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AUTHORIZATION FOR
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G W GENBROUS 0 G BIRTWISTLI G W ERITST G M JONmS
Col. D C/S Col. A-1 Col. A-2 Col. A-3
J E DUKE
Col. C/S
.11
whose deeds contributed their full share to the victory over Germany,
the Rhine, the aerial resupply which helped maintain the lightning
achievement in the European Theater and offering a guide for the future,
PAUL L, WILLIAMS,
Major General, USA,
Commanding,
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PREPARED AT HEADQUARTERS, IX TROOP CARRIER COMMAND (FWD)
JUNE 1945
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PLATOON,
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AF HQ. O.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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APPENDIX 133
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INTRODUCTION
Both in Normandy and on the Riviera the guns and men of the
Wehrmacht pointed toward the sea. But the aerial cavalry of IX Troop
Carrier Command assaulted from the sky, and the Airborne Divisions
In March 1945, the swift-flowing Rhine was the moat guarding the
as pioneer and ended as veteran in the art of the paradrop, the glider
evacuation.
How Troop Carrier performed its manifold mission in the final phase
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CHAPTER I
OUTLINE OF AN OBJECTIVE
Section 1
From the first days of November 1944 until H-hour finially struck at
1000 hours 24 March 1945, these two Teutonic towns on the northeast bank
of the Rhine held a magnetic attraction for the IX Troop Carrier Command
Seizure of the ammerich-Wesel sector would fling open the gate to the
industrially-precious Ruhr and the heart of the Reich. So it was that the
tables hardly before the echo of September's skyborne thrust into Holland
commander of the air component of the First Allied Airborne Army, surveyed
Medical Officer.
by ground forces from the west bank. It was to be the same fundamental
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pattern that spun out victory on Cherbourg peninsula and later on the
When the plan for Operation VARSITY was first outlined by Head-
25 November.
To Seize a Bridgehead
assist the advance of the 9th U.S. Army of the Central Group of Armies by
seizing a bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine between Rees 0852 and
Bislich 1443. Then the skyborne troops would assist in enlarging the
Immediately available for the lift were the 6th British Airborne
Division and the 17th U.S. Airborne Division. The battle-famed 82nd and
101st U.S. Airborne Divisions were still engaged against the enemy in
drop and landing zones, (2) Disposition of ground forces affecting the
airborne operation, (3) Enemy flak strength and (4) Ability of the German
northeast bank of the Rhine as most suitable for airborne assault. Almost
imeadowland invited low glider approaches. Fields ranged 190 to 250 yards
-- 2-
ditches, about nine feet wide, sliced the cultivated fields and appeared
quite dry.
scape, while none existed on the swampier soil. Yet the softer ground was
due for a frost the following month, and the newly-hardened outer surface
would supplement the already existing numerous roads and paths that were
the first extending five miles southeastward from Emmerich and three miles
in depth from the Rhine; The second, a chunk of land covering approximately
three square miles, pointing three miles north of Rees and bordered by the
Rhine loop on the west and south; the third stretching eight miles from
Rees to a point east of Bislich and pushing out two to three miles from the
Rhine.
the largest and firmest fields to lie north of a railroad about two miles
from the river and not grouped too compactly. Reconnaissance of the area
south of the railroad had been obscured by cloud and offered no adequate
information.
The second zone, nestling in the Rhine loop north and west of Rees,
Inviting the widest choice of landing zones, the third area, from
With the picture of the possible assault objectives laid out, Colonel
It was assumed that the bleeding away of German armor by Allied pressure
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l X along the entire lengt the Western front would leave the enemy with-
that Emmerich and Wesel would be heavily defended as key points, and the
Bolstering the threat of German ground defenses were the three main
concentrations of flak around Emmerich, Rees and Wesel. All these would
grow more menacing as a large portion of the mobile guns then deployed on
the west bank of the Rhine would be withdrawn in the face of the Allied
exist 42 heavy and 285 light flak positions with the majority of these
provide a heavier buildup between Emmerich and Rees than between Rees and
Wesel. This factor obviously made the latter a more likely assault point
field and anti-tank artillery, but security for airborne success dictated
Although the railway flak in the sector added up to only four heavy
the northern outskirts of the Ruhr. With the railway connecting Emxnerich
and Wesel running just east of potential drop and landing zones, it was
Other flak threats -cai for consideration were barges and Seibel
- 4 -
ferries plying the Rhine waters with light gun installations.
No smoke cloud generators were reported in the assault zone, but the
ance on the west bank of the Rhine could be avoided by close liaison with
ground forces. Routes then could be planned to give these pockets a wide
berth.
Short Range Weapon a Menace
fire, the Germans had begun to use greater numbers of 13 MM. anti-aircraft
fire than the 20 MM., it was a much more effective weapon at short range.
his 13 MM. guns in numbers at vital points in the communications net, es-
Although the Luftwaffe had long been written off as a force that
could ultimately affect the outcome of the war, it could not be underrated
and C-46 aircraft and the even more vulnerable gliders they towed.
reconnaissance planes.
bombers.
Over a three or four day period, the enemy was believed capable of
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| ~/'~:~engine fighters, fivweo. fighter-bombers and a similar number of
ability of total aircraft inside 150 miles striking range of the target.
One sortie a day was counted upon as maximum capacity for single-engine
Looming as possibly the most dangerous threat was the German Me 262
ideally suited to the tactical capabilities of this enemy ship. The 500 to
6 00-mile-an-hour speed together with the small number of Me 262s available
might enable them to slip inside Troop Carrier formations unnoticed.
augmented in strength.
Favorite tactic of the Me 262 was described as the head on or out of
the sun attack in a single sweep. Pilots were being trained to attack
either from 12 o'clock high coming in, or from shallow dive, or in one
pass and run Just above the formation. An attacking formation would
include 10 or 15 planes strung out in a single line.
Warned. AMalst Overconfideace
should not be too difficult to effect in view of the Troop Carrier route
following friendly territory for all except three to five miles. But he
warned that an enemy already stung three times on the continent by
a memorandum to Colonel JONS (A-3), submitted the view that the Operation
…_ m_e
delivery of troops and gliders.
