Rebuttal of Motion

ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY A.
BRADSHAW
HEARING DATE: OCTOBER 7, 2016, at 1:00 P.M.
WITH ORAL ARGUMENT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FOR KING COUNTY
8
9
A.W.,
11
12
13
No. 15-2-19425-9 SEA
Plaintiff,
10
v.
CORPORATION OF THE CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF SEATTLE, a sole
corporation,
PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
14
Defendant.
15
16
17
18
19
20
I.
RELIEF REQUESTED
A.W. respectfully requests the Court deny the Seattle Archdioceses motion because
(1) the Archdiocese completely ignores the duty it had to take reasonable steps to protect its
students, including A.W., from being sexually abused at school, in the janitors office, by a
janitor with a well-known history of fondling students breasts, slapping their butts, and
21
looking up their skirts; (2) a reasonable jury could easily find the Archdiocese breached that
22
23
24
25
26
duty by doing nothing to protect A.W. from that danger, particularly given the overwhelming
evidence A.W. has presented regarding the Archdioceses knowledge of that danger, which
must be viewed in a light most favorable to M.R.; (3) a jury must decide whether A.W. filed
DEFENDANT CORPORATION OF THE
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SEATTLES
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 of
36
A Professional Limited Liability Company
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
suit within three years of when she began to understood the causal connection between the
abuse and her injuries, particularly where the Archdiocese can cite no evidence that A.W.
began to make that connection until she started counseling in 2015.
II.
BACKGROUND FACTS
A.W. was sexually abused on June 10, 1983, by Charles (Chuck) Siddons at St.
Johns School, an Archdiocesan school in Seattle. It is beyond dispute that A.W. was abused
by Siddons as he pled guilty shortly after A.W.s parents called the police and reported the
abuse.
10
11
A.W. filed this lawsuit against the Archdiocese because it knew that Chuck,
nicknamed Chester the Molester by students, was fondling students breasts, slapping their
butts, looking up their skirts, and dry-humping them in his office. Yet despite the
12
overwhelming notice evidence, the Archdiocese never took any meaningful steps to protect
13
A.W. and the other children from him. Rather than remove Siddons from St. Johns and
14
15
16
17
report him to authorities, the Archdiocese allowed Siddons to continue to molest children
including A.W.
A.
18
It Is Undisputed A.W. Was Abused by an Archdiocesan Employee at an

Archdiocesan School
St. Johns at all relevant times was, and still is, owned and operated by the Seattle
19
Archdiocese. The Archdiocese has admitted in this case, there is no evidence that St. John
20
21
22
Parish and School are separate entities from the Archdiocese run by separate orders, and thus,
does not anticipate asserting a defense based on this fact.1
23
24
25
26
Amal Decl., at 2.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
The Archdiocese has also admitted in this case that Charles Siddons was employed at
2
3
St. John the Evangelist Parish and/or School as a janitor and/or maintenance worker in the
1970s and 1980s.2 More specifically, the records in this case show that Siddons was hired
on or around August 23, 1973.3
The Archdiocese tries to suggest in its motion that its speculation whether its
principal ever took any steps to terminate Siddons after learning that Siddons was sexually
abusing students by 1981. However, it is undisputed that the Archdiocese did not terminate
Siddons employment at St. Johns until June 13, 1983, the day he was finally arrested for
10
sexually abusing A.W., three days prior. 4
11
B.
12
13
Kate Brune was employed as a teacher at St. Johns from approximately 1975 to 2011.
14
15
The Archdiocese Places Great Emphasis on the Fact that One of Its Principals,
Doug Arthur, is Deceased, But the Vice-Principal During His Term, Kate Brune,
Testified that She Was Hired to Help Mr. Arthur Oversee the School
During her time at St. Johns, Ms. Brune testified that the principal at St. Johns would
16
commonly ask a teacher to serve as vice-principal to help oversee the school.5 Ms. Brune
17
testified that she served as vice-principal of St. Johns during the entire time that Doug Arthur
18
was principal. She believes Mr. Arthur was principal from approximately 1980 to 1984.6
19
Ms. Brune testified that while serving as vice-principal, Mr. Arthur talked to her
20
about everything at the school and was very good about keeping [her] updated on what
21
22
23
24
25
26
Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery, Amala Decl., Ex. 1, at 14.
St. John School Board Meeting Minutes, dated August 23, 1973, Amala Decl., Ex. 2.
Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery, Amala Decl., Ex. 1, at 14.
Deposition of Kate Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 5-6.
Id.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
was going on.7 She further testified that her responsibilities included being aware of the
major situations in the school, included allegations of abuse: Well obviously he didnt tell
me everything, but I know the major situations. I know that if something related to, like the
[A.W.] situation, [Arthur] was real clear and kept me informed about anything that was going
on related to that. Ms. Brune further testified she was in charge of the building when he
was gone.8
C.
9
10
11
The Archdiocese Failed to Train Its Staff and/or Implement Policies and
Procedures at St. Johns for Reporting Child Sexual Abuse Until the Late 1980s,
Nearly a Decade After The Mandatory Reporting Law Came Into Effect
Although the law in Washington has provided that school personnel should report
suspicions of child sexual abuse since 1969,9 it is undisputed that in 1971, the Washington
12
Legislature amended Washingtons reporting law to require that all school personnel,
13
14
15
including teachers and school administrators, report reasonable suspicions of child sexual
abuse to authorities. Chapter 26.44 RCW (1971). The Legislature explained that the purpose
16
in requiring school personnel to report reasonable suspicions of child sexual abuse to law
17
enforcement and/or the DSHS is to to prevent further abuses to children. Chapter 26.44.010
18
RCW (1971).
19
Ms. Brune, testified that the Archdiocese, however, did not train its teachers and
20
administrators regarding state reporting requirements or implement any policies and
21
procedures at St. Johns regarding child sexual abuse until the late 1980s:
22
23
24
25
26
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 41, 49.
Chapter 26.44 RCW (1969).
36
www.pcvalaw.com
Q:
2
3
A.
4
Q.
A.
Q.
6
7
A.
Q.
8
9
10
A.
When was the first time that you recall receiving any formal training
from the Seattle Archdiocese on any issues surrounding child sexual
abuse?
I would say late '80s.
Prior to receiving that training in the late 1980s, were you aware of
any obligation to report childhood sexual abuse to authorities?
I was not.
When I say "authorities," I'm referring to law enforcement or child
protective services.
Yes.
So just to make sure we are clear, before receiving the training in the
late 1980s from the Archdiocese with respect to issues surrounding
childhood sexual abuse, you were not aware of the obligation then to
report sexual misconduct that you may have observed at the school?
That is correct, I was not.10
11
Jodi Desclos, a teacher at St. Johns from 1976 to the present, similarly testified that
12
13
14
the Archdiocese did not implement any policies and procedures regarding child sexual abuse
prior to when A.W. was abused in June, 1983:
15
Q:
16
From the time that you started at St. John's until the time Charles
Siddens was terminated, you don't recall any written policies and
procedures regarding the issue of child sexual abuse, correct?
No.11
17
A:
18
The Archdiocese failed to train its teachers and administrators at St. Johns regarding
19
the issue of child sex abuse, even though it admitted in discovery that, prior to when A.W.
20
was abused, it knew that an adult male who had sexually abused a child could pose a risk to
21
abuse another child.12
22
23
24
25
26
10
Dep. of Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 30-35.
11
Dep. of Jodi Desclos, Amala Decl., Ex. 4, at 35.
12
Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Requests for Admission, Amala Decl., Ex. 5.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
D.
Prior to When A.W. Was Abused, the Archdiocese Knew that Siddons Was
Fondling Students Breasts, Slapping Their Butts, and Looking up Their Skirts,
But No Steps Were Ever Taken to Report Him to Authorities, to Remove Him
From St. Johns, or to Protect Students from Him
Ms. Brune testified that when she first started teaching at St. Johns in 1975, she heard
rumors that Siddons had engaged in inappropriate conduct with students.13
specifically, she testified that several of the junior high teachers warned her that when the
female students walked past his office, he was swatting their bottoms.14 Consistent with
Ms. Brunes testimony, Denise Erickson testified that Siddons used to grab and cup her
More
butt and give her butt a little pat when she was a 7th grade student at St. Johns in
10
approximately 1977 and 1978. Denise testified that, on one occasion as she was walking out
11
of Siddons office, a teacher told her not to go in there anymore and to stay out of his
12
13
office15
A few years later, Ms. Brune testified that, while serving as vice-principal, she
14
15
observed Siddons rubbing a students breasts in the lunchroom, which she considered to
16
be inappropriate contact:
17
Q:
18
A:
Q:
A:
19
20
21
22
While you were at St. John's, did you personally witness any actions
by Mr. Siddons that you thought were inappropriate?
Yes, I did.
Can you tell us what that was?
It was when -- one year, I was on lunch duty, and I walked up and
down and amongst the tables; and at one point, Chuck had his hands
around the person's back, and he was rubbing his hands back and
forth across her breasts.
23
24
25
26
13
Dep. of Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 17.
14
Id. at 17-18.
15
Dep. of Denise Erickson, Amala Decl., Ex. 6, at 24.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
Q.
A:
3
4
Q:
A:
Do you recall approximately when you observed Mr. Siddons

