Consti 1 Case Digest (2013)

Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013
MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Judge Asuncion violated Art.14 of the Code of Commerce. The cited provision
prohibits public officers from engaging in business.
HELD: Judge Asuncion did not, or cannot, violate it since such provision is deemed abrogated
Although the cited provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce, it however, partakes of
the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officials and employees.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operations of the governmental organs of the state and defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory. Political law embraces constitutional law, law of public officers and
corporations, administrative law. Specifically, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of administrative Law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees
with respect to engaging in business, hence, political in essence.
Note that the Code of Commerce took effect on 1888. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to US and later from US to RP, Art.14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been
automatically abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs. AQUINO
FACTS:
The legitimacy of the Aquino Govt is questioned on the ground that it was not established pursuant to
the 1973 Constitution.
HELD:
Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states no cause of action.
RULING:
a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge (not a justiciable matter)
b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting the Aquino govt w/c is in effective control of the
entire country.
c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact and law a de jure govt..
d.) Community of nations has recognized its legitimacy.
e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable matter but a political one. It is political
because it belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for the people have made the judgment
and have accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government and all the 11
members of the Supreme Court have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
FACTS:
From the efforts of 4-manresa class 2013
Page 1

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986
election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and
answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7
ISSUE: WON the provision is ambiguous?
HELD: No
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of
the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their
term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph
of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution.
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. (Lawyers
League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al)
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there
can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the
incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.or the abovequoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar,
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.
On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reogranized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to
BP Blg. 129. On 1984, petitoner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice.
Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. A Screening Committee for the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts recommended the return of
petitioner as Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the
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roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's
seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President,
otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are
affected by the ordered correction.
They alleged that petioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously
been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last appointment.
ISSUE: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court exisiting before the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O.
No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that
was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O.
No. 33. It was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary goverment
of Corazon Aqwuino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state
by those who were previously subject to it." or "as suddent. radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Petitioner received a Memorandum signed by respondent
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the
Minister of Local Government."
Respondent OIC Governor also signed a Memorandum designating other respondents as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. So the OIC governor in the memorandum
ordered the replacement of all baranggay officials of all the baranggays in the municipality of taytay rizal
Petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen. Petitioners
maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. That with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to
designate their successors.
Respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25,1986.
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Respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six
years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. So elective officials under the 1973 Constitution
may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned.
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive
order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials.
ISSUE: WON the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD: Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977,
should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante
dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of
5
six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand
of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay
officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative. Thus,
Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor declared to be of no legal force and effect
TANADA vs. TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders,
proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contended that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of
NCC.
ISSUES: WON petitioners have legal standing? And WON various laws in question should be published to
be valid and enforceable?
HELD: The petitioners have legal standing. The SC has already decided in various cases that a party has a
cause of action when the question posed is one of public right and the object is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty.
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The people are regarded as the real party in interest and need not show that he has any legal or special
interest in the result it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws.
The SC also ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of such is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non
excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression
of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all Presidential issuances pf a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by
law. PDs that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or impose a burden such as tax
and revenue measures fall within this category. Other PDs which apply only to particular persosn or calss
of persons such as AOs and Eos need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized
to all concerned.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
outstanding shares of Manila Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% shares at P41.58/share, and a Malaysian
firm, at P44.00/share. Pending the declaration of the winning bidder, petitioner matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by the Malaysian Firm which respondent GSIS refused to accept. The
petitioner posits that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony, petitioner should be preferred
after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm invoking Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, WON Manila Hotel falls under the term national
patrimony.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, WON selling mere 51% shares and
not the land itself can be considered part of national patrimony.
4. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. Yes. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable The
Constitution mandates that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
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2. Yes. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
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3. Yes. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
4. Yes. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by the foreign firm, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the shares of MHC in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to
execute the corresponding documents with petitioner after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, GSIS(respondent) is ordered to accept the matching bid of petitioner and execute the necessary
clearances for the purchase of the subject 51% MHC shares.
Reasoning: The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Province of Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks
to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998,
the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise
ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters declaring
DOMINO a resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City acquire the nature of res
judicata.
2. WON DOMINO was a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding
the election.
3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.
4. WON, the candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be proclaimed as the winning
candidate in the light of DOMINOs disqualification?
RULING:
1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident
of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the
challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion
cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of
the voter's disqualification.
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Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing.For the decision to be a basis for the
dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
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one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
26
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The fact of obtaining the highest number of
41
votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must
be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the
House of Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in
the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House
of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

July 31, 2012
Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
COA Opinion states that there was underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when 5 retired SC
justices purchased from the SC the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the
Court. The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the SC of the wrong
formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property
Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines, when it should have applied the formula found in
COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT COA CAN IMPOSE ITS OWN COMPUTATION IN THE DISPOSAL OF COURT PROPERTIES.
RULING: NO.
Separation of Powers
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The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from
the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any
one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal
branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the
arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Judicial Independence
Judicial independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to
resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its
constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself.
Thus, judicial independence can be broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and
institutional independence. Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free
from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other
hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and
legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective
independence of the judiciary as a body."
Individual judicial independence focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to
decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence
when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does
hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. Institutional judicial independence
focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public
accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority.
Fiscal Autonomy
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy.
The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided
by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. (Bengzon v. Drilon)
Application to the Present Case
The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the
Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its
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personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the
Supreme Court and the appellate courts.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs.
G.R. No. 164763
February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of
public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that have been
replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as
government has not suffered any damage."
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED
IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING: NO. The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who, by reason of the
duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take
and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as
a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather
than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is
the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be,
presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is repugnant to
the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel,
unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
G.R. No. 171101
July 5, 2011 and
November 22, 2011 (on MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)
HACIENDA LUISITA, vs. PARC.
FACTS:
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The hacienda luisita was comprised of 6,443 hectares and owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas (Tabacalera). In 1957, Tabacalera sold the land to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco)
owned by the Cojuancos.
In 1980 martial law administration filed a suit before the RTC Manila against Tadeco for it to surrender the
hacienda to MAR (now DAR) so the land will be distributed to farmers. Manila RTC ruled against Tadeco.
Tadeco appealed to CA.
In 1988, OSG moved to withdraw the governments case against Tadeco, et al. Thus, the CA dismissed the
case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by Tadeco of the PARCs approval
of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been
secured and the case will be revived if any of the conditions is not duly complied with by the TADECO.
Markedly, Section 10 of EO 229 allows corporate landowners, as an alternative to the actual land transfer
scheme of CARP, to give qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase shares of stocks of the corporation
under a stock ownership arrangement and/or land-to-share ratio.
Like EO 229, RA 6657, Sec. 31, also provides two (2) alternative modalities, i.e., land or stock transfer,
pursuant to either of which the corporate landowner can comply with CARP, but subject to well-defined
conditions and timeline requirements.
In 2003, two separate petitions reached the DAR. In the first, respondents Jose Julio Suniga and Windsor
Andaya, identifying themselves as head of the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), and 60 other
supervisors sought to revoke the SDOA, alleging violations by HLI of the SDOAs terms. They prayed for a
renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the alternative, its revocation.
Revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands in the hacienda were the call in
the second petition. The Petition was ostensibly filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng
Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA), where the handwritten name of respondents Rene Galang as "Pangulo
AMBALA" and Noel Mallari as "Sec-Gen. AMBALA" appeared. As alleged, the petition was filed on behalf
of AMBALAs members purportedly composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of Hacienda Luisita.
On December 2, 2006, Noel Mallari, impleaded by HLI as respondent in his capacity as "Sec-Gen.
AMBALA," filed his Manifestation and stated that he has broken away from AMBALA with other AMBALA
ex-members and formed Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement, Inc. (FARM). Should this shift in
alliance deny him standing, Mallari also prayed that FARM be allowed to intervene.
ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER THE PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST TO FILE SAID
PETITIONS.
RULING: YES.
Supervisory
Group,
AMBALA
and
their
respective leaders are real parties-in-interest
The SDOA no less identifies "the SDP qualified beneficiaries" as "the farmworkers who appear in the
annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or periodically
employed by HLI." Galang, per HLIs own admission, is employed by HLI, and is, thus, a qualified
beneficiary of the SDP; he comes within the definition of a real party-in-interest under Sec. 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, meaning, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or is
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
The same holds true with respect to the Supervisory Group whose members were admittedly employed
by HLI and whose names and signatures even appeared in the annex of the SDOA. Being qualified
beneficiaries of the SDP, Suniga and the other 61 supervisors are certainly parties who would benefit or
be prejudiced by the judgment recalling the SDP or replacing it with some other modality to comply with
RA 6657.
Page 10

Even assuming that members of the Supervisory Group are not regular farmworkers, but are in the
category of "other farmworkers" mentioned in Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, thus only entitled to
a share of the fruits of the land, this does not detract from the fact that they are still identified as being
among the "SDP qualified beneficiaries." As such, they are, thus, entitled to bring an action upon the SDP.
Further, under Sec. 50, paragraph 4 of RA 6657, farmer-leaders are expressly allowed to represent
themselves, their fellow farmers or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR. Clearly, the
respective leaders of the Supervisory Group and AMBALA are contextually real parties-in-interest allowed
by law to file a petition before the DAR or PARC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT SEC. 31 OF RA 6657 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: NO.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of
CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and pass upon the
constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments, it does so only when the following
essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a proper party or one
with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
Raised at the earliest possible opportunity
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, has yet to explain its failure to
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, 1989 when PARC
approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter. FARM raised the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court.
Thus, it took FARM some 18 years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even
accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon
which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue
that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events
and activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality will not be passed
upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first
opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657.
Very lis mota of the case
The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of
the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be
made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. Garcia v. Executive
Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or
the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule that every law has in its
Page 11

favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the
FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI
with the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is
whether or not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such
non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional
and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of
AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the
said provision in the SDP that is flawed.
Moot and Academic
Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis--vis the
stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700 provides: "That after
June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory
acquisition." Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is
no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional
should be a moot issue.
It is true that the Court, in some cases, has proceeded to resolve constitutional issues otherwise already
moot and academic provided the following requisites are present:
First, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
Second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
Third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public;
Fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
These requisites do not obtain in the case at bar.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE IS APPLICABLE.
RULING: YES.
Applicability of the Operative Fact Doctrine
While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-3201 and 2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain "operative facts" that had occurred in the
interim. Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null
and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness
must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or
juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or
executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
(a) Operative Fact Doctrine Not Limited to Invalid or Unconstitutional Laws
Contrary to the stance of respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws
subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently
declared as invalid as embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals.
The Chicot doctrine advocates that, prior to the nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity
of taking into account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was done while the legislative or the executive act was in
operation should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.
Page 12

Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2an executive actwas declared invalid in the instant
case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable.
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine
should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are
accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature that have the
force and effect of law.
We disagree. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have
fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase "executive act"
does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by the
minority, nowhere can it be found that the term "executive act" is confined to the foregoing. Contrarily,
the term "executive act" is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies
under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by
the Court.
(b) The Operative Fact Doctrine as Recourse in Equity
Undeniably, the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. Remarkably, it is applied only in the absence of
statutory law and never in contravention of said law.
In the instant case, respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine should not be applied since there is
a positive law, particularly, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which directs the distribution of the land as a result of the
revocation of the SDP. Pertinently, the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states:
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not
made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the
agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of
this Act.
Markedly, the use of the word "or" under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 connotes that the law
gives the corporate landowner an "option" to avail of the stock distribution option or to have the SDP
approved within two (2) years from the approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the
well-established principle in statutory construction that "the word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."
In its elementary sense, "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It
often connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When "or" is used, the
various members of the enumeration are to be taken separately.
Given that HLI secured approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period reckoned
from June 1988 when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Pertinently, said provision does not bar Us from applying the operative fact doctrine.
G. R. No. 180989
February 7, 2012
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA, vs.CHAIRPERSON.
FACTS:
With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government operations, the COA
saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, the circular in issue, which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -controlled corporations
(GOCCs).
On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the preaudit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims
Page 13

that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center
laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing.
RULING: YES. This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the dissipation of public
funds through numerous irregularities in government financial transactions. These transactions have
allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues,
is its Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.
G.R. No. 185053
February 15, 2012
EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO
FACTS:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI). They were elected into office and their terms should have ended on
12 July 2000. However, they continued to occupy their positions in a holdover capacity.
On 23 November 2005, respondents instituted Civil Case in RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato to enjoin
petitioners from holding a special general assembly (GA) and an election of officers. Respondents alleged
that the process by which the GA had been called was not in accordance with Sec. 35 of Republic Act No.
6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
The RTC issued a 72-hour TRO to restrain petitioners from holding the GA. Despite the TRO, but without
the participation of petitioners, 5,910 members or 78.68% of the total membership of the cooperative
went through with the GA and elected petitioners in absentia as new members of the board.
During the 20 December 2008 meeting, the GA ratified the Amended Articles of Cooperation and the
Amended By-Laws of the cooperative. A Certificate of Registration to that effect was issued by
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents still have a cause of action to file the case.
RULING: NO. There is no cause of action since the issue has already become moot.
In the present case, the GA has clearly expressed its intentions through the subsequent amendment of
DARBCIs Articles of Cooperation and By-Laws and through the election of new officers.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us.
The supervening events had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA as the highest
policy-making body of the cooperative to declare the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set
of officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action to
maintain the case against petitioners herein.
G.R. No. 193978
February 28, 2012
Page 14

JELBERT B. GALICTO, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
FACTS:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive
allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila
Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has
been unable to meet its standing obligations.
The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government
financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order the
immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives
and other perks of members of the governing boards of GOCCs and GFIs.
Pres. Aquino, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7. To
support his claim that he has locus standi the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he
"stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and curtail[s] the prerogative
of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation." The petitioner also claims that he has
standing as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of
the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known as the
"GOCC Governance Act of 2011." Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE SHOULD PROSPER.
RULING: NO.
I.
Petitioner has no legal standing
"Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." This
requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
25
controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to "raise a constitutional question" when (1) he can show that
he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree,
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest
is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest."
In the present case, the petitioner has no material interest in the outcome of the case. The curtailment of
future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or
Page 15

expectancies. He has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right
deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present
petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of
the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the
Court "as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry."
While the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the
President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials
and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental
importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, we held that even if
the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort
would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural
infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case. In other words, giving due course to the present
petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities, cannot but be an exercise in futility that
does not merit the Courts liberality.
II. The petition has been mooted by supervening events.
A moot case is "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value." "An action is considered moot when it
no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead,
or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties x x x. Simply stated, there is
nothing for the x x x court to resolve as its determination x x x has been overtaken by subsequent events."
This is the present situation here. Congress, thru R.A. No. 10149, has expressly empowered the President
to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs. For the Court to still rule upon the supposed
unconstitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise. Any further discussion of the
constitutionality of EO 7 serves no useful purpose since such issue is moot in its face in light of the
enactment of R.A. No. 10149.
G.R. No. 164987
April 24, 2012
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together
with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, sought
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent
Secretary of DBM from making, and releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of Congress as
"pork barrel" funds out of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). LAMP likewise aimed to stop the
National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned provision.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ARE MET
RULING: YES.
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
Page 16

its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In our jurisdiction, the
issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and
the authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution
resulting in a serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably,
as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would
necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to
taxpayers. This affords "ripeness" to the present controversy.
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." In
public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person,
and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected
to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
21
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in
taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
FUNA VS. VILLAR 670 SCRA 570 (2012)

Facts: Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008 following
the retirement of Chairman Carague. Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of COA. He was to
serve until February 2, 2011.
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman and prays that the
appointment be declared unconstitutional for violationg sec 1(2), Art IX(D).
Before the SC could resolve the petition, Villar vacated his position when Pres Aquino III named PulidoTan as COA Chairman.
Issue: Whether or not the petition of Funa became moot and academic.
Held: Yes. A case is moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when it ceases to present
a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a resolution of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. There is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.
As a general rule, it is not within the SCs charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case, except
if: 1. there is grave violation of the Constitution; 2. the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; 3. when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
Page 17

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 4. the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
The procedural requisites for the exercise of judicial review are: 1. there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before the court; 2. question before it must be ripe for adjudication; 3. the person
challenging the act must be a proper party; and 4. the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very lis mota of the case.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result
of a government action or have a material interest in the issue affected by the challenged official act.
However, the Court has acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain
individuals not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act standing
to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all
a mere procedural technicality.
The SC laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended
standing to sue: 1. cases involve constitutional issues; 2. for taxpayers, there must be claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 3. for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; 4. for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and 5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.
This case is of transcendental importance, since it has far-reaching implications and there is a need to
promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases.
Note: The main issues in this case were the term of office of the commissioners, rotational plan, etc.
Page 18
CAPALLA VS. VILLAR 673 SCRA 1 (2012)

Facts: Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase the PCOS,
both software and hardware for an Automated Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized
National and Local Elections (AES Contract). Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 to exercise the
option but opted not to exercise the same except for the 920 units of PCOS machines. Comelec seriously
considered to exercise the option and so it was given until March 31, 2012, the extended period to
exercise the option to purchase.
According to Capalla, et al the extended option to purchase the PCOS, as well as the AES Contract is
contrary to law and the Constitution.
The SC already rendered a decision on June 13, 2012 dismissing the petitions of Capalla, et al. This case is
a motion for reconsideration of the SCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not Capalla, et al were correct.
Held: No. Comelec was given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the OTP. The option was,
however, not exercised within said period. But the parties later entered into an extension agreement
giving the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it. With the extension of the period, the
Comelec validly exercised the option and eventually entered into a contract of sale of the subject goods.
The extension of the option period, the subsequent exercise thereof, and the eventual execution of the
Deed of Sale became the subjects of the petitions challenging their validity in light of the contractual
stipulations of respondents and the provisions of RA 9184.
Based on the AES Contract, we sustained the parties right to amend the same by extending the option
period. Considering that the performance security had not been released to Smartmatic-TIM, the contract
was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual agreement of the parties, such amendment
being reduced in writing. To be sure, the option contract is embodied in the AES Contract whereby the
Comelec was given the right to decide whether or not to buy the subject goods listed therein under the
terms and conditions also agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance security has not been released. Thus,
not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the entire contract as well.
Page 19

For a previously bidded contract to be nullified, the amendment must be substantial such that the other
bidders were deprived of the terms and opportunities granted to the winning bidder after it won the
same and that it is prejudicial to public interest. In our assailed decision, we found the amendment not
substantial because no additional right was made available to Smartmatic-TIM that was not previously
available to the other bidders; except for the extension of the option period, the exercise of the option
was still subject to same terms and conditions such as the purchase price and the warranty provisions;
and the amendment is more advantageous to the Comelec and the public.
Hence, the determination of whether or not a modification or amendment of a contract bidded out
constitutes a substantial amendment rests on whether the contract, when taken as a whole, would
contain substantially different terms and conditions that would have the effect of altering the technical
and/or financial proposals previously submitted by other bidders.
It must be pointed out that public biddings are held for the best protection of the public and to give the
public the best possible advantages by means of open competition between the bidders, and to change
them without complying with the bidding requirement would be against public policy. What are
prohibited are modifications or amendments which give the winning bidder an edge or advantage over
the other bidders who took part in the bidding, or which make the signed contract unfavorable to the
government.
While movants may have apprehensions on the effect to government contracts of allowing "advantage to
the government" as justification for the absence of competitive public bidding, it must be stressed that
the same reasoning could only be used under similar circumstances. The "advantage to the government,"
time and budget constraints, the application of the rules on valid amendment of government contracts,
and the successful conduct of the May 2010 elections are among the factors looked into in arriving at the
conclusion that the assailed Resolutions issued by the Comelec and the agreement and deed entered into
between the Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, are valid.
Page 20
CHAVEZ VS. JBC 676 SCRA 579 (2012)

Facts: Art 8 sec 8 of the Constitution provides:
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the SC composed of x x
x a representative of the Congress x x x
In compliance therewith, Congress designated one representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex
officio members. Perhaps in order to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body,
the HR and the Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only
1 representative.
th
In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an 8
member was added to the JBC as 2 representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC- 1 from HR and
1 from the Senate, with each having of a vote.
Chavez filed a petition alleging that JBC shall have only 1 representative from Congress as mandated by
Art 8 sec 8 par 1 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case.
Held: Yes. Chavez seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the
position of Chief Justice of the SC. As a taxpayer, he invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the
rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful purposes.
The SC disagrees with JBCs contention that Chavez lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to
have locus standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the
Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and
nominates other members of the Judiciary. It is not limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate
in the land. More importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the
Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The SC considers this a constitutional issue that must be
passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a
citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the same time,
armed with issues of transcendental importance to society.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the
opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in
this case: 1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; 2. The presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and 3. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not
empty attacks on the wisdom of the other brances of the government. The allegations are substantiated
by facts, and therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court.
Page 21
IDEALS VS. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 (2012)

Facts: EPIRA (RA 9136) mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale, disposition and privatization of NPC
generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer contracts.
On May 5, 2010, and after a post-bid evaluation, PSALMs Board of Directors approved and confirmed the
issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest bidder, Korea Water Resources for the sale of Angat HydroElectric Power including the Angat Dam, Angat Reservoir and the outlying watershed areas.
IDEALS, et al contended that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when in conducting the bid, it
disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the Constitution. It also
alleged that PSALM violated the constitutional provisions on the appropriation and utilization of water
limiting water rights to Filipino citizens and corporations which are at least 60% Filipino-owned.
Page 22

PSALM prayed for the dismissal of the petition because it was rendered moot by the issuance of a Notice
of Award in favor of K-Water.
Issue: Whether or not the petition had been mooted by the issuance of the Notice of Award to K-Water.
Held: No. Though petitioners had sought the immediate issuance of injunction against the bidding
commenced by PSALM-specifically enjoining it from proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of
award to any of the bidders- they further prayed that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of
AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing the States
obligation to protect the citizens right to water but also to bar a foreign corporation from exploiting our
water resources in violation of Art 12 sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to
K-Water indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as
its implementation. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not IDEALS, et al possess the requisite.
Held: Yes. Legal Standing or locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. The SC has adopted a liberal attitude on locus standi if the issue is of
transcendental significance to the people, as when it is of paramount importance to the public. When the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies
the requirement of personal interest.
Ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is of paramount importance to the public. That the
continued availability of water in Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the
privatization of the hydroelectric power plant confers upon IDEALS et al such personal stake in the
resolution of legal issues.
Moreover, if the petition is about the peoples right to information on matters of public concern, any
citizen can be the real party in interest. Requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.
Page 23
ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641

In most cases filed to challenge the constitutional validity of any statute or order, the issue as to whether
the petitioners are the proper parties has been questioned. In JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRAGE,
MANUEL H. AFIADO,
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
642
642
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review
MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela,
THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, In his capacity as
provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as Provincial treasurer, G.R. NO.
133064, dated SEPTEMBER 16, 1999, the Mayor of the City of Santiago, the President of the Liga ng mga
Barangay ng Santiago City and three residents of Santiago City filed a petition for Writ of Revision assailing
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8028, converting the City of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city, the locus standi of the petitioners was questioned. The
Court in said case held that it is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by
one who sustained a direct injury as a result of the endorsement.
Page 24

Annotations have been made on similar issues in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) such as
Constitutionality of Statute or Action Must be Raised by Proper Party (Taxpayers Suit) in 15 SCRA 497501, Judicial Deference to Political Questions in 21 SCRA 822-837, The Plebiscite CasesPolitical or
Justiciable Issues in 49 SCRA 180-193, Judicial Review of the Effectivity of a New Constitution and the
Political Doctrine in 50 SCRA 393-413, and Political or Justiciable Question in 59 SCRA 652-673. The issues
raised in said cases are justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness and political questions. This annotation
will dwell on the rule of locus standi of the petitioners in filing cases questioning the constitutional validity
of statutes or executive orders.
1. Locus Standi Defined
Locus standi generally means a place to stand. It refers to the standing of a person to file a case.
(Ballantine Law Dic643
VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 16, 1999
643
tionary, p.771). It is a place to stand; a standing in law or a suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
[1976]).
2. Early U.S. Doctrines on Judicial Review
The principle of judicial review which originated in the United States restricted the filing of cases by
individuals to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute. Early U.S. court decisions formulated the
conditions needed to adjudicate a case especially with respect to the challenge of the validity of a statute.
Decisions generally limited access by litigants to shield judges from cases that threaten their
independence and institutional effectiveness. They also try to avoid trying cases that involve politically
sensitive issues.
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the boundaries for judicial action were quite fixed: It is most true
that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 [1821]). What the Court should or should not accept is
largely a matter of judicial discretion. Reflecting on his work at the Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis
confided: The most important thing we do is not doing. (Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions
of Mr. Justice Brandeis 17 [1957]). The deliberate withholding of judicial power often reflects the fact that
courts lack ballot-box legitimacy. Although couched in technical jargon, jurisdictional requirements raise
fundamental questions of democratic theory. (cited in Fisher, American Constitutional Law, p. 96 [1990]).
Judges invoked some rules to preserve public support and to avoid conflicts with other branches of the
government, and provide flexibility of action for judiciary. The doctrines used to pursue those goals
include justiciability, standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations, all
of which help protect an unelected and unrepresentative judiciary. Although efforts are made to
distinguish these doctrines, inevitably they overlap. As noted by the Supreme Court: The standing
question thus bears close affinity to
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644
Page 25

questions of ripenesswhether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial
interventionand of mootnesswhether the occasion for judicial intervention persists. (Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10 [1975]). (Fisher, Ibid.)
3. The Issue of Adverseness
To resolve a legal claim, courts need to know that parties have been adversely affected. Abstract or
hypothetical questions, removed from a concrete factual setting, prevent courts from reaching an
informed judgment. The words cases and controversies limit the federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 95 [1968])
American courts occasionally consider a case even when both parties agree on the issue. In United States
vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), the Justice Department agreed with the plaintiff that a provision in a
congressional statute was unconstitutional. To protect its interests, Congress passed legislation to create
a special counsel. Functioning officially as amicus curiae, the counsel in effect served as counsel for the
United States to assure adverseness. (328 U.S. 303, 304 [1946]). In other cases the courts have appointed
a special counsel to satisfy the requirement for a genuinely adversary proceeding. (Granville-Smith v.
Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1,4 [1955]). (Fisher, Op. Cit., p. 97)
In affirming the judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court, the Supreme Court also refused to regard the case as
a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding between Chadha and the INS. As the Court noted, it would be a
curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts because
the Attorney General of the United States agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
From the moment of Congress formal intervention as amicus, adverseness was beyond doubt. Even
prior to intervention
645
645
there was adequate Art. III adverseness. (INS vs. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 [1983])
4. Standing to Sue
To satisfy the requirement of a case or controversy, parties bringing an action must have standing to sue.
Generalizations about standing to sue, Justice Douglas said with customary bluntness, are largely
worthless as such. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 [1970]). After the Supreme Court
announced that the requirements of standing are met if a taxpayer has the requisite personal stake in
the outcome of his suit, Justice Harlan chided the Court: This does not, of course, resolve the standing
problem; it merely restates it. (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 121[1968]) (dissenting opinion).
To demonstrate standing, parties must show injury to a legally protected interest, an injury that is rather
than abstract or hypothetical. (OShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 [1974]). Injuries may be economic or
non-economic. (Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 154 [1970]). They may be actual or threatened.
Injuries may afflict organizations as well as persons. (Havens v. Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379
n. 19 [1982]; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 511[1978]). A threatened injury can be close cousin to the
hypothetical. Five members of the Supreme Court in 1973 held that allegations of injury were sufficient to
establish standing. Proof of actual injury was not necessary. On the other hand, actual injury may be
inadequate to establish standing if the Court wishes to defer to the states. (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 [1983]). (Cited in Fisher, op. cit., p. 100).
5. Individuals StandingA Judge-Made Rule
Page 26

Individuals, functioning in the role of private attorneys general, may have standing as representatives of
the public interest. (Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F. 2d 608, 615-616 [1965]). This
principle sometimes permits one
646
646
party to assert the rights of third parties (jus tertii). Federal courts are reluctant to resolve a controversy
on the basis of the rights of third persons who are not parties to the litigation. There are two reasons.
First, the courts should not adjudicate such rights unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of
those rights either do not wish them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court
litigant is successful or not . . . . Second, the third parties themselves usually will be the best proponents
of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should prefer to construe
legal rights only when the most effective advocates of those rights are before them. (Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 113-114 [1976]).
Although standing is basically a judge-made rule, courts recognize that Congress can, by statute, confer
standing upon an individual or a group, and courts may defer to Congress on such matters. However, such
statutory phrases as phrases as any person aggrieved or adversely affected allow the courts broad
discretion in interpreting what Congress means by standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the
courts to grant standing. Furthermore, Congress cannot compel the courts to grant standing for a suit
that, in the opinion of judges, lacks the necessary ingredients of a case or controversy. Congressional
efforts to confer standing are limited by the judiciarys exclusive responsibility to determine Article III
requirements.
6. Taxpayers Suit
The U.S. Supreme Court at first denied in 1923, the right of taxpayers to challenge the validity of a statute.
(Frothingham vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 [1923]). The Court reasoned that the taxpayers interest as
comparatively minute and indeterminable. There must be a direct injury to evoke standing. The decision
was based on a court policy as it will mean more cases for the court to tackle. The decision was criticized
as such a doctrine would put the government in the position of conceding that a taxpayer lacked standing
even if
647
647
Congress engaged in such palpably unconstitutional conduct as providing funds for the construction of
churches for particular sects. The Court decided to liberalize the rule on standing but at the cost of
creating substantial doctrinal confusion. It claimed that standing focuses on the party, not the issue
when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is
challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue is
justiciable. It was feared that by lowering the barrier for standing, the Supreme Court not only
encouraged more lawsuits but invited collisions with other branches of government. In a later case,
Justice Powell warned that a relaxed standing policy would expand judicial power: It seems to be
inescapable that allowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing would significantly alter the allocation
Page 27

of power at the national level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government. (United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 [1974]) (concurring opinion). (Fisher, op. cit., pp. 102-103)
7. Locus Standi of a Group
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court also denied standing to an environmental group that wanted to prevent
construction of a ski resort in a national park. The Court was deeply split with four Justices arrayed against
three. (Sierra Club v. Morton, 404 U.S. 727 [1972]). In that same year, it refused to decide whether the
Armys surveillance of domestic activities constituted a chilling effect on First Amendment liberties. A
majority of five Justices, with four dissenting, held that there was insufficient evidence of a direct injury to
present a case for resolution in the courts.
PHILIPPINE COURT DECISIONS
a. General Rule on Judicial Review
Since 1937, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), reiterated in Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian
648
648
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990) and Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the Philippine Supreme Court
ruled that when issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
only if the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of
the case. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]).
b. Early Decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court Also Restricted the Rule on Locus Standi
In 1945, the Philippine Supreme Court in Custodio vs. President of Senate, 42 O.G. 1243 (1945) held that a
person who questions the validity of a statute or law must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. This rule was reiterated in Manila
Race Horse Training Association vs. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951).
In People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), the Court ruled that there must be a showing that the petitioners
interests are or about to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the ordinance in question. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of a statute or ordinance,
he has no standing.
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967),
the Court held that the invocation of petitioner as motel operators of their alleged right to being free
from reasonable search and seizure need not be taken seriously.
c. The Relaxed Rule on Locus Standi
In Rodriguez contra El Tesoro de Filipinas, 84 Phil. 368 (1949), the Court ruled that if a taxpayer cannot
attack the validity of the executive order in question or a law requiring
649
649
the expenditure of public money, no one under our laws could question the validity of such laws or
executive orders.
Page 28

In Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993), petitioners having failed to show that they were the owners of the
artwork, it was held that they were not to proper parties to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the
auction sale of old masters paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, et al., 9 SCRA 230 (1963), the petitioner, as a rice planter with a riceland of
substantial proportion and as taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity effected with public
funds mainly raised by taxation, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it seeks to buy
abroad and has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining
what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
d. Taxpayers Suit
A partys standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 Phil. 603 [1953]), the Court said
that because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, it brushes aside technicalities of procedure. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr.,
232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Objections to taxpayers suits for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are, however, in the
main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping
with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of
650
650
these petitions. (Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 111 [1994]).
Taxpayer-Plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or
entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public. (Bugnay Construction and Development Corp. vs. Laron, 176 SCRA 243 [1989]).
However, in Kilosbayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540 (1995), the Court ruled that petitioners do not possess
the legal capacity to institute the action for the annulment of the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
because they are without a present substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy, or
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. The phrase substantial present interest
means such interest of a party in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under substantive
law, to recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has legal title to defend and the defendant will be
protected in payment to or recovery from him.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their
alleged unauthorized disposition. Joya vs. PCGG, 225 SCRA 571 [1993]). In Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994), the Court held that the petitioner KMU has the standing to
sue. Petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and
Page 29

damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that
it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the
challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU mem651
651
bers, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome
cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who compromise
the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo
that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, the Court is ready to brush aside the barren
procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised its discretion and waived the requirement of proper
party. (KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994]).
e. Locus Standi of Associations or Groups
When associations or groups of individuals are composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will
affect their vital interests, they are allowed to file suit. The petitioner, the Philippine Constitution
Association, is a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life whose
main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution. As taxpayers, petitioner may bring an action
to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law. (PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994]). A similar ruling was made in Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Assn. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
f. Locus Standi of Public Officials as Petitioners
The Governor of the Province of Rizal, representing the most populated political subdivisions, whose
taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the Philippines justify the action. (Pascual
vs. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]).
In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines
and a
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652
taxpayer, filed a case to question the validity of some Executive Orders.
In Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1962), the Court ruled that any public official claiming to be adversely
affected by a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service
and thereby limited in scope to officialdom may rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or
any portion thereof. Since the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or
private life, then anyone with an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process or liberty as
long as such requirement is observed. To the extent then that the questioned section of the statute
compels public officials to do a certain act, there is an infringement on their liberty. However, under the
Constitution, such a restriction is allowable as long as due process is observed.
g. The People of the Philippines as Petitioner
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The People of the Philippines represented by the Solicitor General can be a proper party to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute (The Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The People of the
Philippines have a substantial interest in contesting the constitutional validity of a law. Of a greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the moral wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the
state can challenge the validity of its own laws. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 66).
h. Locus Standi of Members of Congress
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales vs. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of Congress,
filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989.
The Court then ruled that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter,
has the legal
653
653
standing question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation
bill. (Id. at p. 519).
Where there is a constitutional question to resolve, a senator has usually been considered as possessed of
the requisite preconditions to bring a suit. (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [1972]).
However, in Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, 246 SCRA 334 (1995), the Court held that the
absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly
intruded into the domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant
action in their capacity as members of Congress.
In Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998), the standing of petitioner Senator Blas Ople was questioned. The
Court said that petitioner Ople, a distinguished member of our Senate, is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a petitioner can also
impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 [1998]).
i. Free Access to Courts
A means of providing guarantee to the constitutional provision of free access to courts (Art. II, sec. 11,
Philippine Constitution), any person is allowed to question the validity of a law under the principle of
taxpayers suit. However, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
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654
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Much less do they have an interest as taxpayers since this case does not involve the exercise by Congress
of its taxing or spending power. (Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to
bring this suit in their name as representatives of affected companies. (Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 337 [1998]).
o0o [Locus Standi of Parties in Actions for Judicial Review, 314 SCRA 641(1999)]
ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 548 SCRA 519

1. Introduction
Locus Standi means a place to standa standing in law or suit. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 358
[1976])
A review of recent decisions show that the Supreme Court has been liberal in recognizing the Locus Standi
of persons or entities who file actions questioning the validity of a law or actions of the government
issuances. In Planters Producers, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008):
_______________
* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
520
520
The Trend of Liberal Recognition of the Locus Standi of Litigants
Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine
laws. They are both engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural
chemicals.
On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465
which provided, among others, for the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic
sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines. The LOI provides:
3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a
capital contribution component of not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected
until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all
domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.
Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and
Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from July 8, 1985 to January
24, 1986.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of
democracy, Fertiphil demanded from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI
refused to accede to the demand.
Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It
questioned the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and
Page 32

an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law. Fertiphil alleged that the LOI
solely favored PPI, a privately owned corpora521
VOL. 548,
521
tion, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.
In its Answer, FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid
exercise of the police power of the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It
also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because the burden imposed by the
levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.
The Supreme Court said that the mere fact of payment of the levy imposed by Letter of Instruction 1465 is
sufficient to acquire locus standi:
Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus
standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required,
and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic market. It may be true
that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it
from attacking the constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate
burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions for failure to pay the levy. The fact of
payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil. Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the
LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly rendered the fertilizer
products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business consists
not only in fewer clients because of the increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate
strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer sellers may have shouldered
all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of
Fertiphil is sufficient injury for purposes of locus standi.
522
522
Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the
RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with some modification.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
2. Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi
A party who suffered direct injury has a locus standi to challenge the validity of a law.
Rule 3, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in-interest is the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. (David vs. MacapagalArroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
Page 33

The Liberal trend is to allow citizens affected to file suits as interested parties. A real party-in-interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a repre523
VOL. 548,
523
sentative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person.
He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer. (David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
3. Difficulty of Determining Locus Standi
The difficulty in determining locus standi arises in public. The petitioner asserts a public right.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
however . . . the people are the real parties . . . It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to
interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006])
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury
524
524
test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he
must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he
has a general interest common to all members of the public. (Id.)
4. Locus Standi of petitioner in cases of mandamus
To be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from
the enjoyment of a legal right. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal questions.
Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained
Page 34

or will sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being challenged. (Pimentel, Jr. vs.
Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622 [2005])
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in such a case that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. (Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA
475 [2005])
5. Locus Standi of Government Officials
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely
525
VOL. 548,
525
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA
736 [2004])
In relation to the claim of a member of Congress to intervene, invoking his prerogative as legislator to
curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as that as a taxpayer, it should be noted that the amount which the
Court di-rected to be paid by the Government to Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO),
was derived from money deposited by Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys
corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National
Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress. (Republic vs.
Gin-goyon, 481 SCRA 457 [2006])
A national political party likewise meets the standing re-quirement, provided that it has obtained three
seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections, which entitles it to partici-pate in the
legislative process. (Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 [2006])
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. (David vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 [2006]; Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discre-tion, such as in cases of transcendental importance, or where the issues raised
have far-reaching implications. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws. (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman, 510 SCRA 74 [2006])
A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
526
526
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will
likely redress the injury. (Francisco, Jr. vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])
Page 35