Geyer declared the time could be shortened still more by dispatching four
The memorandum pointed out that routes from the continent were not
radio aids. It was suggested that twin columns to British and American
target areas swing out in opposite directions for the homeward run.
With the fairly certain knowledge that all terrain up to the west
informed IX Troop Carrier Command that VARSITY still held first priority
General PARKS also indicated that any one of the three airborne
commander of the Twelfth Army Group. On the other hand, if none were
operations would be mounted in February with the 82nd and 101st U.S.
4 formed G-3, FAAA that the mac1 (hics were fairly complete for the three
-7 -
proposed operations but called attention to difficulties to be encountered
missions.
Planning Limited by Weather
two or more consecutive days over a route of three to five hundred miles
resupply mission be accomplished by the 50th Troop Carrier Wing which had
from which to originate resupply for VARSITY, the route would be con-
siderably shortened and thereby less subject to changing weather con-
ditions as well.
However, Colonel JONES (A-3) stated that the problem could be solved
crossings brought the main army to a Junction with the airborne divisions.
But again the operation was delayed. December and January passed
with the Allies still held in check along the main Siegfried defenses.
borne task force would be dropped to assist both the 2nd British Army and
the 9th U.S. Army of the Northern Group of Armies. 25 March was
drop and landing zones which otherwise were ideal. But flak could not
movement of guns in the Nazi retreat across the river from the west bank.
With the 17th and 13th U.S. Airborne Divisions based on the continent,
I ^!d-he double towof CG^-A Waco gliders became practicable and opened the way
. - _, _
safely tug a pair of gliders to landing zones on the east bank of the
From its starting point in East Anglia, the 6th British Airborne
offered no problem.
Bombardment of Targets
any targets that might affect the operation. It was established that
time to elapse for smoke and dust to subside prior to arrival of Troop
Carrier columns.
The plan also called for proper timing to allow for visual precision
tralization of flak along the route and over DZ's and LZ'. Fighters
_ 9 _
Accurate anticipation of Troop Carrier supply and maintenance needs
technique from the various A- 4 branch sections under Colonel McBRIDE (A-4).
Against new problems constantly arising, only the foresight and patience
Warfare.
97 Per Cent Operational
all supply problems connected with this type of aircraft had been en-
countered and solved in previous combat action, and these planes were
The chief task this time was to properly equip the new group of
planes of the 313th Group for combat, and the necessary steps were taken.
Modification of B-24 jacks and B-17 tow-bars was the method adopted
six electric releases and means of attaching bomb shackles; six 2,000-
system for protecting the parachute of the A-5 parapack container from
ment was the aluminum hood, but these would be impossible to obtain in
That left the question squarely in the lap of Troop Carrier Air Corps
paper P-51 jettisonable 108-gallon fuel tanks, and these provided the
answer,
Not only did the P-51 paper tank prove adaptable as a parachute hood,
Contributing to the success of the experiments were the A-4 and S-4
sections of the 52nd Wing, the 313th and 316th Groups, the 3S3rd Air
Service Squadron and the lst Air Service Squadron (Prov). In the final
process, upwards of 1,700 salvaged P-51 paper tanks were converted into
Another bug to be ironed out was the inability to release all para-
pack bundles from the bomb shackle after normal pressure on the release
shackle by welding a fillet into the release jaw. Then a directive was
The 24 straps and buckles available per plane were believed in-
With the eight-foot span between the door of a C-46 and the ground
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period of 30 days was in the possession of the 313th Group in the form of
importance and for Troop Carrier units preparing for VARSITY on the con-
in the following quantities: two F-1, two P-2, 10 F-3, five A-3.
In this connection, it was believed the P-38 discardable metal tank would
be of particularly high value in planes towing two gliders, and steps were
taken immediately to procure and install the P-38 tanks. This type of
pairs in the fuselage of each aircraft, since little more hardware was
service teams with the 53rd Wing inaugurating further assembly on their
own stations, the program was still further intensified when the
point where five CG-4A gliders were produced per day while the assembly
D-1 was able to point to 2,162 operational Waco gliders out of a total
of 2,290.
During the glider buildnup period, a leading source was the area
around Eindhoven where the landing zones for the Holland operation were
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located. Here the reclamation-program of the Service Wing produced a
sizeable yield of silent craft which had flown on the previous mission.
After these had been distributed among units of the 50th and 53rd
The obvious purpose of this move was to eliminate the possibility of any
comprising the Command glider inspector, the Service Wing Air Corps
the Air bervice Squadron Engineer Officer serving the Group. These
combat worthiness.
To equip gliders for VARSITY, rapid steps were taken to obtain De-
priority from the States on 20 January, and before D-Day 326 were re.
the Zone of Interior. These measures accounted for 1,246 gliders being
Another vital glider accessory was the nose crash protection, and
1,585 of these, either Corey or Griswold models, were available for the
operation after arrangements had been made to procure every kit held in
the depot. From January until D-Day, 412 Corey and 28 Griswold kits were
priority for delivery of seven of these critical items from SAEF Main
Air. Troop Carrier was thus enabled to embark on VARSITY with a total of
10 beacon trailers.
:
' ^ ^:. - : e J15
CHAPTER II
Section 1
quired the moTement from Britain to France of all five tactical Oroups
under the 53rd. Wing, two Groups of the 52nd, the Pathfinder Group and
Those Groups engaged in the glider assembly program were faced with
readiness date.
operational commitmentE,
Deadline Established
Construction target date had been deadlined at 15 March when the
Engineers plunged into an effort that called for everything from general
overhead., the 434th Group enroute to Mourmelon Le Grand (A-80); the 435th
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Accompanying the 53rd were Service Wing elements of the 10th, 82nd
and 318th Service Groups as well as the 33rd Air Depot Group.
The pilgrimmage was resumed on the 23rd by two Groups of the 52nd
Wing, the 313th to Achiet (B-54) and the 314th to Poix (B-44), along with
In the case of the 52nd Wing, the Engineer project didn't stop with
preparation of airfields for the 313th and 314th. Although VARSITY called
for the remaining three Groups to carry 6th British Division paratroops
fields, therefore, ranked just as high on the Engineer list as any of the
others.