touching this student? Approximately what year?
It was during Doug Arthurs term. I know that, but I do not know
the year.
Do you know what years Mr. Arthur was the principal at St. John's?
I think it was five years after I got there. I do not know -- I know it
had to be after -- it was probably, like, '81 or '82.
So -- and he was there for three years. So roughly '80 to '83 or '81 to
'84?
Three or four years. I do not know how many.16
Q:
A:
Remarkably, the Archdiocese recently denied that it knew Siddons was molesting
students prior to when A.W. was abused, contending that the precise timing of Brunes
10
observation is a disputed fact.17 The fatal flaw to this argument is the fact that Mr. Siddons
11
12
13
14
sexually abused A.W. on the last day of school and he was then immediately arrested. It is
therefore undisputed that Ms. Brune observed Siddons fondle a students breasts in the
lunchroom sometime prior to June 10, 1983.
15
Even more remarkably, the Archdiocese recently denied that Siddons touching a
16
students breasts constitutes abuse.18 Ms. Brune did not testify that she saw this man merely
17
touch another adult, or that his fondling was somehow open to misinterpretation. Ms.
18
Brune testified that Charles Siddons was rubbing his hands back and forth across [a girls]
19
20
21
breasts. There is no scenario in which this behavior is proper. The inappropriateness is

confirmed by Ms. Brunes next action: she testified that she yelled at Siddons that she
22
23
24
25
26
16
Dep. of Kate Brune, Amal Decl., Ex. 3 at 21-25.
17
See Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, filed September 23, 2016.
18
Id.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
didn't want him to ever do that again to anybody and reported this sexual misconduct (i.e.,
sexual abuse) to the principal Douglas Arthur:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
4
5
6
7
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
9
10
11
12
Who did you tell?

