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Bertram OL

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY


OF THE ORGANISM

UNIFORM WITH THIS VOLUME

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY


OF THE ORGANISM
THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE
THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
IN THE YEAR 1907

BY HANS DRIESCH, PH.D.


Demy

8vo, Cloth.

Price 10s. 6d. net.

(Post Free, Price 11s.)

\Ve have no doubt as to the importance of this great


contribution to the thought of the day. It really defines the
issues, it sets forth with great power the arguments and
principles which men of science and thinkers will have to
regard, and theologians will do well to study the argument of
this great work." Aberdeen Free Press.
"

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MACMILLAN BUILDING, BOMBAY
309 Bow BAZAAR
STREET, CALCUTTA

THE

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

OF THE ORGANISM
THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE
THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN
IN THE YEAR 1908

BY

HANS DRIESCH,

Pn.D,

HKIDELBIBQ

VOLUiME

II

LONDON
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1908
All rights reserved

AUG

2 1 1957

PREFACE
THE second
two

and

portions.

volume of

final

I first

this

work

of

consists

bring to a conclusion the discussion

on which I embarked in Volume


from the point of view of

Science,"

and more important portion

regarding the subject

I.,

"

and then

in the longer
"

proceed to the

"

Philosophy

of the Organism.

The third part


volume opens,
second

edition

is,

so

to

say,

an enlarged

work, Die

my

of

become apparent why the word


in the

German

Seele

in Part

and even

(1904)

I.

of

elementarer
it

will

my

I.

and 2

have already published

Naturbegriffe

und Natururteile

this part is here presented to the reader

in a form very different

new and

improved

was put in inverted

section only Part

162-188) contains matter that

elsewhere

als

Seele

this

title.

Of the philosophical
(pp.

and

"

"

In the course of the argument

Naturfaktor (1903).

commas

which

of the scientific section, with

from what

it

was.

All the rest

is

hitherto unpublished.

may

say here that I myself regard Part

I.

3 to 5

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

vi

(pp.

189-226), and the whole

Part

of

266-339)

II. (pp.

of the

as the most important final results of


philosophical section

my analysis,
The

last

and therefore especially invite criticism of them.

named part

whole building, and


I possess

view.

is,

is

so to speak, the keystone of the

written from an unusual point of

German manuscripts

of the

theoretical

1895 and 1897;

contents of this part dated as early as

but I always delayed publishing as the subject

is

extremely

subtle.

The philosophical terminology employed in

Nobody can

that in general use.

myself how greatly

we need

feel

to

to

understand

by the

characteristica
this

work was

and there was nothing

it,

adopt from others, for modern

"

But

in the sense of Leibniz.

relates only to formalities.

is

new and immediate de

not the right place to introduce

work

more strongly than

nomination of philosophical concepts


universalis"

this

"

"

symbolic logic

so far

must therefore ask the reader

terms

u
substance,"

"causality,"

"

objective,"

my

definitions,

what

nothing but what he

and not

to confuse

might have said but did not.

understand
the

etc. etc.,

my

what
I

is

instructed by

I have said with

ask the reader to

words as they are written, and to conceive

problems only as they are

terminologysteeped as

it is

stated,

and not

as

the

in historical reminiscences

might possibly suggest.


It

should

never

be

forgotten

that

this

work

is

PREFACE

vii

philosophy of the Organism and not a general philosophy.

and even

For that reason problems of general philosophy


philosophy of Nature

the general

of

alluded

general

idealistic
I

only shortly

to.

The

and

are

standpoint of

but idealism

is

work

this

is

subjective-

here nothing more than a method,

no longer regard subjective idealism as

does exist the possibility of metaphysics,

i.e.

final

there

of at least a

certain knowledge about absolute reality.

Once more
great

kindness.

thank

Once

anonymous English

my

friends in

Aberdeen

am

indebted

more

friend

reliable linguistic assistance,

at

Heidelberg

and to

my

for

for their

to

his

my
very

publishers for their

well-known courtesy.

HANS DRIESCH.
HEIDELBERG, 27^ August 1908.

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME


SECTION

THE CHIEF RESULTS OF ANALYTICAL

A.

BIOLOGY
PART

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

III.

......
......

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1.

(Continued)

THE MOST SIMPLE TYPES OF ORGANIC MOVEMENTS


a.

THE SIMPLE REFLEX

/3.

THE DIRECTIVE MOVEMENTS


Tropism
"Taxis"

7.

THE WORK OF H. S. JENNINGS. "TRIAL AND ERROR"


The Resolution of Taxis
The Single Motor Acts. The "Movement at Random
The Modifiability of Single Motor Acts
"

"

5.

CO-ORDINATED MOTIONS

13

16

.17

INSTINCT

20
21

26
27
29

...
...
...
.40
.

2.

8
9

...

The Concepts of von Uexkuell


The Classes of Co-ordination

"

.9

PAOB

35

a.

INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS

]8.

THE ACTUAL PROBLEM.

36

DEFINITION S

y.

THE WORK OF

5.

THE PROBLEM OF THE STIMULI OF INSTINCTS

f.

THE PROBLEM OF THE REGULABILITY OF INSTINCTS

f.

CONCLUSION

J.

38

41

LOEIJ

.......
ix

45
50

THE ORGANISM
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF

PAGE
.

3.

ACTION

52

52
a.

PRELIMINARIES

No Pseudo-psychology
General Definition of Action.
which are not Actions
.

The
j8.

Distribution of

Classes of

Movements

.54

Acting

THE HISTORICAL

THE FIRST CRITERION OF ACTING.


BASIS OF REACTING
.

The Origin of the Acts of Volition


The Different Types of Historical Bases
"Association"

7.

THE SECOND CRITERION OF ACTING.

"INDIVIDUALITY

OF CORRESPONDENCE"
6.

OF THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE

NEW PROOF

Preliminary Remarks
The Union of the two Chief

71

77

Criteria of Acting

"

to Acting

"

So-called

Analogies

...

Conclusions
.

THE

"PSYCHOID"

f.

THE

"SPECIFIC

77.

SOME DATA FROM CEREBRAL PHYSIOLOGY

.82

OF THE SENSORY NERVES

ENERGY"

The Connecting Function

Part in Association

"

"

The Brain
6.

K.

89

94

.96
.

96

.97

REGULABILITY OF MOVEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE

MOTOR ORGANS
t.

84

.91
.93

Functions in the Adult


Are there Specific Functions in the Newly Born
The Centre in General
The Brain and the Psychoid in General
Specific

THE LOWER BRAIN CENTRES IN VERTEBRATES

.100

.102

DIFFERENT DEGREES OF ACTING IN DIFFERENT ANIMALS 106


Man and the Highest Animals Contrasted
.106
.

Higher Invertebrates
The Lowest Forms of Acting
.

X.

/*.

"PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM"

REFUTED

THE SUPRA-PERSONAL FACTOR OF ACTING IN HISTORY

No

Supra-personal Factor

known

in History Proper

Morality as a Supra-personal Factor

CONCLUSIONS OF SECTION

.109
.110
.

114

117

118

.119
121

CONTENTS

SECTION

XI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

B.

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
PAGE
1.

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN GENERAL

2.

THE CONCEPT OF TELEOLOGY

3.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTELECHY

Extensive and Intensive Manifoldne.ss

"

"

Eutelechy and Machine-Work


Problems

of Entelechies.

Conclusions and

New

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF


ENTELECHY
ENTELECHY AND UNIVOCAL DETERMINATION
ENTELECHY AND CAUSALITYPART

A.

The Order

139
145

.146
.

150

.151

I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Difficulties

Forms of the Principle of Causality


Our Theme

Different

1.

.129
.135
.137
.137

....
.

Secondary and Primary Knowing and Willing


Individuum
Entelechy and the
The Classes of Bodies

B.

129

Teleology in General
The Two Classes of Teleology
.

125

153

.156
.156
.158
.160

ENTELECHY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSERVATION OF


.162
ENERGY
162
a. THE PRINCIPLE
164
THE PRINCIPLE IN ITS RELATION TO ENTELECHY
/3.

......

Certain Facts

On

a Supposed Vital Energy


Entelechy not Energy
.

2.

ENTELECHY AND THE "PRINCIPLE OF BKCOMING"


a. THE ".SECOND" PRINCIPLE OF ENERGETICS
The True Principle of Becoming
"

"

Dissipation

On
/3.

as a

"

Third

"

Catenation of Energy

THE PRINCIPLE OF
ENTELECHY
.

BECOMING
.

.166
.167
.168

171

171

172

Principle

174

....
....
IN

ITS

.176

Entelechy not Energy


The Relation of Entelechy to the Intensities of Energies
The Action of Entelechy in "Suspending" Possible

Again

Becoming

175

RELATION TO
177

178
179

xii

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


The Role

....

of Entelechy in the Continuity of Life

PAGE

181
181
Entelechy and Chemism
An Explanation of the Limits of Regulability and of
Life in General
.
.182
184
Entelechy Burdened with as Little as Possible
.

Entelechy and
Conclusions
3.

"Catalysis"
.

.186
.187

ENTELECHY IN ITS RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF


GIVEN ELEMENTS
.189
.

tt.

SOME APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN ENTELECHY


AND THE TRUE SECOND AND THE THIRD EMPIRICAL
PRINCIPLE OF ENERGETICS

The Problem

A
j8.

Partial Solution

....
.

THE ELEMENTAL ROLE OF ENTELECHY IN CREATING


"DIVERSITIES OF DISTRIBUTION
"

The Role
The Role
7.

of Entelechy in Morphogenesis
of Entelechy in Acting
.

4.

THE

191

191

.193

"DEMONS"

OF MAXWELL

....

"Phenomenalism"

The

.....
.....

"Constants"

Negative Characteristics of Eutelechy


A Gap in the Scale of Natural Factors
A Few Words on "Explaining"

ENTELECHY AND MECHANICS


a.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MECHANICAL PHYSICS

198

201

201

.202

....
.....
.

On

/3.

195

PROVISIONAL REMARKS ON ENTELECHY AND THE CLASSES


OF NATURAL AGENTS

On

5.

BUT THE ROLE OF ENTELECHY AGREES WITH A CERTAIN


GENERAL ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE
.197
.

e.

THE ROLE OF ENTELECHY DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE


PRINCIPLES OF THE INORGANIC AS THEY ARE, BUT
AS THEY MIGHT BE FORMULATED
.

d.

189

.189
.190

204
205
206
208
208

a Possible Qualitative Science that is Complete


The Epistemological Character of Universal Mechanics

208
209

The Psychological Basis

212

of Universal

Mechanics

THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF UNIVERSAL MECHANICS


Mere Movement and the Causation of Movement
The Forms

214

215

....

of Mechanical Causation
Pure Kinetics Negligible

216
217

CONTENTS

Xlll
PAGE

ENTELECHY AND DYNAMICAL MECHANICS

7.

218

Entelechy in its Relation to the two Forms of


.219
Mechanical Energy
222
Entelechy as Transporting Mechanical Energy
The Suspending and the Transporting Action of En
223
telechy Discussed Together
224
Entelechy in Contrast to General Mechanics
.

....
....
.....
....
....
......
.

CERTAIN BRITISH AUTHORS ON LIFE AND MECHANICS

5.

6.

How ENTELECHY

is

AFFECTED

THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION AND REACTION AS RELATED


TO ENTELECHY

tt.

THE TYPES OF AFFECTION OF ENTELECHY

/S.

Morphogenetic Entelechy
The Affection of the Psychoid

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN AFFECTION


AND THE INORGANIC

7.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

IN

C.

"

Moment

....

"

of Regulation

227
228

229

.231

"

Justification of our Cautiousness

227

THE ORGANIC

Entelechy Related to Space and therefore Belonging to


Nature, but Entelechy not in Space
The Problem of "Entelechy and Causality only partly Solved

The

225

232
234

234
235
236

.237

ENTELECHY AND SUBSTANCE


a.

.......
......

THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE AND


GENERAL

ITS

APPLICATION

Inorganic Substance
Inorganic Substance of any Type Relates to Extensity
p.

ORGANIC

.....
.....
.......
......
......
.

"ASSIMILATION"

Respiration

"

"Assimilation

The

IN

and

Dissimilation

"Living Substance"

in the

Chemical Sense

Negative Results only


7.

ENTELECHY INCOMPATIBLE WITH A


SUBSTANCE

No
No

"LIVING"

S.

SUBSTANCE AS A CATEGORY IN

The Concept

ITS

245
246
248

CHEMICAL

Chemical Substance Possible as the Basis of Entelechy


Constellation of Chemical Substances Possible as the

Basis of Entelechy
Entelechy and Physiological Chemistry
Ancient Problems

241

242

.242

"

"

238

239

RELATION TO ENTELECHY

of Divisibility not Applicable to Entelechy

249

250
251

254
255
256
257

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

XIV

PAOE

The Concept
Entelechy

of
.

"

"

Entelechy
f.

Localisation

Seat not Applicable to

or

.258

......

INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS

of Negations

The Origin and the End of Individual


The Origin of Life in General
CONCLUSIONS OF PART L

Mere System

so far a

Life

259
260

.260
.262
.

264

PART II. THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


A. THE DIRECT PROOF OF THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE
BASED UPON INTROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF COM
PLETE GIVENNESS
1.

ANALYTICAL PART
a.

A CASE FROM COMMON LIFE


The Case
.

What Common
/3.

Life Learns from the Case

THE SAME CASE IN A SCIENTIFIC FORM

An

Hypothesis

The Case Once More


7.

THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELEMENTS

and Non-Spatial Elements


The Elements of Givenness in their Relation
.

5.

among

The

"Identification"

"

"

Intra-psychical Series

Body

as

my

....
....
......
.

POLEMICAL PART

277

277
279
280

282

.283

"

"

276

.281

"Object"

Other Living Bodies


Understanding Yitalism

a.

.275

those which

......
.....
....

THE DIRECT PROOF OF VITALISM

My

2.

273

to the

Relations to the Scientific Analysis of Acting

e.

273

THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE CEREBRAL PORTIONS OF


ELEMENTS
The Last Cerebral Element of the First Portion.

On

270

....

Spatial and Non-Spatial Elements


do not Relate to the Brain

269

.271
.271

IN GIVENNESS

Spatial

Brain.

.266
.267
.267

284

287

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS CURRENT FORMS


OF PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM

Metaphysical Parallelism already Refuted


Pseudo-idealistic Parallelism Refuted
.

287

287

Parallelism Impossible on a Truly Idealistic Basis

.289
.

291

XV

CONTENTS

.......

A NEW FORM OF PARALLELISM

/3.

CONCLUSIONS
B.

THE CATEGORY
a.

Definitions

Fundamental

....
...

Categories

293
294

of

"Experience"

.298

the Foundation of

301

302

.....
......
......
.....
.

The Fundamental Paradox


Freedom a Mere Negation

"

THE CATEGORIES OF RELATION

300

THE CATEGORY OF NECESSITY


"

296

296

.......
Kind

Remarks on Categories and Ordinary Experience


The Problem of the System of Categories

7.

Difficulties

Irreducible

A Few
.

"INDIVIDUALITY"

CATEGORIES IN GENERAL

An

PAGE

303

303
304
305

Introspective Psychology and the Categories of Substance

and Causality
The Problem of a
d.

THE CATEGORY

New

"INDIVIDUALITY"

Previous Preparatory
"Individuality"
"

"

Finality
e.

Category of Relation

Work

a Subclass of Individuality

CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES
INDIVIDUALITY

IN

"

308

310

.310
.

Functional Conception of Causality

.314

".

Entelechy and Causality

Entelechy Supra-personal
f.

The

"NATURE"

Ontological Prototype

RATIONAL SCIENCE

Rational Science and

"

"

"

0.

Science

of Entelechian Systematics

A FEW REMARKS ON THE PROBLEM OF TIME

329

335

Summary

II.

The Method Applied

Definition of the Organism

324

.....

CONCLUSIONS OF PART

323
324

"

Ideal Nature

Causal

Ideal Nature and Natural Factors

The Problem

318
318

.319

Rational Science and

315
316

"

"

314

.317
.

....
......
....

Organic Nature
Conclusions
77.

CATEGORIES AND FACTORS IN


"Ideal Nature."

312
313

THE CATEGORICAL CONCEPT OF

An Analogy to a Mere
No Causa Finalis

306

324

325

327

335

.337
333

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

xvi

PART

III

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL /TELEOLOGY


PAGE

a.

RETROSPECT

Consequences of the

The

Significance of Propagation

IN

7.
5.

THE PROBLEM OF A REAL INORGANIC INDIVIDUALITY

6.

CONTINGENCY AND TELEOLOGY

IN

MORALITY

of Contingency
of a Limited Teleology

344
344

.346
.346
.347

NATURE

The Concept
The Concept
f.

THE

HARMONY

341
342

.343

......
......
......
.....
.....
.......
.....
......
......
......
.....
......
....
TELEOLOGY

History in General
The History of the Individual

Phylogeny

.340

"

PROBLEM OF SUPRA-PERSONAL
REALM OF LIFE

THE

".Machine-Theory

Different Types of Entelechian Effects


General Plan of what Follows
/3.

348
350

352
352
353
355

Morality as a Standard of Measurement of Universal Teleology 355


.356
Morality as a Category
357
Morality and Vitalism
.

PART

IV.

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
a.

THE THREE WINDOWS INTO THE ABSOLUTE


Morality the Thou
The Nature of Memory the Ego
The Character of Givenness the It
:

p.

THE

7.

TELEOLOGY AND THE ABSOLUTE

of a Limited Teleology once


of Teleology

more

THE PRIMARY ENTELECHY IN THE UNIVERSE

.361
.

INDEX

THE ROUTE TRAVERSED


.

362
363

.365

365
368

AN ETERNAL

METALOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

CONCLUSIONS:

361
361

TASK OF SCIENCE
e.

359

"POSTULATE"

The Concept
The Domain
5.

3/0

372
374

377

SECTION

h-Continmd

PART

III

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

PART

III

OKGANIC MOVEMENTS
INTRODUCTORY EEMARKS

OUR

study of morphogenesis has led us to a very important


We have become convinced of the autonomy of life,

result.

as far as the origin of the individual living form

The

we devoted

short surveys that

is

concerned.

to the physiology of

metabolism and to biological problems of the systematic and


historical kind have not proved so successful.
Physiology
afforded us but few indicia of a future vitalism,
large fields of systematics

was very

We

little to

now

and

in the

and history we found that there

be learnt at

all.

begin the second half of our lectures, and shall

conclude the factual or analytical or purely scientific


section
the analysis of the physiology of organic movement

first

has

still

to

be attempted.

The study

of animal

movement

will be as instructive as the study of morphogenesis has

been

it

will bring us into close contact with philosophical

questions again.

And when we have

have completed our purely

scientific

we

shall

may

then

finished it

work, and

enter the sacred halls of pure philosophy.

The physiology

of

organic

movement may

raise

the

following questions, and, indeed, every text-book of physiology

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

shows us that

it

has raised

actually

i.e.

are changes of the organic

of

all

movements, in some way, are reactions

them.

All

to external stimuli,

body in question with regard

to its external surroundings.

In other words, there

line of processes, the first of

which leads from without

is

to

within, whilst the last one leads from within to without

and besides these there are intermediate

now may
receives

ask

What happens

the external

these stimuli, and

the final effect

stimuli,

what

when

what

the

is

effect of

final

there between the stimulus

is

of the so-called sense organs

us the answer to our

first

question

it

would give

the contraction of the muscle

movement

in

is

studied, but so

the

infusoria, or

and absorption

processes

movement
is

also the

process

strange

of

by which the movements

of gases

of Siphonophora or of Radiolaria are carried out.

intermediate

so.

of locomotory organs takes account of the

question about the final acts in the process of

secretion

to

and by

and function they are

of their organisation

The physiology

ciliary

and

would teach us

sorts of stimuli the organisms are responsive

what means

it

The physiology
what

processes.

in the organism

We

concerned

in

organic

And

all

movements

would come under the physiology of the nerves and nerveNot very much is actually known about this
centres.
subject.

Scarcely

anything

regard to the so-called

themselves

we know

been

has
"

"

centres

little

ascertained

and as

to

with

the nerves

except that nervous conduction

Rhumbler shares the merit of having studied very extensively the means
movement in the lowest Protista. Even if he is wrong in many points
his interpretation (Jennings, Heidenhain) he has done good work in

of
of

But I beg to lay stress


clearing the problems.
has studied means of movement nothing more.

upon the

fact that

he only

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
takes time, that

that

it

is

accompanied by

electric changes,

and

probably of a chemical nature.

it is

Now we

should hardly gain very

sophical purposes,

if

much

for our philo

movement we were

in our analysis of

to follow the lines of ordinary physiology,

which we have

wanting some
thing very important in our sketch, and when looking back
Dann
to it we may be reminded of the words of Goethe
shortly sketched here.

Moreover, there

is

"

hat er die Teile in seiner Hand, fehlt leider nur das geistige

Ordinary physiology indeed does not offer us much


But is there^ anything besides
more than
die Teile."
them is a specific motor act of an organism as such any
Band."

"

thing in

seems

itself, is

me

to

physiology

in

not merely a

other

question about the

come up

it

that this

"

is

the
it

words,

wholeness

"

sum

or aggregate

central problem

seems

me

to

of the act of

at the beginning of the analysis.

It

of motor

that

the

moving must

It certainly is

impossible to neglect this question from the very beginning.

We

therefore

shall

not follow

physiology in our analytical

the lines of

questions into a somewhat different shape.

we know

already from our previous researches

turn them in order to be successful

ordinary

but shall turn the

studies,

let

And, indeed,
how we may

the concept of

made

the centre of our discussion,

though in a slightly different

and more complicated sense

"
"

regulation

again be

we were speaking of the physiology of morpho


and
metabolism.
There is indeed no properly
genesis
state of organisation or function that could be
normal
than when

"

"

said

But

to

be restored or regulated by organic movements.

in spite of that, there

is

something in these movements

that bears the character of a correspondence to a change or

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

variation of the

medium

or the organism, just as in the case

of regulation proper.

An
of

you perhaps a better idea


than mere abstraction can do.

actual instance will give

what

am

thinking

of,

Take a dog and ask what characters resembling

regulations,

not regulations themselves, may occur in his movements.


The dog is running towards a certain place along the direct
if

that leads to

line

when

a carriage

it,

crossing this line just

is

the dog will run a little more


will
and
make
a
curve in order to avoid the carriage.
quickly
Another dog has undergone an operation involving the loss
the dog has to pass

of a part of

ments

one hemisphere of the brain

move

at first his

are very defective, but after a certain time, as the

experiments of Goltz and others have shown, they become


much less so than they were immediately after the operation.

And

a third dog

is

injured in one of his legs so that he

forced to run on three legs only

yet he manages to reach

the place he wants to get

to,

manner somewhat

from the normal.

different

Here we have instances


or, if

the

you prefer

sum

of all possible kinds of regulation,

and the sum of

cerned in movement, which

may

carried out, be

In the

first

it

by

cilia,

between

effects

field of

or organs

con

motor

movement

muscles, or threads of protoplasm.

instance the dog s goal was reached, in spite of

by means of a change

a change in the outer conditions,


in certain single acts of
carriage

single

occur in the

physiology, no matter by what means


is

his three legs in a

by using

to say so, of the correspondence

of conditions

is

instead

movement

of following

second instance we do not

the

the dog ran round the


straight

line.

In the

know very much about

the

change of function that follows the change effected in the

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

dog s brain, but we may assume hypothetically, that other


lines of nerves have been used for carrying out what there
In the third instance the change from
without affected the organs which perform the movement

was

to be done.

change was followed by a change in the use


of these organs
for it is clear that the work done in

itself,

and

this

walking by every single leg when there are four legs at the
disposal of the organism does not remain the same when
there are only three.

Keviewing our three instances, we may say that in the


a variation in the totality of the
first case there was

external stimuli, followed by a corresponding variation in


whilst such a corresponding variation followed a
^
change of the intermediate organs in the second case, and a

the

effect,

change in the general condition


organs in the third.

We

of

the proper effectuating

observe, then, a co-ordination of

our three instances to the three fundamental branches of


ordinary motor physiology already mentioned.

It is not this

co-ordination, however, but the existence of something like

regulation in

organic

movement

that

interests

us chiefly,

and here we have the starting-point of our future researches.


All changes, whether in the external conditions, or in the
intermediate organs, or in the effectuating organs, may be
described as changes of motor stimulation in general, and

we may

therefore say that the relation between motor stimuli

ami movement
there

sums

as such

is

in fact our general problem.

or aggregates on both sides or not

If

Are
not,

These are the questions we have to answer.


Let us now review the great variety of actual organic

what

is

there

movements, with the object of discovering the kinds of


between cause and effect in every class.

relation

THE MOST SIMPLE TYPES OF ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

1.

When

first

six years

tried,

movements according

to

their

seemed inevitable that the

two
ones

types,

which in

the

so-called

of

to classify organic

degree of complication,

classification

must

different respects are the

simple

and

reflex,

start

it

from

most simple

the

simple

free

"

directive motion called

Modern

ago,

"

taxis.

investigations have proved that these

two groups

movements, though the most simple in concept, are far

from being the most fundamental in


classification of organic

movements

have to follow other lines of analysis.


for historical interest, a short

simple reflex

and therefore a

fact,

at the present day will

But

in spite of that,

survey of the theory of the

and of the simple directive movement may

introduce the present chapter.

a.

The simple

reflex

THE SIMPLE EEFLEX


occurs in plants, in the

instance, as well as in animals,

and in the

they possess a well localised brain

and

latter

Mimosa

for

both when

nervous system

and when they do not.


Coughing and sneezing are among
A
the most universally known phenomena of this class.
stimulus applied to a specified point of the body
1

Die

"Seek"

is

followed

als elcmentarer NaturfaTctor, Leipzig, 1903.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
here by a specified

And

movements
It

for

of another

some, though

specified

not

part.

very many,

of Invertebrates.

the

is

relation

movement

same holds

the

invariability,

the

absolute

the

of

fixation

between a simple cause and a simple motor

effect

or reaction, with regard to quality as well as to localisation,

that characterises this type of the simple reflex

a simple reflex occurs with the precision

Nothing

of

1
;

indeed,

machinery.

in fact speaks against the real existence of such

machinery

we

therefore

may assume

hypothetically that

true simple reflexes are machine-like in every respect, and

with

may now

assumption we

this

leave this

type

of

organic movement, which affords us no theoretical problems


of a complicated kind.

/3.

THE DIRECTIVE MOVEMENTS

In the simple free directive movement or taxis it is


the typical relation between the direction of the stimulus
"

"

and the direction of the


or the plane of

effect,

symmetry

this type of motion

with regard to the main axis

of the organism,

The

from others.

will best be illustrated

by

certain

properly belong to the class

of

which separates

significance of this

phenomena which do not


free movements we are

dealing with here, but which more correctly belong to the

physiology of growth

the so-called

"

tropisms"

Tropism
Let us
of these
1

first

devote a few words to the chief characteristics

"

tropisms."

We

did not

discuss

Of course the general type of a simple reflex


locality of the cause and of the effect is the same.

is

them whilst

not changed,

if

the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

10

morphogenesis and growth in particular, since


is not growth but typical

analysing
their

most prominent feature

motion.
All of you

know

that the stem of a tree turns

from the ground, whilst the root enters it.


negative and of positive geotropism in this case,

We
for it

away

speak of
has been

gravity which determines the direction of


stem and of root here, in a manner that has been very

proved that

much
style

it

is

1
And in the same
by modern authors.
and
positive
negative heliotropism, if a stem

elucidated

we

call it

of a plant turns toward


light,

and

if

a root turns

the sun or any other source of

away from such

sources.

Thermo

tropism, rheotropism, and chemotropism are similar pheno


mena their names show most decidedly in what they
;

There are a few similar phenomena in the so-called


stolons of hydroids.
As we have said, it is only on growing
consist.

parts of fixed organisms that tropisms of all sorts are to

be observed.
of the
all of

marked correspondence

cause and of

its

immediate

effect

is

exhibited in

them.

Let us

first

speak of a

state in a

real

"

few words in what cases we


"

direction

medium.

That a

of gravity

and the rays of

body

of the directions

is

specific

clear without

much

peculiar to

may

an agent of the

direction is given in the effect


light going out

explanation

direction in natural agents even

from a radiant

but there

may

be

when they cannot properly

1
I refer to the work done
by Noll, Nemec, Haberlandt, and many others
during the last ten years. Of more than usual importance seems to be the
discovery of Fitting (Jahrb. iviss. Bot. 44, 1907) that phototropic stimula

may be transferred along broken (zigzag) lines, and that this stimula
tion itself probably consists in a real induction of polarity in each cell
established from without.
There is no machine-like apparatus simply set
tion

going.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

11

Take the distribution of heat, not


be spoken of as rays.
by radiation but by conduction, take the diffusion of chemical
substances in solutions, and, last not least, take the electric

we may speak

current; in all these cases


of

in the broadest

"

potentials,"

we may speak

similarly

These lines of

"

lines of

force."

force, existing in all those processes,

not only

and

conduc

allow us to speak

where these

meaning of the word, and

of the existence of

in galvanism but in diffusion


tion,

of the existence

lines

of

agents in every case

directed

and in

exist,

directed agents of the

also in thermic

this

realm of

the

way

medium becomes very large. In fact,


we shall speak about, have been

the directed movements

found to exist in correspondence with almost


directed agents of the

medium

"

is

then,

tropism,"

of the

all

in this broadest sense.

a directed

movement

part of a plant or hydroid determined

of a growing

by the direction of a

directed agent.

The theory
if

of tropisms

would be a very simple thing

there were nothing but typical cases say of geotropism or

of heliotropism,

such cases as the bending of a branch

e.g.

any source of light, and the invariable bending of roots

to

towards the ground.

But there

are

consisting of

two

There are
that

is

to

by the
stimulus.

two

classes of complications, each of

parts.

many

cases

intensity

say

organ

of

the

that

conditions begins to bend


1

where the

"

"

sense

of a tropism,

say, its being positive or negative, is

An

them

light
is

or

positive

of

the

under ordinary

away from the source

In Pfeffer s Pflanzenphysiologie (vol.


the theory of tropisms will be found.

vii. p.

changed
chemical

of stimu-

546) an excellent account of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

12

lation

the

if

conversely.

reaches

stimulus

This

is

certain

and

intensity,

a rather simple complication, but an

phenomenon appears if the increased intensity of


Then the organism
the stimulus has lasted for some time.
additional

becomes adapted, or rather acclimatised, to this


and resumes the positive irritability it had before.

intensity,

Let us remember on this occasion what was said on


irritability

and

its

part of this work

restoration after

first

tropistic irritability follows the so-

all

law of Weber, that

called

the

irritation in

to

is

an increase of the

say,

intensity of the stimulus always acts only in proportion to

This law resembles the so-

the intensity already present.


called

"

action of masses

that something chemical

"

in chemistry,

and tends

to prove

Also

connected with tropisms.

is

the reversion of tropisms might be explained in the same

simple manner.
sion

is

But the change

another thing

a real

to us in its details, a real

of the point

of rever

"

acclimatisation,"

unknown

"

secondary

though not proving vitalism in

itself, is

regulation,"

in

which,

any case very

remarkable.

The second complication in the theory of tropisms


appears whenever the general conditions of life are altered.
In this case a change say of the general temperature of the

medium changes the


that has been named

"

sense
"

"

of say heliotropism

heterogeneous induction

a fact

"

by

Noll.

This change of the sense of a tropism very often plays a


if a pine is
true morphogenetic, or, rather, restitutive role
:

decapitated, one of the side branches assumes the negative

geotropism of the lost main axis, and a similar phenomenon


holds for roots.
The general organisatory state of the

organism

is

the

"general

condition"

that was altered

in

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
Whenever

this case.

13

parts of a plant change the sense of

a tropism, according to their age or state of

we

fertility,

find

Here already the concept of the


something very similar.
whole with regard to functioning in its relation to out
"

"

manner

side factors presents itself, though perhaps not in a


sufficient to refute the

The

"

machine theory

of

reached

last step of complication is

"

life.

two or more

if

stimuli are in competition with one another.

shown by the behaviour

best

of

roots

This case
the

in

is

ground

gravity, moisture, heat, chemicals are the principal stimuli

The

concerned here.

effect is

not a simple

sum

but a sort of unity of a very peculiar kind

component may
"

or

Stimmung,"

change the organism

or resultant,

each single

sense of irritability,

towards any other component.

sort of innate direction relative to the axis

may

certain

be among

the components that influence the behaviour of a certain

organ

("

autotropism

It
").

apply the machine theory of


So much on tropisms.

Are the

directive

or animals, called

tropisms

would

Taxis

It is clear that the direction

different things.

and

so

"

Entwickelungslehre,

say

specific

i.

taxis

signifies

4,

is

1907).

the

axis of the organism with

any directed agent of the

very strange case belonging here


d.

and the movement are two

"

better

regard to the direction of


1

"

It is the direction only that is considered

we may

specific orientation of a

Ausbau

moving Protista
the same way as

"

here,

in freely

explainable in

taxis,"

to

in these cases.

life

movements

"

at least be difficult

medium.

discussed by France (Zeitschr. f. d.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

14

If the taxis

is

combined with or followed by movement,

move

there will, of course, be a specific direction in this

ment

also.

The word

"

"

thus applies only to the correspondence

taxis
It

of directions.

does not say the least thing about the

movement, by which the orientation of the organ


ism goes on it does not even seek to point out that the

means

of

process of orientation

is

In

quite a simple process.

a very easy consideration shows that the process of


is

by no means simple

in

many

fact,
"

"

taxis

cases.

say a protozoon or a crayfish, in


Imagine an organism,
order to show from the beginning that the particular motor

organs in question are of no consequence

and imagine it
placed with its long axis at a certain angle towards the
direction say of the rays of light proceeding from a radiant

Then

point.

taxis,"

in this case

would be said to occur,

taxis,"

some

"

sort of turning

so

deviation between the direction of


light
cilia

the

of

the

by the

protozoon or
"

"

taxis

here

a combination of very

is

or

"

helio-

long as there

its axis

movement being performed

Certainly the
it is

phototaxis

the organism carries out

if

movement

"

"

is any
and the rays of

equally well by the

legs

the

of

crayfish.

neither immediate nor simple

many

single

motor

acts, leading

though this result must be said to have


We have to assume
been reached in an unbroken line.
to taxis as a result,

that the motor organs of one side

of

our organism are

stimulated by the rays of the light as long as there

is

no

symmetrical arrangement of both of its sides with regard


to

the

direction

of

the

light

of

course,

stimulation of this kind would be finally a


orientation.

the

result

of

symmetry

of

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

15

Nothing of course would be explained by calling any


of this

taxis

for

but

"

"

taxis

embracing a rather

movements, which have a

co-ordinated

of

class

"

sort

would be a good name

certainly

simple

"

movement

of

process

very apparent common feature in the fixed relation of the


directions between the stimulus or cause and the final
effect,

reached

without any interruption in an unbroken

line.

phenomena of

It is true, the

known not
all

so-called

so simple as described here

to be

known from

the kinds of complications

"

Taxis was called

of tropisms.

this

the

taxis

were

there were

phenomena
when

in the case

"

positive

the anterior end of the organism was finally placed towards


the stimulating source, and

Now

opposite case.

which had proved


tactic,

could

it

to

react

it

was

"

called

"

negative

in the

was found that the same organism,


be positively phototactic or chemo-

negatively

when

intensity of the

the

stimulus increased, and conversely.

But the point

change was by no means fixed

given individual

for a

of this
;

the

organism could become adapted or acclimatised to a stimulus

which at

first

had caused the avoiding or negative

reaction,

and could thus become positive without any change of the


medium. But other conditions of the medium, such as its
salinity or temperature, were also found to have an influence

upon the
the sun

That

"

(J.

sense

"

of taxis, say with regard to the rays of

Loeb).

was the general

state

of

the

apparently

established theory of taxis about six years ago.


possible

to

explain

all

these

facts

as

well

Was

it

being simple and

machine -like in the same way as simple reflexes ? The


difficulties, as with tropisms, lay in the variability of the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

16

point of changing the tactical sense and in the phenomena

But these

of simultaneous irritation by different stimuli. 1

might perhaps not be regarded as sufficient to

difficulties

force us

not

the

imply

Now

it

the aspect of the theory of

JENNINGS.

S.

II.

"

"

taxis,"

in the sense

"
"

a few

galvanotaxis
tactical

when Hydra

we have

phenomena

in

or a flatworm turns

what had

thermotaxis,

been

among

called

is,

head towards a strong

But very much

shown

well

as

chemotaxis

or

among higher

to be not taxis at

all,

comparable to the tropisms in plants,


It
therefore must be
very different.

regarded as possible at
"

be

as

line

something

cases of

a true

not a final correspondence of direction reached in

an unbroken
but

is

animals, as for instance


its

phototaxis or

Protozoa

animals, has actually been

that

"

analysed, seems

There

light or towards a mechanical stimulus.

of

amongst Infusoria, and there are

"
"

"

taxis

TRIAL AND ERROR

to occur to a rather limited extent only.


real

"

very important for our present purposes to

is

observe that

and

being

agents

ago.

THE WORK OF

7.

impossibility

much about

few years

biological facts

of mtalistic

work in them.

actually at

So

a mtalistic conception of

necessity of

logical

does

accept vitalism, though, of course, to deny the

to

"

taxis

mentioned,

will prove to be
J.

still

more

illusory, though, as

must

least, that in

Loeb

the future

and certain

other

writers

only

Compare the suggestive article, "Die Lichtsinnesorgane der Algen," by


France s conception of
R. H. France, Stuttgart, 1908.
Reizverwertung
is very
originally created by Kohnstamm in a purely psychological sense
1

"

well descriptive of

what happens.

"

17

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
concede

brought

into

limited

very
the

and maintain

field,

views

the

to

validity

the

recently
"

old

taxis

"-

theory.

the

same time

of the elements of animal

movements

The new doctrine

new theory

quite a

in general,

is

his important
result of
the

also

of

and

"taxis,"

at

due to Herbert Jennings.


discoveries

by studying not only the

any directed agent acting


moving individual

Jennings made

itself

upon

final

the organism, but

in the very act of moving.

This very act of moving, especially in the case of Protozoa,


was proved to be anything but a single and unbroken act
of turning.

"

Taxis

"

thus became a mere resultant of the

most various single motor

acts, and,

with the sole excep

tion of galvanotaxis, ceased to be a proper

name

for the

process.
I shall be only following the historical line of events, if
I

now

try first to give a short sketch of Jennings

of the problem of taxis,

and then begin the

solution

real systematics

of animal motions.

The Resolution of

The infusorium Paramecium


to a

weak

"

"

is

Taxis

"

positively chemotactic

solution of acetic acid, that

is to say,

"

number of

these Protista living in a dish that contains a drop of such

a solution in any part of the water after a certain time will

be found to be
which, of course,
water.
1

in a certain region around this drop,

slowly diffusing into the surrounding


The old theory would say in this case, that the

Compare

where the

all
is

his work, Behaviour of

full literature is to

Lower Organisms (New York,

be found.
2

1906),

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

18

of diffusion

lines

of the acetic acid orient the

Paramecia

and that thus the

positively according to their direction,

Paramecia reach the solution by simply swimming forward


But that would be far
after the orientation is completed.
from

the

truth.

Jennings

found, on^the^cpju^rary, by
all the Infusoria swim

observing the single individuals, that


at

random and enter the

solution at

random

but that

also,

then they are kept within the limits of a certain concentra


as soon
tion of the diffusing acid by a very strange feature
:

as they reach those limits the passing of

them out

which would bring

of the region of the acid, they give a certain very

typical motor reaction,

which makes them remain in the

The reaction consists in a swim


region where they were.
ming backward, combined with a revolution round the long
axis

and a turning

And

to the aboral side.

quite the same holds for

"

negative chemo taxis," as

happening, for instance, in the presence of


ordinary

a solution of

All of the animals which by their ordinary

salt.

forward motion would reach the region of a certain con


centration of the diffusing chloride of sodium, perform the
reaction just

named

in the very

Thus they never

region.

for the reaction

may

moment

of entering this

really penetrate to this region,

be repeated as often as necessary; but

the few organisms which were in the region of the salt at


the beginning of the experiment

the end, of course,


solution, just as in

all
"

may

freely leave

it.

In

the animals are out of range of the


"

positive chemotaxis

all

the animals

were in range.
It must be granted that Loeb, in establishing what he
called

"

Unterschiedsempfindlichkeit,"

i.e.

animals to differences of intensity say of

the reactions of
light,

came very

19

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

near to the views sketched here, though he was (and is) far
from admitting the resolution of all kinds of "taxis" in
1

this

way.
Chemotaxis thus

resulting effect of

is

many

proved by Jennings to be a mere


different single performances,

not a simple and immediate process of orientation at

And what

holds with regard to chemicals

is

and

is

all.

also true

light, contact, and any other stimulus


except the galvanic current, and applies not only to Infusoria,
but also to Flagellata, and Bacteria, and Rotatoria, and all

with regard to heat,

other sorts

of

invertebrate animals

far at

as

least

as

experiments in the style of Jennings have been carried out.


Therefore, though

whatever of

we cannot

say at present that no case

"

"

taxis

exists (except galvanotaxis),

not, I believe, be very far


"

the range of

"

taxis

we

shall

in saying that probably

wrong

will prove finally to be at least very

restricted.

now might seem

It

shown by Paramecium,

that the

solution applied in the experiment,


reflex of the

typical

motor reaction

either in leaving or in entering the

most simple kind, and

of the resolution of the concept of

is

of the type of a true

that, therefore, in spite


"

taxis,"

as maintained

by Jennings, the simple reflex would be the actual basis of


1

cannot agree with Walter (Journ. exp. Zool. 5, 1907. Here full
on the subject), when, in his studies on the reactions of Planaria

literature
to light,

he applies the term


of the intensity

.differences

"

Phototaxis

"

to reactions of this

of illumination.

The word

worm towards

"taxis"

strictly

depends on the theory that refers to the direction of a stimulus exclusively.


2
I should not believe that the resolution of "taxis," according to the
analysis of Jennings, would apply to the phenomena of the wandering of
cells to specific localities in

embryonic
vol.

i.

p.

104).

flammation
see also vol.

"

and
i.

The

the case of

"

directive stimuli

"

(see

also hold perhaps in cases of "in


the protective migrations of cells in general (Metschnikoff

p. 206).

old theory

might

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

20

movement whatever.

all

the

first

So indeed Jennings thought in


work, but a more thorough study

of his

period

taught him very

differently.

The Single Motor Acts.

now

This

the

is

The

Movement

"

at

Random

"

point to begin the systematic

right

study of the types of animal movements let us consider, in


first place, what may be called single motor acts.
;

the

The

"

"

simple reflex

is

one of these

acts,

but

it is

far

from being the most original or the most widely distributed


it seems to be restricted to certain specific typesof them
;

of motion
is

among

the higher classes of animals

performed by our Paramecium is not


The most original motor act, that
one

elemental

both

ontogenetically
"

("

phylogenetically

definitely variable

is
"),

motor

motion
effect

at

even what

a simple reflex.
to say, the

is

and

most

systematically

random"

i.e.

an in

following some sort of

stimulus and having no specific relation to the locality of

whether the locality of possible stimulation be a


limited and fixed one, as for instance in many Infusoria, or

the

latter,

not, as in

many

higher animals and in

all

Amoebae.

There are two classes of original movements at random


The first consists of such
requiring to be distinguished.
single

motor acts as show an absolute contingency, the

second of those which show a relative one.


are

may

good
be

instance

followed by

of

the

every

first

type

possible

All

Amoebae

any stimulation

movement

in

every

geometrically possible direction out of a strictly indefinite

number
But

of possibilities

the same holds for

in Infusoria, as in all animals that are

many worms.

more

specifically

21

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
organised with regard to their locomotory organs, the
of motor possibilities

more

is

restricted

number

Paramecium

for

instance always swims backward, revolves round the axis,


and turns to the aboral side. That might seem to be a
typical reflex, but in

fact

far

is

from being

One of

so.

the components of the motor reaction allows an indefinite


the revolving
variety of motions at random even here

round the long

This act

axis.

may

be performed to any

amount, and, of course, the slightest variety in


performing it would bring the animal to quite a different
possible

part of the dish in the course of

its

subsequent movements.

Jennings has introduced the appropriate


"

system

ments, indefinite

in spite of

higher animals possess such


is

restricted

Thus then

all

it

by

single

it,

it

move

clear that all

is

a system, and that

from

action

man

for

flying.

motor acts that could be actually


"movement

at

occurring either on a definite action system or

There was scarcely any


the true kind, in the sense of an absolutely fixed

on an absolutely
reflex of

"

which are founded upon

observed were found to be of the type of


random,"

of

to signify the typical restriction of possible

the typical locomotory organisation

instance

name

indefinite one.

correspondence of locomotory cause and

eft ect.

The Modifiability of Single Motor Acts

The concept

of

embraces the fact


is

the

contingency of single motor acts


But as our mind

of their modifiability.

forced to conceive all that happens as being univocally

1
We might speak here
mathematics does.

of

an

indefiniteness

of

different

orders,

as

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

22

determined, the problem at once

arises,

by what

conditions the actual performance of a particular


in a particular case

Let us

first

requires a

like those in

movement

actually determined as such.

remark that motion in

separate

On

phases.

is

factors or

itself

by no means

external cause for each of

the contrary, not only can periodic

medusae or

its

single

movements

in the heart of animals be said to

be due to innate causes or stimuli, and to be, so to say, the

normal permanent state of the animal or the organ, but


changes of the specific type of random-movements

also

In Hydra such an innate change of


may be studied with the

occur from within.


different

may

motions

contingent

greatest advantage.

This possibility of a change of single random-motions


from within now gives us the key to an understanding of
their change as occurring in response to an external stimulus.

always the interior general state of the organism that


determines which particular motor performance is to go on,
whether the state of rest is to be changed into a state of
It is

some

possible

movement, or whether permanent motion

is

to

its type.

change
Yet we

may speak of motions occurring at random


although we know that they are determined, provided that
we know nothing specific about the general state of the
"

"

In fact, the movements of an


organism in question.
animal which otherwise would not move at all, or the
changes of motion in a permanently moving organism, may
random," if
properly be called
they do not follow any
"

law with regard to their sequence, if they go on


until the stimulus from without, that has caused them, is

specific

escaped

quite

accidentally

during

and by the moving.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
"

trial and error


Jennings has spoken of the method of
in these cases as well as in others to be studied hereafter.
"

I should like to avoid this term, for, besides its psychological


aspect,

which seems

seems

to

But

me

to

imply some sort of so-called

to

"

be out of place here, the word

here in the simple fact of

movement

"

trial

"

experience."

random there

at

it only might
nothing of that sort as far as we know
random-motions
offer
the material
that
the
true
be,
might

is

as will be seen

"

for

experience,"

Contingency thus
performance of

all

is

on a later occasion.

the leading characteristic

of the

these most elemental single motor acts,

as well as of their being stopped.

something more definite


may be said about the factors that determine the type of
not only
each single motion.
Typical interior states

But there are

cases

where

quite generally conceived ones


reaction

as

well

as

stop

the external stimulus being

the type of

may change

motion
still

altogether

in spite of

Thus

present.

it

is

well

known, especially from the studies of Coelenterata, that a

hungry animal

reacts otherwise or not at

all, if

compared

with a fed one, with regard to the same stimulus, and there
are also differences of reaction corresponding to the different

embryonic stage or the age of an organism.


And moreover we find that a competition
various

external

stimuli

reaction.

The

effect

be

that

there

either

original

stimulus,

or

may

determine

the

of a second external stimulus


is

no longer any reaction

that

sort

of

resultant

goes on, or that the type of the original reaction

wise

changed.

so-called

reversal

Here we must
of

among
type

the

recall

to

of

may
the

reaction
is

attention

other
to

the

"
<c

sense

of

the

reaction,

as

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

24

"

by the theory of

asserted

of the original stimulus

came

now

explanation

In

The

into play.

there

fact,

taxis

to occur if the intensity

was increased, or if other stimuli


were quite true, but their real

facts

proves to be of a

much more

general kind.

also
be "acclimatisation," say to
then the avoiding reaction shown at first

may

chemical stimuli
will not be

"

shown any longer

tive chemotaxis

after a certain time

"

will cease to exist.

And

"

nega

other kinds of

coming into competition with the original one,


1
may result in the same effect.
But now we come to two classes of modifications of

stimuli,

motor

single

that

for all

to follow.

is

There
single

which possess a great importance

acts,

may

be a typical series of consecutive different

motor reactions, whenever the

or any following

first

one of these reactions has not avoided the external stimulus


or has not reached the condition
series

may

go on until the

Such typical

"

desired,"

and

this typical

"

"

desired

state is actually reached.

of different single reactions have been

lines

well studied by Jennings and his followers in

many

cases,

the most typical ones occurring in the infusorium Stentor

and
1

If a Stentor

in Actinians.

of light

powder

falling

upon

is

disturbed, say by

it, it first

some

sort

bends to one side

very remarkable fact of this class has recently been discovered by


Minkiewicz (Arch. ZooL exp. et gen. 4 ser. 7, notes, 1907)
the crab Maia
may change the qiuility not the "sense" of its chromotropism," which
:

"

is independent of its reaction to light in general, according to the colour


of the ground it lives upon, and another crab, Hippolyte, changes its colour
and its chromotropism correspondingly. In this case the whole phenomenon

most markedly under the concept of what we have called "physiological


in the first volume of this book.
Indeed, the question may arise,
whether all modifications of primitive motor irritability may not be considered
under this heading in further analytical studies. Of course, what Minkiewicz
calls chromo-" tropism
ought rather to be styled chromo-" taxis," and, most
falls

"

adaptation

"

probably,

is

no real

"taxis."