Four days after the 52nd arrived on the continent, the Pathfinder
Group moved into Chartres (A-I40). This famous cathedral city also was
the site of the 50th Wing headquarters which had arrived in France in
September, along with four Groups, the 439th at Chateaudun (A-39), the
440th at Bricy (A-50), the 44lst at Dreux (A-41), the 442nd at St. Andre
De L'Eure (B-24).
Only 34 Days to Go
750 French civilians into the mammoth task of building runways, marshall-
which had been damaged by enemy action were either converted for use or
the basis that no two fields were laid out alike nor did the runways have
the same magnetic bearing. Bugs were ironed out in the most expeditious
for each motorless craft. This system was based on an area approximately
100 feet wide and 70 feet long with an allowance of 20 feet between nose
77 feet long and 21 feet wide, fabricated from three rolls of square mesh
track.
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accomplished a saving of 5,383 feet of material per glider-..a phenomenal
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SKETCHES SHOWING SAVING OF SQ.UAB :
MATiRIAL BETWEEN THE APRON TYPE OF GLIDER
PARKING AND TEE IYDIVIDUAL HARDSTAND METHOD
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always. But plane and Jeep made possible rapid coordination between
lished under which enlisted men were detailed to ride supply trains from
French civilians,
steel plank; 7,050 tons of Tarmac surfacing material; 2,500 tons of rock
bitumen seal coat; 5,310 rolls of square mesh track; 1,070 rolls of Hessian
mat; 53,300 cubic yards of hardcore; 55,686 bales of straw; and 300
barrels of tar,
With the entire 50th and 53rd Wings together with two Groups of the
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de Prunayr was ideally located for close liaison with the next higher
echelon. General WILLIAMS brought with him to Trance his A-2 and A-3
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Recognising that a determined German effort against newly-established
The situation called for increased vigilance and training on the part
Each squadron had been equipped with four .50 caliber machine guns and
More remote from the front on British bases, the 52nd and 53rd Wings
barkation for France and after arrival, Training was stepped up and re-
Allocation of AA Artillery
And on the 14th, Colonel DUKE, Troop Carrier Chief of Staff, Colonel JONES
(A-3) and Colonel Spencer visited IX Air Defense Command to draw up a plan
around the Command, and on 2000 hours of the same day these outfits were
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(A-79) and the 133rd AAA gun battalion, leas one'battery, at Mourmelon Le
weapons batteries for each field and three gun batteries for area defense
Coulommiere (A-58) and Bricy (A-50) by the 564th AAA battalion, and for
Ninth Air Force also agreed to act upon IX Troop Carrier's request
individual fields was not essential in view of existing area defense, but
--
t.
,
CHAPTER III
Section 1
Officer, directed the 439th and 44oth Groups of the 50th Wing to stress
double and single tow. Double tow missions would be performed by two
planes and four gliders echeloned to the right. The remaining two Groups
of the 50th, the 441st and 4 4 2nd, were directed to concentrate on single
In the 53rd Wing, emphasis was placed on single glider tow by the
435th and 436th Groups; double and single glider tow by the 437th; and
The 52nd Wing breakdown called for the 313th Group to continue
A second priority for the C-46's consisted in double tow of the CG-4A
and single tow of the CG-13. American parachute work was designated for
the 316th Group and British paradrop technique for the 61st, 314th and
315th.
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Intensive glider pilot training was ordered in all Groups, and each
and the part it would play in assisting the crossing of the Rhine by the
by Lt. Colonel N.J.L. Field of the lot British Airborne Corps. For the
parachute lift, 275 aircraft were needed, while a total of 425 gliders,
With three Groups of the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing already allotted to
tows.
.
possibly Woodbridge (for Hamilcars) would have 240 tug aircraft available.
Of this total, 170 would tow Horsas, with the remaining planes pulling
70 Hamilcars.
6th Division ranged between 340 and 350, still short of the 393 desired
stipulated that upon completion of the British 6th lift, hie three Groups-
It was decided that the Central Command Post in Zaat Anglia for
Colonel e.J. Messinger, were found to tally very closely with Troop
Carrier capabilities. Against the 17th's request for 370 paratroop air-
craft, Troop Carrier had 400 immediately available, but th* 660 gliders
on hand were not quite up to the 17thts minimum needs. Therefore it was
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training of tug crews, it was recommended that the 0-461s should not be
required to tow the CG-13 glider unless terrain was considered suitable.
The tentative plan of operation for the 17th Division was- then out-
Group from Achiet (B-54); 162 C-47's by the 434th and 438th from Prosnes
(A-79) and Mourmelon Le Grand (A.80); 90 C-47's by the 44lst and 442nd
from St. Andre De L'Eure (B-24) and Dreux (A-41).
Siule Tow of SO by 314th
The glider schedule called for single tow of 80 by the 314th from
Poix (B-44); single tow of 80 by the 435th from Bretigny (A-); single
tow of S0 by the 436th from Melun (A-55); double tow of 144 by the 437th
from Coulommiers (A-58); single tow of 48 by the 442nd from St. Andre De
L'Zure (B-24); single tow of 48 by the 441st from Dreux (A-41); single
General WILLIAMS concurred and said the project had been referred to
pointed out that the 17th Division's requirement of 370 planes instead
of 400 would leave his 441st and 44 2nd Groups with surplus aircraft.
Under those circumstances, he was in a position to recommend that the
commander of the 53rd Wing, asserted that he would be left with only a
five per cent overage but could still meet his commitments.
General WILLIAMS wasii-nftrmed that enough A-5 containers modified
for C-46 use had been obtained for the initial lift. A total of 425
already had been delivered to the 313th Group and another 500 were on the
way.
Following the conference, Colonel JONES (A-3) requested all parties
troops,
Glider Infantry Trained as Unit
the limited time remaining before the operational deadline. Units were
urged to utilize all flyable weather to the greatest extent possible when
Eindhoven area were made available to the 17th and 13th Divisions.
Pull Dress Rehearsal Inadvisable
Control Teams would accompany each Airborne Division. And glider pilot
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- 33-
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W . ider Pilots", dated 11 March 1945.