I told Doug Arthur, the principal.
Did you immediately tell Mr. Arthur?
Well, as soon as my lunch duty was over. I mean, within the same
timeframe I did.
Do you know if Mr. Arthur took any action following the receipt of
your report?
I do not believe he did.
Why do you say -- why do you say you don't believe that he did?
Well, for two things: He almost always talked to me about everything.
We were very he wanted to be sure that I knew what was going on
with disciplinary situations with students. And, secondly, I think, if he
had reported it, someone would have come back and talked to me, and
no one ever did.19
Despite witnessing Siddons sexually molest a minor student in the lunchroom, Ms.
13
14
Brune testified she is not aware of any steps being taken to remove Siddons from St. Johns,
15
to report him to authorities, or to protect the students from him.
16
17
Another teacher, Ms. Desclos testified that she received several complaints from her
7th and 8th grade female students that Siddons made them uncomfortable and made
18
inappropriate comments to them as they walked past his office. Ms. Desclos testified that
19
20
21
although she reported these red flags to Mr. Arthur, no steps were taken to report Siddons to
authorities or to have Siddons removed from St. Johns:
22
Q:
23
A:
And then you expressed your concerns about those red flags to Doug
Arthur. Is that fair?
I did.
24
25
26
19
Dep. of Kate Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3 at 24.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
3
4
5
Q:
A:
Do you know why Doug Arthur didnt have you report the concerns
you raised about Charles Siddons to CPS?
I dont know.
Did you think that Doug Arthur would report your concerns to CPS?
I thought he would report them to somebody.
And after you reported your concerns to Doug Arthur about Charles
Siddons, did you personally observe any effort to protect the students
at St. John's from Mr. Siddons?
No. I say "no," except for the caution that I know that Doug gave to
Robin [Oswald] to stay away from his office.20
Ms. Desclos explained that Robin Oswald was a student at St. Johns who spent a
9
10
lot of time in Siddons office, and that Mr. Arthur told Robin to stay away from Chuck.21
11
Ms. Desclos testified she is aware of no other steps that Mr. Arthur took to protect the
12
children at St. Johns from Siddons, even though he was aware of the danger Siddons posed
13
to them.
14
Mike McGibbon served as an athletic coach at St. Johns between approximately
15
16
1962 and 1992. He testified that the students at St. Johns reported to him that Siddons
17
would look up the girls skirts as they walked up the stairs and that the students called
18
Siddons a pervert. However, he testified that he never reported these complaints to anyone
19
else at St. Johns or to the authorities:
20
Q:
21
A:
22
[D]id children come to you and express their concerns about other
adults during your time that you were atSt. Johns?
A Well, in the Chuck Siddons casethe boys did tell me that he
would his office was down the second floor, a stairway on the first
floor to the third floor, and I just remember what they called him.
23
24
25
26
20
Dep. of Jodi Desclos, Amala Decl., Ex. 4 at 23-25.
21
Id. at 16.
36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
Q:
A:
They said he was a pervert, and the boys didn't like him even though
he was apparently a pedophile with girls and not boys. But they did
say that he would put up his chair by the door and look up the girls'
skirts as they went up the stairs.
Did you report what the boys were saying about Chuck Siddons to
anyone else?
No.22
Loretta Fletcher had five sons who attended St. Johns and her husband worked as a
janitor with Siddons at St. Johns. She testified that her husband and two other men at the
8
9
school were involved in the schools decision to cut the door to Siddons office in half so that
10
he would be more visible. She testified that this change occurred approximately two or three
11
years after he was hired.23
12
Jan Volk, a longtime employee at St. Johns parish, testified that she thought Siddons
13
was creepy and similarly testified that the door to Chuck Siddons door was cut in half and
14
that he was not allowed to have the door closed when there were children around during his
15
16
employment at St. Johns.24
18
Prior to When A.W. Was Abused, the Teachers and Administrators at St. Johns
Ignored Between 15 to 18 Complaints from a Student and Her Mom that Siddons
Was Grabbing the Students Breasts and Touching Her Inappropriately
19
M.T, a third a third grade student at St. Johns in 1981, testified that at the beginning
20
of her third grade year, Siddons began to sexually abuse her. 25 She testified that her teacher
17
E.
21
22
23
24
25
26
22
Dep. of Mike McGibbon, Amala Decl., Ex. 7, at 26-27, 31,
23
Amal Decl., at 10.
24
Amal Decl., at 11.
25
Dep. of M.T., Amala Decl., Ex. 8, at 15. The Archdiocese fails to show how M.T. and D.T. are parties in
interest as defined under RCW 5.60.030. Neither are an adverse party suing or defending in this case.
Although M.T. filed a claim against the Archdiocese, the question of whether M.T.s testimony is admissible in
her own case against the Archdiocese is not before the Court.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
would often send her to Siddons office and that when she entered his office, he would ask her
to sit down in his rocking chair. He would then begin to rub his hands up M.T.s legs and
thighs. M.T. said this happened on multiple occasions. M.T. further testified that by the
4
5
middle of her third grade year, Siddons became more aggressive and thats when his hands
started going up my shirt and down my pants, and he started rubbing himself against my
backside. M.T. explained he was basically dry-humping me in his office. On multiple
occasions, Siddons put his fingers inside M.T.s vagina.26
9
10
M.T. testified that she told her third grade teacher that Siddons was always putting
his hands on me; that he was making me really uncomfortable; and that he scared me. Her
11
12
13
teacher told M.T. thats ridiculous and told her to sit down. M.T. then reported her abuse
to the school secretary who laughed at her in response and sent her to talk to the principal.
14
When M.T. told the principal, Doug Arthur, that Siddons was sexually abusing her, Mr.
15
Arthur told M.T. that he would never do that kind of thing and that she was being
16
oversensitive.27
17
After being ignored by the teachers and administrators at her school, M.T. reported
18
that she was being abused by Siddons to her mom. M.T. and her mom later met with the
19
20
21
principal where M.T. again reported she was being abused to Mr. Arthur. In response, Mr.
Arthur told M.T. and her mom that Mr. Siddons was just being friendly.28
22
23
24
25
26
26
Dep. of M.T., Amala Decl., Ex. 8, at 17-20.
27
Id. at 19.
28
Id. at 21.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
M.T.s mom, D.T., corroborates M.T.s testimony. D.T. testified in her deposition that
M.T. told her that Siddons was putting his hands on her breasts and vagina in third grade
at St. Johns. Upon hearing these complaints, D.T. told M.T.s third grade teacher that she
4
5
was being sexually abused and asked her not to send M.T. to see Siddons anymore. D.T.
complained to M.T.s teacher at least eight or ten times but nothing was done in response
and the abuse continued. D.T. testified that she also told the school secretary five or six
additional times that M.T. was being sexually abused.
confronted the principal regarding the abuse and told him that Siddons pushed [M.T.] up
10
D.T. testified that when she
against the wall and put his hands on her breasts, he told her she was overly developed for
11
12
13
14
her age and that she was exaggerating. D.T. reported the abuse to the principal at least two
or three times and still, nothing was done in response to remove Siddons from the school and
the abuse continued:
15
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
16
17
18
F.
19
Did the touching stop after you spoke with the principal?
No.
And how do you know that?
Because [M.T.] complained again.29
Siddons Misconduct Was So Well Known at St. Johns that Students Nicknamed
Him Chester the Molester
Barbara Howell is a former student at St. Johns and testified during her deposition
20
21
22
that she thought Chuck was creepy and that her classmates him Chester the molester in
approximately 1975 or 1976.30
Christine Geddis, A.W.s sister and a former student at St. Johns, testified that while
23
24
25
26
29
Dep. of D.T., Amala Decl., Ex. 9, at 15, 21-27.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
she was a student, there was always an unwritten rule that students were not allowed to go
to Chucks office alone. Christines teachers would always send students in pairs to Chucks
office. Christine also testified that there were rumors at school that Chuck would look into
4
5
6
the girls bathroom at the school.31 M.T. similarly testified that Siddons would lurk around
the girls bathrooms and that none of us ever wanted to be in there alone.32
Rory McGibbon, one of Mike McGibbons sons, testified that he played sports at St.
Johns and that because his dad was a coach, he frequently spent time at the school. Rory
testified that his friends, who were students at St. Johns, often talked about how Chuck had
10
pornography in his desk. On one occasion, Rorys friend took him to Siddons office
11
12
13
where they opened the drawer and found Playboy magazines in his desk. Rory further
testified that it was common knowledge that Chuck liked to check out the girls going up the
14
stairs which led to calling him a pervert and creepy. Rory also said that it was common
15
knowledge at the school that Chuck had a relationship with a student named Robin
16
Oswald. Rory said he witnessed on more than one occasion that Chuck Siddons would
17
pick up Robin Oswald in his car after school. He explained he thought it was odd that the,
18
for the lack of a better term, the creepy, old custodian was picking her up in front of the
19
20
school. 33
21
22
23
24
25
26
30
Dep. of Barb Howell, Amala Decl., Ex. 10 at 12-17.
31
Dep. of Christine Geddis, Amala Decl., Ex. 11, at 64-67.
32
Dep. of M.T., Amal Decl., Ex. 8, at 22.
33
Dep. of Rory McGibbon, Amala Decl., Ex 12, at 12-38.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
Plaintiff A.W. Attended St. Johns and Her Family Was Very Involved with the
Church and School
Plaintiff A.W. attended St. Johns School from K-6th grade, beginning in
approximately 1978. Her family regularly attended St. Johns Parish. Her parents were very
religious and her mom was the parish secretary. As a child, A.W. was very involved with the
parish and she explained that, [w]ith my mother being parish secretary, my sister and I were
recruited off into helping any special event that was going on. A.W. further testified that her
parents were very active in the community and that her father was on one of the church
boards and that her family would often invite the priests over for dinner.34
G.
10
H.
11
12
A.W. first met Siddons when she was a student at St. Johns.
13
14
15
Chuck Siddons Used His Position at St. Johns, as Well as the Tasks, Premises,
and Instrumentalities, Entrusted to Him by the Seattle Archdiocese, to Sexually
Abuse A.W.
She recalls that her
teachers would occasionally send her to his office to get a tool or to inflate a ball during
gym.35
16
When A.W. was in the 5th grade, Siddons approached A.W. at the end of the school
17
year and asked her if she could help him with a project on the last day of school. Siddons
18
explained to A.W. that the locks for the student lockers needed to be reset for the following
19
year and checked to see if they still worked. A.W. said she agreed because [i]t was kind of a
20
privilege that you got to do something special around the school and be a part of helping
21
out.36
22
23
24
25
26
34
Dep. of A.W., Amal Decl., Ex. 13, at 31-32.
35
Id. at 70-75.
36
Id. at 79.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
The next morning, on June 10, 1983, A.W. met Siddons in his office at St. Johns to
2
3
help him with the locks. Siddons showed A.W. the large box full of locks that needed to be
reset and they started working. At some point, they took a break from working on the locks
and A.W. sat down in Siddons rocking chair. Siddons approached A.W. and began touching
A.W.s breasts and legs.
penetrated her and began to fondle A.W.s genitals. A.W. testified that Siddons then put his
fingers inside her vagina and that she felt a sharp pain. A.W. testified that she felt scared and
uncomfortable. A.W. recalls Siddons commenting on her pubic hair as peach fuzz. She also
10
remembers that she saw blood on Siddons fingers. A.W. testified that the room she was in
11
He eventually put his hand down A.W.s pants and digitally
had a double door with a work bench in it and that there was another door leading to a back
12
room. She remembers Siddons walking into the back room to wash his hands but does not
13
remember anything after that. A.W. believes that her and Siddons went into the back room
14
15
16
and had intercourse. At the time, A.W. did not understand what Siddons was doing to her and
only came to realize what had happened during a sex education class in 8th grade when she
17
learned what sexual intercourse was. A.W. felt terrified, embarrassed, and ashamed to learn
18
she was no longer a virgin. 37
19
A.W. told her parents that Siddons had sexually molested her later that night at dinner.
20
A.W.s parents reported the abuse to the police and to St. Johns. 38 Siddons was later arrested
21
and pled guilty to sexually molesting A.W.39
22
23
24
25
26
37
Id. at 78-89.
38
Id. at 91.
39
Siddons Plea of Guilty, Amala Decl., Ex. 14.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
As Chuck Siddons wrote in his criminal statement to the SPD on June 21, 1983, I
2
3
have been employed at St. Johns School as a maintenance engineer for the past 11 years. At
the end of every school year I am required to go through locks for the student lockers to make
sure theyre in good condition and the combinations are tagged. On the last day of school I
had [A.W.] assist me with this task after school. During the course of the afternoon on
6.10.83 I began to tickle her while she sat on a chair. After a short time I put my hand under
her shirt and fondled her breast area. I then put my hand inside of her pants and fondled her
vaginal area.40
10
Plaintiffs Expert, Who Was the Former Superintendent of Public Instruction