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
several times, but,

if it

is

not freed from the stimulus, a

second type of reaction sets in

movement

is

reversed.

25

the direction of the ciliary

Again without success

even the

third type of reaction, contraction into the tube,


successful,

and

only the

it is

last

Here quite decidedly the

condition.

"
"

fact that

movement has occurred determines the type


the word

un

kind of motion, swimming

away, that definitively frees our animal from the


of

is

disliked

one type

of the next

not quite correct even


trial," though
at
least
have
a
seems
to
better meaning than if applied
here,
reaction

to

mere movement

types, if to
its

random.

at

might seem

It also

in

"

a very

to be a typical

weak stimulus our

sequence of reaction
first answers

Stentor

usual original manner, and after that does not react

any more but it seems to me that here we have nothing


but the well-known fact of acclimatisation.
:

To the

last typical class of modifiability of

acts only a few

simple motor

words may be devoted in this connexion.


the whole series of possible

If Stentor, after going through

reactions, is stimulated in exactly the

same way once more,

answers with the ultimate reaction at once, supposing


the intermediate time has not been very long.
And

it

similar features in simple motor actions have been observed


in other Protozoa, in Actinians,

and some worms.

Did these

animals acquire any experience," even of the most simple


kind ?
And what does
mean in natural
experience
"

"

"

science

later chapter will

have to deal with this most

fundamental question.
Looking back upon the whole of the work done, especially
by Jennings, we see that there is nothing very fixed about
the most primitive types of animal

movement, but some-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

26

laws and

we understand the

In some cases

thing very variable.

such variability, in others they


us by reason of the

of

principles

either do not exist or they escape

minuteness of the objects in question.

we by adopting

Shall
able

to

understand

"

of life be
machine-theory
that has been observed regarding

all

the

"

the most simple movements ?


Most of it, certainly, might
be understood in such a manner, at least in principle, and
as long as no greater complexity

prove that the fact of so-called


of

limits

an

such

is

"

explanation,

is

experience

be

will

Of

special discussion in the future.

But

discovered.

"

to

beyond the

the object of a

course, as

mentioned

before, to affirm the possibility of mechanical explanation is

not to affirm the impossibility of

of

theory"

as

life

phenomena

We
a

hold

long as possible

this

the

in

actuality

the

apparently

for

machine-

"

theory

may be

most

simple

in organisms.

CO-ORDINATED MOTIONS

S.

to

always

even

wrong

actually

we

reasons

methodological

vitalistic

now

leave the

work

of Herbert Jennings and turn

short survey of the possible classes of so-called co

ordinated motions.

Much

has

long

known

been

about

the

elemental

processes that go on in the nervous system of a

animal,

or, rather,

much

in the form of a so-called

For
of

the

moving

has been attributed to this system


"
"

property

or

"

functional

state."

must be well understood that the immediate subject


experimental study always and in every case has been
it

state of the

motor organs as such

so-called nervous

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

27

have been inferred from this study, and,


so to say, have been projected upon the nervous system.
It was seen that simple nervous conduction would not
states or conditions

suffice to explain

therefore

Centres

here,

and the word

"

"

centre

though rather mysterious role.


were identified with the anatomical ganglia until
a

played
"

"

what happens
great

Bethe showed that in crabs some typical reflexes may go


A
on even after the ganglia have been extirpated.

modern physiologists then thought they


altogether, but more
might drop the concept of a centre

certain school of

"

"

recently a sort of compromise between the old and the

theory has been come

and

to.

The concepts

new
"

of

"

inhibition

"

"

Hemmung,"
Bahnung," in German),
path-making
and the like have been employed to designate elemental
conditions of the nervous system, apart from conduction,
"

("

that are concerned in combined motions.

The Concepts of von Uexkuell


It

seems to

qualities

claim

to

me

that the system of elemental nervous

which von

Uexkuell

be the most

conception in

this

field.

has

lately

created

may

complete and the most original


To state in a few words the

logical value of von Uexkuell

general theory of movement,

it

concepts as relating to the

seems to

me

that he has

formulated what might be called the elemental "means"


in the mutual relation of the motor parts used and con1

See especially Leitfadcn in das Studium der expcrimentcllen Biologic der


Von Uexkuell s work is composed of an
Wassertiere, Wiesbaden, 1905.
we only deal here with the
analytical and of an hypothetical or fictive part
;

This part will retain its value, it seems to


former, which is very valuable.
me, even if the hydrodynamic and electric hypothesis of "tonus" has to be
given up.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

28

cerned in any correlated motion whatever.


to

his

parallel

concepts

"latching"

"blocking,"

of

("

"

"

tonus,"

Klinkung

I should like

tonus

etc.,

"),

reservoir,"

directly

with

the elemental concepts of formative stimulus, prospective


potency, inner means,

in morphogenesis.

etc.,

For, in fact,

of von

Uexkuell are concerned in any


co-ordinated movement whatever, though, properly under
the concepts

all

none

stood,

specificity

Now

of them, of course, says

anything

about

the

of co-ordination as such.
it

results of

is

of

great

the

importance, that

analytical

von Uexkuell about the elements concerned

co-ordinated motion are in a most perfect state of

in

harmony

with what Jennings discovered about simple motor acts.


Let us mention at least a few of the elemental nervous

The type of
by von Uexkuell s work.
any single act of a combined movement may be altered
relations revealed

by the intensity

of the stimulus, or

by

its

quality, or

by

the introduction of a second simultaneous stimulus, either

same spot or elsewhere, or by the occurrence of


previous stimulations and there may be a change in the
the

at

behaviour regarding the single constituents in consecutive


times of their realisation
and one reacting constituent
;

may

be stopped by any other one whatever.

There

is

hardly one

feature

in

this

doctrine

of

the

constituents of combined motion that does not appear in

the

motor acts as

single

well.

Combined motions thus

from being a grouping of simple typical reflexes


most of what was believed to be truly reflex
exclusively
are

far

has been proved not to be


1

It

so.

must be understood that von Uexkuell himself (see Zeitschrift f.


movement, and that

Biol. 50, 1907, p. 168) adheres to the reflex-theory of

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

T/ie Classes

And now

29

of Co-ordination

us glance at the different types or classes

let

of co-ordinated animal motions, always asking at each step,

what would be

intelligible here

and what would

on the theory of a machine

not.

of all co
The simplest class
considered logically
chainordinated movements is formed by the so-called
reflexes," which seem to occur in several groups of Inverte
"

brates

one typical simple reflex

number

is

or in the heart of higher animals

the simultaneous performance of


or the

so-called
"

of

synchronic

the other, as

metameric

In the

ones in the second.


"

many

umbrella

move

"

in

animals.

reflexes in the first case

"

Medusae

similar equal ones,

the stimulus to

is

the movements of

We may
and

"

speak

in the

of

metachronic

jelly-fish all the parts of

together as

begun movement, and

as in

one simple reflex causes

end of the performance of one

the performance

many

combined here with a

Either

of others in a fixed way.

"

the

soon as one of them has

earthworm the end of

the-

contraction of one segment always causes the next one to

move.

And

it

may happen

are dissimilar in organisation

that parts of an animal which

may

also appear as the single

constituents of a metachronic chain-reflex.


to J.

Loeb

that

much

of our

knowledge of

It is especially
"

"

chain-reflexes

both Uexkuell and Jennings are constantly at literary warfare with one
another. But it seems to me that this is owing to a mutual misunderstanding.
In any case von Uexkuell does not operate with the old concept of
reflex
his important discrimination between two elemental functions
exclusively
of muscles and motor nerves ordinary contraction and "Sperrung"
would
"

"

by

itself suffice to

show

that.

Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Comparative Psychology,


York, 1900.
1

New

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

30

Of course these simple

due.

is

phenomena would be

perfectly intelligible on the machine-theory.

common

Unfortunately they are not so


others thought
first

motions,

them

The next

to be.

as

class of

Loeb and
combined

by von Uexkuell, already

established

forces

us to introduce some other elemental nervous phenomena

mere stimulation and nervous conduction.

besides
is

type

seen in the progressive movements of

animals, but also, as

shown by Sherrington, 1

ments of vertebrates, so
cord

expressed

by the

move

depend on the spinal


scheme of the class is

simple

that every motor

fact,

lower

far as they

The most

only.

many

in the

This

stimulation

in

not

always relates to those muscles which


contracted but extended, whether passively or

actively.

This scheme of course takes no account of the

"

simple nerve-nets

are

"

stimulation, but simply states that, if the stimulation

given and
its

if

muscles

is

the organisation of an animal with regard to


is

such as

it

the

is,

movement

kind of

is

determined in the very simple manner we have mentioned.


of the rhythmical

movements

in walking are explained


on
the
They depend
antagonistic character
one muscle has just the opposite effect
of certain muscles

Many

in this way.

another, so that,

to

if

the one

contracted, the other is

is

extended

the latter therefore receives the stimulation and

contracts

then the other extends,

contracts, and so

ing on

Ergebnisse d. Physiol.
New York, 1906.

System,

difficulty in

a purely mechanical hypothesis

combined movements,
1

therefore stimulated,

on.

Of course there would be no


of

is

4,

1905

in

which
The

simple class
one elemental

this

only

Integrati/oe

understand

Action of the Nervous

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

31

nervous function, besides mere conduction, seems to be at


work.
But, unfortunately again, the simple scheme fails us, as

soon as the limits of mere typical progressive motions are

The sea-urchin,

transgressed.

follows our law

when simply

different happens as soon as

turn over into

to

elemental

for

its

functions,

instance, very properly

walking, but something very


it is

put on

normal position
to

relating

back and has

all

sorts

of

new

the

single motor constituents

different

its

dependence of the
on one another, are

playing their part here, just as circumstances require, and


the stating of a simple formula becomes an impossibility.

The same holds

for the

turning over of the

starfish,

in

which the successful movements of some of the arms stop


the

movement

of the others, and, indeed,

say, that almost any

deserving the

name

movement

"

abnormal,"

we properly can

of an animal, in

any way
shows a particular type of

motor combination.

The

"
"

righting reactions

of

the starfish

and certain

other points of interest form the subject of a recent very

important memoir by Jennings (Univ. Californ. Pull. Zool.

Jennings fully confirms the older results


published by Preyer, and adds a good number of new
Let me mention only a few topics.
results.
Asterias was
4,

1907,

p. 53).

found to avoid obstacles whilst creeping to a certain place


in a known environment, but to
explore
every object
"

"

in

new

a great

surroundings.

many

movement

The

"

righting reaction

very different types.

of each single

arm

"

may show

In each case the initial

determined separately by
external stimuli or internal conditions, but as soon as the least
result with regard to righting

is

is

reached a

"

"

unified impulse

32

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

appears

co-ordination

where incoordination had

in

sets

by no means can every single motor act now


be related to a single stimulus, as was the case at the
on the contrary,
very beginning of the process
single
been, and

"

"

now

stimuli

say that

The

"

cease to have any influence at all

animal

the

not

is

by anything.
be based upon a great many

"

unified impulse

different

arms.

It

is

very

reactions

righting

may

constellations

of

we may

"distracted"

movement

initial

to

important
are not referable

position of the animal as such

of the single

well

notice

the

to

the

that
"

normal

"

this hypothesis is refuted

by the fact that during the unified period of the reaction


the single arms very often perform movements by which

they come into

"

abnormal

are indifferent for their

"

positions themselves, or

own

righting

which

everything occurs in

the service of the whole.


It

is

capable

Jennings

true,

of

good

"

therefore

"

experience

movements
chapter.

has shown

deal

of

what

that
is

the

starfish

popularly

the righting reaction and

is

called

other

of this animal do not properly belong to this

But

it

devoting a few

seems

to

me

that

it

was well worth

words to the discoveries of Preyer and

movements of the starfish


Jennings
In
have often been looked upon as enormously simple.
any case the reactions of the starfish are not reflexes,"
at this place, as the

"

but are in the highest degree what on a later occasion


individualised movements."
will be called
]

"

In

Vertebrates

also

almost

all

of

the

"

"

reflexes

1
I am very glad to see that Jennings himself insists upon the unity of
the phenomena observed. He even concedes that my entelechy would explain
this unity, though he declines to see here a true
In this
explanation."
"

respect I hope that Part II. of Section

will convince him.

33

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

dependent on the spinal cord are not reflexes in the old


sense of the word, but are motor reactions determined

by the stimulus and by

and that

that has happened

all

happening in other parts of the moving body, nay,


even by the contingency of the actual general arrange
ment of the motor organs at a given moment (Sherrington).
The
we are told, store and bind and stop
centres,"

is

"

and

stimulations,

them

set

But the word

so on.

anatomical

hypothetic

supposed

at

free

the

centre

places,

where these processes

Nothing whatever

to occur.

and

name here

only a

is

time,

right

"
"

is

for

are

explained by the

use of this ambiguous word.

And now

what

And
is

is

is

"

called

What

work.
facts

position.

known under

the

name

am
of

the last and highest group of combined

what

action,"

shall

combined

of

complexity in style than a simple

normal

the

generally

other instances

still

far greater

turning over into


of

are

there

motions of a

we say

in

which

thinking

"

instinct."

movements
"

"

is

experience

at

in the face of all these natural

I regret that I

am

unable to give here an accurate and

minute analysis of all possible sorts of co-ordinated move


but it seems to me that some special characters
ments
;

at

of

least

the

most typical of the higher

combined animal motions ought


consideration.
of

the

real

It

may

classes

of

to be subjected to a closer

lead at least to a clear conception

motor physiology, and perhaps


that.
In the next chapters
form
of
instinct
and the typical
typical

problems of

even to somewhat more than


therefore

action

the

will be

analysed completely.

as sharply as possible,

shall try

what problems may appear

to

fix,

in these
3

34

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

two groups of organic movements, and what solutions may


Other kinds of complicated movements, which
be given.
are neither instincts nor actions proper, will form a sort
of appendix

to

mental groups.

one or the other of the two great funda

2.

We

know from our


concerned in

processes

nervous conduction, but

again of the old

proved

be

word

due,

are

not only

may

also consist in facts of different

"

centre

and,

"

authors

make use

to

in a purely physiological

meaning of

word had

this

dubious value for physiological


to von Uexkuell that the most thorough

analysis of organic
is

elemental

of rather

It is

analysis.

the

studies

last

the anatomical

after

to

that

animal movements

have forced modern

kinds which

sense,

INSTINCT

in

movements

order

to

into their simple

the

express

components

true logical value

an analysis, we did not hesitate to compare its


results with those furnished us by the analysis of the
of such

genesis of form.

But

this

comparison

saw that form evidently was the


the arrangement of certain elements, and that

portant consequence.
result
all

of

now has another and very im

We

genesis of form could be reduced to the constellation

of certain

factors concerned in

it

but neither was form

a mere sum of those elements nor was


of a

mere sum

of these factors.

about a totality being a mere

by demonstrating
form as well as

for

the elements
for

Nothing

sum
it

movements.
35

its origin

the result

at all is

or not

proved

a mere

consists of:

sum

this holds

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

36

we cannot study here minutely all the


movement which occur in the
For many of them, it is true, we are
animal kingdom.
able to imagine a machine that would represent how

As we

said,

varieties of combinations of

they take place


it

for

for granted that a

it is

machine actually

exists here,

though

not by any means proved.

But

are there not cases of combination of movements,

most familiar
clear

the sake of simplicity let us take

from the

which

is

it

by no means

beginning that a machine even could be

their

present as

of you, for

to all

foundation

Are there not

few classes of animal movements

at

least

which common sense

daily describes by words which seem to express anything


but the conviction that they are simple, mechanical, and

machine-like events
Itistinct

and

it

is

is

one of these classes of animal movements,

with

instinct

that

our

analytical

study will

have to deal in this chapter.

a.

The problem

INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS
used to be one of the chief

of instinct

points in the fight between Darwinians and Lamarckians.

As we cannot accept either of these theories, it


that we shall not study instinct from the usual
of view.
instincts

It

of

may
the

suffice

to

worker-bees,

would never

state

here

which

follows

points

that the specific

are

excluded

from

open to any Lamarckian


explanation, as Weismann has most clearly demonstrated
and on the other hand, every Darwinian explanation fails
propagation,

be

here for the

same general reasons

for

which

it

fails

in

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

37

every explanation of combinations that are typical units.


We do not know what the history of instincts is, nor
"

"

do we know the factors concerned in their history.


Let
us rather try to discover a little about what factors are
concerned in instinctive movements as they actually come
before us every day.

At

problem appears, round which

this point a second

We

discussion centres nowadays.

a limine

this

problem

required for declining

on an epistemological

but a certain justification

also,

it,

shall be forced to decline

and as

this justification is

which

basis,

is

the next, a short excursion into philosophy

Are
this is

instincts

conscious

the question that

And

present day.

"

or

"

is

unconscious

necessary.
"

scious

and

"

movements

always being discussed at the

is

yet this problem cannot be a scientific

or philosophical problem, at least not if the


"

to rest

of first-rate importance

animal movements in this chapter and

for all our studies of

"

is

consciousness

"

are

to

signify

words

"

what

con

they

Let us proceed most rigorously with regard to

usually do.
this point.

As

ments of bodies
the terms
to that

we study animal movements as move


in Nature, and we can do no more.
But

naturalists

"

conscious

part

of the

"

and

"

consciousness

Given which we

"

call

do not belong
Nature
they
;

belong to the Ego, to my Ego, and to my Ego exclusively.


It is not even possible to express with clearness what is
"

"

meant by saying that there


being in Nature.

We

"
"

is

consciousness

are faced here

in

any

by a pseudo-problem

of the purest type.

Other physiologists also have denied the possibility of


"

discovering

consciousness

"

or

"

unconsciousness

"

in the

38

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


But

almost always was in a practical


We under
sense that they spoke of such an impossibility.
There may be feelings
stand it in an epistemological sense.

motions of animals.

quite

unknown

to us,

would be better not


"

of

"

being

it

such authors have said

Nature

in

feelings

relates to bodily

Being

"

sense of

"

being

which

science, in the sense of


It is true

an

advanced

enlarged

it,

philosophical

and

consciousness."

Ego."

"

"

being
;

all

may

be enlarged by

we

ourselves

have

do so further on by introducing
But even such potentialities if
being."

shall
"

natural

as

"

my

being given to

science

the

in that

the only starting-point of

is

the concept of

potentialities as

conceived

"

it

meaningless altogether.

movements and changes,

"
"

is

therefore

But we say

to speak about feelings.

"

or

agents

The word

"

would never be

factors

conscious

"

belongs to intro

spective psychology exclusively.

@.

THE ACTUAL PROBLEM.

But what about


our legitimate and

instincts

How

we

are

to formulate

It seems to me
problem ?
doubt how we are to formulate

scientific

that there can be but


it.

DEFINITIONS

little

Are those animal movements, commonly

called instincts,

such that they might be founded on a machine, a physicochemical manifoldness in space, embracing only physicochemical elemental factors, or are there some features in
instincts

which forbid us

to

machine even hypothetically


Let us

first

assume the existence of such a


?

try to give a purely verbal definition of the

instinctive motions in question.


difficult to find

an under limit of

It will prove to be rather


instinct,

though

it is

easy

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
to find

39

All instincts are separated from the

an upper one.

next higher group of motion, which we propose to call


in the widest sense of the word, by being com
actions
"

"

plete in their specificity from the very first time they occur.

be some improvement in consequence of their


being repeated, but this improvement never affects their
Perhaps it will be more correct to say
specificity as such.

There

that

may

we

shall not apply the

movement

"

term

"

instinct

to

any animal

that shows an improvement with regard to its

specificity.

Instincts are often said to be

We

to their performer.

"

"

purposeful

with regard

prefer to say, at present, that they

possess some regulative character

that they tend to

"

nor

"

with regard to the whole life of the organism which


Here the limit between instincts and
performs them.
mality

other classes of motions

almost

all typically

is

not always very clearly marked

combined motions, be they pure chainmore complicated type, are alike in

reflexes or be they of a

possessing a regulative character.

And

draw a sharp boundary

one has renounced the

question

of

"

here,

consciousness

if

it

is

"

as

illegitimate.

impossible to

In

fact,

all

single nervous acts concerned in


movements, just as are real chain-reflexes and many other

instincts

are

chains

combined motions

it

of

is

only the degree of chaining that

comes into account.

But what
connexion

is

the meaning of the word

Does

plication of the

it

"

"

degree

in this

apply only to different states of com


It is here
?

same invariable general type

that our analytical problems begin.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

40

THE WORK OF

7.

1890

to about

Up

sively from the

consciousness."

the inadequacy of both these methods, and to

see

Unfortunately in

doing

him the prototype


all

as being of the

clear physiological basis.

Loeb was influenced by the


The single reflex was

of all elemental factors concerned in

complex or chain movements were regarded


most simple additive kind, even the compli

cations afterwards

unknown.

so

its

dogmatism of his time.

materialistic

movement,

Jacques Loeb was the

"

put the problem of instinct on

to

were studied almost exclu

historical point of view, or with regard to

their relation to
first to

instincts

LOEB

J.

by von Uexkuell were then


was possible for Loeb to regard in

discussed

Hence

it

stincts also as nothing but chain-reflexes

tive type.

One

of

the mere addi

of the elementary processes composing the

was regarded as being the cause of the next one,


The general state of the organism was not
neglected in this analysis, and it was well known to Loeb

instinct

and so

on.

chain -reflexes
different
young animals may show
from those shown by the adult, and that a well-nourished
"

that

"

from a hungry animal but


the different physiological state of the animal in these cases
was a priori regarded as being a mere point of its organisa
animal

may

react

differently

tion in the widest sense,

and nervous conduction remained

the only physiological element taken as proved


called

"

"

inhibition

was not regarded

even

so-

as a nervous function

sui generis.

Thus pseudo-psychological problems yielded

to

problems

of mechanical dogmatism in the physiology of instincts.

But

in spite of that, one point of great importance

was

41

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
gained by the work of Loeb, and

it

is

from

this point that

a purely analytical treatment of the theory of instincts must


resolving all instincts into chain-reflexes that as

By

start.

a whole were of the well-known character of

taxis,"

had stated a very important problem


science in the future will have

implicitly
of a fact

whether there

8.

"

any such

is

in the
to

Loeb
form
out

find

fact.

THE PROBLEM OF THE STIMULI OF INSTINCTS

If indeed all instincts are of the type of very simple

co-ordinated motions, whether that be the most simple and


in short,
merely additive type or any more complicated one
instincts as a whole are of the character of a
taxis,"
"

if all
it

follows that

it

only can be the simple and elemental

agents in Nature which can act as stimuli to instincts.


stimuli of instinctive

movements may be

The

light of different

wave-lengths, or heat, or moisture, or chemical compounds,


but

tliey

It

never are specific typical bodies.

will soon

appear

how important

this statement

If only simple stimuli are concerned in instinctive


relation

between the medium and the instinct

may

life,

is.

the

easily be

explained on the analogy of a machine, at least in principle.

But what

are

we

to

say

if

"

"

individualised

movements

instinctive

Let us

what

is

stimuli, as

typical complicated stimuli,

we

shall call them, also

if

awaken

try to show, by the aid of a simple instance,


meant by our two contrasted classes of stimuli
first

Lloyd Morgan performed a series of very fine experiments


show whether chickens, just hatched from the

in order to

Habit and

Instinct,

London, 1896.

42

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


bodies forming their food or not.

egg, react to the specific

Putting them in front of a dish which contained peas and


other small bodies of the most different kinds mixed together,

he saw them pick up these little bodies most accurately.


But they took all kinds of them, and experience alone taught

them

to discriminate

On

between what was food and what was

had often been pointed out that


young poultry had an instinctive fear of the hawk and the
hawk s cry. Lloyd Morgan showed that young poultry are
not.

the other hand,

it

frightened by any large body in motion and by any very


shrill

things

Thus these

sound.

fine

experiments teach us two

they teach us what simple and what individualised

stimuli are, and that, as far as experimentally ascertained,

only simple stimuli are the external stimuli of instincts.


Indeed,

all

of experimental
to

which have been the subject


hitherto have proved to be due

cases of instincts

work

The

simple external stimuli exclusively.

antipathy between dog and cat


of chemical compounds, of a

is

instinctive

probably also the effect

"

smell,"

if

we

choose to speak

a little less accurately, and not of an individualised stimulus,

not of the cat or the dog as being seen."


But the experiments about this important question are
"

not at

all

numerous, and

it

can by no means be categorically

asserted that instincts, in the true sense of the word, are

never called forth

would be called a

by a stimulus

by a

body which psychologically


one, or, speaking more generally,

specific
"

"

seen

of the individualised type.

1
Elise Hanel (Zeitschr. f. allg. Physiol. iv. 1904) has shown, following
the line of certain experiments of Ch. Darwin, that the earthworm reacts
leaves or pieces of paper, always trying to
specifically to the specific form of
draw them into its tube-like cave by their most pointed edge the earthworm,
;

in fact, can be stimulated

by

a typical sequence of different singularities,

43

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

Now
of a

very important to notice that, if an actual case

it is

stimulus of an instinct should

individualised

specific

become known, the limits of the possibility of a mechanical

They would be exceeded, and


factor would be at work, because

explanation would be exceeded.

an autonomic or

vitalistic

could by no means be understood how the


combined or individualised stimulus could be

it

specifically

"

"

the organism in such a

and fixed

way

as to

received

become the cause

by

of a

motions in the organism.


Sup
posing that any organism were specifically affected in its

specific

series of

movements by the mere sight of any other


organism, say of the same species but of the other

instinctive

typical
1

sex,

and that

this affection

were the same, whether the

organism which forms the stimulus were seen from before


or from behind, or from the side and at any angle whatever

what would follow from such a

fact

machine could

only be fitted to receive the specific complicated stimulus


in a few typical positions, but

imaginable

if

an

infinite variety of aspects

invariable instinctive effect

We may

how could a machine be

stop our

had the same

discussion at this

point, as a very

which are only

relatively determined, and its reaction is perfect for the very


New researches are required to clear up the
time, that is, instinctive.
facts that come into account here.

first

Chickens are well known to peck their peas or corn with a right calcula
tion concerning the dimension of depth the very first time they do peck.
Speaking psychologically the right idea of space is innate in them not only
a priori," in the sense of Kant, but strictly "before" all experience in the
:

"

before."
temporal sense of the word
Are these facts of use in our present problem ?
1
As regards sexuality the existence of "individualised"
"

instincts seems indeed highly probable.

stimuli

of

Male moths deprived of their wings


Zool. 3, 1906) not to be admitted to

were found by Mayer-Soule (Journ. exp.


but only if the females were not deprived of

copulation by the females


their sight
!

44

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

meet us

similar problem will

in our analysis of action,

and

be fully discussed on that occasion.


Moreover, the
whole of our present analysis rests on a problematic basis
will

for nothing is

known

at present with absolute certainty about

But

individualised stimuli of instinctive motions.

seems

it

to nie highly probable

that future investigation will dis

cover such cases, and

the

present discussion

written

is

particularly in order to encourage research in this direction.

Bees and ants especially, but vertebrates too, it seems to


me, would have to be studied with respect to the question
whether there are cases in which specific complicated bodies
that are
If

"

we

language

seen

"

may

like to give

be the stimuli of real instincts.

up

for a

moment our

strictly scientific

and allow ourselves the use of the common

pseudo-psychological terminology,

we may say

that

all

cases

work would require


the assumption of a something that would be nearly related
to the
innate ideas
refuted by Locke in another sense.
which individualised stimuli were

in

"

"

Physiologists
"

philosophie

at

of

the

school of the

old

German

"

Natur-

often have spoken of a sort of dreaming as

being the foundation of instinctive

life.

It

would be

this

dreaming that we should meet here, and the only


difference between the old investigators and ourselves would
be one of terminology we should not speak of dreaming or
sort of

of innate ideas, but, as naturalists arguing from the stand

point of critical idealism,

we should say

that an autonomic,

former publication (Die,


1 distinguished two classes
Seele")
ones ( frei-combiniert
the fixed and the
freely combined
the word "reflex" being used in a wider sense than in the present book.
All
reflexes, it seems to me, might present quite the same
freely combined
1

In

"

"

of

"

"reflexes,"

"

"

")

"

set of analytical problems as true instincts do, in every respect


provided
they are not simple forms of "acting," as indeed the righting reactions of the
starfish are (see page 31 f.).

45

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

an entelechian natural factor was found to be at work


in instinctive

life,

as far

as

the

reception of

stimuli

is

concerned.

6.

THE PROBLEM OF THE REGULABILITY OF INSTINCTS

Our mention

of the old physiologists

may

serve us as a

stepping-stone to the analysis of the second chief

problem

Here

also the

which instincts

offer to theoretical

biology.

main point must remain problematic,

as facts are too scanty

But here also the


present for a definite statement.
to
serve
of
give an impulse to
possibilities may
analysis

at

future research.

The old

physiologists, such as Treviranus

and Johannes

compared morphogenesis with instinctive life,


Schopenhauer that the most thorough comparison

Miiller, often

and

it is

to

between the phenomena of instinctive movements and emInstincts are regarded by this
is due.
some way the continuation of morphogenesis,
as growing upon the same ground, as governed by the
same reason, viz. the vital principle.

bryological processes

school as being in

As we have

said already,

whether such a view

is

we do not know

fully

legitimate

investigation will determine that.

or

at present

not

further

But we can make use of

the comparison between morphogenesis and instinct

to raise

another question, besides the problem of the nature of the


instinctive stimuli, the answer to which may one day enable
us either to admit the autonomic nature of instincts or to

deny

it.

Certainly instincts are comparable with morphogenetic

phenomena

for the simple

and descriptive reason that they

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

46

occur completely and purposefully the very first time they


Might not there be another point
go on in the individual.

Morphogenetic processes, as we know, are


to be regulated on the largest scale
disturbances of

of similarity
liable

the organisation or of the morphogenetic process itself are

followed by atypical processes leading again to the typical


result.

instincts

Are

there

true

any

regulations

known among

Regulations in instincts, of course, would hardly be ac


cessible to observation if there were not any visible effects of
the instinctive activity

Regulation occurs, in

but that does not happen very often.

fact, in all cases of so-called

or artistic instincts, as

known among

and among

and some other

bees, ants,

birds,

technical

among

insects.

spiders

The

in

stinctive activity of these animals ends in a certain specific


state of the

medium.

nest or a bee

bird for

Let us disturb the state, say of a


us change the material offered to a

hive, let

its nest,

and

let

us see what will happen.

Unfortunately not a single experiment except one has


been carried out with the special purpose of determining
the kind and degree of regulability of instinctive movements
as such.

Such knowledge

as

we have has been gained almost

entirely in the field of so-called natural history,

and without

a full analytical discussion.


It is important to notice once

that

we

at the very beginning,

are not dealing here with the possibility of a

fication of instinctive life

question

more

is

this

Are

modifications in the

by

so-called

"experience."

modi

Our

instinctive acts liable to regulative

same manner, complete and purposeful

from the beginning, as are embryological processes ?


Bees are known to repair the cells of their honeycomb

47

OKGANIC MOVEMENTS
after disturbances

they, moreover,

may change

the style of

and they
may build their house in an abnormal direction with

building them, to suit the requirements of space,


also

respect to gravity, should circumstances require


of building from above to below, they

below to
to

form

above, and
its

web

also sideways.

of silk

ing tulle, and some

if it is

if

instead

from

also build

may

The silkworm

is

said not

cultivated in a box contain

species of bees

tunnels do not do so

it

which normally construct

they find one ready

made

in the

ground, they then only perform their second instinctive act


separating the tunnel into single cells.

In

these cases, except the one relating to gravity,

all of

the state of affairs seems to be the following.

been changed from without


the

full

is

is,

some

it is

somewhere

what might be

in this sequence,

the artificial change of the second class

again be of two kinds

either something

may

away from what the animal had accomplished


be added to the result of

may

something

thing, of course, that

construction.
instinctive

In

more,

all

would occur

it

parts of its

parts are added to

its

what can

it

already, or

activity,

in the process of

to

some

normal

the actual state of matters, no

has to do more or less than normally


own construction are taken away, less,

if

it artificially.

There can be no doubt that the term


justified in these

may

be taken

these cases the animal will adjust its

movements

matter whether
if

has

state in the sequence that leads to the perfect

And

result.

What

either the perfect result of

sequence of instinctive acts, or

called an embryological state

that

cases.

What

"

"

regulation

is

then does this mean, and

teach us as to our question about the autonomic

character of instincts

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

48

Of

course, the actual state of affairs, artificially modified

from what had been performed by the organism, must be


transmitted in some
future behaviour

seems
of

to

this

me

the latter, in order that

to

way

its

correspond to this actual state.

may

It

from the possible or probable nature


transmission that an analytical discussion of our
that

problem must
all sorts of

it is

The

start.

instinctive motions concerned in

constructions form a consecutive chain of single

performances, which normally seem to be called forth one

by the other, but which, as experiments show, may also


be called forth independently.
So we again meet the
problematic question as to the
the

"

"

calling forth

of instinctive

Normally the
whole sequence of a constructive instinct may go on as
The elemental act a results in the state of construc
follows.
motions,

tion

as

to

instinctive

the next state of construction

instinctive process b
finished, but

stimulus.

it

also

may

is

B B
;

is

due

an

to

be set going only because a

is

be called forth by the existence of

may

The mere
something very different.
fact of regulation, as we have described it, seems to show
that the second alternative meets the case
that it is the
t

which, of course,

is

existence of A, the constructive result of the


instinctive act, that

is

the regulation b goes

the stimulus of

I,

for in the case of

on without a or after

already once taken place

without

a, if

elemental

first

itself

has

the result of the in

was changed by the adding, and after a previous


was changed by the removing of anything.
It is
here that we meet the problem of how the state of A as such
stinctive act
b, if it

may
what

be transmitted to the organism in order to determine


is

problem

to go on,

of

the

and

nature

it

is

clear that this

of the

stimulus

is

precisely the

calling

forth

b,

49

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
an

as

regarded
stimulus

simple

specifically

instinctive

independent
or

is

it

individualised,

combined of elements

phase.

Is

that

to

is

this

say,

It is not very pleasant to be again obliged to leave our

question unsolved, but nothing has been done in an exact

manner towards answering


if

It

it.

only typically combined or

"

may

seem, of course, as

individualised

"

stimuli could

suffice to explain the modification of the instinctive acts in

exact correspondence

with what

is

required

but this

is

only probable, nothing more.


I once

more

feel obliged to

say that the evidence of the

mere fact of regulation among instincts is very scanty at


Indeed even what we have mentioned about
present.
observations of this kind
to

ought

and

be,

is

hardly as well established as

it

freely confess that I have treated so-

"

here as if they were a little better established


than they probably are, simply in order to get a basis for
our analytical discussion.
It remains, however, a mere
called

"

facts

For not one of the observations

discussion of possibilities.

which we have mentioned, regarding the regulability of


instincts, has been made with the special purpose of
studying that particular point.

Let us shortly mention the only experimental case in


which our problem has been studied with full and careful
attention.

The entomologist Ch.

F. Schroeder,

in studying

the behaviour of certain caterpillars by the aid of experi


ments, has found that these animals are able to adapt their

most accurately to the real state


so far; he not only saw them

instinctive acts of spinning

of

the

product

formed

repairing their weaving, after it


1

Verhandl. d.

had been disturbed inten-

zool. Ges.

1903, p. 158.

50

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

but his caterpillars also formed typical tissues by


using leaves of abnormal forms intentionally prepared, or by
using leaves of plants that are not normally employed.

tionally,

It is to be

hoped that future research will follow in


the track of the one last mentioned, that is to say, that
entomologists will observe the behaviour of their insects

with the

full

appreciation of the bearing of the study upon

the problems of theoretical biology, and not only in the


interests of natural science proper.

CONCLUSION

f.

we may

Here, then,

movements.

autonomy

has

It

in

the

absolute proofs

close our discussion of instinctive

yielded

some indications

instinctive

of

field

for

life,

of

vital

but no

real,

the facts are too scanty at present to

allow any definite answer to the chief problems appearing


in this field, viz. the

problem of the nature of the stimuli

and of the regulability of

instincts, the latter

reducible to the former.

problem being
both these

It is probable that

problems will be answered some day in favour of vitalism,


that, as matters stand, no machine can in fact be imagined
capable of accounting for what happens.

Such a
1

result

Once more

I call

would not be in
attention to the

conflict

"turning

with the analytical

over"

of

animals when put

into an abnormal position, though we are not accustomed to speak of instincts


No doubt the process of turning in
proper in these cases (see page 31 f. ).
its single phases is exclusively made up of "regulations."
Are they of such
a type that the "whole of the actual abnormal state enters in some way, or
are they mere sums of single acts, purposeful only on account of their per
"

former s general organisation ? Certain experiments of Preyer s seem to me to


deserve more attention with regard to our question than they have generally
received

(Mitt.

zool.

Station

Neapel,

Behaviour of the Lower Organisms).

vii.,

1886.

See

also

Jennings,

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

51

scheme of the co-ordination of organic movements as set


The elemental physiological factors
forth by von Uexkuell.
of this
instincts

scheme would be found


;

"
"

be

at

work

also

in

but there would be something else also at work,

something that
of this scheme.
a

to

may

be said to make use of the factors

3.

PRELIMINARIES

a.

THE way

ACTION

generally taken by science

is

from the simple to

the complicated phenomena, and therefore

when turning

to

the analysis of those organic movements which are called

we might probably be expected to follow this


But we shall not do
ordinary and well-established route.
and
we have good reasons for so choosing our path.
so,
"

actions,"

might seem most natural, after having discussed the


main points of the theory of reflexes and instincts, to
It

proceed to analyse

first

the most simple cases of what might

action,"
and, after
any reason whatever be called
surveying the whole series of animal organisms, to end by
But there is one special
analysing the action of man.
"

for

point

which

materials far

renders

arrangement of
more suitable and convenient. On account
different

totally

of a very strange feature, which, in spite of its strangeness

may

be

theoretical

action

the

pronounced

with

we

biology,

those

most

prefer

cases

to

where

universally

begin
action

known

in

our analysis of
is

of

the

most

complicated nature, and only to add certain remarks about


its

simpler forms

at

analysing naturalist

is

the very end.

The

reasoning

an acting organism himself


52

and

that

is

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

known

the strange though universally

53

fact

One

of.

spoken

of our final chapters will try to deal with the most central

problem, both of philosophy and of biology proper, that is


at present we make use of it in
established by this fact
;

In observing the actions of

a purely practical

manner.

animals and men,

many more

men

us in the

than in the animals, because we understand

the former and not the

not our aim,

by

is

latter.

Psychology thus, though

becoming our means of investigation.

action

into

ultimate

its

could analyse the actions of

even see everything that there

No
By no means,

able to

We

elements.

any animal so

Only

we

the aid of a truly objective psychology are

analyse

to

differences are revealed to

far

never

we do not

to analyse in them.

is

Pseudo-psychology

we

of course, do

intend by our appeal

psychology to introduce that sort of pseudo-psychology

which we excluded from natural science when we were


studying instincts.

All acting organisms, including acting

men, are to us simply natural


they

are

bodies in

immediately presented

analysis in its progress

may

to

These agents

us

as

such,

at least

though

introduce natural agents which

would represent not motion only but

movement.

motion

also the possibility of

would by
no means be psychological in the introspective sense
the
only sense which the word psychological may legitimately
or factors, however,

"

"

possess.

Our time
explicitly

is

upon

you always

to

limited,

and therefore I cannot

this methodological

remember that

in

point

insist

but let

more

me

what follows we

beg

shall

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

54

deal only with such


called organisms,

phenomena

and that

as occur on bodies in nature,

will be our purpose to discover

it

the laws according to which the motions of these bodies

We may

end in vitalism again in this chapter


but certainly we shall not end in pseudo-psychology.
occur.

General Definition of Action.


Classes of Movements
which are not Actions

few remarks about the most general definition of


action, in both a positive and a negative form, seern
desirable

An
for

its

by way of preliminary.
"

"

action

is

specificity

every animal movement which depends

on

the

individual

manner that

performer in such a

life

of

history

this specificity

its

depends

not only, as will be seen later on, on the specificity of the


actual stimulus but also on the specificity of all stimuli in

the past, and on their

effect.

No

animal movement

be called an action in which this criterion


at least in a certain degree.

more

presently

introduce

this short

survey the word

There
the

is

final

organs,

i.e.

suitable

name

for

"
<c

may

experience

elemental

it

did the

"

functional

We

experience."

process

shall

but in

it,

be used.

when

"

action,"

in

motor

the

the process of contraction, goes on better the

second or third than


"

not present

is

"

no experience, and therefore no

physiological

to

In the language of subjective

this criterion is called

psychology

is

adaptation

of the

first

time

we speak

nervous system

Functional adaptation of the muscles as such


to the present discussion.

phenomenon, not belonging

is,

in

of course,

of

this

another

55

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
Nor

case.

muscular

"

is

there

"

the

in

action

of

case

so-called

"

fatigue."

But both these phenomena, especially functional adapta


tion, that is, an improvement of functioning by functioning
be combined with real acting, and, indeed, there
one group of facts in which this combination is very

may

itself,

is

You

important.

all

know

the process which

called the mechanisation of acting

a good instance of
is

we

it,

an example.

also

see

control of consciousness

when

this control

It

later

commonly

the piano-player offers

but any one going down a staircase


Popular psychology says that here
motions,

complicated

is

on.

which,

under

though

learned, are freed from

first

would be more correct

to say

that one and the same action-effect, repeated very


times,

may combine with

unknown

functional

character

of

process of

what

exclude

from our studies later

some

way

as to

reflex.

typical

many

of

adaptation

part of the nervous system in such a

acquire almost the

the

This

by no means identical
with the process of acting as such, and we have devoted
these few words to it in this place in order that we may
it

"

is

Moreover, we
if

called

"

exercise

is

on.

are not entitled to speak of an

"action,"

one and the same stimulus has different motor

effects

according to the variation of certain physiological conditions

which

are

not

concerned

in

the specificity of anything

Such cases are well known among lower animals,


and in dealing with the directive motions and with the

motorial.

we have already mentioned


a few instances in which changes in temperature or salinity,

recent discoveries of Jennings

or in the degree of hunger, also change the sense of response


to

external stimuli.

In such cases there

is

nothing like

56

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

an individual history of the performer, certainly nothing


like

history with

regard to the particular stimulus then

at work.

But then

elements of this sort are entirely

historical

of phenomena, where at first


seem
that they were present.
might possibly
glance
Let us begin with an instance discovered by Jennings
in studying the Protozoon Stentor, and already shortly

absent

another

in

group

it

mentioned

To

above.

stimulus Stentor

and the

one

same

reacted by a simple

first

mechanical

turning aside,

but this reaction did not bring it out of reach of the


stimulus; it then reversed the direction of its ciliary

movement, and

after

that contracted

itself

into its tube,

but without success; the stimulus, a falling of powder,


continued

then,

finally,

the

Stentor

swam

We

away.

here see three or more different reactions following each


other in correspondence

to

We may

one stimulus.

say,

perhaps, that the following reactions occurred because the

one was not successful, and certainly there is some


thing of an individual historical element in this behaviour

first

but, in spite of that,

we should

prefer not to speak of an

action.

It is one series of events that occurs here, not

one

reaction

at

one time and another reaction, modified

by

experience, at

another

there

"

"

is

trial

perhaps, but no

"

experience."

But there

"

is

experience,"

and therefore

action,

though

The same holds for the movements of Ophiurids, according to von


Uexkuell and Glaser (Journ, exp. ZnoL 4, 1907). There is a great variety
of reactions, but no "experience."
Preyer was right in his description of
But in Asterids there exists experience,"
facts, but not in his interpretation.
1

"

besides a great -variability of reactiDg (see the recent


cited on page 31).

memoir

of Jennings

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
most primordial form, when

in its

5*7

Stentor, the

experiment

after a short time, reacts

with the powder being repeated


from the very beginning with its fourth kind of reaction
with the

instead of

This example, besides

one.

first

its

excluding a whole group of motor phenomena from our


future discussion, may well serve at the same time to
illustrate provisionally

by

"

what

really will be called

"

action

ourselves.

The Distribution of Acting


True actions, though, as will be stated later on, of a less
high degree of complication than actions in man, are most

kingdom
in

in

exhibited

clearly

in

all,

and

ants,

bees,

the

following

classes

animal

the

of

even in the lowest classes of vertebrates,

some

beetles,

in

crabs, cuttle-fishes,

Actinia, and some Protozoa.

be kept well in mind in all


All
investigations about so-called animal
intelligence."
organisms, of course, can acquire
experience
only about

One point has always

to

"

"

"

what

in other terms,
experienced
by them
about that which stimulates them to motor reactions.
it

is

"

"

is

clear, that it

organisms what

"

medium

"

which they are

of

accessible.

How,

sum
for

one reason that so

acting

Protozoa.

little

is

There are

common

they possess

of the factors to

instance,

could

we

upon organisms possess

ing no organ like the eye or the ear

in

to use the

our argument

only be the

will

expect individualised stimuli to act

this

Now

always must remain doubtful in lower

sort of sense organs

expression at this stage


their

only

exactly

many

Perhaps

it

is

known about

for
real

observations about

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

58

them

those

seem

which

about their hunting, for instance

to prove that a rather high degree of experience

exist in infusoria

correct

perhaps

but

who can

able to give

feel

answer about the stimuli

which are able

of

any

may

fairly

a chemical nature

minute organisms ?
be spheres of experience

to reach such

And, on the other hand, there

may

in the higher classes of the Invertebrates, for instance

which are almost unintelligible to ourselves in a subjective


Bees seem to remember the absolute amount of their
way.

Even if they have been trans


change of place in space.
ported passively, and not on a direct line, they always reach
their hive again.

And

The very important


and

similar facts occur in birds.


facts recently discovered

his followers also belong here, as

they do so in a different way.


not only to phenomena of
generally spoken of as

"

the

sensorial

conscious

by Pawlow

seems to me, though

Association

"

"

it

or

"

may

relate

motor

class,

ones, but to processes

Secretion, on the part of the salivary

of secretion also.

glands, for instance,

may

be called forth by any stimulus

that has ever been contemporary with the original stimulus


of the purely physiological process of secretion in

any way.
few words on the distribution of experience, not in
the animal kingdom, but among the parts of one organism,

close

may

these

preliminaries.

little

more on the

same subject is to follow in another connexion. It has


been shown by the experiments of Goltz, Schrader, and
1
Radl (Biol. Centralblatt, 26, 1906, and other papers) has given a very
good analysis of the behaviour of animals with relation to their orientation
in space.
Part of it is certainly due to sight, to keeping the eye on a fixed
another part is due to the semicircles connected with the ear of
object
a last part, it seems to me, is not
vertebrates, or to other "statical" organs
The behaviour of bees would belong
yet understood at all physiologically.
;

to the last group.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
others that

it is

59

not only the so-called hemispheres of the brain

Frogs and

of vertebrates that are related to experience.

pigeons at least, and probably dogs also,


experience, or

at least

may

make

may

new

acquire

use of older experience,

even after the total extirpation of those hemispheres.


No
doubt there is less experience shown after the extirpation
than before

we

see

it

that

besides

the

experience.

and perhaps

What

but experience

other parts

hemispheres
This holds for

by no means

is

the

of

central

be

also

may

all so-called

Thus

lost.

nervous system
in

relation

to

lower brain centres,

for the spinal cord also.

the real meaning of these facts

to enter minutely into

is,

And now we

reserved for a future discussion.

must

be

also

are prepared

an analysis of the process of acting

itself.

/3.

THE FIRST CRITERION OF ACTING.

THE HISTORICAL

BASIS OF REACTING

The phonograph

is

of which depend on
specificity

a well-known machine the reactions

its

individual history in their utmost

the phonograph

received in the past.

may

Now we

ally that the individual history

give

forth

what

have said already provision


one of the most important

Is for

to

the reactions

With

this question

any way comparable

of a machine such as the phonograph

we may fitly begin our analysis


If we at first consider the

has

is

features concerned in the characteristics of acting.


this reason acting in

it

of the process of

"

action."

acting organism as a whole,

without laying any special stress on what is called its


nervous system or its brain, we may say that the specificity

60

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


on the

of every one of its actions depends

stimuli

to

relating

encountered

it

and on

in the past,

specificity of all

and movement which have

sensation

the specific effects

all

we have already

of those stimuli.

This character

to describe briefly

by saying that acting depends on


of the organism, and

"

"

individual history

describe

it

reacting

by saying that an

technically

"

("

historische Reaktionsbasis

components of which the

"

the

now

shall

historical basis of

is
")

we

tried

one of the chief


is

become convinced,

specificity of

every action

function.

Without any
suppose, that this

historical basis of

the foundations of action,


"

history
"

is

Therefore the technical term


"

definition

requires a precise technical

basis of reacting

historical

it

in the specificity of its reactions

in

form other combined

say, the specificities

which

we

it

It changes, so

specificities.

in search of
"

"

historical

acting

is

specific

meaning
that

specificities, it

is

has

commonly

is

called

we may

specificities,

Here

the historical basis of

only in a most

"

history

it

has the faculty of

the

has encountered into other

what we are

"

specificity of its

forms on the foundation of their elements.

it

find

by the

any way
organism
from the specific combinations received in order

profiting

to

mere verbal

change the specificity of what

history, is not able to

received

the

The phonograph, though determined

states.

expression

mean more than

to

is

being one of

reacting,"

something different from the

of a phonograph.

"

will

you

difficulty
"

general, not in a

have made up the


experience," but the

true,
"

basis of reacting, as a basis of action created historically,


is

not in any

way

specified in

detail,

but consists of the

elements of the experienced specificities.

The second half

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

show us how new

of our analysis of action will have to

combined

may

specificities

61

be formed on the foundation of

the elements of the historically received ones.