General WILLIAMS strongly emphasized the need for continued training
one from each American Division, be selected for C-46 lifts and be moved
Section 2
Glider Combat Control Teams had been specially equipped and trained to
perform the duties carried out by air coordination parties during the
that in Normandy two out of four air coordination parties were lost due
to enemy action, while the Holland battle saw six out of eight parties
suffer casualties and damage with three units completely knocked out,
A further reason for employing a spare team was the fact that all
control personnel could not be carried in a single glider, this factor caus-
trained in the use of codes and ciphers and the maintenance of their
radio equipment.
*0.;---
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- 34-
Teais Were scheduled for assignment to XVIII Corps (Airborne) during
Operation VARSITYT
Normally two gliders would be adequate to lift the necessary
personnel and equipment of each team, but in this case an additional two
gliders would be required to haul special pickup apparatus of both teams,
bringing the total number of gliders to six. Every effort was being
WILLIAMS stressed.
Responsibility Delegated to Teams
were to establish themselves with XVIII Corps headquarters for the purpose
ropes and stations would be sent in with the control teams. Both IX
Troop Carrier Command and XVIII Corps had agreed upon the desirability of
of a medical Battalion also were equipped with litter straps in the event
it was considered practicable to evacuate patients by glider, Decision
with the headquarters of both IX Troop Carrier Command and FAAA in order
serials and later to resupply formations. UCO code was stipulated as the
medium of communication,
DZ's.
and to supply necessary pertinent information over VHF. They were re.
XVIII Corps for the purpose of familarising themselves with the units with
which they would serve. Then they would proceed to marshalling areas.
Their development was in answer to the acute need for on-the-spot recon-
naissance from DZ's and LZ's during an operation and speedy communication
in VARSITY.
Two Teams per Division
Colonel JONDS (A-3) pointed out that eight teams were formed in order
to provide two for each of the American Airborne Divisions in the European
and single enlisted man who comprised each team. One GP, with a minimum
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Jeep and trailer.
cryptographic equipment, each man was given infantry training with the
Since the control teams were to operate from airborne landing areas,
often inside enemy lines under the most fluid battle conditions, their
wheeled trailer with special rebuilt body to provide adequate space for
efficiently.
Also included in the trailer was the SCR-522 VHP radio to provide an
procure.
No Space Inconvenience
Although the team could function without the SCR-VHF, the set added
less than 100 pounds to the total load without imposing any space incon-
any message; special code similar to air support request code but with
Section 1
Command; and Headquarters, 38 Group (RAP), Marks Hall, (3) To train flight
leaders of the Troop Carrier echelons and key personnel of the participat-
operated from fields assigned for pending operations, but no troops would
established for Troop Carrier the task of flying an air route to a drop
zone-landing zone area, simulating drops and releases and returning to
home bases.
Under the plan, formations would simulate actual Troop Carrier and
RAF serials with (1) Parachute elements in the three ship V; (2) Single
glider tow with four aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the right;
(3) Double glider tow with two aircraft and four gliders echeloned to the
right; (4) RAF single tow with two aircraft and two gliders at a 10-second
territory during the Operation VARSITY, a rope drop area had been desig-
nated for the return trip. Similarly, a rope drop area was selected for
TOKEN and all glider tug pl.anes, except the 439th Group and 38 and 46
The 439th Group and 38 and 46 Groups (BAF)--all with double glider
Head to head time intervals were specified at four minutes for 48-
seven minutes for single glider tow; and ten minutes for double glider tow.
Payload maximums were established at 5,000 pounds for the C-47, 9,000
pounds for the C-46 and 3,750 pounds for the CG-4A Waco glider,
parachute serials: two by the 434th Group; two by the 438th; one by Path-
finder; two by the 313th; and two each by the 316th, 61st and 315th.
single tow by 46 Group (RAP); 11 single tow by 38 Group (EAF); two double
tow by the 437th, 436th and 435th; two single tow by the 440th, with two
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(A-63) airfield after passing simulated LZ'1; two s*ingle tow by the 441st;
one single tow by the 442nd; and two single tow by the 314th.
During the staging and buildup period for TOKEN, the IX Troop Carrier
the exercise.
Direct speech and teleprinter circuits were made available from Head-
52nd Troop Carrier Wing (Tradewind); Headquarters,. 53rd Troop Carrier Wing
IX Troop Carrier Command, located in the operations room of PAAA, and the
.~ ~ ^;-**
.
sr t',-^. '.,'' , . :? *
1
11
^ i' i;', :,,? 7e i'9" ' * '* I.. I
I
the strict maintenance of radio silence except for
on the return Journey for navigational purposes when aircraft were at least
Time signals would be broadcast on the hour and half hour, and all
Troop Carrier aircraft were directed to listen to K69 at all times when
seven points along the route and on DZ's "A", "B", "Xm and "W".
each nine would maintain Rebecca in standby position, with set switched
immediately following drops and would not be turned on again until planes
It was decided that whenever serials were broken np, each small
to 17 March.
and communications.
The 50th and 53rd Wings had found Rebecca functioning satisfactorily.
at all points, and visual aids on the DZ were excellent. But the MF
onh
0 h of |ak reflection.
~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7
Eurieka also proved adequate for the 52nd Wing which stated that DZ
markings stood out very well over a 20-mile radius. In addition, the MF
beacon at Marfak and the Gee at Rheims met their tests successfully, but
the Ruhr Gee Chain faded at the DZ, probably as the result of high terrain.
One squadron could not identify Eureka on the last lap, and anotner was
The Pathfinder Group reported the MF beacon fair to good, the Eureka
Colonel JONES (A-3) added that most serials arrived over the DZ much
The direct line to the 53rd Wing became inoperative at 1730 and remained
unserviceable until 1910 hours, while the direct line to the 50th kept
cutting in and out. And the 50th Wing's A-3 line to the 442nd Group went
the 17th U.S, Airborne Division was set up by Colonel JONES (A-3) for
departing from Bricy (A-50) and flying the TOKET route to DZ "V" and LZ
aircraft and 12 CG-4A gliders assigned to the task actually never left the
At the critique for TOKEN held at 1100 hours on the 15th at IX Troop
Troop Carrier commander pointed out that the Command Post established at
FAAA only two days before TOKEN had satisfied General BEERETON.
that all else was on the positive side of the ledger. Airfields were
adequate.