During the Late 1970s and Early 1980s, Opines that the Archdiocese Breached
the Standard of Care
I.
11
12
Plaintiffs expert, Judith Billings, is the former Superintendent of Public Instruction

13
14
15
for the State of Washington.
She has reviewed the Archdioceses acts and omissions
regarding Charles Siddons and believes the Archdiocese breached the standard of care by
16
failing report Mr. Siddons abuse of children or take any meaningful action to protect A.W.
17
and other children, including, but not limited to the following: (1) failing to report to law
18
enforcement its knowledge of repeated acts of child sexual abuse by Siddons, (2) failing to
19
conduct an investigation into repeated complaints of child abuse by Siddons and by failing to
20
place him on administrative leave during such investigation; (3) failing to terminate Siddons
21
in response to repeated reports that he was sexually abusing M.T. and other students; and (4)
22
failing to implement any reasonable or meaningful restriction to prevent him from using his
23
24
25
26
40
Id.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
position to sexually abuse A.W. and other children, despite its knowledge that he posed a
danger to them.41
J.
A.W. Did Not Begin to Understand How the Abuse Damaged Her Until After She
Started Counseling in 2015
A.W. first spoke to a therapist about the abuse in 2015, and has only recently begun to
6
explore the connection between the abuse she endured and the damages she continues to
7
8
9
suffer.42 In March 2015, one month after first contacting an attorney, she sought therapy with
Daniel Rial, PhD, to help her deal with the abuse and to understand how the abuse affected
10
her.43 Dr. Rial eventually diagnosed A.W. with Other Specified Trauma and Stressor-
11
Related Disorder (Adjustment-like disorder with prolonged duration of more than 6 months
12
without prolonged duration of Stressor).44
13
Dr. Jon Conte, a well-known forensic psychologist who has extensively evaluated
14
A.W., believes A.W. suffers from a wide-range of other psychological damages as a result of
15
the traumatic abuse and she has never previously been diagnosed or treated for those
16
injuries.45 He notes that since thoughts about the rape have resurfacedshe has become
17
18
quite symptomatic. She has many of the characteristics of a person who has suffered a trauma
or sexual assault includingsevere post-traumatic stress disorder. He further notes that, as
19
an adult with a long-standing history of not dealing with the rape and with certain
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
accommodations (e.g. needing a gun to feel safe, distrust of other people) to protect her from
41
Declaration of Judith Billings, Amala Decl., Ex. 15.
42
Deposition of A.W., Amala Decl., Ex. 14 at 110, 117-118.
43
Fairchild AFB Mental Health Records, Amala Decl., Ex. 16 at 1.
44
Id.
45
Dr. Conte Report, Amala Decl., Ex. 17, at 11-12.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
negative feelings about the rape she will be a difficult person to see in psychotherapy. Her
treatment is likely to be long and will require a skilled trauma-informed therapist.46
The Archdioceses expert offers no testimony regarding whether, or when, A.W. was
able to connect the abuse to her injuries. Instead, she agrees that Plaintiff first sought
counseling related to the abuse in early 2015, stating [a]side from one session of marital
counseling at Fairchild Air Force Base Medical Center approximately 7 years ago, [A.W.]
reported that she had no further counseling until February of 2015. At that time, she sought
counseling at the air force base because she had accessed the police and court records of Mr.
10
Siddons, and felt very, very angry. She was angry that the perpetrator had pled guilty to a
11
lesser crime than rape, and felt outraged that his report of the incident appeared to be a copy
12
of her own report [A.W.] worked with a male therapist on base for several months, Dr.
13
Rial, but became angered and quit when he suggested that she begin to work on
14
15
forgiveness.47
16
The Archdioceses strained effort to suggest A.W. has long understood how the abuse
17
affected her is not well taken, and at most illustrates why this is a question for the jury to
18
decide. For example, the Archdiocese relies on conversations in 2000 and 2004 between A.W
19
and her friend, Denise Jones, to suggest that A.W. fully understood how her abuse affected
20
her. There is no support for this contention in the record. To the contrary, Ms. Jones testified
21
that during the conversation in 2000 she talked about her own abuse with A.W. but that A.W.
22
23
wasnt ready to talk about her abuse at that time, and it was something that just was not
24
25
26
46
Id.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
discussed until her mom starting writing that book [last year], and shes at a point in life
now where she can address [her wounds] and deal with them.48 Likewise, Denise stated,
[i]n 2004, Angela told me basically, in very vague terms, what happened, the incident as it
4
5
happened. Angela doesn't discuss feelings. She didn't discuss feelings with me back then.49
Moreover, contrary to the Archdioceses claim that A.W. fully understood how the
abuse affected her when she suffered a panic attack after having sex with her boyfriend for the
first time at 19, A.W. testified that [l]ooking back and understanding how its affected my
life I believe thats not normal for someone who is in a loving relationship to react that way
10
the first time theyre intimate and that I never fully started discussing and realizing the
11
12
effects of what happened until I started counseling recently, within the last year.50
IV.
13
EVIDENCE RELIED UPON
This opposition brief relies upon the Declaration of Jason P. Amala in Support of
Plaintiffs Opposition to the Archdioceses Motion for Summary Judgment
(Amala Decl.), as well as the pleadings, declarations, and other evidence
previously filed in this case.
14
15
16
V.
17
LEGAL ARGUMENT
18
Negligence, even gross negligence, does not sufficiently describe the underlying
19
misconduct of the Archdiocese. The Archdioceses attempt to evade liability and damages for
20
its egregious actions should be denied because (1) the Archdiocese completely ignores the
21
duty it had to take reasonable steps to protect its students, including A.W., from being
22
23
24
25
26
47
Dr. Bibeault Report, Amala Decl., Ex. 18, at 5-6.
48
Dep. of Denise Jones, Amala Decl., Ex. 19, at 83-84, 105, 115.
49
Id. at 53.
50
Dep. of A.W., Amala Decl., Ex. 14, at 117-118.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
sexually abused at school, in the janitors office, by a janitor with a well-known history of
fondling students breasts, slapping their butts, and looking up their skirts; (2) a reasonable
jury could easily find the Archdiocese breached that duty by doing nothing to protect A.W.
from that danger, particularly given the overwhelming evidence A.W. has presented regarding
the Archdioceses knowledge of that danger, which must be viewed in a light most favorable
to M.R.; (3) a jury must decide whether A.W. filed suit within three years of when she began
to understood the causal connection between the abuse and her injuries, particularly where the
Archdiocese can cite no evidence that A.W. began to make that connection until she started
10
counseling in 2015.
11
A.
12
13
The Archdiocese Had a Duty to Protect A.W. Because of Its Special Relationship
with A.W. and/or Because of Its Special Relationship with Siddons
The Archdioceses duty in this case arises from two alternative grounds (1) the special
14
relationship between the Archdiocese and its student, A.W.; and (2) the special relationship
15
16
17
18
19
20
between the Archdiocese and its employee, Siddons. N.K. v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 175 Wn. App. 517, 528, 307 P.3d 730, 736