But
"

fundamental

second

historical basis of reacting

The phonograph

difference was.

and gives

air

between

difference

of a phonograph

the

and of an

at once be discovered as easily as the first

may

organism

"

off

vibrations

receives vibrations of the

of the

air

other terms,

in

previous stimulus and later reaction are of the same nature.

The organism

receives impressions

on

its

sensory organs

and gives off movements.


"experience,"
the events which have created the
say,

whilst acquiring

That

to

is

organism
of this

s history,

history,

and the events which occur on the

belong to

two absolutely

basis

classes

different

of phenomena.

We
our

"

now must

insist

historical basis/

a certain phrase that

and

more

on the analysis of

fully

shall in

we have used

the

first

place justify

We

in our definition.

have said that actions not only depend on all the stimuli
received in the past but also on the effects of those stimuli.

The

word

that

has

subject in

"stimuli"

affected

the

is

to

any form whatever

embrace the

final

include

sense
;

consequences

interpretation,

be

founded

and

of

organs
the word
of any

that had been caused by any stimulus.


of this explanation

here

now may seem

to

this interpretation

everything
the

acting
"

"

effects

is

to

moving
The second half

previous

want some further

may

advantageously

upon a short discussion of a fundamental

1
There would be a strict analogy between the "historical basis" of a
phonograph and the "historical basis" of action if all human speech were
like reciting a story or a poem learnt "by heart."
But a conversation,
for example, is something very different from this.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

62

problem, very often discussed by philosophical psychologists,


the problem of the so-called origin of the act of volition
the

in

few

It

child.

will

expressions

psychological

be

hardly
in

avoidable

the

following

use

to

analysis,

but we repeat that we use them only for the sake of


brevity, and it would be better could every one of them
for
proper phenomenological correlate
with moving bodies in nature that we are dealing.
its

possess

it

is

Origin of the Acts of Volition

TJic

Movements without any specific regularity,


unknown
by
general causes from without and

called forth

within, are

considered to be the real starting-point of acting in the


child

a supposition that agrees very well with the recent


of

discoveries

The child notes the

Jennings.

every one of those movements and


pleasure

or

meaning

pain

and

afterwards

certain possible

does

not

of course,

to

effects
"

"

desire

as

words

these

and

it

belongs to

in

of its

The

out.

child

out

carries

in

may

widest

the

it

possible effects,

advances,

medium may be the subject


Psychology to make out what

functions are concerned in this

broadest

movements, and others

carry

the age of the

their

and

desires

any change of the medium

far as the

share in bringing

its

taken
"

"

of

effect

relate
as

sense,

of experience.

It

elemental psychical
"

"

desiring

and

"
"

liking

course the rudiments of judging are concerned in

it,

of

and a

would probably reveal that volition, reasoning,


and liking are at work here as a whole, inseparable in fact
It has been
and separated only by analytical science.
fuller analysis

neglected

by some

writers,

but

has

been

most clearly

63

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

Wundt and

emphasised by

a few others, that the doctrine

of the

of the so-called origin

relates

of volition

act

by

no means
such, but only to
the origin of the faculty of accomplishing what had been
to the origin of

Volition

"

willed."

as

just

itself,

as

volition

and judging,

liking

is

one of the unexplainable elemental facts of psychology.


But let us turn back to our proper problem, which
is a problem not of psychology but of natural science.

The discussion

may form
was the
by the

clearly, that

of

and

child,

the

of

part

effects

the genesis of the volitional

of

shown us most

the

this

of the

liking

future

of stimulations themselves.

may

say

that the effects of

own

stimuli on their

of reacting.

basis

random movements that became

the historical basis of his


sorts

effects

historical

it,
"

basis

and in

this

way

might seem

But nevertheless

of acting,

and

to

we

"

"

experienced

the whole analysis of the

"

historical

become more simple and uniform.


worth

is

two

distinction between

sense

account, at least as far as they are

to
it

all

become new

stimuli

a something presented to the organism and

by

into

do

as

In a certain

It

liked

enters

effects

actions, just

motor

has

act

motor stimuli

of

while

to

maintain

different types of historical

study them

the
bases

as they actually occur

in

special cases.

The Different Types of Historical Bases

Acting based upon the experienced final effects of


and
chance,"
previous motor stimuli always starts from
"

it is

ance.

in so-called

"

"

trying

Imagine you

that

it

have got a

gains

its

highest import

new portmanteau without

64

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

knowing how

to

open

You

it.

first

of

sorts

all

try

manipulations familiar to you from your experience about


the effects of moving your hands with regard to opening
other trunks, but no

success

attends

At

"

this

trying."

last by chance you press a certain plain knob, and the


effect."
The second time you
opening of the box is the
will press the knob at once
there is no
any
trying
"

"

"

more, but the


the future.

new

"

"

experience assists you in

The whole process has a great

in

trials

similarity to

what we know already from the analysis of the


actions

in

the child, though,

of course,

differences

first

must

not be overlooked.

to

Experience based upon stimuli alone


all of you than our last instance.

languages and
of

this

no

less familiar

The learning

The

general

scheme

of

this

"

"

historical

experience

of

basis

that

of

cases of imitation are typical instances

all

class.

is

is

reacting

certain

simple

this

you

secondary

type
learn

of

by

phenomenon

always accompanies the primary one which is the proper


motor stimulus of your acting, and you then, in response
to

that secondary or indicating phenomenon, perform the

same action that

at

first

only followed the primary stimulus.

In this way you learn to identify different tramway lines

by the coloured boards

or coloured lights they bear.

All of you know, of course, that


as the psychologists call

it,

of

it

is

"association,"

which we have here given

a rather complicated but not incorrect description.

A
an

and

by

good popular illustration of the difference between


concerned with previous stimuli
historical basis
"

"

effects

the

and one concerned with stimuli alone

two following instances.

If

in

is

strange

given

town

65

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
you want

know

to

the

general

position,

you

often the first time, but

very

will

will

by the

of your

effects

walking.

only

probably go wrong
to

"learn"

go

right

however, you are

"
"

which you

of

reach a certain place,

If,

accompanied the first time by a friend who knows the town


on your way, you
see
and give good heed to what you
"

"

find the place the next time without

may

"

One

most important

of the

of

basis

historical

Association

reacting

error."

"

features,

that

is

its

We

be resolved into their elements.


forget that, in spite

"

any

we

said,

of the

may

specificities

must

not, however,

of this possibility of being resolved,

a certain conservation of the combination of the specificities


received

is

the conditio sine qua non in the process of acting

otherwise there would be


as

you

one
or

know,

speaks

on

dependent
contrast.

Now

of

no

"association."

two

the

contiguity,
all

kinds

association

of

other

by

Psychology,
"

association,"

on

similarity

contiguity

is

to

be regarded as in some sort the conservation of at least


a part

of

the original

specificity

of

combination in the

stimuli forming the historical basis of acting.


fact

alone

on the other hand


is

that,

psychologically,

The mere
association

quite unable to explain the totality of psychical

shows that conservation of a portion of the specificities


originally present cannot play more than a subordinate

life,

part

in

acting

but there would

conservation

be

none

does

but

indeed

play

a part,

very primitive forms of

were not accompanied by separation


and new combination of what had been received originally,

acting, if conservation

66

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

and

if

But

similarity.

such

these

peculiarities,

can

remarkable

upon contrast and


and in particular the

processes,

process of resolving given

the

as

thing

based

association

of

phenomenon

no

were

there

peculiarities into other

complex

hardly be properly understood without

a discussion of the second fundamental characteristic of


action.

In proceeding to discuss this second characteristic we do


not bid farewell to the

On

first.

the contrary, as the

first

proved to be incomplete in itself without the second, so the


second will prove to be inseparable from the first.

THE SECOND CRITERION OF ACTING.

7.

INDIVIDUALITY

"

OF CORRESPONDENCE"

We

have already explained,

theory of instincts, what


"

it

individualised

"

stimulus.

is

whilst

meant by a

stimulus

with the

dealing

"

"

simple
is

and an

individualised

if

consists of a specific combination, specifically arranged, of

single elements

the arrangement

may

be one of space as

well as one of time.

Now

the second of the two

main

characteristics of action,

considered as a problem of natural science,

always

is

I need

stimulus.
specific

a reaction

person

to

corresponding

is

that action

an individualised

only remind you that the sight of a

or

specific

house

may

influence

your

1
Mere passive
psychological theory of association is not our business.
association certainly contributes very little to psychical life, at least when
we are awake. It never accounts for the fact that among the innumerable

ideas that are

"similar"

to one another one

comes into consciousness at

See the excellent discussion by Bergson


the given moment and none other.
(Matiere et Memoire, Paris, 1896), and compare also the concept of "apper
ception as used by Wundt.
"

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

67

behaviour in a specific manner, and that a melody or a


in order to give
specific phrase you hear may do the same,

you a concrete instance of what our analysis expresses


more abstractly.
And then the individualised stimulus of actions has an
effect

There are many cases in

that is individualised also.

the inorganic world where the same thing happens, and yet
in spite of that there

is

a great difference at the

first

glance

A
field.
between the Inorganic and
seal with specific initials may also be called an individualised
the Organic in

stimulus or at least cause,

and

if

is

it

this

two individualisations
That

case.

are of exactly the

but the

same kind

in this

not true in the individualisations of cause

appearing in action the one is individualised in


specific manner, but the other is individualised quite

and

&

is

hot

pressed into

sealing-wax the effect will be individualised also

effect

differently.

In more technical language we


.our provisional analysis
.of

the

"historical

may

as follows.

of

basis

state the result of

Besides the principle

reacting,"

there

another

is

fundamental principle concerned in actions, when considered


as bodily processes in nature
this second fundamental
;

principle

may

appropriately be called the principle of


"

viduality of correspondence

We

now

between stimulus and

in the first place have to study

"

indi

effect.

more

fully in

what the individuality of correspondence in acting really


consists, and it is here that the interpenetration of our first
.and our second principle, spoken of already, will

become

For the individualisation of the acting


apparent.
because corresponding to
though dependent on
individuality

of the cause, is at the

effect,

same time found

the
to

68 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


depend on the

"
"

historical basis of reacting

in other terms,

the elements of the individualised acting effect are derived

from

this basis.

What
will be

the theoretical consequences of this relation are

shown

hereafter

minute analysis of

at present the

the correspondence between the individualised stimulus and

the individualised effect concerned in

action

to be our

is

As every problem of a complicated nature


chief problem.
is easier understood when at first demonstrated in a concrete
instance, I prefer to begin our discussion with a concrete
It will be a fact very familiar indeed to all of you,

fact.

for it is the great

advantage in this department of biology


dealing with action, that the facts are generally matter of

common

knowledge, whilst in morphogenesis even the most


simple facts of a merely descriptive character have to be
first

explained to laymen in order to

make them

available

for theoretical discussion.

We

all

versation

experience a hundred times a day what a con

between two human beings

is.

Let us try to

analyse what a conversation would mean from the point of


Two friends meet in the
view taken by natural science.

and one of them, A, says to the other, B, my brother


There will be a very specific effect caused
is seriously
in B by the stimulus that went out from A.
Let us
"

street,

ill."

imagine that the brother is in America B then would talk


about the difficulty of his coming home, or of visiting him,
:

and very many other things, all of them of a very definite


But what would have happened if
and specific character.
brother the word mother had been
instead of the word
"

"

"

used

"

Certainly something very different,

something very

specific also.

and certainly

The mother may be

living in

*,,

>*-^

IH

Jtf^rS.^

**

"

i-"""^

<;fV-r

69

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

B might ask, whether


he could do anything for her, he might remark that the ill
ness must be attended with some danger at her age, and he

the town where the friends meet, then

would say very many other things, all very specific.


Taken as stimuli from the point of view of natural
"

science, the phrases

mother

is

"

seriously

my

brother

seriously

ill

and

"

my

only in a point of utmost

differ

ill"

is

pronounced in one case where m is


In spite of this minute difference
pronounced in the other.
unimportance

br

is

the effects of the stimuli are totally different.

And now

us assume that the

let

one

nationalities, the

different

two friends are of

being German, the other

French, but that the town, where they are

where they meet,

is

staying and

an English town, and that both friends


and German equally well, and that

talk English, French

they are accustomed to use

Then A, instead
have

also
"

said

mein Bruder

been the

of saying
"

ist

"

all

my

nion frere
ernstlich

three in their conversations.

brother
est

S6*

is

erkrankt."

effect of these variations

ill,"

might

malade,"

or

What would have

Certainly the same as

that of the phrase spoken in English.

seriously

verement

This example shows us, that in acting the effect may


remain unchanged in spite of a most fundamental change in
the stimulus this second result of our analysis is the exact
:

counterpart to the

first.

In acting then, there


1

is

It has

ill,"

may

be no change in the specificity

been said that in these instances it is not the phrases my brother


that constitute the real stimulus of action, but the general
"

etc.,
"

condition of the person addressed.


But, beyond doubt, these
phrases are real stimuli in the true physical meaning of the word, and,
moreover, the general "mental" condition, i.e. what we call the "historical
in all its essentials, could never account for these particular and specific
basis

mental

"

reactions at this particular place

and time.

f~r.l

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

70

of the reaction

when

the stimulus

is

altered fundamentally,

and again, there may be the most fundamental difference in


the reaction when there is almost no change in the stimulus.
This

is

very strange result

have reached by our

to

analysis.

Let us now try to state our result in more abstract form.


This will bring us face to face with our central problem
acting explainable on the hypothesis of a

chemical arrangement, say a machine, or

The

individualised

stimulus in

our instance by the phrase

"

my

specific physico-

not

is it

acting, represented

brother

is

Is

seriously

ill,"

in

may

be expressed analytically as being a specific arrangement of


the specific elements a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, and so on.
The
specific effect

which the stimulus has upon the acting person,

B in our example, may be figured as being a


combination
of a
typical
v b^ c v dv e r fr g v h r i^ and so
on.
The question then is How is the series a, b, c, etc.
say the friend

connected with the series a v b^ c v etc., and is there any


way of explaining alt b v c^ etc. by a, b, c, etc., with the aid
of the given organisation,

with the

particular, or at least with the aid of

aid

of the brain in

any kind of machine,

in the broadest sense of the word, in general

Matters would be easy

if

to each

element of the stimulus

there corresponded an element of the effect, if a^ were the


effect of a, ^ of b, c of c, and so on.
That is so in the
1

How then may


phonograph, but by no means in acting.
our observations of what happens in ordinary conversation
It seems to me that our
be formulated analytically?
particular

result

may

be

generalised

in

the

following

manner.
Firstly,

change the stimulus from

a,

b, c,

d,

e,

/, g, h, i

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
into a,

y, d,

b,

e,

f, g, h,

from a v \, c v d v e v

And

/j,

i,

and the

gr hv

effect

Vl

may

into m, n,

be transformed

o,

p, q, r,

secondly, change the stimulus from

g, h, i into a,

@, 7,

S, e, f,

tj,

0,

i,

re,

and the

a, b,

the totality in

its specificity,

e,

f,

fact that

both of the stimulus and

comes into account in

of the effect, that

d,

t.

may remain

effect

a v \, c v d v e v flt g v h v \, in spite of that change.


There can hardly be a clearer expression of the
it is

c,

s,

and nothing

acting,

But what is the meaning


Here we have used the word that embraces our problem,
almost unwillingly we may say, that it came upon us
The totalities of stimulus
unawares the word meaning."
of this totality

else.

"

and
all

effect

have a

"

meaning,"

and

their

meanings do not at

depend on one another piece by piece.


We meet a psychological term here, though we know

that

we

are not allowed to enter the field of psychology

at

any rate we have found something very strange.

8.

NEW PROOF

OF THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE

Preliminary Remarks

We

now ask

the important question

like this in inorganic nature

Is there

anything

If not, one of our principles

concerned in acting, the principle of the individuality of


correspondence, would form a new and independent proof of
the autonomy of the phenomena of life, of vitalism.
Is it possible to imagine a machine, or rather, to con
ceive the brain as a machine, the reactions of which, being

individualised combinations of a high degree of complexity,

change correspondingly with any sort of a stimulus which

72

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

also itself individualised

is

machine

concept of a

Or does

it

contradict the

assume that a typical arrangement

to

elements might respond to typically


combined stimuli with always a typically combined effect,
of physico-chemical

though the single elements of the one do not stand in causal


relation to the single elements of the other

In

particular,

said already that the indefiniteness of correspondence

between

specific cause

and

specific effect,

the principle of adaptive regulation,


dicating at least the
"

simple

have to do with

"

we were then speaking

individualised

that a proof of vitalism

mere indication of

it,

may

always following
be taken as in

of life-processes.

autonomy

stimuli that

"

me

dealing with the

and of immunity in

physiology of metabolism

we

when

a former part of our lectures,

"

stimuli,

now

is

and

It

was

of

but now we
it

seems to

possible instead of a

on account of the intimate nature of

the correspondence between the individualised stimulus and


the individualised
2

Goltz,
of

their

reaction"

happened

effect,

both of which are

when analysing

movements

the

hemispheres, introduced
("

Antwortsreaktion

in

in his experiments.

He

of frogs deprived

term

the

")

totalities.

order

to

"answering

state

what

did not altogether avoid

pseudo-psychology in his discussions, but, in spite of that,


his concept seems to me to be as valuable as his experiments
were.
1

What

Indeed we
this

may

"totality,"

built

say that
up of

it

is

singularities,

is,

because they are


can be best understood

into the field of pure psychology.


The artist, a painter for
example, bears within himself the complete totality of what he is to perform,
and what afterwards is to be carried out by single acts of movement of his

by an excursion

In the same way the single phrases of a conversation, in spite of their


hand.
means something.
consisting of single elements, form a totality that
2
Beitrdge zur Lehre von den Functional der Nervencentren des Frosches,
"

"

Berlin, 1869.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
ansivering reactions, or
reactions, that

better, individualised

still

seem

actions

be

to

answering

beyond the reach

of

mechanical explanation.
A few words may not be out of place with regard to the
different possible kinds of
effects in

may

acting

"

"

individuality

acquire.

of action, as will easily

that stimuli and

The individualised

be understood,

effects

be composed

may

according to order in time exclusively, like a phrase in a


conversation or a melody, or according to time and space,
like all objects

stimuli

there

belong to the

may

is

of art or

The individualised

handicraft.

two

classes just mentioned,

which

also a third class

is

composed

but

specifically

the perfect object of art or


only with regard to space
handicraft as a stimulus belongs here, and so does any
:

Also this last class of


Gegenstand."
any
stimuli possesses an individual wholeness, as a table or a dog,
"

typical object,

We

for instance.

when
The

meet here the problem we met already

with the problematic stimuli

dealing

"

"

dog,

this

"

dog,"

my

"

is

dog

seen from any side or at any angle whatever


recognised as
differs in

"

every

the

same,"

case.

It is

of

the same
:

instincts.

"

it

stimulus,

always

is

though the actual retina image


absolutely impossible to under

stand this fact on the assumption of any kind of preformed


material recipient in the brain, corresponding to the stimulus
in question,

even

if

we

intentionally neglect the fact that

the material recipient would

stimulus in the individual

have
life

been

Such an attempt has

Biol. 50, 1907).

In fact
lately been

to

by

the

a recipient for the dog

seen from the side would not suffice

dog from behind

created

for identifying the

speak psychologically

made by von Uexkuell

(Zeitschr. f.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

74

remembrance

identification or simple

on stimulation, and

only in part

trying on the part of the

We

shall

come back

is

of sameness depends

in the

main an

active

to probability.

Ego according

to this point later on.

So much, for the present, about the "individuality of


correspondence in its bearing on vitalism.
"

It

an agreeable

is

always

same

vestigators in the

when two

occurrence

scientific

field

in

independently arrive

same results, and as some such independent


but contemporaneous discoveries have been made in the

at almost the

subject that

we

now

are

considering, I should like to ask

your permission to say a few words about them.


forming a

It

was

in

1903
first published the argument
new and independent proof of vitalism, which I

the spring of

that I

just have explained to you,

and

was

it

at about the

same

time that the late philosopher Busse, in his book, Geist und
Korper, Seele
so-called

und

psycho -physical

identical with

an argument against
parallelism, which is almost

Leib, brought forward

my

analysis

and we knew nothing at

all

down

to the smallest

about one another.

details

Busse uses

a telegram as his instance, where I use a conversation, but


that

is

the only difference.


the

Later on

autonomy of life,
indeed the same as defeating the

proving

But there

is still

as

we

shall see that

revealed in acting,

is

parallelism- theory.

another case of independent argument

was very glad to learn after this


chapter was written that one of the most original thinkers
of the present day, the French philosopher Henri Bergson,
be mentioned.

to

in his profound analysis of the relation between Mati&re


1

et

Compare Bergson, and also the paper of von Kries Ueber die materiellen
Grundlagen der Bewusstseiiis-Erscheinungen, Tubingen, 1901.
:

75

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
1

Mtfmoire,

had, as early as 1896, established what I should

the autonomy of acting, by a discussion which, though

call

Psychology, and therefore different from

confined to

own

analysis in verlis,

is

very similar to

recommend Bergson

strongly

book to

all

in

it

who

re.

my
most

take a deeper

interest in our subject.

Let us
of

life

arguments in favour of the autonomy


were gained from the analysis of the

call those

which

differentiation

of the harmonious-equipotential systems as

concerned in morphogenesis the


us

first

proof of vitalism.

evidence obtained from the discussion

call the

Let

of the

genesis of the complex-equipotential systems, which are the


foundation of heredity and of many morphological regula
tions, the

Then we may

second proof.

see a third proof of

vitalism in our analysis of the principle of the

of

correspondence,"

This proof

of action.

the

as

scheme

which

the same,

is

viz.,

degree of complication

is

individuality

one of the chief characteristics

as independent

is

two proofs

first

is

"

and self-contained

nothing but the general logical


a machine of whatever kind or

not imaginable.

The Union of the two Chief Criteria of Acting

But our

third proof

another half to

it,

so far dealt with

The

and

it

is
it

not yet complete

was

for this reason

comparatively

we must add
that we have

briefly.

principle of the individuality of correspondence, as

we know,

does not

mean

that there

is

a statical or fixed

This excellent work was quite unknown to me when I


and is not even mentioned by Busse or by A. Klein
(Die modernen Theorien iiber das allgemeine Verhdltnis von Leib und Seele,
1

Paris, 1896.

wrote

my

Seele (1903),

Breslan, 1906).

76

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

through which that correspondence


whether machine or
passes, and the real nature of which
or
not
in
The
is
rather the reacting some
brain,
question.
something, the

brain,

thing, has been

such as

it is

therefore,

ly

created in

its

The

its history.

able

though

half of our argument,

first

it

itself,

has been made

specificity,

seems

to

me, to prove

completed by another half, and this


second half will be gained by a minute analysis of the
vitalism, requires to be

"

action,

of

basis

historical

we know,

in action

potential specificity

stimuli

it

by

is,

future,

in

principles

as

we know, determined

individual history.

its

has received in the past, and

these stimuli, determine

the

our

of

are united inseparably.

That which acts


its

Both

reacting."

how

stimuli

all

may

in

All the

the effects of

be answered in

agreement with the principle of the

in

dividuality of correspondence.

Here, now,

we

are faced

by the very strange

a something, from which reactions are to

start, is

fact

that

determined

in the specificity of its faculty of reacting almost completely

from without
of

but not in the sense of a mere giving back

what had been

received.

We

know,

firstly,

that

it

is

solely the elements of the typical combinations received that

form the basis of

all

reacting in the future, and secondly,

that specificities are received in a very different field from

that in which they are given off in reacting.

So-called

of

centrifugal

sensations, or
irritations

of

rather

the

typical

central

constellations

nervous

system,

movements, or rather typical constellations


of centripetal nerves, are given
as

we know,

off.

received

of irritations

It is the latter point,

that distinguishes our reacting

from the phonograph.

are

"something"

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

77
"

machine
so con
could not imagine any sort of
structed as to react in the manner the organism does, and I
"

Imagine
suppose that you also will not be able to do so.
that it is the medium, in the widest meaning of the term,

and the medium

which makes a child speak English


or German or French, that the medium only makes him a
alone,

reader of the Latin or the Greek, or the Cyrillian or the

Arabic alphabet, and you will become convinced

still

better

perhaps than by mere abstraction, what an impossibility it


would be to assume a machine to be the foundation and
basis of these facts.

Does
i.e.

it

not contradict the very concept of a

arrangement of parts built up

typical
to

purposes,

from without

that

suppose

And, in

acting originates in

its

it

even in

The

the

specificity

without, and afterwards plays


of correspondence."

originates

fact,

"

its

"

"

of

part in the

"

individuality

individuality of correspondence,"

But now what might

priori, proves to be not

into

basis

by contingencies from

and reaction are

possibly have been prepared

prepared but made from without,

and made from without in such a manner


resolution

special

by contingencies

historical

pre-established or prepared, since stimulus

machine,"

for

inconceivable on the basis of something

itself, is

totalities.

"

its

elements

and

as to allow of

transport

into

another

scene of events.

"

So-called

"Analogies

to

Acting

Mechanistic authors occasionally have brought forward

some inorganic
as

"

"

"

analogies

to

"

or to

experience

the potential ground of experience.

"

"

memory

doubt whether

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

78

any one of them

really thought

he had given even

slightest mechanical explanation of the

by doing

In

so.

in

facts

as

"

it

"

analogy,"

of the historical basis of reacting

"

less

question

what they have brought forward,

fact,

seems to me, does not even deserve to be called

much

the

explanation
1

it

really

In

the

is.

first

we must

place,

mere

psychologically

"

memory,"

notice

that

speaking

as the faculty of simple

from being the same as the


as it plays its part in action.
In psycho
historical basis
in
comes
association
besides
terms
here,
logical
memory
storing and identifying,

far

is

"

"

"

"

"

"

pure and simple, and not merely association alone


submitted to judgment.
Here again
association
is
from
its
historical basis
role in
inseparable

but
the

"

"

"

individuality of

the

correspondence."

The so-called

elastic

after-effect,

and

some

similar

phenomena, have occasionally been called analogies to the


In my opinion, however, they are not even
historical basis.
"

analogies to simple
"

fatigue,"

cerned

in

but that

altered

memory
is

they

be analogies to

may

about the opposite to what


Certainly

"experience."
"

"
"

"

but our

"

its

history
by
what we understand by this word
;

an

elastic

in our definition,

my

argument by

mountain, with regard to


1

f.

saying that the

its

con

ball

is

must remember

critics

throughout of the style of a technical term.


objected to

is

"

which

is

Others have
"

reactions

of a

being slowly washed away by

very careful analysis of my Seele has been given by Becher (Zeitschr.


Becher is right in saying that my two "criteria"

Psych. 45, 1907, p. 401).

ought always to be regarded together. But his mechanical analogy to their


being at work together (p. 428) fails, since he does not consider that the
historical stimuli and the reactions of my "historical basis" belong to
different fields of events.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

79

rains and rivers, also depend on its individual geological

Granite resists destruction longer than limestone,

"

history."

why do my

but

whenever
they

But

do

not

"

acts,"

In fact
lowered by atmospherical agents ?
and I suspect they never will.
say so

us formulate the distinction as strictly as possible.

let

In the

it is

not say that a mountain

critics

elastic after-effect

one and the same process occurs

time in a typical manner, considered as to quantity,


In dynamical
and the second time a little differently.

the

first

geology different phases of history are followed by merely


passive different effects in later days, the first differences

with

corresponding

second

the

however, historical

in

locality.

(including

specificities

In

acting,

in

differences)

quite a special class of occurrences, namely, sensation in the

widest sense of the word, are responsible for specificities


(including
reactions

differences)
to

which

are

firstly

the

in

stimuli

real

active

and true

narrowest sense of the

term, and which secondly occur in quite another field

happening, in the field of

"

diversities

"

all

analogies

of

In the face of these

movements.
between

"

"

experience

and

inorganic events appear to be a mere playing with words.


like

Analogies
suggested, had

it

would

these

never

have

experience, or rather the principle of the

of reacting

"

in

mere recollection

been

even

always been borne in mind that so-called

our
of

strict

"

historical basis

definition, not only means the

what has happened, but means

also the

ability to use freely in another field of occurring the elements

of former
specificities

newly combined individualised


We see one
of the future which are wholes.

happening

for

of our fundamental principles of acting always united with

the other, and this fact

may

also

be well expressed by

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

80

word

stating that the

"

principle of the
"

Elements

"

may

"

historical

be words, but

restricted

as

just

the

"

role

of the written

lines

We

like.

you

of

"

association

association

how

understand

in acting

is

important, no doubt, but only as a means of acting

speak psychologically,

the

to

throughout relative.
be the mere letters

may
mere

relation

its

is

basis,"

also, or whole phrases, or the

characters

in

element,"

it

the material for

offers

and judging enters into


psychical acts that are more than association.

judging, but

But

not judging

is

as all so

called

of inorganic

analogies

experience are not really analogies,


all

so,

is

or, to

facts

all

to

on the other hand,

endeavour to transfer the elemental

organic or vital

world are extremely misleading also.


nonsense to speak about the stone liking
to reach
is only a psychological word
the ground, even if
liking
There is nothing at all in the
for a natural process.
facts to the inorganic

"

"

It is

"

"

inorganic world even


"

the

least

comparable

with the

Modern monism, sounfortunately almost always a monism of mere

individuality
called, is

in

of

correspondence."

phrases but not of ideas.

Conclusions

Let us then

try

to

formulate

in a

our third proof of the autonomy of


analysis of acting as a

All
stimuli

acting

is

phenomenon

correspondence

and individualised

effects

life,

definite

manner

founded upon the

in objectified nature.

between

individualised

occurring on a basis of

reaction that has been created historically from without.

Acting defies explanation of any kind on the basis of

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

81

physico-chemical tectonics of any sort, for the

following

reasons.
It

would be very

a machine

not impossible, to imagine /

difficult, if

word

in the widest sense of the

such as to

allow of even the individuality of correspondence in acting,


taken alone.
For it can be shown that it is not the single
constituents of the stimulus on which the single constituents
of the effect depend, but one whole depends on the other

whole, both

"

wholes

"

being conceivable in a logical sense

exclusively.

But
still

to this first general impossibility is

added a second,

more important, by an analysis of the character of the


basis.
That the individualised correspondence

historical

in acting takes place


is

made from

without,

upon a

historical basis, that its basis

a very strange feature in itself

is

but here we have the phonograph as an analogue.


historical basis of acting

the

The
"

"

prospective potency

for

you care to say so by analogy differs in two


fundamental respects from the phonograph, or from any
sort of machine imaginable in
physics and chemistry.

acting, if

Firstly, the
field

effects

of natural

stimuli

received

movements

that are given off in acting occur in a

events

very different

historically

to another

field.

from that of the

sensations

belong

to

one,

Secondly, the historical basis

serves only as a general reservoir of faculties, the


specific

combinations
preserved

of

the

stimuli

by no means in

resolvable into elements

received
their

historically

being

but

being

specificity,

these elements then

however, to another sphere of happening

transferred,

are rearranged

into other specificities,


according to the individuality of the
actual stimulus in question.
6

82

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

The

"

"

that

"

something

"

has the innate faculty of

acts

producing some specific combination of muscular movements


the combination it produces in a special case depends on

the individuality of the stimulus present in that case, and

on the whole of past sensations in the widest sense.


This is the result of an analysis of action unbiased by
dogmatism.

THE

6.

"

PSYCHOID

"

This seems to be just the right place in our discussion

name

to give

not

discovered

"

"

but

it

We

be a machine.

to

we have

the acting something which

we

again, as

entelechy
genesis,

to

appears

might speak of

did in the theory of


better

to

morpho
also

distinguish

in

terminology the natural agent which forms the body


from the elemental agent which directs it.
The words
"

psyche present themselves, but one


of them would lead us into what we have so carefully

"

"

mind,"

soul,"

avoided

my

which

"-

psyche
"

there

name

neutral

pseudo-psychology.
is

in

space.

this

sense

therefore
"

of

no more than saying

no souls in

are

nature

called

"

all along, viz.,

"

"

or

"

the

for

Psychoid

in

the

may

speak of
"

"

but

Ego

phenomenon

propose

the

elemental

very
agent

"

that is, a something


Psychoid
which though not a
can
psyche
only be described in
In fact, there
terms analogous to those of psychology.
"

discovered in action.

"

"

can

be

no

doubt

that

"

straction,"

stand

our

the

thinking,"

only

and so

correspondence

important

principle

the processes called

on, will enable

of

and

the

two

the

"

individualities

process

ab

us to under

of

in

so-called

83

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

regarded as a process occurring on bodies,


That is our justi
performed by a machine.

"

abstraction,"

be

cannot

fication of the

"

Psychoid."

the analysis of instincts should help us some day

If
to

name

some

a true proof of vitalism, instead of offering only

towards

indications
"

is

psychoid

usual difference between the


"

scious

would then have

Conscious

"

be brought to

and the
its

that

said

"

The

Uncon
and

legitimate

by distinguishing between

different kinds of psychoids.

There certainly

want

the

to

"

expression

truly philosophical

two

be

might also

it

it,

the basis of instinctive phenomena.

"

difference

between

first

the

But there

is

psychoid and morpho-

instinctive

systematic vitalist

we know, Aristotle, saw

them.

to

these

and gave a very adequate

analytical differences very clearly

denomination

expressed already by

instincts.

also.

genetic entelechy

The

a difference,

is

experience in

of

the

Calling

spiritual

principle,

which he regarded as the real foundation of life, ^rv^rj in


general, he carefully discriminated between three kinds of
it.

The lowest

of all

is

the

-ty-vyr)

metabolism, which, together with

av^TiKr) and
propagation,
as concerned

may
in

organisms, plants

well as

class of souls is represented

soul

it

by the

animals only, and to some extent


It is only to

that the highest soul, the vovs,

is

animals.

of sensation as well as of

soul of instincts.

called

"

represent our

to

morphogenesis
as

modifications,

the soul of growth and of

yevrjTiKrj, that is,

be said

OpeTmtcr), the soul of

its

may

Entelechy

possessed by

The

-^v^rj

volition

"

aiaQrjTitcij,
it

belongs

the
to

properly be called the

men, according
is

all

next higher

given, that

is,

to Aristotle,

the faculty

84

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

what we have

of reasoning, corresponding to

the

called

"

"

as regulating action.

psychoid
Indeed,
of

me

seems to

it

Aristotle

be

may

that the general classification

accepted

with a few modifications,

if

we

nowadays, at

instinct in

Certainly there

animals, at least if the

instinct is used in its original meaning, that

of purposefulness

least

give up his restriction of

by man.

vovs as being only possessed

more than mere

even

is

is

word

in the sense

and perfection in reacting without any

experience or anything similar to experience in any way.


do not intend to deny by this statement the great

We

between acting in man and acting


in even the highest animals
later on we shall learn a
little more
about these problems.
But there certainly
that

differences

exist

"

"

is

experience

In this respect

animals.

of

in the proper sense of

the word in

many

cannot agree with the terminology


though, what is more important, I almost

Wasmann,

wholly agree with

his

actual

of

analysis

the

facts

in

question.

We

now have completed

the outlines of our analytical

and have given a distinctive name


But we must not yet leave our present

study of action as such,


to

its

results.

part which

and

nervous system
play in acting is not yet clear from what we have said,
and a few words about the real differences in acting

studies

the

brain

the

between man and animals may also seem

f.

THE

"

SPECIFIC

ENERGY

"

to be required.

OF THE SENSORY NERVES

According to our analytical researches so far it might


seem as if the brain were almost unnecessary in acting

;,

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
but, of course,

85

such an opinion would be very far from the

truth.

Let

us

then

with

analysis

in

try,

the

first

our

connect

which has been

problem

physiological

to

place,

discussed very often in the last century, and which can

no means be said to be solved


our concept of the
so

far

as the

"individuality

process

the

of

stimuli comes into account.


so-called

"

"

specific

energy

"

of

correspondence,"
"

individualisation

I refer to the

problem

is

in

the

of

problem of the

of the sensory nerves, and

will easily understand that this

by

a problem that relates to

you

not unconnected

with our analysis, if you remember that all stimulation to


1
acting is transmitted along the sensory nerves.

According to Johannes Mueller, the father of the


of the specific energy, the

meaning of

"

this principle

law

"

was

that the specificity of sensation, say of red or green, or heat


or a musical tone,
single nerve fibre

was in some way a property


of the
under stimulation, and that it was quite
"

"

indifferent by what sort of an occurrence the stimulation


had happened. Later science has transferred the speci
ficity from the nerve fibres to specific localities of the brain,

but the general view has remained almost the same, and

Emil du Bois-Eeymond gave strange but clear expression


when he said that after an operation which
combined the ear with the optic nerve and the eye with the

to the doctrine

acoustic nerve,

we should hear

lightning as a crack

and

see the thunder as a line of sparks.

Intentionally
1

So-called

we

shall
"

put aside the whole epistemo-

spontaneous actions are intentionally left out of account here,


do not touch our most fundamental problems. No doubt
something
affecting the brain, in some way, is concerned in these facts also, and there
fore no special discussion is required.
as they

86

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

which

concerned here,
logical part of the question

by no

is

means an easy problem, and has been treated rather im


Even Johannes
properly in almost all essays on it.
Mueller was wrong when he paralleled his principle with the
Kantian doctrine of apriorism, with which it has nothing
at all to do.

Intentionally

we

take up the position

shall

of naive realism in the short discussion that

and shall not hesitate

moment

to enter for a

is

to follow,

into the field

of pseudo-psychology.

We

simply ask, is it true that the process of nervous


conduction is always the same, and that specific qualities
reach the brain only because specific parts of
stimulated

without

stimulus

It

unable

to

any

relation

to

it

have been

nature

the

of

the

seems to me, I confess, that we are quite


say at present whether it is true or not.

not a single instance brought forward


in favour of Mueller s principle that can be said to be above
Certainly there

The

doubt.

all

is

often

discussed fact,

for

instance,

that

cutting the optic nerve gives the sensation of light proves


nothing, since, as all
is

modern authors

agree, this operation

not possible without stimulating the retina to a certain

extent before the nerve has been cut quite through.

The

phenomena, on the other hand, that are exhibited

electrical

any stimulation of nerves whatever, are


only secondary phenomena, and prove nothing either for
equally well in

or against the problem of qualitative differences in nervous

conduction.
are

facts

of a localised feeling of say the

of

strange as they

hand

or the fingers

amputation of the whole arm, but not a single

after the

one

There remain only the

these

individual

amputations

who had

has

been

performed

on

an

not already received the specific sensa-

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

87

normal manner during his previous


life.
There always had been many normal stimulations
before the operation, and who is able to say whether the
tions in question in the

different

of

localities

specific

come back

brain

the

may

to this question

become

have

not

stimulated specifically

ly having been

We

7:

shall

on another occasion.

Now, on the other hand, the experiments made with the


aid of an extirpation of parts of the brain, as carried out
have positively shown, as will
later on, that there may be a certain

by Goltz and many


be discussed

also

regulation in

those

others,

at

parts,

to

least

extent.

certain

Of course, there probably will be a difference in regulation


according to whether the single parts of one and the same
sensory sphere, or whether
"

senses,"

the

first

case and

parts

There

are in question.

may

not in the latter.

to

different

be a regulability in

But even then the

would be broken as

"

principle of

belonging

"

far as
energy
the single elements of one nerve or the single parts of one
so-called
centre
are concerned one and the same element
specific

"

"

of the brain

tion

would be related

at least

to various qualities of sensa

with regard to one and the same sensory

on the other hand, we could hardly escape


the hypothetic assumption that one and the same fibre of

sphere

a nerve

and,

is

able to transmit stimulations that are different

with regard to sensory "quality."


This view
1
2
while
Wundt
seems
to go
present by "Bering,
in

assuming

what

might

be

called

the

is

held at

still

original

farther

equi-

potentiality of the brain.

Thus the principle


1

of Mueller might be half true, half

Zur Theorie der

Nerventatigkeit, Leipzig, 1899.


5. Aufl., Leipzig, 1903.

Physiologische Psychologic,

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

88

false, as far as

the adult

quite false for

the child.

is

it is perhaps
soon shall enter once more

concerned, though

We

into these questions.

At

our analysis the most important point


is not the question about the
strange to say

this stage of

for ourselves

adequacy or inadequacy of the theory of

"

specific

energies,"

but the simple fact that this whole problem does not touch at all
our principle of the individuality of correspondence" It was
"

only to

make

this clear that our short

present state of the

made

remarks about the

problem of specific energy have been

here.

In fact, if any kind of equipotentiality of the brain


were positively established, a new and independent proof
of vitalism might be gained from that fact alone.
But even

Mueller s law held good, nothing would be affected in our


For the principle of the individuality
previom discussion.
if

"

of correspondence," one of the


of

proof

life -autonomy,

individuality of

elements,

two foundations of our third

only deals

a totality which

without

in

asking

with

the

unity and

constituted

by single
any way by what sort of
is

"

processes the elements of the external

may

be offered to the

"something"

"

stimulus

individualised

that is reacting.

That

this

something cannot be a machine remains equally true both


processes of conduction may occur in the same

if different

nerve

when

fibre,

and

irritated,

if it is different localities

the

represent

different

of the brain which,

elements

of

the

In refuting the principle of a


specific energy," in the sense of Johannes
Mueller, we, of course, do not intend to deny what may be called the
specificity of sensation and its incompatibility with everything like move
"

ment or energy.
sensation occurs,
which

"

"caused

specific potential

Whenever

to speak in the language of naive realism

there always occurs something absolutely alien to that


sensation.
But to cause specific sensation is not the innate

property of specific parts of the nervous system as such.

89

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
"

individualised

mere sum

proves in

In neither case

stimulus."

and the

fact that there

any case that there

Thus we understand

is

this stimulus

more than a sum

is

at work.

more than a machine

is

that our analysis of action is in

dependent of the problem whether the doctrine of specific


The great physiological im
be right or wrong.
energy
"

"

portance

of

this

of

problem,

diminished by what

we have

is

course,

stated

by

no

means

but problems must

always be clearly separated.

SOME DATA FROM CEREBRAL PHYSIOLOGY

77.

But now

let

us try to ascertain positively what the part

played by the brain in acting

We

is.

know, of course, that the brain and the nerves

all

actually do play a most important part in actions as in all


movements for the sake of completeness, therefore, we are
;

what that part is.


Otherwise our whole argument about action might seem

forced to state at least in general terms

rather unconnected with well-established facts.

At the beginning of the present part of our lectures we


observed that we should study organic motions especially
under the aspect of regulations, and we mentioned briefly
that regulations
different

ways.

determined,
1

may

Compare

firstly,

The

enter

these

into

of

specificity

movement may be

by the specificity of the stimuli coming

besides the text-books of Physiology:

Physiol. d. Sinnesorg. 41, 1906, p. 157

von Monakow, Ergebn.

motions in three

d. Physiol.

i.

2,

L. Asher,

Zeitschr.f.

Nagel, Handbuch d. Physiol. iii. 1


1902 Lewandowsky, Die Functional
;

des centralen Nervcnsystems, 1907.


A very good historical and critical review
of the whole subject will be found in C.
Hauptmann, Die Metaphysik in der

modcrnen Physiologic, 1893.

90

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

from without
state of the

by the
and

secondly,

motor organs

specificity of the variable

thirdly,

by the

specificity

of the variable state of the central organs.

Hitherto

we have been studying only the first class


Our analysis, leading to a new proof

these regulations.

of
of

was based exclusively on the correspondence of


The brain, and in fact
the stimuli and the reactions.

vitalism,

organisation altogether, played no part in that analysis, but

become important as soon as we come


other possible kinds of motor regulation.

it

will

to study the

Let us say a few words, in the first place, about regulaThis subject has
bility of the brain functions themselves.
just been touched in our remarks on the doctrine of specific

There exists anything but unanimity and agree


ment in this field of physiology, and to form a proper
judgment is very difficult for one who, like myself, has no
energy.

personal experience of the matters in question, and


to rely

the

on the

brain

literature.

are

regarded

function, whilst,
specificity,

As

On
as

obliged

the one hand, the parts of

almost

completely

equal

in

on the other hand, the utmost functional

even of the individual

far as I

is

am

cell,

a study of the literature,

has been insisted on.

seems to me, from


both experimental and pathological,

capable of judging,

it

that two different fundamental factors are to be distinguished


relating to the organisation of the brain

and of the so-called

cerebral hemispheres in particular, and each accounting for


different results

among

the experimental and pathological

facts.

In

fact

there

is

an interesting parallelism between the

brain and the youngest germ, inasmuch as they are con


structed according to two different types of complexity.

In

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
the mature germ
direction,

more or

we had

scarcely

we

as

any

the intimate structure of mere

less regulable

the protoplasm, and

91

according to the state of


structure showing
In the brain of the adult,

the true material

regulability at

all.

we find the two features a simple structure


conduction and then some higher sort of tectonics, and

for

shall see,

here again only one of them seems to be regulable to any


The hypothetic differences between the
great extent.

young and the adult brain with regard

to regulability are

paralleled, on the other hand, by the differences of the


germ before and after fertilisation and maturation.

The Connecting Function


In the first place, the brain is a system of nervous
connexions of almost inconceivable complexity for the work
of conduction.
I think we shall not be very wrong in
every part of the brain connected in
some way with every other, but also almost every part of
the surface of the body is by the aid of the brain connected

saying that not only

is

some way with every other

in

part.

It is to these features

that the functional regulability of the brain relates.

It is

a known fact that cerebral diseases, apoplexy in particular,


diminish in their symptoms after a certain time, at least to
a certain extent, and

work

that

See vol.

For

i.

defects
page 85

it

in

is

the

also

known from experimental

brain,

caused by a

localised

ff.

man

this statement can be proved as follows


voluntarily that when a certain point of your skin is

with your finger another certain point of

it

You

are able to decide

touched you will touch

the two points

may

be any you

please.
3

Experiment is always better than clinical observation for sickness may


have affected the faculty of regulability and may overshadow it where it
:

also

exists.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

92

operation, are followed by sensorial


that

these
1

advances,

and

inotorial defects,

become smaller and smaller

defects

maximum

until a certain

of regulation

is

but

time

as

reached.

It is highly probable that this regulation, in part at least,


is

due to the

some typical nervous connexions

fact that

in

the brain, which had been destroyed by the apoplexy or by


the operation, are restored after a while
there

morphologically, for
of

generation

not, of course,

no actual restitution or re

the

in

sort

any

is

brain

of vertebrates,

but

physiologically, in the sense that the functional connexion

between the parts

and

is

now, after the destruction of

the shortest route, accomplished by some other of the

many

possible routes.
It

was upon these

facts that our doubts respecting the

doctrine of the so-called

The same

based.

"specific energy"

facts,

when more

in its extremes

were

accurately and minutely

established, might furnish a sort of

new and independent

proof of vitalism, by showing the brain to be what might

be called a

The

"

functional harmonious-equipotential

specificity of a motory reaction

is

system."

not dependent on

the specificity of the brain as such, but the organisation of


the brain

and

its

is

only used in order to perform a specific reaction,


may be used differently in such a

different parts

manner that harmony,


effect in question,

is

i.e.

the specificity of the individualised

never altered.

By no means do we wish these words


as

if

the possible

harmony

were perfect in every

to be understood

of the parts of the brain in use

case.

On

the contrary, in spite of

As a rule this diminishing of functional defects is attributed to the


shock."
Most recent authors, however, agree that use has
ceasing of the
been made a little too freely of "shocks." There can belittle doubt that
this favourite

term has often blinded us to the existence of true regulation.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
the

93

enormous manifoldness of cerebral connexions

it

can

very well be imagined that certain apoplectical or experi

mental

disturbances

impossible.

will

render

In such cases there

between the points

functional

reparation

no longer any connexion

is

and B, and

clinical or

experimental

defects are permanent.

Specific Functions in the

Adult

But the permanency of such defects generally seems to


have other reasons, and I hope we shall learn to understand
if

them,
feature

we now turn to study the second fundamental


concerned in cerebral organisation.
The brain is
a

system of connexions

not

only

The

specific differences of sensations, to speak psychologically,

seem

it

is

something more.

some

to require

specific arrangement in organisation,


which render the brain mequipotential

specifically localised,

to a certain extent.

And

these

arrangements

are

really

found

to

exist.

Certain specific parts of the brain seem to have a specific


functional value that is more than a mere locality of specific

connexion,
"

spheres,"

to a

at

in

least

the adult.

as they are called,

great extent irreparable.

by

Disturbances of these

disease or experiment are

These cerebral

specificities

would seem to be responsible for the specificity of sensation,"


and to justify as much of the old law of Johannes Mueller
"

as will stand criticism, at least with regard to the adult.

But they are not the only


sensation

the

specificity

nervous conduction

now granted by

is

the

of

factors

the

concerned in specific
process

of

centripetal

another factor of importance.


first

It

is

authorities in this field that at

94

SCIENCE

least in one

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

and the same

sensorial sphere, such as sight, for

instance, one nerve element

in their specificity

and

may transmit different

"
"

qualities

as far as the sense of smell is con

cerned I do not see any possibility of escaping this conclusion.


The peripheral organs, being the seat of the real stimulation
of the

way become

organism, in this

responsible for the

specificity of sensation to a

very high extent, though not, of


course, on account of the nature of the stimulating external
agent alone, but also on account of their

own

(chemical

?)

specificity.

Thus

it is

by the co-operation of both

parts, the specific

centres as well as the specific reception organs, that specificity

The

of sensation occurs.

are not liable to

specific centres

regulation.

Are
But

there Specific Functions in the Neivly

Born

Bechterew 1 remarks

this is only true for the adult.

that extirpation of the so-called motor spheres carried out in

newly lorn dog or cat has no effect whatever on its


future motions.
Moreover, it is a well established fact that
the

aphasia

be almost completely cured by re-learning to


These facts seem to prove that spheres are not

may

"

"

speak.

innate

but created during

life,

and that even

are liable to regulation, at least in

some

cases.