0s ; ;,
"""
X;'$0>i- : ' * 14 ^ 5- .
o Cn$ LIIIfifTroop
0 Carrier Communications Officer, reported
that steps were being taken to correct those failures which had occured
TOKEN, General WILLIAMS stressed the need for modifying the existing plan.
Wind had caused some formations to coast ahead of the Pathfinder echelon
TOKEN,
could feel assured that his Command was ready for its greatest achieve-
Section 2
Command (PWD) to First Allied Airborne Army (Midnight) and to each of the
there were direct circuits between each Wing headquarters and its respective
Groups.
From six hours prior to D-Day until 2000 hours on D-Day, these channels
2JNCL S7SFi
i J
'i 5, Ix Troop Carrier i , located in the Operations Boom, lirst
Allied Airborne Army and the A-3 section of each Wing. A special cross-
channel speech circuit was rigged up between First Allied Airborne Army
TOKIE. Policy dictated radio silence except for the exercise of command
function by Wing and higher commanders n"' for cases of extreme emergency.
On the return Journey, the breaking of radio silence was permitted for
3940 kilocycles, with 2956 ae alternate. For the primary purpose of re-
G6*e
I- Oa the Ground ad in the Air
Call sign for any serial would be UGG, followed by the number of the
serial, and KTRC was the collective W/T call sign for all Troop Carrier
made.
With Station X69 broadcasting time signals on the hour and half hour,
the sixth blip on each broadcast would denote the exact time.
ion "H" was directed together with M/F D/F, call sign B12, frequency 273
kilocycles. Aircraft properly equipped could also use section "A" (VEF
channel 755) for air-eea rescue,
Radar and visual aids called for standard display and codings of
panels and Eureka beacons except for the panel letters at LAST LAP,
element would hold Rebecca in standby position with set switched on but
Rebecca equipment would be turned off immediately after drops were com-
pleted and would not be turned on again until at least 40 miles from the
DZ-LZ sector.
In cases where serials broke apart, the leading plane of each small
element would operate Rebecca. ReFe stages of all Rebeccas would be peaked
Removal of Radomes
radomes and associated antenna equipment for storage until a later dates
with IX Troop Carrier headquarters from LZ "tN" by using W/T call sign B-38
on the frequency 4375 by day and 2436 by night. For transmitting information
to headquarters, the teaes would use special settings for X-209 and One-
aircraft, it would be done on VHF channel 757, Team R/T call sign would
be ACHILLES. The team station would take over net control after estab-
U~gLAS@-g'Etb t
lishing contact with IX Troop Carrier headquarters,
used by the Combat Control Teams and the Troop Carrier headquarters net
and copy all messages. In the event a message from the DZ were not
station would immediately pass along the message to the station concerned.
W/T call sign of the Command relay would be J68. At H plus 5 hours, the
For code and cipher transmission, SIGABA would be used down to and
including Wing level. From Wings to Groups, M-209 and RAF 1st cipher
would be used.
user basis.
in flight as well as the crews of any other type aircraft making emergency
Personnel of all arms and services of all armies would receive medical
care from members of medical air evacuation squadrons while they were being
evacuated to airdromes in the vicinity of base hospitals.
- 47 -
Planes returning from operational missions with wounded aboard would
display appropriate signals to the flying control tower for the purp mse
would direct both plane and ambulance to a specific site to avoid any
confusion.
In line with normal policy, air evacuation planes would bear no dis-
For the period of time Airborne units were bivouacked on Troop Carrier
fields prior to the operation, they would receive medical attention from
(A-40), Bricy (A-50); the 224th General Hospital at Dreux (A-4l), St. Andre
De L'Eure (B-24); the 1st Platoon, 40th Field Hospital at Bretigny (A-48),
(A-79), Mourmelon Le Grand (A-80); the let Platoon, l4th Field Hospital at
Upon the admission of the first briefed patient, a ward would be set
aside and maintained under guard until the hospital commander received
commander concerned. Such patients would bear the code word "Underdone#
Ordnance Procurement
aircraft from the United Kingdom, while the remaining 50,000 pounds were
flak vests, 1,732 flak helmets, 2,074 flak pads, 361 trench knives M3 with
t El] ?P n . , -48-
scabbards, 650 Thompson sub-machine guns, 1,187 cal, .45 automatic pistols,
524 carbines, 1,166 pistol holsters, 2,753 pistol magazines, 1,710 sub-
machine gun magazines, 2,830 carbine magazines and 1,658 fragmentation
grenades.
33rd Air Depot Group as chief distribution center and a building was
the IX Troop Carrier Command Ordnance section and the various higher
agencies, including Central Air Depot Area; Air Service Command; USSTAPF
were completed with IX Troop Carrier Flight Section to convey flak equip-
ment and arms from Station 548 in the United Kingdom to Chartres (A-40)
where the material could be processed by the 33rd Air Depot Group.
ammunition at Montdidier.
By 22 March, all unit requisitions for flak equipment, arms and other
items had been filled. Steps were taken to replenish stocks at the 33rd
Air Depot Group distribution center. Supply of flak pads had been comp-
force.
Chemical Warfare items was based on (1) War Department directives which
stimulated that provisional units must be equipped from sources within the
Command in which they were organized and therefore were not authorized to
draw upon normal supply sources and (2) the Pathfinder organization at the
time was not committed in a combat operation and consequently could present
supply was to draw up equipment lists which were attached to a letter ad-
ping provisional units but called attention to the urgent tactical imnort-
Nevertheless, this bid was turned back by the Director of Supply, Air
al commitment was received from SHAEF. Troop Carrier then forwarded the
letter and accompanying lists to SHARF Air Staff and reeleved an indorse-
From that point, the letter continued to pass through necessary chan-
nels. Further indorsed to the Commanding General, Central Air Depot Area,
had to come from the Commanding General of the Communications Zone. There-
Letter Hand-Processed
G-3, FAAA, the latter recommending that the list be taken to G-3, SHAEF (FWD)
make the equipment available on the same nriority as the 13th and 17th
Airborne Divisions.
lishing supply points and arranging necessary services for units moving
and necessary tentage and cots for additional combat crews assigned to
pertinent to the operation. Cots and rations also were moved into the
glider pilot evacuation center at Helmond (B-86) which had been establish-
Section 3
becomes the only lifeline that can be held open to units of hard-pressed
their offensive impetus often can be speeded in direct ratio to the quantity
With a view to the days that would follow VARSITY and to stand ready
period of four days. -These were ready for loading at a moment's notice
51 s7,X, i=' E i r
i Wine
_ .. _ airdromes
...............