(2013).
1.
The Archdiocese Had a Duty to Protect A.W. Because She Was In Their
Care, Custody, and Control
21
The Archdiocese had a special relationship with A.W. because she was a student and
22
a school has a duty to protect students within its custody from reasonably anticipated
23
dangers. C.J.C. 138 Wn.2d at 721; McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wn.2d
24
316, 320, 255 P.2d 360 (1953). The Washington Supreme Court has previously explained
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
that, where a special protective relationship exists a principal may not turn a blind eye to a
known or reasonably foreseeable risk of harm posed by its agents toward those it would
otherwise be required to protect simply because the injury is arbitrarily perpetrated off
4
5
6
premises or after-hours. C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 727,
985 P.2d 262, 277 (1999), as amended (Sept. 8, 1999).
One week before the Archdiocese filed this motion, the Washington Supreme Court
squarely rejected the Archdioceses position that it does not owe a duty to A.W. simply
because the abuse occurred on school grounds after the bell rang. N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist.,
10
378 P.3d 162 (Wn. 2016) (The Archdiocese mistakenly cites to Division Twos reasoning in
11
12
13
N.L. apparently failing to realize the Supreme Court issued an opinion on September 1, 2016).
In N.L., the Supreme Court rejected the school districts argument that it did not owe a duty to
14
a student who was sexually abused by another student, a registered sex-offender, because the
15
abuse occurred off campus.
16
explained that while the district's duty to exercise reasonable care might end when the
17
In rejecting the districts position, the Supreme Court
student leaves its custody, nothing in McLeod suggests that the district's liability for a breach
18
of duty while the student was in its custody would be cut off merely because the harm did not
19
20
occur until later. The Court similarly noted it does not follow [from N.K.] that the victim
21
must be in the schools custody at the time of the injury for the duty to have existed.
22
Borrowing reasoning from the Idaho Supreme Court, the N.L. Court explained that a school
23
district may owe a duty to its students, despite the fact that injury occurred off of school
24
grounds and outside of school hours and held that the relevant inquiry is to the location of
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
the negligence rather than the location of the injury. N.L., 378 P.3d at 162 (citation omitted)
(reversing trial courts summary judgment ruling in favor of the school district).
As in N.L., here, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Archdioceses duty arose
4
5
6
while A.W. was in its custody and that the alleged breached (failure to take adequate steps to
protect students from Siddons) occurred while A.W. was in the Archdioceses custody:
11
The McLeod court had no occasion to consider whether the district's liability
was cut off once the students left campus because both the harm and the
district's alleged negligence happened while the students were squarely in
the district's custody. Here, too, the duty arose while N.L. and Clark were in
the district's custody. Similarly, the alleged breach in both McLeod (the
failure to supervise) and here (failure to take adequate steps to protect
students from a registered sex offender) occurred while the students were all
still in the districts' custody.
12
Id. at 162.
13
As the Court in N.L. made clear, the fact that A.W.s injury occurred after-hours does
7
8
9
10
14
not relieve the Archdiocese of its liability to A.W. for the breach of its duty which occurred
15
16
while A.W. was a student in its custody.
17
The Archdioceses reliance on Scott and Rambo is misplaced. As the Supreme Court
18
in N.L. noted, Scott is not an opinion of this court and is not binding authority to the extent
19
it can be read to conflict with N.L. Id. The Archdioceses reliance on Rambo, an opinion
20
from the Court of Appeals of Louisiana, is similarly misplaced. See Rambo v. Webster Par.
21
Sch. Bd., 745 So. 2d 770 (La. Ct. App. 1999), writ denied, 754 So. 2d 971 (La. 2000).
22
Because the Archdiocese had a special relationship with A.W. that gave rise to a
23
24
25
26
protective duty, and the Archdiocese breached that duty while A.W. was in its custody, the
Archdioceses motion for summary judgment should be denied.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
The Archdiocese Had a Duty Because it Had a Special Relationship with

Siddons, an Employee at St. John School
The Archdiocese notably fails to address its duty based on its special relationship with
Siddons. A special relationship existed between the Archdiocese and Siddons because he was
their employee and they entrusted him with the tasks, premises, and instrumentalities that he
used to molest A.W. As the Court noted in C.J.C., the relationship between employer and
8
9
2.
employee gives rise to limited duty, owed by an employer to foreseeable victims, to prevent
the tasks, premises, or instrumentalities entrusted to an employee from endangering others."
10
C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d at 721 (quoting Niece, 131 Wn.2d at 48).

11
Each of the tasks, premises, and instrumentalities the defendant entrusted to Siddons
12
13
14
triggered a duty to exercise reasonable care in ensuring the same were not used to endanger
A.W. This would include projects like resetting the locks for the school lockers (e.g., tasks
15
and instrumentalities) and the school maintenance office (e.g., premises). Siddons testified
16
that [a]t the end of every school year I am required to go through locks for the student
17
lockers to make sure theyre in good condition and the combinations are tagged. On the last
18
day of school I had [A.W.] assist me with this task after school. The basis for this duty is
19
well-illustrated by the Courts rationale in C.J.C. that entities like the defendant cannot
20
ignore the risk posed by its agents or complain that children like A.W. were abused off
21
premises or after-hours:
22
23
24
25
26
Where a protective special relationship exists, a principal is not free to ignore

the risk posed by its agents, place such agents into association with vulnerable
persons it would otherwise be required to protect, and then escape liability
simply because the harm was accomplished off premises or after-hours. Under
these facts, the focus is not on where or when the harm occurred, but on
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
whether the Church or its individual officials negligently caused the harm by
placing its agent into association with the plaintiffs when the risk was, or
should have been, known.
C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d at 724.
Although it undisputed that Siddons was employed by the Archdiocese, it worths
noting that C.J.C. specifically rejected the argument that agency between Siddons and the
6
7
8
9
Archdiocese was required: an agency relationship is not required in order to establish a duty
of care. a duty of control or protection also does not depend on a showing of agency.
C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d at 724 n. 12.
10
Moreover, the documents and deposition testimony in this case establish that (1) the
11
Archdiocese had the authority to control the school and all of its staff, teachers, and janitors,
12
including Siddons, and (2) there was nothing that prevented the Archdiocese from exercising
13
its authority to do more to protect A.W. and other students from Siddons, including firing
14
him. The evidence in this case demonstrates that the Archdiocese had the authority, it just
15
16
failed to exercise it.