A party invoking the transcendental importance exception to the standing requirement must show,
among others, the presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition. (Francisco, Jr.
vs. Fernando, 507 SCRA 173 [2006])
This is one of the right cases where the Supreme Court held a liberal recognition of the locus standi of a
private citizen.
CONCLUSION
The tendency of the Court in broadcasting the concept of locus standi is in consonance with the
constitutional principle of free access to courts.
Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to
any person by reason of poverty.
This is only fitting as the courts of justice should be as available to the pauper as to the affluent in the
protection of their respective rights. Assuring him that the courts will protect him but only if he is able to
afford the prohibitive cost of litigation is like spreading a Barmecide feast before the hapless indigent. It is
at best a cruel deception, at worst a cynical oppression of the impoverished suitor. (Cruz, Constitutional
Law, p. 371)
The aforesaid constitutional provision is implemented by several rules in the Rules of Court liberal to court
procedure to enable citizens free easy access to courts.
527
VOL. 548,
527
Only recently, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno addressed in a forum vowed to further introduce reform to
comply with the constitutional principle of free access to courts.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: Javier and Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the Javier were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad Pacificadors proclamation, Javier went to the
Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed
and the Pacificadors was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. Javier thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, Pacificador took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Page 36

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, Javier was gunned down in
cold blood and in broad daylight.
The Solicitor General moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of supervening events. Batas Pambansa
was abolished causing the disappearance of the office in dispute between Javier and Pacificador.
Issue: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed because it was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute could be
a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute
has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act
then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a
restraint upon the future.
Terrorism was a special feature in Antique, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned.
Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with fear of
violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on
Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained
against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed
Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as the guardian of free, orderly
and honest elections.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in
favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only
to this Court.
Page 37
ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC 323 SCRA 811 (2000)

Facts: Comelec issued Resolution No. 98-1419 issuing a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon information that ABS-CBN has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President. The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
ABS-CBN filed a petition before the SC arguing that Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing such resolution.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election
has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy.
Issue: Whether or not the petition was already moot and academic.
Held: No. The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11,
1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very
nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
The SC has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by
Page 38

constitutional guarantees. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked
here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding
of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
ABS-CBN does not have to exhaust available remedies such as filing of motion of reconsideration before
the Comelec. The SC has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of
labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20)
days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998.
Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to
obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence;
the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Page 39
CENTRAL BANK VS. BSP 446 SCRA 229 (2001)

Facts: Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional:
Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under
salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758
(Salary Standardization Law).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c), Art 2 of RA 7653 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officeremployee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher grades as
recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. The implications are quite disturbing:
BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in
rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given
higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-andfile employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of
job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by
this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the
more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no
specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they impotent
as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated
them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting
Page 40

time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's duty to
save them from reasonless discrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the SC acted with propriety in making void the provisions.
Held: Yes. Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given
deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be
more strict. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the
character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act,
not its wisdom. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main
functions of courts of justice and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are
under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as
members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it.
Basman
QUA CHEE GAN VS. DEPORTATION BOARD (1963)
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars
without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having clandestinely
remitted the same to Hongkong. Petitioners, Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio
King, with having attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and United States in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of U.S. dollars. A warrant for the arrest of said aliens was
issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing a bond, they were provisionally set
at liberty. When their motion to dismiss was denied, they filed for a petition for habeas corpus and/or
prohibition. After filing a bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court, restraining
the respondent Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against petitioners, pending final
termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
ISSUE: whether deportation board, as an agent of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges
Held: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two
ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. This case constitute economic sabotage
which is a ground for deportation. The President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after
investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. This power of investigation may be
delegated pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue: whether the board had authority to order their arrest as
HELD: No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's power to
deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest. The right of an individual to
be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution in the following language:.
Page 41

3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution).
Unquestionably, the exercise of the power to order the arrest of an individual demands the
exercise of discretion by the one issuing the same, to determine whether under specific circumstances,
the curtailment of the liberty of such person is warranted. This is guaranteed in the Constitution and the
statute. EO 398 which authorizes the board to issue warrant for the arrests of alien and detain him during
investigation unless he files a bond for provisional release is illegal. An implied grant of power, considering
that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must
be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the Constitution. If this is
so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as inimical to
the liberty of the people. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest
precariously on such a shaky foundation.
As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null
and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
Page 42

TECSON VS. COMELEC ( 2004)
FACTS: In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his COC
for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F.
Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
ISSUES: Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen; Whether he made a material misrepresentation in his COC;
HELD: FPJs direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death certificate identified
him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May 17, 1915),
father of respondent FPJ.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried,
and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and
married. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate. The 1935 Constitution is applicable to determine FPJs citizenship. The
applicable provision is:
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Page 43

The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot
be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
]
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful.
GO, SR VS. RAMOS (2009)
FACTS: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go
alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. To prove his contention, Luis argued that birth
certificate of Jimmy was tampered, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos,
the document seems to be tampered since all the other entries were typewritten except the entry on his
citizenship which was handwritten as FChinese.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution and CA 625.
Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. He denied that his father arrived in
the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country
as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines,
and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog. As to erroneous entry, he attributed it to the employees of
the LCR.
ISSUE: whether Jimmy is a Filipino citizen = NO
HELD: Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen. Since his
citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter.
However, neither the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the
Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the
passage of the said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice. It is a settled rule
that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our
considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina,
the aforestated established rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino
citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. The 1935 Constitution and CA
625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made.
The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. The proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was within "reasonable time (within 3 years)" after attaining the age of majority. It is true that
we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has
always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single
circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos
exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the
acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able
Page 44

to vote does not validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his
real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the
rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It
is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any
doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
As to the application of the doctrine of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth): The doctrine was never
extended to the Philippines. It was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship but
it was abandoned in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then, said doctrine only benefited
those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the
mistaken application of jus soli.
Page 45

GONZALES VS. PENNISI (2010)
FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi,
an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a
petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). BI issued him a
Recognition Order which was affirmed by DOJ Secretary on March 3, 2000. Pursuant to such order, he was
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Article III, Sec. 1(2) of the 1973 Constitution and
makes him entitled to all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. Thereafter, respondent was
drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association
(PBA).
In 2004, DOJ issued a resolution revoking Pennisis certificate of recognition and directed BI to begin
summary deportation proceedings against respondent pursuant to a recommendation by Senate to
review recognition orders of Fil-foreign PBA players. Trial court subsequently issued a Summary
Deportation Order against him. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an application for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals. CA ruled in favor of Pennisi.
ISSUE: whether Pennisi is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. The issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality. Res judicata
may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: (1) A persons citizenship must be
raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; (2)The solicitor general or his
authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and (3)The finding or citizenship is
affirmed by this court.
Pennisi was able to present the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos and a
certification issued by the LCR Of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija stating that Quintos was born on 14 august
1949 of Filipino parents in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; and certified true copy of the Letter
Dated 14 July 1999 Of The Australian Department Of Immigration And Multicultural Affairs, Stating That
As Of 14 July 1999, Quintos Has Not Been Granted Australian Citizenship. These documents have more
probative value and must prevail over the statements of Barangay Officials of Nueva Ecija that no Quintos
and Tomedas have resided in the said barangay and such family names do not exist in census or master
list of voters. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The Quintoses and Tomedas were not
included in the census, such as they could have been mere transients in the place. As for their absence in
the masters list of voters, they could have failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of
Quintos birth (made 10 years after her birth) does not indicate fraud because it was not issued at
anytime near the filing of respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. Finally, the Australian
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has
not been granted Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos
Australian Certificate of Registration of Alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Barangay officials.
VILANDO VS. HRET (2011)
Page 46

FACTS: In 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her COC for the position of Representative of the First District
of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. Meanwhile, petitions involving either
the disqualification questioning her citizenship against her were filed before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which reached the Court. Comelec ruled against Limkaichong. On April 1, 2009, the Court
granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec and directed
the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo
Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they
both challenged the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong
was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she
was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who
acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. On March 24,
2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives.
ISSUE: whether Limkaichong is a Filipino citizen
HELD: Yes. Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the
citizenship provision under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Limkaichongs father was
conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino
father. It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore,
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has
satisfactorily complied with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age
under paragraph 4, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost
her Philippine citizenship, respondent can be considered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having
been born to a mother who was a natural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent
was able to elect citizenship informally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the
barangay elections as a young voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a
candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of
election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of
citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent had
informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitution considered
as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2, Article [IV] were enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected, was not conferred naturalborn status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to treat equally those born
before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
Page 47

either before or after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine
citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV] of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article
[IV] thereof also natural-born Filipinos.
Holding an Alian Cert of Reg. by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her
original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking
in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to
her daughter.
b. Election of Philippine Citizenship
IN RE: CHING 316 SCRA 1 (1999)
Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of
majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines."
FACTS: Vicente Ching, born August 11, 1964, was a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. He took the 1998 Bar Exams and passed but he was not allowed to take his oath because of the
questionable status of his citizenship. It was only on 15 June 1999, at thirty-five (35) years old or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority, when he complied with the requirements of
C.A. No. 625. In the Manifestation he filed together with his Affidavit of Election and his Oath of
Allegiance, he stated the fact of his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official.
ISSUE: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?
RULING: NO.
The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine
citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the US Government
to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority
Page 48

However, the SC held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible
rule. But it cautioned that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.
Election in this case was only made over 7 years after reaching the age of majority and the court did not
consider it to have been made within a reasonable time.
Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was
clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.
ISSUE: Would the special circumstances invoked by Ching be sufficient to vest in him Philippine
citizenship
RULING: NO as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Ching cannot take cannot find refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare where the court considered
the exercise of the right of suffrage sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. The facts
and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its
applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second,
the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child
of a Filipino mother.
Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process.
All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
REPUBLIC VS LIM 419 SCRA 123 (2004)

FACTS: Chule Y. Lim, born October 29, 1954, filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court alleging that: 1) her surname YU was misspelled as Yo, 2) her nationality was entered
as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married.
Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina and 3) it was erroneously indicated in
her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her parents were both
Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughters father were never married because the
latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. Also, respondent presented a certification
Page 49

attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that there is
no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
The trial court granted the petition and ordered the correction. The Republic assailed the
decision stating that the respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority citing Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ordering the correction of citizenship
RULING: No. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship cited apply only
to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate
child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not
required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old.
The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship
MA VS FERNANDEZ 625 SCRA 566 (2010)
ISSUE: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
FACTS: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother all of whom were born under
the 1935 Philippine Constitution. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country
for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary
education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have
already raised their respective families in the Philippines
During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the
same. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance.
Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of CA 625 (An Act
Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person
Page 50

whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they
elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.
RULING:
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2)
an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Where the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and
statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed
if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done.
The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual
notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine
citizenship.
In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in
its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict
acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the
right of ownership and other real rights. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the
confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a
serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity
as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect
Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to
register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the
permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with
subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly,
should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time.
VILANDO VS HRET 656 SCRA 17 (2011)
FACTS: Petitioners filed petition for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET challenged her
eligibility. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was
elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had
not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her
marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of
Limkaichongs citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization
certificate of Julio Sy.
Page 51

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred
that the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already
attained the status of res judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be
assailed through a collateral attack.
HRET dismissed the petition and petitioners sought reconsideration.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Quo Warranto petition operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of
Limkaichongs father
RULING:
Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he
makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which,
however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.
The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may
question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving
the naturalized citizens descendant.
ISSUE: 2. WON as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the
plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy
of the certificate of naturalization.
RULING: Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the
authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which,
as already stated, is not permissible.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and
September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition
and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.
ISSUE: 3. WON Limkaichong can derive Philippine citizenship from her mother at the time of her birth,
where her mother is already not a Filipino citizen as a result of her marriage to her father as provided
under Sec 1(7) of CA No. 63 in relation to Art 2(1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of
February 5, 1959
RULING: Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese
Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship.
Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of
Philippine citizenship. . It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to
foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for registration and fingerprinting
and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or
other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Page 52

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original
citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has
consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act
constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly,
Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.
Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law is the citizenship
provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:
Article IV
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxx
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship.
xxx
With Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is
a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired
citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the father
under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the requirement for
candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of
naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.
The HRET is, thus, correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen
REPUBLIC VS SAGUN 666 SCRA 321 (2012)
FACTS: Nora Sagun, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the legitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at
the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was
not recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied
due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has
elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered to annotate the same on her
birth certificate. The petition was granted by the trial court.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible
Page 53

RULING: This Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the
institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our
ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the Philippines, where we
clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right,
legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the
parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino
citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.
ISSUE: 2. Whether respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she has
complied with the procedural requirements in the election of the Philippine citizenship
RULING: Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that only
legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the
parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be considered a
Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2)
an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A.
No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the Alien
Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien. Pertinently,
the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the
evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing
of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding
provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in
the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that
respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent
had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
Page 54

evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance
suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority
and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The
phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation
proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that
the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship
by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship.
5. Denaturalization
CO VS CIVIL REGISTER 423 SCRA 420 (2004)
FACTS: Hubert Tan Co born on March 23, 1974 and his sister, Arlene Tan Co, born on May 19, 1975. In
their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K.
Tan are Chinese citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted
and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of
the Committee issued on February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on
February 15, 1977, Co Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene
Co finished college and earned their respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine
schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. They alleged that : Upon granting of
Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were born in the
Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of
naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended
by Commonwealth Act No. 535 provides that: "Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof;"
The court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that the petition was
insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI No.
270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473)
ISSUE: Whether or not LOI No. 270 and CA No. 47are statutes in pari materia which should be read
together so that petitioners can claim the benefit of derivative mode of naturalization under CA 473
RULING: LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in
the Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial
Page 55

decree while LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same
purpose and objective: to enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having
demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture,
tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the economic, social and cultural
development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted Filipino citizenship.
Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more expeditious, less
cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are able to
integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and
political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent
any express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the
latter law as an integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No.
9
473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized
thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270,
like the petitioners in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father,
Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to
Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their
petition: (a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the
Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
REPUBLIC VS ONG 673 SCRA 485 (2012)

Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws are strictly
construed in the governments favor and against the applicant. The applicant carries the burden of
proving his full compliance with the requirements of law.
FACTS: The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition for naturalization despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or
lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
RULING: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in
the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of
charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with
reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the
demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for under the law the
Page 56

petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicants
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.
The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have included the spouses
income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income. Second, it failed to consider the following
circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his income: (a) that Ong does not own
real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual income around the time of his application, which
was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ongs
children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it
arrived at the conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.
Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the qualification of a known lucrative
trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law
Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship
AASJS VS DATUMANONG 523 SCRA 108 (2007)
FACTS: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign
Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
RULING: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep.
Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
JOSE B. AZNAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local
elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in
his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.
Page 57

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent
is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958.The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent ExParte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial
Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and
proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that
he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he
has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more
than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue: W/N private Respondent (Lito Osmea) is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: Yes.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from
running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial
and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From
the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America,
the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration
and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the
U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not
a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.By
virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo
v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he
was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos
government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out
that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated
Page 58

in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate
.Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
De Guzman vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vicemayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed
against petitioner a petition for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not
a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the
[5]
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired
Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run
as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Issue: whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May
14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in accordance with R.A. No.
9225.
Ruling: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) naturalborn citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or
[14]
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question that petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on those who wish to seek
elective public office, as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
Page 59
(2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute apersonal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,

vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent.
Facts:
7
The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a naturalized Filipino citizen
8
sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at that time, were also recognized as Filipino
citizens.
9
Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and
deportation against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis
that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, petitioners having
been issued Canadian passports.
Acting upon the Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of the
10
BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae, to appear before her
and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current immigration status, to which the petitioners
objected by filing with the Special Task Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with Motion
11
Ad Cautelam to Quash Re: Subpoena dated 30 April 2004 (Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum), which was
12
eventually denied by respondent Salcedo in an Order dated May 14, 2004.
Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings.
Ruling:
Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied upon by the CA in its
decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls under an exception. Citing Board of
Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners assert that immediate judicial intervention in deportation
proceedings is allowed where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the applicability
of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied upon in ruling against the same
petitioners.
In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the claim of citizenship of a
respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such claim is correct. In the said case, the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so
substantial and conclusive as to his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention.
In the present case, there is a substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Without necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their Filipino
Page 60

citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the evidence adduced and
undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized Filipinos, unless proven otherwise.
However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised as an
issue. The issue in this petition is on the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above, the trial court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned their Filipino citizenship or have
acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.
Jacot vs Dal
Facts:
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
3
December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles,
4
California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioners request, and
on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice
5
Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification
6
Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice7
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
8
On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC
Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.
Issue:
whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Ruling:
This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the
requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as
citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).:
Page 61

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ,
Vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time
of filing the certificate of candidacy.
Facts:
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay,
San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held
on October 29, 2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,
petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. He returned to thePhilippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is eligible to run as Barangay Captain.
Ruling:No. Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced
his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may
run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that
should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.
Page 62
Republic vs Dela Rosa

Facts:
Raul Lee(Petitioner) was the official candidate of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the
position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private respondent (Frivaldo)
was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same
position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of private respondent
as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition
of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an
alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3)
that private respondent is not a duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in
favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid
votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive
because the case is still on appeal before us.
Issue: W/N PR is eligible to run for Governor.
Ruling: No.Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under
the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not
for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely,
are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance
value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who
was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine
citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any
one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of
intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for
the good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization
Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required
by Section 7 of the said law.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Page 63

Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall
be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant
has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules;
and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Sobejana Condon vs Comelec
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
5
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenshipbefore the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
6
citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid.
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of ViceMayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
7
8
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning
the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute
a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
Issue
For purposes of determining the petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.
Ruling:
Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
18
have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Page 64

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
xxx---xxxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
xxxx--xxxxx
21
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and
held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing
of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the
oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public
offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225),
Willie Yu vs Santiago
Facts:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988
1
seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. After manifestation and motion of the Solicitor
General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
2
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20
3
July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1)
jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and
detention of the same person.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for
five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
Page 65

officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of
the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on
20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization,
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty"
and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Issue:
W/N Petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Ruling: No. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become
a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally shown
that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only
established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID
would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was
given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for clarification and
other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
Vilando vs HRET August 23, 2011
st
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1 District of Negros Oriental. Because of this, her opponent,
Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged
that Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father
was still a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichongs father. After election, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC.
Held: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her
motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
COMELECs Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
Page 66

impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held that
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law
is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the
presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino
absent any evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not
whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization.
Respondent had previously participated in the barangay elections, accomplished voter's affidavit as of
1984, and was elected as Mayor. These are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case
of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested in actions indubitably
showing a definite choice.
Sobejana-Condon vs Comelec (2012)
Sobejano-Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen on August 8, 1944 but became a naturalized
Australian citizen due to her marriage to one Kevin Thomas Condon on December 13, 1984. On December
2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 9225, which was approved and she took her oath of
allegiance to the Republic on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued
the order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The Court held that petitioner Sobejana-Condon was disqualified from running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian citizenship under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Sec. 5(2) that
the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an
affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath, the Court held.
The Court further held that the petitioners act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an
effective renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While the Court has previously declared that the filing
by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidate is already considered a renunciation of
foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the enactment of RA 9255 on August
29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.
Reacquisition or Repatriation
Republic vs dela Rosa (1994)
Page 67

Frivaldo opted to reacquire Filipino citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law is
duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed in the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the
petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the
date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last
publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of
the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall
be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant
has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules;
and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or contrary to
government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality.
Valles vs Comelec (2000)
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. Australia
follows jus soli. She ran for governor. Opponent filed petition to disqualify her on the ground of dual
citizenship.
Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens with dual allegiance. The fact that she has dual
citizenship does not automatically disqualify her from running for public office. Filing a certificate of
candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship because in the certificate, the candidate declares
himself to be a Filipino citizen and that he will support the Philippine Constitution. Such declaration
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact
that respondent was a holder of an Australian passport and has an alien certificate of registration are not
acts constituting express renunciation.
Bengzon III vs HRET (2001)
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April
27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On
November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent
Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Page 68
WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Angat vs Republic (1999)
Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He lost his citizenship by naturalization in the
United States of America. In 1991, he returned to the Philippines. On March 11, 1996, he filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City a petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines. On
September 20, 1996, upon motion of the petitioner, he was allowed to take the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines which was scheduled on October 3, 1996. On October 4, 1996, the trial judge
issued an Order declaring the petitioner as repatriated and a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171.
On March 19, 1997, the OSG filed a Motion asserting that the petition itself should have been dismissed
by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum was the Special Committee on
Naturalization consistent with Administrative Order No. 285.
The Court ruled that when petitioner filed his petition on March 11, 1996, the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order
285, promulgated on August 22, 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory
issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angats petition should have
been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The
courts order of October 4, 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be a
source of right on the part of petitioner.
Note, the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for
petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws could only apply to
persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed
forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter
not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was
to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Alterajos vs Comelec (2004)
Ciceron P. Altarejos, a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections was petitioned by the respondents to be disqualified or cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy that he was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Page 69

Altejaros took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino on Dec. 17, 1997 before the special
Committee on Naturalization. However no copy of his oath was registered in the proper civil registry and
the Bureau of immigration until Feb. 18, 2004.
The registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In the case at bar, petitioner
completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a
mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10,
2004 elections.
Tabasa vs CA (2006)
When petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who
holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner
theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and
that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor
children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner
overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children
of said natural-born Filipinos.
Tabasa lost his citizenship by operation of law and not due to political and economic exigencies. It was his
father who could have been motivated by political and economic reasons in deciding to apply for
naturalization.
MERCADO vs. MANZANO

307 SCRA 630
Facts:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
1
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.
Ruling:
Page 70

Yes, he is qualified. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR (54 SCRA 83)
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an
order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch
I, declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being
excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State is immune from suit.
2. Whether or not the writ of execution directed against the funds of the AFP was validly issued.
Ruling:
1.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision,
Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may
be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability
of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to
go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in
Page 71

the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."
2.
No, it was not validly issued. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic
concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by
the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. A rule
which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may
be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts
except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to
permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another
reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it."
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO vs. TESDA (591 SCRA 83)
Facts:
TESDAs Pre-Qualification Bids Award Committee (PBAC) conducted two (2) public biddings on June 25,
1999 and July 22, 1999 for the printing and encoding of PVC cards. A failure of bidding resulted in both
instances since only two (2) bidders PROVI and Sirex Phils. Corp. submitted proposals.
Due to the failed bidding, the PBAC recommended that TESDA enter into a negotiated contract with
PROVI. On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed a Contract Agreement for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. On August 24, 2000, the two
parties executed an Addendum to the Contract Agreement Project whose terms bound PROVI to deliver
one hundred percent (100%) of the specified supplies to TESDA.
On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA.
PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment against
TESDA.
Issues:
1. Whether TESDA, as an agency of the State, can be sued without its consent.
2. Whether or not the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVIs claim
against TESDA, is valid.
Ruling:
1. No. TESDA is an instrumentality of the government undertaking governmental functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority or TESDA under the
declared "policy of the State to provide relevant, accessible, high quality and efficient technical education
and skills development in support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower
responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities."
Page 72

Under constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can
seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the
DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of
governmental functions i.e., the handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills
development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with
both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
2.
The writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds was not valid. TESDAs funds are public in
character, hence exempt from attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied
consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ
of garnishment or attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act; hence, TESDA funds,
being sourced from the Treasury, are moneys belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in
the hands of public officials.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN vs. ATO (629 SCRA 451)
Facts:
In 1935, spouses Mateo Pidacan and Romana Bigo, predecessors-in-interest of petitioners-heirs namely,
Pacita Pidacan Vda. de Zubiri and Adela Pidacan Vda. de Robles, acquired a parcel of land with an area of
about 22 hectares, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title No.
2204 was issued in favor of said spouses.
However, in 1948, respondent Air Transportation Office (ATO) used a portion of the property as an
airport. In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the property. It
also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway. Petitioners demanded from ATO the
payment of the value of the property as well as the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused.
Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in
favor of petitioners. Despite this development, ATO still refused to pay petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity finds application in this case.
Ruling:
No, it does not apply. Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the constitutional
doctrine of non-suability of the state, otherwise known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and
conveniently hide under the state's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields
to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that
the state may not be sued under any circumstance.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens' rights and welfare cannot sanction an
injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Justice and
equity sternly demand that the State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance,
and that petitioners-contractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit for
construction done on the public works housing project.
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and the end of the suit and is the life of the law. A
judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation
must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts
must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are
to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. Petitioners have
been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property for a considerable length of time.
Page 73

Now that they prevailed before this Court, it would be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular
circumstances that payment of just compensation be withheld from them. We, therefore, write finis to
this litigation.
ATO vs. RAMOS (644 SCRA 36)
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City land records with an area of 985 square meters, more or
less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by
petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed after negotiations
to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00.
However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its
officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that
included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had
no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had
been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling:
Yes, the ATO can be sued. Not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or nongovernmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public
purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is
true, although the state may own stock or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by
implication consents to suits against the corporation.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government
not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of
the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid
claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has been rendered
moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of
2008. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the obligations that the
ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might now be enforced against
the CAAP.
CHINA NATIONAL vs. SANTAMARIA (665 SCRA 189)
Facts:
Page 74

On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG),
represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the
conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to
extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The
Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the
DOF as the borrower. Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per
annum.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction against
CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the
National Economic Development Authority and Northrail. Respondents alleged that the Contract
Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic
Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential Decree
No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
Issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
Ruling:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to
proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary
activity. The parties executed the Contract Agreement for the purpose of constructing the Luzon Railways.
Despite petitioners claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial assistance to Northrail because the bank
was mandated by the Chinese government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the
Philippines, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial
transaction.
It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs
governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term "implementing agency" has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining
whether GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it
failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this
Courts ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be
presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result,
it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation Code.
HEIRS OF GAMBOA vs. TEVES (682 SCRA 397)
Page 75

Facts:
This resolves the motions for reconsideration of the 28 June 2011 Decision filed by (1) the Philippine Stock
Exchange's President, (2) Manuel V. Pangilinan, (3) Napoleon L. Nazareno ,and (4) the Securities and
Exchange Commission (collectively, movants).
Movants contend that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has long been settled
and defined to refer to the total outstanding shares of stock, whether voting or non-voting. In fact,
movants claim that the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked to enforce the 60-40 ownership
requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in the Constitution and various statutes, has consistently adopted
this particular definition in its numerous opinions. Movants point out that with the 28 June 2011 Decision,
9
the Court in effect introduced a "new" definition or "midstream redefinition" of the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue: How should the term capital be construed?
Ruling:
Pursuant to the express mandate of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 (FIA), as amended, which defined a
"Philippine national" as follows:
SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:
The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic partnership or
association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines of which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing
business in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent (100%) of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by Filipinos or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national
and at least sixty percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine nationals: Provided,
That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) registered enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at
least sixty percent (60%) of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be
citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a "Philippine national."
Thus, the FIA clearly and unequivocally defines a "Philippine national" as a Philippine citizen, or a
domestic corporation at least "60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote" is owned by
Philippine citizens.
The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively
controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the
ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign
Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 percent of whose
capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIAs implementing rules explain that "for stocks to be
deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to
meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate
voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the
term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as
well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of
directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.
Any other construction of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution contravenes the
letter and intent of the Constitution. Any other meaning of the term "capital" openly invites alien
Page 76

domination of economic activities reserved exclusively to Philippine nationals. Therefore, respondents
interpretation will ultimately result in handing over effective control of our national economy to
foreigners in patent violation of the Constitution, making Filipinos second-class citizens in their own
country.
Note: The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the Philippines, irrespective of the nature
of business and area of investment. It spells out the procedures by which non-Philippine nationals can
invest in the Philippines.
c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given.
Veterans vs CA (1992)
Facts: VMPSI was operating as a security agency. By virtue of the provisions of RA 5487, the Private
Security Agency Law, the then Pt. Chief Lt. Fidel Ramos issued Rules and Regulations requiring that all
private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter
organized within the Region where their main offices are located. On May 12, 1086, a Memorandum
Argreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for 8 hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside.
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and cancellation
of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA (Phil. Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security
and Investigation Agencies) made similar findings.
When VMPSI requested the issuance of a clearance/certificate of membership, PADPAO refused
to issue one. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief on March 10 1988 but as the latter did not reply and VMPSIs
license was expiring in March 31, VMPSI filed a civil case in the RTC against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA.
The RTC issued a restraining order enjoining the defendants from committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSIs license. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA moved to dismiss on the
ground, inter alia, that the case is against the State which had not given its consent thereto. On June 10,
1988, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from cancelling or
denying renewal of VMPSIs license, until further orders from the court. On August 11, 1989, the CA
granted the petition for certiorari filed by the defendants, ordering the RTC to dismiss the complaint
against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for review.
Issues: W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the state without its
consent.
How is consent given?
Ruling: The petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed form is affirmed. The complaint is a
suit against the state without its consent. The PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the
national government exercising a primary governmental function of regulation the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official and agency may not be
sued without the Governments consent. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. In the instant case, the
Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did not constitute an implied
consent by the State to be sued; it was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the
salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly a governmental
function. The execution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose of RA 5487, as amended, which is
to regulate the organization and operation of private detective watchmen or security guard agencies. The
Page 77

correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of the contract by the State by the
legal nature of the act.
DA vs NLRC (1993)
Facts: The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential
pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of
Cagayan de Oro City against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency. The Executive
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant
security guards. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Commanding the City
Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro,
alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void
and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner
also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's
governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
Petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution.
The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department,
which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue:
1. W/N the DA can be sued.

2. W/N the writ of execution was valid.
Ruling: 1. Yes. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without
its consent," reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. True, the
doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants
the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may
not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States'
consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
Page 78

between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private
respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in
the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have,
in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
2. No. Pursuant to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act
No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction
thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is
to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
In Republic vs. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against
the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained,
thus
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
1.
Express Consent
a. Money claims arising from contract
SAYSON vs SINGSON (1973)

Facts: Singson was the sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service. In January 1967, the Office of the District
Engineer requisitioned various spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. After a public bidding was
conducted on May 5, the Committee on Awards accepted the bid of Singkier Motors for the sum of
P43,530. On May 16, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications sent a letter-order to Singkier
requesting it to immediately deliver the items listed therein. In due course, Voucher No. 07806 reached
Page 79

the hands of Highway Auditor Sayson for preaudit. Sayson approved it for the payment of P34,824, with
the retention of P8,706. On June 9, 1967, the Voucher was paid to Singson in the amount of P34,824.
However, it would appear that when the Voucher and supporting papers reached the General Auditing
Office (GAO), a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in Manila. Quotations were
submitted at P2529.64 only, which was P40,000 less than the price of Singkier. In view of the overpricing,
the GAO took up the matter with the Secretary of Public Works. The Secretary then held the district
engineer responsible for overpricing and charges for malversation were filed against the latter and the
civil engineer involved. It was the failure of the Highways Auditor that led to the filing of the mandamus
suit below, with respondent Singson being adjudged as entitled to collect the balance of P8,700, the
contract in question having been upheld. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Issue: What is the proper remedy to enforce collection of money claim against the Government arising
from contract? Will mandamus apply?
Ruling: Mandamus us not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State but an
ordinary action for specific performance. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the
Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, respondent Singson should
have filed his claims against the State may be filed. It is true that once consent is secured, an action may
be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain
administrative proceedings be had and exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be
specified if thereafter on appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the
Auditor General. Even had there been such, the Court to which the matter should have been elevated is
this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that.
It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.
b.
Incorporation of Government Owned and /or Controlled Corporations
NHA vs HEIRS of GUIVELONDO

Facts: On February 23, 1999, petitioner National Housing Authority filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, respondents herein,
filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate
their properties. On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation of the Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs
of Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter. Petitioner NHA filed two motions for
reconsideration. One of which assailed the amount of just compensation. The lower court denied such
motion. Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on November
22, 2000. Prior to the aforesaid denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner filed with the trial
court a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of
the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot afford. The Motion was
denied on September 17, 2001, on the ground that the Partial Judgment had already become final and
executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. On May 27,
2002, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against
Page 80

the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds
and personal properties of petitioner. Hence, the matter before the SC.
Issues: 1. W/N the State can be compelled and coerced by the courts to exercise or continue with the
exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. W/N writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the State in an expropriation
wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose.
Ruling: 1. Notably, the foregoing cases refer to the dismissal of an action for eminent domain at the
instance of the plaintiff during the pendency of the case. The rule is different where the case had been
decided and the judgment had already become final and executory. Expropriation proceedings consists of
two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the
taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three
commissioners. The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of
expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other hand, the
second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders, being final, are
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10,
1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any
court.
Petitioner, in essence, contends that there are just and equitable grounds to allow dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings. The argument is tenuous. Socialized housing has been
recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The public purpose of
the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount of just compensation that the
court has fixed. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation
case. Petitioner cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
2. Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. However, if
the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is
clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds
are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. In the case of
petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from garnishment has already
been resolved squarely against its predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC).
Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent Sheriff Pascual Abordo from
enforcing the Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties must, therefore, be denied.
2.
Implied Consent
a. Government enters into business contracts
PTA vs PGDEI (2012)

Facts: PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to bolster and promote
tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros
Page 81

Golf Course Expansion Projects. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the
project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized domestic corporation,
to build the golf course. The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress
billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.
PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest, for the construction of the golf course. PTA
failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of default.
Issue: W/N PTA is immune from the suit.
Ruling: PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases
of commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to
the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the Intramuros
Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into between PTA and
PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
b.
Inequitable claim to immunity
EPG CONSTRUCTION vs VIGILAR (2001)