_ , _ on the continent at Chateaudun (A.-q).
cated in the Eighth Air Force area at Neaton was one full day's supply of
, , ,
I , , , ' I~~~~~~~~~~~~
fields at Greenham Common, Earsbury and Welford marked time with 80-air-
The 490th and 334th Quartermaster Depot Companies were charged with
loading C-47 aircraft of IX Troop Carrier Command, while the former also
Bach C-47, with six bundles in the pararacks and four in the cargo
compartment, was set up to haul a peak load of 1.25 tons. With a double
u08ragb~rXef P M _
capacity of 2.50 tons, the B-24 could lug 20 bundless--l in the bomb bays,
four around the ball turret well and two at the rear camera hatch,
it was established that the British would assume responsibility for supply-
roller conveyors and any other necessary items. In such cases, the British
When it was learned that B-24 bombers were going to be used for re-
suwnly, a plan for loading was worked out with the 2nd Bombardment Division
departure airfields, bomber crews also were given short intensive courses
30 -nlnes were available for 610 bundles weighing 75 ton&; at Old Bucken-
ham, 120 planes for 505 bundles we'¥!hing 62.5 tons; at Shipdham, 30
planes for 610 bundles weighing 75 tons; at Wendling, 10 planes for 200
UNCLAS2SIFIED _ *
.
I*I IT iI!
. 'i* -,* (A
-i „
* -, j-^ !:j I I ' me ; i ^
(Above)
Para-Bundles Adjusted on a C-46 Before Take-
off and (Below) How They Look in Flight....
I I 1; 14,"I
-N - I
.x! "I
`, ,
F,I
1-4 - I
P
111k
bundles weighing 25 tons; and at Tibenham, 25 planes for 504 bundles
Successful in Yugoslavia
With both ships tested at the same time in hauling various sized
loads, the B-17 was found to be impractical for the task in view of the
A comparison of the two types of bomber and the C-47 revealed that
as against 10 seconds for the B-17 and eight seconds for the C-47, In
planned resupply, B-24's used in place of C-47's could drop the same
Technique Disseminated
The testing team worked out a general plan for loading the B-24.
familiar as B-24'1 were used to haul freight from the resupply fields.
when 252 Liberators were assigned for resupply under tactical conditions.
bomber fields, loaded the ships and flew on the missions to dispatch the
loads,
personnel made necessary the training of Eighth Air Force men in loading
IX sri^ ^ 56-
VA M-, - --- 1S :
the dispatch position and lashed down. Thus crews had simply to be ed-
ucated to unlash the bundles and stand clear of the static lines when the
warning signal was given. Then, on the drop signal, they were to push
Although the C-46 has yet to be used for resupply, a plan has been
worked out for that eventuality. Unlike the C-47, the larger C-46 is
not equipped with pararacks, but six bundles can be loaded under the
fuselage.
Two web straps and a bomb shackle are used to secure each bundle,
with the end of the strap inserted in the hook of the shackle, then
carried around the end of the bundle and buckled to the fuselage. A
plastic or paper nose is attached to the forward end to cover the para-
chute and streamline the bundle. When the release is made, the shackle
In the standard plan for loading a C-?47, six bundles are carried in
the pararacks and four in the cargo compartment to be ejected out the
Jump door. When a resupply mission calls for more than one pass over
the DZ, an additional four bundles are loaded inside the plane for each
additional pass.
Section 4
into Field Order No. 5 which outlined the forthcoming operation in detail.
at 1000 hours and the procession of Troop Carrier parachute and glider
serials to continue streaming over the target until well beyond noon.
cross the Rhine in the vicinity of Wesel eight hours before the arrival
- 57 -
Air Force bombers were delegated the task of softening up the enemy days
communication centers east of the battle area, flak positions near the
During the actual operation, Eighth Air Force fighters would maintain a
screen east of the landing area. And 15 minutes after all Airborne forces
were on the ground, s fleet of approximately 240 B-24 Liberators would drop
540 tons of supplies to the 6th British and 17th U.S. Airborne Divisions.
area where Second Tactical Air Force would take over the job. RAF fighters
Ninth Air Force would provide fighter escort for Troop Carrier
columns starting from French bases until Second Tactical Air Force assum-
ed the burden in the vicinity of the target area. Ninth also was available
Coastal Command which also was to cooperate with Allied naval units in
The main job of air protection went to Second TAP which was assigned
to cover Troop Carrier formations upon taking over from RAF and Ninth Air
Force fighters. Second TAF also would furnish day and night patrols
concluded that the Nazi Air Force was not strong enough to offer effective
were too few in number to materially affect the operation; that the
- 58 -
prior to VARSITY described the LZ-DZ area as firm terrain highly suitable
for glider landings. Field and meadow patterns averaged 200 to 300 yards
the countryside was known to be poled or mined, although the Germans had
and trees except for the church steeple at 150 feet and the town hall
tower at 135 feet. Rail sidings were 950 yards long and four tracks
both sides by roads lined with trees, but all obstructions were under 40
with ditches on both sides ranging to 10 feet in width and five in depth,
Also slightly embanked was the single track Wesel-Bocholt line which was
across the width of the bank. The main power line through the area was
strung on single pylons spaced 230 yards apart. These pylons, standing
90 to 100 feet high with three cross arms, were built out of steel girders.