"

"

spheres

That would

allow us to call the brain an organ which possesses originally


the same functional

"

"

prospective potency
their

these parts

obtaining

secondarily,

and being able

under certain conditions.


1

Bewusstsein

und

in

all

its

"

specific

prospective

parts,

value

"

modify it to a certain extent


Such a doctrine would be the
to

ffirnlocalisation, Leipzig, 1898, p. 48.

95

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
"

death-blow to the doctrine of

"

specific

energy

in

any

sense.

been actually ascertained here at


as sensorial nerves and centres are in question

It is true, nothing has

present, so far

no experiments have yet been made on the newly born.

Might we expect that

"

specificity of

"

centres

in the adult

completely a product of specificity of previous centripetal


that by interchanging the connexion of the
conductions ?

is

optic

to their respective sensory organs in

and acoustic nerves

the newly born, the optic brain centre of the adult would be
transferred to the place where the acoustic centre normally

and

is,

vice

simply what
nerves,

versa
is

Such ideas regarding

generally called

"

"

"

centres

"

as

in the single

Einfahrung
but one must grant at
seems to me, that they are possible, and that, so
rather

are

present, it

revolutionary

concerned, they even are

far as only

one sensorial sphere

probable.

If they held good to the fullest extent, all kinds


"

"

of

pressure -points,"

is

and

heat -points,"

"

"

pain- points

found in the skin of the adult would prove nothing at all,


of course, regarding innate specificities of nerves or parts of
the brain

all specificities

would originally be peripheral. 1

1
The few "facts" relating to the specificity or non -specificity of nerves
or parts of the brain, besides those mentioned above (p. 86), are the following,
all relating to the adult.
Stimulation of the chorda tympani, i.e. the nerve

of taste, carried out directly by electric or mechanical agents, is always followed


by a sensation of taste ; this fact, of course, may be interpreted in favour of

the specificity of "centres" in the adult, but may also be related to a


chemical process in the nerve, set up by the irritation.
Langley succeeded in
transforming a vaso-contracting nerve into a vaso-dilating one, and a motor
nerve into one that stimulated peripheral ganglia a connexion of the central
;

with the peripheral part of nerve B, and rice versa, had been
the experiment proves the possibility of centrifugal conductions
leading to different results in one and the same nerve, it does not immediately
part of nerve
effected here
relate to

"centres."

myself have laid stress upon the fact that in many of the transplantation
experiments in young amphibial larvae, as carried out by Born, the brain has
to accomplish quite abnormal duties, which it does in perfect harmony.
See
I

96

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

But enough

of such hypothetic discussions

the cerebral

physiology of the adult certainly does reveal specificities in


the brain which are not liable to regulation.

The
This

"

Centre

"

in General

the right place to say a few words on that very

is

At

"

ambiguous word,

brain-centre."

the

first

"

was

"

centre

conceived purely anatomically as a so-called ganglion, but


this

view has been abandoned, especially under the influence


Loeb 1 then regarded the centre as

Loeb and Bethe.

of

nothing more than a typical locality of typical intracerebral


It seems to me that this view is a little too
connexions.

As we have

restricted.

said, there

in the brain, related to sensation,

may

be specific functions

and these functions might

Of

be specifically localised, at least in the adult.


the word

"

"

centre

would be a very suitable name

course,

for these

localities.

The Brain and


But, most important of

the Psychoid in General


all,

the very factor that determines

the specificity of any cerebral or rather motor reaction

centre

"

"in

any sense

we have proved

not physico-chemical in character at

is

say, there

is

something more concerned

is

not

that this factor

all.

So we

may

in reactions starting

from the brain or passing through the brain than mere


more also than
localities of connexion, and something
Seek, p. 42

my

also Braus,

Anat. Anz. 26,

1905.

The transplantation

experiments performed on the earthworm, by Korschelt, Joest, and Ruttloff,


seem only to prove the possibility of nervous conduction going on in a
direction opposite to the normal (Arch. Entw. Mech. 25, 1908).
1

Comparative Physiology of the Brain,

New

York, 1900.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
localities
"
"

"

centre

of specific function
in the

but this

97
more

"

of something in

sense

"

not a

is

This

the brain.

more/ our Psychoid or Entelechy, uses the conductive and

uses the piano.


specific faculties of the brain as a piano-player

In these words

is

included what

we

are not entitled to

attribute to brain-functions proper.

The Brain s Part in

"

Association

"

Another very important topic now requires some further


The "historical basis of reacting" is created

elucidation.

in its specificity from without

manner

in a certain bodily

it

therefore

must be marked

in the central nervous system.

Let us try to show what this manner

The immediate

is.

functions of the historical basis are of two kinds.

an elemental

fact, to

It is

speak psychologically, that a sensorial


the
is known to be

impression occurring the second time

same

may

"

as the first impression

be called the

first

this character,

the fact that any

or

regarded as the

"

"

sameness,"

immediate function of the historical

Its second function is

basis of reacting.
contiguity,"

"

same

association

sensation

"

or

"

"

different,"

is

not

but that

it

awakens the remembrance of other sensations of the


which were connected with

it

in time or space

by

only
also
past,

on a former

occasion.
It

is

of these

basis

in

the brain that the possibility of the origin

two kinds of elemental functions of the

must

lie

in

historical

some way; experiments indeed show that

they are present in

it

in

a sort of specifically localised

distribution.

But by no means,

it

must be repeated,

is

the primary
7

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

98

acting identical with these bodily prerequisites

in

factor

of acting, or with their distribution

the brain

is

a sort

and some day indeed we


But the acting factor
may
physiology.
it uses it, just as it
is not identical with the warehouse
of warehouse, a place of storing,

understand

its

uses the brain as a system

of

connexions.

The

brain,

as a specifically organised body, possesses nothing but the

faculty of storing all the impressions that have occurred to


it

in

any way just as they are given, and, by doing so, it


able to become differently stimulated the second time

is

by the same stimulus


the type of

it alters

convenient

the

having been stimulated

future

its

name from

"

a book

effects.

of

it

the

psychical

by

Borrowing a very

Semon s, 2 we may say

that the brain possesses the faculty of storing

But

"

"

engrammata."

only can store engrammata in the sense of given


combinations of given elements, and therefore nothing but

association

processes

phenomena

by contiguity
it

is

is

absolutely

of

simple

recognition

"

logical

following

of

how the brain


new and free and

inconceivable

qua bodily brain could accomplish the


"

and

immediately related to cerebral

rearrangement of the elements of the engrammata,


the lines

of individuality.

The storing

of en-

cannot be our task here to develop a theory of insanity, and so we


content ourselves with saying that in all "mental diseases it is not the
mind which is ill but the brain on account of abnormalities in the
1

It

"

may

"

"

mind receives what might be called an abnormal reality."


The theory of hypnotism is also beyond the province of this book.

brain the

"

Of

course all hypnotising agents, though "psychical" in themselves, must


The same holds for the phenomenon of so-called
affect the brain somehow.
"

in
subconsciousness
generally called
psychology a very bad term indeed would be a psychoid of inferior order,
according to our terminology.
2
Die Mneme, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1908.
"double

consciousness."

Von Uexkuell

reception"

"What

"

is

s "schemata" promoting
iconoreception and "motoOf
can be nothing except engrammata in the sense defined.
"

"

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
grammata may be compared
with

the

of

faculty

some way,

in

on another occasion, with the

99

elastic

even

after-effect or

but

phonograph,

as already said

the

faculty

of

"

association
by
nay, even the faculty of
with
no
and
has
contrast,
any per
relationship
identity
formance of any combination of physico-chemical agents
"

rearranging,

whatever.

By
more

and more

easily

between

difference

thinking

The

we

a psychological analogy

right or

come

as

still

and judgment.

as they like, but I judge about their being

The

in each case.

wrong

processes

understand

or the difference between idea

of,

ideas

fully

association

shall

what happens. It is the


and apperception we are

its

second has

the

starting-point,

has real cerebral

first

not

it

has been shown in our third proof of vitalism that the


sort.

To

this proof:

the

second cannot be a mechanical process of any

summarise the most important points of


basis

"historical

mechanically,

if

the phonograph

anything

course these

reacting"

basis

but

it

inorganic

"

reveals itself

schemata"

They only can be means

in

understood

be

might

revealed itself as

by

Therefore a factor that

of its elements.
like

of
this

any sense

it

does

in

free combination
is
is

by no means
concerned

in

are acquired, as far as action comes into account.


and are in no sense whatever the acting

for acting

or reacting factor itself.


It must be
(See Zeitschr. f. Biol. 50, 1907.)
mentioned that von Uexkuell himself regards his "schemata" simply as
"

Erkennungsmz
1
Our argument burdens the brain with a
^eZ."

be played in relation to "memory."


Bergson would not even go so far:
relation whatever

into account.
naissance."

to

him

note

1).

(see

to

certain,

him

matter, except so far as


See his excellent analysis of
to

role to

though limited,

"souvenir

"perceptions
"attention"

pur"

has no

purs"

and

come

"recon

Association (except in sleep) is a very active process, according


Matibre et M^moire, Paris, 1896 ; compare also page 66,

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

100

and the

"

can only
be said to have been created by physico-chemical processes,

acting,

that

"

by the stimuli

is,

basis

historical

affecting

of reacting

the brain, as regards its

elements; these elements stand at the disposal of an agent


that

is

6.

autonomic.

REGULABILITY OF MOVEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE

MOTOR ORGANS

We

have finished our discussion of the regulations occur


ring in the brain and of all that is connected with them, and
therewith have closed at the same time the study of the
second type of the possible regulations concerned in move
ment, those relating to the intermediate organs, at least

come into account. Before


hemispheres
adding a few words about regulation among the so-called
certain remarks seem to be required
"lower" brain-centres
"

as far as the

"

about the third possible kind of regulation of movement,


that

is,

about regulations regarding the motor organs as


may be done rather shortly, for facts may

This

such.

suitably

reduced

be

here

to

the

two

other

of

types

regulation.

The dog who


therefore

instance

here

is

wounded

in

one

of

what we mean

of

otherwise than they

there were

still

all

regulations

sumed under our


with

first

the

may

are

legs,
is

It

and

a good

on

going

these three legs

would have been

four of them.

instances of this kind

dealing

his

forced to walk on three legs only,

in the use of the three legs left;

are used

all

is

seems to

used

me

if

that

without difficulty be sub

class of regulations in motion, those

correspondence

between

stimuli

and

101

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
and therefore a

reactions,

discussion

full

not required.

is

Indeed the fact that there are but three sound legs

is

an item in the sum of the motor stimuli and conditions

be

as

just
;

according

part

which

to

the

of

the

"

an

dog would

individualised

stimulus,"

the

of

individuality

But any one who

determined.

of our

the path

crossing

carriage

forms

it

action

is

also gain

it might
from this

prefers

kind of
autonomy
independent proof
motor regulation, by saying that, besides the individual
of

correspondence between the stimulus proper and the action,


correspondence of an individualised type

on between the
the

specified

state

specified

use

of

regulation

are

in.

what kind

relates

of abnormal state the

it

other

and the same

centrifugal nerves are used for one

according to

and

In some way, of course,

them.

to the brain again that this

is

also going

is

of the motor organs

action,

motor organs

very interesting clinical experiment, carried out by


The tendon
Vulpius, deserves mention in this connexion.
of a flexor

was made

halves

perform
being
flexor

to

the function

for

heal in

and one

split

such a

of stretching

After

paralysed.

muscle was

was used

it

muscle of the foot was

way

the

certain

that

of

it

its

could

extensor muscle

time,

in

fact,

the

"

"

split

also

physiologically

bending, part for

stretching,

as

part

of

circum

In a very strange and perfect manner


had succeeded here in using quite
the
acting principle
an abnormal centrifugal nerve, and, of course, quite
stances required.

"

"

Ophiurids deprived of one or more arms also show good instances of


movement. Compare Preyer s experiments, which
have most completely confirmed myself.

this class of regulability in


I

102

SCIENCE

abnormal

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

central

also,

parts

in

the

of

service

certain

One could

reactions that were needed.

"individualised"

hardly imagine a better illustration of the role of the


nervous system as a mere instrument for acting of course,
;

in the light of this discovery the so-called


also

appear

as

nerves for

t.

its

may

motor spheres

"

but absolutely fixed 1 in any


learn to use abnormal centripetal

anything

case the organism

"

normal performances.

THE LOWER BRAIN CENTRES IN VERTEBRATES

To the whole

of our discussion about the role of the brain

in acting in general a few remarks

must be added concerning

knew as early as 1842 that fowls use their wings in the right
the two main nerves of the plexus brachialis are crossed by a
See also Spitzy, Zeitschr f. orthopad. Chir., 1904,
complicated operation.
and Bethe, Miinchner med. Wochenschrift, 1905, No. 25. Most
vol. xiii.
1

Flourens
if

way,

physiologists at present are strongly under the influence of materialistic


doctrines, and therefore try to conceive all complicated animal movement
as a mere sum of reflexes as far as possible.
To such authors the formula

which von Uexkuell has given for certain very primitive motions (page 30)
was very welcome, and they sometimes have tried to found a general theory
on it. According to von Uexkuell s formula, in animals with "simple nervethe state of the terminal (motor) organ determines the path of motor
nets
work almost passively here as mere "reservoirs"
stimulation, the "centres
"

"

"

of

"

case, or

How

absolutely impossible it is thus to understand Vulpius s


the case of the dog walking on three legs, cannot be better shown,

tonus.

seems to me, than by simply alluding to the fact that all the movements
and
question are notoriously under the influence of so-called
(See also Giardina s
certainly do not take their origin from the periphery.
Von Uexkuell s formula only holds good,
discovery, page 105, note 2.)
as he concedes himself, for rhythmical movements once set going, but never
I can walk
for the origin or stopping or alteration of such movements.
almost mechanically and unconsciously, but I can also
to walk or

it

in

"will,"

"will"

In other words

Uexkuell s formula may explain a good deal of the


movements of an animal as far as these movements depend on the spinal
But it never explains how abnormal
cord exclusively (see pages 30 and 103).
regulatory movements tending to a normal end are first established. When
once established, of course, these movements may again obey Uexkuell s law,
as far as their mere going on
not their origin or stopping is concerned.

not

103

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

the physiological importance of the so-called lower braincentres in vertebrates.


Pflliger was the first to speak of a
"

Kiickenmarksseele,"

that

is,

of the faculty of the spinal cord

had been deprived of their whole brain to


But
stimuli in a manner which resembles action.

of frogs that
react to

later researches

have

left it

doubtful whether these reactions

name

of the spinal cord really deserve the

of acting,

it

being

perhaps more probable that there occurs nothing but a con


secutive line of different single motions in correspondence to

a permanent stimulation which has not been removed by


have seen already that
the first or second of them.

We

besides real
Jennings has found such a sort of behaviour
in the infusorium Stentor, and that there is no
acting

reason for speaking of actions in such cases.


It

was Goltz who showed

for the first

time that frogs

deprived of the hemispheres, but possessing


central system than the
reactions

which

to

mere spinal

speak in our

more

of their

cord, are capable of

own terminology

show

most clearly the two fundamental characters of action the


and the individuality of correspondence."
historical basis
:

"

"

"

Schrader afterwards proved the same to hold for the nervous

system of birds, and finally we have the experiments carried


1
out by Goltz on a dog with no hemispheres at all.
What these animals performed, was indeed much less
than what they would have done with the use of the parts
act
in the true sense
removed.
But, after all, they did
"

"

of the

word

obstacles were avoided, even if one of the legs

was made helpless

there were reactions to specific optic

Goltz,
Pfliiger, Die sensorischen Furiktionen des Riickenmarks, 1853
Beitrdge zur Lehre von den Funktionen der Nervencentren des Froschcs, 1869
and Pfliiger s Archiv, 51, 1892. Schrader, ibid. 41, 1887, and 44, 1889.
;

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

104

sensations; dogs (but not pigeons) ate


frogs

caught

pigeons

flies,

it is

flew

The

calculation of distance.

true, for the greater part

and drank spontaneously,

with an absolutely right


"

"

of these animals,

memory

related to experience gained

before the operation, but to a certain extent they also were

new

able to acquire

experience even in their defective state.

In other words, on the basis


"

of a

"

general

prospective

the lower parts of the brain acquired a definite

potency

"prospective
1

therefore cannot be

It

acquired.

which otherwise they would not have

value,"

denied that acting in

possible even without the main part of the


brain, though the degree of this acting is of a much lower

some measure

is

kind.

The term

made use

"

Antwortsreaktion,"

was invented by Goltz

of elsewhere,

what he had discovered


spheres.

He

which we have already


to describe

in his frog deprived of the

hemi

himself speaks of the impossibility of imagining

a machine as the basis of the phenomena, and then tries to


It is strange that he

introduce a psychological terminology.


did not notice that
processes, that

it

was

vitalism, the

had been proved by

Goltz does not stand alone here


the so-called

"

"

soul

autonomy

his

many

of vital

discoveries.

But

authors agree that

plays a positive and causal role in act

without noticing that a natural factor which is neither


is thus introduced into the argument.

ing,

chemical nor physical

That

real acting

hemispheres,
1

is

Therefore, as

may

go on in animals deprived of the

of great importance, of course, for the theory

Lewandowsky

not able to teach us the

also well observes, operative experiments are

performances of the parts left by them.


But they demonstrate what I call the "prospective potency," and that is
more valuable. All experiments about electric irritability of parts of the
brain,

"normal"

of course, relate to their

"prospective value"

hypothetical remarks on the newly born in the text.

only.

Compare our

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
of life-autonomy in general

not only

it

105

shows that the

related to the cerebrum, but

"

"

psychoid

may

is

also use the

One might say that a higher sort


the
main
brain, a lower one the thalapsychoid governs

lower parts of the brain.


of

nms

opticus, the cerebellum, the medulla,

and so on, and

would correspond, in some way, with the discrimination


between consciousness and subconsciousness that is made
this

"

"

by some modern psychologists or rather pseudo-psychologists.


But it may well be true, in spite of our statement, that all
motor entelechy
that

is

one and the

same

in one individual,

and

only on account of the primitive state of their

it is

can do

with the lower parts of


the brain than with the hemispheres.
In any case there
organisation

that

it

less

must remain an open question.


Eegulability in a vicarious sense

the lower brain themselves

is

among the parts of


beautifully shown by some

experiments of Luciani carried out on the cerebellum, whose


function

it is

movement.

to maintain the equilibrium of the

All disturbances of

its

functions

body during
caused

by
were regulated after a short time.
Even
the extirpation of a whole half was followed by ataxy only
for a while, and then regulation set in, and
swimming and
partial extirpation

2
walking went on as well and symmetrically as before.

Compare our analysis of the

Recent discoveries of Giardina

belong here

also.

of the hemispheres.
(Arch. Entiv.-mech. 23, 1907) seem to
Pieces of the tail of tadpoles, if taken from very young
"potencies"

animals, move in co-ordination, but if they are taken from animals of a certain
age co-ordination is established only after a while. In the latter case the

lumbar spinal cord had already exercised a certain influence in the sense of
a general governing, and the co-ordination
centres
had to be established
secondarily in the nervous system of the tail, whilst they were arranged ab
So-called "shock" was excluded experi
origine in the very young pieces.
"

mentally.
"segmental

All this
theory"

is

the first place against Loeb s so-called


physiology, and is, in fact, well able to

directed in

of nervous

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

106

K.

DIFFERENT DEGREES OF ACTING IN DIFFERENT ANIMALS 1

Human

acting was the starting-point and centre of our

analysis of acting

we

if

but our discussion would be incomplete

said nothing about the different kinds

and degrees of

acting in the other parts of the animal kingdom.

Man and

the Highest

Animals Contrasted

Darwinism and phylogeny laid stress on man s affinity


animals, and with justice in respect to most details of

to

his

organisation

was always a

that was all right so

far,

though there

with regard to the hemispheres of


In agreement with this particular the experi

the brain.

ments of the

difficulty

last

few years, carried out by English and

American authors (Lloyd Morgan, Thorndike, Hobhouse,


Kinnamann), have shown that as far as the degree of acting
the point of comparison, there

is

is

a difference between

man and even the highest ape which is simply enormous


man after all remains the only reasoning organism, in

"

"

spite of the theory of descent.

We

have said more than once that motions

are the only subject

and nothing

we

But

else.

of animals

are studying in this chapter, motions


to describe

them

at all satisfactorily

Giardina claims to have proved by his experiments an indipenddisprove it.


enzainiziale o virtuale, but not an indipendenza effectiva"
these concepts
seem to signify about the same as the terms "prospective potency" and
"

"

"

"

prospective
1

value,"

as applied to brain physiology.

found in the following works


Lloyd Morgan, Introduction to Com

fuller reference to the subject will be

Thorndike, Animal Intelligence, 1898.

"Wasmann, Instinkt und Intelligenz im Tierreich,


parative Psychology, 1903.
3. Auflage, 1905.
Here the full literature may be found. The recent litera

ture on the subject

Psychology number
article "Animal

is

well discussed in the articles of the "Comparative

"

of the Psychological Bulletin (vol. v. No.


Behaviour" in The American Naturalist, vol.

6),

and

xlii. p.

in the

207.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
we hardly can avoid

psychological terminology, and in fact

nobody would blame us


emphatically that

107

for

we make

applying it, after we have stated


use of it only in the sense of a

descriptive analogy.

Apes and
an

"

it

dogs,

is

a good deal

true, learn

there

is

"

historical

basis

to their acting of a very complicated

character indeed, but their acting lacks

This

"abstraction."

would seem

all

that

we

call

be the chief reason

to

they invent nothing, and have nothing resembling


Wundt has well said
language except quite superficially.

why

somewhere that animals have no language not for any


reason of their organisation, but because they have nothing
to talk about.

lack

of a

It is

real

how

very strange indeed

absolute the

inventive or imitative faculty

is

even in

Thorndike observed some apes kept in a


with several doors that might easily be opened
he opened a door several times very carefully and distinctly
the highest apes.

sort of stable

show the apes the mechanism


them followed his manipulations.

in order to

one of

of opening, but not

Only

after

one of

the animals had succeeded in opening the door by chance


did

it

notice

Even then
experience

what opening was, and thus

his fellows did not profit


:

by

"

"

learn

their

opening.

companion

each animal had to learn by personal experi

ence, realising absolutely

by chance what opening was.

Certainly there exists even in apes that which our term


"

historical basis of reacting

their behaviour

is

"

expresses.

The

specificity of

determined by their individual history,

by the specificity of the stimuli that occurred to them,


and by the effects of these stimuli.
But the individual
i.e.

combination of the elements of their experience is far less


Some
complicated and far less variable than it is in mau.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

108

Wasmann,

authors, like

animals

may

Gedachtnis

possess

have said aptly that

for instance,
"

sensorial

memory"

("

sinnliches

but nothing more. 1

")

me that analysis must keep especially to


one point of the characteristics of acting in order to state
well in what the differences in behaviour between man and
seems to

It

We

higher animals have their foundations.

another occasion that the term

and

historical basis

way.

it,

may

in

a landscape

have said on

as a part of the

relative.

Everything
concerned in the creation of the

be regarded as an

Single words or

phrase
of

effects

"

element

means something

analysis of action
in the stimuli

"

letters

may

individual bodies, or anything

it,

element

some

"

in

be the elements of a

may be whole

the elements

or the individual bodies in

"

some parts

or

Now

else.

parts

of the

think a

fair

description of the behaviour even of higher animals would


be, that

they are far

data into elements.

less

They

capable than

man

of resolving

cling to the combinations in the

form in which they have occurred, at any rate they do not


go farther than to resolve what is given into individual
bodies

a stick and a bone are as

it

were the very

letters

of a dog s alphabet.

And from

all

this

follows

the

range of their power of combination


their association is only

time, but never

and therefore

by
the

comparatively small
:

for it follows

by contiguity, be

it

that

in space or in

similarity or contrast in the real sense,

material

to

be

combined

in

acting,

according to individualised circumstances, is very small.


1

But

do not agree with Wasmann when he tries to regard this "sinn


as akin to instinct
for it is the chief criterion of instinct

liches Gedachtnis

that

it

"

does not rest upon a

"

historical

basis."

109

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

power of resolving data seems to


be the reason of the rather low mental state of animals
all the other differences between the acting of men and the

Thus the lack

of the

acting of animals

are

consequences

fundamental

of this

diversity.

But we should not learn very much more for our


this
philosophical purposes by entering more deeply into
and I therefore must leave the further study of the
differences in the acting of the highest animals and of man
subject,

to your personal meditation.

Higher Invertebrates
Acting of the type found in apes and in dogs seems by

no means

restricted to the higher

vertebrates only

many

not only ants and bees but also beetles, seem to be


capable of actions of almost the same degree of complexity.

insects,

you know, I suppose, that Sir John Lubbock, now


Lord Avebury, has carried out numerous beautiful experi

Many

of

ments about the experience of

ants.

"

need only remind


instance.
He found
I

bridge-experiment," for
you of his
what modern students of the behaviour of dogs and apes
there is acting, but so-called abstraction
have found also
:

is

almost completely lacking.


can now assert with perfect confidence that the old

We

view was very mistaken which regarded the behaviour of


ants and bees as quite like the behaviour of a human
Acting
creatures than it

society.

developed in a

is
is

much

of

far

less

high degree

in

these

in man, but their instinctive life

higher degree, as

we know

in fact that is almost inconceivable to us.

is

in a degree

We

of course

110

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

take the word instinct here in

its strictest

nifying a complicated reaction that


time,

and

meaning, as

perfect the very

is

sig
first

remind you once more

I take this opportunity to

of the fundamental problems of the doctrine of instincts,


relating to the possibility of their regulability

being called forth

and

to their

by individualised stimuli.

Experience in insects, of course, though of a far less


high degree if compared with human experience, may in

and may relate


occurrences that are experienced.
Thus it

spite of that be of a very different character,


to very different

might be
able to

we have

possible, as

said already, that bees are

remember the absolute amount and

direction of a

that in fact would


change of their localisation in space
be something of which man can be said to have only a very
;

shadowy

idea.

The Lowest Forms of Acting


Let us close our present discussions with a few words
about the most inferior kinds of experience.

we know,

Psychologically, as

the

most simple case of

remembering occurs by the mere observation of


that

is,

in noticing that a certain stimulus

a former

It

one.

would

objectively

the existence

organisms

there

when an animal

may

The second

step,

this

be
sort

sameness,"

the same as

possible
of

to

prove

experience

in

very likely be something of this sort

reacts

second time than the

hardly
of

is

"

quicker to a certain stimulus the


1

first.

or rather the second foundation of

1
Compare the experiment on Daphnids, carried out by Davenport and
Cannon, Journ. of Physiol 21, 1897.

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
remembering in the psychological

111

sense, is constituted

the mere act of association by contiguity

but also recalls other

only recalls the idea of sameness


stimuli (and effects) which
first

time.

"

not acting;

is

rate from true

ence

had been combined with

it

the

of this sort, of course, is only concerned

Memory

in acting, but

by

a stimulus not

even

it

better kept sepa

is

altogether, the

"experience"

word

"experi

an

being reserved for something about acting as

actuality.

in this sense is seen in its most simple


Experience
type, if one of the elements concerned in associative memory
"

"

is

a certain behaviour of the motor organs, able to call forth

liking or to overcome disliking.

from this kind of

It is

man

experience that the acting of

takes

origin, as

its

we

have discussed already, when dealing with the so-called


but it is this kind of
origin of the act of volition
;

experience, too,
"

acting,"

which

even

if

fully deserves the

almost

no

name

historical

basis

of reacting

the

of

resolution

"

"

of a basis of

its

remoter

have

studied

into

given

elements

occurs.

American authors

especially

the

most

simple types of acting in lower animals, in particular in


Infusoria, Actiniae,

worms, and crayfishes.

We

on another occasion already, when trying

have stated

to

define

the

concept of acting in its contrast to other kinds of changeable

motor reactions, that a mere consecutive


reactions in response to one

line of changes of

and the same often repeated

as discovered by Jennings in the Protozoon


and in the earthworm, never deserves the name of

stimulus,
Stentor

real acting,
1

but

may

be due either to fatigue or to some

For literature see the work of Jennings referred to at page

17, note 1.

112

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

unknown

conditions of the physiological state of the organism.

But there

is acting, if

C have answered

first

C answers

being understood of course that


a

"

liking

the organism

and

is

had overcome a

or

"

time the reactions A, B, and

a one

to the stimulus

the second time

if

the

that

after the other,

it

any delay, it
was C that had produced
"

"

disliking

on the part of

what actually happens in

is

and

to it without

Stentor,

very important as being a case of experience in a

simple motor act.

Primitive forms of experience relating

to motorial combinations

in Crustacea.

can be studied most advantageously

In Yerkes

"
"

labyrinth

experiment a crab

was placed in a box containing two different tracks, only


The crab ran at random
one of which led to the water.
for a while, until at the

entrance to

the water

water was taken with

end of many

"

"

trials

it

found the

the second time the path to the

much

fewer mistakes, and at the end

of a set of experiments the crab ran to the water directly

Here we have a most typical case


of previous motor
which the effect

without going wrong.

"

"

of

"

experience

stimuli

is

we assume

in

"

concerned, and

it

hardly matters at

all,

whether

that the crab was guided by sight or that

it

was

guided by some spatial memory, unknown to us, such as we


have supposed to exist in some insects.
Experience here
consisted in the omission of a set of previous reactions in

favour of the last effective one occurring in a series of con


secutive stimulations.

In another set of experiments carried

A
by Spaulding the facts lay a little differently.
hermit crab was fed with pieces of fish placed under a
green screen, and after a certain number of experiments it
out

ran beneath the green screen even

if

no piece was

there.

Similar experiments have been carried out by the pupils of

113

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
the Eussian physiologist

Pawlow with

cases a certain reaction, originally caused

A,

is

In

dogs.

way

that always

Whilst in the instance with the crab

was united with A.


its

clear kind

was a very

to the water there

Both

of trial, there is not trial in the second experiment.


offer

experiments

these

by the stimulus

in the end called forth by a stimulus

shortening

all

good instances of the two fundamental

characters of our historical basis

in the first

it is

not only

former stimuli but former effects also that are responsible


for the specificity of the reaction, in the second it is

former

stimuli only.

But the scheme

is

always the same.


"

fine instance of real

"

training

"

by means

of

"

lessons

has been demonstrated by Jennings in his excellent paper

on

the

movements
"

"

Training

former

of

the

starfish,

relates to the righting

stimuli,

referred

already

movements

to.

in this case

former reactions, and former

effects

are

equally concerned here.


And now let us close our long discussions of animal

motions with some remarks of a most general character.


1
But here the process influenced by association is not movement but
secretion of the salivary glands. Compare in particular, besides the writings of
Pawlow himself, the good article by Boldyreff in Zeitschr. f. d. Ausbau d.
i., 1907, Hefte 5 and 6.
Compare our general discussion on pages 63-65. In the experiment de
trial and error" as used by Jennings is quite
scribed by Yerkes the term
appropriate what was at first the effect of a series of trials including errors
will become the immediate reaction when the stimulus appears a second
But it seems to me unjustified to speak of trial and error when there
time.
is no objectified experience, and when a series of consecutive various reactions

Entw.-lehre, vol.
2

"

only ceases
there

is

if

a certain state

is

reached

this state

may be

no criterion to discover this in lower animals.

calls the "resolution of

the physiological states one into

"

"

liked

one, but

What

Jennings

another"

expresses

about the same as does my "historical basis of reaction." But Jennings


is wrong when he says that this "resolution" only becomes "easier and

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

114

"

X.

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM

"

REFUTED

In analysing acting we have become convinced that, on


account of the individualised correspondence between cause
founded on a basis historically created, we are
not able to explain what is going on by the aid of physics

and

effect,

and chemistry, or of mechanics, if you prefer to say so.


is a new and autonomic natural factor concerned in

There

action, a factor

Now

it

is

unknown

to the inorganic world.

very important to notice well, that by stating

the autonomy of natural events as occurring in action

we

are in fundamental contradiction with a wide-spread theory

that

is

at present very

the theory of

I refer to

we

least

of this

much

in vogue

among

psychologists.
]

"

psycho-physical

parallelism."

At

are in a fundamental contradiction with one side

All of you know, I suppose, what that

theory.

theory claims, and I can dismiss

it

the more briefly since

James Ward, a few years ago, gave a splendid


sketch of the different aspects of the theory of psycho-

Professor

physical parallelism in this very place.

The theory
basis

by

of parallelism

may

start

from a metaphysical

saying that the psychical and the physical facts

are but different aspects of one

unknown

absolute reality,

standing in permanent correspondence with each other, as

Spinoza and his followers, though


Or the
sometimes stated in a more materialistic form.

was

the

opinion

of

more rapid with each repetition


that is most important.
"

tieele

there are links left out of the chain,

Compare the general critical discussions in Busse,


und Leib, Leip/ig, 1903. See also H. Bergson,
mttaph. et m&r. 12, No.
M&noire (1896), by the same author.

psycho-physiologique," Rev.

Mature

et

6,

und Xorper,

Geist
"Le

1904,

and

paralogisme

and the book

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
theory

parallelistic

an

be put upon

may

115

phenomenological basis, stating that the

idealistic

"

Given,"

and

as being

on the one hand, and as being immediate


on
the
other, shows a complete correspond
self-experience
ence of the elements of its two sides, there being not a
objectified in space

single element of the one side without a correlated element

on the

In either case the advocates of the theory of

other.

parallelism have held that


forms a continuous chain

the physical side of their duality

of

strictly

mechanical events without any gap in

means been proved by the defenders


theory, but

physico-chemical
it.

of

or

That has by no
the parallelistic

generally has been regarded as self-evident


without any further reflection.
it

There can be no doubt that we cannot agree with these


statements regarding the physical part of the parallelistic

theory in any of

not at

is

all

action as a

its

usual forms

we have shown

that there

an unbroken mechanical chain of events in

phenomenon

of motion, that there

is

a mutual

between factors which are mechanical or physicochemical and factors which are of quite another elemental

relation

character.

But

it

must be well kept

"

psycho
1

"-physical

in

mind

we do not speak

interactions in spite of that

of

our funda-

shown that parallelism on an


wish to say in passing that even
metaphysically parallelism has always proved and always will prove to be
How could a mere sum or
quite an impossible statement in our opinion.
addition, as the physical side of the supposed reality is maintained to be,
from its other side" as a something that is quite certainly not such
appear
a mere addition? Pai^lleiiaiiL.n.ciwadays seems to be almost wholly ,4riyen
out of the field.
Even Wundt is no longer a convinced parallelist. That
Kant never was a parallelist is proved in my book Der Vitalismus als
In one of the next chapters

it

idealistic basis is a simple absurdity.

will be

We

"

Geschichte

und

translation.

als Lehre.

See in particular the additions

made

to the Italian

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

116

mental point of view, which

to say so, at least as long as

Our statements regarding

idealism, forbids us

is critical

we

are not metaphysicians.

action refer to natural events in

there are factors contrary


space and to such events only
to mechanics in these natural events, but these factors are
:

"

natural

"

"

factors too

they belong to

in the

"

physics

modern

sense of the ancients, though not to physics in the


sense.

Our

(f>v(Ti,fcd,

an agent or factor of nature, looked upon as part of

"

"

in this

psychoid

sense

is

factor of

ra

Givenness.

From our

idealistic

metaphysical,

as long

standpoint,
"

"

psychology

and

as

is

it

non-

"

the

"

belong

psychical

the self-experiences of the Ego.

among
The question now arises, if from such a point of view there
might not be room for a parallelism of quite a new type, very

exclusively

strange perhaps at the


"

and

Ego

my

first
"

"

my

psychoid

glance

a parallelism of

"

my

work

as a natural factor at

in

Perhaps that would only be a parallelism of

body.

methodological sort that might be called doctrinaire.

Let

us only note for the present that, for the sake of analytical
clearness,
tion,

may

my Ego
in fact

and

my

psychoid, as

my

object of reflec

be regarded as being in activity

"
"

parallel

A special chapter of our


with respect to one another.
future lectures will be devoted to the deeper elucidation of
the relations between idealistic philosophy and vitalism in
its

most general

sense.

At any

we must deny

there

is

rate

the claim of parallelism that

an unbroken mechanical chain of events in acting,

and we must deny


psycho "-physical interaction also, if
we wish not to become metaphysicians. By our non"

metaphysical point of view

we

avoid,

of course,

all

the

117

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS

how

of

difficulties

between two

be an

there ever could

such

of

entities

"interaction"

absolutely different kinds

It is
as the
psyche and the physical reality in space.
well known that it was especially these difficulties which
"

"

led

to

Spinoza

doctrine

of

and

monads,
of

theories

idealistic

dogmatic parallelism, Leibniz to his

his

and Kant

Berkeley

different

styles.

their

to

From our

present

between
interactions
view we only recognise
- chemical
and
non
chemical
agents of
physico
"

"

point

of

physico

nature.

/JL.

THE SUPRA-PERSONAL FACTOR OF ACTING IN HISTORY


form

remarks

These short

one

of

the

ends

of

our

discussion of acting, and at the same time one of the ends


of our long discussion

of problems

The next

science altogether.

of

analytical

natural

lecture will bring us into the

realm of the real philosophy of nature.


But still another end must be given to our theory of
action

history,

let

us say a few words about the role of acting in

and about what may follow therefrom.

That human

throughout based on acting


needs no further explanation, and indeed finds its proper
history

is

"

expression

in

the

concept

reacting, as being one of

of

are the

what he

"

historical

basis

the foundations of action

individual history of the acting


specificity of

the

man

is

of

the

responsible for the

That speaking and writing


factors, upon which the history

will do.

most fundamental

of generations builds itself up, also needs only to be shortly

mentioned.

But another problem

arises,

one related with the problem

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

118
of

human

of last

history in general, as discussed in the last lecture

summer.

No

Supra-personal Factor knoum in History Proper

Does history teach us that there are concerned in true


historical states and events any elemental agents or factors
or

laws which

additional

formula

fundamental
its

are

what

to

individual

of

two familiar principles ?


The answer to this question

said

is

acting,

in

resting

the

upon

by our analysis
of history by proving that the history of mankind seems to
be a mere process of cumulation only, a process by which one
is

given

simply added to the other without there

is

complication

we know, the
By proving this we express at

being, as far as

"

"

of a real unity.

evolution

the same time that in the

we only
but no new

State, in religion, in science, in law, in economics

meet cumulations of acting and


So-called

elementalities.

law,

as

created

their results,
"

"

philosophies

of the State or of

most profoundly by Hegel,

philosophical branches of the second order

same

the philosophy of action in the


stands to chemistry and physics.
"

entities,"

as far as

The

terminology.

we know,

State

say, for so very often in

organism was pretended


of the State

Even

is

to

be

they stand to

relation as geology

State and law are no

to

not an

modern

therefore, are

speak in an ontological
"

organism

"-

strange to

literature the real biological


"

"

explained
"

the so-called

"

States

on the analogy
and ants

of bees

are real organisms only to a very small degree

and not

in

detail.

In order that any form of

human

society might properly

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
be called an organism in

119

would be required that

itself, it

disturbances of this organism should be repaired by force

But nothing

of the whole.

of this sort exists

"

"

in social

regulations

for instance,

life, as,

that needs workers attracts

whilst an overcrowded

them by

there are

when

a business

offering better payment,

business readily parts with work

happens for the sake of the individuals


liking and happiness, and for no other reason, as far as we
There certainly is a little more of real organisation
know.
people

but

all this

"

in the

of

State

"

Hymenoptera.

Morality as a Supra-personal Factor

But now

let

us ask another more general question

anything new appear


there

is

in nature besides

not one single acting

human

mere

acting,

Does

when

being, but a

community,
on
the
scene
?
Such
a new
beings
of course, would play its part in social life, though

or at least two
factor,

human

not in a properly

We

also

may

"

"

historical

ask

sense.

like

this

Is

really

complete

philosophy of acting already created or at least prepared


the analysis
chief thing

we have given
is

of acting

and

still

seems to

me

by

that one

for

social becoming,

we have

It

it ?

such a preparation, and that


the elemental entity that is concerned in

wanting

this chief thing is


historical

of

besides the two principles

analysed.

Entelechy in morphogenesis, metabolism, and instinctive


life tends to guarantee the
specificity of form and function

entelechy in acting, our psychoid, guarantees the realisation


of

what

quite

is

"liked"-

intelligibly

to

by the

speak

little

incorrectly, but

performer of the action.

In

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

120

both cases

for the sake of the

is

it

of the eutelechy

"bearer

that everything goes on.

But

if

there

is

acting between two or

more human beings

a very
do not say that there always is
there may
strange exception to this retortion on the performer himself
there may occur acting which tends not to the liking of the

be

agent but to the normal state or the liking of another


This kind of acting may even lead to the sacrifice
being.
"

"

of the agent s

What

life

in order that

occurs here

is

"

the other

"

may

be saved.

as contrary to entelechy as

entelechy to mechanics, though

in

some

way

it

was

shows a

certain similarity to instinct.

In these few words we have sketched the character


istics

of morality,

of morality

of bodily nature

phenomenon
same time, it seems

to me,

that

is,

considered

by a naturalist

1
;

and

we have given account

as

at the

of the

second elemental entity, besides acting for oneself, that was


still

wanted in order

to complete the truly elemental facts

upon which the history and social life of mankind are built
History and its results, taken by themselves, are mere
up.
cumulations, but cumulations grown up by the permanent
interaction of entelechial
It

is

general

life in all its

forms and morality.

not unimportant to notice that the role which


morality

plays,

or

rather

which

moral

acting

individuals play in history, might have an enormous effect

even

if

history were proved

evolutionary

elements.

law regulating the


1

is

some day

Morality in

actions

among

to contain certain

as

the general

least

two human

fact,

at

Morality, of course, from such a point of view belongs to "nature," and


We shall come back
it, as is often asserted by philosophers.

not alien to

to this point at the

end of the book.

121

ORGANIC MOVEMENTS
beings, could

would do

It

phases.

could

evolution

possibly counteract

whenever

so

evolution

"

"

and stop

it.

led through immoral

Suppose that an evolutionary process of any kind


only be effected by war or revolution, and that

the majority of a people objected to war and revolution

moral reasons

for

then evolution would be stopped in

We

favour of morality.

have spoken of the possibility that

contain certain

history might

evolutionary elements.

If

were evolution throughout, all morality," of course, would


there would in reality be no such thing
"

it

be only apparent
the

as

between two

relation

there would be one


its

individuals
"

super-individuum

"

in

this

case,

using the biological

"

individuals as

"

"

means."

CONCLUSIONS OF SECTION A

Our survey
of

biology as

of the

most important theoretical results


science is ended
discussion of

a natural

these results as such

may

begin and, indeed,

to

is

occupy

us for the rest of these lectures.

Nobody can blame


the

concept

us, I

of biology

in

suppose, for having understood


too

narrow a sense

on the

some people might say perhaps that too many


have
been brought by us to the court of biological
problems
natural science, such as the history and culture and morality
contrary,

of mankind.

But

biology, I think,

natural science of all that


1

is

living

must be taken

and of

all

the

as the

phenomena

In this case moral feeling itself would be subjected to evolution which,


That, otherwise, all sorts of cumulations are
personally, I do not believe.
able to be stopped by morality is too obvious to require further
analysis.
The problem of the content of morality as such lies beyond the limits of this
book.

122

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

offered in

as states

we have

any way during life, as far as they can be defined


and changes of bodies in space and all the facts
;

discussed could be defined in this manner.

from the great variety of biological subjects


that biology, if understood in its full sense, comes face to
face with many special sciences, borrowing something from
It follows

each of them

only then can biology be said to be complete,

and to be a material that

is

well prepared for the philosophy

of organic nature.
1

Only one

field of

problematic biological phenomena has not been taken


I feel quite unable to judge here personally in

into account altogether, as

I refer to the so-called


spiritualistic phenomena.
refer for this subject to the critical publications of the

any way.

may

Frank Podmore

The reader
"Society

for

Studies in Psychical Research (London,


The only thing that seems
1897) giving an excellent survey of the same.
to be established beyond all doubt is "telepathy"; and even telepathy

Psychical

Research,"

might perhaps some day be understood as being a phenomenon of radiation


comparable with wireless telegraphy. The only new thing in it would then
be the faculty of man to put special parts of his brain into a special state
That at least would be the
voluntarily, as he can do with his muscles.
most simple theory. Of course, there might be at work also something
absolutely different (see the end of Podmore

book).

What we have

called

(with Semon) engrammata would in some way be comparable with what


possibly is transmitted in telepathy (see page 98).

SECTION B
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE OEGANISM

123

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN GENERAL

1.

PHILOSOPHY of nature

is

the demonstration of the general


the

scheme of nature based upon


of

received

It

reason.

its

character

or

essence

modern foundation from the

Kant and

though Kant
himself, in his conception of the categories and the a priori,
went only as far as to show by what means such a
In answering one of his
philosophy might be built up.

analytical

work

"

fundamental

questions

"

moglich

?
("

proved that

of

How

it

Wie

ist

reine Naturwissenschaft

he
pure natural science possible ?
on
account
of
some
faculties
possible

is

really

his followers,

"),

is

of reason referring to concepts and principles of relation in

These concepts and principles are a priori or


self-evident, in other words, they cannot be denied when
Givenness.

once understood in their meaning, albeit they do not rest


solely on the logical principle of contradiction.

was the school

It

of Schelling

and Hegel, and

to

some

extent Schopenhauer also, that tried to develop the ideas of

Kant

at least

but, unfortunately, the

were not very

critical

two first-named philosophers


in their deduction, the whole

subject of a philosophy of nature


fantastic

under their hands.


125

becoming more or less


That has done the utmost

126

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

harm

to

times.

the

nature in

our

Philosophy of nature, in its true sense, has been

discredited altogether

the

conception of

philosophical

period

of

a period of

mere empiricism followed


more than that,

the natural philosophers

there was not only the strong endeavour to get empirical

which might have been very useful indeed

knowledge

but there was the

conviction that there

never

could

be

anything more than mere empirical experience at all.


Such an opinion is still predominant in our times, and

need only mention the names of Mach, Clifford, Pearson,


and Ostwald to remind you of this state of affairs, and to
I

remind you, at the same time, that the men of science who
hold the empirical view sketched above are in fact among
the best representatives of science in our days.
Nevertheless,

it

my

is

strongest conviction that such a

wrong and incomplete, and


that the work of Schelling and Hegel was certainly true
and valuable so far as its aim went.
There can be a
conception of natural sciences

is

philosophy of nature resting on the foundations of criticism,


and evolving a real system of nature from reason without

and there

use of uncontrolled imagination;

the

will

be

such a system some day, there will be a system that really


deserves to be called philosophy of nature in the old sense
of this term.

In this

been

country the term

"

natural philosophy

justified in so far as a great

part of

does in fact rest on principles

philosophy
agree with

of nature,
this

that

natural

statement.

philosophy

is

has

certainly

theoretical physics

are

part of a

real

even though physicists

But the

"

"

and that

restricted to mathematical physics,

"

as

identical

might not
use of the word

with

mathematical

127

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

physics must be said to be misleading in so far as there


are

many

purely

empirical

principles

in

mathematical

physics also, only the consequences of which are explained


Of course, there is nothing of a real
mathematically.

philosophy of nature in explanations of this kind.


We shall deal in the remainder of this work with the

But do not expect a complete

philosophy of the organism.

system of life from my future discussion.


be very disappointed if you did so.

philosophical

You would
In

show you

shall try to

fact, I

lectures that the laws of

life

mmt

in this section of

be what they

my

are, that

reasoning forbids us to accept any other law, and that

acknowledge the actual laws,

forces us to

when once

But I shall do so only


meaning is understood.
end of a rather long discussion which will move,

it

their

at the

so

to

systematic philosophy and

speak, half-way between mere


theoretical science.

The time

is

feel

of

the

of

system

philosophical

number

not ripe for offering you a real complete

organism

At

discussions.

preliminary

without
least

a
I

great

myself

unable to offer you such a system without a certain

amount

Therefore I shall begin with the

of preparation.

discussion of certain fragments of a future complete system

of philosophical biology, or rather with certain considerations


relating to

it

and not

till

to sketch the outlines of

Our

first

task

is

what

will really deserve the

and the organism.


a limited one we must

of a pure philosophy of

the general concepts

that has been done shall I try

name

life

we have gained from

first

bring

the analysis of

biological facts into connexion with parts of the philosophical

system of the Inorganic, at

least

with some special concepts

128

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

Of

and laws concerned in that system.


not

time

ourselves

Inorganic here
the parts of
will

easily

though you

it

to

formulate

course,

we have

real

system of the
ready and perfect
which we shall use are such that all of you
let

us imagine that

understand what

may

is

it is

being spoken about, even

regard as singularities

parts of a great unity

and

totality.

what

in truth are

THE CONCEPT OF TELEOLOGY

2.

We begin our philosophical analysis by summarising the


most general results of the scientific part of these lectures
This will lead us to the
in a new form and terminology.
discussion of a concept which plays a very important role
in

the

usual

logic

regarded as a real
regulative

Many

and

and ontology, a concept which is


category by some and as of a mere

heuristic character

of you, I suppose, will

by others.
have noticed that in the

whole of our previous discussions, this year and last, we


have strictly avoided making use of a certain term, though
almost

all

our analysis related to the meaning of that term.


"

"

Teleology
"

and

is

the concept I

am

thinking of

the words

"

have not been used a single


teleology
teleological
time and in spite of that we have almost always dealt
"

"

with phenomena which were teleological or

"

"

purposeful

in

the highest sense.

TELEOLOGY IN GENERAL
Let us begin our studies with a few analytical words
about teleology, without discussing at present the true
logical or ontological nature of this concept.

In ordinary language and also in science, as long as science


129

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

130

remains purely descriptive, the word

"

"

The

applied to relations of very great variety.


