with his wife; that if there was really a legal defect
in the sale, the person who has the legal standing and the right to question the validity of
the sale in his name is Marilou, the person who exercised the right of redemption and the
person in whom the right to dispose legally resides; and that Marilou has all this time
remained passive.[11]
The petition must fail.
There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petition that must be
resolved: First, whether Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as successor-in-interest, may
validly redeem the property in question; and second, whether the petitioner has a cause of
action against the respondent.
Was there a valid redemption effected by Marilou?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides: Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or
any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may
redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale;
and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixtyfour to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (emphasis supplied)
Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: SEC. 27. Who may
redeem real property so sold. Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or
any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by
the following persons:
(a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the
property;
The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes
a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest
in the property, or his spouse or heirs.[12]
Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at
expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. If no redemption be made
within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser
is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever
sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof
given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the
conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire

period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property.
The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and
in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had
continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property at the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied)
Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after
she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that
petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired
ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred
upon the expiration of the right of redemption.[13]
And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right
of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property.
Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to another.
This brings us to the resolution of the second issue -- whether petitioner has a cause of
action against respondent -- and the answer is in the negative.
A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the
plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an
obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[14]
In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with
more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to
respect such right. There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner.
It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in
behalf of the petitionerMarilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised
the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the
circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioners
wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her
redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent.
Consequently, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject property to
respondent by virtue of the General Power of Attorney executed by Marilou, is not within the
realm of the Courts jurisdiction to resolve in this case as said issue is not properly raised by
the right person, Marilou.
Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party
who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a
contract, is binding only between the contracting parties,[15] then only the parties, as well
as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of
the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary
of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest.
The Court cannot grant the relief prayed for in petitioners Complaint as to damages,
considering that the issue on damages was deemed waived when the parties limited
themselves to the legal issue arrived at during the pre-trial in the RTC.[16]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

17.HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,

G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005
Charges and Obligations
FACTS:
M and D were married on August 1967 without a marriage settlement.
They purchased a house and lot in San Pablo City during their marriage, but the Deed of
Sale was executed only in favor of M, without the knowledge and consent of D.
The loan remained outstanding upon maturity so H instituted an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding on the mortgaged property. A Certificate of Sale was issued to H as the highest
bidder and consolidated the ownership of the property.
D instituted a case for the nullity of contracts of sale and other damages in the RTC, which
ruled in her favor. So did the CA.

ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late M on the property as co-owner is
valid as to his undivided share.
(2)Whether or not the conjugal partnership (CP) is liable for the
payment of the loan obtained by the late M.

LESSONS:
(1)Article 105: The Chapter on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was
made applicable to CPG already established before its effectivity, unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws
(2)Article 124: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without authority or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance
shall be void It is not only the share of the nonconsenting spouse that is void, but the
entire encumbrance or disposition.
The burden of proof that the debt redounded to the benefit of the family must be proven by
the creditor for the CPG to be liable.

18.Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October
1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting
their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned
from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite
settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the
spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more
than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo
contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on
contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily
deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner,
however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence.
Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque
property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an
instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same
served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather
a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part
of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount
of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

19.Vda De Ramones vs Agbayani (471 SCRA 306)

FACTS:
S and R are married and owned a 358-square meter lot. May 23, 1979, S sold the property to
A without knowledge of the wife R. March 7, 1980 S died and subsequently, A built a septic
tank on the said lot. A filed to recover property that was sold to her by S. June 27, 1983, Trial
court decided that sale is void. October 11, 1995, Court of Appeals reversed the decision,
property is valid

ISSUE: W/N sale is valid

HELD: Sale is valid but voidable Article 166 of the Civil Code valid, voidable. prohibits
alienation or encumbrance of real property by the husband without the consent of the wife.
However, it should be read with article 173 which states that such contract that without prior
knowledge of the other spouse can ask the court for annulment any contract within (10) ten
years. There is no proof that Aldegonda didnt ask for the courts for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale. And now that the prescription period has ended, the sale is valid and
enforceable.
20.Pelayo vs Perez (459 SCRA 475)
G.R. No. 141323. June 8, 2005
Marital Consent
FACTS:
B conveyed to M two (2) parcels of land through a deed of sale, for his services as
attorney-in-fact in negotiating with the illegal occupants in an ejectment suit.

 A, the wife, signed only on the third page as a witness, which caused the registration of
the deed of sale to be denied. M sought for the signature of A on the first and second pages,
but the latter refused to do so.
Subsequently, B claimed that the deed was null and void because it was executed without
As consent. He cited Article 166 of the New Civil Code, which provides: unless the wife has
been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void due to lack of vs. marital consent.
LESSONS:
The lack of consent from the other spouse does not automatically make the disposition or
alienation of a property null and void. The contract is merely annullable at the instance of
the wife.
A wifes consent to the disposition of a property does not always have to be express. For so
long as the actions of the wife show such consent or approval, the disposition is valid.
Held: Under Art 173, in relation to Art166, both of the NCC, W/C was still in effect on January
11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of marital consent to the
disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract viol of initio but Merely violable.
Said provisions of law provide:
Art 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compass mentis or a spedthriff, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a lepresarium, the husband connot alienate or encumber
any real property not the Longugal property w/o the wifes consent. It she refuses
nreasonable to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art 173. The wife may during the marriage and w/in 10 years the transaction questioned,
ask the court for the annulment of any contract of the husband w/c tends to defraud her or
impair interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right
she her heir, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
21.Bautista vs. Silva (502 SCRA 334)
FACTS:
On March 3, 1988, P, husband of the respondent, executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of petitioners by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney allegedly signed by N, the herein
respondent.
The respondent then found out about the transaction and filed a complaint for the
annulment of the transaction by virtue of the prohibition contemplated under Art. 166 and
Art 173 of the Civil Code.
The trial court nullified the sale and the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.
Petitioners now appealed by Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that they are
buyers for value in good faith and that if ever the SPA was a nullity, it only affects the share
of the other spouse.
Lessons:
Nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the consent of
the wife affects not only the share of the wife, but the entire property.
All things being equal, a person transacting with a person whose capacity to sell is
restricted qualifies to be of good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller,
as well as his capacity to sell, and he relied on the duly notarized special power of attorney.
22.MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN Case Digest
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated
romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused
were convicted of the crime charged.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages
imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the
said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion
was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed.
ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her
to share in the conjugal property?
HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision correccional
shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not
carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to
manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.