Another power line, based on 60-foot single steel pylons, ran along the
and small power lines ranging to 40 feet in height formed a grid of the
area.
im^^ f. 1v ^. .,^ - 59
imate height of 20 feet at one road intersection.
noted that defense positions frequently were dug in the vicinity of farm
ditches also were evident in the vicinity. Trees and poles occasionally
wire fences not over five feet high and with few trees in the vicinity.
Hedgerows and stone fences were observed only around farm yards, and very
few drainage ditches sliced the terrain. Occasional stacks of grain and hay
were in the vicinity, while weanons pits and foxholes bordered some of
but seldom above 60. Varying in density, a majority of these woods con-
Of the two landing zones selected for the 17th Airborne Division, LZ
"N" was the most northerly, lying about four miles northwest of Wesel
Located about three to four miles southeast LZ "'N' and about two
more numerous in the latter but counted less major glider obstructions.
There were four landing zones for the 6th British Airborne Division,
the most northerly site, LZ One, running three miles just north of
;M5 ft ! i _60
I
Ramminkeln and following the same terrain pattern as the American zones.
a north-south axis for about two miles. Located along both sides of the
LZ Four ran a mile and a half along the northeast side of the double
track Emmerich-Wesel railway and numbered more than the usual amount of
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northern fringe of the long woodland and a mile south of the autobahn,
was DZ Two.
American drop zones were "W" and "X", the former located approximately
two and a half miles northwest of Wesel and a mile due north of the Rhine.
The latter extended in a similar direction from Wesel and a mile and
the southwest, the double track rail line to the west and the single
the Troop Carrier A-2 analysis. Colonel ERNST'S section concluded that
able for 24 to 36 hours by Allied bombardment. Thus the Nazi Air Force
'1C j -, M
I' I' .: n ~ ~ ~ ll~t'^'t^N^
C 4: tackCa o roop Carrier airfields during marshalling
Another German threat was the jet fighter which could be expected to
But on the whole, it was believed that Allied fighter escort would
2nd British Army or the Airborne troops. In either case, the Airborne
radius.
main effort against the river-borne force, the airborne landing would
On the other hand, if the Germans hurled most of their weight against
the skytroopers, the resistance probably would be launched from the east
side of the Issel Canal and could pin the Airborne Divisions under a
crossfire.
But the Airborne force would find itself in contact with the enemy within
of flak evacuated from the west bank of the Rhine despite the enemy
Germans on M/T and petrol for flak units, and it was assumed that such
enemy flak positions within a two mile strip along the east bank of the
e- - R hine, And-low-flying fighter planes coud deal with any installations
X V .1 i X' . * I ' _ 62 -
*that; survived the barrage or new guns rushed up afterward.
the river and the target area was expected to come with the reduction of
ground attack scheduled to begin six hours before Airborne troops were
ccmmittedl, the enemy would be alerted and could start concentrating mobile
and self-propelled flak units in the area for defense against any potential
airborne landings. Troop Carrier's fighter escort would have the assign-
light between the river and the high ground back of the river plain.
ment and artillery barrage as well as the progress made by ground troops
area, it was requested that aerial bombardment cut the railways leading
to drop and landing zones from Zmmerich, Bocholt, Dinslaken and Dorsten.
light flak that had no tracer. As a result, air crews were being informed
four days after VARSITY, the principal responsibility facing the IX Troop
Carrier A-1 section under Colonel BIRTWISTLE was to insure the avail-
pilots to return in the short span of four days, so the VARSITY GP's were
63, -
1 7 :1
had been made to convert into glider co-.pilots approximately 50 per cent
of the power pilots assigned to the Command from the Zone of Interior
between Novamber 1944 and January 1945o Many of these men were insuffic-
iently trained for glider action, but operational demands made their
In addition, a mass transfer of 52ind Wing glider pilots who were not
committed for VARSITY would have shifted these personnel over to the 50th
and 53rd Wings, But with the cancellation of CHOKER II, these emergency
For VARSITY itself, glider pilot teams of two Groups in the 53rd
Wing were moved to the. remaining three Groups of the same Wing and a
smal number of glider mechanics from the 52nd Wing to the 53rd.
Section 5
parachute and glider troops and equipment of the 17th U.S. Airborne
troops and equipment of the 6th British Airborne Divisions; and to resepply
? -.. . .tbh 17th by air,
7
5
^
/
~~~~. .
Under
allocation
ofroutes,
aircraft
the initiati
United Kin
Under allocation of routes, aircraft initiai from the tnited King_:
dom would fly a designated course to the Command Departure Point, then would
hold to the left stream to the Initial Point and from there to the LZ-DZ
area.
Planes taking off from France, with the exception of Pathfinder and
departure points, then to the Command Departure Point where all glider
serials would join the center stream to the Initial Point and parachute
serials would fall into the right stream to the initial point.
from the 50th Wing departure point to the 53rd Wing departure point, there
The C-46 aircraft of the 313th Group would, after assembly, fly to
the 52nd Wing departure point, then to the Command Assembly Point where
they would affect a crossing of. columns to join the right stream to the
Initial Point.
Annex No. 6), 1,000 feet from MARFAK to the Initial Point at YALTA, 600
feet above the DZ and LZ areas. On the return trip, Troop Carrier
columns would climb to 2,500 feet, with the C-46 serials rising still
ced by the Commanding General, IX Troop Carrier Command, by 1700 hours on D-l,
The responsibility of taking Serial A-1 into action went to the Path-
finder Group, the same veteran organization which had spearheaded every
The leading plane of this serial would carry one Pathfinder stick
, -
_-65
U f^ A-20. The 50th also would be prepared to
fly 260 resupply sorties on D plus 1, if called upon to do so.
Among the Groups of the 50th, the 441st would be ready to stage a
48-glider serial from Chartres (A-.40) as well as its home station Dreux
(A4l), while the 4 4 2nd would equip and stand ready to utilize i2 gliders
return from VARSITY to its home station at Chateaudun (A-39) with the
The 52nd Wing serials were listed as B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6,
A-5, A-6, A-21 and A-22. Leading aircraft of Serials B-1 and B-4 would
carry Pathfinder sticks of the 6th British Airborne Division, while the
leading plane of the 313th Group's Serial No. 5 would drop one Pathfinder
Of the 52nd s three Groups staging in the United Kingdom, the 61st
would start from Chipping Ongar airfield but would return to B-92 upon
completion of the mission, while the 315th and 316th Groups would execute
their paradrops and return to England. Following the operation, the three
Groups would be relieved from operational duty with 38 Group (RAF) and
would revert back to the control of the Commanding General, 52nd Wing.