Facts: In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS Development Corporation, initiated a
housing project. The Ministry of Public Works and Highways forged individual contracts with herein
petitioners EPG Construction Co., Ciper Electrical and Engineering, Septa Construction Co., Phil. Plumbing
Co., Home Construction Inc., World Builders Inc., Glass World Inc., Performance Builders Development Co.
and De Leon Araneta Construction Co., for the construction of the housing units.
After complying with the terms of said contracts, and by reason of the verbal request and
assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be available and
[4]
forthcoming, petitioners agreed to undertake and perform additional constructions for the
completion of the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations and written contracts to cover
subsequent expenses for the additional constructions. Petitioners then received payment for the
construction work duly covered by the individual written contracts, thereby leaving an unpaid balance of
P5,918,315.63, which amount represents the expenses for the additional constructions for the
completion of the existing housing units. On 14 November 1988, petitioners sent a demand letter to the
DPWH Secretary. The money claims were then referred to COA which returned the same to the DPWH
Auditor for auditorial action. On the basis of the Inspection Report of the Auditors Technical Staff, the
DPWH Auditor interposed no objection to the payment of the money claims subject to whatever action
the COA may adopt.
The COA returned the documents to the DPWH, stating that funds should first be made available
before COA could pass upon and act on the money claims. Then DPWH Secretary Jose De Jesus requested
the Secretary of Budget and Management to release public funds for the payment of petitioners money
claims. P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of petitioners money claims.
In a letter dated 26 August 1996, respondent DPWH Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims prompting herein petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, , a
Petition for Mandamus praying that herein respondent be ordered to pay.
Issue: 1. W/N petitioners-contractors have the right to be compensated for a public works housing
project.
2. W/N DPWH is immune from suit.
Ruling: 1. YES. Respondents posits that the existence of appropriations and availability of funds as
certified to and verified by the proper accounting officials are conditions sine qua non for the execution of
Page 82

government contracts. According to respondent, sans showing of certificate of availability of funds, the
implied contracts are considered fatally defective and considered inexistent and void ab initio.
Respondent concludes that inasmuch as the additional work done was pursued in violation of the
mandatory provisions of the laws concerning contracts involving expenditure of public funds and in excess
of the public officials contracting authority, the same is not binding on the government and impose no
liability therefor.
We find the instant petition laden with merit and uphold, in the interest of substantial justice,
petitioners-contractors right to be compensated for the "additional constructions" on the public works
housing project, applying the principle of quantum meruit. The peculiar circumstances present in the
instant case buttress petitioners claim for compensation for the additional constructions, despite the
illegality and void nature of the implied contracts forged between the DPWH and petitionerscontractors. On this matter, it bears stressing that the illegality of the subject contracts proceeds from an
express declaration or prohibition by law, and not from any intrinsic illegality.
To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitionerscontractors right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered, where both
the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project
and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor.
2. NO. Incidentally, respondent likewise argues that the State may not be sued in the instant
[17]
case, invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State, otherwise known as the Royal
Prerogative of Dishonesty. Respondents argument is misplaced inasmuch as the Principle of State
Immunity finds no application in the case before us. Under these circumstances, respondent may not
validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak of
invincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough,
the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal
norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained.
To be sure, this Court as the staunch guardian of the citizens rights and welfare cannot
sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration
thereof. Justice and equity sternly demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in
this particular instance, and that petitionerscontractors be duly compensated on the basis of quantum
meruit for construction done on the public works housing project.
REPUBLIC vs UNIMEX (2007)
Facts: Respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171
cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts and
accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. After the shipment arrived in the Port of Manila on July 9, 1985, the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description appearing on the
cargo manifest. As a result, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued a
warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment. The Collector of Customs issued a default order
against Handyware for failing to appear. The Collector then forfeited the goods in favor of the
government.
Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC Commissioner)
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the
subject shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties. The CTA decision became final
and executor. Unfortunately, however, respondents counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to
Page 83

enforce the CTA decision. Respondent filed in the CTA a petition for the revival of its June 15, 1992
decision. It prayed for the immediate release by BOC of its shipment or, in the alternative, payment of
the shipments value plus damages.
BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its warehouses. The CTA
declared that its June 15, 1992 decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of respondents
shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods
based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation. The dispositive portion of the
decision read: xxx payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of the goods or properties seized or
forfeited by the Bureau of Customs. BOC appealed. The CA held that the BOC Commissioner was liable
for the value of the subject shipment as the same was lost while in its custody.
Issue: 1. W/N the state is liable for the loss.
2. W/N government funds can be charged with respondents claim without a corresponding
appropriation.
Ruling: 1. Yes and yes. Petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government
requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order. Although it may be
gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the government, and that,
under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus
imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its
exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of
respondents goods.
The situation does not allow us to reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the
doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail
itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.
Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts directive that, upon payment of the necessary
customs duties by respondent, petitioners payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or
properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs.(no appropriation needed)
c. Government initiates a complaint. Open to counterclaim.
FROILAN vs PAN (1950)
Facts: On February 3, 1951, Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that:
Foilan purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200T, paying P50T down and
agreeing to pauy the balance in installments; that, Foroilan mortgaged said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission to secure the pauyment of the balance; for failure to pay the installments, the Shipping
Commission took possession of the vessel and cancelled the contract of sale; that Shipping Commission
chartered and delivered the vessel to Part Oriental; that Foilan appealed to the President and the Cabinet
restored him to his rights under the original contract of sale with the Shipping Commission; that Pan
Orental refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan; Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the
seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court
issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was divested of its possession of the vessel. On November 10,
1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that:
Froilan failed to pay to the Shipping Commission; that Pan Oriental refused to deliver the vessel to Froilan;
Froilan prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel and that he be adjudicated to
have the rightful possession thereof. The lower court issued the writ of replevin and Pan Oriental was
Page 84

divested of its possession of the vessel. On March 21, 1951, the latter filed its answer denying the right of
Froilan to the possession of said vessel.
On November 10, 1951, the government filed a complaint-in-intervention alleging that: Froilan failed to
pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel; the Intervenor was
entitled to the possession of the vessel either under the terms of the original contract or in order that it
may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. Intervenor prayed that Froilan
be ordered to deliver the vessel to the Board of Liquidators.
On Novemeber 29, 1951, Pan Oriental filed an Answer to the complainant-in-intervention alleging that:
The Republic was obligated to deliver the vessel to it vy virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with
option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949 by the Republic in favor of Pan Oriental; that Pan Oriental
had made necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention; that Pan
Oriental prayed that, if the Republic succeeded in obtaining possession of said vessel, the Republic must
comply with its obligation of delivering to the former or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan.
The Republic filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental on the ground that its purpose
was to compel the government to deliver the vessel to Pan Oriental in the event that the government
recovers the vessel from Froilan. It was also alleged that moven was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court in connection with the counterclaim. The lower court granted the motion and dismissed the
counterclaim. It is from this order that Pan Oriental filed the present appeal.
Issue: W/N the lower court erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that the state is immune
from suit.
Ruling: This is untenable because by filing its complaint-in-intervention, the Government in effect waived
its right of non-suability. Hence, the appealed order is reversed and set aside and the case remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the
right to sue private parties in its own courts. The State as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the
state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he
might have against the State.
REPUBLIC vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2006)
Facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al.,
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case
is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the
PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.
PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other
properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of
corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private
respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or
controlled.
Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of
Directors of NOGCCI. As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the
corresponding monthly membership due thereon totalingP2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227
sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. PCGG filed a complaint
Page 85

for injunction with the Regional Trial Court. The complaint, however, was dismissed, paving the way for
the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was
conducted.
On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into
a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release
clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227
NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within
private respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and
the exercise of his profession.
The Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms and subsequently ordered the return of the sequestered shares or in default
thereof, to pay their value which can be deducted from the Republics cash share in the Compromise
Agreement.
Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No.
0034 a Motion for Compliance.
PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration which the SB denied. Hence, this recourse before the SC.
Issue: W/N the PCGG is liable? Can it invoke immunity from suit?
Ruling: PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227
NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned. PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions
is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property, in this case the 227 NOGCCI
shares in question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be
considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. Petitioner Republic, through
the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered,
the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the
level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may
have against it. Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver
of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When
the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and
purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue
and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent,
precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent
to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the
corresponding right to the other party to the agreement.
3. Scope of Consent
a. Under Act No. 3083
G.R. No. L-30098 February 18, 1970
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
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FACTS: On 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for eminent domain for the
expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to N. T. Hashim, needed to construct a public road, now known
as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue.
The parties thereafter worked out a compromise agreement, respondent estate having proposed on April
28, 1966, the total amount of P209,076.00, equivalent to the land's total assessed value, which was
confirmed, ratified and approved in November, 1966 by the Commissioner of Public Highways and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
On the same date, October 14, 1968, respondent Garcia, as special sheriff, forthwith served a Notice of
Garnishment, on respondent Philippine National Bank, notifying said bank that levy was thereby made
upon funds of petitioners Bureau of Public Highways and the Auditor General on deposit, with the bank to
cover the judgment of P209,076.00 in favor of respondent estate.
ISSUE: w/n the government funds maybe garnished to satisfy a money claim arising from an expropriation
proceeding?
HELD: NO. the Court holds that respondent Court's two questioned orders are null and void on the
fundamental ground that government funds are not subject to execution or garnishment.
As early as 1919, the Court has pointed out that although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation
proceedings, submits itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waives its immunity from suit, the
judgment that is thus rendered requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for
the condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor, cannot
be realized upon execution. The Court there added that it is incumbent upon the legislature to
appropriate any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary to pay
the award determined in the judgment, since the Government cannot keep the land and dishonor the
judgment.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of Public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
This doctrine was again stressed by. the Court in Republic vs. Palacio, setting aside as null and void the
order of garnishment issued by the sheriff pursuant to the lower Court's writ of execution on funds of the
Pump Irrigation Trust Fund in the account of the Government's Irrigation Service Unit with the Philippine
National Bank. The Court emphasized then and re-emphasizes now that judgments against the State or its
agencies and instrumentalities in cases where the State has consented to be sued, operate merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiff's claim; such judgments may not be enforced by writs of execution or
garnishment and it is for the legislature to provide for their payment through the corresponding
appropriation, as indicated in Act 3083.
. Under a Charter
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION
FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
Page 87

which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public in character."
ISSUE: w/n the funds of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (a government owned entity) may be
garnished?
HELD: YES. The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the
sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not
follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court
of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of
the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable
for, as a government owned and controlled corporation. The NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated
October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established 'all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended.
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through
Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations."
The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, as well as Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, did not
help the cause of petitioner at all The decisions are not applicable. The funds appertained to a
governmental office, not to a government-owned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical
personality. In neither case therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the funds
of which could thereafter be held liable to execution and garnishment in the event of an adverse
judgment.
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental
funds are immune from garnishment, refer to Merritt v. Insular Government, a 1916 decisio. Since then
such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the latest case in point being Republic v.
Villasor, promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished. That is
what happened in this case.
c. Execution
[ G.R. No. 113191. September 18, 1996
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-01-0690-93 for his
alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Forthwith,
the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers,
were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
Page 88

securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank.
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit. The ADB did not appeal the decision.. Petitioner was later constrained to
make an application for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction following the issuance,
on 16 March 1994, by the Labor Arbiter of a writ of execution.
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution is enforceable against ADB?
HELD: No. Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in cases arising out of or in
connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell
or underwrite the sale of securities.
The above stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement should be able, nay well enough,
to establish that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form.
The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be
respected.
"It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government x x x it is then the duty of the courts
to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government, x x x or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle
that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction x x x as to embarrass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that `in such cases the judicial
department of government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.'
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of
the municipal law.
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that
it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.
(See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states
"The Supreme Court has long settled the matter of diplomatic immunities. In WHO vs. Aquino, SCRA 48, it
ruled that courts should respect diplomatic immunities of foreign officials recognized by the Philippine
government. Such decision by the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land.
REPUBLIC v. NLRC
263 SCRA 290 (1996)
FaCTS: The full ownership of PNEI was transferred to its creditor, the National Investment Development
Corporation ("NIDC"), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank ("PNB"), following the latter's
foreclosure of PNEI assets. PNEI was one among several companies placed under sequestration by the
Page 89

Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG") shortly after the historic 1986 events in EDSA.
The sequestration order was lifted to give way to the sale of PNEI by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT)
which, in the meanwhile, had taken over the management of the company. The continuing deterioration
of its financial condition prompted PNEI to lodge a Petition for Suspension of Payments with the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), a move calculated to prevent further dissipation of PNEI's assets and
to make PNEI a viable source of income for the government.
The management committee, which was created to handle the business operations of PNEI, presented a
report to the SEC that recommended, in a move to best serve the interest of all parties concerned
(creditors, employees of PNEI and the government), the sale of the company through privatization in
accordance with the rules of the APT. As a cost saving measure, the management committee also
recommended to the SEC the retrenchment of some 500 employees of PNEI. The retrenchment was
carried out.
The filing of various labor complaints against PNEI was the immediate result where PNEI lost against the
employees. By virtue of the writ of execution, various pieces of property of PNEI were levied upon and
sold at public auction. Meanwhile, APT filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash Execution. By then, the
proceeds of the sale of some property had amounted to P1,200,000.00. The amount was deposited with
the NLRC pending resolution of APT's motion. On the other hand, the employees filed a Motion for
Intervention before Labor Arbiter Aquino claiming interest over the same property of PNEI because of the
union's own monetary claim against the latter. Proceeds from the sale though were not enough to cover
these claims, together with the claims of the creditors.
Issue: Whether or not APT can be sued to be held liable to the obligation of PNEI
HELD Proclamation No. 50, creating APT which has been mandated to "take title to and possession of,
conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of assets" that have been identified for privatization or
disposition, clearly provides that said instrumentality, among other things, can "sue and be sued." This
provision indubitably shows that APT can be haled to court. Nonetheless, we have likewise since
explained that suability does not necessarily mean liability on the part of the particular instrumentality or
agency of the government. The liability of APT under this particular arrangement should be co-extensive
with the amount of assets taken over from the privatized firm.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO

FACTS: On 02 June 1999, Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of
nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of a four
thousand nine hundred twenty-four-square meter (4,924.60 sq. m. to be exact) property against the
Republic of the Philippines (in whose name the title to the property was transferred and registered. The
property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel, Manila.
On 27 August 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A certificate of
finality[8] of judgment was issued by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Michael B. Robles, on 27 November
2003. On 10 December 2003, respondent issued an order[9] directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
On 07 January 2004, Sheriff Cachero further directed the National Treasurer to cause payment of
P1,942,576,312.45, thus:
ISSUE: w/n the writ of execution can be enforced against the state? NO
-w/n the state can be held liable for attorneys fees? - NO
Page 90

HELD: In the present case, respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable procedural errors the
pronouncement of costs against the government and the subsequent issuance of the writ of execution, in
violation of settled rules and jurisprudence.
In the decision dated 27 August 2003, respondent Judge declared the Republic liable for payment of
attorneys fees and cost of suit, pertinent portion of which reads: 7. Ordering the defendant Republic of
the Philippines to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of
the amount due to the plaintiff.
In declaring the government answerable to the attorneys fees of the plaintiff and other costs of the
suit, the respondent utterly disregarded the well-established rule that costs of suit are not recoverable
against the government (Section 1, Rule 142, Rules of Court). As early as 15 November 1918, we ruled in
the case of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Rafferty that no costs shall be allowed against
the government of the Philippine Islands where the government is the unsuccessful party. This was
reiterated in the case of Philippines Veterans Affairs Office v. Anover and The Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office v. Tamayo, when we ruled that court costs are not recoverable from a government agency.
It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent
to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. In Republic
v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus . . . The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
4. Suability vs Liability
E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS: The plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle and collided with the General Hospital ambulance. As a
consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, and he had to
give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
The court find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing
the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These
were the two questions submitted to the court for determination.
ISSUE: Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount?
HELD: No.
Page 91

By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state
for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is
difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from
suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with
the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition
of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only
question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from
suit.
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause
not previously recognized.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official)
so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of
Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according
to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and
employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and
that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. FIRME
195 SCRA 692 (1991)
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando is a municipal corporation existing under and in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent Judge Firme is impleaded in his
official capacity as the Presiding Judge of the CH. Private respondents are heirs of the deceased Laureano
Banina, Sr. and plaintiffs in the civil case before the aforesaid Court. On Dec. 16, 1965, a collision
occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by the Estate of Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck driven by Nianandog and owned by Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fen-tando and driven by Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano
Banina, Sr. died and 4 others suffered physical injuries. On Dec. 11, 1966, private respondents instituted a
complaint for damages against the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot, owl-ter and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the
petitioner and the driver of the dump truck of petitioner. Private respondents amended the complaint
Page 92

wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, -Bishg, were impleaded as defendants. Petitioner
invoked, among others, non-suability of the State.
On Oct. 10, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents)
ordering defendants Municipality of San Fernando and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs for
funeral expenses, actual damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit, dismissing the complaint against
the Estate of Nieveras and Balagot. In an order dated Nov. 7, 1979, the respondent Judge Firme denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner. Hence this petition. (Respondent Judge failed to
resolve the issue of non-suability of the state in the guise of the municipality.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando is liable for quasi-delict committed by its regular
employee?
HELD: We arrive at the conclusion that the Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger imposed on the Municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. Accordingly,
the petition is granted.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them
the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that
they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the
injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the Municipality insist that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed.
We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN VS. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR

G.R. No. 168289
FACTS: The case stems from a Complaint filed by herein private respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao
against herein petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople
(Ople) for collection of a sum of money and damages. It was alleged that sometime in the middle of the
year 2000, respondent, doing business as KD Surplus and as such engaged in buying and selling surplus
trucks, heavy equipment, machinery, spare parts and related supplies, was contacted by petitioner Ople.
Respondent had entered into an agreement with petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of
motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental undertakings in the
municipality. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed respondents
claim for payment.
ISSUE: W/N the municipality maybe held liable? YES.
HELD: The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its
political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but
only when they consent to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as
it then descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special
law[34] such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which vests local government units with certain corporate powers one of them is the power to sue and
be sued.
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Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v.
Allarde,[35] where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the
state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue
upon such judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction. Thus, where
consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the
resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.[36]
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects. x x x
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699
Various Categories of Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction
ANNOTATION
VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FROM LOCAL JURISDICTION
By
JORGE R. COQUIA*
________________
1.Introduction, p. 699
2.Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity, p. 700
3.The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, p. 702
4.Absolute and Relative Immunity, p. 702
5.Theory of Absolute Immunity, p. 703
6.Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, p. 704
7.Immunities of Consuls, p. 704
8.Honorary Consuls, p. 705
9.Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State, p. 706
10.Immunity of Officials of International Organizations, p. 708
11.Immuntiy of Intergovernmental International Organizations, p. 709
12.Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations, p. 710
13.The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity, p. 712
14.Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats, p. 714
15.The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case, p. 714
1. Introduction
The concept of diplomatic immunity or exemption of individuals from local jurisdiction originally started
from the immunity of diplomatic envoys such as ambassadors, minis________________
Page 94
* Member, Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).

700
700
ters, our counselors representing their countries abroad. Heads of states or sovereign rulers traveling
abroad enjoy inviolability from local jurisdiction. As international relations developed with the formation
of the family of nations, the concept of immunity persons from local jurisdiction has very much
broadened. Immunity has extended to consuls, ad hoc diplomats, international organizations and their
officers. International law now recognizes a system of granting immunity from local jurisdiction not only
intergovernmental organizations but also international non-governmental organizations and their
officials.
The nature of diplomatic immunity granted to officials of intergovernment organizations was the issue in
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent, G.R. No. 125865,
promulgated on January 28, 2000 now under annotation.
The petitioner in said case, an employee of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an intergovernmental
banking organization who allegedly committed a crime of oral defamation invoked immunity from suit,
citing a provision of the Headquarters Agreement between the Philippine government and the ADB, that:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing
missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.
2. Historical Background of Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity with the law on diplomatic relations among States was developed much earlier than
all other aspects of international law. Even before the emergence of Greek civilization, the records of
ancient China, India and Egypt showed practices observing respect for emissaries and recognizing the
sacred character of their office. Although no
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permanent embassies were established, the Greeks and the Romans sent and received envoys who were
accorded respect and personal inviolability. By then, traces of the principle of exterritoriality as now
understood in modern international law had already been recognized. (Grotius, Book II, ch. XVII on Right
to Legation, trans. by FCG Kelsley, Carnegie Endorsement for International Peace, Oxford, 1925).
Up to the fall of Roman Empire, ambassadors were regarded only as personal representatives of the kings
or princes. With the development of the Italian states in the fourteenth century, embassies took on a
more formal character, especially in the case of the representatives of the Holy See to the various secular
courts. By the fifteenth century, resident embassies were established and some form of diplomatic
Page 95

procedure developed. Eventually, questions of precedence and inviolability of envoys arose, which
resulted in serious disputes among States. (De Vattel, Book IV, ch. V-IX [1773] Law of Nations).
By custom and tradition antedating all other rules of international law, the diplomatic agents sent by one
state to another have been regarded as possessing a peculiarly sacred character, in consequence of which
they have been accorded special privileges and immunities. The ancient Greeks regarded an attack upon
the person of an ambassador as an offense of the gravest nature. The writers of ancient Rome were
unanimous in considering an injury to envoys as deliberate infraction of the jus gentium. Grotius wrote in
1625 that there were two points with regard to ambassadors which are everywhere recognized as
prescribed by the law of nations, first that they be admitted, and then that they be not violated. The
basis upon which this personal immunity rested was generally found in the principle that the ambassador
personified the state or sovereign he represented. From this principle developed not only the custom of
according special protection to the person of the ambassador but also a comprehensive exemption from
the local jurisdiction. In explanation of the privileges and immunities thus granted, writers worked out the
fiction of exterritoriality, which held that the ambas702
702
sador and his suite, together with his residence and the surrounding property, were legally outside the
territory of the state. This fiction obtained for a time of foothold in international law and served the useful
purpose, on one hand, of explaining the actual immunities granted to foreign representatives and, on the
other hand, of emphasizing the sovereignty and equality of the several states. It was, however, open to
the disadvantage not only of being a fiction but of permitting inferences more comprehensive than the
position of the ambassador called for. The conception is abandoned in the Vienna Convention; which
offers no theoretical basis for the privileges and immunities it grants. (Fenwick, Charles G., International
Law, Appleton-Century Co., Inc., New York [1965]).
3. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The law on diplomatic intercourse in general as now codified in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. Likewise the law in consular immunities and privileges are provided with the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
4. Absolute and Relative Immunity
Immunity from the exercise of local jurisdiction may be generally classified as absolute or relative.
According to the classical, or absolute, theory of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign could not,
without his consent, be made a defendant in the courts of another sovereign. But according to a newer
and restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, such exemption has been recognized only with respect to
sovereign or public acts of state and not necessarily with respect to its so-called private acts.
Long ago, the principle of sovereign immunity embraced both the government of a foreign sovereign
(state immunity) and the individual head of the state in question (personal
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VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
703
immunity). Today the two forms of immunity are quite distinct and have to be discussed separately.
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5. Theory of Absolute Immunity
Regardless of whether an individual is constitutionally the actual head of a state or only its nominal head,
he or she enjoys complete immunity from suit in the territory of another state. This principle applies
equally to crowned heads of state and elected heads of state. And whatever the sovereign may do in the
territory of another state, he is immune from all prosecution, civil or criminal. This principle was applied in
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, Queens Bench Division (1894) 1 Q. B. 149. The Sultan of Johore, a young man
visiting England was sued by a woman for breach of promise to marry. Although the Sultan was not
exactly a head of a state, the English Court dismissed the case on the ground that the Sultan of Johore is
immune from suit. The Court held that (1) certification of the status of a foreign sovereign by means of an
official communication from an adviser of the British sovereign binds English courts and is to be accepted
as conclusive as far as those courts are concerned, and (2) the relationship existing between Great Britain
and the Sultanate of Johore was based on a treaty of protection by which the Sultan was to enjoy the
protection of Great Britain, engaging, on his part, not to enter into treaties with any foreign states. In the
opinion of the court, the agreement by the sultan not to enter into treaties with other Power does not
seem. . . to be abnegation of his right to enter into such treaties, but only a condition upon which the
protection stipulated for is to be given. If the sultan disregards it, the consequences may be the loss of
that protection, or possibly other difficulties with this country; but I do not think that there is anything in
the treaty which qualifies or disproves the statement in the letter that the Sultan of Johore is an
independent sovereign.
Similarly, the Gaekwar of Baroda, named as correspondent in the divorce suit of Statham v. Statham and
the Gaekwar of Barosa, (Great Britain, Probate Court, 1912, p. 12, cited in
704
704
Glahn, Law Among Nations, p. 138) was declared by a British court to be immune from suit because of his
position as sovereign of an independent state in India.
A foreign sovereign or head of state not only enjoys personal immunity from suit but also cannot be
named as a party defendant to a suit brought against him in his official capacity as the representative of
his state. This was brought out clearly in the case of De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, (Great Britain, Court
of Queens Bench, 1851, 17 Q. B., 196) in which a British court dismissed on grounds of immunity of a suit
for money allegedly wrongfully paid to the government of Portugal.
6. Immunities of Diplomatic Agents
The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomats Relations exempts the heads of diplomatic missions, such as
acting ambassadors or nuncios, or internuncios and charges daffaires from the exercise of local
jurisdiction. The diplomatic representatives enjoy personal inviolability. They are exempted from exercise
of jurisdiction of the receiving state. Even if they commit an offense they may not be arrested. The
remedy of the local state is to consider him a persona non grata and will be asked to leave the country.
Should he refuse to leave the country he will be treated as an ordinary individual and the local laws can be
applied on him.
7. Immunities of Consuls
Consuls do not belong to the class of diplomatic agents. They look mainly on the commercial interests of
their own states and perform non-political matter such as issuing passports and visas taking deportees
and verification of documents. Generally, they are not clothed with diplomatic privilege.
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However, 1963 Vienna Convention of Consular Relations grants the privileges and immunities in so far as
they are performing their curricular duties. Consuls do not enjoy im705
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
705
munity from local jurisdiction from private or commercial transactions not connected with the consular
duties. This rule was followed in Schneckenburger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1936). The consul of Uruguay in
Manila invoked the immunity from criminal prosecution for falsification of private documents. The
Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was not in the performance of his consular duties hence,
he cannot claim immunity from suit.
8. Honorary Consuls
By agreement among states honorary consuls are appointed to perform limited curricular duties. They
may be citizens of the receiving state and are non-career consuls of a special category distinguished from
career consuls. Various national criteria define honorary consuls as persons who are not regularly
salaried. They may not be nationals of the sending state, and can engage in private gainful occupation,
and permitted to perform only certain limited functions. In view of the wide use of honorary consuls, the
Vienna Convention deals in detail with their status. (See Chap. III, Arts. 58-68.) The drafters of the
Convention refrained from defining honorary consuls and merely attempted to codify the existing practice
of strictly limiting their immunities to a minimum level necessary for the proper exercise of official
consular functions, for example, freedom of communication, immunity from local jurisdiction with
reference to official acts. Other immunities are limited so as to prohibit the granting of special benefits to
honorary consuls acting in private capacities. For example, consular archives of a consular post headed by
an honorary consul are inviolable provided that private and official documents are separated; tax
exemption extends only to renumeration received from the sending state for the exercise of consular
functions. Consular employees at a post headed by an honorary consul and members of the honorary
consuls family are granted none of the privileges provided in the Convention.
706
706
9. Immunity of Officials Representing a Sovereign State
The traditional absolute theory of immunity exempted a state in every way from the jurisdiction of other
countries: its government could not be sued abroad without its consent; its public property could not be
attached; its public vessels could not be arrested, boarded, or sued; nor could any property or real state
owned by the state be taxed or attached in whatever country it might be located.
Under the doctrine of immunity of the State from suit even officers representing the sovereign state are
exempted from local jurisdiction. This principle was followed in the Philippines in several cases at the time
the US Military Bases were present in the country.
One of the earliest decisions on this subject was Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). The US
military commander was sued to restore the apartment buildings they owned and leased plus rentals. The
Supreme Court in dismissing the case held that the real party in interest as defendant in the original case
is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of
America and the lease agreements themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her
Page 98

agents. The consideration of rentals was always paid by the US Government not only because, as already
stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the premises were
used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the termination of hostilities.
The Supreme Court held that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have
no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the
filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a
citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latters consent but it is of a citizen filing an
action against a
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707
foreign government without said governments consent, which renders more obvious the lack of
jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In an earlier case (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]), the Supreme Court declared that it is well
settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by
permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.
In Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission, 87 Phil. 328 (1950), the
respondent, a United States agency established to compensate damages suffered by the Philippines
during World War II, was held as falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually
be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government because x x x, the Commission
has no funds of its own for the purpose of paying money judgments.
In Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568 (1951), a suit against the Alien Property
Custodian and the Attorney General of the United States involving vested property under the Trading with
the Enemy Act was a suit against the US. Similar rulings were held in Parreo v. Mc Grannery, 92 Phil. 791
(1953) and Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807 (1954), Miquiabas v. Commanding General, 282 C 1948).
In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974) a suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander in Subic Bay was
dismissed under the doctrine of immunity from suit without its consent.
In US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 482 (1985) the suit filed against the US Naval Base Commander for breach of
contract was likewise dismissed on the doctrine of state immunity state immunity from suit.
In US v. Ceballos, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the US Air Force Officer who was sued for conducting buy bust
operations, to prevent the distribution, and possession of prohibited drugs in the US military base was
considered as an official function. As US government officials they are immune from suit.
708
708
Likewise in US v. Alarcon, 182 SCRA 646 (1990) the suit filed against the US military officials for damages
due to injuries suffered by complainants who were bitten by their dogs was dismissed as the suit was in
effect against US government. The complainants were committing theft of government property within
the military base.
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In 1994, the Supreme Court in Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 (1994) reiterated the settled
jurisprudence that the Vatican as a state represented by the Holy See may not be sued. The Republic of
the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its
ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since
1957.
10. Immunity of Officials of International Organiza tions
Historically, the present law on international immunities of international organization started from the
experience of the International Labor Organization and League of Nations and eventually the United
Nations and its agencies.
The immunities enjoyed by the United Nations includes immunity for United Nations assets, wherever
located, from any legal process; immunity of all United Nations premises from search, requisition,
expropriation, confiscation, and any other sort of interference; immunity of archives; complete freedom
from all financial controls, moratoriums, or other monetary regulations; freedom to hold funds in any
desired currency or metal; freedom to transfer funds; an absolute exemption of all assets and revenue
from all direct taxes; exemption from all customs duties as well as from any foreign trade prohibitions on
goods needed for the official use of the organization; a guarantee of most favored diplomatic treatment
as far as rates, priorities, and so on, connected with all media of communications, are concerned;
exemption from all forms of censorship; the right to use codes; and the privilege of transporting
correspondence by courier or otherwise under
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the full complement of customary diplomatic immunities (Glahn, Law of Nations, p. 154.) Officers in UN
agencies also enjoy immunities from local jurisdiction. When engaged in their official functions, judges of
the International Court of Justice enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Similarly, the representatives of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
(EURATOM) possess customary diplomatic privileges and immunities in the States where they are located.
Special diplomatic missions are usually sent to States the purpose of which are specified by mutual
consent between the sending and receiving States. Members of these special missions normally enjoy
privileges in international law, except in respect of personal actions, or professional or commercial
activities. They enjoy civil and criminal immunities, and are exempted from customs duties and
inspections.
In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Supreme Court sustained the position of
the Department of Foreign Affairs that the WHO official was entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of diplomatic envoys and order the quashing of the search warrant on him issued by a lower court. The
Supreme Court said in said case that the executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly
recognized that the petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of
the Host Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs formally advised respondent judge of the
Philippine Governments official position that accordingly, Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a
Philippine court summons without violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine
Government.
11. Immunity of Intergovernmental International Organizations
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The growth of intergovernmental international organizations dedicated to specific universal endeavors
such as health, agriculture, science, technology and environment has broadened the concept of
international immunities. The reason
710
710
behind the grant of privileges and immunities to international rights organizations, its officials and
functionaries, is to secure them legal and practical independence in the performance of their duties.
(Jenks, International Immunities, London [1961])
The Philippine Supreme Court has ruled on this type of immunity. In Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development CenterAquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AOD) v. National Labor Organization, 206 SCRA
289 (1992). The Court in said case held that the SEAFDEC, being an international organization enjoys
functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory it is located.
In Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 (1995), the
Court ruled that the United Nations Revolving Funds for Natural Resources Exploration, which is a special
fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations enjoyed immunity from suit. The United Nations
Revolving Funds is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
exploration work in Dinagat Island. The Labor Arbiter of the Department of Labor has no jurisdiction to try
the case involving labor disputes.
12. Immunity of Non-Governmental International Organizations
The principle of immunity from said suit has been extended even to non-governmental international
organizations which are performing meritorious services to assist countries in the promotion of health,
protection of environment, and development of natural resources. By agreement with the government,
non-governmental international organizations which volunteer are exempted from local jurisdiction in
order to give them freedom in the performance of their activities.
In response to the plight of Vietnamese refugees an agreement was forged in 1981 between the
Philippine Government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating
center processing Indo-Chinese refu711
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
711
gees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in the Philippines. The
International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), a non-profit international humanitarian agency
incorporated in New York, was accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee center in
the Philippines. Duly organized under the United Nations Economic and Social Council where it enjoys
consultative status, category II in the U.N., the ICMC was granted status as specialized agency with
corresponding diplomatic privileges accorded by the Philippine Government.
In view of a certification election of employees union of the ICMC issued by the Director of Bureau of
Labor Relations of the Philippine Government, the ICMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Philippine
Supreme Court invoking its status as recognized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and
immunities. The Department of Foreign Affairs through its Legal Adviser intervened in the case on the
ground that as the highest executive department with authority and competence to act on matters
Page 101

involving diplomatic immunity and privileges, it has legal interest in the outcome of the case. The
Supreme Court sustained the intervention of the Legal Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs that
the certification election of laborers and employees union violated the diplomatic immunity of the ICMC
as an international organization. The court reiterated the principle in WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
[1972], that the determination of diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question which is
conclusive on courts. (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]).
The Philippine Supreme Court made a similar ruling in the case of International Rice Research Institute,
Inc., a Ford and Rockefeller Foundation-supported international organization, with the principal objective
of conducting research on rice production. The Supreme Court sustained a ruling of the Secretary of Labor
that an application of the Philippine Labor Law on the employees and the laborers violated the immunities
and privileges of IRRI as a recognized international or712
712
ganization. (Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI v. International Rice Institute, 190 SCRA 130
[1990]).
13. The Doctrine of Restrictive Immunity
The privileges and immunities of diplomatic officials are not altogether unlimited.
The theory of restrictive immunity was raised for the first time in the Philippines in US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA
487 (1985). In the dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar, he averred that the US Naval Commander of
Subic Bay should not hide himself behind the cloak of immunity since when he entered into contracts with
private individuals, he went down to the level of a private. Justice Abad Santos, writing that the majority
opinion of the case, however, ruled that the US Naval Commander was entering into a contract which
involved public and sovereign function of the US government which is the maintenance of naval facilities
for the use of the US Navy.
Since 1952, US Government has followed the policy of recognizing the restrictive immunity of a State.
Through a letter of Jack B. Tate, then acting legal adviser to the Department of State, to the Acting
Attorney General, a policy was laid down that, thenceforth, private activities of foreign sovereigns would
be denied immunity in American courts. Several United States court decisions followed the new policy
(Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 American Journal of International La,
93 [1953]).
The United States Congress enacted into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 which took
effect on January 19, 1977. Said law codifies the re strictive theory of sovereign immunity by limiting the
latter to public acts and excluding all commercial or private acts. It also laid down the procedure to be
followed in filing a case against a foreign State. The decision of vesting sovereign immunity is exclusively
with the courts, thereby eliminating political questions in the Department of State.
The principle of restrictive immunity was applied by the Supreme Court in US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
(1990). In said
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713
Page 102

case, the private respondent sued the US Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding for contract for barbering services. The Supreme Court held that barbershops subject of the
concessions granted by the State Government are commercial enterprises. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only
the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations) but such similar indulgences, all
for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to
improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not
more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are, under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to
the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to
them in their respective areas.
This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private
respondents in the court below. The contracts in question being decidedly commercial, the conclusion
reached in the United States of America v. Ruiz case cannot be applied here.
In US v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 (1990), the court also ruled that the US Air Force operating the open mess
complex at Camp John Hay is a business enterprise opened to the public and that the principle of
immunity of suit will not apply. The business was proprietary in character. Such services are not extended
to the American servicemen for free as a prerequisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United
States. Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is
well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio City, many
of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing themselves of this facility
pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants. Although the prices are
concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are
714
714
undoubtedly operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.
The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to
justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. For that matter, not even the United
States government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its
sovereign immunity from suit.
14. Immunity of Ad Hoc Diplomats
Members of official missions and delegates traveling abroad to attend international conference are
accorded diplomatic immunity while in the performance of their official functions. The principle of
restrictive immunity applies to them, however, for acts not directly connected with their official duties.
15. The Proper Procedure in the Jeffrey Liang Case
In the case under annotation, the proper procedure was for the municipal court to inquire whether the
petitioner had committed the crime in connection with the performance of his official duties as an officer
of the Asian Development Bank. Sec. 45 (a) of the Headquarters agreement between the Government of
the Philippines and the Asian Development Bank states that the immunity applies to the performance of
their duties in their official capacities.
The immunity of Jeffrey Liang was not absolute. The principle of restrictive immunity applies to him. The
municipal judge in outrightly dismissing the case on the ground of immunity of the petitioner from local
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jurisdiction was not proper. It will be different if the person enjoyed full diplomatic immunity as what
happened in the case of WHO vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 243 (1972) the official was a U.N. officer with full
diplomatic immunity. Thus, the certifications of
715
VOL. 323, JANUARY 28, 2000
715
Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the WHO officials enjoyed diplomatic immunity are conclusive on the
courts. It was a political act of the executive which should be respected by the court.
For that matter, had there been a preliminary investigation as averred by the petitioner, the case should
not have reached the Supreme Court. The preliminary investigation could have clarified whether the
petitioner committed oral defamation in connection with his official duties as an ADB official.
o0o
GIL
BANAT VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:
Formula for Determining
Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis
given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latters number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing
the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party
-------------------Total votes for
party -list system
Proportion of votes of
first party relative to
total votes for party-list system
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first
party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified
parties.
Formula for Additional
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Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
Additional seats
for concerned
=
party
No. of votes of
concerned party
-----------------Total no. of votes
for party-list system
----------------------No. of votes of
first party
-------------Total no. of votes
for party list system
No. of additional
x seats allocated to
the first party
In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats
concerned party
for concerned =
-----------------x seats allocated to
party
No. of votes of
the first party
first party
No. of additional
xxx
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number
of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 0788. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A.
No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.
ISSUE:
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
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3.
4.
5.
Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?
HELD:
WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3
August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
RATIO:
1 & 2. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation
of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20%
party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that
a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections.
3.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.
4.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the
percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters.
The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a
partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38
seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
5.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of
the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative
the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
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party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion
of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET
FACTS:
Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayo and Bantay
respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over the
Party list.. and its representatives.. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifivcations of petitioners.
HELD: Affirmative.
The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications
of Aangat Tayo andBa nt a y. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were
chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire
into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits
as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party list.
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House
of Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote
for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both
the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of
party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the
facts
that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd Bantay, respectively, and
the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the
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House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the
question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgenders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
HELD:
Page 108
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to
irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy,
at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest
to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC) vs
COMELEC and the House of Representatives (2010)
FACTS:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered
under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the
May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent
to participate, CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five
Page 109
nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required
number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L.
Galang.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) CruzGonzales, and (3) Borje.
On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting
as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second
nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed
were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have
garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that
CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.
The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment
of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC
failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.
On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219, whereby it resolved to set the matter
pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No.
07-054.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos,
purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of
the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested
that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office.
Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because
COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
The COMELEC approved the withdrawal of nomination of Atty. Luis Lokin. Hence, this present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act.
RULING:
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:
o Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only
when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated
to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these
cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.
No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.
Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth
being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Page 110
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three
statutory grounds for substituting a nominee.
We agree with Lokin.
The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither
the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement
thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs
should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions
phraseology.
The explanation does not persuade.
To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase
anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not
altered.
However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941,
because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new
ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination
already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done.
Considering that Section 13 of the Resolution No. 7804 to the extent that it allows the party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC was invalid,
CIBACs withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin ang the others and its substitution of them with
new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin
and the others could only be for any grounds expressly stated in section 8 of RA 7941.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a partylist organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted to the COMELEC.
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. and TERESITA F. PLANAS vs COMELEC, CIBAC PARTY LIST represented by VIRGINIA S.
JOSE SHERWIN N. TUGNA, and CINCHONA CRUZ-GONZALES (2012)
FACTS:
On 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution expunging the Certificate of
Nomination which included herein petitioners as representatives of the party-list group known as
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC). The COMELEC en banc affirmed the said Resolution,
prompting Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita F. Planas to file the present Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing both
Resolutions, praying that they be recognized as the legitimate nominees of CIBAC party-list, and
that petitioner Lokin, Jr. be proclaimed as the CIBAC party-list representative to the House of
Representatives.
Page 111
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.)
7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the
platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys
public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and
governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to
the COMELEC a "Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections." The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who
claimed to be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as
the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8744 giving due course to CIBACs
Manifestation, "WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO the determination which of the two factions of the
registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent
to participate is the official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations
xxx."
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva,
submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The
nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla
submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin, Jr. and
Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as "acting
secretary-general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the
nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification," seeking to
nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented
herself as "acting secretary-general," when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the
Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party
and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of
Nomination on its behalf.
COMELEC granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the
records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing
respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
RULING:
By virtue of the mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the
nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the
COMELEC promulgated its "Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections." Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with
the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the
Page 112
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent.
A careful perusal of the records readily shows that Pia B. Derla, who has signed and submitted, as
the purported Acting Secretary General of CIBAC, the Certificates of Nomination of Respondents,
has no authority to do so. Despite Respondents repeated claim that Ms. Derla is a member and
officer of CIBAC, they have not presented any proof in support of the same. We are at a loss as to
the manner by which Ms. Derla has assumed the post, and We see nothing but Respondents
claims and writings/certifications by Ms. Derla herself that point to that alleged fact. Surely, We
cannot rely on these submissions, as they are the very definition of self-serving declarations.
Pia Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and
clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to the
COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the
evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members of
the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered with
COMELEC.
WHEREFORE , finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the
COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia
B. Derla. The nominees, as listed in the Certificate of Nomination filed on 19 January 2010 by
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, President and Chairman of Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) Party List, are recognized as the legitimate nominees of the said party.
MILAGROS E. AMORES vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J.

VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his
change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be
qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE:
WON Mr. Villanuevas assumption of office is legal.
RULING:
the Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of RA
No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident
of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks
to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
Page 113
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must
be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL
youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no reason
to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation,
the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law
was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective
of RA No. 7941.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual support for
public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private respondents shift of
affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as
there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes
his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided,
That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliationwithin six (6) months before an
election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party
or organization. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral
affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list
organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee
who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination
under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba
legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth
sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May,
2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not change his
sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found
that he shifted to CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March 17,
2007.
That private respondent is the first nominee of CIBAC, whose victory was later upheld, is of no
moment. A party-list organizations ranking of its nominees is a mere indication of preference,
their qualifications according to law are a different matter.
RONALDO LAYUG vs COMELEC, MARIANO VELARDE (alias BROTHER MIKE) and BUHAY PARTY-LIST
Page 114
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List
from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He
argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
4
Constitution , as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act. Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real
estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section
6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of
Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
In their Answer thereto, Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List is not a
religious sect but a political party possessing all the qualifications of a party-list. It is composed of
groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the handicapped, as well as the professionals, and
Brother Mike belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. They likewise
argued that nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not even come from
the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying the petition for lack
of substantial evidence.
As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers for Party-List, promulgated on July 30, 2010 NBC Resolution No. 10-034 proclaiming
Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of Representatives. Being the
fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay PartyList.
ISSUE:
WON the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
RULING:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members"
of the House are:
o Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall
be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list
1
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay
Page 115
Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano
Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the
fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states
that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We
ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
disqualifications of said party-lists.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND OTHER CASES (G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02
APRIL 2013, CARPIO, J.)
(pasensya na...pertinga taasa man uyy)
Facts:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366
and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in
the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization
that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of
R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC
disqualified the 39 groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW,
PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were
Page 116

able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of
these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Issue:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
49
Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Ruling:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of
this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional,
and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied
by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to democratize political power by
giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the house
of representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system ofrepresentation. Simply put, the partylist system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his
or her party-list group or organization of choice.
Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list system.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-listsystem to include not only
sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who come
from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.53
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead,
the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the
proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended
the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of
votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the
entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that
could not compete in legislative district elections.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
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organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties?
Section 5(2), article VI of the 1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first three consecutive
terms of congress after the ratification of the 1987 constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to partylist representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided
by law, except the religious sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively
for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of
one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully
open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be
no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the
party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political
and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in
the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the partylist
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed
struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the
Page 118

party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral
party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular
sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent
a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless
of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and
underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by definition marginalized and underrepresented,
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth
may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests andconcerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require
national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or
cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and
underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in section 5 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does
not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her
sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized and
underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.58
How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do they need to be
marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run as party list will give
give small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a
chance to win seats in the house of representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly,
women and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the
House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the
sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of
society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in
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economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of
Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their sectoral wings. They cannot
directly participate because they neither lack well defined political constituencies nor represent
marginalized and undderpresented sectors.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined political
constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those
who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them the opportunity to have members in the
Political parties are allowed to participate in the party list elections through their sectoral wings in order
to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections
so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of
major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House
of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
The qualification of a party-list nominee
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to
the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking
in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
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5.
6.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized
and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or
that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes
of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act
No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective
interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the
full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 19982001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of
office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed
performing the functions of his office and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B.
Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to
Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for
three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of
November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render
complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
Issue:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule;
and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section
43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective
officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule
embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official
has title to office and can serve
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The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption
7
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis
of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation
as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and
executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1.
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office
is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.(EXCEPTION)
"Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves
no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office
for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the
thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective
officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary
renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not
be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to
stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the
suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,"
which ends on 30 June 2004.
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao
del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of
six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President." Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and
Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required under
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645");
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881; 5 and, consequently,
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(3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or
regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646
("R.A. No. 6646").
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended
petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an
amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their original petition and, in
addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on
petitioners' standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for
lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to
this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14
May 2001 senatorial elections.
Issues:
W/N a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the Senate agreed to amend
Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth
(13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless
expenditures and the voters further inconvenience.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in
our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this Court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest
elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While
the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELEC's failure to so call
and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should
not take chances in future elections.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus: In case of vacancy in
the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the
manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they
contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases
25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it
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would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the
special election.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made
by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's
validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to
fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be
held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed
is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do
so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call
for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place
of the election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60 days nor longer than
90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office to be filled. The COMELEC's
failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a special election to fill the vacancy.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most prejudiced by
the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the absence of
proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate
the holding of the special election.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in
our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of
the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for." Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section
4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of
candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
PHILCONSA VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
FACTS: Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa), non-stock, non-profit association, whose members
are Filipino citizens and taxpayers has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of
Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such
implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution which provides xxx No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase. The reason given being that
the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have
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expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of
the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the
increase becomes effective?
RULING: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the
expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the
singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the
singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the House,
underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before
the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will
have expired.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974)
56 SCRA 823
FACTS: Petitioner LIGOT served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional
officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law and under section 7
thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided
that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not
entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous
decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase."
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Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on
December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by R.A 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of
at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
"in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of
pay as provided by law."
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in
petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its
supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim. Petitioner's request for reconsideration
was denied in due course. Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners claim for retirement gratuity be computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress.
RULING: No. Ligots contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act 4134
could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the full term of
all members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as petitioner) will have
expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is selfevident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969
such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the
similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the
Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what can not be done directly."
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative
when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969 cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned
for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation.
PEOPLE VS JALOSLOS
324 SCRA 689
FACTS: Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
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counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion (Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives) asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will. He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman.
He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.
Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.
Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be
heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general?
RULING: No. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The privilege of immunity from arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication
or equitable considerations.
Section 11, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution provides A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged
from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.
Aguinaldo doctrine does not apply to criminal cases.
Page 127
Neither can he rely on Aguinaldo doctrine. The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising
from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by
Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency
or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make
him a free man.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded.
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We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.
TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817
556 SCRA 471 (June 27, 2008)
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later that day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the
teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that
evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, Trillanes has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won
a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" Among his requests were: (a) To be allowed
to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate xxx (d) To be allowed to give interviews
and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press, (e) With prior notice to the Honorable
Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters
and other members of the media who may wish to interview him. xxx
(NB: letters (b), (c), (f) were withdrawn upon his MR when the court denied this Omnibus Motion)
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The trial
court just the same denied the motion. Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case.
(2) Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and serve
his mandate as senator.
(3) Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail as in the case of Former Pres. Estrada & Former ARMM Gov. Misuari.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case.
Page 129
Trillanes in attempting to strike a distinction between his case against Jaloslos argues that the latter was
already convicted albeit his conviction was pending appeal, whereas he is a mere detention prisoner. He
asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his
favor.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. The trial court thus correctly
concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. SC
categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of
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the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been
charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur
Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." He harps on an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner
failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December
2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on
these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG
17 SCRA 876
FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money,
by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion
having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal.
ISSUES: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,
(2) whether it is libelous or not.
RULING:
(1) No. The publication is not a privileged communication.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that Article VI, Section
15 of the 1935 Constitution it states that The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
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shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The determination of the first
issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein,
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the
trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
(2) Supreme Court are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein
alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano,
plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise,
added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. SC do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as
"planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations
are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said
communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to
stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned
passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup
d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
OSMEA VS PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
109 PHI 863
FACTS: Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., filed a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary
immunity.
Page 132
HR 59 created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960. Said charges
emanated from his one-hour privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a
serious assault upon the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule
XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by
the House.
The respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Osmea parliamentary immunity was violated.
(2) Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
RULING:
(1) There was no violation of Osmeas parliamentary immunity.
(2) SC has no jurisdiction.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for
"it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense." Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in
doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
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circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmea conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
LIBAN VS GORDON
G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
593 SCRA 68
CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat in
the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with
this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners
are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that
by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member
of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v.
Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.
Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to
be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed an act which, by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is
not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI
of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
Page 134

1. W/n petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled corporation;
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who is
Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate
RULING: We find the petition without merit.
(1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition.
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filed an action for
usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act which
constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto,
specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that
he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In the present
case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have
no standing to file the present petition.
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition
would still fail on the merits.
(2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known as the PNRC
Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is
to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to uphold the Fundamental
Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to
be autonomous and must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers
during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be seen as belonging to
any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim
separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the
PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy.
Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend
to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
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Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in
order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The PNRC must not appear
to be an instrument or agency that implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of
all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the
PNRC must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State.
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or
controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC
does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC
Board by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate powers of the
PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are
not reviewable by the President. The President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC Board. Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office, not a government
office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by special charter on 22
March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as amended, reads:
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government
or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would
be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the corporation is private,
it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated differently, only corporations created under a general
law can qualify as private corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code,
except that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives.
Although PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or
controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the
government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by
special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is
void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, are void.
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of
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the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
LIBAN VS GORDON (MOTION FOR RECON)
G. R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011
639 SCRA 703
CASE: Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed on August 10, 2009 by respondent Richard
J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the Decision),
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on August 27, 2009 by movant-intervenor Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC), and the latters Manifestation and Motion to Admit Attached Position Paper filed on
December 23, 2009.
FACTS: The Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
[5]
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC
Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled that the PNRC
should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 95
was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court
decided that Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court
on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the
Court to decide on that question. Respondent cites Laurel v. Garcia, wherein the Court said that it will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground and goes on to claim that since this Court, in the Decision, disposed of
the petition on some other ground, i.e., lack of standing of petitioners, there was no need for it to delve
into the validity of R.A. No. 95, and the rest of the judgment should be deemed obiter.
ISSUE: Whether to sustain the constitutionality of the PNRC Chapter.
RULING: As correctly pointed out in respondents Motion, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was
not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was
not the very lis mota of the case.
This Court should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have
based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
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consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after
more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August
16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No.
1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure,
but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the
international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its structure is sui generis.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
113 SCRA 31
CASE: This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
FACTS: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private
corporation, was held where Puyat and his group won.
The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings,
questioning the election. They claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional
grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.
Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional
prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that, May 15, Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A.
Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run
for election as a Director. The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30 and was sought to be
registered on said date. The next day, May 31, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in
the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. It is
this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 11. No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by, the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
RULING: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to
be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, after the contested
election of Directors on May 14, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25 before SEC and one
day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before
he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in
the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually
to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be
pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
Election of Officers
Santiago vs Guingona 298 SCRA 756 (1998)
Facts:
During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated Senator Tatad as Senate
President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated Senator Fernan for the same position. Senator
Fernan was voted Senate President with a vote of 20-2.
Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon was voted majority leader.
Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted for him were himself and Senator Santiago,
the two of them comprised the minority and that an agreement was entered into between them that
he will be the minority leader.
The Senate was grouped as follows:
10 members Laban ngMasang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
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Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member AksyonDemokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent
23 total number of senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a minority since there are
only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Senator Guingona
was thereafter formally recognized by the Senate President as the minority leader.
A petition for quo warranto was filed by Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that Senator Guingona had
been usurping ,unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,
according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator Guingona as the
minority leader.
Held:
History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party
to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with
a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller
number of votes or adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which
is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for
purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe
which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select
the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that
43
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To
our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there
an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
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choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during
their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them." Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the
courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence
of a majority.
Quorum
Avelino vs Cuenco 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada requested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session was delayed. He was not given the chance
to speak despite his attempts to claim his right to speak. A commotion broke outside the Senate gallery
which prompted them to adjourn. Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led
Senate President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session. The remaining
senators continued the session which was then chaired by the Senate President Pro-Tempore.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it
to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position
of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of
the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United
States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were present at the opening of session.
Issue: Whether or not there was quorum?
Held:
The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten
senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that
met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly,
Page 141

because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators
Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at
any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
Rules of Proceedings
Arroyo vs de Venecia 277 SCRA 258 (1997)
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that
there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that
their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after
a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of
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the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
wassigned into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification.
Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Garcillano vs HR Committee 575 SCRA 170 (2008)
Facts:
A few years ago, the Garci tapes (alleged conversation of GMA and Garcillano) became the subject of
Congressional hearings and joint investigation of different HR Committees. The hearings were indefinitely
suspended; however, the they decided to submit reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a
Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
4
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees
be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in
their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any
reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
5
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
10
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.
Held:
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The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of
the Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general
45
th
circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however,
of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
46
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published
rules of procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules
of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before
it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates
membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus
enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
th
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14 Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Dela Paz vs Senate Committee 579 SCRA 521 (2009)
Facts:
On October 6, 2008, a Philippine delegation of eight (8) senior Philippine National Police (PNP) officers
arrived in Moscow, Russia to attend the 77th General Assembly Session of the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO)-INTERPOL in St. Petersburg from October 6-10, 2008. With the delegation was
Gen. Dela Paz, then comptroller and special disbursing officer of the PNP. Gen. Dela Paz, however, was to
retire from the PNP on October 9, 2008.
On October 11, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended by the local authorities at the Moscow airport
departure area for failure to declare in written form the 105,000 euros [approximately P6,930,000.00]
found in his luggage. In addition, he was also found to have in his possession 45,000 euros (roughly
equivalent to P2,970,000.00).
Petitioners were detained in Moscow for questioning. After a few days, Gen. Dela Paz and the PNP
delegation were allowed to return to the Philippines, but the Russian government confiscated the euros.
On October 21, 2008, Gen. Dela Paz arrived in Manila, a few days after Mrs. Dela Paz. Awaiting them were
subpoenae earlier issued by respondent Committee for the investigation it was to conduct on the
Moscow incident on October 23, 2008.
On October 23, 2008, respondent Committee held its first hearing. Instead of attending the hearing,
petitioners filed with respondent Committee a pleading denominated Challenge to Jurisdiction with
2
Motion to Quash Subpoena. Senator Santiago emphatically defended respondent Committees
jurisdiction and commanded Balajadia to arrest petitioners.
Page 144

Issue: whether or not the respondent Committee has jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident.
Held: Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
"Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this
power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process.
Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
12) Committee on Foreign Relations. Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the relations of the
Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all
international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas Filipinos.
A reading of the above provision unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident
involving petitioners is well within the respondent Committees jurisdiction.
Pursuant to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee may
conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office by
officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and instrumentalities, and
on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its attention by any of its members. It
is, thus, beyond cavil that the Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general
and member of the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him
millions which may have been sourced from public funds.
Subsequent to Senator Santiagos verbal command to Balajadia to arrest petitioners, the Philippine
Senate issued a formal written Order of arrest, signed by ten (10) senators, with the Senate President
himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.
Discipline of Members
Alejandrino vs Quezon 46 Phil 63 (1924)
th
Senator Alejandrino, appointed by the Government General to represent the 12 Senatorial District, was
deprived of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from
the first of January, 1924. The resolution was adopted by herein respondents.
Senator Alejandrino prayed before the court: (1) To issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents
enjoining them from executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null
and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction
against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as
Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from
preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of
suspension, into effect.
Issue: whether the court has jurisdiction over the matters prayed for by Alejandrino.
Held:
the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie
against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely
legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
Page 145

power. So it has been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the
courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to
compel his reinstatement.
the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act,
sec. 18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for disorderly behavior. Neither House may
expel an appointive member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend" is then included in the
power to "punish," a power granted to the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the
power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General by the Constitution, it would appear that
neither is the correct hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the
Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the
Legislature.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does not
authorize it to suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year, conceding
what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet
the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not possess
the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. If it be said that this
conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of
all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a
credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of legislation and
of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against the Legislature and the Chief
Executive.
Osmena vs Pendatun 109 Phil 863 (1960)
Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida
K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them
to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
Issue: whether or not the House has the authority to censure petitioner.
Page 146

Held:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This
section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or
civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than
Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize
the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate. its purpose "is to enable
and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for
"it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."
Issue: whether the House may still bring action against him when it had taken up other business after his
speech.
Held:
Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, and such approval amounted to a suspension
of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited
number of members have agreed to a particular measure."
Issue: whether a speech attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.
Held:
the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which
the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.
Santiago vs Sandiganbayan356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Facts:
Review of the act of Sandiganbayan in ordering the preventive suspension of Senator DefensorSantiago in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for her alleged violation of
RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Issue:
Authority of the Sandiganbayan to issue to decree a 90-day preventive suspension of Senator

Santiago from any government position.
Page 147

Held:
It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form
and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and
there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.
"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982)."
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.
Nature of preventive suspension it is not a penalty because it is not imposed in judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. (BayotvsSandiganbayan)
The Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
the jurisprudence in which this Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to
decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
Order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each
xxx house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of its members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension,
when imposed shall not exceed sixty days.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the
government the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly
intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
Kahulugan
Page 148

Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)
On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections. While failure of elections
were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results.
Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.
The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna in
the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his complete/exact address
as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation of petitioners COC
and the latters disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged material misrepresentation in
his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he had declared Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in
[
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District.
[5]
Rosa residence).
Page 149

[6]
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said
petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET
CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners
[9]
election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required
one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
[33]
Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the
winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
[34]
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC
had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is coequal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the
matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers
to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only
where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct
and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the
office
of
Governor.
Page 150

The
respondent
seasonably
filed
an
election
protest
with
the
COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was approved
and
COMELEC
ordered
the
parties
to
submit
their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial
election
contest,
to
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd Division.
According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the
resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper
coordination
with
the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the motion on May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET
premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported
conduct
of
proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in
nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard
and
(b)
that
judgment
be
rendered
only
after
lawful
hearing
apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the
right
to
have
judgment
only
after
lawful
hearing
is
absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should have
jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was COMELECs
decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can
conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of
discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a
pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving due
notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in
appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own premises, authority and
control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent
COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies
Page 151

exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record
and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving
at
a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of
the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of
COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of
the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Page 152

In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and
deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial
contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under
these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of
any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is
taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our
standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election
contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and
other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over
election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET
premises side by side with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down
any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayoand
Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over
the Party list, and its representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of
the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party
list Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of
Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the
Page 153

HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be
a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
3
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from
participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that
Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified
4
from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , as well as Section
5
6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 , otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither
does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required
6
of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 , the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
3
Resolution denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC En
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his representatives or
counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in
4
the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. His motion for
5
reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated August 4, 2010
for being filed out of time.
Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
1
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two
Page 154

seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William
Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had
not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
1
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided
2
under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
3
Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and
lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel
[7]
his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En
Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del
Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that
he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
[15]
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that
of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
[17]
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from
the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no
final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs
Page 155

Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue
any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been
[18]
proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by
the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall
form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in
the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and
annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by
Page 156

the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations were
proclaimed winners.
Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the Commission on
Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks
the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on
proportional representation.
Page 157

Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate exercise the power
to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral
tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the
House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent
a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)

Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was
th
the incumbent representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May
th
2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against petitioner
alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city government of Ormoc to
extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.
The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case. Eventually, petitioner
was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.
Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the COMELEC
Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt
was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the
corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election Director to speed up the
reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the
Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute the allegations
against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he
received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after
Page 158

it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification.
The same order declared the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of
th
office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte. A copy of the said
Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a) reversed
the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent null and void.
Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
th
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte.
Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was
taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner as the
th
legally elected representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a
party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be
considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and
ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration
and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office
a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.
Page 159
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet
enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office
th
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 Legislative district of Leyte. For these
reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the
administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the
following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC
Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en
banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not
challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569 (2005)

On June 2, 2004, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Biazon as the duly elected 12th Senator in the May 10, 2004 National Elections. While failure of elections
were declared in some precincts, COMELEC reasoned that they would not materially affect the results.
Barbers, who ranked next to Biazon, filed a petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation.
When this was denied, he raised the issue before the Supreme Court. Does the Supreme Court have
jurisdiction?
Held: No. The word sole in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
Senate Electoral Tribunals (SET) jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.
The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since Barber contests Biazons proclamation as
the 12 winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint
Hernandez vs. HRET 2009
[5]
Rosa residence).
Page 160

[
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District.
[5]
Rosa residence).
[6]
Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First Division) dismissed said
petition for lack of merit
On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET
CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners
[9]
election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Private respondents main ground for the quo warranto petition was that petitioner lacked the required
one-year residency requirement provided under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution
Held:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17 thereof that the HRET and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members. The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these
[33]
Tribunals, which is conferred upon the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the
winning candidates. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office
[34]
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this case, the COMELEC
had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of
the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate.
Page 161

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET,
when reference to the qualification/s of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is coequal to the COMELEC, such that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the
matter of eligibility and qualification of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other
way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers
to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum
shopping even if another body may have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the Members qualification while the Member was still a candidate. There is forum-shopping only
where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct
and dissimilar in their nature and character.
Mendoza vs. Comelc (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Mendoza and respondent Pagdanganan vied ofr the position of Governor of the Province of
Bulacan in the May 14, 2007 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed winning candidate and assumed the
office
of
Governor.
The
respondent
seasonably
filed
an
election
protest
with
the
COMELEC.
- Revision of ballots involving the protested and counter-protested precincts soon followed.
The
revision
was
conducted
at
COMELECs
office
in
Intamuros.
- Thereafter, both parties submitted their other evidences. The formal offer of evidences was approved
and
COMELEC
ordered
the
parties
to
submit
their
memoranda.
- Mendoza and Pagdanganan complied with the order and the case was then submitted for resolution.
- March 2, 2009: the COMELEC transferred the Bulacan ballot boxes, including those involved in the
provincial
election
contest,
to
the
Senate
Electoral
Tribunal
(SET).
The
petitioner
filed
to
dismiss
further
proceedings.
- April 29, 2009: The motion filed by petitioner Mendoza was dismissed by COMELEC 2nd Division.
According to the latter, COMELEC has plenary powers to find alternative methods to facilitate the
resolution of the election protest; thus, it concluded that it would continue the proceedings after proper
coordination
with
the
SET.
- The petitioner moved to reconsider the order but still COMELEC 2nd Division denied the motion on May
26,
2009.
- Allegedly alarmed by information on COMELEC action on the provincial election contest within the SET
premises without notice to him and without his participation, the petitioners counsel wrote the SET
Secretary, Atty. Irene Guevarra, a letter dated June 10, 2009 to confirm the veracity of the reported
conduct
of
proceedings.
- The Secretary responded that the action was authorized by then Acting Chairman of the Tribunal, Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, upon formal request of the Office of Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle.
- The petitioner argues that the proceedings before the COMELEC in election protests are judicial in
nature and character. Thus, the strictures of judicial due process specifically, (a) opportunity to be heard
and
(b)
that
judgment
be
rendered
only
after
lawful
hearing
apply.
- The petitioner claims that without notice to him of the proceedings, the due process element of the
right
to
have
judgment
only
after
lawful
hearing
is
absent.
- Mendoza asserts that an important element of due process is that the judicial body should have
jurisdiction over the property that is the subject matter of the proceedings (2nd issue).
- Private respondent Pagdanganan argues that the proceeding referred to by Mendoza was COMELECs
Page 162

decision-making
process.
- Public respondent COMELEC further argues that in the absence of a specific rule on whether it can
conduct appreciation of ballots outside its premises or official custody, the issue boils down to one of
discretion the authority of the COMELEC to control as it deems fit the processes or incidents of a
pending election protest.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC violated due process by conducting proceedings without giving due
notice to the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction in
appreciating ballots which are not in its official custody and are outside its own premises, authority and
control.
Held:
While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent
COMELEC action is assailed for having been undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our standard of review is grave abuse of discretion, a term that defies
exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.
After due consideration, the Supreme Court held that the petition is bereft of merit.
These are the powers of the COMELEC as mentioned by the 1987 Constitution:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of
the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials.
(3) Decide, save those involving the right to vote, administrative questions affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, the appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and the registration of voters.
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC are the cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay Requirements 1-7).
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable
mind
might
accept
as
adequate
to
support
a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record
and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving
at
a
decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
Page 163

The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of
the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process is to give an opportunity to explain ones side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of
COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the
standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of
the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or
submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a
subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
In the present case, the petitioner invokes both the due process component rights at the hearing and
deliberative stages and alleges that these component rights have all been violated.
In these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial
contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations, and
controvert each others submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of procedures. Under
these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and neither one can complain of
any denial of notice or of the right to be heard.
The SC said The COMELEC is under no legal obligation to notify either party of the steps it is
taking in the course of deliberating on the merits of the provincial election contest. In the context of our
standard of review for the petition, we see no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the COMELEC in its deliberation on the Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation entailed.
We state at the outset that the COMELEC did not lose jurisdiction over the provincial election
contest, as the petitioner seems to imply, because of the transmittal of the provincial ballot boxes and
other election materials to the SET. The Constitution conferred upon the COMELEC jurisdiction over
election protests involving provincial officials. The COMELEC in this case has lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter, i.e., the provincial election contest, as well as over the parties.
Since the COMELEC action, taken by its Second Division, is authorized under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, the Second Division cannot in any sense be said to be intruding into the COMELEC en banc
rule-making prerogative when the Second Division chose to undertake ballot appreciation within the SET
premises side by side with the SET revision of ballots. To be exact, the Second Division never laid down
any new rule; it merely acted pursuant to a rule that the COMELEC en banc itself had previously enacted.
FACTS: Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayoand
Bantay respectively. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jurisdiction of HRET over
the Party list, and its representatives. HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the
nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC
Issue:W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..
Page 164
HELD: Affirmative. The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto
filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners
Abayon and Palparanwere not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under
their
internal
rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
nominees. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5,Article VI of
the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party
list Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like
manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of
Representatives, a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of
Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the
end,would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House
of Representatives.Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution.It is for the
HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be
a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay , respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
Layug vs. Comelec (2012)

Facts: On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and
3
concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to Disqualify (SPA No. 10-016[DCN]) Buhay Party-List from
participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. He argued that
Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified
4
from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , as well as Section
5
6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 , otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither
does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required
6
of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807 , the Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
3
Resolution denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
Layug moved for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 before the COMELEC En
Banc claiming denial of due process for failure of the COMELEC to serve him, his representatives or
counsels a copy of said Resolution. He alleged that it was only on July 26, 2010, after learning about it in
4
the newspapers, that he personally secured a copy of the Resolution from the COMELEC. His motion for
5
reconsideration, however, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in its Order dated August 4, 2010
for being filed out of time.
Page 165

Held:
The Court not the HRET has jurisdisdiction
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
its Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be elected
from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
1
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two
seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William
Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had
not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.Section 6 of said Act states that the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
1
coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse
its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided
2
under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
3
Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos vs. Comelec (2012)
Facts: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and
lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008 he began occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel
[7]
his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC
when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En
Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del
Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place
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to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that
he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
[15]
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
[16]
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that
of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
[17]
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from
the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no
final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs
Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue
any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been
[18]
proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Tanada vs. Cuenco
After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET
would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3
justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by
the NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
Held:
Although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall
form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the
authority shall be exercised.
Under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines.
Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted
Page 167

by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of
an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in
the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a
resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former
Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and
annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without
inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only
jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating
the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction.
Abbas vs. SET (1988)
Facts:
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates of
the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by
the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said
election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)
Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the
resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its
composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the
Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not
to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
Page 168

dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is
that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
Pimentel, Jr. v. HRET, 393 SCRA 231 (2002)
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13 organizations were
proclaimed winners.
Subsequently, the house of Representatives constituted the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12 members to represent it in the Commission on
Appointments. No one from the party-list was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks
the inclusion of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats in the CA based on
proportional representation.
Held: Under Sec. 17 and Sec. 18, Art. VI of the Constitution, the House and the Senate exercise the power
to choose who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 slots of their respective electoral
tribunal, as well as the 12 seats in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, even assuming that party-list
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse rests with the House, not with the Court. The discretion of the
House to choose the members is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court will not interfere, absent
a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion. The present petition does not allege that
the House barred party-list representatives from seeking membership in then HRET or the CA. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
Codilla vs. Comelec (2002)
Petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. was mayor of Ormoc City, while respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin was
th
the incumbent representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte. Both were candidates in the 14 May
th
2001 elections for the position of representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
A registered voter of Kananga, Leyte filed with COMELEC a petition for disqualification against petitioner
alleging that petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the city government of Ormoc to
extract, haul, and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte for the
purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
The case was assigned to the COMELECs Second Division, which issued an order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.
The same division sent notice to the petitioner through telegram.
At the time of the elections, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the case. Eventually, petitioner
was included in the list of candidates and voted for; initial results showed that petitioner was the winning
candidate.
Page 169

Respondent filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent with the COMELEC
Second Division. A copy was allegedly served on the petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt
was attached thereto. She also filed a second motion, a copy of which was sent to petitioner with the
corresponding registry receipt; however, theres no indication when petitioner received the motion.
The COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the (a) Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of the petitioner and (b) the Regional Election Director to speed up the
reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the office of the Clerk of the Commission. At this time, petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the
Motion to Suspend his Proclamation, hence he was denied of his right to rebut and refute the allegations
against him; (b) he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification; and (c) he
received the telegraph order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation four days after
it was sent to him. Said motion was not resolved; instead, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution that found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification.
The same order declared the votes cast in favor of the petitioner as stray votes and directed the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes. As a result,
respondent was declared as having the highest number of votes and she was proclaimed, took her oath of
th
office, and assumed office as the duly elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte. A copy of the said
Resolution was sent by fax to petitioners counsel.
The petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration and a petition for
declaration of nullity of proclamation. Said motion was granted and the COMELEC en banc (a) reversed
the resolution of the Second Division and (b) declared the proclamation of respondent null and void.
Respondent did not appeal from this decision.
th
Eventually, petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected representative of the 4 district of Leyte.
Petitioner took his oath of office before the Executive Judge of the Ormoc Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
wrote a letter-appeal to the House of Representatives through respondent De Venecia, but no action was
taken by the latter. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.
2.
3.
WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

WON the proclamation of respondent Locsin directed the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction
to review its validity.
WON it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize the petitioner as the
th
legally elected representative of the 4 legislative district of Leyte.
Held:
1. NO. First, the petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a
party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Page 170
Second, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be
considered stray. Considering the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC Second
Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and
ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor.
Also, Respondent Lim, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. It is a settled doctrine that the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration
and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office
a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place.
2. NO. The petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him; hence, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said order was yet
enforceable as it has not attained finality; thus, it cannot be used as the basis for the assumption in office
th
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4 Legislative district of Leyte. For these
reasons, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
3. YES. If the Law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. In the case, the
administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents because of the
following reasons: the petitioner garnered the highest number of votes; the order of the COMELEC
Second Division, which ordered the proclamation of Respondent Locsin was set aside by the COMELEC en
banc which ordered the proclamation of the petitioner; said decision by the COMELEC en banc was not
challenged by the respondent and has become final and executory.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office
of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of
the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) vs ATTY. ANTONIO
MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
(I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please focus on the Doctrine of Nondelegation of Powers)
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional Director II
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned citizen
dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is apparently
disproportionate to his income as a public official. The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama,
Page 171
Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for appropriate action. The
Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter
and issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of the BIR and the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief
Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayors appointment papers along with a
certified true copy of the latters Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year
2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished
the PAGC with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford Expedition, a
1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi Galant.
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, a
media organization which had previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of
certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999,
2000 and 2001. In Montemayors 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that Montemayor
declared his ownership over several motor vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.
On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal Charge against Montemayor on
May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019in relation to Section 8 (A)
of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from
1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1
million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM0149-03. On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counteraffidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the receipt
of the Order. Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer to
the formal charge lodged against him.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel, moved for
the deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA questioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct the administrative
investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion for lack of merit, and instead
gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-affidavit or verified answer. Still, no answer
was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285
enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60) days. On September 12,
2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and recommending to the Office of the President
Montemayors dismissal from the service.
On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Arthur P.
Autea, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This time, he argued that he was
denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case
notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent
elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND RESPONDENTS DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE;
Page 172
WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OF ITS JURISDICTION TO

INVESTIGATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE PAGC [WITH ITS
JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH ITS INVESTIGATION.
RULING:
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily address the
problem on corruption and abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials
appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12, the PAGC has the power to
investigate and hear administrative complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated
must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
and (2) that the said official must be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an
equivalent rank, or higher.
Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded
to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any documents
supporting the complainants assertions.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous
complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based
on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to
engender a belief that the allegations may be true. Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision
to proceed with the investigation process without giving him the opportunity to present
controverting evidence.
We find nothing irregular with the PAGCs decision to proceed with its investigation
notwithstanding the pendency of Montemayors petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing
of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case before it.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution enjoys the
presumption of regularity particularly since it was done in the performance of its official duties.
Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against
the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized government
personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by
itself cannot be used to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular
performance of the PAGCs duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was not
afforded a second opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold water. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the
party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor of the
formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counteraffidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed without respondent asking for an
extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but the
latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his petition for certiorari. During the preliminary
conference, Montemayor was again informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until
June 19, 2003 within which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting
evidence with a warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted
Page 173
for resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again, the deadline
lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
We stress that the PAGCs findings and recommendations remain as recommendations until
finally acted upon by the Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices
upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for
another opportunity before the Office of the President to present his side particularly since the
assailed resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of these
two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this Court for the
consequences of his own shortcomings.
o The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the
Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor. More importantly, the
proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the initiation and filing
of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the Office of the Presidents decision to
dismiss Montemayor from government service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office
of the President of its concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power over
Montemayor had already been terminated even before the Ombudsman could take
cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take over a task that is
already a fait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss Montemayor
from government service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of petitioners.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center
and Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two
of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam
results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the
successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules
and Regulations).
Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review

centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving
permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno
however believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate
of EO 566.
Page 174
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner
filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center
from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to
tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to
public and private institutions of higher education.
In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the operation of
independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI,
tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the
annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative
power, and the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other
organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.
On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s.
2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers
to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC
resolved torequire the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the
RIRR, and CMO 21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it
expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1.
Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR
clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private
post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows
that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance
the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program
that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher
learning" that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as
"education beyond the secondary level or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the
"similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by
licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance
examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly
qualify as programs of higher learning.
2.
Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20, Title I of Book
III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states
Page 175

that the exercise of the Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."
There is no law granting the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has
no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. The line
that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested
this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition,
is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has
control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative power. Administrative power is
concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise
of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its
jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
Before us is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated April 2, 2009 which
granted the consolidated petitions of petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are hereby (1) restrained from collecting from
petitioner the amount of P28,413,783.00 representing the transitional input tax credit due it for the
fourth quarter of 1996; and (2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of P347,741,695.74 paid as
output VAT for the third quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional input tax credit available to
petitioner for the said quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to such amount. No pronouncement
as to costs.
The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following arguments:

1.
Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue Code (old NIRC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the treatment of real properties or real
estate dealers on the one hand, and the treatment of transactions involving other commercial goods on
the other hand, as said distinction is found in Section 105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 7-
Page 176

95 which defines the input tax creditable to a real estate dealer who becomes subject to vat for the first
time.
2.
Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the transitory provisions of revenue regulations no. 7-95
validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the improvements on real properties.
3.
Revenue Regulations no. 6-97 did not repeal Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
ISSUE: Whether or not
properties.
allowable transitional input tax credit is limited to improvements on real
HELD: The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273 [1987], took effect on January 1, 1988. It
amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise
accommodated the potential burdens of the shift to the VAT system by allowing newly VAT-registered
persons to avail of a transitional input tax credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.
RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section 100 of the Old NIRC by imposing for
the first time value-added-tax on sale of real properties. The amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax. There shall be
levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods, or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.(1) The term 'goods or properties'
shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include:
(A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade or
business; xxx
The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional input tax credit, remain intact
despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section 105 however was amended with the passage of the new
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (New NIRC), also officially known as Republic Act (RA) 8424. The
provisions on the transitional input tax credit are now embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development

Corporations (FBDC) presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on the basis of Revenue
Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96).
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the
improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988). The transitional input tax shall be 8% of the value of the
inventory or actual VAT paid, whichever is higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the
output tax of the VAT-registered person.
In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of
RR 7-95 for being in conflict with the law. It held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and
coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans statutory authority or basis and
justification to make such limitation. This it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the
case of real estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to their beginning
inventory.
A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole
law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statutes clauses and phrases must not be taken
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be
Page 177

interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole;
construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each
and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make
every part effective, harmonious and sensible.
The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties" leaves no room for doubt. It states:
Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. (a) Rate and base of tax. xxx. (1) The term
goods or properties shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are capable of pecuniary
estimation and shall include: (A) Real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in
the ordinary course of trade or business; xxx.
The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes "real
properties held primarily for sale to costumers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business."
Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used in Section 105 of the same code
could not have a different meaning. Goods, as commonly understood in the business sense, refers to the
product which the VAT-registered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to real estate dealers,
it is the real properties themselves which constitute their "goods." Such real properties are the operating
assets of the real estate dealer.
However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the presumptive input tax shall be the
improvements, such as buildings, roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot

contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition
of the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR and the
Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect
of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and
purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of
the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void. While
administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement
statutes, they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or
extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law.
Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative
ruling, the basic law prevails.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of transitional

input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that the allowable transitional input tax
credit is not limited to improvements on real properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has
effectively been repealed by RR 6-97 which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as
the definition of real properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause would
not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the aforequoted
Page 178

paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the provisions of
RR 6-97 and RR 7-95
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
FACTS:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe benefits into
the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state universities and colleges, and
local government units as required by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 and
implemented through the challenged National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees. Its Section 12
directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being enjoyed by
employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that
the employees may be receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC 59 dated
September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state universities and colleges, and
local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and additional compensations which
were deemed integrated in the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2, 1989, covering
all government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM reissued this circular on February 15, 1999 and published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the
Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001, clarifying
that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the
employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of
allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were
already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their standardized
salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners
in G.R. 159007 questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing
personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R.
173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials and employees of the
Insurance Commission.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that all
Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees under
R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated
cases covering the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently, the
payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until
otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other
Page 179

responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and
benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the COLA into the standardized salary rates;
and
HELD:
1.
Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all government-owned or
controlled corporations and government financial institutions was ineffective until its re-issuance and
publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart, NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of
the national government, state universities and colleges, and local government units should also be
regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus, the COLA should not be
deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that the
fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA
into the standardized salary rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59,
should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the fact of consolidation of COLA into the
employees salary as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform
the public of its contents before their rights and interests are affected by the same. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates is not
dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in the standardized
salary rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of integrationall
allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually integrated into the
employees salaries. Records show that the government employees were informed by their respective
offices of their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with
the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of
the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his standardized pay
under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the employees monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of the consolidation of
COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of
a back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first
place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity
of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing
rules.
Page 180
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)

FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The
source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut
Administration was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at
the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the
PCA. Cocofund receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller. During the Martial Law regime,
then President Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of
the coconut industry. The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the Fund
for theacquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the distribution of the
shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free to the coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share
(P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers. The rest of the Fund was
deposited to the UCPB interest free. Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA
were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of COCOFUND receipts
were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to
private individuals. Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1which created the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to
file cases for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of
stock in the UCPB registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the PCA.
TheSandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut
Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD No. 755 (and some other PDs)
were unconstitutional.
Now, petitioners come to this Court contending that, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the distribution of the UCPB shares to
the coconut farmers. Section 1 of PD 755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards that
circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely authorized the PCA to fill matters of detail an
execution through promulgated rules and regulations
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
RULING: YES. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes
PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy
the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank.
Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who
Page 181

plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB
shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as
to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined
by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition
of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the
national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become
participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development. The said law gratuitously gave away
public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without any
restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the
private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any
other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline,
standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that
would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte
blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full
disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or
restrictions that would advance the laws national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue
delegation of legislative power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation
G.R. No 179579, February 1, 2012
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified
further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%.
The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation
classified them to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive application of the regulation is
confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not
have jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003
was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the respondent
were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in favour of the
respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that the
regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were not complied with.
The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
Held:
Page 182

Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The Commissioner of
Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe
the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws
when he provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and (3) went
beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer
to examine and assess imported articles.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause
under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it,
where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food
grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to
7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade
wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The
regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer must first
assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer
had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the
Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs
officers prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so
that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House.
During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum.
But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There
being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is
thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report
had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House
Page 183

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members
of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn
for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House.
ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
1
FACTS: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the
year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or
reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in
the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by
their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees
whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria
adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions,
including the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and
issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created for such purpose.
Page 184

Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed
upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argues that the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It
ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power
on the part of the executive and the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House
of Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight
Committee will have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter
become functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May
22, 2006, it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition
for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
52
presentment.
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
53
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two
chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto,
both a single-chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Page 185

Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making
under the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto
is a valid legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if
approved by both chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
54
55
Congress. Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President. As summarized by Justice
56
57
Isagani Cruz and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. , the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some
measures that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the
Senate President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same
nature or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a
committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in
its entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most
important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at
least three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes
and explain them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three
readings. If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference
58
committee representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and
the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
59
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the
legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable
61
requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is
62
wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and
the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role
of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress
or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling
made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Page 186

Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there
may be similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court
refrains from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case
assailing those provisions is brought before us
SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
2
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations dated September 22,
2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005
was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
7
Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch
of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of
E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at
the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of
the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from
the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga
sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the
Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has
been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Page 187

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan
and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari
and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it
has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public
interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and
prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to
the hearings but most of them failed to attend having invoked E.O. 464.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution
RULING:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two
provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through
the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the
question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President,
or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard
by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article
VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which
provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." An excerpt
of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is
a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
Page 188

accountable for their acts and the operation of the government, corresponding to what is known in
Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the
legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in
the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before
their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from
the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear
in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the
Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a
parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the
executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are
adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive
branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made
reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is
intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive
information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of
most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex
gratia by the executive. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In
such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only
request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is
Page 189

"in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the
basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker
Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
LEGUIN
MANTE
MANZANO
CIR v. CA, CTA & YMCA, 298 SCRA 83.
Facts: YMCA is a non- stock, non- profit institution that conducts various programs and activities which
are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and
charitable objectives. Thus, YMCA declared itself as charitable and, at the same time, educational
institution.
In conjunction with its operation, YMCA is, on the other hand, earning revenues from its leased
spaces to other private individuals and parking fees from non- members, among others.
In 1980, YMCA generated, inter alia, an income of P676,829.80 from rentals of the leased
premises, and P44,259.00 from parking fees on non- members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an
assessment to YMCA.
Issue: Is the income derived from the rentals of real property owned by YMCA established as a
welfare, educational and charitable non- profit corporation- subject to income tax under the National
Internal Revenue Code and the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 27 of the NIRC, viz:
Page 190

Exemptions from Tax on Corporation.- The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in
respect to income received by them as suchxxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare;
(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other non- profitable
purposes, not part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or member.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Notwithstanding the provisions in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character
of the foregoing organizations from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities
conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax
imposed under this Code (As amended by P. D. No. 1457).
A reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any property of exempt
organization, as well as the arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase any of
their activities conducted for profit does not qualify the word properties. This makes income from the
property of the organization taxable, regardless of how that income is used- whether for profit or for lofty
non- profit purposes.
Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides exemption not the institution
itself, but from real estate taxes of all lands, buildings and improvement actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.
Neither an exemption be given in light of Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter. We
reiterate thatYMCA is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from
its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non- stock, non- profit educational institution is
insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of the income tax.
To avail of the exemption, YMCA must prove by substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the
classification non- stock, non- profit educational institution; and, (2) the income it seeks to be exempted
from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744.