"

are very

"

purposeful

birds for flying


is

for walking,

men

feet of

and so are the wings

of

the process of regeneration in the earthworm

purposeful, as is also the formation of

an antitoxin after a

the insect Phyllum has

a very purposeful

snake

bite

form and colour

for being protected

the modern railway system


is

might be

purposeful

is

very purposeful too

a very purposeful instrument

But

against enemies.

and of a

the

man who

lift

triples

might be said that he acted


purposefully on some occasion, while the physician also acts
his fortune in three years it

when by an

purposefully

operation he saves his

patient

from death.

There is not the slightest doubt that the word purposeful


cannot be used scientifically without thoroughly sifting its
meaning.
Let us, in

the

first

avoid applying

place,

purposeful to mere arrangements or states

any kind
sense

it

not purposeful but

is

may

be called

"a

"

is

useful

and

purpose,"

allows some events to go on which are

Only events, then, are


But when is an event to be

sense.

is it

not

the

an engine of

"

it

is

in a certain

useful if

it

"

"

in

purposeful

any

"

purposeful."

called purposeful

and when

To comprehend the proper meaning of the term


"

word

us start by considering

ful

let

this

term

is

my own

originally applicable.

a line of thought which later on

We
is

to

"

purpose

actions, to

which

shall here pursue

lead us to very

important consequences, but which at present is merely


used for the sake of a clear terminology.
My acting is
purposeful whenever it serves to bring about what I like
"

"

131

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
away with what

or to do

acting always

a certain state of the

is

an engine,

"

to exist

The

I dislike.

for instance

that

my

of

purpose

medium

"

ought

always external

is

it

"
"

with respect to myself, and therefore the concept of a selfAll my acting towards
purpose may be declined a limine.
"

"

means
a purpose is based upon knowledge of the
by
be
and
which the purpose may
attained,
upon judgment of
"

"

"

the

of those means.

"

suitability

From

this it is

purposeful

he

acts

acting in such a
like

him under

being

is

purposefully,

manner that

man s

whenever

acting-

him

see

I can imagine myself acting

similar conditions, that

placed,

and should

act in

men
we

of other

is,

if

I can imagine

should have some liking or disliking,

some way

from

It follows

is true, if

in order to gratify or to obviate

this that purposefulness in the acting

always judged of by analogy alone.


pass from man to the higher animals

some

may

even

be said to be intelligible

degree.

But things become more


to the

This

is

the actions of an ape or a dog


in

call another

under the circumstances in which the other human

that,

it.

but one step to

lowest organisms,

still

processes of morphogenesis

have we

the

right

to

difficult

as soon as

certain

purposeful or teleological and others not

Mere analogy would

fail

pass

regarded as acting, and

and metabolism

claim

we

such

in

to

what cases

processes

as

here to justify the application

we cannot imagine ourselves in the


situation of a newt repairing its foot
we are certainly un
able to regenerate our own foot if it is lost in an accident,
of the term, for, in fact,

and even

our body could repair it, the process would


in a so-called unconscious manner.
on
We
probably go
if

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

132

must then seek

somewhat

for a

different criterion of teleology

without leaving the analogy with our own acting quite out
of sight.

Now

seems to

it

me

that

would not meet the point

it

and morphogenetic processes are


simply because they serve to form and to

to say that physiological


teleological

for this argument, taken by itself,


would not imply that there is something that ought to be
We gain a deeper insight into the
formed and preserved.

preserve the organism

nature of the individual organism, if we remember that the


organism is of the type of a specific constellation of simple
elements, and that
in innumerable

it is

realised in its actual constellation

And

exemplars.

pointed out by Kant, are mutually

one another.
organisms
not

make

was

It

based upon

is

"

cause and effect

for this reason that

"Naturzwecke"

use of

exemplars, as was

these

("purposes

of

Kant

to

called the

We

nature").

Kant s terminology, but

"

shall

the argument

Every organic process indeed,

important.

"

morphogenetic

or

reason that

it

serves to form

constellation

which occurs in

specificity

it is

"

physiological,

is

for

and

purposeful
to preserve a

indefinite exemplars,

the

specific

and whose

has no other reason than the existence of a

previous specificity of the same type


for

no other

on

this basis is

for this reason

and

an organic process teleological."


For only
there an analogy with phenomena to which
"

is

the predicate

teleological

previous analysis,

viz.,

the

has already

phenomena

been given

by

our

leading to indefinite

exemplars of specific constellations called machines, or objects


of art

human

and industry in general, that

is

the phenomena of

acting.

The organisms,

to a certain extent at least, appear as

133

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

purposes, just as do the effects of acting, and therefore the


processes leading to

them

Thus by regard

are purposeful.

ing certain bodies in nature as purposes

analogy of our
state

we

that

own

acting

in doing so

we return to the
we indeed merely

could imagine ourselves wishing or liking

those bodies to exist, and liking their existence in the state


of normality.

that

discussions

markedly

no consequence to these preliminary


works of art or handicraft are most

It is of

to

brought

their

constellation

typical

by

occurrences external to them in the spatial sense, whilst

organisms are certainly not built up by external events in


space.

On

a later occasion

the analysis which

this

distinction

undoubtedly deserves

it

will

receive

at present

we

are only seeking a useful terminology.

You might

reply to our discussion by saying that nobody

speaks of volcanoes or of

crystals as

"purposes,"
though
both of them exist in indefinite exemplars.
Volcanoes,
however, are not derived one from the other, but are due

most clearly to a cumulation of physico-chemical acts from


without in every single case, and crystals are not typically

composed
another

be pointed

bodies, as will
occasion.

Therefore

out more

processes

leading

fully

on

to

the

two groups of natural bodies are by


teleological."
Indefinitely repeated bodies must

formation of these

no means

"

possess a specifically complex character,

from their own kind,


restoring

We

them

if

and must

the processes leading to

are to be called

originate

them or

"

teleological."

have said that we could imagine ourselves wishing

the bodies called by

Kant

"

purposes of nature

"

not only

to exist in their innumerable exemplars but also to exist

in the state of normality

this

discrimination requires a

134

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

You might

further analysis.

say perhaps that only the

ought to be called
teleological,"
from
abnormal
states to
the
i.e. only
processes leading
normality but would it not be quite unjustified to refuse
"

processes of

regulation

the

name

to the processes

on

indeed

account

existing between

bodies

organic

them seem
in

as such therefore

the

of

is

the

of normal
different

embryology, which
kinds of harmony

promote the existence of the

to

degree

highest

Their

existence

to be regarded as nature s purpose

existence here to include all regulation of disturbances of

normality.

And now
of

the

let

us

make

the last step in our application


"

term

"

in

teleological

occurring in natural bodies.

relation

its

to

processes

All processes contributing to

made

the construction of any kind of engines and machines

The
by man are purposeful, for they are actions of men.
machines themselves we have called merely
useful," but
"

all

the different processes that occur in such engines or

machines when they are


are also purposeful.
working
There is no difficulty, I believe, in understanding this sort
"

"

of teleology,
to

which appears in inorganic bodies belonging

the class of so-called

artefacts,

machine that

of the definition of a

for
it

it

simply

shall

is

its

part

work

by
Thus purposefulness of
the mere outcome of the

ing serve some purpose of man.

machines

is

in the last

resort

But it is important that the concept


has
been
thus transferred to inorganic events.
teleological
Let us not lose sight of the real character of the present

teleology of acting.
"

"

discussion.

What

sort

predicate

We

have only tried to answer the question


may be denoted by the

of natural processes

teleological

We

have done nothing but

this

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
work

of terminological description.

down

as to

what teleology might

135

There was nothing laid

signify.

THE TWO CLASSES OF TELEOLOGY

But now a more important analysis


certain extent
to

we now

what may be

shall pass

to follow

is

to a

from mere denomination

called ontological problems.

Whilst studying the teleological processes going on in

an engine constructed by man, we understand with absolute


clearness and distinctness that a process in nature may be
teleological or purposeful,

time

of

and that

be at the same

may

it

purely mechanical or physico-chemical order

processes going on in human -built machines are


of that class, no matter what the machine.
We know that

indeed

all

process of the whole

in these cases every single

function goes on in

engine

purposefulness or teleology

combination in the whole

is
it

its

due
only

is

no other reason at
Let us speak of a
of

teleology

Now

purposeful because

teleology

and

statical teleology in

such cases, or of a

constellation.

at once the question arises

if

it

all.

Are

processes in nature of the statical type,

follow

its

place and

its

stands in this special relation to other single processes,


for

the

and that

singularity,

only to

of

they were not

might be given to

Of
all

course, the

all

teleological

and what would

name dynamical

kinds of natural processes

which are purposeful without being the mere outcome of


the constellation of a machine.

We
ment

have proved by three independent

lines

that such processes exist in organisms.

of argu

From our

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

136

analysis of the differentiation of harmonious equipotential

and

the

of

of

complex -equipotential
of the process of
our
intimate
from
and
study
systems,
an
historically created basis and
acting, going on upon
systems,

with

the

of

criterion

between cause and

genesis

an

effect,

individualised

we have

correspondence

learnt that

no machine,

of whatever kind and whatever degree of combination, can


afford us the

means

There was a natural factor at work,

the organism.

in

what happens here

of understanding

autonomic and not resulting from a combination of other


this factor acted teleologiagents, but elemental in itself
;

cally

it

therefore

may

be called a factor of dynamical

teleology.

might seem that we ought to have been able to


accomplish our proof more easily
might we not have said
It

simply that the single processes going on in a machine are


of course of the statical-teleological type, but that the act
of

constructing

this

machine

one, being due to

teleological

is

course

of

my

will

would have been simple indeed, but


also

wrong

for

it

a dynamical-

That argument
would have been

psychological terms were excluded from

our discussion, which was purely one of natural science.

We

had

there

was

planation,

to

prove exclusively by natural science that


no possibility of a statical-teleological ex

and

this, I trust,

we have succeeded in doing.


we shall now begin

After this terminological work

to

study what that impossibility means.


Let us begin with a descriptive enumeration of the im
portant characteristics of our entelechy.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ENTELECHY

3.

EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE MANIFOLDNESS


Entelechy either underlies the origin of an organic body,
built

typically

an

i.e.

action,

ments.

of

up
a

Thus we

typical

combination

typical
see

of

it

underlies

move

typical

entelechy always results in a inani-

foldness of a typical

or

elements,

kind, the single elements

which

of

are beside each other in space, or one after the other in

Let us

time, or both, always in a typical order.

a manifoldness as
entelechy an
to notice

is

the

that

and

of

us not forget

let

of engines or machines are also

sorts

all

manifestation

of the

result

extensive manifoldness,

such

call

extensive manifoldnesses in this meaning of the word.

Now we

believe

we have proved

that entelechy,

i.e.

the

foundation of the extensive manifoldnesses just mentioned,

whether organisms

or

not

is

machines,

in

turn

its

an

extensive manifoldness of the type of any machine what


ever.

In

other words,

the

itself

to

observation,

is

actual
certainly

singularities, each of which

of

physics

and chemistry,

organism, as

may
like

be

the

but

the

reason
137

of

in

and

a machine,
results

described,

offers

combination

be described

changes in these singularities lead to


so

it

of

terms

also

all

which may

origin

of

the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

138

all its changes is not a law or any


combination of laws taught us by physics and chemistry,
but rests upon entelechy, as does the reason of the origin

combination and of

of

any kind of machine that


propose to

therefore
ness

to

name

the

give

kinds of entelechies

all

"

in fact, something

manifold

of the manifoldness are

"

from

results

or

intensive

psychoids

manifoldthere

is,

in them, but the elements

one beside the other in

neither

We may

space nor one after the other in time.

entelechy

We

acting.

say that

manifold in thought but simple as a natural

is

agent.

As being an

intensive manifoldness entelechy belongs to

the general sphere of dynamic teleology

thing teleological in

there

is

some

very work, whether this work be

its

directed towards the normality of an

organic individual,

with regard to form or function


existence in space being
or
included in the meaning of the term
normality
"

"

whether, as in real acting, the boundaries of mere normality


artist
are broken.
the work of the
Acting, in fact
"

"

in

the

widest

sense

of

that

term,

not

"

"

only

is

but

creates, and entelechy creates through the artist.


Here we meet again the difference between a product

of entelechy

a machine and

acts itself
Tiitigkeit

phrase

itself

is

"

is

the point of manifestation

unable to perform further entelechian

acting has gone over into


in

ist

applied

of

and a product of entelechy that

the organism

entelechy
is

that

ihr

Produkt

by Hegel.

its product"

libergegangen

We

shall

to

Die
("

use

"),

have to

say more

about this later on.

Once more we say that entelechy or the psychoid has


nothing of a

"

"

psychical

nature

in the psychical sphere

139

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
there

is

Ego, at least for the critical and idealistic

my

only

have sensations and likings and judg


volitions, but nature as the object of my
"

philosopher.

and

ments

"I

perceiving and judging and


factors

to

relating

wishing only has agents

structure

its

and

of

type

or

change

and psychoids are some of these factors.


It is true, we occasionally have taken analytical expres
sions from psychology in order to describe these agents by

entelechies

analogy, and

we

shall

doing so was,

and

will be, exclusively to analyse the

But our object in

do so again.

kind

and degree of manifoldness concerned in entelechy


for
this kind and degree of manifoldness resembles to a great
extent the manifoldness of the whole of the psychical
;

In this way psychology simply becomes a


phenomenon.
method in our studies.

For a more intimate study of the nature of the mani


foldness embraced in entelechy, I think it advisable to
the different kinds

separate

whether so-called
not

the

reacting,"

entelechies, according to

"

experience

entelechies

are wanting in

of

"

the

of

plays a part in

them

or

morphogenesis and of instinct

criterion of the

psychoids are endowed with

"

historical basis

of

it.

SECONDARY AND PRIMARY KNOWING AND WILLING


It is

by no means

difficult to get a

the manifoldness

concerned in

logical analysis.

In

fact,

good idea of part of


"

"

psychoids

we have merely

by a psycho
to

apply such

concepts as perceiving, liking, judging, willing to a psychoid


in a metaphorical
1

manner

Provided entelechy

is

in order

to

have a good picture

concerned in instinctive

life.

See page 50.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

140

what

of

is

in

happening

natural

every

psychoids come into play

of course a

event

picture

where
in

only,

the merely descriptive meaning of the word.

the case
its

of those

acts

"

"

historical basis, its

logical

"

knowing and willing in


of a psychoid which go on upon
These two psycho
experience."

Let us speak of secondary

terms seem to be sufficient to describe adequately


as it is well known from pure psychological

what happens,

and judging judging about the most


means among those which are known to promote

analysis that liking


"

"

suitable

the end

and

are never wanting

volition

occurs

inseparable

in

fact

name a few

of

them

analogy, to

psychical

and

elemental

of

knowing

functions

only separable in thought

therefore

name them

The word

whenever the act

for the

is,

are
to

purposes of our

all.

"

secondary,"

as applied to certain characters

of the manifoldness of one type of entelechy, the psychoid,

seems to imply that there are also some primary character


istics of a similar kind
in studying the primary features
"

"

of entelechies our analysis will


It is

worth while

to

become

notice,

far

the

in

primary characters are not only possessed


of morphogenesis,

more

difficult.

first

place,

that

by the entelechy

metabolism, and instinct, but in some

measure by psychoids

That they are possessed by


and
instinctive entelechies is
morphogenetic, physiological,
clear without any further deliberation.
The manifestations
also.

primary
they occur either not
at all or perfectly the very first time
all sorts of restitu
tions and of instincts are instances of this primariness.

of these entelechies are

"

"

But how could


class

of

"

"

secondary

entelechies,

the

faculties appear in the other

psychoids,

endowed

with

the

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

were not also primary

historical basis of reacting, if there


faculties in

We

them

are here faced by a very fundamental problem of

the theory of knowledge in

experience possible
"

how
"

possible

is

biological form.

its

"How is

was the epistemological question of

"

Kant

141

are

the

the

biological

faculties

secondary

We may

pyschoids

Here

question.

course, analogies only are possible.

of

of

again,

say that in

know, the general type of judging


be
And the same holds about
must
given.
knowing
what is willed rests on experience,
the analogy to volition
order to judge or to

and

of

but willing

itself is

And, moreover, the

primary.
"

willed

"

that

is

consciously

in

"

depending upon

experience,"

mediately
these,
"

is

innervations

specific innervations.

the unscientific

wills
by no means
performed (in an unconscious

and

"

"

it

seems to me,

Now

mind knows nothing at


innervations.
But they
"

of

all

are

way), and this fact alone,

"

it

form,
secondary
a
certain
state
of
always

is

on their part, depend on


"

the

accomplished by no means im
accomplished by muscular motions, and
This

the external world.


it

is

effect

"

"

doubt that

all

proves beyond

primary

1
I should like to take this opportunity of pointing out that
Jennings is
mistaken if he thinks that in the case of the righting reactions of the starfish
and "ultimate," since these re
entelechy would in any case not be "final
"

actions in their specificity rest

upon the

"past

history"

He does not

of the individual.

clearly enough separate here the "primary and the "secondary


characteristics of a special entelechian factor, or rather "psychoid."
If the
righting reactions were instinctive, then only primary
knowing and willing
"

"

"

"

would come into account now Jennings has proved that they rest upon
and therefore he believes that entelechy is not an elementality.
"experience,"
;

But the

possibility of being influenced

existence of a
willing"
"

(i.e.

new and

"experience"

primary knowing and

"historical basis").

by the

natural agent.
or the specific

final

willing"

(i.e.

"

"

past history
"

implies the

Secondary knowing and

"historical
basis")
implies
the possibility of acquiring a specific

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

142

knowing and willing

concerned in any kind of acting

is

So

far

plicated as soon as
as soon as

we turn from

the facts to the

com

"

how,"

inquire the meaning of the primary faculties

which

in

play any part at

not

primary."

but the problem becomes very

entelechies

those

of

we

is

hardly seem to exist any serious

there would

analytical difficulty

"

the faculty of innervation

an

We

all.

basis

historical

does

indeed are in a rather

desperate condition with regard to the real analysis of the

fundamental

properties

instinctive entelechies

of

morphogenetic,

for there

them that has an analogy not


general
faculties

of pyschoids

may

experienced realities,

attaining them.

of

to

and

must be a something in
knowing and willing in

be supposed to exist in the primary

as

it

adaptive,

hut

and

to

to

the

willing of specific

un

knowing the specific means


are by no means able to

And we

understand such a specified primary knowing and willing


in even the slightest degree.

It is here that the difference

and the
a

"

moment

We

unconscious
to adopt

do not accept

differences expressed

Without doubt
its

at

"

enters the

field,

if

"

conscious

we choose

"

for

Eduard von Hartmann s terminology.


this terminology definitively,

by

it is

greatest difficulties.

their

between the

it

but the

are real differences.

at this point that vitalism encounters


It is here that so

many make up

minds that they cannot accept vitalism as a theory


They would be inclined to accept the autonomy of

all.

life

as far as psychoids are concerned, as far as the historical

To speak of an "inherited experience" here would only be to state the


problem in another form. Besides that there is no good reason at present
for assuming such an inheritance.
Compare vol. i. pp. 278 ff.
1

143

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

secondary knowing and willing, comes


into account, but they feel unable to accept autonomical

basis of reacting,

i.e.

teleological agents unpossessed of these secondary faculties.

Schneider, Pauly, Strecker and

authors take this view

he

similarly, for

left

many

Kant,

it

among modern

others

seems to me, thought

open the question

vitalism proper,

of

and only advocated formal teleology in morphogenesis and


metabolism, though he was not opposed to the theory of
"

so-called

But

"

interaction.

psycho-physical
it

firm conviction

my

is

we cannot avoid

that

the admission of vitalistic autonomic agents possessing no


faculties, and yet endowed
secondary
experience, i.e. no
"

"

indeed, as far as
knowing and willing
and
physiological adaptation and instinctive
morphogenesis
reactions are
concerned, there must be a something
comparable metaphorically with specified knowing and

with

specific

Of

but without experience.

willing,

careful about what has to be

course,

"known"

and

"judged"

willed."

Here the end

the light of morphological restitutions.

be attained

is

normal

the

towards this end are

we

what

have

organisation

that

and

called

it

is

equifinal

regulations,"

the primary faculties

already
1

urged

Compare

1905.

my

former

that
state

final

concerned in adaptation

great theoretical caution seems to be advisable.


a

"

a fact also, in the case

means leading to one and the same


be
known
and adopted.
may

on

to

means

"

different

to

"

known and found may seem very

strange, but it is a fact

As

and

This problem seems rather easy to answer in

"

of

we must be

occasion

book, Der Vitalismus als Geschichte

that

We

have

is

quite

und ah Lehre,

Leipzig,

it

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

144

impossible to imagine even by analogy how the organism


could know that any substance when taken in either by
"

"

the

intestine or

by the skin

will poison

that
possible to imagine

the organism

whenever the functional

state of

its

it.

But

knows how

life

is

it

is

to act,

on the point

of becoming disturbed, and that it then does something to


In fact we have noticed that anti
repair the disturbance.
"

"

bodies

are not formed

till

have entered the

after poisons

organism, and we have noticed changes in the permeability


of surfaces that do not occur until after the abnormal
specific

exchange of material between the medium and the


1
organism had gone on for some time.

fluid of the
1

The concept

of

"function"

may seem

to require a little further logical

sifting in this place beyond what


In the strict meaning
168 ff.).

was said about it in the first volume (pp.


of the term a part of an organism is
when it performs that kind of specific metabolism which
"functioning"
the totality of all the normal metabolic performances
is normal to it
;

of the parts of the organism

is its "normal

functional

state."

If this state

disturbed from without, "adaptation" may restore it; this adaptation


So far
consists in a specific change of the functioning of a specific part.

is

it seems to me, is quite clear, and so far the concept of "func


was discussed at great length in the first volume of this work.
But the word "functioning" may also be applied in a certain other sense

everything,
tioning"

not relating to the performance of a certain organ as such, but to the relation
or effect of this performance with regard to other parts of the same organism,
It is the "function" of the cells of the pan
or even the whole organism.
let us call this their "proper function."
But by
creas to secrete trypsin
;

secreting trypsin the pancreatic cells prepare material for assimilation by all
harmonious function of the
the other organs of the individual that is the
"

"

pancreas.

And

in the

same way

it is

the

"proper"

function of the cells of


"

harmonious function to support


We now see what adaptation of the disturbed
the organism mechanically.
functional state" of the organism, carried out by a change of functioning in
a certain part of it, really means teleologically. The harmonious function of
the bones to secrete

salts,

whilst

it is

their

"

"

"

a certain part

its role in

the total unity of the living individual, in other

words had been disturbed by disturbing the "functional state" from with
out and this disturbance of harmonious functioning, or the harmony of func
:

Indeed, only because it leads to the


tioning, is rectified by adaptation.
restoration of this harmony, is the change of the "proper" functioning of the

organ in question adaptive.

145

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
In this way, regarding

it

only as a kind of description,

I see no fundamental difficulty in speaking of entelechy

at least no other descrip


primary knowing and willing
tion of what happens seems to be derivable from any species
"

"

of analogy.

ENTELECHY AND THE

We

now

shall

"

INDIVIDUUM

regard entelechy from yet another point

of view, necessitating a comparison between organisms

and

crystals.

From

ancient times the organism

individuum,

a something that cannot be divided without

i.e.

what

ceasing to be

has been called an

it

"

was.

are the atoms of the Organic, the words


aro/jiov

be

itself

of

the

must be

meaning
and

individuum
If this

"

view

is

said to represent the individuum,

But

individualising.

restriction that

cept

in this
"

indeed expressing the same thing.

held, entelechy
to

"

Individua

it

is

only with some

modern science can make use

individuum.

We

of the con

know from experimental

work that the organism, both adult and embryo, can be


divided without change of
parts to

new

its

nature, since

it

The term individuum,

wholes.

restores its
therefore, if

applied to bodily forms, is incorrect, at least in very

too,

many

an original individuum may be individua


parts
at least potentially.
Perhaps it would be more success

cases

of

apply the term individuum to entelechies only and


to bodily forms
but if we do so the fundamental

ful to

not

problems of the divisibility of entelechy and its relation to


matter at once present themselves.
The discussion of
10

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

146

these very central problems of biology

must be reserved

for

a future chapter.

Let us rather restrict ourselves at present, and


ask

let

us

In what sort of natural bodies are entelechies mani

fested,

and

what

in

bodies in nature

relations do these bodies stand to other

THE CLASSES OF BODIES


All bodies

views

may

be classified according to two general

they are either homogeneous or combined, and their

form

either

is

or

accidental

accidental bodies are called

any

essential.

amorphous

to

belong

this class

their

islands

form

they are without

Combined-accidental

interest for our present discussion.

bodies play a great role in geology

Homogeneous-

is

and mountains

given to them from

without by processes which are parts of a cumulation, as


studied in a chapter of our first volume.
Homogeneousbodies

essential
crystals,

are

crystals, all

typical arrangements

such as so-called dendrites, and

all

of

other varieties

form capable of being assumed by homogeneous matter,


such as figures produced by the shrinking of gelatin or

of

albumen

or

some other

Combined

material.

essential

bodies are organisms and artificial products exclusively.

One

of

organisms

is

the

great

differences

throughout, while organisms are not.


difference relates to their
1

We shall

body."

between

that crystals are of the

manner

crystals

and

same material nature

The other fundamental


of

origin.

Organisms

not insist here on the problem of what is meant by "being a


This question the subject of a theory of matter is not a proper

problem of theoretical biology.

147

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
originate from a starting-point

than

manifoldness

does

the

which exhibits

less

visible

end

are

always

crystals

show nothing but

themselves, and might almost be said to

mere increase of

that

the fact

in

size.

specificity of their

It

the

only a means of growth, their

is

but I shall not lay

much

this point in our present analysis.

upon

may

use

growth

during

in its very specificity, whilst to

specificity resting in themselves


stress

their

crystals

medium

medium

organisms the

third difference might be found

be objected to the second of our definitions that

researches of the last few years, especially those of

Rauber

and Przibram, have shown a very high faculty of restitution


Broken crystals, in fact, are not only capable

in crystals.

of restoring the parts that are wanting, a process resembling

some cases

regeneration, but are also able in

new and

themselves into a
their

themselves, and
so,

which resembles the

facts

that crystals

are

show nothing but mere growth

because in spite of their

so-called

could

always
I

all

differen

How

an harmonious-equipotential system.

I say in the face of such

say

smaller whole, by changing

a process

proportions

tiation of

to transform

could

"

restitution,"

crystals go through their formative processes only with the aid


of the forces

which

These forces show different intensities

in the different directions of space,

arrangement

of the relative

maxima

embracing

relations of tension

crystal
1

Arch.

there.

and the
f.

between the

solution

Entw.-mech.

22,

The

typical

and

taken together with

solid material of the

surrounding
1906.

of these intensities,

this character of their formative forces,

some

and with no

also determine their growth,

other help whatever.

full

it,

is

sufficient

literature

will

to

be found

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

148

explain normal growth as well as so-called restitution

same thing happens all the time.


In
tion is a mere process of addition,
restitution

the

this respect crystallisa

in

of

spite

so-called

the material of growth always comes from the

solution in its specificity,

and the typical form is completely


all the minute particles

determined by the directed forces of


of the crystal.

the forces

Knowing

of one

knowing the physical conditions existing,

particle

we know

and

that this

growth must occur.


Ultimately everything may be
reduced to some sort of molecular arrangement
the
sort of

specificity of the arrangement gives the

can be said to be
"

"

potentia

but

"

whole

"

actu,"

"

in each

and

of its

crystal thus

parts,

change in the arrangement of such

the result of

being not a proper

seem

have said a

little

more about

to be necessary, because

not only

all processes of restitution in it

only relate to a
it

of the

specificity

distribution of forces of different intensity.

"

"

totality

in

"

wholes,"

itself.

crystallisation than

might

nowadays the analogies between

and morphogenesis are being unduly pressed. 2


opinion that there are analogies, nay more

crystallisation
It is

my

I have shown elsewhere (Arch. f. Entw.-mech. 23, 1907,


p. 174) that
Przibram was wrong in saying that crystals are harmonious-equipotential
1

my definition, because in some cases they are capable of


changing their exterior form after disturbances and producing a new smaller
There is nothing whatever like a "prospective
proportionate whole.
as there is in organic harmonious
potency" concerned in this process,

systems, according to

there is only a change of place going on among equal parts.


change of place is not one single process, but the result of two
independent processes something is taken away in one locality by the forces
of the medium, and something is added in another locality by the forces of the
I have never said that the mere fact of
crystal.
regeneration proves vitalism
but the special nature of the systems that form the basis of organic regenera
tion does prove it (see vol. i. page 241 f.).

restitution

Even

this

"

Compare also the article by Hofmann in Annalen der Naturphilosophie,


It seems to me that Hermann s argument cannot stand
1908, p. 63.
against the analysis given in the text and in the preceding note.
7,

149

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS

but only in so far as crystallisation is one of the


means of inorganic nature employed by entelechy for its

identities

Morphogenesis, however, only uses some features of


crystallisation, which, taken by itself, has nothing to do with
purposes.

any organic phenomenon.


The combined essential bodies
like crystals,

called organisms originate,

with materials delivered from without in the

But the starting-point


form of oxygen and nourishment.
it
of an organism does not use these substances directly
;

first

of

forms out of them what

employing them

is

is

and

to be used,

its

manner

anything but a mere addition

it

a consecutive series of typical differentiations typically

is

placed.

To build up the organism

combined body of a typical


entelechy means the faculty
style is the task of entelechy
of achieving a
forma essentialis
being and becoming are
as a
:

"

"

united here in a most remarkable

the Timeless,

i.e.

into the

"
"

idea

manner

in the sense of Plato.

Even elementary physiology teaches


organic form

the word.

"

is

forma

The form

"

essentialis

time enters into

its

student that the

in yet another sense of

organism is not only built up


typically, but is also kept in its normal state, in spite of a
permanent change of material, by metabolism in the widest
of the

Some authors have spoken of


The expression
dynamical equilibrium."

sense.
"

if it is to

feature

as

a harmless one,

denote nothing but the mere permanency of form


but nothing is explained at

in spite of material changes


all

this
is

by such terminology, and

"

still less

does

it

reduce anything

to the inorganic sphere, as uncritical physiologists

times asserted.

"

have some

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

150

ENTELECHY AND MACHINE-

THE ORDER OF ENTELECHIES.

WORK

We

know

not

that

already

event that takes

every

place during morphogenesis and metabolism is the direct


outcome of entelechian acts, and it seems worth while to

And

say a few more words about this point.

remark once more that

different kinds

first

be said to be at work in the organism.

There

is

us

let

of entelechies

may

first

the

morphogenetica, and after that the entelechia


psychoidea, and the latter may be discriminated as governing
entelechia

instincts

parts

and actions separately.


the

of

brain,

such

cerebellum in vertebrates,

Furthermore, the different


the

as

may
In

different kinds of entelechy.

hemispheres

be said
fact,

to

and the

possess

their

we may speak

of an

order concerning the rank or dignity of entelechies, compar


able with the order of ranks
administration.

But

all

or

dignities

an army or

in

entelechies have originated from

the primordial one, and in this respect

may be

said to be one

altogether.

Now

the primordial entelechy of the egg not only creates

derived entelechies but also builds up

ments of a truly mechanical character

all
:

part of its functioning, is nothing but a

sorts of arrange

the eye, in a great

camera obscura, and

the skeleton obeys the laws of inorganic statics.


of

these organic systems has

where

it

must be placed

to

been

placed

Every part

by entelechy

act well in the service of the

whole, but the part itself acts like a part of a machine.

So we see

finally that the different forms of

harmony

in

the origin and function of parts that are not immediately

151

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS
on

dependent

was harmonious in

all

in

are

another,

the

intensive manifoldness

its

extensive structures which are produced by

harmonious

it

In other words, there are

too.

in the organism

the

resort

last

The entelechy that created

of entelechian acts.

consequence

them

one

which are of the

the

are therefore

many

processes

statical-teleological type,

which go on ideologically or purposefully on a fixed machinelike basis


but entelechy has created this basis, and so
;

statical teleology has its source in

We

now
is

entelechy

extensively

see the full

an

"

in other words,
is

"

manifoldness

intensive

that a body in nature

dynamical teleology.

meaning of the statement that

we know what

a living organism

itself

realising

it

means

to say

we have given

full descriptive definition of this concept.

NEW PROBLEMS

CONCLUSIONS AND

But how can an


factor in nature

of course, on
factor in

which

it is

intensive manifoldness

"

be an elemental

The answer

what

to this question will depend,


understood by the expression elemental
In other words, a detailed analysis of
"

is

nature."

this concept

"

will serve to

show us the circumstances under

legitimate or illegitimate to speak of a factor of

nature as elemental.
Materialistic

dogmatism

would

reply

here

that

the

concepts of mechanics or energetics are the only legitimate


elementalities of all science

but

we have nothing

to

do

thinking,"

as

with dogmatism of any kind.

The

principle of so-called

economics of

"

prevalent nowadays, might say,


1

See vol.

i.

on the other hand,

p. 107.

that

152

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

every

elemental

natural

Whenever

necessary.

factor

is

hitherto unrecognised in nature that


in terms of natural factors already

and then only

known

a sort

or

of

"energy,"

"

practical,"

is

economist,"

science

is

Of

science.

course,

would by no means
shortened

way

find out

any new

or

To the

not.

jus

for

whether

constant,"

what

mere experience, and

no such thing as real philosophy

create

to

"

summum

whose

"

epistemological

or

something

to science, then

new elementally, and would only want to


this new factor is to be regarded as a
"force,"

is

not to be expressed

is

would allow us

"economy"

by being

legitimate

analysis shows that there

to be

is

him

there

nothing higher than

factors, created in

this

"

style,

"

but merely describe


in a
explain
but the economists say there cannot, be any
"

"

thing except description in this sense.

We

are by no

"economism,"

and

means partisans
therefore

epistemological justification
factor is to us

We

the

of our

of

modern

question

as

empiristic
to

the

newly created natural

an important problem.

shall begin this justification forthwith.

PART

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


A.

ENTELECHY AND UNIVOCAL


DETERMINATION

COMPLETE system of ontology has to develop the sum of


aprioristic concepts and principles regarding nature on the
principles of reasoning.
here,

and

would not even be necessary

it

purposes.

It cannot be our task to do so

Our endeavour

is,

for our

immediate

in the first place, to

show how

our concept of entelechy as an elemental natural factor


related to those concepts of general ontology

any

which play

On

part in the science of inorganic nature.

is

a later

occasion a few words on the theory of categories will be

added.

The concept
coming may
of nature.

of the univocal determination of being and be


be called the very starting-point of a philosophy
No states and no events in nature are without

a sufficient reason for their being such as they are at such

a place and time, and the same thing always

under the same conditions.


expressions

of

the

or happens

These are the most general

principle

of

univocality.

nothing in the doctrine of entelechy


given certain circumstances,

is

is

Of

course,

opposed to them

and given a certain entelechy


153

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

154

in a certain state of manifestation, there will always be or

go on only one specifically determined event and no other.

name

I do not give the

"
"

of

causality

of natural necessity or determination.

to this principle

Causality relates to

a particular kind of changes exclusively, and the relation


bears

entelechy

to

it

Our

be discussed later on.

will

principle of necessity or univocal determination relates to

everything that

be or happen in the universe, without

may

any reference to the character and nature of the changes in

Of

the case of things that happen.


holds,

whether entelechy plays

or not.

The

part in a series of events

its

facts in the universe that originate in entelechy

will be univocally determined as such

such as

it is,

mined kind.

course, this principle

and entelechy

is

whenever entelechy

either of this or of that deter

And, moreover, any

spatial occurrence

single

induced or modified by entelechy has

its

previous single cor

relate in a certain single feature of entelechy, as far as

an intensive manifoldness.
to

assume anything

the consequence

It

evolutio"

We

though our assumption leads to

else,

strange as

that nothing really

it is

we never have

to

true psychical facts, but only with natural events.


refer to a certain

generally expressed

philosophy of nature
"

freedom

in

we

most remarkable
psychological

do with

But we

relation

terms.

which

In

the

are not allowed to speak of any

"

of acting, in the real

word, in the sense that


tion.

is

more that even when dealing with those

entelechies which govern action,

is

new

All happening

in the deepest meaning of the word.

repeat once

must now

it is

would be quite inconceivable

can happen anywhere in the universe.


"

is

is

and

strict

sense of

the

contrary to univocal determina

It is quite impossible

to

imagine

that,

with given

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

155

circumstances and a given psychoidal entelechy, there ought


to be or to

happen

to

is

happen

with

either

or B.

On

the contrary, what

is

quite fixed, and a supreme mind, conversant

the inorganic facts of nature and

all

intensive manifoldness of all

knowing all the


entelechies and psychoids, in

cluding the individual history of the

latter,

would be able

any psychoid with absolute


just as possible as it would

at once to predict the actions of

Such prediction

certainty.

be

in

pure

mechanics, as

in

stated

the

of the

fiction

It is interesting to note that almost

"

Laplacian

is

mind."

philosophers and theologians who go really into the depth


of analysis are unanimous in rejecting indetermination in

all

In Christianity the word

nature.

"

"

is

grace

a short ex

pression indicating the impossibility of indetermination in


"

nature, placing

freedom

"

in the metaphysical sphere

am

not even free to believe or not to believe, but to be able to


believe

is

a gift of grace.

For the present we have

to follow the course prescribed

by a phenomenological philosophy of nature


another occasion to deal with the problem of
a very different point of view.

We

now approach

the realm of real

"

there will be

freedom

"

causality,"

"

from

that

is,

of univocality with regard to changes in space exclusively.

How

does entelechy stand to this concept,

have learnt that


tion in general

it

now

that

we

does not contradict univocal determina

ENTELECHY AND CAUSALITY

B.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
ENTELECHY may be aroused
bodily nature, such as

is

to manifestation

by a change in
by some

fertilisation or

effected

by
some
motor
stimulus
and, on the other
by
hand, entelechy may on its own part lead to changes in
operation, or

bodily nature.

All this

be related

is

to

very general
causality,

i.e.

it

to

of changes in spatial nature.

asserts that entelechy

may

the principle of connexion

But

it

does not

make

smallest assertion about the most important question

the
"

entelechy by itself a specific form of causal connexion, or


it

not

"

Is
is

This question must, however, be answered.

DIFFICULTIES

Now

let

us recollect that not every single event in space

resulting from the manifestation of entelechy has its


single external cause.

impossibility of

this

It

own

was precisely on account of the

being the case that our concept of

We should not need this concept


entelechy was created.
if there were to be found a single external cause of every
single

step

in

the

differentiation
156

of

an

harmonious-

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


equipotential system, and

were

not that action

it

we should not need

is

157

the psychoid

The

a whole and not a sum.

we

single steps in the manifestation of entelechy are, as

know, uni vocally determined, but they are so by their being


united in the intensive manifoldness of their realiser: thus
"

they seem to be acausal with regard to real causes which


are not embraced in this manifoldness, but are single changes
In other words, it is the essence of an entelechy
in space.
"

to manifest itself
details of

manifoldness

intensive

is

of

causes."

manifoldness
the

depend

entelechy, but

With regard

to

all

the

upon the
not

upon

morphogenesis

speak of an immediate correlation of parts


non-causal, as indeed K;idl has done in a somewhat

thus

that

an extensive manifoldness

"

different spatial

we

in

extensive

this

may

connexion.

different

There

are

combinations

single

always interchanging with one another, but each

diversities

singly independent of the other; their

the specific
realises

of

intensive

them.

manifoldness of

Thus the problem

common ground

is

the entelechy that

of the relation

between

causality

and entelechy seems by no means simple, and

therefore

we

lengthy

shall best approach our subject

First let us analyse a little

cept of causality,
1

by a rather

series of analytical considerations.

more deeply the pure con

as understood in inorganic sciences.

general discussion of "energetics" will be found in my Naturbegriffc


I fully maintain what is said in that book about
Natururteile, 1904.
but as to the relation between entelechy and energy the
energetics itself

und

following discussion will be found to differ from that of 1904 not inconsider
I hope that this change of my opinion will be found
ably.
accompanied by

improvement.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

158

DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY

complete system of natural ontology, whilst dealing


to
causality, would have
develop more specified
Some such principles have indeed
principles regarding it.

with

been found by naturalists, but, strange


generally regarded nowadays

to

they are

say,

and

as being of an empirical

inductive nature, while in reality they are quite otherwise.

The

and the principle

"

principle of
"

"

phases

are cases in point.

action

We

these principles in our discussion

more

therefore shall insist

fully

shall not
;

but

we

of the

"

least

make use

shall apply

of

and

upon the analysis of two

specific aprioristic causal principles which have played a

great role in the history of inorganic sciences

the two so-called


It

"

me

seems to

principles of

have their

by

the

and the

"augmentation of

thorough analysis.
nature

effect in spatial

which

is

effect.
"

relation of

energy."

energy"

to a

"

"

followed

refer to

logical sources in the different aspects

which causality offers


The cause of an
in spatial nature

that these principles, generally spoken of

as the "conservation of
entropy,"

"

causality

in a

invariably and

We

now may

is

that change
"

"

necessarily

consider

more general and more

this

specified

manner.

We

first

imagine the totality of a

"

system,"

that

is,

a limited part of space including all the natural realities

embraced in

it.

We

study the states of the system as a

whole at the different moments ^ and t 2 all causal relation


between it and its surroundings being excluded.
Then
,

we

assure ourselves that the causality of the system with

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


regard to

its

surroundings has remained unaltered in amount

The system

in spite of all internal changes.


as a

159

whole has been the

"

"

cause

of its state at

a causal system with regard to

its

at

state

but as

has

it

surroundings

remained the same.

now study two systems

Let us

and

let

in the sense described,

us assume that there are causal processes going on

between these two systems, but in no other way or direction.


Then we call the whole of the change of the totality of the
one the cause of the whole of the change of the other,

and are convinced that both changes are equal in amount.


It is upon these two fictions that the principle of the
conservation of energy rests, and from these two fictions
derives

its

two fundamental modern formulations

energy of an isolated

system

is

constant,"

"

it

the

"

and,

any

loss

of energy in one isolated system corresponds to an equivalent

gain in another

and

Robert Mayer was


well aware that his principle was based upon an aprioristic
foundation, and he did well to place in the beginning of his
one,"

discussion the two phrases


"

nihil

fit

ex nihilo aut ad

vice versa.

"

causa aequat effectum

nihilum."

In

fact, it

is

"

and

upon

a combination of the categories of causality and of quantity


that the aprioristic part of the principle of the conservation
of energy rests

energy

is

causality quantitatively determined.

It is meaningless to speak of the energetic constancy of the universe, as


In
long as the problem of its material finiteness or infiniteness is unsolved.
the case of its infiniteness, of course, to speak of
would be
constancy
"

"

altogether meaningless.
2

An

important but secondary formulation of the principle in question is


the amount of energy of an isolated system is
univocally
determined in every movement, and the total causal effect due to such a
system the "work" done by it if its "energy" is reduced to zero, is
the following

independent of the way of transformation.

160

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

But

causality

may

also be conceived in a very different

which enables thus the foundations of the second

fashion,

so-called principle

we may speak

of energetics

of

specified

limited system again, but


sorts of physical

we

single

condition that

is

be

laid.

In this case

We

causality.

imagine

then

parts

anything

that

find

the

of

the singular diversity of all

and chemical agents concerned in

We

consider.

different

it

to

system

may happen

the

in

it

at

that

the

in

diversities

are

it

necessary
all

that

nothing can happen unless there are original diversities.


For the sufficient reason of happening would be wanting in
a system which was uniform throughout, wanting at least

was uniform.

Only if an element or
from
others can something
any
Such, at least,
happen on that particular element or part.
most
source
of
second
is the
the
general ontological
principle
so far as the system

part of a system

of energetics

the

first

is

different

it relates to specificities

principle related to generalities.

But we

shall postpone all further discussion of the second

principle of energetics to
to establish a little

and

in causation, just as

its relation to

its

proper time, and shall

more about the

first

try

principle of conservation

entelechy.

OUR THEME

With

this discussion

we

enter a part of our philosophical

studies which, though not final,

is

to

rank among the most

important considerations of this whole course of lectures.

We
living

have shown that there are classes of phenomena in


nature which do not allow of any resolving into

elements

known from

the study

of the inorganic world.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


But we have shown nothing more.

now

arises

inevitably

What

and

The important question

are

our

161

ultimate

the

autonomous

relations

between

the

What

the meaning of saying that inorganic factors are

not

is

inorganic

for

sufficient

organic factors,

world

explanation

so

to

what way

In

entelechy?

in

are

speak, counteracted in the organic

That the

closest relations exist

the inorganic

most

is

studies of the

"

means

between the organic and

clearly shown, for instance,

by our

"

of

morphogenesis

moreover,

it is

evident from the mere fact that every organisation exhibits


as

is able to perform
shows mutual relations to

different systems of organs as

many

functions, in other words, as

it

it

In fact, knowing what it means to be an


and
what
the different agents of the medium are,
organism,
one could really deduce what systems of organs an
the inorganic.

organism must possess.


Thus our important question
simply

obliged to attack the

intimate

relation

is

We

inevitable.

are

what the most

as to

problem
between inorganic nature and entelechy

implies.

We

shall try to get a solution by degrees, studying one


one
the general scientific conceptions of the inorganic
by

world, and always bringing entelechy into

We

shall begin

physics

is

What
Organic

mean

in

with so-called energetics

relation to

it.

pure mechanical

to follow.

then does

crosses the

it

mean

to

assert,

as

border of the Inorganic

we

terms of energetics and of mechanics

And what

is to

follow ultimately from

about the problem of

"

do,

What

that

does

the
it

discussion

this

entelechy and causality

"

ii

ENTELECHY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CONSERVATION

1.

OF ENERGY
a.

"

"

Energy
the amount

is

THE PRINCIPLE

measurement and nothing

of causality

else

it

measures

given off or received by a limited

system in no other sense than the kilogramme or the

pound
The unit of

measures the amount of gravitating matter.


this

measurement, the

of the nature

"

erg,"

is

of

"

work/

in the terminology of mechanics.


"

something in

all

which retains
character

aprioristic

to

of

energy

its

far
it

it

quantity, though

the

there

is

rather

becomes empirical as soon as

mechanics must

be

this

of natural

regarded
respect,

as

for,

sciences

principles of pure rational mechanics,

its

from place to

its

is

purely

application

Only

begins.

an exceptional
as

in

may change

of conservation

principle

the special realms

knowledge in

that

truly causal processes, as denned above,

from body to body, or

So

place.

means

"

Conservation

field

of

ontology teaches, the

and among these the

motion containing the principle of the


conservation of energy in its mechanical form, are aprioristic

general equations of

throughout.
1

It is

almost unconsciously

intentionally avoid the term

162

"quality"

reason

for this

in this connexion.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


that

"

work,"

that

to say the

is

amount

of one of the

163

two kinds

of energy in mechanics, has been accepted as a standard

measurement

But that

of energy in general.

thermo

in

dynamics the so-called quantity of heat must be measured


and not temperature, is a real empirical fact.
by ergs
"

"

In general terms we

may

of conservation

say that the general form of the

though its special


content, regarding the kind of quantity to be measured by
ergs, is empirical, pure mechanics excepted.
principle

is

aprioristic,

All these relations seem to be very simple.

In short

/yy\

a body

motion endowed with the kinetic energy

in

may perform a specific amount of work pi, that is to say,


and, on the
may overcome the force p along the distance
other hand, the force p affecting the body along the dis
/,

tance

will

and one so-called

the kinetic

to it

impart

energy

again

"

calorie

"

is

always

equivalent

to

424

kilogrammetres.

But things are


at the first glance.

from being as simple as they seem


The law of the conservation of energy

far

from being empirically true if only those natural


agents which are actually measurable as performing work
are
taken into consideration.
But the truth of our
is

far

principle

is

postulated by reason, and therefore the empirical

incorrectness of the principle

ing way.

Whenever the

is

corrected in a very interest

principle fails to hold, so-called

"
"

potential

energy

may

energies

disappear

are

or

postulated,

from which

Such potential energies play

into
it

their role in

gravitation, of electricity, elasticity,

which actual

may

originate.

the theories of

and some other branches

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

164
of

physics,

and

actually stated or
energies

it is

in

also

There

chemistry.

measured in the case

is

nothing

of all these potential

simply assumed that there must be a some

thing representative of quite a definite amount of

may not seem to


may properly call

We

therefore

ergs

arise out of

in order that actual energy

nothing.

"

"

sorts

all

of

real,"
subsidiary
they are
can
be
as
in
real
possibilities
regarded
ontology, but they
1
never are immediately real in any sense.
In this meaning
"

potential energies

there

"

"

is

a certain

amount

a pendulum reaches one of


is

again

pendulum

highest points.

the

work

This amount
"

performed

whilst overcoming gravity, which

"

work

Quite the same holds with regard to

natural

other

work

"

whenever

"

equal to the kinetic energy of the pendulum at

is

lowest point.

its

"

its

of potential energy

regarded as equal in quantity to the

by the

so far as

"

having a

agents

more

all

mentioned above, the concept

or less

figurative

meaning

in these

cases.

ft.

THE PRINCIPLE IN

ITS

RELATION TO KNTELECHY

After these preparatory discussions


firstly,

how

servation of energy, and secondly,

is

stands entelechy to the principle of the con

the concept of energy itself


It

we now may ask

clear

how

stands entelechy to

from the beginning that contradiction to

Empiricists often claim that potential energies are really proved to


by the fact that it always is the same amount of measurable energy

"exist"

which enters into the potential forms, and which is able to arise from them.
But it is clear that this "fact rests simply upon the general principle of the
univocality of nature, and that, if it should not prove to be empirically true,
we by no means should abandon the conservation principle, but should
invent as many more supplementary energies as were necessary.
"

165

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


an aprioristic principle
tion,

is

therefore,

is

not,

The ques

absolutely impossible.