The 53rd Wing serials would include A-2, A-3, A-4, A-7, A-8, A-9,
A-10, A-11, A-12, A-.13. The Wing also would be prepared to fly 180
missions called for D plus one or subsequent days would fall to the
officers and men of the 49Oth and 334th Quartermaster Depot Companies,
the 1st and 2nd Air Cargo Resupply Detachments and the 3rd Air Cargo
% e. l a" ir -
N _@_
To the IX Troop Carrier Combat Camera Unit (Prove) went the assign-
ment of photographing VARSITY in all its phases, including takeoff -form-
ations enroute to the target, paradrops and glider landings and the home-
ward flight.
Troop Carrier formations would fly in three columns spaced a mile and
a half apart and denoted specifically as Left Stream, Center Stream and
Right Stream.
Payload Ceilings Jixed
Payload ceilings were fixed at 5,850 pounds for C-47 parachute air-
craft, 10,500 pounds for C- 46's, 3,750 pounds for CG-4A gliders and no
weight lift of any type for planes tugging gliders. Six bundles would
comprise the supply and equipment loads carried on all parachute aircraft
Initial Point at respective speeds of 140 and 165 miles an hour, then
cutting down to 120 on the approach to DZ' , slowing to 110 for the drops.
Swinging toward home, C-47's could step up their airspeed to 150 and
C-46's to 1gO.
Glider-towing planes would slide over LZ's at 110 an hour, then whip
parachute serials; seven minutes for single glider tow; 10 minutes for 36
aircraft double glider tow; 12 minutes for 40 aircraft double glider tow.
the tail of the last parachute serial and the head of the first glider
serial.
RAF interval of flight for loose pair glider formations was estab-
lished at 10 seconds.
Parachute column formations were designated as nine-ship Via of TEEse,
the case of double tow, a pair of pairs would consist of two tug planes
Prescribed methods for turning out of the target area dictated that
aircraft making drops over DZIs "A" and "B" would swing 180 degrees left
Aircraft over DZ's "WI and "X" would turn 180 degrees right and follow the
Tug craft going to LZI' "N" and "S" would, after release, make a 180
degree turn to the right and proceed to the Rope Drop Area to release
that no attempts would be made to save tow ropes if the tactical situation
produced undue dangers. The area was to be marked by the SON control
team with yellow smoke and white pannels. Ropes also would be collected
by the team.
Crews were instructed in Troop Carrier policy which did not permit
that DZIs or LZ's were not located on the first pass, combat troops were
Between the IP and the DZ-LZ area, a taboo was placed on evasive
Serial leaders, flight leaders and individual pilots would be held respon-
sible for continuing to the target area despite any mishap that might
Any pilot returning with wounded aboard would signal that fact to
Hq, IX Troop Carrier Command, subject: "SOP for the Tactical Employment
r a:'
: : This- SOP directed glider pilots to assist Airborne troops in unloading
rons in the Wing assembly area. Each pilot was individually responsible
Once the GP s were rounded up, the Wing glider officers would report
to G-3, 17th Airborne Division at the Division command post and submit a
strength report. Prior to the operation, the Wing glider officer would
appoint a deputy eand make his appointment known to all group and squadron
glider officers.
During VARSITY, the 314th Group glider officer would be under the
50th Wing for evacuation, while the 439th Group glider pilots would be
Army, They would be moved to Helmond, Holland (B-86) where a Troop Carrier
A full week before VARSITY was scheduled to take place, the commanding
officer of the Troop Carrier control team at SON (B-56) had received
the evacuation of glider pilots from the combat sector, recovering tow
team could supply the glider pilots with "C" rations and emergency heating
assigned by the team to arrive at the rope drop area with a jeep and one-
7 t1This detachment would post_ ta guard around the area from 0900 to 1330
! .:D , ::' ' ;' 6
-_9
hours on 24 March to deny entry to any personnel. All ropes would be
retrieved as soon as they had been dropped by tug ships returning from
the mission.
Assist in Unloading
in their gliders. They would then proceed with the troors to the assembly
area of the airborne unit with whom they flew. At that point, they would
periods spent in the combat area, glider pilots could be called upon for
would provide a glider pilot guard to protect the motorless craft from
defensive role,
Conference on Tactics
Troop Carrier. Major Howard H. Cloud, Jr., Command Glider Officer, headed
for the XVIII Corps (Abn) Surgeon and members of his staff. Two pickups
j-
170- 1®l I
6L
: 4 lT
-
_IM It
Iv r I ' '. ,- ; .I J a dj
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-
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two CG-4A gliders were flown into the Remagen bridgehead on the east bank
of the Rhine with 4,000 pounds of medical supplies and evacuated by pickup
25 wounded soldiers of the U.S. First Army.
Briefing of Commanders
The VARSITY plan called for briefing of Wing commanders on D-3, Group
and Squadron commanders and essential Squadron staff members on D-2 and
combat crews on D-1.
It was established that "A" time (GMT plus one hour) would be the
basis for all time signals and would be synchronized for the operation on
inating the air evacuation of glider pilots also would furnish, as far as
practicable, food, lodging and medical aid. In addition, it would send out
a detachment to mark the glider Rope Drop Area. Direct contact would be
each of the Serials A-1 and A-5 to DZ's "WN and "X' respectively. There
the teams would lay out aids in accordance with signal communication
procedure,
Possibility For Pathfinder Techniques
serials to DZ's "A" and "B" would be made available to carry those teams,
Troop Carrier Wings and 38 Group (RAF). The Air Officer Commanding, 38
Group (RAF) would control the operation from the United Kingdom and would
.- - . _i _ *.w T TTA
_NQ
.ble to Ueneral WhljALD. -
0'3if,
t ,-; by',',,:
ould be inspected immediately
the aid of the Air Service Squadron. Service Wing headquarters would
74