Facts: Francisco I. Chavez (Chavez later, for brevity), as tax payer, citizen and former government
official who initiated the prosecution Marcoses anf their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury, alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometimes in September 1997, viz:
Page 191

1) The alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss bank; and,
2) The reported execution of a compromise between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
Invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the State to disclose
publicly all its transaction involving the national interest, Chavez demands that PCGG make publicly any
and all negotiations and agreement pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill- gotten
wealth.
The PCGG interposes several oppositions for the denial of the reliefs being sought by Chavez,
however, admits forging a compromise with the Marcoses, stipulating, among others, viz:
2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the
FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE
PARTY shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due to the Republic of the Philippines. xxx.
Issue:
Was the said compromise agreement valid?
Held:
Legal Restraint on a Marcos- PCGG Compromise:

xxx
xxx
xxx
Second, PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the
Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28(4), Article VI of
the Constitution, specifically provides, No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The PCGG has absolutely no power to
grant tax exemption, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill- gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their
properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights.
Any special grant of tax exemption in favour only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate constitutional rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal
revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt
as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates
a clear inability to pay. xxx. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the
commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears
to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due.
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUEZON CITY & THE CITY ASSESSOR, 433 SCRA 119
Page 192

Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines (LCP later, for brevity) is a non- stock, non- profit entity,
established by virtue of P. D. No. 1823. It stood in Lot No. PR- 3- B- 34- 1- B- 1, SWO 04- 000495,
registered in its name, measuring 121, 463 sq. mtrs., and situated in Quezon City. A wide portion of the
said hospital at the ground floor is being leased to private parties and being utilized as canteen, small
store spaces, offices of some professionals, medical clinics, and the like.
LCP contends as a charitable institution being committed to provide free medical services to
indigent patients, and must thus be exempted from real property taxes. It reinforces its claim by saying
that it is being subsidized by the government. And, such character shall not lose by mere fact of collecting
fees from the paying patients.
Issues: Whether the LCP is a charitable institution; and, (2)Whether the real properties of the LCP are
exempt from real property taxes.
Held: 1) We hold that the LCP is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. xxx
xxx
xxx
2) Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue,
that those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
In order to be entitled to the exemption, the real property is ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and
EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusive
of others; debarred from participation and enjoyment; and exclusively is defined in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes,
it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words dominant use
or principal use cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively.
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the
direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purpose for which the charitable
institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of
whether the property is used for tax exempt purposes.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts
of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the
portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether
paying or non- paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
EXEC. SECRETARY, et. al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC, et. al., GR No. 164171; GR No.
164172; GR No. 168741 (482 SCRA 673).
Facts: On December 12, 2002, Pres. GMA, through Exec. Sec. Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156 entitled
Providing for a Comprehensive Industrial Policy and Directions for the Motor Vehicle Development
Program and its Implementing Guidelines, that provides, among others, viz:
Page 193

3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of used motor
vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The above- cited Order is being bombarded with suits for declaratory reliefs from Subic- based
used vehicles importers and traders, among those is herein Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., before the
RTC of Olongapo City, unanimously seeking, inter alia, for the nullity/invalidity thereof for being
transgressing to the constitution.
Issues: (1) Whether there is statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; (2) If the answer is in the
affirmative, whether Section 3.1 of EO 156 is reasonable and within the scope provided by law.
Held: The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was issued pursuant to
EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that its application should be extended to
the Freeport because the guarantee of R.A. 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an
exemption from customs duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate
for all kinds of goods and materials without restriction.
Concomitantly, the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an exercise of police
power, which is vested on the legislature. Absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President
through an executive issuance, is void. Such delegation confers upon the President quasi- legislative
power which may defined as the authority delegated by the law- making body to the administrative body
to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy. To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the following
requisites:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and,
4) It must be reasonable.
EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. xxx. There are thus
explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the President to ban or regulate importation
of articles and commodities into the country.
xxx
xxx
xxx.
With respect to the third and fourth issues, an examination of the nature of a Freeport under
R.A. 7227 and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.
R.A. 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and balanced conversion of
the Clark and Subic military reservation and their extensions into alternative productive uses in the form
of Special Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and
social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.
Page 194

The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and capital within a
portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to invest their capital in a business climate
with the least governmental intervention.
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general, engaged in any
business as well as import and export any article into and out of the Freeport. These are among the rights
accorded to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39, Rules and Regulation Implementing R.A.
7227.
In given discussions, we hold that the importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid
administrative order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits
of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other
existing laws for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government
cannot usurp.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to regulate or forbid
importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which R.A. 7227,
considers to some extent, a foreign territory.
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative only outside the
Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of
R.A. 7227.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,
such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adopted to secure the end in view. If shown to
bear no reasonable relation to the purpose for which they were authorized to be issued, then they must
be held to be invalid.
SEN. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et. al. v. EXEC. SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., et. al., 252 SCRA 695
Facts: On April 18, 1993, House Representative Antonio Abaya filed HB No. 8817, entitled An Act
Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago. After public hearings on the said bill were conducted, the same was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading, and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. Then, it
was transmitted to the Senate.
However, prior to the transmission of the said HB No. 8817 to the Senate on January 18, 1994,
Sen. Vicente Sotto III previously filed before the Senate SB No. 1243, entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago. Public
hearings were also conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on SB No. 1243. Later, the
Senate Committee on Local Government submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817 approving
the same without amendment considering that HB No. 8817 was all fours with SB No. 1243.
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Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and was approved on
Third Reading, with amendment proposed by the Senate which, on the other hand, the House of
Representatives approved the same.
The enrolled bill was signed by the Chief Executive as R.A. No. 7720.
Issue:
the
In the enactment of RA No. 7720, was there a compliance with Section 24, Article VI of
Constitution?
Held: Although a bill of local application like BH No. 8817 should be constitutional prescription,
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that R.A. No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the Houseof Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was
passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. xxx. HB No. 8817 was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of R.A. No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant
controversy.
xxx. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate
in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
JOKER P. ARROYO, et. al., v. JOSE DE VENECIA, et. al., G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997.
Facts: A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the approved bill, which originated in the House of Representatives as HB
No. 7198.
During the session on November 21, 1996, a number of representatives delivered sponsorship
speech, after interpellation. During Rep. Rogelio Sarmientos turn, he was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After the head count, it turned out that there was really a quorum.
The transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as
published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996, showed the factual accounts
thereof, viz:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question
that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
Page 196

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report,
and the Chair called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
The bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Issue: Whether or not the House rules were violated that would render the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 null
and void
Held: The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no
quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
Page 197

if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 235
SCRA 630.
Facts: A HB No. 11197, seeking to amend certain provisions of NIR pertaining to Value Added- Tax
(VAT) was instituted before the House of Representatives, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110
of Title IV, 112, 115 and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and
114 of Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
After the same was considered on the second reading, it was approved by the House of
Representatives after the third reading.
After the HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate, the latter came up with another version
and recommended the approval of SB No. 1630, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System to widen its Tax Base and Enhance its
Administration, amending for these purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of
Title IV, 112 of Title V, and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V,
all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
After considering the HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, the conference committee ended up with
the endorsement of another/third version of the bill, entitled:
An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax System, Widening its Tax Base and Enhancing its
Administration and for these Purposes Amending and Repealing the Relevant Provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as Amended and for Other Purposes.
The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines, and became R.A. No.
7716.
Issue:
of
Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is void for it did not exclusively originate from the House
Representatives.
Held: To begin with, it is not the law- but the revenue bill- which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. xxx. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute- and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law- must substantially be the same
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as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. It would be to violate the equality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINCNE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 249
SCRA 630.
Held: (On Motion for Reconsideration). While Article VI, Section 24 provides that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills must originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, it also adds, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely
new bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to
which a bill is referred may do any of the following: (1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make
changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely
new bill as a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or, (4) to make no report at all.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO v. EXEC.
SEC. ERMITA, et. al., 469 SCRA 1.
Facts:
Article VII Executive Department

C. Prohibitions
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary (194 SCRA 317)
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department
to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional
compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII
prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment.
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor
General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless
otherwise allowed by law which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII,
section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet
member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, Section 13 of the
constitution.
RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions
is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment
which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
Page 199

and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII
cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative
intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to
particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA 437 SCRA 655
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by
then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and
review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members
appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members
turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12,
1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment
ofhonoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June
27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Issue: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
Ruling:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is correct that
there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex
officio members' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding multiple
positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket prohibition of paragraph
2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against holding multiple government offices, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office, profession,
business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant
Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
First, the NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because
there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional
compensation therefor.
Bitonio vs. COA 425 SCRA 437 G.R. No. 147392
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the DOLE. In a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S. Brilliantes of the
DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. in
pursuance to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7916, otherwise known as the Special Economic Zone Act of
1995, As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for
every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per
diems to the petitioner.
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The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows:
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office
and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038
dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509
Hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Ruling: We rule in the affirmative.
The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary where the Court declared Executive Order No. 284 allowing government officials to hold
multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their
Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly
provides It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of
his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no
separate or special appointment for such position. Since the Secretary of Labor is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise
applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary
of Labor.
In Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit., it was held that
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under
the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution."
Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the Secretary of
Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the
member in the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the
member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV of the
DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties
Union case is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by
the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would
not have been in the Board at all.
Public Interest v. Elma 494 SCRA 53 (2006) G.R. No. 138965 June 30, 2006
*concurrent
appointments,
incompatible
office
Nature: CPM + TRO to declare null and void the concurrent appointments of ELMA as PCGG Chair and as
Page 201

Chief
Presidential
Legal
Counsel
Facts: Elma was appointed as PCGG Chair Oct 1998. Later on he was appointed as CPLC (Jan 1999 during
his term), but waived any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
Supervening events: Theres actually no more controversy involved: In 2001, Elma was replaced by Sabio
as PCGG. Nachura was then appointed as CPLC but pending resolution of the case, he was appointed
SOLGEN.
Arguments: Public Interest Center
CLU vs. Exec Sec: Art IX-B, Sec 7, par2 and Art VII, Sec13 are violated by concurrent appointments CPLC
and PCGG Chair are incompatible offices.
Arguments: Elma
As interpreted in CLU vs. Exec Sec, the mentioned consti provisions dont cover other public officials given
the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary. His appointment falls under the exceptions
in Art IX-B, Section 7
The 2 positions are not incompatible.
NOTE: even if issue already moot, SC still took cognizance of the case because the case is capable of
repetition, and to serve as a guide to the bench. (Symbolic or Teaching Function of Judicial Review)
Issue 1: whether such appointments violate the other constitutional provision regarding multiple offices,
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
NO if based on position.
YES if based on primary functions test.
The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG
Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
CLU vs. Exec Sec: The language of Section 13, Article VII is a definite and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple offices or employment. The Court cautiously allowed only two exceptions to
the rule against multiple offices:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice President
to become a member of the Cabinet; or
(2) posts occupied by the Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials office. The Court further qualified that additional duties must not only be closely related to, but
must be required by the officials primary functions. Moreover, the additional post must be exercised in
an ex-officio capacity, which denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.[18] Thus, it will not
suffice that no additional compensation shall be received by virtue of the second appointment, it is
mandatory that the second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is
exercised in an ex-officio capacity.
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*Even Section 13, Article VII does not sanction this dual appointment. Appointment to the position of
PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa.
In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent
Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant
secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is applicable to respondent
Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do
not require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question are not
covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under
Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and elective officials, due to the incompatibility
between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
Issue 2: whether the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC falls under the prohibition against
multiple offices imposed by Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
YES.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People
v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to
interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two; x x x Where one
office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent
and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the
one is the vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the
nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from
the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one with the other,
before they are incompatible at common law. x x x
***In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The
duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of
various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of executive
departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the
review of the CPLC.
*note: Memorandum Order No. 152, issued on 9 July 2004 (provides that CPLC review Decision on
investigation involving Cabinet Secretaries, agency heads, or Presidential appointees with the rank of
Secretary conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
Public Interest v. Elma 517 SCRA 336 (March 5, 2007) G.R. No. 138965
Facts:
Elma sought - the reconsideration of the Decision in the case of Public Interest Center, Inc., et al.
v. Magdangal B. Elma, et al. (G.R. No. 138965), promulgated on 30 June 2006.
Page 203
In its Decision, the Court declared that the concurrent appointments of the respondent as PCGG
Chairman and CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled that the concurrent appointment to these offices is in
violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible
offices. The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the
heads of various executive departments and agencies and reviewing investigations involving heads of
executive departments. Since the actions of the PCGG Chairman, a head of an executive agency, are
subject to the review of the CPLC, such appointments would be incompatible.
The Court also decreed that the strict prohibition under Section 13 Article VII of the 1987
Constitution would not apply to the present case, since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a
secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. However, had the rule thereunder been applicable to
the case, the defect of these two incompatible offices would be made more glaring. The said section
allows the concurrent holding of positions only when the second post is required by the primary functions
of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity. Although respondent Elma waived
receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not
require his appointment as CPLC.
Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration be granted.
Ruling: DENIED
After reviewing the arguments propounded in respondents Omnibus Motions, we find that the basic
issues that were raised have already been passed upon. No substantial arguments were presented. Thus,
the Court denies the respondents motion for reconsideration.
In response to the respondents request for clarification, the Court ruled that respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible
offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when
he accepted the second office as CPLC.
There also is no merit in the respondents motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in
question in the present case is the constitutionality of respondent Elmas concurrent appointments, and
[2]
not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere application of constitutional
provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. Contrary to the allegations of the
respondent, the decision of the Court in this case does not modify the ruling in Civil LibertiesUnion v.
Executive Secretary. It should also be noted that Section 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated 7
February 1989clearly provides that the Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or
resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
D. Succession
Estrada vs. Desierto
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
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In the heat of people power , At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacanang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers
the duties of the Presidency On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.,
as her Vice President.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal- Arroyo claims she is the President..
Issue: 1. Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President
Rule: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The
validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum, we hold that the
resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was
going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge
after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
Page 205

now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary
leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella
is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the
Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence
when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor
of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people.
Issue 2: Was Estrada merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave?
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII. Considering
the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and
Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at
about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175
4. Also, House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176 stating that expressed its support
to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
5. Further, bills were already sent by the Congress to the Office of GMA as president.
6. Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of
petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. In
fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
Page 206

to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Borja v. COMELEC 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998
* In case of temporary disability
Facts: Jose Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on
June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30,
1998.
Jose Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as
mayor of Pateros. On motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to
run for mayor. It ruled that Capcos succession into office is not counted as one term for purposes of the
computation of the three term limitation under the Constitution and Local Government Code.
Capco was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was
proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Issue: WON Capco is eligible to run for mayor
Held:
Yes
Ratio: Purpose of the three term rule: First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the
only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the
freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to
disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of
choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they
rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive
terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they
adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred
from running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third
consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will
choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution
provision recognizing peoples power.
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The
first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a
Page 207

result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the
right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of reelection.
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose
whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served
three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election.
The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from
serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official
concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he
was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the
House of Representatives from serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if
one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter
how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed. This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide: Yes, because we
speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower
House.
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of
Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from
office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term
for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected
and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than
refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of
a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to
the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. This provision says that No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office
at any time. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have
served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who
simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has
occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on
elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the
constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose
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of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by
automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that
office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected
primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or
resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the
good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the
Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think
can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than
four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer
of the Sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct
powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. It
cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that
in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted
in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
MUNEZ
OMELIO
EFFECTS OF PARDON
CRISTOBAL v. LABRADOR
71 PHIL 34 (1940)
FACTS: On March 15, 1930, the CH found respondent Santos guilty of the crime of estafa and sentenced
him to 6 months of arresto mayor and the accessories provided by law, to return to the offended parties
the amounts of P375 and P125 respectively, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs. On appeal, the judgment Of conviction was affirmed and the respondent was accordingly
confined in the provincial jail from March 14, 1932 to Aug. 18, 1932. Notwithstanding his conviction,
respondent continued to be a registered elector and was, for the period comprised between 19-~4 and
1937, seated as the municipal president of Malabon, Rizal.
On Aug. 22, 1938, CA 357 (Election Code) was approved by the National Assembly, Sec. 94 of
which disqualifies the respondent from voting for having been "declared by final judgment guilty of any
crime against property." The respondent forthwith applied to the president for an absolute pardon. On
Dec. 24, 1939, the Chief Executive granted the petition restoring the respondent to his "full civil and
political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money
or property responsibility."
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On Nov. 16, 1940, petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of respondent Santos
from the list of voters, citing Sec. 94 of CA 357. The CFI denied the petition. Hence, this petition for a writ
of certiorari to review the decision of the lower court sustaining the right of respondent to remain in the
list of registered voters.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pardon granted by the President restores the respondent to the full
enjoyment of his political rights.
HELD: An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting
from the conviction. While the pardon extended to respondent is conditioned in the sense that "he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent to full civil and political
rights."
1.
Under Section 11(6), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this Constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, to wit: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and, (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment. Subject to
the limitations imposed by the Court, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by
legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by
the highest authority to whom it is entrusted.
2.
The disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis for
disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those
who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power
likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute
pardon removes an that is left of the consequences of conviction.
FELOBELLO v. PALATINO
72 PHIL 441 (1941)
FACTS: Petitioner Pelobello instituted quo warranto proceedings in the CFI against respondent Palatino,
the mayor-elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. He alleged that the respondent, having been criminally
convicted by final judgment in 1912 and sentenced to imprisonment, was disqualified from voting and
being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by
plenary pardon granted by the President on Dec. 25,1940. From the records, it is admitted that the
respondent committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already been merited conditional
pardon from the Gov. General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected
councilor for the period 1918-1921; was elected municipal president of Torrijos three times in succession
(1922-1931) and finally elected mayor in the 1940 local elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to
criminal conviction under Sec. 94 of Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but
before the date fixed by law for assuming office.
HELD: We adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations
imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by the legislative
action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities
Page 210

resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,
absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.
Under the existing circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus
extended on the date mentioned above and before the date fixed in the Election Code for assuming
office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of
the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and
disregard what at bottom is a teclu'lical objection
LACUNA v. ABES
24 SCRA 780 (1968)
FACTS: Respondent Abes had been convicted of the crime of counterfeiting treasury warrants and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor. After he had partially served his sentence, he was released from confinement on 7 April 1959 by
virtue of conditional pardon granted by the president, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison
term and fine. Without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have been served on 13 Oct. 1961. In
view of the forthcoming 1967 elections, respondent applied for registration as a voter but the Election
Registration Board denied his application. The denial notwithstanding, he filed his certificate of candidacy
for the office of mavor and won the election. Petitioner Lacuna placed second.
Petitioner filed his petition for quo warranto with application for preliminary injunction,
challenging the eligibility of the respondent to the position of mayor to which he was duly proclaimed
elected. On the same day when hearing was held for the application for preliminary injunction, the
President granted to respondent an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored him "full civil and
political rights." Thereafter the lower court dismissed the petition and declared the eligibility of
mayor-elect Abes to his position. Petitioner appealed.
In this present petition, petitioner raised the following arguments: (1) That the restoration to him
of his civil and political rights by the presidential plenary pardon on Dec. 7,1967 did not retroact to
remove the disqualification existing anterior to the grant of the pardon; and, (2) That by reason of his
conviction and non-registration as avoter, Abes was not a qualified voter at the time of the election, and
was therefore ineligible to the position of mayor under Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code. On
the other hand, respondent contended that the absolute pardon blotted out all the consequences of his
conviction, including his disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plenary pardon, granted after election but before the date fixed by law for
assuming office, had the effect of removing the disqualification prescribed by both the criminal and
electoral codes.
HELD: We conclude that the pardon granted to respondent Abes has removed his disqualification, and
his election and assumption of office must be sustained.
1. The new rule consistently adopted in this jurisdiction is that the pardon's effect should not be
necessarily limited as it would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power, which was not
contemplated in the constitution. "We adopt the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the
limitations imposed by the constitution, the pardoning power not only blots out the crime committed but
removes all disabilities resulting from conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction.xxx We are of the
opinion that the better view fi-i the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to
Page 211

unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the
environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving
completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction (Felobello v. Palatino).
2. Petitioner emphasizes the non-registration of Abes as a voter in order to differentiate the case
at bar from Pelobello case. The fact stressed does not, however, make the case dissimilar because
registration as a voter is not a qualification for a candidate or a voter, within the meaning of "qualified
voter" in Sec. 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code; it is merely a step towards voting. Moreover, the
non-registration of Abes as a voter was predicated upon the same disqualifying effects of his previous
conviction that were blotted out by the plenary pardon.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190 (1989)
FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Mosanto (then assistant treasurer)
and 3 other accused, of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to
10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. On appeal, her conviction was affirmed by this court.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but pending said motion, she was extended by the President
absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the city treasurer
requesting that she be restored to her former post since the same was still vacant. In a resolution, the
Ministry of Finance ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity
of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed
the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbavan had required to be
indemnified in favor of the government be satisfied. In her motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
ruling, petitioner stressed that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; and that she is entitled to
back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the sum of
P4,892.50.
The Office of the President, to which the petitioner's letter was referred for further review,
adopted the resolution of Sandiganbavan and held that petitioner is not entitled to an automatic
reinstatement on the basis of her absolute pardon but must secure an appointment to her former
position and that she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. In this present
petition, petitioner contended that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case because she was
extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal. Without that final judgment
of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her
employment remained suspended. According to her, when pardon was issued before the final verdict
of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the Pres. declared her not
guilty.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
Page 212

HELD: The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as asst. treasurer, she must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
1. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate
for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out
the moral stain- It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a
criminal indictment if or-dy to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative,
should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon
blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were
innocent.
2. The rationale is plainly evident. Public officers are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
3. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 constitution had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the
High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 constitution, the former limitation of final
conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material
when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the
same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
4. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords
no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES v. GONZALES
152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts), and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1
day. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to
the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement. On March 22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986, the
Page 213

President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was accordingly arrested and confined
in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard
before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional pardon since
he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition, petitioner
files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of
pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
DOES PARDONING POWER APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES?

LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC.
202 SCRA 844 (1991)
FACTS: Sometime in 1989, petitioner Llamas, the incumbent Vice Governor of Tarlac, filed with the
Department of Local Government verified complaint against the respondent Governor Campo for alleged
violation of some provisions of BP 337 (Local Government Code). Prior to that, he had instituted with the
office of the Ombudsman a verified complaint against the same respondent for alleged violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). After that, the DLG Secretary imposed the penalty of
suspension for a period of 90 days upon the respondent upon his finding that the latter is guilty of serious
neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract with the Lingkod Tarlac
Foundation grossly manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac province. Respondent's appeal was dismissed by
respondent Ex-Secretary Orbos. Pursuant to Sec. 66, Chapter 4 of BP 337, petitioner, on March 1, 1991
took his oath of office as Acting Governor. Respondent Governor accepted his suspension and turned over
his office to petitioner. However, on March 9, 1991, respondent issued an "administrative order" in which
he signified his intention to continue in office in view of the pendency of his motion for reconsideration of
the DLG's decision. Without ruling on the repondent's motion for reconsideration, respondent Orbos
granted Executive Clemency in favor of respondent governor in the sense that the latter's 90-day
suspension was reduced to the period alreadv served. ' Thereupon, respondent Governor reassumed the
governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner. Petitioner
questioned that grant of executive clemency on the ground that executive clemency could be granted by
the president only in criminal case as there is nothing in the statute books or even in the constitution
which allows the grant thereof in administrative cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.
HELD: It is the court's considered view that if the president can grant reprieves, commutation, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal case, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
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1. Applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos," we cannot sustain
petitioner's view. In other words, if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the
president, with the sole exception of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may
be exercised only in criminal cases, it would be indeed unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's
proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded in as much as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.
2. A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of executive
clemency in administrative cases. Under Section 43 of PD 807, "in meritorious cases, the president may
commute or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in the interest of service. "
3. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but the constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the
proved criminal and in the process exempts him from the punishment therefor. On the other hand, in
administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is a mere substantial evidence to support the
decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by
technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will be unjust and unfair for those
found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot
be extended to them, even in the case of modifying a decision to sub serve the interest of the public.
WHO MAY AVAIL OF AMNESTY?
PEOPLE vs. PATRIARCA
341 SCRA 164 (2000)
FACTS: Accused, member of the New Peoples Army, was convicted of murder and sentence to reclusion
perpetua He appealed to the Supreme Court. While his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under
Proclamation No. 347 of March 25, 1992. His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board.
ISSUE:
What happens to his appeal?
HELD: The approval of his application for amnesty serves to put an end to his appeal. Amnesty
commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense. The conviction of accused is therefore reversed, and he is acquitted
of the crime of murder.
POWERS OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
LANSANG v. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448 (1971)
Page 215
FACTS: On August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
Manila, 2 hand grenades were thrown. As a consequence, 8 persons died and numerous persons were
seriously injured. On August 23, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation
No. 889 suspending the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners assail the validity of Proclamation No. 889.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Proclamation No. 889 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC has the authority (under the 1973 Constitution) to inquire into the existence of a factual
basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof. Far from being full and plenary,
the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is circumscribed, confined and restructed, not only by
the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but also as regards the time when and
the place where it may be exercised. The requisite for a valid suspension is outlined in Sec. 10 of Art. VII
of the 1935 Constitution. The President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both
conditions are present. Upon the basis of the evidence presented, the court rules on the validity of
Proclamation No. 889.
Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying the system of Government of the
Philippines, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under
the Constitution, is NOT ABSOLUTE. It goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under
which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law (Constitution), and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted -- is vested in the Judiciary Department, which, in this aspect is in turn
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Judiciary is merely to
check, NOT to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
GARCIA v. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472 (1983)
FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus and mandamus filed in behalf of 14 detainees. The 14 had
been under surveillance for sometime as members of the CPP. Nine (9) were arrested on July 6, 1982
while holding a meeting in the residence of one of them, Aurora Porong, in Nueva Ecija. Taken during the
said were materials said to be subversive documents, detailing how the group would infiltrate youth and
student organizations. Also found were a .38 caliber revolver, live bullets and several rounds of
ammunitions and P18,650 cash. Four (4) were arrested the following day, July 7,1982, while one of them
was arrested on July 15.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the arrest of the detainees was illegal on ground that
it was affected without a warrant and that their detention was likewise illegal because no criminal charges
had been filed against them within the period provided by law. In their return, the respondents alleged
that shortly after the arrest of the detainees, Presidential Commitment Orders (PCO) were issued against
them and it was by virtue of these orders that the detainees were being held in custody. The SC denied
the petition.
Page 216

HELD: We hold that upon the issuance of PCO against the petitioners, the continued detention is
rendered valid and legal, and their right to be released over after the filing of charges against them in
court, to depend on the President, who may order the release of a detainee or his being placed under
house arrest, as he has done in meritorious cases.
1. The function of the PCO is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person for
any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in force the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially without any warrant. Its legal
effect is to render the writ unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in
view of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. The grant of power to suspend the said privilege
provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion/ rebellion has
not been repelled or quelled, and the need therefore in the interest of public safety continues.
The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally upon the President as
Commander-in-chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to
determining its legality in the light of bill of rights guarantee to individual freedom. This must be so
because the suspension of the privilege is a military measure the necessity of which the President alone
may determine as an incident of his grave responsibility as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces,
of protecting not only public safety but the very life of the State, the government and duly constituted
authorities.
2. From the clear language of Lansang vs. Garcia (42 SCRA 488), "the function of the court is
merely to check-not to supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the
wisdom of his act." If, however, the constitutional right to bail is granted to herein petitioners by the
court, thus the procedure laid down under Rule 114 of the Rules of Court what inevitably results is the
supplanting of the decision of the President to detain pursuant to Proclamation No. 2045, of person's who
come under its coverage.
3. What has been said above shows the need of re-examining the Lansang case with a view to
reverting to the ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker (5 Phil 87) and Montenegro vs. Castaeda (91Phil 882), that
the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon
the courts, and all other persons." This well-settled ruling was diluted in the Lansang case which declared
that the "function of the court is merely to check not to supplant - the Executive, or ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." Judicial interference was thus held permissible, and the
test laid down therein is not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily.
This would seem to be pure semanticism. If we consider that with particular reference to the
nature of the actions the President would take on the occasion of the grave emergency he has to deal
with, which partakes of military measures, the judiciary can, with becoming modesty, ill afford to assume
the authority to check or reverse or supplant the presidential actions. On these occasions, the President
takes absolute command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes
the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and
to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust
and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them.
CASE DIGESTS
f. Power and Function of the President
Page 217

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to
the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed
by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held:
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inherent in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the
country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the
sum of specific powers so enumerated
The Power Involved
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President
has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
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To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide
discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way
diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to
exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed
forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep
the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to
the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's
power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she
has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The
State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to
its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of
the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the
Page 219

people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
OPLE vs TORRES
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.
Issue:
Whether or not Administrative Order No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue.
Held:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance
.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies the primacy of national security, the
Page 220

extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the
dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
thought.
As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the
State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the
legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right,
imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives
no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
KMU vs DIRECTOR GENERAL
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all
government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs,
achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the people served
by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions
by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420 infringes on the citizens
rights to privacy.
ISSUE: IS EO420 a valid exercise of executive power?
Held:
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the
heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to
their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative
power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus
Page 221

and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in
the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to
achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not
extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply
to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID
cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed
to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are
several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve
public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the
President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO
420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply
an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
Difference in AO 308 re: Ople vs Torres:
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power
that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople
v. Torres sought to establish a National Computerized Identification Reference System,[19] a national ID
system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where
none existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card
systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and
user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under
the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
REVIEW CENTER vs ERMITA
Facts:
Page 222

There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were
circulated duringthe examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center
and Inress Review Center.The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of
the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing).
The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out
but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees.
Subsequently, President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED
to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
On 3 November 2006, the CHED, through its then Chairman Carlito S. Puno (Chairman Puno), approved
CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of 2006 (IRR).
In a letter dated 24 November 2006, the Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to amend, if not withdraw the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs)
or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers.
On 26 October 2007, petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying
for the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional, and the prohibition against CHED from
implementing the same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the
CHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
Held:
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and degreegranting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566 directed the
CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers a program or
course of study that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations given by
the PRC. It also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or courses provided by individuals
whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure examinations given by the PRC.
A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a
degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees. A reviewee is
not even required to enroll in a review center or to take a review course prior to taking an examination
given by the PRC. Even if a reviewee enrolls in a review center, attendance in a review course is not
mandatory. The reviewee is not required to attend each review class. He is not required to take or pass
Page 223

an examination, and neither is he given a grade. He is also not required to submit any thesis or
dissertation. Thus, programs given by review centers could not be considered programs x x x of higher
learning that would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
Further, the similar entities in EO 566 cover centers providing review or tutorial services in areas not
covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college
entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These review and tutorial
services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under
]
RA 7722. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them, and this power is
vested with the Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation of
rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its
jurisdiction under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities which are neither
institutions of higher education nor institutions offering degree-granting programs.
Hence, both the EO 566 and RIRR are unconstitutional.
ANGELES vs GAITE
Facts
Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take care and provide for as
she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and took care of her as her own. Petitioner also
gave the same attention to the half-brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial
support ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan, failed to do an important
task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling out. Since no more support was given to the
latter, he took his half-sister away. He brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain
individuals to mislead the petitioner and the police. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan
through a dragnet operation.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in
Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as
the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a
complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the case. This was however
denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a
petition for review with USEC. Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with
SEC Perez and was also denied
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She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the ground of
Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or death
Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost
unfettered power.
Issue:
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the President?
Held:
No. it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum
Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in
our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be
deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the
Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular
No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions
issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated
and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
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It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases.
Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of
Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses
the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner
cannot second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is
he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice,
especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law. There are
certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives
over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise
by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be
a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing
with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional
class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary
investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties
of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice
notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of cabinet positions
and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
Presidents effectivity in running the government.
BUKLOD vs ZAMORA
Facts:
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He
subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created thru
EO 196 the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially
the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the
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president has no power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and
that the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure.
Issue:
WON the president has the power to abolish such public office.
Held:
Yes.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of
Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees,
but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force Aduana was
created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides that the
technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the
public service, they being employees of other existing agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would
only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task
Force. Since their employment with the Task force is only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their
employment with the existing agencies. And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to
the agency concerned.
Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control and
supervision of the President as base of the governments anti-smuggling campaign. Such a smaller base
has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or office and to use their
respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) to select and recruit personnel from within the PSG
and ISAFP forassignment to the Task Force. Obviously, the idea is to encourage the utilization of
personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of
maintaining an independent office with a whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself
burdensome for the government because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.
And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of the
Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIBs expenses.
While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the latter to
have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the Presidential
[36]
Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the
essential power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force
Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations; and to use their personnel,
facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the
additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly
granted to the EIIB.
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Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice
Commission, we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the
bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.
Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our
law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office or its salary.
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SECRETARY vs MABALOT
Facts:
The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman Memorandum Order No. 96-735, transferring the regional
functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new
Sec. of DOTC issued Department Order No. 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the
Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.
Issue:
W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the
powers of the
legislative department
Held:
SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.
In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the
challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted political agent and alter
ego, may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment
of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of
public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3) by
authority of law. This case falls under the third category.
The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish the LTFRBCAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the Presidents power of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution.
By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to
undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.
Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws xxx
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These decrees
expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.
Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR valid?
Page 229
In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general
rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the instant case was decreed in the interest of service
and for purposes of economy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.
DENR
vs
DENR
EMPLOYEES
Facts:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South Cotabato. The
Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR
Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association,
COURAGE, represented by their Acting President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and Whether the DENR
Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Held:
The DAO and Memorandum are valid. The acts of the DENR Secretary are likewise valid.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
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However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National
Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular
executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the President through his duly
constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional
Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and performance of public
functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer
of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter
had not expressly repudiated the same.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the
regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of
[23]
government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14
which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in
delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no
buildings yet to house the regional offices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan,
(3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in Cotabato City, (4) the
Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a
resolution, requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues
addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government
that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the
legislative department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is
devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other
department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed,
measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.
CONSTANTINO vs CUISA
Facts:
During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external
debt.
The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate
the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs.
Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/
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Freedom from Debt Coalition averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and
they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution.
And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by
the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of
the President.
They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that
the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an
entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not
respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.
Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.
Issue: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. (Governor of
BSP)
Held:
Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the
doctrine of qualified political agency.
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to
execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter
of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and
choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and
defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in Villena v.
Secretary of the Interior from American jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated
to or exercised by an agent oralter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes
this clear:
Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it
should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by
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subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3,
[58]
SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at
least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise
of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within
this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in
question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within
the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital
public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not
from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance.
Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of
the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the
matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts
performed in this regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein
succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the
Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents. Notably though,
petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of the
President or that the terms of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents
authorization. Congruent with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure
existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to
conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.
With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of suppletory
guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof empowers the Secretary of
Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation of the Monetary Board, to borrow
from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment
may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government.
Ineluctably then, while the President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who
normally carries out its thrusts.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute, R.A. No. 245, that
establishes the parameters by which the alter ego may act in behalf of the President with respect to the
borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the Secretary of Finance may enter into foreign
borrowing contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary to the Constitution but merely
implements the subject provision in a manner consistent with the structure of the Executive Department
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and the alter ego doctine. In this regard, respondents have declared that they have followed the
restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245, which include the requisite presidential authorization and which,
in the absence of proof and even allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent
with the presumption of regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary of Finance, be
nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional interpretation, petitioners in effect would have
this Court declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. We will not strikedown a law or provisions thereof
without so much as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical statutory construction would suffice.
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA, July 21, 2006
Article VII, Section 16
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the
primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. PD 15 increased the members
of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, increased further
the trustees to 11.
Eventually, during the term of Ramos, the CCP Board included the Endriga Group
the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto questioning Estrada's appointment of seven
new members to the CCP Board. They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely
vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the
ranking officers of the CCP.
o The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the
CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one
trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely
vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in
consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees,
whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more
than two consecutive terms.
o The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino
group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board
then had 10 incumbent trustees. They maintained that under the CCP Charter, the
trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation,
incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified
since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to
fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
o The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control
of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
"shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."
Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers
lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to
Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the
Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The Rufino group took their oaths of
office and assumed the performance of their duties.
Page 234

elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than
the appointing power.
- CA: Endriga group entitled to the office.