The defendant cannot accept the benefits of its master/servant relationship with
17
Siddons, and then repudiate its consequences. And even if they could, the focus is on whether
18
the defendant negligently caused the harm by placing [their] agent into association with
19
20
21
22
[A.W.] when the risk was, or should have been, known. C.J.C., 138 Wn.2d at 724. The
Archdiocese cannot distance themselves from Siddons when they placed their agent into
association with A.W. and they knew or should have known that he posed a danger to A.W.
23
The Archdiocese is alternatively liable to A.W. because it had a special relationship
24
with Siddons, particularly where he used their tasks, premises and instrumentalities to
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
sexually abuse A.W., and where they benefited from his work as a maintenance person at the
school.
B.
The Archdiocese Breached Its Duty to A.W.
A jury could also readily determine that the Archdiocese breached its duty to A.W. by
(1) failing to report to law enforcement its knowledge of repeated acts of child sexual abuse
by Siddons, (2) failing to conduct an investigation into repeated complaints of child abuse by
Siddons and by failing to place him on administrative leave during such investigation; (3)
9
failing to terminate Siddons in response to repeated reports that he was sexually abusing M.T.
10
11
and other students; and (4) failing to implement any reasonable or meaningful restriction to
12
prevent him from using his position to sexually abuse A.W. and other children, despite its
13
knowledge that he posed a danger to them.
14
breached its duty to A.W. is generally a question for the jury. N.L., 378 P.3d 162
15
16
The question of whether the Archdiocese
In N.L., the Supreme Court rejected the school districts argument that the act of the
school district was too remote or insubstantial to impose liability on the district for the
17
18
plaintiffs sexual abuse. In rejecting the districts argument, the Court noted that sex offender
19
registration was enacted in 1990 in response to horrific crimes by known sex offenders.
20
The Court reasoned that [g]iven this background and the principles set down in McLeod, we
21
cannot say as a matter of law that a district's failure to take any action in response to being
22
notified that Clark was a registered sex offender was not a legal cause of N.L.'s injury. Sexual
23
assault by a registered sex offender is foreseeable, as is the fact that a much younger student
24
can be convinced to leave campus by an older one. Id.

25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
The same reasoning applies here. The Archdiocese admitted in discovery that, prior to
A.W. being abused, it knew that an adult male who had sexually abused a child could pose a
risk to abuse another child.51 Like sexual assault by a registered sex offender, sexual abuse
4
5
by an adult who previously sexually abused a child, is foreseeable. In fact, Washingtons
mandatory reporting law was enacted, in part, to prevent continued abuses. Chapter
26.44.010 RCW (1971). Moreover, just as a younger student being convinced to skip class by
an older student is foreseeable, a student being be convinced by a staff member to stay after
school to help with a project is foreseeable, particularly where A.W. testified that it was a
10
privilege that you got to do something special around the school and be a part of helping out.
11
The Archdiocese tries to distinguish N.L. on the basis that the plaintiff put forth
12
13
expert testimony regarding the standard of care at the time of the abuse and the need to
14
prepare a safety plan with respect to the sex offender student.52 However, the same is true in
15
this case. Plaintiff submitted expert testimony from Judith Billings regarding the standard of
16
care and the Archdioceses failures to (1) report to law enforcement its knowledge of repeated
17
acts of child sexual abuse by Siddons, (2) conduct an investigation into repeated complaints of
18
child abuse by Siddons and by failing to place him on administrative leave during such
19
20
investigation; (3) terminate Siddons in response to repeated reports that he was sexually
21
abusing M.T. and other students; and (4) implement any reasonable or meaningful restriction
22
to prevent him from using his position to sexually abuse A.W. and other children, despite its
23
24
25
26
51
Defendants Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission, Amal Decl., Ex. 5.
52
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, at 13.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
knowledge that he posed a danger to them. The Archdiocese has presented no evidence to the
contrary, and any such evidence would raise an issue of fact that should be submitted the jury.
Contrary to what the Archdiocese contends, the fact that Siddons was never removed
4
5
from the school is circumstantial evidence, not speculation that the Archdiocese failed to
take meaningful steps to prevent him from abusing more students. As Washington courts
have noted, many times circumstantial may be more probative or reliable than direct
evidence. State v. Gosby, 85 Wn.2d 758, 766, 539 P.2d 680, 685 (1975) (It is simply
untenable to assume that circumstantial evidence is less reliable than is direct evidence.
10
Sometimes direct evidence is more probative or reliable, but many times circumstantial
11
12
13
evidence may be more probative or reliable.). The testimony of Brune, Desclos, McGibbon,
M.T., and D.T. establishes that the Archdioceses agents and employees received numerous
14
reports regarding Siddons inappropriate behavior but failed to remove him from the school
15
until June 13, 1993.
16
17
18
Finally, the Archdioceses absurd claim that the permission given by A.W.s mom
to stay after school is an intervening cause must be rejected. Not only have courts said there
can there be more than one proximate cause of an injury, but also, accepting the
19
20
Archdioceses position would lead to absurd results. It would mean that a school would never
21
be liable for its negligence so long as a parent gives permission for the child to attend a
22
school activity, field trip, extracurricular event, or after-school activity. The Archdiocese
23
cites no law, nor could it, in support of its position.
24
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
For the foregoing reasons, the Archdioceses motion on Plaintiffs negligence claim
should be denied.
3
4
The Archdioceses Motion Regarding Outrage Must Be Denied Because A.W.