"is

the doctrine

of

entelechy in

harmony with the first principle of energetics ? but, how


In other words, the
is harmony to be established here ?
"

"

"

principle of conservation

is

an aprioristic
inorganic realisation may be

unimpugnable

as

but the type of its


changed or enlarged without hesitation.
Let us remember once more that the principle of con

principle,

is merely quantitative, that it says nothing at all


What could this
about the quality or direction of events.

servation

principle

mean

entelechy

at

is

in its relation to processes of life in

work

It

seems to

me

which

that two different

Take an
answers to this question are a priori possible.
in
of
the
midst
a
limited
medium, and
given
organism

we know, on

imagine that

the one side, the energetic value

of any possible event leading from the medium to the


organism, and, on the other side, the energetic value of any
possible event leading from the organism to the medium.

Then

possible that the

it is

both kinds of events

is

sum

of the energetic values of

the same, or that there

ence, either in one sense or in the other.

we should
energy

is

case energy

an organism

known
form
a

say that in

would seem
;

it

its

a differ
first case,

through processes of

quantity at all

life

in the latter

to be

changed by passing through


would either be partly stored in some un

form, or be

of storage.

way

passing

not changed in

is

In the

to unite it

awaked

into actuality

from some unknown

Whatever might happen, we should find


with the general principle. The unknown

energy spoken of in the case of a difference of the amounts


energy entering and leaving the organism, would be of
the potential or subsidiary kind
and we should know

of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

166

nothing more about it, except that it must exist in some


form
though not in any form known from the Inorganic
;

but nothing would be


processes of

established

about

its

role

in

the

life.

Certain Facts

Before going on in our analysis, let us appeal to certain


facts regarding the actual relation between the inorganic
The latest researches, carried
forms of energy and vitality.

out most carefully, especially by Eubner and Atwater, have

shown that there

is

of energy leaving

and entering the organism, as far as the


considered, in which metabolism is almost

adult organism

is

no difference at

all

between the sums

completely functional and not morphogenetic.

Considering

the heat of combustion of the food, and comparing


the heat of combustion of

with

added to the thermo-

all excreta,

dynamical equivalent of the actual

it

work performed, the two

values are found to be equal within the limits of error. 1

Such a

result

subsidiary

greatly simplifies
are

energies

functioning energetically.
probably,

if

in

the

place

the

unnecessary

The
of

results

the

problem of energy
for

understanding

would be

adult

the

different,

developing

organism were the subject of study but it seems to me


that even in this case a real equation between the energy
taken in and the energy given out might be gained, if all
:

substances which are chemically stored during ontogeny, or


rather,

1906.

which are stored as chemical ones, were considered

good summary

is

given by Zwaardemaker, Ergebnisse

d. Physiol. 5,

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


as given out,

combustion

energy

if

of

see that the principle of the conservation of

actually or probably demonstrated

in the clearest form

have seen that

also

to their heat

also.

Thus we
is

and were measured according

167

the forms
to

sufficient

what

but,

it

would

"

still

is

hold

by the organism
more important, we

"

for the organism,

even

of energy known to us should not appear


form a complete equation of the organism s

economy.

On a Supposed
But what about the
its relation to

energy

role of entelechy,

and what about

Ostwald, the present head of the

and many others following him, have

school,

energetical

Vital Energy

admitted that, in cases of morphogenesis, and probably in


nervous phenomena

energy

may

some unknown potential forms

too,

be at work

of

and, in fact, a few such authors,

as Bechterew, for instance, claim to be real

"

"

at

vitalists

the same time, stating that the specificity of vital pheno

mena and
that

unknown energy

due to the peculiarities which


possesses, just as mechanical energy

has

its

regarding

their

autonomy

peculiarities

is

direction

in

and

space,

radiating energy regarding periodicity.

In order not

to complicate

our problem we say nothing

in this place about the general question whether

seem advisable

to

altogether

deal

energy in this manner, regarding


"

ing of
I

"

properties

and

Naturbegriffe

the

as elemental,

peculiarities of energy.

have fully explained that


1

it

with

und

I should not like to

Natururteilc, Leipzig, 1904.

it

may

concept

of

and speak
Elsewhere 1
adopt such

168

SCIENCE

a view,

At

which seems

me

to

we have

this place

even an

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

and unnatural way,

artificial

and unnatural.

artificial

very

only to ask, Is

it

possible in any,

to speak of a sort of

subsidiary or potential energy as being the natural agent

by ourselves entelechy ?
That the energy in question would be a subsidiary one,
would not in itself be an objection to such a view.
So-called
called

that kind

always the mere


difference between two amounts of thermic energy that is
chemical energy

called

is

of

chemical potential energy


"

the

"

vitalistic

energy
energy in one respect.
able, since there

two

is

it

that

is all.

energies.

the economic equation

it is

true,

would be a rather strange sort of


It would be absolutely indiscover-

would not even be any

discoverable

But,

is

At

least

difference

cases

where

would seem

to be

in

fulfilled there

between

all

no place for a new energy.


Vitalistic energy, therefore,
would mark nothing but a point of passage or transforma
tion of known energies, and would not be storable in any
"

"

way.

But,

seems to me, not even

it

this difficulty could be

said to be absolute.

Entelechy not Energy

however, one objection to regarding entelechy


as being of the type of an energy that seems to me to be
known to exist or invented
absolute. All
energies," actually

There

exists,

"

to complete the general energetical scheme, are quantities,

and

relate to

phenomena which have quantity among

their

In asserting these phenomena to be of the


energetical order, we state that there can be a more or less

characteristics.

of them, and that this

more

or less possesses

most distinctly

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

169

the faculty of being measurable, as being equivalent to a

more

or less of actual

But

work."

lacks

entelecliy

entelechy

"

all

the

the quantities concerned in

all

characteristics

of qiiantity

order of relation and absolutely nothing else

is

case being due to

its

manifestation in every

means which are used by entelechy,

or to

conditions which cannot be avoided.


It

seems to

therefore

me

that

it

is

not only rather

imaginative to speak of a vital kind of energy, just as

is

it

"

rather imaginative to speak of all other sorts of


energies, but that

it is

"

potential

absolutely wrong and contrary to the

fundamental principles of definition and terminology.

It is

not legitimate to subsume a something under a general


concept as one of

its

species, if this

something

the general term just in that property which

important and essential.


after the principle

"

it

from

the most

Science does better not to classify

lucus a non

Therefore entelechy
of that

differs
is

is

lucendo."

not a kind of energy, but in spite

does not disturb the validity of the first principle

of energetics.

This principle would hold in

life,

even

if

an equation of economy were impossible.


New subsidiary
but these
fact
would
in
then
have
to
be
created
energies
;

new

subsidiary energies would

entelechy and

vitalism.

have nothing

Whether they

to

do with

exist or not is a

Short formula of the relation between entelechy and the first principle of
In a given limited system the sum of energy remains 2 (E) =
I do not lay
Const., whether entelechies are concerned in the system or not.
energetics

much stress upon the often-quoted fact that so-called "mental work" done
by a man has never been found to affect the general economy of the body,
including the consumption of energy, though, of course, this fact might seem
views.
On the other hand, the fact that, if a person
performing movements, the circulation in the brain
increased, allows of no univocal conclusions.

to be favourable to

my

imagines that he

is

vessels is

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

170

question by

itself,

which certainly cannot be answered with

out actual empirical research.

Thus

I decline,

even more decidedly than in

publications, any kind of

"

"

energetical

"

What,
energy

"

then,

is

entelechy

More preparatory

if it is

my

former

vitalism whatever.

not a special kind of

considerations are required to

decide this most important question.


1

See in particular iny Naturbeyriffe

und

Natururteile, Leipzig, 1904.

2.

ENTELECHY AND THE

The study

"

PRINCIPLE OF BECOMING

the second principle of energetics

of

our next problem.

"

to be

is

It will bring us to the intimate relation

between the non-energetical entelechy and the energetical


factors of the Inorganic.

THE

a.

It

"

SECOND

PRINCIPLE OF ENERGETICS

has often been said that the

"
"

first

principle of

energetics says nothing at all about becoming, as such, but

only deals with something connected with becoming.


as

we have

seen,

there

most general

another

But,
causal

be developed by pure reasoning

easily to

principle

is

the

principle that there never can be any becoming where no


diversities exist.
It

was

correlate

of this

Clausius

and Lord

expression

thermodynamics that a
principle was first established.

in the limited field of

for

general

Kelvin independently found a short


the relations between heat and the work

actually done by

it

both of them started from an old but

very ingenious analysis of the motive force of the steamengine, due to the French engineer Sadi Carnot.

The expression mentioned has assumed very


forms.
Lord Kelvin speaks of the
dissipation

different

"

"

171

of heat,

172

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

whilst Clausius begins his analysis with the principle that

heat cannot pass by itself

He

warmer body.

("von

selbst

")

from a cooler to a

ends with the phrase

the universe tends to a

maximum,"

the entropy of

"

the concept

"
"

entropy

signifying a special mathematical function which belongs to

the specific characteristics of any thermodynamical process.

There are

many

other formulations of the same principle.

The True Principle of Becoming

Helm was

the

to cross the

first

boundaries of thermo

dynamics with regard to the principle here in question, and


Ostwald was his chief follower. Helm formulated a general
"

"

principle of becoming

("

Satz des Geschehens

that differences in the factors of so-called

"),

stating
"

"

intensity

must

be present in order that becoming may be possible, and that


the raising of one intensity is only possible by the decreasing
of another.
It should be mentioned here that modern
energetists regard every sort of energy as
factor

of

capacity,"

quantity, and of

composed

of a

such as mass, specific heat, electric


such as velocity,
intensity,"

"

a factor of

"

temperature, electric or chemical potential, and so on.


l
that there are
I have tried to show on another occasion

two constituents of a very different logical character in what


is

usually called the

"

second

proper principle of becoming

"

principle of energetics.
is

The

but a specified formulation

of the aprioristic phrase, belonging to the realm of general

happen without diversities, and


diversities demands pre-existing

ontology, that nothing can

that

the

originating
1

See

of

my

Naturbegri/e, chap. C.

2.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


This principle

diversities.

only as far as

it

of an equal logical value with

is

the principle of conservation

like the latter, it is empirical

applies to real nature.

and these only, must be

173

different,

That the

and that an

intensities,

intensity can

only be raised by another intensity falling and becoming


do work," is the empirical part of it but that a
able to
"

must be

"

"

something

As an

different

was prior

to all

experience.

we

illustration of this true second principle of energetics

may remark

that in the very largest quantity of water, say

the ocean, nothing at

all

would happen

temperature were the same throughout, or

"by

if

itself"

if

the

the surface level

were the same everywhere, though the absolute amount of


There would
energy contained in the water is enormous.
"

"

be no differences of the intensity either of thermic or of


in these cases.
And on the
potential mechanical energy
of
on
account
such
is
it
differences
alone that
other hand,

a steam-engine does mechanical work, or that a waterfall

can produce electric potentials.


Let us notice, by the way, that this fact of non-becom
ing in the absence of diversities in intensity might lend
countenance to the proposal to call the real second principle
of energetics the

The

principle.

ideally

first,"

the law of conservation the

in tensity -principle

is

"second"

far

"first"

more

Moreover, the conservation-principle is only


only with reference to a zero-point for all

immediately.
true

"

energy could

all

energy practically be measured

a zero-point can never be attained.

but such

This shows once more

that the conservation-principle rests far more on reasoning

than on

But

facts.

let

us

enlarged form.

return

to

the

principle

of

Carnot in

its

174

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

"

as a

"

Dissipation

"

Third

"

Principle

Besides the aprioristic principle of becoming there

purely empirical statement concerned in almost


second
formulations of the so-called
principle
tion
is

or

of

"

augmentation

a mere fact that

physics.

Its

of a case

where

is

it

is

entropy,"

as

it

is

may

"

real

pendulum

of friction.

This

fields

all

of

be realised by trying to think


In abstract mechanics a

not found.

pendulum may go on possessing kinetic energy and


energy alternately ad infinitum, it may swing
But a

dissipa

called.

encountered in almost

importance

the

"

"

"

is

all of

will soon cease to swing,

ever.

on account

in the form of heat-conduction,

"Dissipation,"

We

here occurs by friction.

potential
for

speak of the law of dissipation

"

as the third or
It is clear

"

principle of energetics.

empirical

from our statement that what really gives a

certain sense to natural

phenomena

is

not the true aprioristic

second principle dealing with the necessity of diversities of


intensity for becoming, but the empirical principle of dis

Without

dissipation all events in nature

might
behave like the ideal pendulum, there would be a permanent
change of diversities, but diversities would never disappear.
sipation.

Experience shows that that

is

not the case.

Of

not meant by this doctrine of dissipation that

course,

it is

all

becoming
from different intensities leads immediately to
an average value of intensity, and thus to an end of becoming,
In all cases where
as all purely thermic becoming does.

which

results

transformations of energy occur, where one kind of energy

appears at the cost of another, on account of another energy


"

doing

work,"

there

is

an

increase

with

regard

to

the

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


But

energy which appears.

this increase is not only

the decrease of the intensity of the other kind,

175
due

but

it

to
is

amount than the corresponding decrease


the difference between decrease and increase has

always of a smaller

had been
been

"

dissipated,"

and has thus been

lost for future

changes

in nature.

On

By

Catenation of Energy

our last remarks

problem of the

"

we have been

catenation

kinds of energy, and by this

led to the important


"

"

or

we

of different

"

chaining

back to biology.
There exists a specific equivalence between the factors of
intensity of different energies, just as there was such an
shall be led

The

equivalence between the amounts of energy as such.


increasing of the intensity of

any one energy stands in fixed

relations to the decreasing of the intensity of the others, in

such a manner that there


"

called the

and so

"

coupling

fixed not only

is

of one energy

on, but also the

amount

what has been

to the energies B, C,

of this coupling.

By

this

fact of coupling the concept of the diversity of intensities is

enlarged in a very important

There

may

be

way

it

becomes

"
"

equilibrium

intensity of one energy

if

there

is

so

relative.

much

of the

and so much of the intensity of the

other, and there may be a disturbance of equilibrium


relation of the two intensities is changed.

the

if

It is at this point that potentialities regarded as realities

enter the field of the second principle of energetics in the


1
This is the language of dogmatic energetics. As a matter of fact, in
chemical becoming for instance, the decreasing intensity probably always
causes the increase of another intensity by means of heat.
The increase is

smaller than the corresponding decrease, because part of that heat


sipated."

is

"

dis

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

176

same manner as they did that of the first.


Intensities can
be actually measured only in very few cases, in all other
cases they are

imaginary and subsidiary.

proceeds in a circle here.

If, for instance,

ing in a system of chemical


of aggregation,

we

all

this

known only

is

potentials

and

their

compounds

"

exists

diversities of

post factum

diversities

know what happens, and

in

principle of such creations

nothing

happen

"

equilibrium

happens then there were

reasoning
is

or of different states

"

say that

All

if

anything

But

potentials."

in other words, the

are created only after

And

what amount.

we

the leading

always the aprioristic convic


of intensities
tion that there must have been diversities
is

in order that anything could happen.

ft.

THE PRINCIPLE OF BECOMING IN

ITS

RELATION TO

ENTELECHY

now study

Let us
true

the
third

the relation of vital

second aprioristic principle

empirical principle

only occasionally.

to

is

Empirical

as

of

phenomena

energetics

to

the

enter into our discussions


it

is,

it

of course offers

no special ontological problem with regard to entelechy.


of some sort must have been
That an
equilibrium
"

"

disturbed

if,

for instance, a process of regeneration is going

on, is absolutely self-evident, and does not throw any light


To say there is no equilibrium,"
on the problem whatever.
and to say
there is happening," are identical phrases
"

"

the logical

in

sense.

certain biological
1

The word

terrible

Strange to say,

authors

there

have

been

who have thought they were

has been misused in biology in the most


"equilibrium"
manner, especially by certain physiologists (Verwoni, Jensen, etc.).

177

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


wisdom

uttering profoundest

mena, such as

restitution,

in saying that

due to a

are

"

vital

pheno

disturbance of

"

equilibrium

The

of

restoration

ly what

"

true problem

is

take

equilibrium

in those cases in which

it

is

single

does the

acts

here,

place

especially

proved that entelechy

work, and that physico-chemical

diversities

is

at

and potentials

of themselves are not able to offer a sufficient explanation


of

what happens

"

Again

Any

one who

catenation

"

with

decrease by increasing

the

them

energies, either causing

some kind of

vital

difficulty in solving this problem.

of his vital energy

intensity
"

little

"

"

into

able to assume

felt

energy would have

The

Entelechy not Energy

would have
of

intensities

to increase

or

the

inorganic

making them

But hitherto a

itself.

come

to

vital

energy

has appeared to us to be a simple impossibility, and

it

becomes even more so at this point.


For, though always
kind
and the same
of subsidiary energy, the
"

one

"

"
"

entelechian energy

endowed with
the

of an individual

would have

be

to

variable intensities with regard to one

and

same inorganic intensity, in exact correspondence to


In other

different states of disturbance of the organism.

An argument

often

employed by these authors

is

this

All organic events

are the consequence of a disturbance of equilibrium, all inorganic events are


the consequence of a disturbance of equilibrium, therefore organic events are

This argument rests upon the "logical" formula:


inorganic (mechanical).
All A are C, all B are C, therefore all A are B ; or in words
All men are
therefore
all men are birds.
I am sorry to
bipeds, all birds are bipeds,
:

"

"

say

so,

but

it is

true that this sort of

"

"logic

really has been

employed

biology.

12

in

178

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

which

would be an

it

words,

is

energy with

in

differences

itself,

contradictory to the concept of energy.

we cannot speak

Therefore

of intensities of a subsidiary

"
"

entelechian energy

in

any

The Relation of Entelechy

But in

that

of

spite

sense.

to the Intensities

of Energies

study of the true second


some use to us. Even

our

principle of energetics has been of

be not comparable to an energy in any sense,


entelechy, as far as it comes into connexion with the
energies of inorganic nature, can do so only through the

though

it

which are concerned in any kind of

aid of those factors

connexion

The

the

of

intensities

inorganic

of

inorganic

energies
energies,

one

with

therefore,

another.

the

are

point at which any possible relation between the living


and the non-living must be set up, for upon the intensities

depends

Now
standing

all spatial

becoming exclusively.

intensities

in

of

sort

any

inorganic energies, as
of possible exchange

we know,
at

all,

if

stand

either in the relative state of equilibrium or compensation,

mutual appearing and disappearing.

or in the state of
is

clear

act only

It

from what we have said that entelechy also can

upon the

state of

compensation or non-compensa

tion of the inorganic intensities.

Let us try to

fix

this

fundamental relation in a more

concrete manner, which will illustrate at the same


in

the

clearest

between the

manner,

vital

how we wish

and the inorganic

to

the

time,

differences

be understood.

a non-living system of a specific number of


chemical
specific
compounds in specific states of aggregation

Imagine

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


and

in

arrangement

specific

then

it

of

potential

each of these constituents, what

equilibrium

is

We

reached.

absolutely

and by the mass

"
"

determined, by the so-called

is

179

happen until
have chosen a chemical and
to

is

aggregative system as our instance, because in the organism

the

becoming that can actually be

of

phenomena

single

observed are such as to consist in chemical and aggregative


specificities.

consisting

of

Let us now study the behaviour of a system


chemical and aggregative constituents, as

but forming at

before,

organism.

Our

the

same time part of

living

doctrine of entelechy teaches us that the

behaviour of this system

is

not exclusively dependent

on

the potential and mass of the constituents, but on something

In what possible relation is this something able


to stand with regard to the potentials of the constituents
further.

of the system

It is of the greatest importance to find

adequate answer

to

this

and

question,

hope

an

be able

to

to give at least the beginning of such an answer in

what

follows.

The Action of Entelechy in

"
"

suspending

possible

Becoming

Entelechy is not able to change the chemical potentials


of the elemental constituents of the system in a qualitative
way at least we have no grounds for such an assumption,
:

which

make

would

sulphuric acid

of sodium
far as

imply,

of

instance,

(H 2 S0 4 )

and potassium

we know,

specificities

for

at

if it

its

that

entelechy

disposal.

Entelechy,

at least, is limited in its acting

inorganic

nature,

could

had only the chlorides

among which

specificities included under the phrase

"

chemical

as

by many
are

the

element."

180

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

Entelechy

compounds which never

known

are

In short, entelechy

world.

between chemical

also unable to cause reactions

is

differences of intensity of

But entelechy

is

to react in the inorganic

altogether unable to create

any kind.

we know from

so far as

is able,

the facts

concerned in restitution and adaptation, to suspend for as


long a period as

it

wants any one

are possible with such

compounds
would happen without entelechy.

And

regulate this suspending of reactions

now

and now in the

which

of all the reactions

as are present,

and which

may

entelechy

in one direction

suspending and permitting possible

other,

Now, after
becoming whenever required for its purposes.
all we have said, this suspending of affinity, so to say, is
to be considered as a temporary compensation of factors of

which would otherwise be uncompensated, and


would lead to immediate becoming. This faculty of a
"

"

intensity

temporary
regarded
of

of

suspension
the

as

entelechy.

most

inorganic

essential

Because

it

becoming

ontological

possesses

this

to

is

be

characteristic

faculty

without

an energy at the same time, entelechy

being of the nature of


is the

non-physico-chemical agent.
Let it be well understood

we do

entelechy

by means
Entelechy,

may
of

"

so-called

energy, and entelechy

itself

prevented

hitherto.

may

is

set

from

Auslosung
view,
"

"

in

"

our

to

according

entelechy

that

transform potentials into actual happening

remove any kind of an


is removed in catalysis
that

admit

not

obstacle

is

any

quite

sense.

unable

to

to happening, such as

such a removal would require


We only admit
non-energetical.
for

free

into

actuality,

actuality

what

it

what

has

it

has

suspended

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

The Role of Entelechy in


This statement implies a

the

181

Continuity of Life

very important consequence.

must have done something in order that


may do anything in the present and future, there can, of

If entelechy always
it

course, never be

acting

any

real beginning of its acting, but this

And

must be continuous.

inheritance teaches us.

this is

what the

Life is indeed continuous

fact of

a certain

portion of matter that stands under the control of entelechy


is

handed down from generation

entelechy always has already

to generation.

acted

And

Unfortunately, as will be seen later on,

we

are unable

to escape this regressus

ad infinitum in any way

we know nothing about

of

suspension

of

thus

at least

"
"

first

inorganic

arid really primordial act

becoming

on

the

part

of

entelechy.

Entelechy and

Of course we can only

Chemism

affirm

the

possibility

of

temporary suspending of reactions on the part of entelechy


in those cases where there is an empirical reason for doing
and that is only the case at present in the spheres of
so
;

chemical and of aggregative events.


1

It might be objected here that the continuity of entelechian control


would imply a decrease of the amount of possible becoming, according to the
and that for this reason life, i.e. the suspending
principle of dissipation
But the principle of dissi
action of entelechy, would soon come to an end.
pation is a purely empirical principle of inorganic science, and nobody is
able to say a priori that the regulating acts of entelechy in relaxing sus
pension must be subject to it. Decrease and increase between coupled inten
sities therefore may amount to the same value in the sphere of vitalistic
;

happening.

182

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

In these spheres there


of inorganic nature

is

indeed a sort of

overcoming

by the Organic, an overcoming that

no more strange, of course, than

coming of gravity by

electricity

is,

two

when

small balls of elder


though, of course,
"

"

real

is

for instance, the over

pith are attracted by a rubbed glass rod


in the latter case

"
"

energetical

intensities are in

action against each other.


If spiritualistic facts should prove to be true

about which I have no personal experience at

a matter
or

all

if it

were really true that Indian fakirs are able to overcome


gravitation and to rise from the ground, there would be a
far larger field of inorganic intensities

where becoming, on

the basis of diversities of intensity, might be temporarily

suspended by entelechy.

An

explanation of the Limits of Regulability and of


Life in General

If

we understand

that the action of entelechy

is

only

an action of suspending that which, but for this, would


an action of regulating by suspending
we
happen
at

once

understand two

very important

features

which

the dependence of life


appear in all phenomena of life
on the conditions of the medium, and the limits of its
:

reguldbility.

We

know

that

life

is

impossible

without

food

and

oxygen, without a certain amount of heat and without a


all within rather
specific composition of the medium

narrow

limits.

We

have frequently remarked, moreover,

in our purely biological discussions that there exist great


differences in the faculty both of restitution

and of adapta-

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


tion.

open

One plant

able to live in water as well as in the

is

whilst another one

air,

183

the surface of water

is

killed if

submerged under

the newt regenerates the foot with

the utmost perfection, whilst

mammals

are only capable of

healing up their wounds.

Even

it

seems to me, are understood without

we assume

that entelechy can only suspend the

these facts,

difficulty, if

of

compensation

which

potentials

differences

of

already, but that

exist

intensities

energetical
it

is

or

not able to

The acting of entelechy thus be

create such differences.

comes dependent on the potentials of the single parts of the


body, which are themselves of an inorganic character, and
on the potentials of the surrounding medium.

Now

somebody might say that the medium always con

tains potentials of the highest possible value, as exhibited,


for instance, in the

the

of

intensity

temperature of the

emanating

rays

medium and

from

in the

These

the sun.

potentials certainly are of the greatest importance for the

permanence of

life,

because, thanks to them,

life is

not ex

clusively dependent on the internal potentials of the material

the organisms consist


that there
such, in

order

differences

in

that

It

is,

"
"

differences

becoming

may

of energy

potentials

with each other, which


other.

But we know, on the other hand,

of.

must be not only

may

moreover,

of potentials as

be possible, but also

which are

"

"

coupled

be transformed one into the

well-known

fact

that

most

chemical and aggregative processes are almost absolutely


beyond the influence of radiant energy of even the
strongest intensity.

Entelechy then

is

limited in

its

operation to the differ

ences of potentials already existing, so far as the organism

184

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

same time an inorganic system surrounded by an


This limitation 1 will explain not
energetical medium.

is

at the

2
only the limits of regulability, but also disease and death,

The

at least in principle.

founded upon some rather insignificant feature,


be in spite of that very marked in their
fragmental

some
It

of

development

may be
and may

limits of regulability

the

isolated

The

effects.

blastomeres

of

is a good example of what I have said.


on
some
very unimportant peculiarity in the
depend

sorts of eggs

may

consistency of the protoplasm that the isolated blastomere


of the Ctenophore egg

is

not able to restitute

intimate protoplasmatic structure into a small

From

the impossibility of performing

regulation

it

simple
whole.

rather simple

follows that not a whole but a half animal

develops from the isolated

cell.

Entdechy burdened with as

We

this

its

new

have

tried

to

Little as Possible

formulate

the

relation

between

entelechy and inorganic elemental agents in such a manner

nothing may seem to be postulated which is not


founded on experimental facts, and that at the same time
the amount of specific performance burdened upon entelechy
that

may
1

appear as small as possible.

The discontinuity

"theories

of matter

"

Our

personal belief

is

of physical phenomena upon which the so-called


is, of course, also one of the conditions that

are based,

Maxwell, MacKendrick, and ErreVa have discussed


entelechy is limited by.
the lowest possible size of an organism from this point of view.
Compare
Errera, Bull. soc. roy. sc. m6d. et nat.,
references will be found in this paper.
2

It will

Bruxelles, Janvier

1903;

other

be understood from our discussion of morphogenetic teleology

(page 134) that death, though practically the end of the individual s life, is
by no means its rAos at least not from the point of view of a philosophy
of nature.

185

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


that

we have charged

it

with

too little, that future

will enlarge the sphere of its acting.

best scientific
is

method not

to

But

it

experience

always

is

the

assume more of the new than

absolutely necessary.

In attributing to entelechy the suspending of possible


becoming exclusively, though in a changeable and regulable
way, we at the same time, I believe, have avoided one
very bad mistake that has been very often a reproach to

We

have not imputed any action to entelechy


that might seem to represent any amount of energy in
itself, and in fact we could not do so, as we had most

vitalists.

refuted

strictly
itself

any kind of theory regarding entelechy


Suspending the compensation

as a sort of energy.

of uncompensated differences of intensities

among coupled

kinds of energies and relaxing that suspension are in fact


not acts that would require any amount of energy.

we

repeat, our

For,

hypothetic act of suspending and setting

uncompensated potentials by no means relates


1
a removal of obstacles, such as occurs in catalysis, for

free actually
to

example.

We

must always very

carefully discriminate

between

creating differences of potential and suspending the

compen
The former can only happen
energy, whereas for suspending and

sation of existing differences.

by an actual

transfer of

no transfer of energy is required,


but simply a transformation of energy from actuality into
a potential form, and vice versa.
for relaxing of suspension

On

catalyser

the theory of

would

"intermediate

also require

reactions"

the part played by the

no extra amount of energy.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

186

Entelechy and

"

"

Catalysis

few words seem desirable about the

of the potentials of the Inorganic with

We

especially connected.

specific

nature

which entelechy

is

have said already several times

that the field of chemistry and of the states of aggregation

the proper sphere for the activity of entelechy, and

is

this

for

reason that

all

researches on

aggregative nature of so-called

much

scientific

it is

chemical and

the

"

are of so
living matter
But I think we can attain still

interest.

"

greater certainty as to the exact point where entelechy


chiefly at

work.

catalysis plays

We

already

know

that

the process

is

of

a leading role not only in normal but also

Now it is of no import to
regulative life processes.
our present purpose which theory of catalytical processes
is right, though personally we believe that catalysers not

in

only accelerate reactions but that without them the reactions


question would never take place.

in

that

Let us also grant

made ferment

the effect of the ready

or

enzyme

inorganic, just like that of the inorganic ferments

by Bredig

and

others.

In

cess

concerned in
"

"

activation
1

The

"

any

activation

regulation and

studied

the formation of

case
"

catalysers or their so-called

is

is

the chief pro

adaptation phenomena,

of ferments out of the state of

"
"

preferments

between the two theories would practically disappear,


by catalysers were regarded as happening
In this form their occurring without
"infinitely slowly" without them.
the ferments would only be assumed in deference to a certain innate property

if

difference

all processes

"accelerated"

of the mind, namely, its inability to conceive beginning.


All the applications
of the infinitesimal calculus to physics rest upon this property of the mind.
2
Bredig himself is by no means a dogmatic enemy of vitalism (see
Biochem. Zeitschr. vi., 1907, p. 326; and Centralblatt f. Bakter. xix., 1907,

p. 493).

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


being

also, of course, a

definitively

become by

187

formation in the sense that ferments

very process what they actually

this

are.

In the formation or activation of ferments we hypothetiOur


cally see the fundamental role played by entelechy.
theory of the mere suspending action of entelechy, of course,
forbids us to regard entelechy as really creating catalytic

We

materials.

think

right to assume that on the basis

it

of the chemical system actually present in the organism

an indefinite though not

strictly infinite variety of reactions

regarding the production of ferments

sum

of

possible

reactions

is

possible.

that entelechy

It is this

takes

suspending and relaxing suspension according

in,

part

to its purposes

of regulation.

Conclusions

We
at

now have

said, it

present about the

seems to me,

relations

of

that can be said

all

entelechy

to

the

true

second principle of energetics, which deals with diversities


of

intensities

and

the

coupling

in
life

life

processes,

depends

extent

there

and because

on inorganic
cannot

be

them, and which

of

This principle

aprioristic in its foundations.

it

is

observed

processes.

any

is fully

we

Indeed,

contradiction

is

observed

see that
to

between

some
the

second principle and the doctrine of entelechy on account


of the partly aprioristic character of the former.
In this
sense

we can say

and that

that the principle was

was only the

bound

to hold

special form of reconciling the


doctrine of entelechy with it that was the problem.
Our problem then was not to state whether the true
it

188

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

second principle holds for the organism or not, but to make


out in what sense it holds, its purely inorganic form being
insufficient for the explanation of

But what entelechy


out at

all

really

life.

"is"

has not yet been

by these rather complicated

considerations.

made

3.

ENTELECHY

IN ITS

KELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION

OF GIVEN ELEMENTS

SOME APPARENT

a.

BETWEEN

CONTRADICTIONS

ENTELECHY

AND THE TRUE SECOND AND THE THIRD

EMPIRICAL

PRINCIPLE OF ENERGETICS

The Problem
Individual

organic

in

development

and

general,

the

differentiation of the harmonious-equipotential


particular,

seem

to

contradict

principle of energetics at the

which at

least

may

first

the

relation

glance,

be connected with

entelechy

to

and some features

seem

acting

second and

the

the

third

principle of energetics requires yet further consideration.

An

to

Therefore the problem of

contradict these principles also.


of

systems in
second and the third

the

harmonious-equipotential system, before differentia

tion occurs, consists of elements

which are equal

other in actuality, and equal in potentiality

sum

also,

to

each

and out

formed by differentia
tion another system, which shows an enormous diversity of
its constituents in actuality and perhaps in
potentiality
of the

of these elements there

is

The fundamental problem to be discussed


But I only found
Naturbegriffe, p. 180.
when I wrote that book.
in

my

189

in this chapter was first seen


a very unsatisfactory solution

190

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


There

too.

are,

we know, no

as

and

specified

localised

external causes that could be responsible for every single

one of the resulting diversities.


Entelechy, on the other
hand, as we have seen, cannot be regarded as being of the
nature of an energy, though

it is

able to suspend energetical

processes.

What

does that

mean

Does

it

not seem as

if,

in the

differentiation of harmonious-equipotential systems, a state

of diversity were created out of the

homogeneous

state of a

Indeed,
system by the sole agency of this system itself?
as far as the originating of diversities as such is concerned
that seems to be the case, even though energetical potentials

between the medium and the system play their part in


this process; for these

in general, but not to

potentials only relate to

becoming which leads

becoming

to diversity

in the different parts of the system.

Such a

state of things

seems to contradict the second

and the third principle of energetics at the same time.

A
Now,

of course,

it

Partial Solution

must well be kept

harmonious-equipotential system

is

in

mind

that an

from being homo

far

It is composed
geneous in the strictest sense of the word.
of cells, and each of these cells is probably composed of an
enormous sum of chemical and aggregative constituents,

both

in

its

protoplasm

and

its

nucleus.

Part

of

the

be said to have been solved

problem propounded here may


by this statement, but part of it remains.
For,

granted even that

single elements

there

are

not more different

taken as truly homogeneous constituents

191

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


of the system, as so-called

than

differentiation

there

were

end of the

at the

"phases"

before

it

began,

there

a greater amount or degree of diversity in the


certainly
distribution of different single elements at the end than at
is

the

beginning, and this greater

regard to distribution

What

itself.

system
A mixture of

is

amount

of diversity with

created by the sole agency of the

about this very striking fact

and water, which afterwards separates

oil

into a layer of oil and a layer of water, shows also a greater

degree of diversity or heterogeneity in the distribution of


its elements at the end than at the beginning, and such

a phenomenon
are

becomes

mixed which are

remain individual

still

clearer

three

if

substances

of different specific gravity,


for

phases

But

themselves.

and
all

will

such

events go on under the influence of an external factor,

Such

gravitation.

an

external

responsible for the increase of the


distribution

is

wanting

that

factor

amount

in the case of

could

be

of diversity in

the differentiation

of harmonious-equipotential systems.

/3.

THE ELEMENTAL R6LE OF ENTELECHY IN CREATING


"DIVERSITIES

OF

DISTRIBUTION"

The E6le of Entelechy in Morphogenesis

Now we know

is

is

that an harmonious-equipotential system


with
endowed
entelechy, and that the function of entelechy
to suspend

existing

and

to set free, in

potentials,

i.e.

a regulatory manner, pre

pre-existing faculties

of

inorganic

interaction.

What

does

differentiation

that

imply with regard to the origin of

192

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

An

harmonious-equipotential system

of such a kind that out of


of

the

may

organism

is,

any one of

its

But,

as

originate.

we know,

as
cells

any part

morphogenesis

depends in the main on chemical and aggregative trans


formations, this means that in each cell of a harmonious

system the same number and kind of chemical-aggregative


reactions are possible}

become actual

Only part of these possible reactions


each cell, and these actual reactions are

in

different according to the relative position of the cells.

transformation from possibility into actuality

is

mental work done by entelechy, based upon

its

This

the funda

elemental

action in suspending possible becoming and relaxing the

suspension

What
It

when

required.

does this imply

seems to

me

that

it is

phenomenon

of quite funda

mental importance.
If

we

elemental

to

agree

distinguish

composition"

we may

distribution

of

between

system and a

"

diversity

of

"diversity

of

say

Entelechy, though not capable of enlarging the


the diversity of composition of

augmenting

its

manner, and

it

diversity

a given

amount of

system, is capable of

of distribution

in

regulatory

does so by transforming a system of equally

distributed potentialities into a system of actualities which

are unequally distributed.

Thus, what
differentiation
1

of

The word

"infinitely

mere description of
now appears as the immediate effect of

first
"

"

"possible,"

actual"

appeared

as

of course, is not to be understood here in the sense


page 186, note 1), as in a certain theory of

(see

with
It is entelechy that suspends actuality in the present case
catalysis.
out entelechy there would at once happen all sorts of chemical reactions
;

until "physico-chemical equilibrium"

was reached.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


entelechy, and as the
at

the same time.

"

"

"

of

definitio realis

193
"

differentiation

the

in fact, passes

"

Differentiation/

limits of inorganic events.


It

is

worth while

to illustrate the

between

differences

the diversity of elemental composition and the diversity of


distribution in a

still

more concrete though schematic form.

A harmonious-equipotential system may consist of n cells,


each of them composed of m different (chemical) constituents.
In each

cell

every constituent

able to react

is

with every other;

in other words, there exist chemical potentials or affinities

between each possible pair of constituents in each


far the given

"

diversity of elemental

composition,"

mere potentiality by the suspending action

But now entelechy proceeds


by enlarging the amount of
the

system

in

question

to actuality,
"

value

each

actual
"

reaction

actually, out of

which

regulatorily determined

entelechy transforms a
different elements

entelechy.
it

does so
"

in

the possible

all

allowed to happen, and

is

determines

of the cell, is different in each.

cell is

and

kept in

diversity of distribution

reactions in each cell, only one


this

of

So

cell.

the

The

"

prospective
specificity in

by entelechy, and thus


"

"

homogeneous

and given

distribution of given

possible reactions into

"

hetero

"

geneous

distribution of

effects.

The Role of Entelechy in Acting

Now

that the study of entelechies which govern typical

order in space has given us such an important result, let us

glance at some features connected with action,

work

i.e.

with the

of entelechies related to typical order in time.

There

is

workman and

there

is

a heap of bricks, and


13

194
the

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

workman

building a small house with the bricks.

is

It

without any deeper consideration, that the system


represented by the bricks is passing from a state of almost

is

clear,

a state of distribution showing a

equal distribution into

But you answer me that


very marked degree of diversity.
is
to
its
brick
each single
brought
place by a single external
factor, namely, by a single act of moving, on the part of the
That

workman.
the

workman

is

true,

certainly.

But

if

you consider

plus the heap of bricks, and, of course, plus

the

the medium, as

"

"

be

to

system

studied, the

whole

Certainly there
problem acquires a very different aspect.
in
one
of
diversities
the
part
many
system, that is, in

were

the man, at the beginning of the process; but at the end of


it

there

is

a very

much

higher degree of diversity in the

whole system, as regards the distribution


least

for the

amount

we

elements at

heap of bricks has greatly augmented

of diversity,

and

the

man

"

see

of

that the

"

system

has

has

lost

none of

enlarged

its

his.

its

Thus

amount

of

diversity of distribution by factors which lay exclusively in


1

itself.

It

is

the same result as

we

got from the study of

the harmonious morphogenetical systems, regarding this very


point of the

There

is

"

diversity of

"

the

distribution."

only a difference in so far as in morphogenesis

"

suspending

act of entelechy relates to the material

elements of the body exclusively, while in action

immediately

to

the material

it relates

elements of the brain, and

1
The energetical factors of the medium, of course, can only claim to
be necessary for becoming in general, but have nothing to do with the
our system.
By the aid of one and the same
originating of diversities in
amount of oxygen, food, etc., the workman may either transform the original
homogeneous heap of bricks into another homogeneous heap, or construct

any kind of small house he

likes.

195

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

certain

and the muscular

brain

the

through

But

system

affects

difference

does

ENTELECHY DOES NOT CONTRADICT

THE

material

external

also.

this

not touch the chief point in question.

THE ROLE

7.

OF

OF THE INORGANIC AS THEY ARE, BUT AS

PRINCIPLES

THEY MIGHT BE FORMULATED

At

the

first

contradict the
third

our

glance

and

second

also,

principle of energetics.

created

amount

without

to

of course, the empirical

the

diversities,

a given

in

seem

For, if diversities can

pre-existing

of diversity

results

analytical

not only not

is

system

be

absolute

diminished, as the third principle postulates, but

is

most

decidedly increased, and this without any external event.

And

yet there

and

third

different,

for

number

the
said,

no contradiction to

is

energetical

principle,

we have

not admitted

but

second

something

quite

any augmentation of
elemental diversities by what we have

of

nor have

usual

the

we allowed any

regard to differences of

increase of diversity with

"

intensity."

We

only have stated

that an increase of diversity with regard to the distribution


of elements

has occurred from within, a


1

regard to tectonics, so to say.


is

affirmed

"by

any of

the

But about
energetical

diversity

this

with

point nothing

principles,

either

1
very good instance of the augmenting of diversity regarding distribu
tion but not elemental composition is offered by the process of printing.
Take the compositor and the types as forming our "system" by the action
of printing, which is a real "action" in our analytical sense, new types,
of course, are not created in any way, but the types present, which at the
:

beginning showed a fairly simple order of distribution, say in about fifty-two


boxes, will at the end

complexity.

show a

state of distribution of the highest imaginable

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

196

positively or negatively

the energetical principles

relate

to the diversity of potentials or intensities exclusively.

Now

would be wrong to conclude from this


that there is no opposition between inorganic and
it

But the opposition does not

phenomena.

relate

fact
vital

the

to

true second principle of energetics, but relates to a certain

more general

ontological

principle

have been

that might

established with regard to inorganic events, to a principle

that in fact

and

realised in a certain form in the

This
follows

principle

may most

generally

be

that, so

as

expressed

It is impossible to transform

a certain state of diversity

constituents into a

agency of the

Our
words
ally,

Inorganic

form in the Organic, 1 but


has been forgotten by physics and chemistry.

in a certain other

to say,

"

is

any system that possesses


among its actual and potential

more heterogeneous

state

by the

system."

principle becomes limited to the Inorganic

"constituents"

and in

energetical

sole

and

"agency"

as

the

are understood energetic

this form, of course, implies the true

principle

if

sub-class

but

second

even then

it

speaks of any kind of diversity, even of mere diversity


of spatial arrangement, and not only of diversity with
regard to intensities, as the latter does.

What

is

done by entelechy now contradicts or rather


form, and here

exceeds our principle in its general inorganic

1
It is very strange to note, that from this point of view the moat
remarkable biological phenomenon of "retro-differentiation" (as it occurs
in Clavellina and Tubularia, compare vol. i. page 163), in spite of its biological
exceptionality, appears more similar to inorganic phenomena than ordinary

differentiation does:
retro-differentiation.

there

is

a decease of

"diversity

of

distribution"

in

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


lies

the

between inorganic and

contrast

organic systems

may

vital

becoming

agents.

But

the

agents

own

of organic

are not energetical agents exclusively:


is

acquire a higher degree of diversity

of distribution without reference to other than their


energetical

197

systems
one of their agents

entelechy.

BUT THE ROLE OF ENTELECHY AGREES WITH A CERTAIN

GENERAL ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE


Therefore

our

in

principle,

most

its

general,

strictly

ontological form, can be shown not to be contradicted or


exceeded by vital facts
otherwise it would not be a
strictly ontological

principle

of univocal determination

nay, otherwise the principle

would be

The

violated.

principle

of univocal determination postulates that nothing happens

but what
Given.

is

related in only one

way

the rest of the

to

Formulated with special reference to the origin of


of any kind, the principle would demand that

diversities

any increase with regard


be

referable

in

corresponding to

any kind

to

of diversity

but one way to pre-existing


the increase that

is

diversities,

studied

words, that every newly originating singularity

must

is

in

other

referable

to a pre-existing singularity.

Our

analysis taught us that a certain general ontological

principle of becoming diverse


if

is

exceeded

by

vital

facts

expressed in limited inorganic terms, but that entelechy

plays a part in vital facts.


manifoldness,

embracing

But
real

entelechy is

system

diversities in itself: thence it follows that

the

principle of univocality

is

as

well

of

an

intensive

pre-existing

by our argument
observed as ever,

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

198

and that our principle of diversity in its most general form


Also in organic systems diversities
is observed as well.
are only created on

even

if

the basis of pre-existing diversities,

external agents are excluded, for organic systems

by entelechy, and therefore contain all possible


future perceptible diversities in an imperceptible latent
are governed

but

form,

"

"

diversities

qua

evolutio

in

differentiation

short,

is

in the ontological sense of the word.

Of course the

principle of univocality does not appear

here in the form of real spatial causality, as will be seen


later on.

THE

contrasted

have to deal with them


an

of

instance

contradict the

this

country,

have

very

with physical principles.


As far
relate to pure mechanics we shall

vital

statements

these

as

OF MAXWELL

"

in

particularly

Physicists,

often

DEMONS

"

that

true second

in thermodynamics.

But there

later on.

assertion

The

organic

energetical

is

one famous

processes

may

at

least

principle,

principle of Clausius, that heat

cannot pass from the cooler to the warmer body unless


an equivalent amount of work is performed, has been
said

to

be

organism.

possibly

contradicted

by something

The famous instance we

so-called mechanical physics, but as


1

vital

this

We

refer

it

to

like

starts

an

from

does not touch the

have not said a single word in our discussion on the so-called

"self-motion"
"concept"

of a

particle of matter,

most emphatically.

and, in fact,

"Self-motion"

We

is

should reject

self - contradictory,

do not even admit the creation


applied to a particle of matter alone.
of motion by entelechy, but merely the regulation of existing motion, as
will become still clearer in a later chapter.

if

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


mechanical

as

principles

mentioned at

be

may

it

such,

199

this place.

Maxwell imagines two boxes

there

is

please.

a sort of

temperature,

which may be closed and


Now, he says, let us assume that

communicating by a small
opened as you

of different

hole,

"

demon,"

who

able to

is

move

the door

and who only opens it when


a molecule of great velocity is passing from the box A
to the box B, but in no other case, the temperature of
of the hole at his pleasure,

The

being the higher one.

result of doing so will be,

that the temperature of B, in

spite

of being

the higher

one, will be raised at the expense of the temperature of

A; and

this

contradicts the second principle of thermo

dynamics.

seems to

It

me

that in

Maxwell s

fiction

workman and

just as they did in our instance of the

was accomplished by the


"

"

temperature

his

Let us not forget

vital agent.

not exist for Maxwell

as such does

from his mechanical point of view


are

the

where only an increase of diversity of distribution

bricks,

that

things stand

molecules in motion

elements to be studied, each of them endowed

with a specific velocity.


His
demon deals with these
molecules as our workman with his bricks
he does not
"

"

create diversities of velocity, he only increases the

amount

of

moving

diversity

in

In

molecules.

the
this

Maxwell s statements

distribution

sense

there

tion

the

to

the

heat

"

second

and

differently

no

contradiction

in

to the general principle of the role

of diversities in general becoming

but

of
is

of

principle
"

there only

is

a contradic

mere thermodynamics

are nothing elemental to


temperature
mechanical physicist.
Of course, the empirical law

"

"

200
of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

the

dissipation

Maxwell s
Let

it

upon a

fiction.

of

energy would

be well understood

fiction,

be

contradicted

by

and does not

But

any energetical law.

Maxwell s argument

it is

assert

life

contradicts

important, since now, after

our own analytical discussions,


to life as to a natural

that

rests

autonomous

it

may

really be applied

reality.

1
It has often been said that the "second principle" of energetics does
not hold for mechanics, but the "true second" and the "empirical third"
It seems to me
principle have always been confused in such an analysis.

that the true second principle

("

principle of becoming") finds its mechanical

expression in the simple phrase that a system of bodies all moving in the
same direction with the same velocity is unable to change its individual
velocities.
The law of dissipation, our "third empirical" principle, has

been applied to mechanics by Boltzmann on the basis of calculations on


To express the chief point in our terminology a homogeneous
in any system of moving bodies, endowed with different
velocities, is more "probable" than a heterogeneous distribution.
probability.
distribution

4.

PROVISIONAL KEMARKS ON ENTELECHY AND THE

CLASSES OF NATURAL AGENTS

On
Are we now

Phenomenalism

"

"

at length prepared to decide

what

a factor or agent or elemental value entelechy


nature regarded as a whole
First of all

may

it

more words on

"

and ought rather

ately

phenomenalism

what

is

alone

to

it calls

if it rejects

not based upon

it is

phenomena

"

much

the concept of a priori.


"

"

phenomena

exclusively,

For

be called empirical idealism.

that

is,

in

itself in the strict

the mere

sum

of

what

is

immedi

in the form of so-called sensations

"given"

be in

as the basis of

So-called pure phenomenalism, so

vogue nowadays, never


sense of the word, even

Even then

may

be not quite out of place to say a few

so-called

natural science.

sort of

would

never allow science of any sort to be formed.


The Ego
not only receiving but is also producing, and what is

is

generally

regarded as the

"world,"

even by unscientific

the greatest part a product of the producing

people,

is for

Ego.