Issue: w/n Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that:
A. [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution;
B. [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the
CCP
Held: UNCONSTITIONAL
POWER TO APPOINT
The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate
the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
the President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.The President shall have the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the
Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the
Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our
democratic republican government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of
officers.
1. heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. w/ the
Commission of Appointments consent
2. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. consent not
required
3. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law. consent not required
appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission,
or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of
PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the
CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers.
o * there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
Page 235

-
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter
of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of
agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants,
Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like
requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members
of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by
28
the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to
29
appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc and on the
30
Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or
conditions.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to
appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only
one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint.
Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the HEADS of the named offices. The word
"heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for
several reasons:
o a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that
term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is
consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution.
o agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief
executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other
interpretation is untenable.
o all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the
Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief
executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads
of the commissions or boards.
o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution
32
limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of departments." The 1973
Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x
33
x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x." If the 1973 Constitution
intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have
followed the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members
of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the
words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so as to state "members of the
Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used
"heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
o the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of
Page 236
that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint
"in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks
of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also
applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the
heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the
other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers
of the CCP.
the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. The CCP, being governed by a
board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
** Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP
Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other
hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing
officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the
CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it
violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
"elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations
on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the coworkers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no
constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power
of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts
with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office.
POWER OF CONTROL OVER THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all
35
executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress
36
cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.
The CCP falls under the Executive branch. Since the President exercises control over "all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over
the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have
control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP
performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
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-
The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch
outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it
independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of
the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of
control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive
branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law
putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This
will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among
the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in
the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political
44
influence and pressure, specifically from the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the
CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office
or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution.
MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003.
Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating
thebus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and
convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron
Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the
extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law
contravened the Public Service Act.
Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the
Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the
MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus
operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to
conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and
the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties
without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial
court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision,
this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the
authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to
order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is
inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Page 238

MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy
in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and
elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp
failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to
coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South
Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief
Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issue: Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private
investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications
systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not
the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of
the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the
implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the
DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to
establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly
overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning
traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs
and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering
and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority
to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes and the means.
Page 239
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not
merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested
statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of
any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience
of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper
subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be
addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of
traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem,
this Court has not been enlightened
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of
terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the
franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the
Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such
conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public
interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The
law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and
operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.
Anak Mindanao vs Executive Secretary (Aug. 29, 2007)

Facts:
AMIN charges the Executive Department with transgression of the principle of separation of powers.
Under the principle of separation of powers, Congress, the President, and the Judiciary may not encroach
on fields allocated to each of them. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the
executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases
and controversies. The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative
and judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as
19
they see fit.
20
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be
transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders.
21
While AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President who, as Chief Executive, holds
22
the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits that this broad
Page 240

power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be exercised in a
23
manner contrary to law, citing the constitutional duty of the President to ensure that the laws, including
those creating the agencies, be faithfully executed.
AMIN cites the naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an extension of the
24
President, and the creation of the NCIP as an "independent agency under the Office of the President." It
thus argues that since the legislature had seen fit to create these agencies at separate times and with
distinct mandates, the President should respect that legislative disposition.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the subject of a
statute.
Issue: W/N the President has the power to reorganize administrative agencies without need of an
enacting Statute?
Held: Yes
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus
and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power.
The line that delineates the Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the
authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the
will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress
of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged
it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government
as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted
administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
25
effectively. (Italics omitted, underscoring supplied)
The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to
26
carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing
27
laws and jurisprudence on the subject. It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which
places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive
28
agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary, but subject
to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus,
agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the
President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
Page 241

In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the President is best equipped to assess whether an
executive agency ought to continue operating in accordance with its charter or the law creating it. This is
not to say that the legislature is incapable of making a similar assessment and appropriate action within
its plenary power. The Administrative Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to provide the President
with suitable solutions to situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the service that may call for the
exercise of the power of control.
x x x The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This is
the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
32
Office of the President.
33
The Office of the President consists of the Office of the President proper and the agencies under it. It is
34
not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as agencies under the Office of the President. The
"Agencies under the Office of the President" refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to the Office for policy and program
coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them under any special
35
department.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
36
simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against these guidelines, the challenged executive orders
may not be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule of law.
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, et. al vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The present controversy arose from a Petition for Certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 dated October 25, 2004, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo.
Petitioners characterize their action as a class suit filed on their own behalf and on behalf of all
their co-employees at the National Printing Office (NPO).
President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending Section 6 of
Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the
printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to
source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the
condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost
compared to what was offered by the NPO.
Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPOs appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its
income.
Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that:
(1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No.
285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and
Page 242

(2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the
gradual abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE: WON the 2 contentions of petitioners have merit
HELD:
Anent the first ground raised in the petition, we find the same patently without merit.
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which
in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) torestructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice
versa.
Concomitant to such power to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office of the President
Proper and to transfer functions/offices not only among the offices in the Office of President
Proper but also the rest of the Office of the President and the Executive Branch, the President
implicitly has the power to effect less radical or less substantive changes to the functional and
internal structure of the Office of the President, including the modification of functions of such
executive agencies as the exigencies of the service may require.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions
to be transferred to another agency.
Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the
government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest of greater
economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private
sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which
remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as
the Commission on Elections may determine
At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity
of its printing responsibility to election forms.
To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the Presidents power to reorganize
executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.
Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in 2004
(the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority
to effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive
Branch.
The President has the powerto reorganize even executive offices already funded by the said
appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and operational
Page 243
adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of

funds as may be necessary under such reorganization.
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS
FACTS:
Consolidation of three cases.
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary
of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
thereof, respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in
number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among
them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
Opinion Court of Appeals: Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a
preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of
sixty (60) days.
The respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for
another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor
Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary, that the Department of Local Government in hearing the
ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had
been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged
refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political rivalry they
maintained in the last congressional and local elections and his alleged refusal to operate a
lottery in Iloilo City.
He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety
days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), notwithstanding which,
the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the
aforementioned cases.
He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in
order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.
He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds, among them, that
he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" witness was
16
also hospitalized but that the latter unduly denied his request.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local
officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend
and/or remove local officials
HELD:
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her
Page 244
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local

officials.
It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than
to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over
local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive.
It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub
silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional
control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
he Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the
President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."
The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to
"liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila."
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES

FACTS:
The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato
Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija.
Private respondent Oscar C. Tinio is the Vice-Governor of said province while private respondents
Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra, Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G.
Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Private respondents filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging petitioner
with grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
Private respondents alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session
hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when
petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall.
Petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at them;
close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area.
Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of
P150 million from the Philippine National Bank.
Petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan.
Page 245
Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner.

That the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents' lives and
safety.
The letter was endorsed by Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico Fajardo of the Second
and Third Districts of Nueva Ecija, former Congressman Victorio Lorenzo of the Fourth District,
and Mayor Placido Calma, President of the Mayors' League of said province.
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner
and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy.
The parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and
order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases that would
adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
On recommendation of Secretary Barbers (DILG Secretary), Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for
60 days pending investigation of the charges against him.
He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the President that has jurisdiction over the
letter-complaint and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego principle because
the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
ISSUE: WON the DILG Secretary is authorized and has jurisdiction over the petitioner
HELD:
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the
Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces,
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities in
Metropolitan Manila."
An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and filed with the
proper government office.
A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the
President.
A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan.
The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
The Disciplining Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself or
through the Executive Secretary.
The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who may act
by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the
DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is
derived from his power of general supervision over local governments.
Page 246
The power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in
his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation,
contrary to petitioner Joson's claim.
The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate,
not the power to discipline.
Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alterego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
o "Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution
or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."
The Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should
have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should
have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this
procedural lapse is not fatal.
The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary
assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to
respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in recommending to
the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the investigation.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre

FACTS:
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services;
and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a
portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending
Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment
(IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power
of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner
Page 247
further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal
revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was
issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and
constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify
measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25
percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
ISSUE:
WON (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and
(b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are
valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments
HELD: YES
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them,
the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of
the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic
stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is
well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive
cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern.
Bito-onon vs. Fernandez
FACTS:
Page 248
The petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra,
Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The
private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman
of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the
Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position
of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said
election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25, 1997.
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of
the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26,
1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by
the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga
Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the
Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on
August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or
resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an
exercise of control over the Ligas internal organization.
The RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that the Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government is vested with the power to establish and
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general
supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor
compliance thereof by said units. The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by
the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II,
Book IV of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
WON the questioned provision in memorandum circular 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary in
excess of his authority
HELD: YES
The Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for
Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest
is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that
in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular
courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the
National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be
subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than
an exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the
President does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
[27]
monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to
watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary
over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
[28]
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides,
Page 249

any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved
[
in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
National Liga vs. Paredes
FACTS:
On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan
City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging
that David, Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the
Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed
certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng
mga Barangay elections in 1997.
On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for
seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting
of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly
served on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was
held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and
thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto,
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of CaloocanCity, and Secretary Barbers. Rayos alleged that he was
elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on14 June 1997 by the
members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July
1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and
Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and
Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two (72) hours.
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-512
pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCANo. C-508 pending before Branch 124.
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondentSecretary
Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion, invoking the Presidents power of general
supervision over all local government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated
power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and administer
the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga Officersshall have been
duly elected and assumed office.
ISSUE:
WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision
HELD:
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the Constitution, which
reads in part:
o Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.
Page 250
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents power of
supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments
bureaus and offices. Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the
provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al., this Court defined supervision as overseeing, or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to
take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In Taule v. Santos, the Court held that the
Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a
local government or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
The case of Drilon v. Lim clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not
lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may
not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see
that the rules are followed
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga Barangay? Otherwise
put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, where the Court ruled that the Presidents
power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego,
extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is
not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled
that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation,
league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or
elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as
an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of
the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions
thereto.
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from the
perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which are in
turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives of
the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such,
they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city
councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle
through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of
Page 251

policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time
serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development.
[G.R.
No.
107369.
August
11,
1999]
JESULITO A. MANALO, petitioner, vs. PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA. CUSTODIO,
GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN, WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR.,
RUBEN J. CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA, EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T.
BULAN, PEDRO J. NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and HONORABLE
SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Facts: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local
Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino. Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975
provided that the appointments of PNP Chief, Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General, and
Director General shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
In accordance therewith, on March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then Executive
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted fifteen (15) respondent police officers, by appointing them to
positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
appointments
of
respondent
police
officers
were
in
a
permanent
capacity.
Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation, the said police
officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of
Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements
for
their
salaries
and
other
emoluments.
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original petition for
prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and disbursements made
therefor.
Issue: WON the appointments extended to police officers require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Ruling:
NO
Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to
be
appointed
by
the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested
in
him
in
this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third,
those
whom
the
President
may
be
authorized
by
law
to
appoint;
Page 252

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the
first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa
vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in
the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the
Commission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections
notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law
declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without
its
voided
sections.
It is settled that the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in
the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
[G.R.
No.
149036.
April
2,
2002]
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA,

FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-InCharge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections, respondents.
Facts: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested
Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period.
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300
dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed
an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws,
rules
and
regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
Page 253

questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as
Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of
the
COMELEC.
Issue: WON the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article
IX-C
of
the
Constitution.
Held:
NO.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac
and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this provision should be
harmonized with the Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to make ad interim
appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every
provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.
[G.R.
No.
153881.
March
24,
2003]
ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III, petitioner, vs. REUBEN S. LISTA, DOMINGO T. ESTERA, ELPIDIO B. PADAMA,
MIGUEL C. TABARES, ARTHUR N. GOSINGAN, EFREN L. TADURAN, CESAR A. SARILE, DANILO M. VILDA and
HONORABLE EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Facts: Public respondents were promoted by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to different ranks in the
Philippine
Coast
Guard
(PCG)
on
different
dates
as
follows:
Reuben
S.
Lista
Vice
Admiral,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Domingo
T.
Estera
Rear
Admiral,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Miguel
C.
Tabares
Commodore,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Arthur
N.
Gosingan
Commodore,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Efren
L.
Taduran
Naval
Captain,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Cesar
A.
Sarile
Naval
Captain,
Philippine
Coast
Guard
Page 254

Danilo
Elpidio
M.
B.
Vilda
Padama
Naval
Captain,
Commodore,
Philippine
Philippine
Coast
Coast
Guard
Guard
Petitioner bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their names to the Commission on
Appointments (CA) for confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG had assumed their
duties and functions. According to petitioner, their respective appointments are illegal and
unconstitutional for failure to undergo the confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be
prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such officers of the PCG.
Issue: WON the appointments of the respondents need the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
Held:
NO.
The PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
Section
16,
Article
VII
of
the
1987
Constitution
provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
The enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation by the CA under Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution is exclusive. The clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain refers to military officers alone. This is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission on the proposed text of said Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Since the promotions
and appointments of respondent officers are not covered by the above-cited provision of the
Constitution, the same need not be confirmed by the CA.
G.R. No. 164978
October 13, 2005
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA,
JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R.
OSME A III, Petitioners, - versus- EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO
Page 255

J. CRUZ, JR., MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP, Respondents.
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary
Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M.
Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of
their respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of
the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere
with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an
office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of
its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it
exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a
position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
Page 256

secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President
must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person
may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent
abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them
are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover adinterim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL
DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT
ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES
(C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: The petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President
pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Due to the
opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that
sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take
their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives, Speaker Ramon V. Mitra,
Jr. suspended the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives which was scheduled at the Session Hall
of Congress after the Order of Business.
Page 257

In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted on April 25, 1988, a
letter dated April 11, 1988 of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for
confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives.
Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Annex V)
appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since no attempt was made to
subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity
for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory.
On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation from the Commission on Appointments for the
deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. Petitioner sent a reply dated May
11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments
over the appointment of sectoral representatives.
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the
Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the
position of petitioner Deles.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution require the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
HELD: NO.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Since the seats reserved for
sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President
by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution, referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. The records show that petitioners
appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17,
1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to
her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the appointment of
petitioner is, the recognition by the President as appointing authority, that petitioners appointment
requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. As a matter of fact, the President had
expressly submitted petitioners appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted
on petitioners appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to
Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and unless resubmitted shall not again be considered
by the Commission.
[G.R. No. 131429. August 4, 1999]
Page 258

OSCAR BERMUDEZ, ARTURO A. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. DAYAON, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES, BUDGET SECRETARY SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., JUSTICE SECRETARY TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., and ATTY. CONRADO QUIAOIT, respondents.
FACTS: The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main contestants in
this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the
proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a
recommendee of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President
Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment
and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the
President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition
and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary
restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for
resolution and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by
petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a denial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can
be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD: NO.
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise
of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer,
such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to
appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in
Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a
mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or
obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices
Page 259

even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond
the scope of his authority.
G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006
ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA,
petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE
POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 139565 July 21, 2006
BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO,
and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA,
RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, respondents.
Facts: The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two
sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as
the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils
down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the
Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to
preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who were all appointed by
President Marcos, were Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio
Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15,9 the
CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from
the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine
trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to
11.
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board
for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven
new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance
of their duties in early January 1999.
Page 260

On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that
under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority
of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies
shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The
Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the
Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint
officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees
the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and
not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should
be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing
the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power.
Issue: WON the appointments extended by then President Estrada to the "Rufino Group" are valid.
Held: YES.
The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution
provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial
branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican
government.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The
first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments
Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present
case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the
appointment of this fourth group of officers.
The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the
appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the
President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of
officers.
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers.
Page 261
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments constitute the
Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the
CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD 15, as
amended,states:
Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and
exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation.
The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to
appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c)
of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not
"appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A
statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a
public office through election by the coworkers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public
office has no constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their
fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's
power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP
trustees every time a new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the
remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus
vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect
the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive
branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are
irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly.
There is another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under
our system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.
Page 262

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive
employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail
the President's power of control over the Executive branch.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of
the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government
unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the
Office of the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In
mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions outside of
the independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that
the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,
runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The
intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure,
specifically from the President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity,
virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the
1987 Constitution.
Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x
x."45 This provision does not free the CCP from the President's control, for if it does, then it would be
unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies
and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President's
power of control.
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control over the CCP in the
guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the "President shall have control
of all the executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but
even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and
subsumes, influence.
G.R.
No.
196231
September
4,
2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and
represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG,
Respondents.
G.R.
No.
196232
Page 263
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN
MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF MALACA ANG LEGAL
AFFAIRS,
Respondents.
Facts:
G.R.
No.
196231
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong
Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry
against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC), chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by Interior and Local
Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through
the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman
herself, refused to participate in the IIRC proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman
is
an
independent
constitutional
body.
Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales
to be among those in whom culpability must lie. In its Report, the IIRC made the following findings:
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their
own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction
is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate
resort
to
hostage-taking.
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due process,
manifest injustice and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the
judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration.
By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine
months, the two Ombudsman officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the
constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case. As long as his motion for
reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the right to
avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher
courts and seek a temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.
As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have
provisionally suspended the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its reimplementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied. Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from
its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending resolution of his motion
for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the
Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for
execution.
Page 264

But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion
for review of the case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected,
Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly demanding Php150,000 in exchange for
favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura") the
Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the
situation from getting out of hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the
PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed their
duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.
On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect
of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil Service Laws, rules and regulations,
and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner filed
his
Answer
thereto
in
due
time.
Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the
administrative charge against him was to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales alleged,21 however, that on February 4,
2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to his delay in the
disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already
prejudged his case and that any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer
attended the scheduled clarificatory conference. Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on
February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through with the proceedings
and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out
the
penalty
of
DISMISSAL
from
service.
SO
ORDERED.
G.R.
No.
196232
In December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the
United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and making false
statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed
to forfeit the amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the
charges against them and for being sentenced to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into
the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and the Philippine Government
unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than P
300 Million during his active military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually
filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two sons before the Sandiganbayan.
On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that
strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the
Page 265

government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and
her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing
but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for
serious public offenses, the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on
the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted
Committee Resolution No. 3,24 recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit
from the service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the
appropriate government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.
The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her
written explanation, petitioner raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP
with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded
with
the
case,
setting
it
for
preliminary
investigation
on
April
15,
2011.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of
the
Ombudsman.
Held:
YES.
The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prose-cutor
is
not
exclusive.
Sec. 21, RA 6770. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government
officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive.
Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman
and
a
Special
Prosecutor.
Thus:
Section
8.
Removal;
Filling
of
Vacancy.-
Page 266

xxxx
(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process.
Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in
the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman
over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and
balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy
may
try
to
protect
one
another
from
administrative
liabilities.
Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out
administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions.
Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the
first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to
desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer
instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved
"demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both
of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman.
In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and
parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption
against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding
against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.
By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor,
Congress
merely
filled
an
obvious
gap
in
the
law.
While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is
by impeachment under Section 244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that
matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul
of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman
and
Special
Prosecutor,
who
are
not
subject
to
impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his
Power
to
Appoint.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general
Page 267

rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is
when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an
office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution expressly separates
the
power
to
remove
from
the
President's
power
to
appoint.
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional
authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking
into abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly
of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President concurrent disciplinary
authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman.
The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested with was
intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a protector of
the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and
discipline of all persons under the office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians. The
cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to
effectively function as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog and protector of
the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its
officials
to
escape
administrative
discipline.
Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political
influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the
President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of
the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and
(2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the
Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be
removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving
the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would
diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely,
a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the
discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law.
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional
standards,
do
not
constitute
betrayal
of
public
trust.
Page 268
At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP
proceeded with the administrative case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was
admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his defenses to the formal charge against
him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity
to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. Due process is simply having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.The fact, therefore, that petitioner later refused to
participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability based on
substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon which it is based."
Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence. The
OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of
the corresponding penalty of removal from office was based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a constitutional ground for the
removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory
ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section
8(2)
of
the
Ombudsman
Act.
The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in
directing the PNP-NCR to elevate P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the
basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his pronouncement of administrative liability
and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an unverified
complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding
the latter's non-receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for
reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the pendency of the motion for reconsideration for
more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against the immediate
implementation
of
the
Decision
dismissing
him
from
the
service.
The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. In the instant case, while the
evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the
correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually
appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of
the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for
causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that justify the removal
by
impeachment
of
the
highest
officials
of
the
land.
Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other
Page 269

high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of office, the
impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard may be too
broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature." Indeed, the catch-all phrase
betrayal of public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but,
nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office" could be easily utilized for every conceivable
misconduct or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable standard by which the
ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and
good
faith
precluded
an
adverse
conclusion.
The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public
trust to refer to "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against
public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers." In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant
removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and
seriousness
as
the
other
grounds
for
impeachment.
A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for
theirremoval from office on the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have
intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently.
Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds
of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of
removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for
impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of
their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or
malevolent
on
the
same
level
as
the
other
grounds
for
impeachment.
The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including
system failure of government response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales
may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and complete resolution of the case, or to his error of
judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the resolution of P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to
immediately act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of
duty amounting to betrayal of public trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act
upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his appropriate action compared to the length
of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman Merceditas N.
Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within nine (9)
calendar days reckoned from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he
forwarded his recommendation to the Office of Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's
final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in his hands.
Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained
failure on petitioner's part to supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be
considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal for betrayal of public trust. More so
because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.
Page 270
Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman
without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in
the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon
the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of
the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the
case was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative
liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the
truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence
of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social
ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable
motivation.
Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the
findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the
President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a
betrayal
of
public
trust.
The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed administratively against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as
provided
for
under
the
Constitution
and
the
Ombudsman
Act.
Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her
from office upon the averment that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the
basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with acts and/or omissions "tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal from
office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation
of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue
injury to the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. With reference to the
doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking
and continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final
disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the
PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against her; if not, then the situation becomes
ripe
for
the
determination
of
her
failings.
The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an
administrative finding of liability against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the
propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary
authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea bargain
is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and
efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State.
Page 271

Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the
prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue or build a
strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds
"grossly disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the
plea
bargaining
agreement
entered
into.
Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt
of the accused of the crime charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this
case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated
on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20) prosecution
witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by
the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail."
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain
with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of guilt which is
sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable cause which
is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against accused Major
General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and
wherefores
of
the
prosecution's
turnabout
in
the
case.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to
obtain the necessary votes to invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land.
To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal taken against petitioner
Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner
Gonzales from office, it was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed statutory
provision in its two deliberations held on April 17, 2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority
vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.
Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the
Members of the Court actually taking part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.
PALO
DRILON VS CA 202 SCRA 378 (1991)
FACTS:
Ganzon and Paredes (private respondents) were charged with double murder before Military Commission
for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez during early martial law. On July 27, 1973, the military
promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life imprisonment with
hard labor.
Page 272

Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence until he was
released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez directed State
Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against Ganzon and Paredes for the
above murders.
They moved for the dismissal of the case, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had been
extended an absolute pardon by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been previously
convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been
acquitted.
ISSUE: W/N a Ganzon can be tried anew for the murders before the civil court despite earlier verdict
rendered by the military court?
RULING: NO
In the case of Cruz vs Enrile the SC ruled that that all the petitioners in said proceedings "who have been
serving (but not yet completed) their sentence imprisonment" shall have "the option either to complete
the service their sentence, or be tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction they should be credited in
the service of their sentence for the period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should
set free."
The records show that the private respondents had been arraigned by the military court, pleaded not
guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon, convicted and
sentenced. The records also show that Ganzon had served time until 1978, when he was placed under
"house arrest" by then President Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by the then
President, an alleged pardon he is invoking to deter the reinvestigation by the Department of Justice. To
the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him, and as Tan asked, "why should
[he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict of the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair
hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing
in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
Apparently, the question is whether or not, with respect to Ganzon, he has completed the service of his
sentence, since as we held in Cruz, civilians serving sentences "may be given the option either to complete
the service of their sentence," the option Ganzon has apparently accepted, "or be tried anew by the civil
courts," the option he is obviously rejecting. The Court believes that the question is material since if he,
Ganzon, has completed the service of his sentence, Tan and Cruz are with more reason applicable, and
second, if he has served his sentence, the question of pardon is moot and academic.
Ganzon served six years in the stockades of the military no doubt as a result of his conviction but
was released in 1978 and put under so-called house arrest (although then President Marcos never
apparently carried this out seriously as Ganzon was free apparently, to move in and out of his residence).
The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin developments six-year service of sentence and
subsequent release are significant, since if then President Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after six
years of imprisonment, he then President Marcos, unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six
years (give or take a few days), although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain under "house arrest." Court
is of the opinion that if Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, he, Ganzon, has therefore served his
Page 273

sentence and if he has served his sentence fully, he can no longer be reinvestigated, or, as the Cruz cases
decreed, be made to "complete the service of [his] sentence."
Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Charter the "pardoning power" of the President
(that is, to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures) is final and
unappealable so is commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a sentence. It
extinguishes criminal liability partially, and has the effect changing the penalty to a lesser one.
The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a specific form. It
is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was voluntarily released in 1978 with terms or conditions, except that
he should remain under house arrest.
The Court can not consider Ganzon's house arrest as a continuation of his sentence, first, because in no
way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of "taking ... a person custody in order that he may be
forthcoming to answer for commission of an offense," or, during early martial law, a means to carry out
Proclamation No. 1881, and second, because of the records own scant condition as the exact terms of his
"house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists. ) Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective
of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for
the same offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his service.
The fact that Ganzon might have gotten off too lightly, so to speak, is immaterial, and even as we
sympathize with his victims' bereaved families, we cannot ignore the legal effects of then President
Marcos' acts as we did not ignore the legal implications of trials by military tribunals, although
void, as faits accomplis.
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever
"pardon" the former President may have extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he
was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house arrest but as we said, not as a
continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during martial
rule. The question of whether or not he should continue to remain under house arrest is also a moot
question as we noted, and arrests except upon lawful judicial orders are no longer possible.
Page 274

PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR. 250 SCRA 378 (1991)
FACTS:
Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably filed their
Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however,
appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional
pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants will be released from
confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the
appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. Lao further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then
prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his
acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mengotes conditional pardon
is valid?
RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person
withdraws his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a motion to
withdraw his appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby given thirty (30) days
from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to
this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon
the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which
purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Page 275

IN RE TORRES, 251 SCRA 709 (1995)
FACTS:
Torres was convicted for estafa. The sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a
conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner
would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Petitioner accepted the conditional
pardon and was consequently released from confinement.
The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
before, and convicted of sedition by, the RTC of Quezon City.
President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice
Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against
petitioner.
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. His wife and
children filed for an original petition for habeas corpus and pray for his immediate release from prison on
the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in
violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W/N the petition of Torres should be granted?
RULING: NO
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition
that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated
in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or
his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of
the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to
order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with
the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched
rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The
determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the
Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the
judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases
filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for
thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Page 276

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for
the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination
of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a
conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely
lodged in his office.
Page 277

People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997
Facts:
In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and
Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The PCGBRP
was constituted in line with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accusedappellants were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon
granted to accused-appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior
to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.
Issue: W/N
the
release
of
accused-appellants
is
valid
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them and
not
by
the
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by the Proclamation of
the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take
judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of
the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender
from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the
law precisely
as
though
he
had
committed
no
offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal or
before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which accused-appellants voluntarily applied
under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
Page 278

PEOPLE VS PATRIARCA 341 SCRA 464 (2000)
FACTS:
Jose Patriarca, Jr., a member of the NPA, was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder for the
death of Alfredo Arevalo and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He then appealed
the
decision
of
the
RTC.
Subsequently, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724. His application was favorably granted
by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by
some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty,
which
completely
extinguishes
the
penalty
and
all
its
effects.
The grant of amnesty serves to put an end to the appeal. Jose Patriarca is acquitted of the crime
of murder.
NOTE: SC DISTINGUISHED PARDON FROM AMNESTY
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive. It is a private act, which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the CE
with the concurrence of Congress is a public act of w/c the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of person or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, it abolishes or forgives the punishment thus it does not work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office or right of suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence (Art 36).
Page 279

MAGDALO VS COMELEC673 SCRA 651 (2012)
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC,
seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration on the ground that
they employed violence and used unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws
of organized societies.
Magdalo filed for Motion for Reconsideration and a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution, while
the case is under examination, the May 2010 election was held without Magdalo on the list of registered
political parties.
During the pendency of the case there was a subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel
involved in the Oakwood standoff.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the subsequent grant of amnesty?
RULING:
This Court, in People v. Patriarca, explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses,
or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some
breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense
itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved
by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
51
notice. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, SECTION 4. Effects. (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall extinguish any criminal
liability for acts committed in connection, incident or related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident without
prejudice to the grantees civil liability for injuries or damages caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the restoration of civil and political rights
or entitlement of grantees that may have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any
executive, administrative or criminal action or proceedings against the grantee in connection with the
subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic) any form, if any.
xxx
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation of its members in the
Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or other harmful means would be inconsistent with
the legal effects of amnesty. Likewise, it would not be in accord with the express intention of both the
Executive and the Legislative branches, in granting the said amnesty, to promote an atmosphere
conducive to attaining peace in line with the governments peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the COMELEC as regards the use of
violence. Thus, should MAGDALO decide to file another Petition for Registration, its officers must
Page 280

individually execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to achieve the
objectives of their organization. Further, it must also be underscored that the membership of MAGDALO
cannot include military officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run counter
to the express provisions of the Constitution.
NOTE: (these principles were discussed in this case)
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation
of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
25
review. (Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The instant action brings to the
fore matters of public concern, as it challenges the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means
as a ground for disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed intention of
MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence of supervening events pertinent to the
case at bar, it remains prudent to examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once
and for all.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as
those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof,
and so certainly known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men."
Page 281

People of the Philippines & HSBC vs Judge Jose Vera & Mariano Cu Unjieng 65 PHIL 56 (1987)
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to
the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of
the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it
is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards
the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the
law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered.
And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this
also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of
the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom,
as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer
may the probation system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an
imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards
are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability
of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than
those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces
that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their
locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may
not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.
Page 282

G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939 EUFEMIO P. TESORO vs. THE
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS:
Tesoro, a convict of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents, accepted the parole granted by the
governor
general. The same included the condition that he shall not commit any crime and will conduct himself in
an orderly
manner. Subsequently, he was charged with adultery. He was arrested and recommitted to prison.
Rule: 1. Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to
investigate
the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the terms of his parole,
petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a month during the first year of his
parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his consent to this condition, petitioner has placed
himself under the supervision of the board. The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a
corresponding power on the part of the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make
recommendations to the President by whose
authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries with it the power to
investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power of revocation is to be rational
and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of inquiry and investigation, the President of the
Philippines is not precluded by law or by the Constitution from making use of any agency of the
government, or even of any individual, to secure the necessary assistance.
2. Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a crime is
necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional parole. Under condition
No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in
an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court,
of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his
parole. And under section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order
"the arrest and re-incarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole,
or suspension of sentence."
3. Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional parole. He
claims that,
according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not "in the latter part of September,
1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937, the date when the parole was supposed to
expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant case, the determination of the violation of the
conditional parole rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not
interfere, by way of review, with any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to place his
liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the
courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered.
Page 283

4. When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he was at the
time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons (See U.S. vs. Ignacio
[1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And the rule is well-settled that, in
requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment imposed by his original sentence as he had
not suffered at the time of his release, the court should not consider the time during which the convict
was at large by virtue of the pardon as time served on the original sentence.
TORRES vs. GONZALES 152 SCRA 272 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime before the 1979, petitioner was convicted of the crime of estafa (two counts), and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term from 11 years, 10 months and 22 days to 38 years, 9 months and 1
day. These convictions were affirmed by the CA. On April 19, 1939, a conditional pardon was granted to
the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law. "Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement. On March 22, 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. On September 8, 1986, the
President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner who was accordingly arrested and confined
in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Claiming that he has been deprived of his
rights under the due process clause of the Constitution since he was not given an opportunity to be heard
before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 2 counts of estafa nor the crime of sedition,
petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon.
HELD: No, a conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is not necessary before the petitioner can
be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon. The grant of
pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts and which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a
convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally
Page 284

pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
BARRIOQUINTO vs. FERNANDEZ (January 21, 1949)
FACTS: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As Barrioquinto
had not yet been arrested, the case was proceeded against Jimenez, upon which the CFI of Zamboanga
sentenced him to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal has expired, defendant
Jimemeze became aware of Proclamation No. 8, dated September 7, 1946. The Proclamation granted
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
Provided, it is in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of
the enemy, which was committed from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents
herein, and the other petitioner Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same.
After a preliminary hearing had started, the Amnesty Commssion, presided by the respondents,
issued an order, returning the cases of the petitioners to the CFI of Zamboanga. However, the
commission did not decide whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty
Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having
committed the offense as Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolention who shot and killed the
victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty
RULING: YES, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the benefits of amnesty.
The theory of the respondents is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character or
an amnesty. Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon:
1.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty is granted
by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice.
2.
Pardons are granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
3.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work
the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him the sentence. While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that, in order to entitle a person to
the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition must admit
having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a
defense. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the
offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say
that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance.
Page 285

Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or
the Amnesty Commission entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense, with which he is charged, the Commissions, if necessary or
requested by the interested party, should conduct summary hearing of the witnesses for both he
complainants and the accused.
Whether or not the defendant has admitted the commission of the offense, he can invoke the
benefit of amnesty. It is because there is no law, which makes such admission or confession not
admissible as evidence against him in the courts of justice in case the Amnesty Commission finds that
the offense not come within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation.
TREATY MAKING
BAYAN vs. EXECUTIVE
342 SCRA 449 (2002)
FACTS: On Oct. 5, 1998, President Estrada ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Philippines and the United States of America. The VFA provides for regulating the circumstances and
conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The
President submitted the Agreement for concurrence by the Senate under Sec. 21, Art. VI, instead of Sec.
25, Art XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Considering that the agreement is not a basing agreement but covers only temporary presence
of troops and facilities, is the President correct?
HELD: No. Sec. 21, Art VII, applies to treaties in general regardless of the subject matter or coverage. In
contrast, Sec. 25, Art. XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. It is not right to argue that the latter section is
inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structures
for the establishment of a military bases, troops, or facilities. The conjunction is or. Stated otherwise,
the provision applies to entry of troops without any foreign bases being established.
PIMENTEL vs. OFFICE
462 SCRA 265 (2005)
FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court with power to exercise jurisdiction
over persons for the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression. While the Philippines signed the Statute on Dec. 28, 2000, the Office of the President did not
ratify it in accordance with its terms and did not transmit it to the Senate for its concurrence.
ISSUE: May a petition for mandamus lie to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the DFA to
bring the signed copy to the Senate for its concurrence?
HELD: No. The President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. In the realm of treatymaking, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate
Page 286

for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving
or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus.
DEPORTATION OF UNDESIRABLE ALIENS

QUA CHEEGAN v. DEPORT.BD
9 SCRA 27 (1963)
FACTS: Petitioners-appellants contest the power of the President to deport aliens and, consequently, the
delegation to the Deportation Board of the ancillary power to investigate, on the ground that such power
is vested in the Legislature. In other words, it is claimed, for the power to deport to be exercised, there
must be a legislation authorizing the same.
ISSUE:
Does the President have the power to deport aliens?