was Within the Zone of Foreseeable Danger Created by Its Outrageous Conduct
The Court should deny the Archdioceses motion regarding outrage should be denied
because a reasonable jury could easily find in A.W.s favor, particularly when all evidence
C.
7
8
and all inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to A.W. Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d
612, 630 (1989) (a jury should usually decide whether a defendants conduct was outrageous).
More specifically, a reasonable jury could find A.W. has presented evidence of (1) extreme
10
and outrageous conduct, (2) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (3)
11
12
13
severe emotional distress on the part of A.W. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 51
(2002).
14
The first element is satisfied upon proof that the conduct is so outrageous in
15
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
16
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Reid v. Pierce Cty.,
17
136 Wn.2d 195, 202 (1998). A reasonable jury could conclude it was utterly intolerable for
18
the Archdiocese to not only fail to report Courtney to the authorities, but to laugh at and
19
ignore repeated complaints by M.T. and her mom that she was being abused by Siddons.
20
21
A jury could also easily find in A.W.s favor regarding the second element of outrage
because there can be no dispute that the Archdiocese either intentionally or recklessly
22
inflicted severe emotional distress on A.W.
For example, a jury could conclude the
23
Archdiocese knew its conduct would result in more children being abused where the
24
25
26
Archdiocese admitted that it knew that an adult male who had sexually abused a child could
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
pose a risk to abuse another child. See Phillips v. Hardwick, 29 Wn. App. 382, 387-88
(1981) (the actor must be aware that there is a high probability that his conduct will cause
severe emotional distress and he must proceed in a conscious disregard of it). Despite the
fact that the principal, vice-principal, secretary, coach, and several teachers at St. Johns all
knew Siddons was sexually abusing children, they failed to take meaningful steps to prevent
him from abusing more children, like A.W. It is difficult to imagine a jury not concluding the
Archdiocese and its agents consciously disregarded their knowledge that their misconduct had
a high probability of more children, like A.W., being sexually abused and suffering extreme
10
11
12
emotional distress.
The Archdiocese does not seem to dispute that A.W. suffered severe emotional
distress from being sexually assaulted by Siddons in his office at St. Johns.
13
Finally, A.W.s claim for outrage is not subsumed by her claim for negligence because
14
15
16
the Archdiocese cites no case that allows a defendant to prevent a jury from finding the
defendant acted intentionally. While the Archdiocese cites Rice v. Janovich, 109 Wn.2d 48
17
(1987), to suggest outrage is only available where a plaintiff has no other remedy under tort
18
available, that analysis does not apply here. Instead, Rice held outrage is available when
19
there is no presence of the elements necessary to any other tort, such as assault, battery or
20
the like. Id. at 62 (internal quotations omitted). That analysis does not apply here because
21
none of the other torts allege intentional or reckless conductPlaintiff does not also allege
22
the Archdiocese assaulted him, or battered him, or the like.
23
24
A.W. has a constitutional right to seek redress in the courts and the Archdiocese cites
no law that allows a tortfeasor to force its victim to accept a judgment for negligent conduct
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
rather than intentional or reckless conduct. Perhaps that distinction is not relevant to the
Archdiocese, but it is relevant to A.W. and the other victims of its outrageous conduct.
D.
Washington Law and Public Policy Weigh Heavily Against the Laches Defense
To avoid unnecessary repetition, A.W. incorporates by reference the facts and legal
argument regarding laches from her Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants
Affirmative Defense, which was filed on September 9, 2016, and noted for hearing on the
same day as this motion. As outlined in that motion, the Court should deny the Archdioceses
motion regarding laches because the timing of A.W.s claim falls squarely within the
10
11
applicable statute of limitations, which was designed by the Washington legislature to fairly
balance evidentiary concerns with the long unknowable injuries that result from childhood
12
sexual abuse. The public policy and law in Washington is to protect abuse survivors like
13
A.W., not the entities that allowed them to be abused.

14
15
16
It is important to point-out that this equitable defense is generally disfavored if a

plaintiff brings his claim within the statute of limitations. Brost v. L.A.N.D., Inc., 37 Wn.
17
App. 372, 375, 680 P.2d 453, 456 (1984) ([a] court is generally precluded, absent highly
18
unusual circumstances, from imposing a shorter period under the doctrine of laches than that
19
of the relevant statute of limitations); see also United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489
20
(1935) ("[l]aches within the term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law). This
21
concern is particularly true where the Washington legislature has made definitive legislative
22
findings of public policy. See Weyerhaeuser Company v. Commercial Union Insurance
23
Company, 142 Wn. 2d 654, 688, 15 P.3d 115 (2000).
24
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
In turn, the Washington Supreme Court has held that in enacting this statute the
legislature "specifically provided for a broad and generous application of the discovery rule to
civil actions for injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse." C.J.C. v. Corporation of the
Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 712, 985 P.2d 262 (1999).
In C.J.C., the Court recognized the Legislatures articulated public policy in favor of
allowing victims of childhood sexual abuse to bring claims against religious entities like the
Archdiocese. Id. at 712-714. Given the legislative history, the Court concluded that there is a
strong public policy in favor of protecting children against acts of sexual abuse. Id. at 726.
10
11
The C.J.C. decision directly disposes of the Archdioceses arguments based on the
timing of A.W.s claims because in that case the abuse had occurred over thirty years earlier
12
and the perpetrator had died by the time the plaintiffs brought suit against the Church. 138
13
Wn.2d at 705. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to pursue their claims against the religious
14
15
16
entity, noting that "[n]owhere in RCW 4.16.340 does the Legislature articulate concern for
defendant who might be sued."
Id. at 713; see also Hollmann v. Corcoran, et al., 89
17
Wn. App. 323, 325, 949 P.2d 386 (1997) (noting the legislature enacted the statute in order to
18
address instances "where the victim of childhood sexual abuse was initially unable to connect
19
the abuse to mental or emotional disorders caused by the abuse).
20
21
22
The Archdiocese also fails to show how it is prejudiced from the asserted delay when
the following key witnesses are still alive and have been deposed: Brune, Desclos, and
McGibbon. The testimony of these witnesses establishes that the Archdioceses agents and
23
24
25
26
employees, including its vice-principal, knew that Siddons was sexually abusing students but
failed to report him or remove him from the school until June 13, 1993. The fact that Siddons
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
was never removed from the school is circumstantial evidence, not speculation, regarding the
Archdioceses failure to take meaningful steps to prevent him from abusing more students.
Gosby, 85 Wn.2d at 766.