Now, the

dimensions, as

"

as conceived in space of three

Given,"

regarded

to

"

exist

"

even when

it

is

not

directly perceived, as subjected to causality in its different

forms,

may

well be called

"

phenomenological," so far as it

201

202
is

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

not regarded as something absolute,

and science

is

i.e.
metaphysically
without
the
Given in this
possible
regarding

But the Given

though existing with


without
further analysis, has
Ego exclusively
already been made a
conceptum," and is no mere
perit
is not immediate, but
ceptum
givenness.
enlarged
way.

in this sense,

respect to the

"

"

"

"

"

So much

for the present

on

this

our manner of using the term


"phenomenalism" is

idealism
is

all

Our

phenomenological."

identical with critical non-metaphysical

form

in this

important point, and on

"

it

is

the only basis of science that

quite free from prepossessions of

any kind, and therefore


if meta

science should start from this idealism, even

physics

is

form

to

its end.

The

The question

"Constants"

as to the logical or ontological nature of

any factor or agent in the realm of the Given, in the sense


explained, is simply the question with what kinds of general
categories, concerned

in the creation of the

ceptus, these factors or

agents

We

know

energies are

factors,

constants

phenomenon conceptually

commonly

are

be co-ordinated.

the factors constituting the

you, I believe, will also

such

know
called

that there

enlarged.
is

"

both properties

constants."

of

"

bodies

world

permanent

properties.

"

in

Most

Intensities

and

intensities

are

These constants

name
show

very clearly the conceived character of natural factors in


contrast

to

mere perception.

Specific

of

another class of

variable or temporary properties, constants, as their


implies, are

con-

already that energies and the intensities of

among

the sense of a

may

mundus

its

heat, conductivity,

203

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


mass,

are instances of constants

etc.,

but so are

also, in

more complicated degree, the terms expressing the transone sort of energy into another, and as
constants must also be regarded the relations of affinity

formability

of

between chemical elements and the

specificity of the direc

tion of the attractive forces that appear in crystallisation.

None

of these constants, in fact, gives us any information

about anything that is immediately observed or perceived


all of them deal with possibilities only, with possibilities of
;

immediate becoming, which exist as realities in the most


general meaning which this word can have in true idealism.
"

"

Constants are expressions for possible immediate experiences


of different but elemental kinds, they are concepts created
in order to simplify the survey of the whole of possible

experience.

our

own

Their creation, however,

choice, but has to go

is

not only a matter of

on according

to the

funda

mental characters of the organisation of mind.


It follows from what we have said that a sort of order
of

exists

complication

among

all

the

different

classes

simplest

class

Specific heat

relates
is

to

simple physical properties only.

a good instance of this

class

expression of the degree in which a substance


to heat.

is

The physical constants combining two

energy, dealing with


other, form

the

the

next

of

The

constants conceived by phenomenological philosophy.

transformation

higher

class,

of one

it

an

is

accessible
fields

of

into the

whilst chemical

and

crystallographic constants, the one dealing with the mutual


relations of constants of the physical order, the other dealing

with the specificity of directed forces, form the two species


of the highest class.
1

Compare

my

Naturbegriffe, Part A.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

204

Negative Characteristics of Entelechy

What

We

sort of natural factor then is entelechy

know

already that

since quantity

same reason

it is

not one of

is

cannot be a

it

ambiguous meanings

not energy and not intensity,


its

For the

characteristics.

"force"

of that word.

in any of the very


Could it be called a

1
I thought it
thought so once myself
possible to speak of the entelechy of an organic system as
"

constant

"

"

"

its

constant

in the sense of its

permanent property

the

word property meaning the same as it does in the Inorganic,


where it is to signify nothing but the possibility of becoming
that would be actual with regard to immediate perception.

But

now seems

it

to

me

word

that the

"

constant

"

can be

applied to an entelechian system only in a very metaphorical

meaning, if at all for a constant always is the property of


a body, always is a something that is really possessed by
:

the body.

categories of substance

Only by help of the

inherence can the real relation of a constant to

Our next

be properly understood.

we

are

not at

all

able

thus

lecture will

its

and

bearer

show that

regard the relation of

to

upon which they act.


state it here in a more

entelechies to the material systems

So then

it

must be

sufficient to

provisionary and apodictic way

We may
is

into all

entelechy is not

constant.

only say that in this specific harmonious system

or in this acting system

which

we

are studying there

is

something
which
comes
constant,
prospective potency,
But this some
its reactions in the same manner.
viz., its

thing which

is
1

constant

is

not

"

constant."

Die organischen Regulationcn, Leipzig, 1901.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

What

then

our elemental vital factor in nature

is

205
?

Let us only say in this place that entelechies remain


also with regard to their true ontological
"

"

elemental

character, just as they were elemental with regard to the

Entelechies are not energies, not


law they obey.
entelechies.
intensities, and not constants, but

we know,

Entelechy, as

It is

teleologically.

is

forces, not

a factor in nature which acts

an intensive manifoldness, and on account

of its inherent diversities it is able

to

augment the amount

of diversity in the inorganic world as far as distribution is


It acts

concerned.

by suspending and setting

based upon potential differences

nothing like

We

There

regulatively.

is

in inorganic nature.

it

free reactions

Gap in

the Scale of

have learnt that there

is

Natural Factors
a sort of scale of constants

in the Inorganic, leading from simple physical constants to


As far as
the constants of chemistry and crystallography.

what happens
becoming

regarded exclusively in relation to univocal

is

in general,

we

could say that this scale

tinued in the Organic, and that entelechy


of

Morality, considered as a

it.

is

is

con

the next degree

phenomenon

in nature,,

might perhaps be said to form the highest degree of all.


But there is a gap between the constant factors of the
Inorganic and
that

of

life

of

these

Owing
taken
value.

to

as

the

not

is

factors
this

to

factors
to

be

concerned in the
filled,

matter

is

as

taken

far

into

gap the scale of factors

whole,

possesses

only a

phenomena
the

as

of

relation

consideration.

becoming,

certain

if

descriptive

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

206

Once more we remark here that nothing


in the proper

entelechy

meaning

entelechy

of the word,

is

"

psychical,"

introduced by our

an elemental factor of nature, con

is

ceived to explain a certain class of natural phenomena.

know

well

Few Words on

ambiguous, and that in


deal of
aiid

moving
are

so

the

there

explanation

very

a good

is

Constants are said to explain,


specific

actually done

is

kind of subsuming

is

explaining
"

and

entelechies

"
"

"

in a circle.

What

energies.

all

Explaining

word

the

that

"

"

kinds of forces and

here

is

nothing but a

phenomena under

single

certain

from the singularities them


and the question must remain at this very un

classes of generalities derived


selves,

idealism,"

others.

we may

On

to

"

the basis of our critically idealistic philosophy,

look a

more optimistically upon explaining."


doctrine, the generalities which are con
"

little

According to this
sidered

"

"

pure phenomenalism or empirical


as advocated by Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, and

satisfactory point in

"

"

are

explain

immanent and

formulated

to

according

categorical principles of reasoning

the

priori,

and what empiricism adds to them only consists in the co


ordination of some truly inductive general terms with the
In other words, the general type of
so-called natural laws is known independently of the

categorical generalities.
all

amount

of experience,

by experience, and
laws that are

and

it is
"

first

and

is

only brought to consciousness

only the empirical addenda to these

abstracted

"

from empirical

singularities,

"

after that serve to

"

explain

only constants in their different

these singularities.
specificities

but also

Not
specific

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


enteiechies are instances of these empirical addenda.

no difference in

207
There

with regard to the sciences


Later on we shall see
of the Organic and the Inorganic.
that with regard to apriorism also inorganic and organic
is

this respect

natural factors are on equal terms.

ENTELECHY AND MECHANICS

5.

a.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MECHANICAL PHYSICS

On a

We

possible Qualitative Science that is Complete

now

the

leave

realm of energetics, with all its


to another possible

consequences, and turn our attention


interpretation of nature.

Ordinary

qualitative

energetics

is

of

matter,

in

other

of the

material,"

"

the

words,

being a

is

the problem, though neglected,

the

"

being

But

almost forgotten.

is still there.

problem

the

of

problem

body,"

means

by no

complete system, even of inorganic nature

Now

it

must

be granted that a science of inorganic nature seems possible


which should not put aside the problem of materiality

Such a possible science


and should yet remain qualitative.
would have to deal not only with qualitative energies and
intensities,

but also with the concept of qualitative

defined on the analogy of

"
"

in mechanics,

force

forces,

and would

regard ultimately the inorganic universe as a system of


geometrical points, from which lines of different kinds of
qualitative

chemical

forces

affinities,

proceed

and the

states of aggregation.

representing heat,

electricity,

different characteristics

The word
208

"
"

quality

of the

would have two

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


very different meanings in such a scientific view

it

209
firstly

would be used in the simple sense of a property, such


as warmth or redness, but secondly, there would be
qualities

with regard to

"

bodiness,"

and

so to speak,

this

second class of qualities would relate to the problems of


materiality,

especially

discontinuity,

which

is

to

the

of

problem

continuity

almost wholly neglected by

or

common

energetics.

As

a complete qualitative science of the Inorganic, as

sketched

does

here,

mentioned

not

exist,

possible existence.

its

commonly known

it

is

We

enough
pass on

to

have

to a

more

scientific point of view.

The Epistemological Character of Universal Mechanics


It is

way

very

difficult

to introduce

in

a really legitimate

the possibility of so-called mechanical physics, that

is,

the interpretation of nature as a pure mechanical system,

and the reduction

of all quality in nature to

mere

constella

tion of elements.

Mechanical physics has been called a


metaphysical
an assumption which relates to something
hypothesis," i.e.
but such a
absolute, and might some day prove to be true
"

view without further explanation is not compatible with


an idealistic philosophy.
Others have called the theories
"

of mechanical
to describe

with

"

physics

regard

to

their

that of

might even be
this

or

by analogy the relations

value beyond

was

fictions

quantity

mere

"

"

pictures,"

of natural

only,

but

adequate

phenomena

possessing no

economy of thinking," which


in some other way.
It

reached better

point of view in particular that led

science
14

to

210

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

was quite a natural result of


regarding mechanical theories as mere fictions to reject
them completely as mere ballast, superfluous for a pure

its

qualitative period,

description

of

for it

mechanical physics

attacks

more than

But

in

lives

in

phenomenalities.
still

that, in the theory of electrons

a remarkable renaissance.

our days, and,


is

it

That seems to prove that there


it seems

is

fictions,

to

a great vitality in

me

that they are

though, on the other hand,

they by no means relate to anything absolute.


innate necessities of the

to

again and again.

reach

to

the

states

and

of

human mind

They always
tries

"

It is

owing

that they arise

whenever science

arise

problem of

final

and when science

undergoing

these theories, and indeed

much more than mere

these

of

spite

the Material

tries

"

as

such,

to explain the varieties of material

ordinary qualities

on the same

basis.

system of nature that is complete and at the same time


free from logical and real contradictions needs mechanical
physics of a certain form, and cannot be satisfied until

has succeeded in demonstrating the variety of the

"

Given

it
"

mere arrangement or constellation


of some elements, the law of whose behaviour is known
To modern
aprioristically, at least as to its general scheme.
as

due

being

to

"

phenomenological science the combination of pro


perties, of constants in particular, in one and the same

"

purely

"
"

thing
1

is

a mere given state, a something that

is

merely

with the elimination of causality as


phenomenalists. As may easily
be conceived, this elimination is based upon a philosophical doctrine that
mathematical form of this
is altogether incomplete, and so too is the
functional
phenomenalism. The philosophy of nature cannot be satisfied
by the mere statement of necessary dependence it asks for causality in its
It is not the place here to deal

advocated

"

by some modern

empiristic

"

strict ontological form.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

211

be acknowledged.
But that is by no means satisfactory.
Mechanical physics offers a real explanation of the problem
to

combination of properties, and at the same time


allows us to understand another important problem,

of the
it

which

insoluble in any other

is

way

the problem which

may

be called the systematics of natural events and properties


in the Inorganic.

In

mechanical

fact,

to prove

physics in

ultimate

its

combinations of properties

all

in

aim

tries

one thing on

the one hand, and the totality of possible properties (and

of

such, on

as

events)
the

kinds

possible

us

of

may

why

be the mere outcome

equilibrium

there

may

or

causality

class of

of

phenomena

mechanical physics shows


be so many kinds of typical

be thus explained

firstly

to

To mention only one

elemental matter.
that

the other,

shows us secondly why there may be so many


atoms,
kinds of molecules, and it shows us thirdly why there
it

may

be so

to do so

many

types

and then

of equilibria

of atoms,

and

in

first

space,

finally of molecules.

some

extent,

we have

said

to

problems,

In order

only has to solve certain problems about the

it

possible

kinds of crystalline systems.

become

mere

of

electrons,

Thus

all its

problems

of

absolutely independent

of

geometry.
All that

is

the present state of mechanical physics

mechanics holds the

classical

of material elements

primary

forces, or

electrons,

and

the form of

("

mass

field,

it is

true whether

operating with one kind

"-elements)

and two kinds of

whether we shall have to reduce mass to

to consider space

as

a sort of activity in

"

ether."

Future mechanical science, then, will have altogether

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

212

abandon the metaphysical view of the older mechanics


in this respect it may learn from modern energetical
to

But mechanical physics is not a system


Mechanical physics is phenomenalism in
the enlarged meaning of the term as we have defined it,
it deals with the
mundus conceptus as presented to the
mind
but it is a thorough -going, a truly ontological
phenomenalism.

"

"

"

of

fictions."

"

"

phenomenalism.

Its

scheme

general

is

specific form at a given time


with reference to what
existence

its

ontological,
"

is
"

"

hypothetic,"

or

aprioristic

truly

means

phenomenalism in this sense molecules may


be found to exist some day, just as do the nucleus and
the chromosomes of a cell.
in enlarged

Tfie Psychological

Basis of Universal Mechanics

So much for the epistemology of mechanical physics


merely psychological starting-point
of acoustics

sound

"

is

manner.

here

we

the same

We

actually

"
"

is

know
"

its

given by the science


that a body emitting

a body

moving in a special
cannot discuss here the most important words
as

is

also

1
It was the great fault of many modern phenomenological physicists to
confuse theoretical mechanics as a rational and aprioristic science with the

knowledge of the actual motions of perceptual bodies. In fact, rational


mechanics is above experience, and is only called into existence by it.
Rational mechanics cannot be
it would hold, even if all actual
movement in the universe did not obey the law of Galilei as modern
"false,"

Actual movement
electrodynamics asserts, at least for very great velocities.
then would not be pure "mechanical" movement, but would be pure

movement

corrected by an electromagnetic field.


Rational mechanics isnothing but enlarged mathematics, or rather a step beyond real mathematics
in general categorical ontology.
2

The corresponding perception

for distinguishing practical

of two

"reality"

"senses"

from

is

"illusion."

also the chief reason

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

philosophy,

enough

and

same"

"the

in

which

"also,"

of

spite

their

at

lie

213

the very root

of

it

is

everyday character;

here that acoustics forms the most simple

for us

bridge from quality to motion in constellation

from sound

to heat is but a step.

We

repeat that the kinds of motion

heat (in general words

"

"

corresponding

molecules, atoms, and

are in their epistemological character as

moving particles of air corresponding


them are either non-real or

"

"

real

electrons)
as are the

Or

to sounds.

to

better

"

all of

"

they

certainly

of

are

same

the

"

as

real,"

degree

as

you choose

"

to

reality,"

the word reality being taken in the sense of


possibility
of perception."
Hypotheses come in here, of course, as to the
"

specificity of

what

must be a

there

which

is

not yet actually perceived

ately suggested

by

certain facts. 2

which

subject of science proper not

that there
heat,

is

"

"

is

also

sound

forces us to

and

"

make

"

heat,"

the

but the

any evidence
movement where there is sound and
soon as there

of a something, as
"

but that

an hypothesis but an assumption immedi

best reason, finally,

movement

with regard to discontinuity,


molecule or the atom or the

something,"

of the degree of the

electron, is not

The

is

"

epistemologically given, as

we know,

is

in the possibility

Compare Hegel, Phcinomenologie des Geistes.


discovered
If molecules or atoms were ever
perhaps by the aid of an
what would be immediately perceived would be sensa
ultramicroscope
2

"

"

"

"

though on account of the length of the waves of light not sensations


representing the molecules or atoms directly. But would therefore the molecules
or atoms be "red" or "green," or at least "dark" or "light"?
By no means,
but discontinuities with regard to sensations would compel us to say that here
tions,

we have

are radiating.
ness."

which are waiting for application


atoms would be points from which fields of force
not metaphysics, but analysis of
enlarged Given-

a field for applying certain concepts

in our mind.

As

concepts

All this

"

is

214

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

applying nothing but geometry.


Psychologically we
here find ourselves face to face with the simple fact that
pushing and pulling," i.e. mechanical causality in the crudest

of

"

the only kind of causality

is

form,

In

ourselves.

this sense alone

do we

we

are able to perform

"understand"

mechanical

causality.
I

have said more about the philosophy of mechanics than

might seem to be required in a biological discussion, because


at the present time mechanical physics has been discredited
in the utmost degree.

It

was necessary

a certain extent, in order that

to rehabilitate

to

it

altogether valueless to

might not be regarded as


analyse the relation in which auto

nomous biology stands

to the mechanical type of inorganic

it

science.

THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF UNIVERSAL MECHANICS

/3.

We

now

entelechy

What

return to our biological problem.

and

about

inorganic nature as a system of uniform

elements in motion,

now

that

we understand

the relation of

entelechy to the inorganic universe as a system of qualitative


energies or even qualitative energetical elemental centres
It

is

study of

important to notice at the very beginning of our


the role of entelechy in a world that is considered

mechanically, that
of nature

is

it

matters

little

conceived in detail.

how

the mechanical view

Whether the dualism

of

ether and mass, or in other terms, of primary and secondary


matter, be solved or unsolved, whether the ultimate elements
of

mass be regarded

as particles or as

dynamical points,

in the kinetic fashion, as specified permanent

continuum

all

states in

or,

these questions, though of the greatest im-

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

215

portance for the ontology of the Inorganic, have no bearing

upon the problem before us,


fundamental form.
And it would not
at all

at

least

in

affect us if

most

its

movements

were one day proved to be essentially electrodynamical, or if rational mechanics were shown to be actually
In the first case, as is well understood,
at work in nature.
in nature

natural mass would not be the

"mass"

of analytical mechanics,

whilst in the second case analytical

would be

and empirical mass

identical.

Mere Movement and

The problem

of

the

the Causation of

relation

between

Movement
entelechy

and

mechanics has to deal not with movement as such, but with


a certain possible kind of causation of

movement

that

is

movement occurring in
soon become apparent what

irreconcilable with the causations of

the inorganic

field.

It

will

that means.

Hertz remarks, in his famous posthumous treatise on


mechanics, that his most general principle of movement,

which

is

of inertia

a combination in some

way

of Galilei

and the Gaussian principle of the

principle

least action

that

most general principle, though only stated for inorganic


systems, would also hold for systems in which life-processes
this

are concerned, as the

of every vital

effect

could be imagined as being the

From

inorganic class.

whole of Hertz

this

analysis,

effect

process

always

of a system of the

statement and, indeed, from the

it is

clear without further discussion

that his principle only deals with the character of motion,

some way and is now existing,


but not with the causation of motion.
Be that causation

as far as

it lias

been caused in

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

216
what

may, it will always result in a force of special


intensity and special direction, acting upon the special
element of mass, and precisely the same sort of result^ of
it

course,

might follow from the action of some

inorganic

combination.

Under such a view there


of motion,
"

hidden

is

whether they consist

masses,"

and motion

alone,

room

for all

sorts of causes

in the effect of systems of

or in the effect of anything else


is

motion,

studied by this kind of mechanics.

That the special mechanical system of Hertz is kinetic


it knows only motion as the cause of motion,

at bottom, that

and therefore knows only one kind of energy,


energy, does not

movement

come

into account here

viz.,

kinetic

his principle of

such would hold for any other theory of

as

dynamics equally

well.

The Forms of Mechanical Causation

But the problem

of

inorganic

causation

of

motion

in a rather abrupt
almost put aside by Hertz and solved
l
now demands an answer. The two chief classes
manner
"

"

of

possible

mechanics

require to be considered.

kinetics

and

dynamics

at least

Kinetic mechanics knows only motion as the cause of


1

the assumption of stiff or rigid "connexions." This assumption fails


the requirements of the theory of elasticity.
Kinetic mechanics may appear in two different forms, the one founded

By

even to
2

fulfil

upon the hypothesis of the continuity of matter, the other upon discontinuity.
Dynamical mechanics, of course, regards matter as discontinuous with regard
to its atoms, which are "centres of force," but its "lines of force" fill
space continuously whether they be regarded as mere abstractions or as
"states"
of a continuous ether.
Kinetic mechanics based upon continuity
"Motion"
cannot speak of "motion" in the ordinary sense of the word.
becomes equal to
continuity and contiguity of change of elements of space."
"

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


motion

all

other forces

are

to

only apparent

principle of the conservation of the

"

it.

21 7

The

quantity of motion

"

(mv) of a given system is its only principle, including of


course the conservation of kinetic energy, the only energy
kinetic mechanics knows.
But whenever nature is regarded
as a mechanical

system of the dynamical type,

it is

conceived

as a typical arrangement of mass-elements possessing central


forces,

and in

system all becoming depends on the original


motion and the amount of these forces.
There

this

state of actual

are two kinds of energy

the actual form

and

the

Li

and all becoming is represented as an increase


potential form
and decrease of the amount of these two forms correspondingly,
their sum total remaining unaltered in each of the three
dimensions of space.
The potential form of energy is as
subsidiary here as any subsidiary energy in the field of

qualitative energetics.

But, in any case, the

sum

total of

energy existing cannot be imagined changeable and this


principle is valid with regard to each co-ordinate separately.
The principle of the conservation of the quantity of motion
;

of course, does not hold in a theory of mechanics

(mv),

that

dynamical it is contradicted by potential energy.


What role then could entelechy play in a world of either
is

mechanical type?

Pure Kinetics

As

far as I

am

aware, there

Negligible
is

not any kinetic system of

In order to explain
mechanics that could claim to be pure.
some
kinds of
forces
phenomena

the totality of physical

are always being introduced, at least where

"

it is

"

a question of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

218

Thus pure kinetics

molecular dimensions.
given up

is

in fact always

in the long run.

we can

think

Therefore, I

kinetic mechanics

to

and may simply ask


dynamical mechanics ?

altogether,

the relation of entelechy to

7.

allow ourselves

ENTELECHY AND DYNAMICAL MECHANICS

neglect

What

is

As entelechy is non -energetical, it certainly does not


change the amount of energy of a limited system in any
whatever

case
1

3
;

but

might do everything that can be

it

only motion were the cause of motion in the Inorganic, the


becoming in space since it has been proved not to be of
the inorganic type would be confined to the real creating or annihilating of
motion. But since kinetics is far from being the only legitimate form of
mechanics, we are not forced to go thus far. The modern views about the
If in fact

role cf entelechy in

electrodynamical foundation

of

real (not of

analytical

!)

mechanics are

intentionally neglected here.


2
In the standard work by the late L. Busse,
Geist und Korper, Seele
und Lcib" (Leipzig, 1903), a very thorough critical discussion of all current
"

and mechanics will be found. We


"mind"
It seems strange,
only mention here what we ourselves think to be valuable.
considering the eternal nature of the problem, but, as far as I know, our
first hypothesis, to be brought forward hereafter, seems never to have been
theories about the relation of

advocated in

its

present form

which were also new

views

it will be seen to be an application of our


about entelechy as augmenting the amount

of diversity of distribution.
3

Busse, Schwarz, and probably others have admitted an increase of the

amount of mechanical energy, when discussing the relation between "mind"


and matter. I should not like to go so far, unless facts really forced me to
do so
though it must be conceded, that nothing unthinkable would be
;

postulated; for the "mind" (or the entelechy) would be a something that
is external to the system in question.
Compare the last note but one.
The view has also been advocated occasionally that "mind" acts on
"matter"
by disturbing so-called labile equilibria. Such equilibria are,
however, extremely improbable.
Apart from this there would be no logical
argument against the "lability" theory, as the amount of energy that

is

required in order to disturb a labile equilibrium

is

infinitely small (dx),

and thus might be regarded as belonging to another sphere of Being.


Compare the important concept of "Behaftung" in K. Geissler s valuable
work, Das Unendlicke (Leipzig, 1902)

see in particular page 406.

219

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

imagined to be done without relation to the quantity of the


Now it seems to me
energetical state of a system as such.
that there

may

be non-energetical modifications in this state

of two different kinds, one of which

we

already

know from

qualitative energetics.

Entelechy in

Relation

its

two Forms of Mechanical

to the

Energy

am

thinking in the

first

place of entelechy as suspend

ing the becoming that otherwise would happen.

The process

of compensation of potentials, in the most general

mean

ing of the word, such as differences of coupled intensities,

could

we know be suspended by

as

Does

entelechy.

anything similar happen in pure mechanics with its two


and only two kinds of energy ? Kinetic energy and poten
tial

mechanical energy, of course, would be the only

accessible

to

certainly not

the

action

of

Xow

entelechy.

it

fields

would

hypothesis to assume that

be a legitimate

any potential energy into the


kinetic form by removing some kind of obstacle that has
eutelechy

hitherto
so-called

word
case,

is

able to transform

this

impeded

transformation, for

this process

"

"

to use the untranslatable

Auslosung

requires a certain finite

and entelechy

is

not

amount

energy.

of

German

energy in any

But the

acquires a very different aspect as soon as

of

problem

we assume

that

always the given


material entelechy has to work with, but that entelechy is
able to transform actual happening into a state of mere
kinetic

"

energy,

potentiality

i.e.

happening,"

by suspension, and that

is

it

can only set free such

"

"

potentials

as

it

has

itself created

by

its

suspension of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

220

happening.
it

kind,

seems to me,

work

to be the

with velocity
force
zero.

combination of processes of the following


well able to explain what I suppose

is

An element

of entelechy.

until

v,

of mass

comes within range

it

of a

moves

repulsive

then decreases constantly until it becomes


That point will be reached when the amount of its

its velocity

m
has

original kinetic energy

been

equalled

potential energy derived from the repulsive agent.

the element
to

to

and

one,

this

Finally,

decreasing from

impulse

as velocity increases

moment,

the element has reached

its

m
original

the

receives an impulse in a direction opposite

the original

moment

by

kinetic energy

will last until

and

original velocity,

2
,

also its

taken in the opposite sense.

Now

imagine that the process of constantly decreasing


motion just described, is suspended by entelechy at some
stage or other

say at the

moment

in

amount

of

which the velocity

is

m
vl

in such a form that the

into an equivalent
at the place of

amount

of

v*

transformed

is

"

"

energy, localised

potential

and kept there until

it

is

set free, that


977

is,

transformed into the actual kinetic energy

i^

again.

Could not such a thing happen without any relation to


questions of energetics
of suspending

Certainly

it

could, for the process

would not touch the amount


would

interfere with inertia,

way, though

it

of relaxing

suspension would

of energy in

any
and the process

be in no sense equivalent

of obstacles.
The
an
or removing
Auslosung
mechanical process we have imagined is represented very
to

"

"

221

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


by an

clearly

entering

move

velocity,

its

during

into

body moving with the velocity v and


motion into an elastic ball.
It will

inelastic

ball for

this

come

for a

to rest

time

certain

with

decreasing

moment, and then move in the

opposite direction with increasing velocity again

process be stopped at the

has

There

let this

the inelastic body

of the path into the elastic


no contradiction to energetics in such an

say one-third

traversed

mass.

moment when

is

event, provided, of course, that after the suspension has ceased


the mechanical
the point whence,

So

and

energetic events contimie their course

was

it

broken.

think that even in mechanics proper

we have

possibility of formulating in a strict logical sense

done by entelechy.
Entelechy,

from

the

what

is

its

~by

very

may suspend move

nature,

ment, transforming kinetic energy into potential energy,


and it may set free suspended movement as circumstances
require.

Of

course, as

we saw with regard

to

general energetics,

entelechy can only be regarded as able to set free those


potentials
by its own
potentials which it has made
"

"

suspending

action,

existence to

but

not

potentials

inorganic cause.

that

owe

their

This important feature

any
would lead us to a discussion of the continuity of suspension
1

Our hypothesis,

of course,

implies

that a

movement

like that of a

pendulum, which changes its direction periodically, passing through states


of mere potential energy at the point of change, may be suspended in this
point of change, in which there is no movement. This case, of course, is
more simple than ours, and would not charge entelechy with an actual
But our more general hypothesis seems to me
stopping of kinetic energy.
to be legitimate as well.
2
similar view, with regard to

"

interaction, has
been urged by Wentscher and others; but as a rule "suspending" and
Auslosung" have not been distinguished clearly enough.
"

psycho-physical

222

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

by entelechy, as seen in inheritance, but we regard our


previous remarks on this point of the theory as sufficient
(see page 181).

Entelechy as Transporting Mechanical Energy

Before discussing our result any further let us turn to


the second possible

mechanical systems.

way

in

which entelechy may influence

The discovery

of this possible role of

the Non-mechanical in mechanics goes back to Descartes.

In our own days Eduard von Hartmann in particular has


investigated more carefully

what

supposed to happen here.


Descartes, strictly speaking, was not trying to study the
influence of entelechy as a natural factor on mechanical
is

mind and
mass and motion, but to fix the interaction of
body. You are aware that we ourselves regard such a
"

"

not

problem as

legitimately formulated.

But Descartes

analysis holds well on a different epistemological basis in

the form that any non-mechanical agent, though not able to

change in any way the amount of energy in any dynamical


1
system, has the faculty of reversing any mass-element it
likes,

and of thereby changing the

direction

of forces

and

might be objected that a certain amount of


would
be
necessary for any "turning" of a mass-element,
energy
motions.

It

there being required a certain force, or rather pair of forces,

from the side on account

of inertia.

Where

energy to come from, since entelechy


1

itself

is
is

the necessary

regarded as

Descartes, strictly speaking, according to his theory of the continuity


knew only kinetic energy the so-called "quantity of motion"

of matter,

(mv), therefore,

was the mechanical quantity he would not allow

to be altered

by mind. For this reason our first hypothesis about the relation between en
Even his own
telechy and mechanics would have been impossible for him.
statement about this relation

and matter

or rather about the relation between

"mind"

does not acquire any very clear meaning on the kinetic theory.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


non-energetical

Hartmann

tries

"

scious

as such

the

is

sum

it,

the

"

Uncon

transport energy from one axis of space into

may

the other.

to avoid this difficulty

or, as he calls

by assuming that entelechy

223

The energy it needs for the process of turning


taken from the one axis and placed at the other
:

of all the energies remains unaltered, there only are

energetical changes with regard to the three chief co-ordinates


x, y,

and

z,

and thus the action of the

pass the boundaries of mechanics,

But

energetics in general.

complication
se

why

is

not assume that

its

is

its

any

case,

would

is

a natural agent per

action in changing the direction

an action

intensive manifoldness

are broken in

vital principle

of inertia, but not of

can hardly agree that this

Entelechy

necessary.

of force and energy

i.e.

"

"per

se

that

The true laws

is

implied in

of mechanics

and entelechy must by no means be

imagined as a mechanical apparatus it is just the negation


of that.
We must free ourselves from all the conventional
:

You may say if you like


images as completely as possible.
that entelechy, when turning a mass particle, acts upon it
at right angles to its path

this

but even thus there

kind of action requiring no


would only be a pseudo-

energy
obedience to the laws of real mechanics, since

must be regarded here as non-energetical, and


with inertia at the same time.

The Suspending and

the

entelechy

as interfering

Transporting Action of Entelechy

Discussed Together
If

now we

possible

ways

whatever

may

consider the theoretical probability of the two


in

which entelechy or anything non-mechanical


it seems to me

influence mechanical systems,

224
that

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


our

first

statement

hypothetic

possibility of a suspension of
offers

several

becoming

with

dealing

the

in mechanical systems

advantages which are not afforded by the

doctrine of a changing of the direction of forces.

would seem

ing to the latter theory entelechy

Accord

to be limited

by practically nothing except the amount of existing energy,


whilst, according to the former, it would be limited not only
by energy

as such but also

by pre-existing differences with

And we

regard to velocities and potentials.


that entelechy
rather high
"

is

limited and restricted in

But

degree.

confess

that

do in fact see

its

actions to a

the

of

theory

and thus changing the direction of forces and


also be regarded as a possible solution of our

"

turning

energies must

In

problem.

any case

it

would

assume

less

than any

hypothesis about the real creation of energy by entelechy.

Entelechy in Contrast

General Mechanics

to
"

Is

there any

statements

mechanics

"

contradiction

Certainly,

concerned.

is

as

to

mechanics in our two


the

as

far

Wherever

universe something happens that

mechanical constellations as such

is

there

exclusiveness
is

life

in

of

the

not present in the given

something is introduced,
not changing the quantitative side but changing the actuality
But I should prefer
and direction of mechanical events.
to speak of a

"

contrast

"

instead of a

"

contradiction."

might seem as if there were more contrast between


entelechy and mechanics than there is between entelechy and
It

energetics, as far at least as the energetics of ordinary text

books

is

concerned.

For both of our formulations of the

possible relation between entelechy and mechanics assert that

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

225

a something which

is non-energetical interferes, though not


with the amount of mechanical energy as a whole yet with
inertia, and therefore with the amounts of the two types of

But

mechanical energy respectively.


this place that there also

us not forget in

let

was a great contrast between

phenomena and the complete

vital

science of inorganic or spatial

"

"

becoming that is to be written in the future.


Entelechy,
as endowed with the faculty of enlarging the amount of
the

in

diversity

distribution

of

given

elements,

was

in

opposition to that future science.

Of

what we have

course,

about

said

entelechy

and

mechanics would imply most clearly that entelechy can


"

diversity of

Thus

this

point

does not need any further explanation in this chapter.

The

augment any

work of the

"

demons

distribution."

Maxwell

"

of

here

is

regarded as

actually accomplished.

8.

CERTAIN BRITISH AUTHORS ON LIFE AND MECHANICS

That

life

must

be

most

intimately

direction of the motion of masses

related

to

the

no uncommon view

is

with physicists and chemists, especially in this country.


Lord Kelvin speaks of the organism as endowed with the
power of directing and moving particles," and Tait regards it
"

"

as simply

"

planation of
1

unscientific
life.

even to attempt a mechanical ex

Both these statements

Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures,

ii.

p.

464

ff.

are rather general.

Fortnightly Rev., 1892, vol.

Lord Kelvin also


Tait, Contemp. Rev., 1878, 31 Jan., p. 298.
refers to the impossibility of understanding the fact of inheritance on the
li.

p.

313.

Our second proof of vitalism


theory of an accidental concourse of atoms.
(see vol. i. p. 226) implies the same statement.
15

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

226

l
know, Professor Japp some years
ago advocated a vitalistic theory that was most markedly
based upon the concept of direction.
That certain lower

But, as

many

of

will

you

organisms are able to consume or to produce only one of a


pair of corresponding asymmetrical chemical compounds
proves,

according

elementality
besides

those

plays

to

him,

that

specific

fundamental

organisms only the

chemical experimenter

is

part

direction
in

conscious

organic

mind

able to do the same.

like to regard the biochemical facts alluded to

Japp

as really proving vitalism

most

clearly

as

an
life

of the

I should not

by Professor

by themselves

they only
prove a certain kind of specific statical teleology, it seems
to me
but certainly the role of specific direction in life is

mentioned
1

"

shown by them, and

that reason they are

here.

Stereochemistry and

1898, p. 813.

for

Vitalism,"

Report QSth Meeting Brit. Assoc. Bristol,

How

6.

"We

ENTELECHY

have discussed at

full

is

AFFECTED

length

how

entelechy

may

possibly act with regard to an energetical or a mechanical

inorganic system, or in other words, what


in

any way
mentioned so
changes

in

such
far

the

of

may change

in

But we have not even

system.

corresponding question

any inorganic system

this problem,

it

affect

how may

entelechy

]>ut

needs at least to be mentioned

course,

In the theory of so-called psychophysical interaction both problems, as a rule, are treated on
is regarded not
the
Psychical
equal terms
only as
as well as the other.

"

"

affecting the

a.

"

Physical,"

but also as being affected bv

it.

THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION AND REACTION AS


RELATED TO ENTELECHY

In the

first

place

we

are,

think, obliged to inquire

whether in the work of entelechy there may occur anything


comparable with the Newtonian principle of action and
reaction, this principle, of course

mechanics

"

as in

"

electrodynamical
in
understood
the
widest
being
possible onto-

Of course, since entelechy is neither an energy


nor any factor of the mechanical type, the principle of

logical sense.

reaction

cannot apply to

it

in

227

any physico-chemical or

228

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


But, even then, entelechy

mechanical sense.

is

an

"
"

agent

"

in nature, entelechy is a something acting


with
regard to the inorganic, as we know, and
univocally
therefore there must be something in this relation that is

or a

"

factor

comparable with the principle

of

a general

in

reaction

For

logical sense though beyond inorganic causality.

not

becoming

true

must

alone

causality

also

With regard

A.

not only

affects JB,

to

is

of

purposes.
to

relate

believe

the

is

pure causality this principle holds


cause," almost

them being formulated with


1

When

affected but so

irrespective of all our special definitions of a


all

be

always

conceived under the form of a mutual interaction.


ever a factor

all

now

concept

reference to practical

we can

that

of

"

Entelechy when performing any

"

easily find out

how

"

reaction

to

entelechy.

act in a system becomes

changed with regard to its intensive actuality by this act


the
itself
having done changes its doing," for doing is
no longer necessary after having done.
Thus entelechy is
"

"

"

affected

by the accomplishment

of its

acting as well as in morphogenesis.


case in

which any kind of

13.

We

own

performance, in

We here

meet the

first

affection of entelechy occurs.

THE TYPES OF AFFECTION OF ENTELECHY

now

turn to a short survey of the possible ways in

which entelechy may be

affected

by a mere change

inorganic nature as such.


1

Comp.

vol.

i.

p.

99

ft .,

and

vol.

ii.

p.

158

T.

in

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

229

MorpJiogenetic Entelechy

The

organism,

we

know,

is

the

system

constituents of which are inorganic in themselves

single

only the

whole constituted by them in their typical order or arrange

ment owes

its specificity to

constituents of an

Therefore the single

entelechy.

organism also stand in energetical or

mechanical possible relations to many external constituents


of the inorganic universe.
These possible relations may
disturb the whole as governed

disturbance entelechy, in the


affected,

We

by entelechy
first

place,

by some such

may

be possibly

be called into activity, so to say.

may

here meet the problem of the stimuli of restitution

and adaptation again.


In order that adaptation
state of the organism

may

happen, the fundamental

must be disturbed

in its normality

this fact affects or calls forth entelechy.

In cases of restitution we were not able to state any


thing in detail about the precise stimulus that sets this
going

process

but, since in all restitutions the

on

the

morpho-

of
though occurring
indefinite possibilities, was always in the most typical and
specific relation to what had been disturbed, we were able

genetic

to

performance,

say that the stimulus of restitutions

something connected with the


of the

normal whole.

This

is

basis

most probably

specificity of the disturbance


"

"

something

must be regarded

as affecting entelechy.
In.

short,

morphogenetic entelechy in cases of adaptation

or restitution

based

is

affected

whenever the
of

state of normality,

specific suspension
upon
possible inorganic
becoming on the part of entelechy, is changed by the effect

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

230

Entelechy then at least tries to


suspension in such a way as to reduce that

external

of

its

becoming.

modify

external becoming to normality.

But such a view

we know,

Here,

necessary in

What
meet

the

mean

as

hypothesis.
of normal

condemned

is

of

by
But

oxygen.

that

means,

it

were, without

Artificial

parthenogenesis,
to

support

would mean that even

missing

~by

its

some

to inactivity, just as it is

development entelechy

in the proper sense

is

shall

or

fertilisation

necessary

Loeb, lends strong


this

it

may come
me that we

potential differences, as

absence

for

into action.

seems to

some

here

affords

analysed

It

we assume

if

point

which entelechy
the

some substitute

or

fertilisation

necessary specific

in

the face of normal development.

order that entelechy

does that

substitute

fails in

its

is

normal

in the case

into

called

such an

result

activity

where

it

and thus normal development would

might exist potentially,


be regarded as a mere example of all restitution.
Fertilisa
tion or its substitute would thus play a rather secondary
It would not call forth entelechy by itself, but
part.

would only allow entelechy

to act after it

had been

called

by the mere existence of a living


an organism.
Of course, this is no answer to the problem why
in the ser
the organism does actively form
fragments

into

activity already

fragment of

"

"

vice

of

"

"

reproduction

but this problem leads beyond


"

the

theory

of

embryology, and

"

personal

entelechy

will shortly be

as

the

subject

mentioned again on a

of

later

occasion.

Any restitution, like normal morphogenesis, is accomplished


by

a great

number

of consecutive single performances,

or,

in

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

What

other words, single stages.

231

about the manifestation of

We may say here briefly, I believe,


that the spatial existence of, say, the stage A affects entelechy
each stage by entelechy

with respect to

performance of the next act leading to


and not morphogenesis alone
stage B. Thus morphogenesis
becomes a series of events that occur between matter
its

and entelechy, and

vice versa.

The Affection of the Psycho-id

As

the affection of the psychoid or the entelechy

to

of real acting

by external inorganic

forget that the concept of

so

as

far

certain

place of normality

time

"

is

If

normal

we

"

handicraft,

visible

is

we must not

comes in here only

and willing takes the

liking

a certain thing at a

certain

psychoid at that time.

our analysis to such acting as ends in

we may

being given,

will

for the

restrict

distinctly

normality

actual
to

events,
"

"

result,

say

affected

say

an

by the very

of

object

the psychoid,

its

art

or

of

specific willing

specificity of

combination

what there

is, compared with what there ought to be


In this way a printer will always
according to its willing.
take up his work at the point where he left it the day

of

before.

similar view

would hold with respect

to acting

in general.

Psychologically

all

passivity,

or

rather

entelechy with regard to external changes,


1

is

receptivity

of

expressed by

We

avoid by this formulation the difficult concept of an intra-entelechian


which plays its part, for instance, in Lotze s writings in a
"causality,"
It must be granted that
very different form and terminology, of course.
introspective psychology might seem to lend support to such a concept we
shall speak ourselves of an
intra-psychical series" on a later occasion
"

but

it is

better avoided by the philosophy of nature.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

232

We

the words sensation and sensibility.

can hardly avoid

mmt

what

describing, at least analogically,

happen in the

by words similar to these,


a primary knowing and willing

affection of entelechy in general

we have spoken

just as

of

But,

entelechy.

of

of

affection of all entelechy

and that

As

is

postulate

to

specificities

an

that

by external changes must

this affection relates

combination

our

course,

exist

of order or

more important than mere terminology.

in discussing the affection of morphogenetic entelechy

we came back

to the

stimuli

could analyse again what

when we were
of the

type

we

of restitution,

of the

constitutes a proof of vitalism

"

we

here

individualised stimuli

Both times the analysis

discussing action.

of affection

so

"

called

vital

"

itself

something"

and forces us

to call

this

"

"

something

7.

entelechy.

THE CONTRAST BETWEEN AFFECTION IN THE ORGANIC

AND THE INORGANIC


To sum up
activity

Entelechy

is

affected

and thus called into

by changes of any normality governed by

which

it

are due to external causes, and these changes do not


entdecliy

as

a mere sum

changes of normality as

This point

is

a,

of changed

singularities

affect

but

as

whole.

very important,

for,

on the other hand,

our careful analysis of the relation of entelechy to energetics


and mechanics has taught us that the activity of entelechy
relates

immediately to single inorganic events, though in

the service of normality.

The fundamental contrast

between

the

affection

of

entelechy from without and any kind of affection in the

233

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


Inorganic

is

well

illustrated

by the mere

that

fact

in

the case of entelechy the affecting inorganic combinations


It was for this reason that we said that
totalities.

act as

"

the

of the

"

analysis

here a proof of the


in

by itself forms
what happens, whilst

type of affection
"

of

"

autonomy

our discussion of the active role

of

with

entelechy,

regard
energetics and mechanics, we had to start from
the autonomy of life as proved, and had to study what
to

might follow from such autonomy with regard

to single

effects in inorganic nature.

All

of

changes

"

causes,"

that

affect

entelechy

are

of course, in so far as they are changes of given

realities in space,

spatial effect

Qua

normality

though their

effect is

not an immediate

but one that has passed through entelechy.

they are as specific as is their final spatial


Thus we meet the strange
induced by entelechy.

causes,

effect

fact here
effect

are

that,

in

as

the

regards

biology,

first

most intimate relation

cause and
to

final

one another

with regard to specificity, though not in an immediate


This sort of relation between cause and effect

relation.

occurs nowhere in the inorganic except in pure mechanics,

and there
theory

in

quite

of relation

another form.
I

do not say of

general

ontological

"

causality

take advantage of this most important logical

fact.

"-

might

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Entelechy related

to

Space and therefore belonging

to

Nature,

but Entelechy not in Space

THE

contrast between the Non-living and the Living has

appeared in

all

the discussions of this long part.

But the contrast always was a contrast with regard to


Given in space. We
nature, or rather in nature as the
"

"

have at no time

lost

by what we have

sight of nature

said.

This contrast
there

is

quite a

is

indeed of a most fundamental character

new type

of natural becoming revealed to

whenever entelechy is at work, actively increasing in a


regulatory way the amount of diversity of distribution on
us,

account of

its

intensive manifoldness after

it

has been affected

by individualised stimuli.
Inorganic becoming relates to
extensities and is measured by energy
we may say that
energy measures the amount of causality which is spatial in
;

The same contrast would appear if we were to relate entelechy to a


modern type of analysing inorganic systems, i.e. the so-called

certain

I
"principle of phases," which also rests upon aprioristic considerations.
have discussed entelechy under this aspect in my Naturbegriffe, p. 182 but it
seems to me that the result to be possibly obtained would not repay a long
analysis in these lectures.
Entelechy is a "parameter" of its own kind
helping with the inorganic parameters to determine "equilibrium" and
degrees of freedom." This is the whole result to be obtained.
;

"

234

235

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


Entelechy is a diversity or a manifoldness in
but not in the sense of spatial extensities, therefore
itself.

itself
it

has

nothing to do with the amount of spatial causality as such,


though it relates to events in space, and therefore it is not

measured by energy.
acts

upon

it

not in space,

is

fact,

is

entelechy

spatial causality as if

spatial dimension
it

In

it

affected

came out

does not act in space,

by and

of an ultra-

it acts

into space

only has points of manifestation in

it

This analogy with some theoretical views that are


space.
advocated by so-called spiritualists to explain the facts
which are admitted by them to exist is a very good
description indeed of

what happens

upon which entelechy

is

acting.

any natural system


At present it must be
in

enough to lay stress upon the great difference between the


two great classes of becoming in nature, both of them, as

we know,

subject to univocality

quantitative

only

the one spatial, extensive,

the other non-spatial, intensive, and arranging

but both of them realising themselves in spatial

events,

in nature.

i.e.

The Problem of
But, after

"

Entelecliy

how

all,

and Causality

"

only partly solved

does entelechy stand

to

causality

Is it a special type of causality itself?

am

sorry

to

say that the answer

problem must once more be put


another kind have been weighed.
1

to this ultimate

off until considerations

of

difference as formulated in the text that the very essence


non-materialism rests. It matters little how materialism
is formulated in detail
energetics is but a new form of materialism, and is
far from being its tfbcrwindung, as Ostwald claims.
It is

upon

of vitalism, of

tliis

"

"

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

236

Justification of our Cautiousness

We

have charged entelechy with the minimum amount

of non-physicochemical performing that


to

its

passively

dealing

From

causality.

and

is

actively

possible in regard

with

the point of view of energy

inorganic

we only admit

entelechy as a factor which suspends occurrences that would

be possible according to the inorganic order.


Perhaps
have charged entelechy with too little, though what

we
we

have done stands in harmony with our actual knowledge,


which has shown us limits of regulability at many points.
Let us not forget that there

we do not know
hundred
the word
"

years,

on account

realities

possible objects of

excluded.

many

of their

realities,

know

which

for

some

minuteness perhaps

to be understood here in the sense of


experience,"

as long as metaphysics

is

how late the phenomena of


In other words
have become known to us.

Let us not forget

radio-activity

there

exist

yet and possibly shall not

"

"

may

be

may

still

more fundamental actions

done

by

entelechy than those which we at present know of and


therefore admit.
May not entelechy have an individual

And what about


upon electrons directly ?
life
?
we
are
of
But
here
origin
already touching
some problems which belong to the next chapter.

ising

the

action

first

Perhaps it will really become necessary some day to


admit that entelechy not only suspends potentials, but that
it

creates

uncoupled
*

by coupling or chaining
and thereby creates
intensity

potentials

perhaps

differences

of

would be expressible in purely


have no reason to deal more fully

energy; something similar

We
dynamical terms.
here with such an assumption, which, of course, would have

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

237

to consider the

the universe

problem of the finiteness or infiniteness of


for it was our endeavour in this chapter to

draw only such


to

known

theoretical conclusions as are nearly related

facts.

The

"

Moment of Regulation

"

Let us then close this chapter with a certain considera


tion

which most intimately

relates to biological facts

in

general.

In

all

phenomena

of

morphogenetic

regulation

and

adaptation and of acting we are by no means forced to


assume that entelechy by its counteracting inorganic
becoming works all along the single phases of the process in

In adaptation especially it would seem to be


needs of the organism, if

question.

quite

sufficient for fulfilling the

entelechy were to break the inorganic chain of events at

one special point, the rest being inorganic becoming again.


In restitution and acting something very similar may happen.

The term
of this
sets

in.

"

moment

would be well descriptive


happening where entelechy
"

of regulation

one special point of


But we do not know anything special about this
1

problem.
1

Compare our remarks on

catalysis, p. 186

f.

ENTELECHY AND SUBSTANCE

C.

A3
^

fy
"

V*

THE CATEGORY OF SUBSTANCE AND

a.