If so, what is the extent of such power and may the President delegate the said power to the
Deportation Board?
What is the extent of such authority that the President may delegate?
Does the power of the President to conduct investigation for purposes of finding grounds for
deportation carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of?
If so, may such power to order arrest be delegated?
HELD: Under the present and existing laws, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two
ways: (1)
by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.
The President may only exercise the power to deport only upon the grounds enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, and on no other, as it would be unreasonable and
undemocratic to hold that an alien may be deported upon an unstated or undefined ground depending
merely on the unlimited discretion of the Chief Executive.
The President's power of investigation may be delegated. This is clear from a reading of Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said
Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." . . . By virtue of Executive Order No. 33 dated May 29,
1936, President Quezon created the Deportation Board primarily to receive complaints against aliens
charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code and the rules and regulations therein provided, and make the corresponding recommendation.
Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the
President.
Page 287

On whether the authority of the President to conduct investigation herein, carries with it the
power to order the arrest of the alien complained of, since the Administrative Code is silent on the
matter, and if it does, whether the same may be delegated to the respondent Deportation Board.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, --there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be
arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be
required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive
order of President Roxas.
And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions
requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of
power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that
would serve as a curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life
and liberty, must be viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to the guarantee contained in the
Constitution. If this is so, then a delegation of that implied power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as
inimical to the liberties of the people.
Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue
warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe
the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of
arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant
to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
GO TEK v. DEPORT. BD
79 SCRA 17 (1976)
FACTS: On March 3, 1964, the Chief Prosecutor of the Deportation Board (Board) filed a complaint
against the petitioner Go Tek, a resident Chinaman. It was alleged that:
"In December, 1963, the NBI searched an office believed to be the headquarters of a guerilla unit
of the " Emergency Intetligence Section, Armv of the US", and that Go Tek was among those arrested, an
alleged Sector Commander and Intelligence and Record Officer of that guerilla unit; Fake dollar checks
were found in Go Tek's possession in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC, rendering himself an undesirable
alien.
The prosecutor prayed that the Board recommend to the President the alien's immediate
deportation as an undesirable alien, his presence in this country having been and will always be inimical
and a menace to the peace, welfare, and security of the community. In a motion to dismiss, petitioner
raised the argument that the complaint was premature because there was a pending case against him for
violation of Art. 168 and that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the case in view of the obiter dictum in
the Qua Chee Gan case that the President may deport aliens only on the grounds specified in the law. The
Board denied the motion arguing that a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite before the State may
exercise its right to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board is only a fact finding body whose
function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power
Page 288

to deport an alien or dismiss a deportation proceeding. The trial court, in granting the writ of prohibition
applied for by petitioner, ordered the Board to desist from taking cognizance of the said complaint and
held that the President may deport only on grounds enumerated by law; that mere possession of forged
dollar checks is not a ground for deportation; that a criminal conviction is necessary; and that the Board
lacks jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether the Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground which is not
specified in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the
offense imputed to him.
HELD: We hold that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of fake dollar
checks (as well as his alleged "guerilla" activities) inspite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted of
illegal possession thereof under Art. 168 of the RPC and notwithstanding that the act is not among the
grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens as enumerated under the law. The charge against Go
Tek before the Board was not premature.
1.
2.
The aforementioned obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case is not decisive of this case.
In the said case, the aliens were charged with economic sabotage which is a ground for
deportation under RA 503. The ratio decidendi of that case is that the provision of EO
398, series of 1951, empowering the Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of
formal charges against an alien, is illegal or unconstitutional because it is contrary to
section 1(3), Art. III of the 1935 Constitution that warrants shall issue upon probable
cause to be determined by the JUDGE after examining under oath the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.
The President's power to deport aliens and the investigations of aliens subject to
deportation are provided under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On the
other hand, Section 37 of the Immigration Law provides that certain aliens may be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose, and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien." 13 classes of aliens who may be deported by
the Commissioner are specified in Section 37.
So, under existing law, the deportation of undesirable aliens may be effected: (1) by order Of the
President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code; and (2) by
the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section
37 of the Immigration Law.
3.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive when he deems such action necessary for the peace
and domestic tranquility of the nation. When the Chief finds that there are aliens whose
continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, he may, even in the
absence of express law, deport them.
It has been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of the facts which
warrant the deportation of aliens, as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with section
Page 289

69. No other tribunal is at liberty to re-examine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which
he acted.
DOMINGO vs. SCHEER
421 SCRA 468 (2004)
FACTS: Herbert Scheer, a German national, was granted a permanent resident status by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation in 1986, however, it was discovered that he had police records an financial
liabilities, as well as a pending arrest warrant in Germany so that he was ordered deported from the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Is the power of the President to determine whether an alien may be deported from the
Philippines subject to judicial review?
HELD: The authority to exclude or expel aliens by a power affecting international relation is vested in
the political department of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by an act of Congress, and
to be executed by executive authority, except insofar as the judicial department has been authorized by
treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution to intervene. Although the courts are without
power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch, the court may resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has
been made with the Board of Commissioners acted with grave abuse of discretion in causing Scheers
arrest and detention. Indeed, it deprived him of due process in issuing the order of deportation without
even conducting a summary hearing. The BOC merely concluded that Scheer was involved in illegal
activities in Palawan without affording him the right to be heard.
BENGZON v. DRILON
208 SCRA 133 (1992)
FACTS: On June 20, 1953, RA 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of
the pension rates. Identical benefits were also given to the Members of the Constitutional Commission
under RA 1568, as amended by RA 3595. President Marcos signed PD 578, on Nov. 12, 1974, which
extended similar retirement benefits to the Members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic
readjustment features of RA's 1797 and 3595. However, on Jan. 25, 1975, President Marcos issued PD
644 repealing Sec. 3-A of RA's 1797 and 3595 which authorized the adjustment of the pensions of the
retired justices of the SC, CA, Chairman & Members of the Constitutional Commission and the officers and
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Significantly, while the adjustment of
the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces was restored by President Marcos, those of
the retired justices of the SC and CA, were not. This led to the passage by Congress of House Bill 16297 for
the reenactment of the repealed provisions of RA's 1797 and 3595 restoring the said retirement pensions
and privileges of the retired justices and Members of the Constitutional Commission. President Aquino,
however vetoed House Bill 16297, citing the policy on standardization of compensation as reason for such
veto.
Page 290

Prior to the instant petition, however, some retired justices of the CA filed a petition dated April
22, 1991 asking this Court for a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with RA 1797,
contending that PD 644 repealing the latter law did not become a law for lack of publication.
The Court acted favorably on the request in a resolution dated Nov. 28, 1991. Pursuant to such
resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 (House Bill No. 34925)
a certain appropriation for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the
retired justices of the SC and CA. On Jan. 15, 1992, the President vetoed some portions of Sec. 1 and the
entire Sec. 4 of the Special Provisions for the SC and the lower courts, some portions of Sec. 1 and the
entire Sec. 2 of the Special Provisions for the CA, and some portions of Sec. 3 of Art. XLV of the Special
Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (General Appropriations Act, FY 1992). Hence, the instant
petition filed by the petitioners as retired Justices of the SC and CA questioning the constitutionality of the
veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act for FY 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices of the SC and CA. The petitioners assert that said
veto is not an item veto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General Appropriations Act,
FY 1992, relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the SC and CA, is
unconstitutional.
HELD: The questioned veto is set aside as illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the
1992 Appropriations Act are valid and subsisting.
The veto power is not absolute. In the exercise of the veto power, the executive must veto a bill
in its entirety or not at all. He cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of the government and it cannot veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve
into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely
provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be
vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriation bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the item.
The Presidential veto is unconstitutional because:
a) The President did not veto the "general fund adjustment" which is an item which appropriates
P 500-M to enable the government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been
inadequately funded by the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and
offices of the government. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that
permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due;
b) An examination of all the sections and the underlined portions which were vetoed will readily
show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvested parts. Less than all of an
item has been vetoed;
c) The vetoed portions are NOT ITEMS. They are PROVISIONS. Thus, the AUGMENTATION of
specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other
Page 291

items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief Justice to transfer funds
from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that, in compliance with decisions of the SC and
the COA, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is not an
item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. It was not vetoed.
No President may veto the provisions of a law enacted 35 years before his term of office. Neither
may the President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of the SC through the exercise of
veto power.
GARCIA v. EXEC. SEC
211 SCRA 219 (1992)
FACTS: The President issued EO 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This
additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other
products imported in the Philippines. EO 443 subsequently increased this additional duty from 5% to 9%
ad valorem.
The Tariff Commission, following the procedures set forth by the Tariff and Customs Code for the
imposition of a special levy on crude oil and other petroleum products, scheduled a public hearing to give
interested parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of their respective
positions.
Meantime, the President issued EO 475 reducing the rate of additional duty from 9% to 5% ad
valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products. Upon completion of the public hearings,
the Commission submitted to the President a "Report" for consideration and appropriate action. A week
later, the President issued EO 478 which levied (in addition to the aforementioned duty of 9% ad valorem
and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special levy of 95 centavos per liter or 151.05 pesos per barrel
of imported crude oil and P 1 per liter of imported oil products.
Petitioner filed a petition assailing the validity of EO No.'s 475 and 478 as violative of Sec. 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. He contended that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact
revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing EO No.'s 475 and 478
which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. He further argued that EO No.'s 475 and 478
contravene Sec. 401 of the Tariff & Customs Code which authorized the President to increase, reduce or
remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties ONLY when necessary to protect local industries or
products but NOT for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No.'s 475 and 478 are violative of the Constitution and whether or not they
contravene the TCC.
HELD: We believe and so hold that EO No.'s 475 and 478 which may be conceded to be substantially
moved by the desire to generate additional revenues, are not, for that reason alone, either
Page 292

constitutionally flawed, or legally infirm under Sec. 401 of the TCC. Petitioner has not successfully
overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which these EO's are entitled.
1.
2.
Under Sec. 24, Art. VI, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the legislative rather than the Executive
department. There is an explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose" to fix
"within specific limits tariff rates and other duties or imposts" (Sec. 28, Par. 2, Art. VI).
The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the President is authorized to
act under the TCC ONLY to protect local industries and products for the sake of the
national economy, general welfare and/or national security for the following reasons:
a. There is nothing in the language of either Sec. 104 or 401 of the TCC that
suggests such a sharp and absolute limitation of authority. The words
"protective" and "protection", being relied upon by petitioner, are simply not
enough to support the very broad and encompassing limitation which the latter
seeks to rest on those two words;
b. Petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of which this Court
may take judicial notice -- thai the Bureau of Customs which administers the
TCC is one of the principal traditional generators of producers of governmental
revenue, the other being the BIR;
c. Customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates are very much
like taxes which are frequently imposed for revenue-raising and for regulatory
purposes. The levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some
measure the effect of protecting local industries. Simultaneously,, however, the
very same customs duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental
revenues. In the instant case, since the Philippines in fact produces 10 to 15 %
of the crude oil consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a
special duty on imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to
have SOME 11protective" impact upon indigenous oil production for the
effective price of imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same
time, it cannot be gainsaid that substantial revenues for the government are
raised by the imposition of such increased tariff rates or special duty;
d. Sec. 401 of the TCC establishes general standards with which the exercise of
the authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent:
that authority must be exercised in the interest of national economy, general
welfare and/or national security. Petitioner, however, insists that the
"protection of local industries" is the only permissible objective that can be
secured by the exercise of that delegated authority. We find it extremely
difficult to take seriously such a confined and closed view of the legislative
standards and policies summed up in Sec. 401.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT

MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADE, et al.
G.R. No. 158540, 3 August 2005, En Banc (Tinga, J.)
Page 293

PRINCIPLE: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard
measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may
reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress has the
putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or expand
its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure.
The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how
atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of
government.
ISSUE: Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition
of General Safeguard Measures
HELD: The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the
DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final
determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based
on the acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a
properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose
tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the
Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff
rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as
they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the
ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
[49]
of the Government.
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this
case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the
Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no
matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.
(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the justification
cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive
orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law
and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if
Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a
tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the
importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn
Page 294

producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must
be observed by the President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These impositions
under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within
the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other
similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did
not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute
an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation
from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the
President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain
primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified
limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose
limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not
provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior
statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of
members of the executive branch.
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be
exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department
secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI,
Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts asalter ego of the President. The SMA
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress,
in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary
has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the
same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and
imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff
Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective
spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its
strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered
as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the
President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative
authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard
measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the
delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to
perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that
the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by
the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard
Page 295

measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks
pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of
whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned
[50]
the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislatures scheme of
things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by
Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves
violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions
may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be
demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides
for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may
impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this
case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard
Measures, and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff]
Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute
or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to
the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish
[51]
that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.
IMMUNITY FROM SUITS
GLORIA v. CA
338 SCRA 5 (2000)
FACTS: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools Division Superintendent,
Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned as a superintendent of the Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology as recommended y DECS Sec. Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994
Director Roxas informed Icasiano of the reassignment but Icasiano requested reconsideration of the
assignment. Request was denied and CA granted a TRO. CA found that the reassignment as violative of
Icasianos security of tenure. However, Sec. Gloria and Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is
improper because it attacks as act of the President in violation of the Doctrine of Presidential immunity
from suit.
HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against the
petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or
that the President has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
ESTRADA vs. DESIERTO
356 SCRA 108
Page 296
FACTS: Following the aborted impeachment trial and the resignation of majority of the members of the
cabinet and the defection of the military and police at about noon of Jan. 20, 2001, Vice-President Arroyo
was sworn into Office as President of the Philippines, while President Estrada with his family left
Malacaang. In the days that followed, various criminal complaints were filed against Estrada before the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.
ISSUE:
Is Estrada, a non-sitting President, still immune from suit?
HELD: No. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination, can these crimes, especially plunder, which carries
the death penalty, covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting President. There is no
decision licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity
from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
353 SCRA 424
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit Assuming he enjoys immunity, the
extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. [Estrada vs.
Desierto, 353 SCRA 452(2001)]
HELD: We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted
in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7,
2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio109 Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it
will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against
him, incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
Page 297

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the
death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.
SAID
1.
Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, GR L-78780, 23 July 1987
FACTS: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and
qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court) from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section
10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminution of the salaries of Judges/Justices?
HELD: The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil
552) and ENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary
exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries
during their continuance in office. The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are
property subject to general income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such
income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against decrease of
their salaries during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so
violates the Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David, must be deemed
discarded.
Page 298

2.
Gualberto J. De La Llana, et. al. vs. Manuel Alba, et. al., GR No. L-57883, 12 March 1982
FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to enjoin
the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from
taking any action implementing BP 129, which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from
the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of
their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that the security of
tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in
this case?
HELD: The SC ruled that the Court is empowered:
to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus
it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was
vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law
no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It
is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction
that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to
the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put
in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no
departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved
by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents
vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred.
3. In Re First Indorsemet From Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez Dated 16 March 1988 Requesting
Honorable Justice Marcelo B. Fernan To Comment On An Anonymous Letter-Complaint, A.M.
No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, endorsed an anonymous letter complaint with
enclosure dated 14 December 1987, against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The second attachment is a
copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco
Page 299

refers to pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative
Case No. 3135 against Justice Fernan.
Issue: W/N disbarment proceeding will prosper against a justice of the Supreme Court whose position is
constitutionally classified as impeachable?
Held: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed. Members of the Supreme
Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be
removed from office only by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution) To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent
and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from
office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
Constitution...
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan are substantially reproduced
in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (underscoring supplied)
It is important to make clear that the Court is not saying that Members of the other constitutional offices
we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that
there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should
the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior
that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
4. Civil Service Commission, Petitioner, Vs. Department Of Budget And Management, Respondent,
G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Civil Service Commission filed a petition for mandamus which seeks to compel the
respondent Department of Budget and Management to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year
2002. It also seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy.
The petitioner claimed that the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002 appropriated P215,270,000.00
[1]
for its Central Office, with a total allocation from all sources, amounting to P285,660,790.44.
It
complained, however, that the total fund released by the respondent to the petitioner during the fiscal
year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
The balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis of its no report, no release policy,
whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the documents mentioned in
Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of
the FY 2002 Funds.
Page 300

Issue: W/N, the application of the no report, no release policy upon independent constitutional bodies
like the petitioner, CSC, a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy, and therefore, unconstitutional.
Held: The SC held that the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically
and regularly released.
By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission, which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that
no conditions for fund releases may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the June 3, 1993
Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy
[10]
against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution.
The Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected
to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are
not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the
release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a
revenue shortfall.
Significantly, pertinent General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA read as follows:
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations
authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is unmanageable national government
budget deficit. (underscoring supplied)
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this Section shall be construed to mean
that the actual national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets
consistent with the full-year target deficit of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President to Congress pursuant to Section 22,
Article VII of the Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of such
condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by the
President. (underscoring supplied)
In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA, which specifically applied to
offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines,
Page 301

the Commission on Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is generally allowed when there is
an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002 GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from
such rule the appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that there was
a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full release of petitioners funds without
violating not only the Constitution but also Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states as a guiding principle on
the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal Autonomy that:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly
released subject to availability of funds. (underscoring supplied)
This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the present ruling that the
funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be automatically and regularly released a shortfall in
revenues notwithstanding. What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total
revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations for all entities
vested with fiscal autonomy. In such event, it would be practically impossible to fully release the
Judiciarys appropriations or any of the entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without
violating the right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It is under
that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
appropriations is allowed. (underscoring supplied)
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small portion of the total
national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will the total revenue collections fall short of the
requirements of such agencies.
With respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly provides:
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
[16]
automatically and regularly released. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Constitutional Commissions, a
similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is
clearly absent. Article IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction of appropriations below
that for the previous year is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
Page 302
In light of all the foregoing discussions, respondents act of withholding the subject funds from petitioner
due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
5.
Re: Clarifying And Strengthening The Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-Up of the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, January 31, 2006
Facts: The Court promulgated a Resolution on February 24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the
1
organizational structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA). Pursuant
to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with
Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23, respectively, were created in the following Divisions of the PHILJA:
Publications Division, and External Linkages Division (Research, Publications and Linkages Office);
Mediation Education and Management Division (Judicial Reforms Office); Corporate Planning Division,
and Administrative Division (Administrative and Finance Office). However, in its Notice of Organization,
Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary grades, as follows:
Position Title/SG Position Title/SG
per A.M. No.
per
Remarks
01-1-04-SC
DBM NOSCA
SC Chief Judicial Administrative
Title downgraded
Staff Officer/ SG Officer V/SG 24
and SG reduced
25
Supervising
Administrative
Title downgraded
2
Judicial
Staff Officer IV/SG22
and SG reduced
Officer/SG 23
On July 5, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution, retaining "the originally proposed titles and salary grades
of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) in the [PHILJA]".
Issue: W/N, DBMs issuance of the NOSCA downgrading the Courts proposed positions and reducing its
corresponding salary grades "undermine the independence of the Judiciary and impinge on the Supreme
Courts exercise of its fiscal autonomy expressly granted by the Constitution."
Held: The SC held that the primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary
Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions." Pursuant to its mandate, the DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a
5
proposed reclassification and upgrading scheme is consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The
task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or
entity concerned and determine if it complies with the prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this
regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is "supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to [government] officials and
6
employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws."
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on
matters of compensation is even more limited, circumscribed as it is by the provisions of the Constitution,
7
8
specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 on administrative
9
supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control , as the Court
10
explained in Bengzon v. Drilon.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
Page 303

constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of
comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so
far limited their objections to constant reminders. XXX
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon
the Courts fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a
violation of the Constitution itself.
Moreover, the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Act reiterates the constitutional
provision on fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary. In matters affecting court personnel and compensation, the
Court is guided by the Special Provision for the Judiciary under the General Appropriations Act for FY 2003
(Republic Act No. 9206), which was deemed reenacted for FY 2004, and hence governed during the
issuance of the Resolution of 24 February 2004. The Special Provision vests the Chief Justice with the
authority to "formulate and implement the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires,
makes adjustments in the personal services itemization, including but not limited to the transfer of item
or creation of new positions in the Judiciary." (underscoring supplied)
It is therefore clear that when the Court exercises its administrative authority over matters affecting its
personnel, it does so within parameters prescribed by pertinent laws. It cannot be presumed that the
Court will violate budgetary laws or go beyond the ambit of its authority or issue administrative
resolutions in derogation of the law. The exercise of such authority should not in any case be absolute or
outside the law as, being the ultimate interpreter of the law, the Court is constitutionally bound to
observe the Constitution and the law it is mandated to interpret. On the other hand, the DBM is dutybound not only to accord respect for the issuances of the highest Court in the Judiciary, the third branch
of government, but also to implement them. For the DBM to even venture to alter a Resolution of the
Court is to violate the basic principle of separation of powers. xxx
xxx
Thus, the authority of the DBM to "review" the plantilla and compensation of court personnel extends
only to "calling the attention of the Court" on what it may perceive as erroneous application of budgetary
laws and rules on position classification. The DBM may not overstep its authority in such a way as to cause
the amendment or modification of Court resolutions even if these pertain to administration of
compensation and position classification system. Only after its attention to an allegedly erroneous
application of the pertinent law or rule has been called by the DBM may the Court amend or modify its
resolution, as its judgment and discretion may dictate under the law.
In this instance, the change of two position titles was made apparently to conform to position titles
indicated in the personnel services itemization for all government positions, clearly oblivious of the fact
that positions in the Judiciary are peculiar only to that branch of government. It appearing that the salary
grades of 25 and 23 are proper positions equivalent to those of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, respectively, under the Salary Standardization Law, and that the Court
prescribed those position titles only after consideration of the nature of work and functions that the
holders of those positions must perform, there is no reason to amend the Resolutions of 24 February
2004, and of 5 July 2005, so as to reflect the position titles and salary grades stated in the NOSCA for the
12
same positions.
Page 304

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Department of Budget and Management is DIRECTED to implement
the Resolutions of the Court dated February 24, 2004 and July 5, 2005, retaining the originally proposed
titles and salary grades of the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial
Staff Officer (SG 23) in the Philippine Judicial Academy.
6. Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012
Facts: On June 8, 2010, the Legal Services Sector of the Office of the General Counsel of the Commission
on Audit (COA), issued an opinion which found the underpayment amounting to P221,021.50, which
resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal
properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the
wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles by applying the Constitutional
Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in
3
compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it
4
should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A dated August 5, 1998.
Issue: W/N, the Commission on Audit (COA) encroached into the Courts judicial prerogative in light of the
Courts fiscal autonomy, when it questions and attempts to substitute the Courts policy in the disposal of
its property.
Held: The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and
of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and
its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to
retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:
XXX by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15
April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require";
XXX the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing
for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been
recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and
XXX the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring
Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance
with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources.
Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and
the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and
benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the
Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor.
In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35
is part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted
retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and
independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief
Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs. (underscoring supplied)
As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states:
Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and
responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national
Page 305

government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus,
and offices of the national government, XXX. (underscoring supplied)
This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and
sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as
Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a
benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation
with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En
Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretations and
insertions.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the
Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April
23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is
CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution
for its guidance.
7. Annotation Supreme Court re: Jose Suan, Petitioner, Vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, Irma Fishing And Trading Inc., Roberto Del Rosario And Emiliano Oripaypay,
Respondents, G.R. No. 141441, June 19, 2001
Facts: Jose Suan filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision dated
1
August 17, 1999 of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter dismissing the petitioners illegal dismissal case against private respondents and the
2
resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issue: W/N, petitioners remedy of filing the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
was proper.
Held: The SC ruled that the petition was without merit. The Court found the petition was essentially
raising a factual issue, whether petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by the private
respondents.
In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
confined to a review of questions of law, except where the findings of fact are not supported by the
8
record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion. It is a settled ruling
9
that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. (underscoring supplied)
The arguments herein raised are mere rehash of petitioners contentions in his memorandum filed with
the NLRC and in his petition for certiorari filed with the respondent court. We find no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the respondent NLRC and Labor Arbiter in finding and declaring that petitioner was not dismissed by
the private respondent and hence not entitled to backwages.
8. Evelyn Ongsuco And Antonia Salaya, Petitioners, V. Hon. Mariano M. Malones, Both In His
Private And Official Capacity As Mayor Of The Municipality Of Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent, G.R.
No. 182065, October 27, 2009
Facts: Petitioners, Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
1
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 2006,
2
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, of Iloilo City, dated 15 July 2003, in a
Civil Case dismissing the special civil action for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by the petitioners against
respondent Mayor Mariano Malones of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo.
Page 306

Petitioners are stall holders of the newly renovated Maasin Public Market, which imposes an increased
goodwill fees of P20,000.00/month in contrast with the previous P45.00/month rent prior to the
renovation, as sanctioned by the Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal Revised
Revenue Code" approved on 17 August 1998. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease
5
contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders
at the municipal public market. On 18 September 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin passed a
Resolution No. 68 declaring the public hearing dated 11 August 1988 inoperative because majority of the
persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said measure. However, the
respondent Mayor vetoed the resolution. Thereafter, the respondent Mayor sent a letter to the
petitioners informing them that the stalls were considered vacant and open for any qualified and
interested applicants, due to the fact that they did not have a new lease contract required by the new
ordinance.
Issue: W/N, petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA before the SC is
proper, where petitioners raise the following issues:
I WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE FILING THE
INSTANT CASE IN COURT;
II WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE; AND
III WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF
25
MAASIN, ILOILO HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Held:
1. On issues 1 and 2, the Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus in the
Civil Case was premature is anchored on Section 187 of the Local Government Code, which reads:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or
she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
Page 307

administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However,
26
there are several exceptions to this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating
unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question,
well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency, would
27
clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the interpretation and
application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the
28
Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present evidence.
The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held
in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction
of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases involving the
constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(underscoring supplied)
Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another procedural issue,
specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners availed
themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC.
Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petitions
for prohibition and mandamus may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, XXX.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus . - When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. (Emphases ours.)
Page 308

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person - - whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions - - who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent
32
to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. On the other hand,
33
the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a
writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be
34
the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
In this case, petitioners' primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from
occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in the
nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance).
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are:
(1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions"; and
35
(2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial
function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies that are required
to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to
exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.
A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or
36
impropriety of the act done.
The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.
The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners' stalls at the municipal public market
vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners would be unable to conduct their businesses, thus, depriving
them of their means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners' part to have the implementation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the soonest. As this Court has established in its
previous discussion, there is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies, considering
that the fundamental issue between them and respondent is one of law, over which the courts have
competence and jurisdiction. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners in the
ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding
respondent to desist from continuing to implement what is allegedly an invalid ordinance.rl
2. On the validity of Municipal Ordinance N. 98-01, the SC ruled that:
While the respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the municipal
public market is not a revenue measure that requires a prior public hearing, and that rentals and other
consideration for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of taxation, the
SC rules that respondent's argument is specious.
Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its power to
impose taxes, fees and charges should comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled "Local
Government Taxation":
Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. Consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, each
LGU shall exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or charges,
subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges shall accrue exclusively to the LGU.
Page 309

Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines "charges" as:
Article 221. Definition of Terms.
xxx
(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property.
Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other fees and
charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of
the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges. (underscoring supplied)
For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be met. Section 186
of the Local Government Code identifies such requisites as follows:
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local government units may exercise the power
to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein or
taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable laws:
Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory or
contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose. (underscoring
supplied.)
Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code establishes in
detail the procedure for the enactment of such an ordinance, relevant provisions of which are reproduced
below:
Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. x x x.
xxx
(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:
xxx
(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall cause the
sending of written notices of the proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or
affected parties operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned.
(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The
initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or
notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later;
xxx
(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a public hearing
duly conducted in the manner provided under this Article. (underscoring supplied)
It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an ordinance levying
taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted as provided under Section 277 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.
There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the municipal
public market were sent out on 6 August 1998, informing them of the supposed "public hearing" to be
held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice also on 6 August 1998, the
"public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998.
This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the notices were
sent out, posted, or published.
When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No.
68, series of 1998, dated 18 September 1998, respondent vetoed the said resolution. Although the
37
Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondent's veto, it no longer did so.
Page 310

The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing
was held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and
approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local Government Code prescribes that
the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying
taxes, fees, and charges.
Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 9801, said ordinance is void and cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance
could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order petitioners' stalls at the municipal
public market vacant.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 November
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance
No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of
the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners
are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they filed the
Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition XXX. In the event that they were deprived of possession of the said
market stalls, petitioners are entitled to recover possession of these stalls. (underscoring supplied)
9. Henlin Panay Company And/Or Edwin Francisco/Angel Lazaro III, Petitioners, vs. National Labor
Relations Commission (Nlrc) And Nory A. Bolanos, Respondents, G.R. No. 180718 , October 23,
2009
Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning the
1
2
Decision dated October 9, 2007 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
3
affirming the Resolution dated January 31, 2007 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
declaring petitioners liable for illegally dismissing respondent Nory A. Bolanos.
Issue: W/N, the CA erred in affirming the decision of the NLRC declaring the petitioners liable for the
illegal dismissal of the respondent.
Held: The SC affirmed and modified the decision of the CA confirming the resolution of the NLRC in
declaring the petitioners liable for the illegal dismissal of the respondent. The Court held that:
To constitute abandonment, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment
without any intention of returning. Two elements must concur:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
13
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. It is the employer who has the burden of
proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without
14
any intention of returning.
In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove that it was Bolanos who refused to report for work despite
being asked to return to work. Petitioners merely presented the affidavits of the officers of Henlin Panay
narrating their version of the facts. These affidavits, however, are not only insufficient but also
undeserving of credit as they are self-serving. Petitioners failed to present memoranda or show-cause
letters served on Bolanos at her last known address requiring her to report for work or to explain her
absence, with a warning that her failure to report would be construed as abandonment of work. Also, if
indeed Bolanos abandoned her work, petitioners should have served her a notice of termination as
required by law. Petitioners' failure to comply with said requirement bolsters Bolanos's claim that she did
not abandon her work but was dismissed.
Clearly, Bolanos's case is one of illegal dismissal. First, there is no just or authorized cause for petitioners
to terminate her employment. Her alleged act of dishonesty of "passing out" food for free was not
proven. Neither was there incompetence on her part when some food items were not punched in the
Page 311

cash register as she was not the cashier manning it when the food items were ordered. In fact, the other
cashier even owned up to said mistake. Second, Bolanos was not afforded due process by petitioners
before she was dismissed. A day after the incident, she was verbally dismissed from her employment
without being given the chance to be heard and defend herself.
SUAREZ
TAGANAS
LEAGUE OF CITIES VS COMELEC
Facts: During the 11th Congress] fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives. Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24)
other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157 to amend Sec. 450
of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The
proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city
from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001 xxx
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.)
Joint Resolution No. 29 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement
prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the
previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives readopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for
approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on
November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net
effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the
municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills
to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for
proper action.
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the
PhP 100 million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which
eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30)
days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
Page 312
Issue: The instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause.
[Issue in relation to Article VIII of the Constitution is with respect to the votes required in a case
assailing the constitutionality of a law. Please see (3)]
Held:
(1) RE: Constitutionality of Exempting Municipalities from the Requirement of RA 9009:
By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political
subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any constitutional grant,
Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province,
city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC. The 1987 Constitution,
under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs xxx
As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political
subdivisions in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, subject to the
approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of
viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by
RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only in
the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991.
Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the
income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution.
Petitioners posture does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term
barrio in lieu of barangay, may be instead of shall, the change of the phrase unit or units to
political unit and the addition of the modifier directly to the word affected, the aforesaid provision
is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It bears notice, however, that the code similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly
but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to
create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions,
surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable
indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs
the clause in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code is to lay stress
that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. xxx
Page 313

It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the
reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. Be it noted
that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC,
was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the
embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they
would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of
laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These
criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to
ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification,
enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously
as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income
requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory
laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular
political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s,
effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law
strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009
embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA
9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis-vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be
discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million.
The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds
expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume
purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to
a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991,
and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that
the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from
the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the
intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the criteria established in the Local Government
Page 314

Code, pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this
exemption angle.
Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those
detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading Requisites for Creation. The section sets the
minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for
cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income of at least ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city
conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450
provided that [a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an
average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x. RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further
increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus: xxx
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable
therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent. Xxx
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills
on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20
million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing
excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel,
the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157
would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills xxx
Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption
clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA
9009. Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws
from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express
in the challenged cityhood laws.
(2) WON there was a violation of the equal protection clause
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of
the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on
account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit
of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to
already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same
reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws
cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a
city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
Page 315
(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills
which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws
to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt
respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;
(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing
body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic
reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being
considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid
of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills
long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities
aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted
under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have
not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
__________
(3) RE: Votes needed
Xxx But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:
(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted,
indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual
premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration
per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that the basic issues
have already been passed upon reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying
Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie
vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly
argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law
shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to
whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial
Page 316

vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the
Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied
to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the
sole stated groundthat the basic issues have already been passed suffice to hurdle the voting
requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial
motion on the sole ground that the basic issues had already been passed upon betrayed an evenly
divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed
passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of
the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality
of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28,
2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the
Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be
deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in
question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of the Members
contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution xxx
Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the
constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main
petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration.
Xxx
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the
complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or
the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such
deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc
or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may
be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions
ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon. To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the
constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock.
Page 317
xxx Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension
of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the
ends of justice would be served thereby. In the performance of their duties, courts should not be
shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools
crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. xxx. When a case is
impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. Time and again,
this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require.
The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of
June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of
the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
Page 318
MANGELEN VS. CA
215 SCRA 230 (1992)
Facts: Civil Case No. 84-22306 involved an action for the recovery of the amount of P600,000.00 which
defendant, now private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., represented by its President, private
respondent Pedro Habaluyas, bound itself to pay plaintiff, now petitioner, by virtue of a Compromise
Agreement. Instead of filing an Answer within the reglementary period private respondents submitted a
motion to dismiss xxx
On 24 July 1984, defendant filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold in abeyance
further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court on 12
July 1984 a petition for certiorari raising the issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis
pendencia. That case was docketed as A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. xxx
IAC - In said decision, public respondent practically adopted the factual findings of the trial court, and
explicitly declared that the latter simply acted "in accordance with the provisions of the rules of court" 12
and committed no reversible error "in declaring the defendents (sic) in default xxx Still unable to accept
the verdict, defendants-appellants filed a motion to reconsider the decision, xxx On 12 July 1989, public
respondent promulgated a resolution reversing its earlier decision of 30 January 1989. Because of its
brevity, the resolution is quoted in full:
It appearing (sic) from the motion for reconsideration that defendants-appellants have good and valid
defenses as a amplified in their motion for reconsideration and their reply to Opposition which in fairness
to the lower court, We will not point out, since this is default case so that any decision of the lower court
will not in any way be preempted in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court promulgated on January 30,
1989 is hereby granted and the said decision is hereby reversed. Let this case be remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings.
Issue: WON IAC followed the requirement of Article VII Section 14 of the Constitution.
Page 319

Held: NO.
The challenged decision leaves much to be desired. What was filed before the public respondent was an
ordinary appeal from a judgment by default. This necessitated a full-blown decision taking into account
the five (5) assigned errors which touch on both substantive and procedural matters. Accordingly, public
respondent promulgated its 30 January 1989 decision following a meticulous review of the proceedings
had before the trial court and careful re-appraisal of the evidence adduced before it. Thus, that decision
faithfully complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it
is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified decision, such resolution or
decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside
from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of
course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn conclusions and
pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public respondent miserably failed to do
so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's
challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public respondent's own
decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the status quo obtaining
prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on the merits
of the decision of the trial court would be in order.
There is more to the confusion. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
further proceedings, thereby placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial
court would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified the
order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be hard pet at
finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.
GERMAN MACHINERIES VS. ENDAYA

444 SCRA 323 (2004)
Facts: Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent company on January 18,
1993, [as a] car painter xxx he filed a complaint with the Social Security System against respondent
company for failure to remit his SSS premiums; that when management learned about his complaint, he
was reprimanded and became the object of harassment xxx
Complainant, thus, contends that he was illegally dismissed. Xxx
Page 320

On January 8, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent (Endaya) xxx
Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision, herein petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
In a decision promulgated on February 28, 2002, the NLRC affirmed, with modification, the Labor Arbiters
decision. Accordingly, it disposed of the case as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of January 8, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED in that the award of 10%
attorneys fees shall be based on awards representing 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a resolution
promulgated on April 19, 2002.
On July 3, 2002, herein petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the aforementioned decision and
resolution of the NLRC. On November 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued the herein assailed
resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari, to wit:
It is axiomatic that for a writ of preliminary injunction to prosper, it must be shown that the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and
unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
In the present petition, the foregoing circumstances are not present. The findings of fact by the Labor
Arbiter were affirmed by public respondent to the effect that private respondent Eddie Endaya was
illegally dismissed by petitioner. It therefore pains us to conclude that private respondent stands to suffer
more due to the said illegal dismissal. Such that, it is the private respondent who may suffer irreparable
injury should the writ for preliminary injunction be issued. Such being the case, the prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
Insofar as the prayer of private respondent for the immediate dismissal of the instant petition is
concerned, we find merit in the same. The factual issues raised in the instant petition had already been
passed upon by public respondent. As such, we give our imprimatur to the same since it is in agreement
with that of the Labor Arbiter, and hence deems (sic) binding and conclusive on us.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that the questions raised
are too UNSUBSTANTIAL to require consideration. SO ORDERED.
Issue: CA has violated the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Held: NO. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals issued the above-quoted resolution without any
analysis of the evidence of the parties or reference to any legal basis. As such, it violated Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution
Page 321

The assailed resolution is not the decision contemplated under Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. The mandate embodied in this constitutional provision is applicable only in cases
submitted for decision i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where a resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal
basis thereof. Thus, when the court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to
deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible
error in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. In the present case, the Court of Appeals denied due course and outrightly dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner on the grounds that the factual issues had already been
passed upon by the NLRC, and since its factual findings are in agreement with the findings of the labor
arbiter, the same are binding and conclusive upon the Court of Appeals; and that the questions raised are
too unsubstantial to require consideration. We find these legal bases in conformity with the requirements
of the Constitution.
The writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative writ, never demandable as
a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the court may dismiss a petition for
certiorari if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
Furthermore, a reading of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals shows that the main issue raised
is factual as it questions the finding of the NLRC that respondent Endaya was illegally dismissed from his
employment. Petitioner brought up issues the resolution of which necessarily involves a review of the
evidence presented by both parties. It is settled that resort to a judicial review of the decisions of the
NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is confined only to issues of
want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the rendering tribunal, board or
office.[18] It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence which was the
basis of the labor official or officer in determining his conclusion It is not for the appellate court to
reexamine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact
of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field. Considering that the
findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are supported by evidence on record, the same must be
accorded due respect and finality.
Page 322
Page 323
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