4
Allowing the Archdiocese to avoid liability through a backdoor laches defense would
5
6
defeat Washingtons strong public policy of providing redress to abuse survivors. Public
policy and the law favor a remedy for victims, not a shield (much less a shield grounded in
equity) for perpetrators and those who harbor them.
9
10
11
E.
A.W.s Claims Are Timely Because She Filed Her Claim Within Three Years of
When She Began to Understand the Causal Connection Between the Abuse and
Her Psychological Injuries
The Seattle Archdioceses motion regarding the statute of limitations should be denied
12
because their arguments are rejected by RCW 4.16.340 and every Washington case that has
13
14
15
interpreted it. At most, a jury must decide whether A.W. brought her claim within three years
of discovering how the abuse affected him. Hollmann v. Corcoran, 89 Wn. App. 323, 334
16
(1997); see also Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 620-21, 547 P.2d 1221 (2001)
17
(defendant has the burden of proving a statute of limitations defense).
18
Washington has a unique statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse. In 1991
19
the legislature amended that statute to clarify that survivors may file their claim within three
20
years of the time the victim discovered that the act caused the injury for which the claim is
21
brought. RCW 4.16.340(1)(c). In adopting this statute, the Washington Supreme Court has
22
23
observed that the legislature "specifically provided for a broad and generous application of the
discovery rule to civil actions for injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse," and made clear
24
that its primary concern was to provide a broad avenue of redress for victims of childhood
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
sexual abuse who too often were left without a remedy under previous statutes of limitation.
C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wn.2d 699, 712-13 (1999). Over the
past two decades, a number of Washington cases have provided trial courts with guidance on
the contours of this statute and what, as a matter of law, is not sufficient to trigger the statute
of limitations.
First, the statute did not begin to run until A.W. discovered the full extent of her
injuries. For example, in Cloud ex rel. Cloud v. Summers, 98 Wn. App. 724, 734-35 (1999),
the Court held that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations for abuse survivors does not
10
begin to run until the survivor discovers the full extent of her injuries:
11
12
13
14
[T]he victim may know that he or she was molested, and may even know
that some injury resulted, but may not know the full extent of the injury.... as
our legislature has found, childhood sexual abuse, by its very nature, may
render the victim unable to understand or make the connection between the
childhood abuse and the full extent of the resulting emotional harm until
many years later.
15
Likewise, in Korst v. McMahon, 136 Wn. App. 202, 209-10 (2006), the Court held a
16
survivors recognition in 1995 that the abuse resulted in constant hurts, is something that
17
18
19
20
never goes away, and haunted her for over twenty years did not prevent her from filing suit
in 2002 after she was first diagnosed with abuse-related PTSD. The Court rejected any
argument that remembering or feeling bad about the abuse was enough: Presumably, victims
21
of childhood sexual abuse know that they have been hurt, but RCW 4.16.340 makes it clear
22
that a plaintiffs cause of action does not accrue until she knows that the sexual abuse has
23
caused her more serious injuries. Id. at 210.
24
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
As noted in both Cloud and Korst, although A.W. has always remembered the abuse
2
3
4
and may have felt ashamed, disgusted, or angry about the abuse, as a matter of law, those
feelings are not enough to trigger the statute of limitations.
Second, the statute did not begin to run until A.W. understood the causal connection
between the abuse and his psychological injuries. For example, in Hollmann v. Corcoran, 89
Wn. App. 323, 328 (1997), the plaintiff sued his childhood sexual abuser. Even though he
was diagnosed with PTSD in connection with the abuse over five years earlier, his therapist
testified he was not capable of understanding the connection between his PTSD and the abuse
10
11
at the time he was diagnosed. Id. The Court explained there is no reasonability requirement
on when an abuse survivor discovers the damages related to the abuse: The statute of
12
limitations is tolled until the victim of childhood sexual abuse in fact discovers the causal
13
connection between the defendants act and the injuries for which the claim is brought. Id. at
14
15
16
334. In doing so, the Court held RCW 4.16.340(c) refers to the discovery of the causal
connection between a known act and subsequent injuries including injuries that develop years
17
later. Id.; Korst, 136 Wn. App. at 207-08 (the focus is on when a victim of sexual abuse
18
discovers the causal link between the abuse and the injury for which the suit is brought).
19
The Court should deny the Archdioceses motion because A.W. did not begin to
20
discover the causal connection between the abuse and his injuries until at least 2015, when
21
she started counseling and began to understand how the abuse may have affected her. 53 The
22
Archdiocese cannot dispute that Dr. Rial did not diagnose A.W. with a stressor-related
23
disorder until 2015, and Dr. Conte has opined that A.W. is just beginning to understand how
24
25
26
53
Deposition of A.W., Amala Decl., Ex. 14, at 110, 117-118.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
the abuse affected her. For example, Dr. Conte states that she has a long-standing history of
not dealing with the rape and her treatment will required a skilled trauma-informed
therapist.54
The Court should deny summary judgment on the statute of limitations because no
reasonable jury could conclude that A.W. discovered the causal connection between her abuse
and her damages until after she started therapy in 2015, well within three years of when this
case was filed. At most, a jury must decide this factual issues, though the Court should grant
A.W.s summary judgment motion because the Archdiocese cannot cite any evidence that
10
would meet its burden under the cases described above.
11
VI.
CONCLUSION
12
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff A.W. respectfully requests the Court deny the
13
14
Archdioceses motion for summary judgment.

Dated this 26th day of September 2016.
15
16
PFAU COCHRAN VERTETIS AMALA PLLC

I certify that this motion contains 10,154 words
consistent with the parties reciprocal agreement
regarding Over-length Briefs.
17
18
19
By _________________________________________
Michael T. Pfau, WSBA No. 24649
michael@pcvalaw.com
Jason P. Amala, WSBA No. 37054
jason@pcvalaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
54
Dr. Conte Report, Amala Decl., Ex. 17 at 12.
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com
1
2
3
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Bernadette Hacker, hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of
the State of Washington that that I am employed at Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala PLLC, and
that on this 26th day of September, 2016, I served the foregoing along with the Declaration of
Jason P. Amala in support thereof, via email, first class mail, ABC Legal Messenger and/or
6
facsimile by directing delivery addressed to:

7
8
9
10
11
Counsel for the Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle:

Keith A. Talbot, Esq.
PATTERSON BUCHANAN FOBES & LIETCH, Inc., P.S.
2112 Third Avenue, Suite 500
Seattle, WA 98121
Phone: (206) 462-6700
Email: kat@pattersonbuchanan.com
12
13
Certified By:
Bernadette Hacker
Legal Assistant
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
of 36
www.pcvalaw.com

Rebuttal of Motion

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rebuttal of Motion

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ASSIGNED TO THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY A.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 15-2-19425-9 SEA

A Professional Limited Liability Company

It Is Undisputed A.W. Was Abused by an Archdiocesan Employee at an

A Professional Limited Liability Company

on or around August 23, 1973.3

sexually abusing A.W., three days prior. 4

Deposition of Kate Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 5-6.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

administrators regarding state reporting requirements or implement any policies and

Id. at 41, 49.

Chapter 26.44 RCW (1969).

A Professional Limited Liability Company

I would say late '80s.

abuse another child.12

Dep. of Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 30-35.

Dep. of Jodi Desclos, Amala Decl., Ex. 4, at 35.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

rumors that Siddons had engaged in inappropriate conduct with students.13

Dep. of Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3, at 17.

Dep. of Denise Erickson, Amala Decl., Ex. 6, at 24.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Do you recall approximately when you observed Mr. Siddons

breasts. There is no scenario in which this behavior is proper. The inappropriateness is

Dep. of Kate Brune, Amal Decl., Ex. 3 at 21-25.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Who did you tell?

to report him to authorities, or to protect the students from him.

Dep. of Kate Brune, Amala Decl., Ex. 3 at 24.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Mike McGibbon served as an athletic coach at St. Johns between approximately

else at St. Johns or to the authorities:

Dep. of Jodi Desclos, Amala Decl., Ex. 4 at 23-25.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

years after he was hired.23

employment at St. Johns.24

Dep. of Mike McGibbon, Amala Decl., Ex. 7, at 26-27, 31,

Amal Decl., at 10.

Amal Decl., at 11.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

backside. M.T. explained he was basically dry-humping me in his office. On multiple

occasions, Siddons put his fingers inside M.T.s vagina.26

Dep. of M.T., Amala Decl., Ex. 8, at 17-20.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

additional times that M.T. was being sexually abused.

D.T. testified that when she

Dep. of D.T., Amala Decl., Ex. 9, at 15, 21-27.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Dep. of Barb Howell, Amala Decl., Ex. 10 at 12-17.

Dep. of Christine Geddis, Amala Decl., Ex. 11, at 64-67.

Dep. of M.T., Amal Decl., Ex. 8, at 22.

Dep. of Rory McGibbon, Amala Decl., Ex 12, at 12-38.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Dep. of A.W., Amal Decl., Ex. 13, at 31-32.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

A.W.s breasts and legs.

He eventually put his hand down A.W.s pants and digitally

she was no longer a virgin. 37

and pled guilty to sexually molesting A.W.39

Siddons Plea of Guilty, Amala Decl., Ex. 14.

A Professional Limited Liability Company

Plaintiffs Expert, Who Was the Former Superintendent of Public Instruction

Plaintiffs expert, Judith Billings, is the former Superintendent of Public Instruction