628 SCRA 502 (2010)
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision dated May 6,
2002 of the Sandiganbayan granting the Demurrer to Evidence of Mayor Henry E. Barrera (Mayor Barrera)
and dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25035-25037, 25039-25041, 25043, 25045-25047, 25049-25050, and
25053-25054, on the ground that the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, were not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the assailed decision as it never
expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and the evidence on which it is based, in violation of Article VIII
Section 14 of the Constitution
Held: NO.
Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." The
purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the decision, and
especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and
examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to
a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does
not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as
to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring
to appeal therefrom can assign errors against it.
Our review of the Sandiganbayan Decision dated May 6, 2006 reveals that said judgment actually
contained a summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; as well as a discussion on the relevant
statutory provisions, the elements of the offense charged, and the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the People. The factual and legal bases of the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision, granting
Mayor Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence, are readily evident xxx
In the instant cases, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove actual injury and damage
suffered by the private complainants, as one of the elements of the crime herein charged, in that it failed
Page 324

to specify, quantify and prove to the point of moral certainty the purported "undue injury". Xxx Likewise,
the prosecution's evidence failed to prove manifest partiality and/or evident bad faith on the part of the
accused, as the fourth of the above-stated requisites for the commission of the crime herein charged.
The evidence presented by the prosecution falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to establish the
fact that the accused acted with manifest partiality or with evident bad faith. On the contrary, what is
clear from the evidence adduced, was that herein accused simply exercised his legitimate powers under
the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) which provides that a municipal mayor has the power to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its
corporate powers" and, for this purpose, he shall have the power to "issue such executive order as are
necessary for the proper enforcement and execution of the laws and ordinances." Ex-Mayor Elamparo's
acts of entering into lease contracts, when his term was about to expire and herein accused-movant's
term was about to commence, being the mayor-elect, was not only in violation of the Local Government
Code provision that "no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the sangguniang concerned," but also of the other
requirements of law such as, a verified application from the complainants, payment of application fees,
drawing of lots and the opening of bids, since not all the displaced vendors can be accommodated in the
thirty-two stalls in the new public market. The intent of such a maneuvering was obviously to tie the
hands of the incoming administration.
The undue haste of awarding stalls in the new public market by Ex-Mayor Elamparo was flagrant, because
from 26 June to 30 June, 1998, former stall holders of the old market that burned down, held a rally to
denounce the allegedly unfair awarding of contracts of lease over the new stalls, complaints ranging from
awards to new comers, to instances of two stalls, being awarded to one lessee.
It was precisely in this state of affair that prompted herein accused-movant Barrera to cause the
issuance of Memorandum No. 1, Series of 1998, after he had taken his oath as mayor of Candelaria,
Zambales, to wit:
"You are hereby advised that effective 1:00 PM, June 30, 1998, the transferring to and occupancy of
stalls inside the Public Market shall be temporarily suspended.
For your strict implementation and compliance."
Lastly, of significance is the fact that Memorandum No. 1 applied to all stallholders at the new public
market, be they supporters or not of Mayor Barrera during the 1998 mayoralty elections just past. These
admissions of the complaining witnesses in open court, thus, refute their allegations in their affidavits
that the purpose of the memorandum was to award the new stalls to Mayor Barrera's supporters.
In the light of all the foregoing, We find that herein accused-movant Henry E. Barrera cannot in fairness
be held liable under the indictment. In this connection, it has been held that the prosecution must rely on
the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense; the burden of proof is never on
the accused to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime charged. "It is safely entrenched in our
jurisprudence" says the Supreme Court, "that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
Page 325
In fact, based on the foregoing, the People was able to identify and discuss with particularity in its
present Petition the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the graft court in granting Mayor
Barrera's Demurrer to Evidence. Thus, contrary to the People's contention, the aforequoted
Sandiganbayan judgment did not violate the mandate of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.
Page 326
LUMANOG VS. PEOPLE

630 SCRA 42 (2010)
Facts: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National
Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a security guard employed assigned at 211
Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported
eyewitness, he testified on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint
examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights
during custodial investigation.
The trial court however convicted the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision
of the trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the credible
eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective positions and
participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed
the crime.
Page 327

Issue: Did the CA decision comply with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
Held: YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional standard that [n]o decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the
facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every
assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how
the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments
raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA
rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations
of torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense
and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially assail is the verbatim
copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal
authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor Generals
position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of
intermediate review by the CA.
Page 328
DUQUE VS. GARRIDO

580 SCRA 321 (2009)
Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated February 7, 2006 complainant Marietta Duque charged
respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte,
with gross violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond
ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementioned Criminal Case
No. 2000-10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution for rendering a decision beyond the 90 day reglementary period without requesting an
extension of time from this Court. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the
case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005
which was promulgated on January 27, 2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended
party nor the handling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Issue: WON the respondent judge violated Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held: Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts nothing less than
faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a case within the
reglementary period of 90 days xxx
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods.
Page 329

Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to
decide cases is mandatory. The Court has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order
to minimize the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay in
the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition
of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the Memorandum for the
Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision on that
date. Accordingly, the decision should have been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However,
respondent issued it only on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had
been submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code of Judicial Conduct when
he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed
for the lower courts.
Whenever a judge cannot decide a case promptly, all he has to do is to ask the Court for a reasonable
extension of time to resolve it. In this case, granting that it was for a justifiable reason to render a
decision or resolve a matter beyond the reglementary period, the respondent could have sought
additional time by simply filing a request for extension. Respondent, however, did not avail of such
relief.
Administrative Circular No. 28 issued by this Court on July 3, 1989 regarding the submission of
memoranda for purposes of deciding cases, clearly provides:
x x x The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case
for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be
considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the
period to do so, whichever is earlier. (Emphasis ours)
A judge cannot even justify his delay in deciding a case on the excuse that he was still awaiting the parties'
memoranda. In Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court held:
x x x judges should decide cases even if the parties failed to submit memoranda within the given periods.
Non-submission of memoranda is not a justification for failure to decide cases. The filing of memoranda is
not a part of the trial nor is the memorandum itself an essential, much less indispensable pleading before
a case may be submitted for decision. As it is merely intended to aid the court in the rendition of the
decision in accordance with law and evidence - which even in its absence the court can do on the basis of
the judges personal notes and the records of the case - non-submission thereof has invariably been
considered a waiver of the privilege. (Emphasis ours)
Page 330

Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed period is
inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.
Under Section 9(1), Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the Revised Rules of Court, undue
delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) [21] of
the same Rule, the penalty for such charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding
P20,000.
Page 331
COCOFED VS. REPUBLIC

663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Page 332
Facts: The case revolved around the provisional take-over by the PCGG of COCOFED and its assets, and
the sequestration of shares of stock in United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) purportedly issued to and/or
owned by over a million coconut farmers, Cojuangco, the six (6) Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF)
corporations[6] and the fourteen (14) CIIF holding companies[7] (hereafter collectively called "CIIF
companies"). These CIIF companies are so called for having been organized and/or acquired as UCPB
subsidiaries with the use of the CIIF levy.
Concurrently, on June 7, 1990, the PCGG issued a memorandum stating that, pursuant to the Decision
dated October 29, 1989[11] promulgated by the Court in G.R. No. 75713 entitled Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc., (COCOFED) v. Presidential Commission on Good Government[12] (COCOFED v.
PCGG), it was appointing the Executive Committee, Directors of the National Board and Regional Directors
of COCOFED. This prompted COCOFED to query the Sandiganbayan as to the validity of such
memorandum and ask for a temporary restraining order to stop the PCGG from implementing the
memorandum. For ease of reference, G.R. No. 75713, a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
sought to nullify the sequestration and other orders issued by the PCGG against COCOFED and other
enterprises, culminated in the dismissal of said petition. However, in the assailed Order dated June 15,
1990, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the PCGG-designated board of directors shall operate COCOFED,
stating:
Upon verbal inquiry by Atty. Manuel Laserna, Jr. as to which board should be recognized in the interim
until a resolution of the matter pending before this Court, the Court is of the view and so hold that those
designated by the PCGG as of June 11, 1983 (sic), in the afternoon, will be the operating board of the
COCOFED. As earlier stated, this recognition by this Court is without prejudice to any other act or acts
which the parties might wish to refer to this Court and which this Court will respond to at the interim.
Aggrieved, COCOFED and others who claimed to have been prejudiced by the designation of the board of
directors issued by the PCGG interposed the instant petition to challenge said PCGG appointments.
The PCGG discovered later that the sequestered properties involved in the case were registered in the
name of the corporate-owners and not in the name of the individual defendants; thus, there was a need
to further amend the complaint pursuant to Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. Under this
constitutional provision, failure to include corporate defendants which own the sequestered properties
would result in the automatic lifting of the writs of sequestration. Thus, 78 corporate defendants were
included in the newly amended complaint entitled Third Amended Complaint [Expanded per Courtapproved Plaintiff's Manifestation/Motion dated December 8, 1987] dated August 19, 1991. COCOFED
was then included as a party defendant.
In 1995, during the pendency of the instant petition, the Republic moved for the subdivision of CC 0033
into separate trials on the various sequestered assets, attaching the corresponding amended
complaints. On March 24, 1999, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the Republic's motion
and subdividing CC 0033 into eight (8) separate complaints on the various subject matters
Issue:
Page 333

GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PETITION
The series of acts and omissions of respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0033
culminating in the Order of 15 June 1990 are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The refusal of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan Court to receive petitioners' evidence is a
whimsical and capricious evasion of a positive duty under the law and particularly enjoined in this
Honorable Court's Decision in G.R. No. 75713.
The inaction of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan on the Class Action Omnibus Motion serves to
perpetuate the unlawful acts of respondent PCGG.
The failure of Respondent Honorable Sandiganbayan to afford Petitioners speedy justice is tainted
with such unfairness and arbitrariness as to amount to a lack or excess of jurisdiction.[14]
Held: This petition must be dismissed.
Superseding events have rendered the instant case moot and academic
In Mendoza v. Villas, the Court explained the concept of mootness, citing Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners:
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, the Court defined a moot and academic
case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Sec. 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically provides for the effect of the amendment of pleadings,
to wit:
Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it
amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader,
and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed
waived.
Thus, the Court considered the issue of whether an original complaint should have been dismissed for
having become moot with the admission of an amended complaint in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. The Court ruled in
this wise:
With the issue of admission of the amended complaint resolved, the question of whether or not the
original complaint should have been dismissed was mooted. Section 8, Rule 1.0 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends. In this case, the
original complaint was deemed withdrawn from the records upon the admission of the amended
complaint. This conclusion becomes even more pronounced in that the RTC already rendered a decision
Page 334

on the merits of the said amended complaint, not to mention the Lu Ym father and sons' concurrence in
the mootness of the issue in the instant petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidently, with the admission of the subdivided complaints in the instant case, the original complaint in
CC 0033 is deemed withdrawn from the records, such that CC 0033 no longer exists. Correlatively, the
issues pending in CC 0033 must be likewise considered moot and academic.
Page 335
OCA VS. MANTUA

665 SCRA 253
Facts: Travel Order No. 103-2008 dated 11 November 2008 ordered the conduct of a judicial audit in
Branch 17 from 24 to 25 November 2008. The judicial audit team submitted a memorandum dated 14
January 2009, five days after Judge Mantuas retirement, to Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches
(DCA Vilches). The judicial audit team quantified Branch 17s caseload as follows:
As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230 criminal cases and 126 civil
cases based on the records actually presented to and examined by the team xxx
The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17s case records were not in order.
The team noted that the case records are stitched together with pagination. However, the criminal
records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records attached to criminal cases jointly tried are
incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131, 1189, 1190, 1185, 1186, 1033, 1205, among a few). The courts
docket books are not updated. There are no log book[s] on arrest and search warrants, exhibits,
disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents. There is no order on payment of
postponement fee in proper cases.
It was also noticed that alias warrants of arrest were issued without archiving cases. xxx
In a letter dated 27 April 2009 addressed to DCA Vilches, Atty. Mape informed the OCA of the status of
the cases enumerated in the report of the judicial audit team and submitted the Orders, Resolutions and
Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17. Atty. Mape also stated that Branch 17 already complied with all
other items mentioned by the judicial audit team in their recommendation. However, the wearing of
uniform was considered optional starting 1 April 2009 in view of a memorandum issued by the OCA. Atty.
Mape begged for the OCAs indulgence and explained that the delay in the submission of his reply was
brought about by two substitutions of the judge assigned to Branch 17. At the time of audit, Judge
Mantua presided over the court. Pursuant to Judge Mantuas retirement on 9 January 2009,
Administrative Order No. 180-2008 designated Judge Maraya, Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial
Court, Calubian, Leyte, as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 to replace Judge Mantua. Administrative
Page 336

Order No. 23-2009 dated 3 March 2009 revoked Judge Marayas designation and Judge Rogelio R. Joboco
(Judge Joboco), Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, took over as acting presiding judge of
Branch 17.
Issue: WON Judge Mantua was remiss in his duty to promptly dispose the cases in his sala
Held: The report of the judicial audit team, and consequently that of the OCA, suffers from inaccuracies
and a slant towards mere fault-finding. Civil Case No. PN-0354, Mingasca v. Omega-Reyes, was entered
twice, but in consecutive numbers, in the table for civil cases without further setting. Because of this
double entry, the judicial audit team and OCA probably overlooked Judge Mantuas action dated 27
November 2008. Furthermore, despite Atty. Mapes submissions dated 19 January 2009 and 27 April 2009
of copies of the Orders, Resolutions and Notices of Hearing issued by Branch 17, the OCA failed to state in
their Memorandum that out of the 126 cases listed, Judge Mantua took action on 114 cases, or 90.48%,
before he retired on 9 January 2009.
It should be noted that the judicial audit team submitted their report to DCA Vilches five days after Judge
Mantuas retirement. The OCA, in turn, submitted their Memorandum to CJ Puno on 12 May 2009, or a
little over four months after Judge Mantuas retirement. During his incumbency, Judge Mantua was
never given a chance to explain the results of the judicial audit report. With the knowledge that the
judicial audit report will be submitted only after Judge Mantuas retirement, the judicial audit teams
recommendations were directed only to Atty. Mape, the Acting Clerk of Court and Legal Researcher II of
Branch 17, and Judge Maraya, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 17 at the time of the reports submission.
In its Memorandum, the OCA recommended that Judge Mantua be fined for gross incompentency and
inefficiency.
The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in 68 cases, 23 cases
remained unresolved after a sufficient amount of time, and 10 cases were not decided within the
reglementary period. In contrast, there is no showing that Judge Mantua ever requested this Court for a
reasonable period of extension to dispose of these cases.
We issued a Resolution dated 15 August 2011 which redocketed the case as a regular administrative
matter and required Judge Mantua to comment on the OCAs 12 May 2009 Memorandum. The pertinent
portions of Judge Mantuas comment read:
When I assumed office as Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte in August 2005, my court then had
no Clerk of Court. xxx
This comment is not an excuse for the findings of the Judicial Audit team of my performance, but is made
only to show the state of affairs of the court during my stewardship of the same for a period of a little
over three (3) years. However, despite my earnest efforts, there were things which have been overlooked
due to inadvertence and these were just product [sic] of human weakness and imperfection.
This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding cases with dispatch. Section 5 of
Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that [j]udges shall perform all
judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that [a] judge shall dispose of the courts
Page 337

business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides that [a judge] should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that
justice delayed is often justice denied. Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that
judges of lower courts decide cases within three months from the date of submission.10
This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters pending before them
promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they cannot
comply with the same, they should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious
grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges,
unless they have been granted additional time.
Judges must dispose of the courts business promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith
and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence,
judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.11
Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge,12 penalized either by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or by a
fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.13 We consider, however, that Judge
Mantuas earnest efforts in attending to the pending cases in his docket during his incumbency serve to
negate his liability.
This Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the
absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired
judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the
results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not
only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but also give
commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted
at least six months before a judges compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a
judges observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited
resources. These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantuas right to due
process.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Judge Celso L. Mantua is DISMISSED.
Page 338
HIPE VS. LITERARTO

671 SCRA 9 (2012)
OCA VS. SANTOS

684 SCRA 1 (2012)
Facts: In a Letter, Judge Santos requested from theOffice of the Court Administrator (OCA) additional time
to try and decide two election cases, namely: (a) Special Proceedings No. 2007-02 (Election Protest No.
2007-02) filed by a certain Felicisimo Gavino against Raymundo Jucutan; and (b) Special Proceedings No.
2007-03 (Election Protest No.2007-03) initiated by Angel Marinas against Edgardo Corre.
The OCA, favorably recommended the extension requested by Judge Santos which was adopted by the
Court in its July 21, 2008 Resolution.Judge Santos was granted an extension of thirty (30) days or until
June 7, 2008 to decide both election cases and was directed to furnish the Court with copies of his
decisions on said cases within ten (10) days from the promulgation of judgment.
Thereafter, in a Letter Judge Santos provided the Court with a copy of his February 16, 2009 Decision in
Election Protest No. 2007-03. The OCA, however, noticed that the said decision was
rendered eight (8) months beyond the extension granted to Judge Santos. Inits March 11, 2009 Report,
the OCA recommended Warning.
In a letter, dated July 10, 2009, Judge Santos sought another extension of thirty (30) days or until August
10, 2009 to decide Special Proceedings No. 2007-02 as he apparently needed more time to evaluate the
voluminous records of the case. The OCA, in its Memorandum required Judge Santos to explain xxx
Issue:
Held: Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve cases or
matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Corollary to this
constitutional mandate, Canon 1, Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs that a judge should
administer justice impartially and without delay.
Specifically, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. All cases or matters must be decided or
resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission.
Page 339
To stress the importance of prompt disposition of cases, the Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-99,
dated January 15, 1999, reminded all judges to strictly follow the periods prescribed by the Constitution
for deciding cases because failure to comply with the said period violates the parties constitutional right
to speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, failure to decide cases within the ninety (90)-day
reglementary period may warrant imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.
In this case, Judge Santos failed to render the decision in 294 cases within the reglementary period or to
even ask for extension. The Court,
in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the
disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has been
sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and
incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all
that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within
which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the
90-day reglementary period is obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Judge Santos could have easily asked the Court or an extension of time to decide on these cases like what
he had done in the two election cases. He, however, opted not to do so. The Court cannot understand
why Judge Santos asked for extension in the two election cases but not in the 294 cases already waiting
for disposition in his sala. The Court can only surmise that it was deliberate so he could not be directed by
the Court to immediately resolve all of them. The fact that the cases were mentioned in the monthly
report of cases and semestral docket inventories is not extenuating. The indelible fact is that he was in
delay in resolving those cases. Under the circumstances, it was inexcusable.
TAN
CAYETANO v. MONSOD
201 SCRA 210 (1991)
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner Cayetano opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least 10 years.
On June 5, 1991, the CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Hence,
this petition by Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of COMELEC be declare null and void.
HELD:
Section 1(1), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
Page 340

been candidates for any election position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
While there seems to be no Jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to
an appointive office, Black defines practice of law as The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and techniques to serve the interest of another with his comment.
It is not limited to appearing in Court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation but embraces
the preparations of pleadings, and other papers incidents to actions and special proceedings, conveyance,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of legal advises to clients. xxx
The practice of law means any activity, In or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which devise or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Interpreted in the light of various definitions of the term practice of law, particularly the modem
concept of law practice, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer economist, a lawyer-manager,
a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poorverily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirementthat he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. These are added to
the fact that Mr. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, has been dues-paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-1973 and has also been paying his
professional license fees as a lawyer for more than 10 years.
Practice of law- to include any activity in and out of court which should require the use of legal skills,
knowledge or expertise. But this is qualified by the phrase member of the Philippine Bar.
rd
Because of the law student practice rule that law students who have finished at least 3 year,
not 3 years, in law school, to be accepted in the law student practice. The law student would be
technically performing tasks which require the use of legal skills, but he is not yet a member of the
Philippine bar, he cannot be qualified to the position.
There is a common disqualification on appointments. They must not have been candidates for
any elective position, in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.
2 things:
(1)
It does not refer to the 1 year usual laying back prohibition
that if you have ran in the last election, you cannot be appointed to any government office
within a period of 1 year for the Commissioners, it is in the immediately preceding elections
if youre a candidate, you cannot be appointed within a period of 3 years.
(2)
What election are we talking about-national election, or local election?

-if youre 35, you cannot run for youth (SK)
-for example you ran in 1998 for Congress, then theres the 2001, no problem, you can be appointed
after May 14, 2001 can you be appointed after next year? The immediately preceding elections would not
be the 2001 elections if the barangay election is considered.
-it should be a national election
Theres a special rule with respect to the COA, all members must not belong to the same
profession. So 2:1 in favor of the CPAs and lawyers.
(2)
Appointment & Term of Commissioners
Page 341

(a)
Rule against Reappointment
Art. IX-C, Sec. 1(2): The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointment for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the
last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
The President shall make the appointment for 7 years, no reappointment with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments (CA).
No reappointment because it would not be in consonance with the rule on independence.
NACIONALISTA v. ANGELO
85 PHIL 101 (1949)
FACTS:
On Nov. 9, 1949, while respondent Bautista held the Office of the Solicitor General of the Philippines,
President Quirino designated him as acting member of the COMELEC. He took his oath of office and
forthwith proceeded to assume and perform the duties of the office while at the same time continued to
exercise all the powers and duties as Solicitor General.
Petitioner Nacionalista Party instituted this proceeding praying that after due hearing, a writ of
prohibition be issued commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as
member of the COMELEC unless is legally appointed as regular Member of said Commission. Petitioner
alleged that membership in the Commission is a permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and,
therefore, no designation of a person or officer in an acting capacity could and can be made because a
member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office; and because the respondent
Page 342

as Solicitor General belongs to the Executive Department and cannot assume the powers and duties of a
member in the Commission.
HELD:
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By the very nature of their
functions, the members of the COMELEC must be independent. They must be made to feel that they are
secured in the tenure of their office and entitled to fixed emoluments during their incumbency, so as to
make them impartial in the performance of their functions, their powers, and their duties. That
independence and impartiality mal- IV shaken and by designation of a person or officer to act temporarily
in the COMELEC. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the
Constitution to appoint a, permanent Commission than to designate one to act temporarily.
Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent as Solicitor General is the broad sense incompatible
with the temporary one to which he has been designated, because his duties and functions as Solicitor
General require that all his time be devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is
required and expected of him.
The Supreme Court said that the appointment to the Commission is permanent, they cannot be
temporary or in an acting capacity. Only permanent appointees are secured in their offices.
A person not secured in his office may retain from exercising his duties in such a manner that he will
clash with the appointing authority. There may be hesitation on his part, that is not conducive to the
independence of the Commission. Only a permanent appointment can make the person secured from the
appointing authority.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
GR 93867 (Dec. 18, 1990)
FACTS:
Petitioner Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate
Commissioner Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman
Hilario Davide, who had been named Chairman of the fact-finding Commission to investigate the 1989
December coup dtat attempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to make the challenged designation.
HELD:
No. The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation. Art. IX-C of the 1987
Constitution provides that: In no case shall any Member of the Commission on Elections be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Art. IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution, likewise expressly
describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own
rules and the exercise of its own discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines. The choice of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President violates their
independence.
Page 343
This case talks about the designation of the appointment of the temporary chairperson. Who
shall be the acting chairperson. Because the permanent chairperson is appointed President, how about
the acting? Should the President make the appointment?
It is within the discretion of the remaining members, who in the meantime will be the acting
chairperson. Because:
st
1 - the Constitution prohibits appointment in a temporary or acting capacity
nd
2 - it is still not conducive to the independence of the Commission.
NP v. VERA
85 PHIL 149 (1951)
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its official candidates for
Senators against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the COMELEC to enjoin him from sitting or taking part in
the deliberations of said Commission in connection with the elections of the Liberal Party for the position
of Senator in the last elections, and for that reason, he is disqualified from acting on all matters connected
with said elections, the Nacionalista Party also argued that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC
is a violation of the constitution and, therefore, it is void ab initio. It was found out that de Vera was
already a member of the Commission when he is appointed its chairman. Nacionalista Party argued that
such appointment was in fact a reappointment which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court pronounced that the ground invoked by petitioners would be proper in quo warrant
to proceedings but not in a petition for prohibition because it is inquiring into a persons title he is holding
under color of right. Nevertheless, the Court gave its view on the 1985 Constitutional appointment of
COMELEC that There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a chairman and two
other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. xxx it must be noticed from
this provision that the prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that
the Commissioners shall hold office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners may not
be reappointed only after they have held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provided his term will not
exceed 9 years at all.
REP v. IMPERIAL
96 PHIL 770 (1955)
FACTS:
Page 344

The Solicitor General filed this quo warrant to proceeding against respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon.
Perez, to test the legality of their continuance in office of as Chairman and Member, respectively, of the
COMELEC. According to the Solicitor General, the first Commissioners of COMELEC were duly appointed
and qualified on July 12, 1945 with the following terms of office:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951;
Hon. Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;
Upon death of chairman Vito in May 1947, Member Vera was promoted Chairman on May 26, 1947.The
Solicitor General argued that based on the case of NP V. Bautista, the term of office of Vera would have
expired on July 12, 1954 or the date when the term of office if the late Vito would have expired. But
Chairman Vera also died in August, 1951 and the respondent Hon. Imperial was appointed Chairman to
serve for a full term of 9 years or to expire on July 12, 1960 despite the theory that he could legally server
as Chairman only up to July 12. 1954. Respondent Hon. Perez was appointed member on Dec.8, 1949
again for a full term of 9 years expiring on Nov. 24, 1958. The solicitor General argued that Hon. Perez
could serve only up to July 12, 1951 or the date when the term of office of Member Enage who was his
predecessor would have expired.
HELD:
Sec 1. Par. 1 of Art. X of the 1935 Constitution provides that: There shall be an independent Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for a term of nine
years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the
Commission on Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provided in this
Constitution.
The provision that of the first 3 Commissioners appointed one shall hold office for nine years, another for
6 years and the third for 3 years when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9 years,
without reappointment, evidences a deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership
of the Commission, by having subsequent members appointable only once every 3 years, so that no
President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving and safeguarding the
independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body. The rotation plan and selection of the fixed
term of 9 years for all subsequent appointees were evidently for the purpose of preserving it from hasty
and irreflexive changes.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1)
That the terms of the first 3 Commissioners should start on a common date; and, (2) That any vacancy due
to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term.
The starting date, however, should be June 21, 1941 since that is the date of the organization of the
Constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 ( which was formerly, a purely statutory commission under CA
607), not July 12, 1945 as pointed out by the Solicitor General. Hence, the terms of office of the first
appointees are as follows:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1950;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on June 20 1947.
The first 3-year term expiring on June 20, 1944 was not filled (because Hon. Vera was appointed on July
12, 1945).
Page 345

Hence, when Hon. Vera was appointed on July 12, 1945, the first 3-year had already expired and so his
appointment must be deemed for the full 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1953.
When Chairman Vito died on May 7, 1947, Commissioner Vera was appointed Chairman. Such
appointment could only be for the unexpired period of Veras term or up to June 20, 1953.
Chairman Veras tenure as Chairman expired on June 20, 1950 and his reappointment was expressly
prohibited by the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent Hon. Imperial whose terms of 9 years
must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1950, expiring only on June 20, 1959.
As to Perezs case, he succeeded Hon. Enage whose initial 6-year term expired on June 21, 1947. Perez
was to serve for a 9-year term which must be deemed to have started on June 21, 1947, expiring only on
June 20, 1956.
Hence, the legal terms of office of the respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon. Perez have not yet expired.
They were trying to discuss whether reappointment is possible. The term before is 9 years. If you
are appointed for only 3 years, you can be reappointed for another 6 years. or if you have been appointed
to serve the unexpired term of the incumbent Commissioner who has died or becomes incapacitated or
has been removed, you can be reappointed provided it does not exceed 9 years.
Supreme Court said in those cases that reappointment is still not possible because of the socalled rotation plan.
The purpose of the rotation plan is to afford the independence and to protect and safeguard the
independence of the Constitutional Commissions. They are performing executive functions but not under
the executive branch. They are strictly independent from the executive.
If theres a vacancy before the expiration of the term- the appointees shall serve only for the unexpired
term and that appointee cannot be reappointed.
No Member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. This is also traceable to
the independence of the Commision.
Page 346
GAMINDE v. COA
347 SCRA 655 (2000)
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of
office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment (CA), Congress of the Philippines
confirmed the appointment also informing her that her will expire on February 2, 1999.
On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date
of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners
term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory
opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon
Alma G. de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde
and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, COA, issued an opinion
that the term of Commisioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment
conformably with the constitutional extent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor
Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments
pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999,
petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc. On June 15, 1999, the COA dismissed petitioner
appeal. The COA affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of
office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration
date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her
term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the COA denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, CSC, to which she was
appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
HELD:
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, CSC, under an appointment extended to
her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the CSC is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as
follows:
Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for 7 years, a Commissioner for 5 years, and another
Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires 2 conditions, both
indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a
Page 347

common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of
the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.
The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the CC under the 1987 Constitution must start on a
common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of the terms.
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the Cc under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02,
1987, the date of adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the
interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the CC of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B),
Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution that
uniformly prescribed a 7-year term of office for Members of the CC, without re-appointment, and for the
first appointees terms of 7, 5 and 3 years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the
beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with effectivity of the Constitution upon
its ratification.
(3) Appointment of Personnel
Art. IX-A, Sec. 4: The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance
with law.
(4) Salary
Art. IX-A, Sec.3: The salary of the Chairman and Commissioners should be fixed by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure.
Art XVIII, Sec. 17: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of
three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representative and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty thousand pesos each: the
Senators, the Members of the House of the Representatives, the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.
Salaries of members of the Commissions are just like the judiciary- not to be decrease during their tenure,
but no prohibition on increase. They can be increase even during their terms because they have no hand
on the passage of the bill.
(5) Disqualifications
Art. IX-A, Sec. 2: No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the activity management or
control of any business which in any way maybe affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in contact with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the
Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
(6) Impeachment
Art. XI, Sec 2: The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, an impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
Page 348

crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
(7) Appeal
Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 179370, November 18, 2009.
FACTS
Capablanca was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of PO1 with a temporary
status and was assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. After two years, he took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOM and passed the same. On 2000, he took the Career Service
Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the CSC and likewise passed the
same. Thereafter, the Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon him the permanent status as PO1.
On 2001, The CSC Caraga informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative
to the CSP-CAT which he took on 2000. According to the CSC, the person in the picture pasted in the
Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the signature affixed to the PDS.
During the preliminary investigation, Capablanca, represented by a counsel, moved to dismiss the
proceedings. He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and
promotional examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC.
Thus, the CSP-CAT
conducted was void. Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls
under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
In an Order, the CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute as to the sole authority of
NAPOLCOM as argued by him. However, since he submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility
to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation. So, the motion was denied.
PO1 Capablanca, then, filed a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. Instead of filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved
to dismiss the case. It argued that, other than not exhausting administrative remedies, the CSC was not
stripped of its original disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies.
The court denied CSCs motion, and later, ruled that that the CSC had no jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
The CSC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted CSC Petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION TO
CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE.
RULING
The petition lacks merit.
Page 349

It is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary
investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. Petitioner
anchors his argument that the heads of departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first commence
disciplinary proceedings against their subordinates before their decisions can be reviewed by the CSC.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will
only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection
with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from
cheating in the civil service examinations.
Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention that the CSC only has
appellate disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and falsification of documents in connection
with an appointment to a permanent position in the government service.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, is misplaced. In said case, the
NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National Police must
have passed any of the following examinations:
a)
b)
c)
PNP Entrance Examination;

rd
Police Officer 3 Class Examination; and
CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c), arguing that the
requirement of taking a CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination is only applicable to entrance in the firstlevel position in the PNP, i.e., the rank of PO1. NAPOLCOM stressed that what would entitle a police
officer to the appropriate eligibility for his promotion in the PNP are the promotional examinations
conducted by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC, by issuing Item 3 of
CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975 to
administer promotional examinations for policemen and to impose qualification standards for promotion
of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the CSC with regard to
anomalies or irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally different matter.
TAY
Powers of COA
VELOSO et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011
FACTS:
Page 350

The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, authorizing the conferment of Exemplary Public
Service Award (EPSA) to elective local officials of Manila who have been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same position. Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of a
number of former councilors.
However, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued an Audit Observation Memorandum, with
the following observations: that the Ordinance is without legal basis; the monetary reward is excessive
and tantamount to double compensation in contravention to the IRR of RA 7160; and that the
appropriations to implement the Ordinance was improperly classified.
Thereafter, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued.
The councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance, which was granted by the Legal
Adjudication Office-Local of the COA. Upon review however, the COA rendered the assailed Decision,
sustaining the Notice of Disallowance.
ISSUE: whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds.
RULING: YES.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the power and authority of the COA to audit government
funds and accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement.
Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, they claim that the COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments
on the ground that the same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable.
The SC however disagreed. As held in National Electrification v. COA, the ruling in Guevara cited by
petitioners has already been overturned in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. COA. It was explained that under the
1935 Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of public funds, but could only bring the matter to the attention of the proper administrative
officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine
whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government
funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and functions of the COA, to
wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and
on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the
internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
Page 351

including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of
government funds and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous
state colleges and universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through the
government. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies cannot be taken away
from it as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any
entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from
the jurisdiction of the COA."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
AGRA et al. vs. COA
G.R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011
This case involves the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration
(NEA) by virtue of RA 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989). A group of NEA
employees, claiming that they did not receive such allowances, filed a special civil action for mandamus
against NEA before the RTC which later decided in their favor and directed NEA to settle said claims. This
decision was issued a certificate to the effect that is has become final and executory.
This decision was questioned by NEA before the CA which ordered the implementation of a writ of
execution against the funds of NEA. This was reversed by the SC on the following grounds:
COA had already passed upon claims similar to the subject of the case in their earlier resolution.
COA opined that the court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition
for the entitlement of the employees which had already been passed upon by COA. Thus,
employees, pursuant to the above COA decision, cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for
mandamus in the lower court. PD 1445 and the 1987 Constitution prescribe that the only mode
for appeal from decisions of COA is on certiorari to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by
Page 352
law and the Rules of Court. Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when it entertained the
subject case of mandamus. And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much
less be executed.
NEA is a GOCC. As such GOCC, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be garnished or levied
upon in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However, before execution may proceed
against it, a claim for payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under CA 327, as amended by PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine,
audit and settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to money claims arising from the
implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subject
only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to the SC.
As to the grant of the allowance under said final and executory decision, NEA requested for a legal
opinion before the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which opined for the approval of
the release of the allowance. Hence, NEA issued a Resolution approving the same and the release of the
funds.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance for a particular period.
The Notice of Allowance was appealed, but the same was denied by COA. They went again to the SC
questioning the disallowance of their rice subsidy.
RULING:
(Discussion is primarily on the entitlement to the subsidy. The following are the matters relating to the
powers of COA)
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money
claim falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of COA. Noting the propensity of the lower
courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the SC
issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000 enjoining judges of lower courts to
exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and procedures of the
Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that: "All money claims against the Government must
be filed with the Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the
State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and
exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such
jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and
decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted in the cited Supreme Court Circular that
money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court. The
lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
COCOFED vs. REPUBLIC
663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Page 353
RULING:
Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As an
independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed,
under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of
the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of [COA]. Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing
provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over coconut levy funds, being special public funds.
Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using said funds.
However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private
appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and consequently,
renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of PD Nos. 961
and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional
independence. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both PD Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for
being unconstitutional.
VERZOSA vs. COA

G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which substantially held that petitioner
(as former Executive Director of the Cooperative Development Authority or CDA) is personally and liable
for the amount of P881,819.00 covered by a COA Notice of Disallowance and involved overpriced
computer units.
Among others, the MFR is anchored on the following ground: whether brand should be considered by
COA as one basis of comparison, in light of compliance with intellectual property laws on software piracy
and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of
the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the
COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its
audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government
funds and properties.
As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and
its accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences
Page 354

regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is
reasonable price for the items purchased.
In this case, the brand information was found by the COA as irrelevant to the determination of the
reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by CDA. Hence, on this ground, the MFR is
dismissible.
FUNA vs. COA

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly
thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to
serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse.
He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years
reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter to President Aquino III, signified his
intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar
vacated his position when President Aquino III named Tan as COA Chairman. This development has
rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of
Villar, the SC consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and
academic case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for 4 years of his 7-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed
under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
RULING:
Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other
Page 355

commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner argues that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind
within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position
(commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson)
is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
This is however incorrect. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing
any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a
term of 7 years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended
another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of 7 years who
likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or
Commissioner shall have served the full term of 7 years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either
the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president
from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of 7 years, further
qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such promotional
appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms
in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said
position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed 7 years
so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances
or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA
Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his
four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court.
While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has
been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or
commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view
would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally
offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly
appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not
Page 356

legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as
COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to
every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7
years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than 7
years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of
the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and
constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than 7 years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the SC restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of 7 years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The
appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of 7 years in case of the expiration of
the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of 7
years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the
Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also
covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than 7 years is eligible for
an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the
departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided
that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of
the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the
position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one
and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to
Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a
reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Appeals
REYES vs. COA
G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Reyes filed this petition with the SC as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised
Rules of Court, assailing the decision of the COA disallowing the refund of the government share in the
Page 357

fund to them as employee-members of TLRC, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners mode of appeal is correct.
RULING: Incorrect.
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of rulings of the Commission on
Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section
2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by
an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed
on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of
elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit
are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45
of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on
Audit.
[But note that in this case, the SC set aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treated the petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit not finding that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
disallowing the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its
members.]
VALLES
Page 358
Page 359

Consti 1 Case Digest (2013)

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Consti 1 Case Digest (2013)

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

MACARIOLA vs. ASUNCION

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

From the efforts of 4-manresa class 2013

Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

February 28, 2012

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

FUNA VS. VILLAR 670 SCRA 570 (2012)

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

CAPALLA VS. VILLAR 673 SCRA 1 (2012)

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

CHAVEZ VS. JBC 676 SCRA 579 (2012)

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

IDEALS VS. PSALM 682 SCRA 602 (2012)

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

ANNOTATION ON LOCUS STANDI 314 SCRA 641

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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Constitutional law 1 case digest 2013

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