ITS

APPLICATION IN GENERAL

THE

late

Eduard von Hartmann

says

somewhere

in

his

Kategorienlehre that all philosophy has been a struggle about

the concept of

knows the

substance

"

history

"

and

of all categories

doubt

any one who

if

philosophy would say that he

of

Substance and inherence, in

how

common
knows very much earlier
the most

fact, are

even the child

them than how

is

apply causality but in spite


of that the problem of what is properly to be regarded as
substance remains the unsolved problem in all the various
to use

to

"

"

fields of philosophical research.

The

categories of substance

and inherence, as

know, find their simplest application whenever

all of

you
"

"

things

are
"

regarded as possessing properties, as being the


their properties.

regards the

"

We

science proceeds on

being a thing

of a property

property

But

What

its

"

bearers

way and soon

"

then

as a property
is

of

itself.

What

sort

the criterion of not being a

see

here

that

from the very beginning a very

remarkable principle of ontology


238

is

coming into

action, at

239

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

almost hidden to consciousness, but in an advanced

first

stage of philosophy consciously applied

the principle that

must be a something in enlarged givenness which is


absolutely unchangeable, and that only this unchangeable
there

something deserves to be called a

"

substance

"

definitively.

INORGANIC SUBSTANCE

Of

we cannot pursue
so we
ontology and epistemology

course, in our biological lectures

the subject of general

only mention that inorganic sciences have ended in our

days by regarding as the true substance either discrete


though not in
dynamical points generally called atoms
"

"

the more restricted meaning of chemistry

Space in this sense


but

is

identical with

as the latter

think about
physicists,

is

is

not merely a

what

is

or space

form

generally called

taken as a continuum.

find that all of

them

itself.
"

of intuition
"

"

ether

In

as far
if

fact,

the so-called properties of the

all

you

"

"

ether

you
"

of

are non-properties, or

mere expression of possibilities, 1


that they are mere negations and that space alone is left as

at least nothing but the

the

continuum, as the bearer of phenomenoat the end of the discussion.

substantial

logical reality,

The

which

doctrine

regards

space

as

the

inorganic
substance applies more strictly than any other the principle
or

of stability,

conservation,

cannot even change

or imchangeableness

"

its

place,"

space

whilst all sorts of atoms

are changeable according to their position in formal space.

But on the other hand

this

identification

substance seems to go too far beyond the


tion

of

the

category
1

With

of

substance,

of

space

common

which

in

reference to the electromagnetic field.

and

applica
its

most

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

240

primitive form was to signify a

So

"

thing."

comes that

it

advocates of the space-substance theory generally introduce


still

another kind of inorganic

"

substance,"

marked elements

merely distinctly
have the character

also

of

unchangeableness

and are almost

respect to motion,

which they call


But these

of their space.

in

except

identical with the

atoms

of the other theory.

In

fact,

there seems to be some force compelling

human mind

to

The

substance.

the

as

merely space

the

admit some substance in space and not


the

of

principle

constancy of the sum of all inorganic or material substance


would then be guaranteed for the simple reason that ita
coming out of space or its coming into space is quite an

unimaginable and unthinkable event.

Here, indeed, are

the very sources of the aprioristic principle of the conserva


tion of material substance.

There

exists

very

close

relationship

between

the

and the principle


both of them in some respect

principle of the conservation of substance


of the conservation of energy

upon the character of (formal) space


embracing something which neither may be

some modern authors

measured by

"

"

ergs

is

seduced

to be absolutely

that

what

is

only the amount of causality as

far as the latter has quantity

and

whilst substance relates to what

The two

all-

nor be

into asserting the identity of substance

and energy, a doctrine which seems to us


For this assertion forgets
impossible.

all.

left

It is probably this relationship that has

entered.

at

an

as

resting

is

is

therefore measurable,

not touched by causality

principles of conservation

relate

two

to

""

absolutely
not,

but

is

different

realised in

branches

change

of

"

ontology.

substance

is.

Energy

is

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


It is true that ordinary energetics has not a

241

very good

opportunity to discover the proper equivalent of substance


in nature, but the fault is its

"
"

being material

own and

As soon

the category of substance.

does not

as the

with

lie

problems of the

are not neglected, the category of substance

would become applicable even in the realm of qualitative


of course it becomes much clearer in mechanical
energetics
;

In

physics.

fact,

might we not say that the

irresistible

tendency to apply the category of substance has been one


of the fundamental sources of the mechanical view of
inorganic nature altogether

INORGANIC SUBSTANCE OF ANY TYPE RELATES TO EXTENS1TY

But enough
"

stance

in

difficulties

we

at this place about the

the inorganic world

remaining

still

shall only use one

also

enough

sub

about the

In what follows

unsolved here.

fundamental

"

meaning of

result,

common

to all

the different theories of substance relating to the Inorganic.

Inorganic substance either

itself,

that

is,

as the bearer of phenomenological reality, or

it is

a some

is

thing consisting of absolutely

one beside the other in


Inorganic

are built

and

to

single

extensity.

space

elements which

are

All extensities in the

up out of such substantial elements.

That the substantial elements


extensities

extensity

of inorganic nature relate to

extensities alone also holds good, if the

substantial elements themselves are understood dynamically,


"

they are regarded as certain elemental spheres


in space which are each the seat of forces going out from
that

"

is, if

a centre.
is

Even

a point and

in this case,
is

though the centre of the force

not extensive in

itself,

the substantial
16

242

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

element in space as such is an extensity.


We have no
desire to advocate the dynamical atomistic theory by what
we have said, at least not without restrictions. We only
wish to emphasise the fact that inorganic substance in any
possible form relates to extensities, and that if it relates to
varieties

and manifoldnesses

ones and to nothing

We

now

biological

it

does so with regard to extensive

else.

turn back to our proper

philosophy in

its

relations

field

of

the

to

researchcategory

of

substance.

/9.

In the

first

ORGANIC

place

we

"

ASSIMILATION

"

have to deal with some

shall

which are by no means philosophical


These introductory remarks will serve at

characteristics of life

by themselves.
the same time
phenomena.
still

to

fill

a certain gap in our survey of

You probably have

noticed that

there

life

was

a gap in that survey, though, I hope, our following

discussion will

show that

this

gap was only apparent and

implied only a pseudo-problem.

RESPIRATION
Respiration and assimilation are generally regarded as
the most fundamental functions of organic

foundations indeed of
Kespiration
of

in

its

all

life,

as the very

physiology.

scientific

meaning

is

any chemical compound of the body, that

the

oxidation

is, its

combina

tion with oxygen, in order, as text-books tell us, to provide

a source of energy for functional performances.

pounds

to be oxidised

may

The com

be split into simpler ones before

243

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


oxidation or they

urea,

may

The

not.

last result of the process

the production of carbonic acid, uric acid,

of oxidation is

and some other compounds, which are poisonous to the

organism

if

care

As we have

is

not taken for their removal.

said already, oxidation

as a source of energy exclusively

is

generally regarded

or, better, as

a source of

is, energy that may do work on


But this role
account of differences of coupled potentials.

so-called free energy, that

of oxidation

would never explain


were the whole

If such a doctrine

its

absolute

necessity.

truth, the stopping of

oxidation would only stop the functioning of the organism

but the organism


is

is

not only damaged,

not allowed, and death


to a

there

well

known

dies if oxidation

here not to be due

poisoning by the final products of oxidation

merely
such as carbonic
elaborate

is

it

acid, for the

removing of which the most

arrangements exist in the organism.

must be yet another part played by

Therefore

We

oxidation.

should not be wrong, I suppose, to formulate this role in


the following way
The organism by its merely synthetic
:

or analytic metabolism seems to produce some substances

which are poisonous to it, i.e. which disturb the order of


its metabolism in an irreparable manner if they are not
converted into an innoxious form this conversion into an
:

innoxious form

is

done by oxidation}

For a long time the foundations of organic oxidation


were an absolute enigma to biology, and all sorts of theories
were

invented

instance, the one

to

solve

which

it.

All

these

as,

for

oxygen in

its

theories,

utilises the effect of

I advocated this theory as early as 1901, at a time when only Noll held
a similar view with regard to organic oxidation.
But at present the theory
.of the anti-poisonous action of oxidation seems to be
gaining ground, the new
1

discoveries of Winterstein being

most favourable to

it.

Comp.

vol.

i.

p. 199.

244

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


(0 3 ), have become antiquated owing to
of the last few years.
It was the mistake

so-called active state

the discoveries

of all former theories of oxidation to look upon respiration

which the organism plays an almost passive


Either some compounds of the organism were regarded

as a process in
role.

as

oxygen of the medium by their own


or oxygen itself was regarded as attracting parts

attracting

affinity,

the

Modern

of the organism.

an

is

shown

biology has

that oxidation

on the part of the organism

active function

Wherever

benefit of the whole.

it

is

for

the

necessary either to

destroy noxious compounds or to gain energetical potentials,


the organism forms catalysers or calls into activity so-called

zymogens, which set up oxidation that would otherwise


1
not have taken place.
The fuel consumed for the supply
of energy consists generally of those constituents that are

though hardly without some inter


but it also may be more
taking place

derived from the food

mediate change

first

important constituents of the tissues themselves, as we


have learnt in our analysis of the metabolism of fasting.
Oxidation as a mere process of anti-poisoning attacks

all

the

so-called by-products of metabolism in general.

Thus the most general


research

is

that oxidation

other processes of metabolism

that

it

as limited in its regulability as they


to be

more important on account

in all forms of
1

by modern

result gained

the knowledge

is

biological

like all

the

as regulable

and

is

that

it

only seems

of its universal presence

life.

Our description

is

little

schematic

former theories of respiration

have made a difference between so-called "primary" or fundamental oxida


tion, which is necessary for life in general, and "secondary" oxidation,
It is highly probable that this difference
subsidiary to special functions.
will disappear in the light of modern research, but the matter has not yet

been fully decided.

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

We

and approach

therefore leave the theory of oxidation

the general subject of metabolism

245

of this general subject

oxidation has proved to be but a part.

"

AND

ASSIMILATION

Metabolism,

i.e.

"

DISSIMILATION

the change of chemical specificities during

the differentiation, growth, and functioning of the organism,


is

generally considered under the two headings of


"

and

lation

"

dissimilation."

Few

"

assimi

terms in science are

more ambiguous and problematic in meaning, and few


terms are used so freely and recklessly.
Of course nobody
would mind if they were only used to signify that some
which lead

of the processes in the organism


results

from

proceed

the

more

to

simpler

chemical

to

complicated

chemical compounds, while the rest proceed in the opposite


In that case one could only object that the
direction.

words

synthetic

chemists, would

and

analytic,

suffice

for

as

used

commonly

But, as a rule, something else and something more

whenever
are

the

words

and

used

"
"

this

by

the needs of physiology also.

and

assimilation

more

"

something

is

meant
"

"

dissimilation

"

is

extremely

problematic.

We

here must enter the realm of so-called physiological

chemistry, with which I

must confess

am

not

at all

but in spite of that I hope that the following


discussion, dealing with some very general and almost

familiar

purely logical questions exclusively,


a

little

what

might

be

called

may
the

serve to elucidate
central

point

of

physiology.

Whenever the words

"

"

assimilation

and

"

"

dissimilation

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

246
are

to

anything specifically determined, that is


other than what chemists call
synthesis

signify

"

"

something

and

and whenever

"

analysis,"

to be used in

that there

is

any

strict

meaning

at

all,

they can only mean

a something of a specific chemical nature, yet

intimately bound up with


of

same time they claim

at the

making other

less

life

which has the power

itself,

complicated chemical materials

like

producing from itself less complicated materials


an
by
analytical process.
Let it be clearly understood
assimilation
the word

itself or of

"

"

does not

mean

that there

quantity, to

given

quantity, but

further
increases
of the

by

its

medium

own

it

a fundamental material

is

which external means and


that

expresses

material

the

of

add a

forces

action at the cost of the components

in the broadest sense.

Taking the word assimilation in this usual sense, the


question of course would arise as to the kind of forces
"

assimilating,"

that

is,

equalising foreign materials to the

material

and seated in

seems to

me

that another question should be settled

which

perhaps of a still deeper importance,

is

at

the same time.

though

But

it

it

first,

does

not sound so theoretical.

The

"

"

Living Substance

in the Chemical Sense

am

thinking of the very simple but very fundamental


Does assimilation in the sense we have indicated
question
I

really

take

place

Does

substance A, the so-called

Are there any

many

the
living

substance,"

criteria of its existence

theoretical

authors

distinctive

chemically

"

exist at all

There are in fact

who have answered

these two

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

247

and they have almost always


heen of the materialistic school.
But is it not remarkable
questions

that

affirmatively

the positive investigators of physiological chemistry

never say one single word about the problematic material

and the problematic process of

What

"

assimilation

"

real

then does physiological chemistry really teach as

the result of

its

There are

experiments

many

chemical compounds present in

specific

the organism, belonging to different classes of the chemical


system, and partly

be

known

But those that

known.

known some day

is

no

theoretical

in their constitution, partly

impossibility

albumen and how

constitution of

known

are not yet

in the near future,

"

will probably

and certainly there

about
to

un

the

discovering

make

"

All the

it.

substances present in the organism have a definite range


of possibilities regarding their physiological origin and their

physiological destruction.

number
certain

of different

number

They may

ways, and

may

the chief classes of their constituents

and albumen,

out

of

be

destroyed

in

Organisms behave differently in

of ways.

Fungi, for instance, are

this respect.

originate in a certain

one

organic

able to build
fats,

up

all

carbohydrates,

compound

of

rather

variable constitution, while all animals require constituents


of all three classes in their food, or, at least, are not able
to live without receiving albumen.

The modes

of construct

ing and destroying the constituents of the organism almost


always differ to a great extent from those used in the
laboratory

to

mention but one

the organism.
the

organism

difference,

what

is

done by

generally done by ferments in


And, finally, upon this use of ferments by
depends the most remarkable feature of

heat in the laboratory

is

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

248

organic

Metabolism

metabolism.

manner which

occurs in a regulatory

whole

the benefit of the

to

is

at

one

moment one chemical construction goes on here and at


another moment another chemical destruction occurs there
need

the

according as

those

in

exists

places

the

all

regulations, of course, being confined within certain limits

sum

presented by the fact that a certain

forms

pounds

the

absolutely

of specific

food

necessary

com
the

of

organism.

In these chief results of metabolistic physiology not a


word has been said about our special living substance A

and

its

"assimilation."

of the organism

may

as they are liable to

other

constituent

Thus the word

of

however,

the specific constituents


"
"

assimilated

in so far

never

seems

assimilation

whole

but this

due to the action of some

always

the organism,
"

"

as the organism as a
it

fact,

an increase of their amount

is

pseudo-assimilation

In

be said to be

is

themselves.

to

justifiable

only so far

In that sense,

considered.

would mean nothing of importance.

Negative Results only

What

then

gained by our discussion

is

of

the

most

general results of physiological chemistry for the central

problem of this chapter, the


I

entelechy to substantiality
for

assuming that a

dissiinilating

in

the

of the relation of

problem

The

facts suggest

no reason

assimilating

and

base

and

"

living
strict

substance,"

sense,

is

the

real

On the contrary, physiological chemistry


a living substance and nothing about
about
knows nothing

foundation of

life.

"

"

assimilation

and

"

dissimilation."

The

facts revealed

by

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


though not amounting
operation of an autonomic factor
this science,

are certainly very

entelechy,

249

a real proof of the

to

in

such

life,

reconcilable

easily

as

our

with

its

existence.

chemical

"

living substance

"

does not exist.

ENTELECHY INCOMPATIBLE WITH A

7.

"LIVING"

CHEMICAL

SUBSTANCE

We

We

now

shall

regard our problem from

know that the

substance

"

autonomic regulatory factor


then,

factor

or agent

is

at

"

living

we

further knoiv that an

work

in organic processes.

from the concept of

us ask, follows

let

other side.

show no indication of a

facts

in the chemical sense,

What

its

this

with regard to the existence of a

itself

living substance of a specific chemical constitution, as the

foundation of vitality

Does an analysis of the concept

of entelechy lead to the admission of a

substance in spite of the negative

"

"

living

chemical

of physiological

facts

chemistry, or do the results of such an analysis stand in

harmony with our actual present knowledge


In the
the

"

first

case science would have to go

living substance

in a test-tube

"

until

it

found

in the second case its

it

of

metabolism

and search

for

and could show

it

main work might be

said to be completed in this field.


I

the

now hope
concept

to be able to

of entelechy

elemental agent in nature

show you from the meaning of


that being a

well established

that entelechy can be neither

the consequence of any sort of specific chemical

when

"

compound

might be represented by such a compound as


nor the outcome or consequence of
substance
living
it

"

250

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

any constellation of different specific chemical compounds


of any sort, which might otherwise perhaps be regarded
as the materia viva.

No

Chemical Substance Possible as the Basis of Entelechy

we know,

Entelechy,
it

is

an intensive manifoldness,

is

an agent acting manifoldly without being in

i.e.

itself

manifold in space or extensity.


Entelechy therefore is only
an agent that arranges, but not an agent that possesses
quantity.

What

then would be the significance of saying that a

specific chemical substance

is

the bearer of entelechy

To

say so would be to attribute the property of extensity to a

something that has nothing to do with extensity at all, to a


something which in a certain respect may be said to be the
negation of extensity.
It gives a

the

doctrine

good idea of the strange consequences to which


of

"

living

autonomic entelechy would

substance

"

as

the

bearer

of

lead, to recall the fact that, of

course, a living substance in the sense of a specific chemical

compound would be measurable by weight


chemical compound.

pounds

We

should have to speak

of lion-substance, or a

any other

like

substance, or three ounces of earthworm-substance


these chemical

market perhaps.

say, six

of,

pound and a half

of eagle;

and

all

compounds would some day be sold in the


We here see most clearly that it is quite

impossible to assign the characteristic of extensity ta an agent


which is simply a determinant of order in extensities for our
;

lion-substance, of course,

much of the
but would mean so many

would not

actual substance of a given lion,

signify so

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

251

pounds of that homogeneous chemical material which


supposed to represent the

Of course nothing
hypothesis that there

which are

is

is

"

being-a-lion."

by our remarks against the

said

may

exist real chemical

compounds,

characteristic of organic specificity in the sense

of being necessary

means

of morphogenesis,

and which perhaps

play their role in the process of inheritance as far as


material side

is

In

concerned.

hybridisation, as

fact,

we know, seem

to

the

new

its

discoveries in

advocate such a view

These substances, however, are by no


means identical with entelechy but are used by entelechy.

to a certain extent.

There

is

still

another very grave objection against the

material character of entelechy

if it

were material

it

would

be subject to energetical changes, for it would be energetical


And,
itself; but that we have seen is an impossibility.
moreover, to assume that the disintegration of a certain amount
of chemical material,

homogeneous in itself, could explain


would clearly contradict

real differentiation during ontogeny,

the principle of univocal determination.

No

Constellation of Chemical Substances Possible as the

Basis of Entelechy

But now you might reply

our discussion

to

"

Good, a

specific chemical compound cannot be the basis of entelechy

in the sense that entelechy always appears

the very fact

of

formed, by
compound
But could not entelechy be a consequence
is

relative

constellation

of different chemical

specific states of aggregation


1

Comp.

its

this

formation.

of a specific

compounds of

Could there not appear a

vol.

whenever

i.

p.

134

ff.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

252

new and elemental


other

factors

factor

already

owing

known

Do we

event happen whenever electricity


a glass rod

is

generated by rubbing

"

in a narrower

first

If the typical constellation of the inorganic agents

sense.
C,

and

come

is

to originate a

new

sort of activity,

them from without, but


true and real consequence, how would

does not
their

not see such an

Let us try to answer this objection at

A, B,

some

to the constellation of

to

is
it

one

which

regarded as

be conceiv

the four
you imagine
constituents, A, B, C, and D, possessed the new agent in

able

at

all

that

unless

of

question already in a state of potentiality, comparable to


the state of a so-called zymogen in fermentation, which

waiting to be transformed into a ferment

But,

if it

is

gives

this turn to the problem, the constellation-theory represents

no great advance on the purely chemical theory


already refuted.

One

of the four elements of the

thetic constellation creating entelechy

form almost the same role that

is

would have

considerations

new elemental kinds

hypo

to per

performed by the

compound of the chemical doctrine.


But to pass to more general
at all possible that

of entelechy

specific

is

it

of natural changes

can be created by the mere constellation of agents already


known ? Can such a constellation possibly be followed by

more than a mere resultant action


elemental actions of
It has

its

constituents

the

of

sum

of

the

been said occasionally by modern writers that a

system, by the mere increase of

its

amount

begin to exhibit marked differences in


for instance

a homogeneous

simply be flattened at

its

sphere

poles, if

its

in
it is

of material,

behaviour.
rotation.

may
Take

It will

small, but a large

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


sphere of the same material and moving with

angular velocity will

throw

off its equatorial

the form of a ring, and a satellite


for

the

absolute

amount

253

the same

substance in

be formed out of

may

of peripheral

it

velocity increases

enormously with the increase of the total amount of sub


So there may result very different definitive forms
stance.
from systems which differed only in size at the outset.
But, of course, it is clear from the very beginning that

new

the origin of

elemental factors

not touched at

is

all in

this example.

But how about the


electricity,

how about

chemical potentials, as

relation of rubbing a glass rod to

the rise of the electric current from

we

see in the familiar galvanic cell

It is true that at the first glance there

a real creation of something fundamentally


constellation

phenomenalism
would advocate such a view.
shows that

it is

impossible for

new by

to

be

a mere

in its purest form, in fact,

But the history of physics

human

reason to rest content

Science always has been in search

with such a conception.


of

may seem

some pre-existence of what seemed

fact, science has always

to be

new, and, in

to find this pre-existence

managed
some way. Either it has attributed the new thing that
arose to what existed already, endowing the latter with it
in the form of a potentiality, expressed under the name of

in

a so-called

"

constant,"

or

it

has gone further and has tried

to conceive the possibility under the

form of a substantiality.

Mathematical phenomenalism takes the


theory of electricity follows the second

first line,
;

the

the mere

modern

E of the

"

as an irremarking the being potentially electric


ducibility, becomes the electron of the second, in the sense
"

first,

of the

elemental

quantity of the

new phenomenality

in

254

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

In some respect our mind

question.

by both

satisfied

is

methods, though more by the second.

For our present


purpose it is enough to know that there exists in our mind
a demand for some such satisfaction
newly arising
:

elemental agents must be conceived as already pre-existing


in

some way.
become quite

have

will

It

clear,

discussion, that any theory which tries to


arise as a

must

new elemental consequence

hope,

from our

make

entelechy

some constellation

of

result in taking one of the constituents in the real

sense

of

But the living-substance

"

living-substance."

theory has been already refuted.

Entelechy and Physiological Chemistry

Entelechy cannot be regarded as arising from material


What follows from this result
conditions of any sort.

which formed one

for the facts of physiological chemistry,


of the earlier parts of this chapter
to

me, that

results

that

It follows, so it

what physiological chemistry studies


are

chemically

processes that are chemical processes.


to

not

characterised

seems

is

only

results

of

It is very important

understand well what this means.

Of

course, chemical

potentials have formed the general basis of all physiological

chemical

but

results,

these

results,

as

we

know,

are

not due to the mere play of these potentials as such, but


to

the

the

of entelechy
therefore something
found in the results only, but not in
Without entelechy there would be other

intervention

purely chemical
processes.

is

chemical results.

Entelechy controls not only oxidation but

"assimilation"

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


and

"
"

dissimilation

also

by means

that entelechy acts

before

the

this

without

it

a chaos of chemical

occur, and would soon disturb organisation


Previous analytical work has taught us

processes would
and functioning.

potentials

255

of setting free pre-existing


of

compensation

also to its

applies

which

work

has

it

suspended

in the fundamental

phenomena of all physiology. It probably is the production


and actuation of ferments that is immediately controlled
here, oxidation or

any kind

of

chemical synthesis or analysis

thus being purely chemical processes that follow the funda

mental

vital act.

Ancient Problems

In a certain respect the problem dealt with in our


identical
with the famous
present considerations is
Aristotelian question whether the concept of a house be

subordinated
concepts of

more than a formal manner

in

wood

or stone as its higher classes.

answers the question

But

it

general

is

to

negatively,

Aristotle

we should do

as

the same thing, only

exactly

form,

to the

deny that entelechy

in

itself

a
is

still

also.

more

connected

with or dependent on chemical substances.


And still another famous problem has been solved by
the
us implicitly
enigma how it might be possible for
"

"

matter to

"

think,"

a question which plays a great part in

one of the well-known addresses of Ernil du Bois-Keymond.


The answer is simple, for the problem is a pseudo-problem

"

matter

"

not only does not

even the foundation


something different

"

of life

think,"

in

but

"

sense.

matter

"

is

not

any
Entelechy
from matter and altogether opposed

the causality of matter.

is

to

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

256

SUBSTANCE AS A CATEGORY IN

8.

RELATION TO

ITS

ENTELECHY
proving that entelechy is not identical with or a
consequence of any chemical compound, or the constellation

By

of such compounds,

our

problem of

May

not

that

can

of a
"

present

chapter,

solved the chief

which

the

category.

though absolutely unlike everything


called substance in the inorganic world

entelechy,

be

be conceived purely chemically or in the sense

it

"

word, that

matter

of

theory

substance

may

not entelechy

be called

is,

its

changeable

Then there would be two substances with regard


nature, and our theory would become very similar
some

most general philosophical sense of the


in the sense of a something irreducible, which

in the

remains the always unchangeable bearer of


qualities

with

deals

between entelechy and substance as

relation

whether

we by no means have

to
to

past, though with the remarkable


difference that our idealistic view would not allow us to

theories

the

of

regard one of these two substances as


other
the

similar

latest.

stance

"

theories

have done

"

as all

psychical,"

Lotze

one of

being
There would be one spatially extended sub
matter and one non-spatial intensive substance
"

"entelechy"

both

substances

forming

part

that

of

branch of enlarged given reality called conceptual scien


tific

nature.

Let us

first

what may be

note a few very characteristic features of


called

may perhaps
fundamental problem.

analysis

the

behaviour

afford

us

of

entelechies

materials

to

decide

the

our

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


The Concept of Divisibility not Applicable

At
I

to EntelecJiy

the risk of shocking you with an apparent absurdity

say that entelechy has the power of preserving

might

its specific

intensive manifoldness in spite of being divided

two or more

into

257

The

parts.

fact

which we have called

the genesis of complex-equipotential systems seems to favour


this

view at the

relating

first

glance,

the development

to

and so do

all

the experiments

of isolated blastomeres of a

whole organisms of smaller proportions.


More
our
second
of
founded
vitalism
over, we directly
proof

germ

into

upon the evidence

a typical machine

though

that,

like

constellation of agents, different in its arrangement along

the three

be divided and

of space, cannot

axes

remain

whole at the same time, yet there exists in the living


organism a something which does show these two incom
patible characters.

The question now

whether in a deeper sense we


are entitled to speak of entelechy as remaining whole in
arises

"

spite of its

"

division

into parts.

It is very difficult to free the philosophical analysis of

entelechy from

ance with
it

from

all

all

that

extensive

is

familiar to us from our acquaint

phenomena

and yet we must free


It was the great

that belongs to extensity.

achievement of Kant to show that space is the inevitable


form of our intuition of the Extensive.
Now, as to
entelechy, there
all sorts

is

no

to do with entelechy.
it

is

is

intuition,

and therefore space and

of relations about space have practically nothing

perceived only in

Entelechy
its

itself is

conceived only

extensive results.

not spatial, but only acts into space

Entelechy
do not say in
"

"

17

258

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

and the word

space

"

of a

"

spatial

come out

fully

"

into,"

of course,

on,

itself

not at

there

is

entelechy and such natural agents as forces and

though the

clear that

spatial,

"

is

Now

dividing

and therefore

it

we have

follows from all

in its strict

meaning

entelechy.

When we

speak of

of a something

it

always understood as something

word

this

energies,

latter are also concepts, not percepts.


"

is

all

In this respect, as will


quite a gulf hetween

character here.
later

is

is

not at

all
"

"

dividing

which we can cut into

pieces.

said that

applicable to

we always think
But entelechy

cannot be cut in this manner, for the simple reason that it


has no spatial dimensions at all
the
having dimensions
"

"

would contradict altogether the meaning of the term.


Therefore we had better not speak of entelechy as an
remains whole in spite of its division into
agent which
"

but simply say that entelechy may manifest itself


wholly even after the division of a certain organic body, on
parts,"

which, had

manifested

remained one whole, entelechy would have


itself as one whole also.
Entelechy always
it

but our analysis proves that


so-called individuality of the real organic body is not without
further discussion to be identified with the deeper meaning
manifests itself individually

of entelechian individuality.

The Concept of Localisation or Seat not Applicable

to

Entelechy

An
said

to

agent which

is

of a

non-spatial nature cannot be

have a definite seat or a definite localisation in

It
Entelechy therefore cannot possess a
cannot at all be imagined like a point consisting of a somespace.

"seat."

259

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


thing and moving through space,

soul as having

its

and now

in this

in

known, regarded the

seat in a specific organ of the brain, the

We may

so-called pineal gland.

say that there

now

Descartes, as is well

that direction.

may

him

follow

so

far as

to

he specific points of the organism with

which entelechy is active while at other points


But these would only be points of mutual
inactive.

respect to
it is

relation, not points of rest.

"

Entelechy"

I fully see

about

how

so

far a Mere System of Negations

difficult it is to

without

entelechy

I say once

say anything positive


other

contradicting

more that there

statements

nothing at all
to be
imagined in a picture-like manner about entelechy
the non-spatial can never be realised by our imagination in
regarding

it.

is

"

"

spatial images.

It

may

be hard on us, but so

same time we always must bear

at the

dealing with entelechy

we

at

work

in

And

it is.

mind that

in

are not dealing with anything

we are analysing
know concerning this

psychical, or absolute, or metaphysical

an agent

in

nature.

We

cannot be spatial in any sense, that it has no


into
seat in space nor any dimensions, but merely acts
but
in
not
in
nature
one
that
it
is
word,
space
spatial
only acts with regard to spatial nature.
factor that

it

"

"

"

"

In

fact,

the characteristics of entelechy form only

complicated system of negations so far, and little more.


Nor can it be otherwise unless we are prepared to change

our whole view of


as in fact

And

we

reality,

very soon

and of natural

reality in particular,

shall.

thus at present the question whether entelechy

is

260
"

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

must remain

"

substance

about the relation

was a kind of
an enduring

of

entelechy to

Entelechy

causality.

causality, and now may be said to be


substance.
But still we feel that our

"

"

quasi
"

"

quasi

reason craves more than

this.

INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS

At

as open as the previous question

the end of this chapter you probably will expect the

discussion of a few questions which interest you

more than

any others, and the answering of which perhaps you have


But
hoped would be the final result of all our analysis.
such remarks as I

am

of individual

and the origin of

life,

able to offer about the origin and end


life

in general, can claim

Materialists profess to know a


merely a subjective value.
good deal about all these eternal problems, but I confess

that I

know nothing

at all about

The Origin and


In

the

remember,

of

face
firstly,

the

End

any of them.

of Individual Life

fundamental

these

that our present task

psychological nor a metaphysical one.

questions
is

We

let

us

neither a truly
therefore have

nothing to do with the problems of immortality as relating


to the

Ego

In

the Ego.

we

are only studying

fact,

even

if

"

phenomena

in respect to

principle of the conservation of

could be established, and if we were able to speak


entelechy
about what might be called a phenomenological metem
"

psychosis,
place,

and

discussion

it
it

would
is

all

relate

to

phenomena

in

the

first

well worth noticing that without further

spiritualistic

phenomena,

if

proved some day,

261

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

be mere phenomena to the Ego and nothing


At the end of these lectures we shall devote some

would

also

else.

time to certain considerations that might probably lead us


this theoretical

beyond

With the
begins a

that

is

new actual individual, entelechy


new manifestation, and with death it ends one
all we can say.
What that manifestation, qua

was before that beginning, and what

individual,

death
to say
all
"

is

unknown

absolutely

whether

it

in these two
"

will be

that

Egoism.

starting of a

to

to

is

was and
periods

We

to us.

not

"

"

individual

words

the

after

is

are not even able

will be anything

or

it

"

was

at

and

"

be understood in a non-metaphysical sense,


in

say,
"

experience.

For

the
the

of a

sense

or

ideal

"possible

Platonic

immediate

existence

of

entelechy as an individualising agent does not, of course,

guarantee any sort of permanence of the individuals which,

on account of an entelechian manifestation, form part of the


given universe at a given time.
Spiritualists claim to

problem,

that

saying

have some knowledge about our

after

death

the

entelechy preserve their individuality


"

(so-called

astral

though using a

kind of material.

")

of

manifestations

But

I say

new

once more

that I can form no opinion in this matter, though I should

much to be able to do so. Science, in fact, ought


with these questions even at the risk of finding a
mere chaos of defective criticism and actual fraud but one

like very
to deal

single fact, positively established,

work

would well repay the hard

of generations.

What
certain

science

amount

knows about death

of matter that

entelechy becomes freed from

is

simply this

was formerly controlled by


and then obeys

this control,

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

262

Does

the laws of physico-chemical causality exclusively.

entelechy actively withdraw from matter or


actively, then

possible

why

But

it

is

Why

has

not,

regulation

of no use formulating

and,

if

become im

"

"

any more of

these unapproachable questions.

The Origin of Life in General

The question about the

so-called

as incapable of being discussed as

the great

of

in spite

number

primary origin of

is

the problem of death,

We certainly cannot grant that

it.

by a

fortuitous concourse of inorganic

clear without

works written

of popular

about

is

life is

life

has originated

constituents

that

any further discussion from our analysis

matter in general. 1
Con
stellations do not create entelechy, but entelechy governs
of entelechy in its relation to

But nothing can be said concerning the


primordial relations between entelechy and

constellation.

absolutely

elemental materiality.

Whilst speaking about


intensities

of

energy,

we

entelechy

mentioned

which

postulates the continuity of

life

by the

From

fact of inheritance.

this

in

its

that
is

relation

our

theory

well illustrated

we may conclude

that there are no gaps in entelechian manifestations


is

to

there

a continuity of a constellation of specific kinds of matter

always maintained by entelechy, always overcome, so to


say,

by

If

its

we

suspension of inorganic becoming.


accept the theory of descent

we may say

that

It therefore is only an argument of minor, i.e. merely empirical im


portance against "generatio equivoca" by contingency, that organic com
pounds, even of low complexity, do not exist on earth except if produced
1

by organisms.

263

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

the type of manifestations of entelechy has changed in the


course of their continuous

But we never come

line.

to

any

kind of beginning.
In any case it must appear very strange that life is
only known to us in immediate relation with very complex
chemical

entelechy act
is

few

of

relation

of

consequence

continuously existed

the

Has

between

long

time

entelechy,

behaviour with regard to matter?

its

Why

classes.

that

me

that the whole

that this

problem

of far less theoretical

the laws of

life,

closely

consequences.

importance will

day

is

the right place to point out

of the

origin

of

life

on

earth

importance than the problem of


common opinion almost always

though the

argues otherwise.

its

but there are no answers.

It seems to

selves so

we simply

and problems might be

so the series of questions

continued

is

has

life

say, altered

are

in ignorance of other types of its manifestations

And

Or

entelechy and

so to

Or

not

does

upon the elements of matter directly

the present state

matter

of

compounds

For
to

this reason

we have devoted

the study of the vital law and

The

all

solution of all problems of secondary

knowledge of the law some


knowledge no real solution of those

follow

but without this

our

the

problems would ever be possible.

CONCLUSIONS

We

have reached

phenomena of
and laws we

let

life

are

had

moment

traversed.

shown

not explainable

know from

our

part of

first

us then rest for a

we have

discussion

scientific

PART

end of the

the

philosophy of the organism


and look back upon the path

Our

OF

that

us

by the concepts
but

science,

inorganic

the

that

something new and elemental must be introduced by


science

of

biology.

The

first

the

part of our philosophy of

the organism was devoted to the justification of our newly

introduced factor, in a special sense of the term


It has

justification."

been our endeavour to show how our new elemental

agent and
general

the

"

law

may

be put

ontological

and

logical

its

science

formulated

of

relation

between

relation

principles

But

nature.

inorganic

this

into

the

with the

concerned

we

have

in

only

Organic and

the

Inorganic by using those ontological aprioristic principles

which are empirically realised in the latter, and that has


mere negations with regard to entelechy.
But, of course, still another kind of justification of

led us to

our entelechy
that there

and those
are

is

We

required.

not

only have to show

no contradiction between our new conception


elements of the system of apriorities which

is

concerned

in

inorganic
264

sciences,

but

we have

to

THE INDIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


demonstrate the legitimacy of our factor
of the

We

aprioristic

have

system

of

natural

show that epistemology

to

to introduce into science such a


is.

factors

or

a part
entities.

entitles us positively

something as

entelechy

In other words, we have to establish vitalism from

what may be
That
the

itself as

265

way

called the organisation of the Ego.

will be done,
for

and the following pages will prepare

it.

All the proofs of vitalism given in our merely scientific


section were indirect proofs, or

proofs per exclusionem

all

the possibilities but one were wrong, and therefore that


one possibility was true.
Our next endeavour will be to prove vitalism directly.

And upon

this direct proof the

positive

entelechy will afterwards be founded.

epistemology of

PART

II

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


A.

THE DIRECT PROOF OF THE AUTONOMY


OF LIFE BASED UPON INTROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF COMPLETE GIVENNESS
ANALYTICAL PART

1.

THE

way

which

is

generally

in almost every branch

from the simple


in

the

analysis

us

sense
is

of

to

in

biology,

as

and philosophy, leads

of science

the complex, both words being taken

formal

possible also,

an important

to

followed

But another method

logic.

and

this

method

We

result.

shall

is

now

of

to lead

once more begin

our analytical study of biological phenomena, but we shall


begin it not with the most simple but with the most intimate
facts,

more

that

is

to say,

closely than

My

with those facts which are related

any others

to the Ego.

own body as a scientific object is to be the startingnew type of biology my own body in the

point of this

strictest possible sense.

But

my own

body

is

not

constitutive part of objectified

to

be

"nature,"

the very beginning of the analysis.


266

regarded here as a
at

least

The whole

not for
series of

what

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

267

am

acting

"

"

is

given

my

to

consciousness whilst I

form the subject of our analysis, and only at the


end of it will one part of that whole be considered as
is

to

Thus our method

"

nature."

even

strictly

"scientific,"

not be biological, nor

will

so

to

will

it

speak;

analyse
"

natural
completeness, not only so-called
The consecutive series of the phenomena
"

Givenness in

its

Givenness.

which
I

acting

"

nature
find

shall

may

consciousness

my

to

In

be formulated.

will

we

only shall
to

themselves

present

am

try to separate

second

the

whilst
place

what properly may belong

and what does not belong to it.


We thus
out, I hope, how nature and natural factors

"

be most elementally conceived in their relation to

life-

processes.

am

my chair and want to write a lamp


and
not yet quite known to me in its
recently bought
construction stands on the table
the lamp begins to
smoke it is here that our analysis is to begin.
I

sitting in

This analysis
in

their

mere

will

not relate to

passivity,

not

i.e.

"
"

to

given

mere

phenomena
"sensations,"

but to those objects of consciousness exclusively in which


some sort of activity or
on the part of
apperception
"

"

the Ego
to this

is

True

concerned.

domain

"

perceptions,"

of course, belong

of mental activity.

a.

A CASE FROM

COMMON

LIFE

The Case

My
in

having an optical perception of the smoking lamp,

short,

stop the

my

optical

smoking;

lamp

is

in order

followed by the
to

do that

my

desire

attention

to
is

268

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


towards

directed
I

the

construction

the

of

which

lamp,

compare with that of other lamps already known


ends

This consideration

the

in

will

move

to

me.

to

certain

I see and feel my hand touching


screw of the lamp.
and moving the screw
the smoking of the optical
;

lamp

ends.

it
These are the most general lines of the process
worth while to mark them in a more detailed fashion.
;

is

My

the

seeing

first

followed

smoking
the

is

smoking lamp, to be quite accurate, is


by the remembrance of what a lamp s

then comes the associative remembrance that


of

consequences

the will arises


of such

stop smoking

a stopping, and

previous ways
construction

from

to

known

of the

is

in

question;

that calls
this is

my

to

of

past

them

hand

cases
recalls

attention to the

my

found to be different

them

the means

of

a certain

moving the

the specific will arises to perform

the

and seen moving the screw


smoking lamp is seen not to smoke

the

"
"

relating

any more.
The whole of a
which

constructions but similar to

noticed

movement

lamp

recalls

this

the recollection

of doing so

point of similarity

wick

smoking are very unpleasant

its

is

felt

special

am

excerpt from given reality in

playing a part has been described

myself
here as a continuous

series.

phenomena presented

to

follow each other

order of

in

my

All of

its

constituents are

conscious Ego.

All of them

time with regard to their

though the amount of their velocity in following


each other may vary to a great extent.
Only a few of the

originating,

constituents

are

"

spatial."

By

saying that

all

constituents follow each other in order of time

it

of
is

the

not

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


stated that only one of

element of time

them

269

presented to the Ego in each

is

on the contrary,

my

seeing the smoking

lamp continues during the whole of the series, and some


remembrances
of

different

of past cases of

construction

But what may be

whole.

smoking lamps and of lamps


continue

also

may

called the active role

during

the

of the

Ego

only relates to one of the constituents of the continuous

one element of time.

series in
"

is

it

one,

who

"

experience the

and only one, of

I only

am

conscious that

phenomena with regard

their constituents

to

the permanency

series, though existing, is of no more


than
the seeing of the room in which
consequence
I am sitting during the whole of the process to be analysed.

of other parts of the


to

me

What Common

Life Learns

from

the Case

immediate and unprejudiced manner,


there cannot be the smallest doubt that the Ego, as far as

Taken

in a quite

an active factor in the whole that happens


The willing Ego is influenced and is
in our example.
a
It
is
real link in the whole chain of events,
influencing.
"

it is

and

willing,"

this

is

whole chain

in

other terms, the whole of the

consecutive series of constituents


in question
far as

it is

must be regarded
an object of

which forms the process

as univocally determined so

reflection at

all.

It is for this very

If only one phenomenon were passively presented to consciousness


altogether at a certain time differential, the acts of identification and of
comparison would be impossible. We cannot enter here into the important

psychological and epistemological question that arises in this connexion.


Compare the remarkable discussion of these problems (and of association also)

by M. Palagyi
2
The word

in Philosophische Wochenschrift, 1907, vols. vii. and viii.


"continuous" therefore must be understood here in a rather

wide sense. Space


cardinal numbers.

is

continuous, but so

may

also be called

the series of

270

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

reason that

every

the

influence

next,

importance,

and

at

if,

this

of

must be

it

said to

have been influenced by the

to

We now

one.

preceding

element

single

shall

of

point

get

the

result

of

greater

we

analysis,

take

advantage of the different character of the constituents of


our process with regard to spatiality.
Only the first and
the last phenomenon of our process were spatial ones, what
there was between
in

objectified

them was only


Thence

space.

in

time but was not

follows

it

that

spatial

phenomena may be uni vocally connected by phenomena


which

are

not

spatial

the

forming a group by

latter

themselves.

What we have described and considered here is practically


the view taken in common life, with the only exception that
common life regards spatial phenomena as absolute realities,
and not only as
Science

realities to the Ego.

now

will tell us that our analysis has been very

incomplete, that

we have regarded our body not

organism, but as something that

@.

THE SAME CASE

is

as

an

extremely simple.

IN A SCIENTIFIC

FORM

Let us then try to complete scientifically our study of


the

phenomena which

my

acting

its specific

let

are immediately given to

us consider

my

body

as

me

during

an organism playing

phenomena as a
the same time let

part in this particular series of

consequence of its organisation but at


us never forget that we are analysing at present a certain
;

series of

phenomena presented

Ego, and nothing

else.

to

my

consciousness, to

my

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

An

271

Hypothesis

The organism then, my organism, may be looked upon as


I now must beg you to allow me a
playing its full role.
In order

certain hypothetical liberty at the very beginning.

that a full and complete analysis of those of the

phenomena

concerned in our process which relate to my body


become possible, let us make a supposition, which, in
is

not true, but which easily

may
fact,

be imagined to be true

may

We
without exceeding the limits of our present researches.
shall assume that we are able to touch every single element
It
whole body, including the brain and the nerves.
is true, we cannot in reality touch our own brain at any
point, but it seems to me that there is no objection in
of our

principle to

assume the

all their parts are

possibility, as in

what we

any case brains in

call tangible things.

The Case Once More


After these preparations let

phenomena

the

of

us

begin

once

smoking lamp

to analyse the

Let

more.

us

we possess a complete knowledge of all


that at the same time we do not forget for
but
physiology,
a single moment that we have to do with phenomena in

imagine

that

respect to

The

my Ego

optical

and with nothing

phenomenon

"

"

optical
tells

lamp

is

of

else.

the

smoking lamp

again the starting-point.

us that this lamp

first affects

the

Physiology

the retinas of our eyes

from the retinas an influence goes out to the optic nerves,


But let us stop here
and from these to parts of the brain.
a

moment

how

could the

"

"

optical

lamp

to

put

it

briefly

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

272

be the antecedent of processes of which


the effect

it is

notoriously

In other words, how could the optical lamp

and the nerves, since we know that


our seeing the lamp as an optical image follows the irrita
It would be an
tion of these parts of our organisation ?
influence the retinas

We

absurdity.

"

the

"

optical

Certainly a

"

link of the
is

must not begin our analysis with


lamp, but must begin it with something else.
lamp may be assumed to exist as the first
therefore

"

phenomena

"tactile"

in question, but, briefly speaking,

lamp, tangible say by

lamp, as a constituent of

my

hand; this

Stimulation of

admitted at least in principle.


at

left

least

tangible

follows stimulation of

of all these processes

my
is

tactile

immediate Givenness, influences

taken in the tactile sense, which

retina, also

or

my

it

nerve

optic

tactile brain,

the

may

follows,

tactile

and

then

and only at the end

"

"

optical

be
"

my

"

lamp given

to me.

and now this smoking calls forth


smoking lamp
the whole series of conscious phenomena mentioned before
identification with former cases of smoking, remembrance
It is a

of their unpleasant

effects, desire

to stop

smoking,

remem

brance of past cases of such stopping, of the means to effect


Our whole instance might be reversed, of course the
lamp
optical
might be the beginning of the process studied and the "tactile" lamp the
In this case all the processes of the nerves and brain would have to be
end.
also.
But the whole example would become rather
considered as
optical"
clumsy in this case. A good instance of this class would be a wasp that flies
The reader is advised to
myself."
upon my hand and is then removed by
The phases of the "continuous series"
analyse this example by himself.
would be these (1) Optical," i.e. "seen wasp (2) optical skin affected, i.e.
"

"

"

"

"

"

sensory nerve affected (4) optical part of brain affected


All the subsequent phases (identification,
tactile wasp
(5)
experienced.
association, will, moving the hand) are the same as in our instance dis

changed
"

(3) optical
"

cussed in the text.

Of course the new instance would

hypothetically that we can see our nerves and brain


mirror.

assume
by means of a

force us to

at least

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

273

attention to the construction of the lamp, comparison


with known types of construction, noticing of a certain
screw as an important thing, specific will to move this
it,

screw, feeling and seeing

my

hand moved

the optical lamp

ceases to smoke.

THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELEMENTS IN GIVENNESS

7.

Spatial

now seems

It

these

to

and Non-spatial Elements

me

phenomena may

as being

important to inquire which of all


be regarded as spatial, that is to say,

extensities in

any

sense,

whether in the

tactile

or in the optical sphere.

There certainly

is

a continuous series of

to consciousness, leading

phenomena given

from the givenness of the

tactile

lamp through the stimulation of retina, nerves, and brain


"

as

tactile

my

phenomena, through

seeing

the

"

optical

lamp, and through very many other phenomena down to


the moving of my hand as a phenomenon that is optical

and
to

tactile at the

same

time.

notice that the single

series follow

Moreover

it is

very important

constituents of this

continuous

one another with the predication of univocal

The

"

the
tactile
follows
lamp
in
its
has
the
which
for
brain,
phenomenon
followed
part
the tactile phenomenon in the optic nerve, and the
optical
necessity.

"

optical

"

"

this

by the phenomenon of identification.


is by no means clear from the very beginning that
continuous series must consist of phenomena of tactile

and

optical, that

lamp
But it

is

followed

is,

of spatial

character exclusively.

On

the contrary, introspective analysis shows most distinctly


that the opposite

is

true.

The

first

process that

relates
18

274

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

to the brain, following the stimulation of the optic

we

allow to be spatial,

some way.
is

the lamp, which was only

seeing

by a conscious act which

is

"

before, that

tangible

spatial also, but belongs to

is

remembrance and

of

then followed

"

Now

quite another class of so-called qualities.


processes

nerve,

noticeable as being tangible in

This phase in consciousness


"

"

by

i.e.

the

identification appear

first

the

"

is

smoking lamp
of the

regarded as

"

There certainly

past.

similar
is

to

smoking lamps
"

of a

nothing

"

spatial

character in this process of comparison as such, even

the

if

images of lamps formerly experienced, which are among the


of

pre-requisites

are

identification,

as

regarded

spatial.

Here follow the remembrance of how unpleasant the effects


of smoking may be and the wishing to stop smoking.
All these processes

completely lack the characteristic of

The moving

spatiality or extent.

of

my

hand

the

is

first

spatial process again, at least for the unscientific observer,

though the

scientific physiologist will tell us that this process

follows a certain change

part of the

("tactile")

occurs a spatial
i.e.

which

brain,

spatially related to

is

and that between these two there

phenomenon

relating to

centrifugal nervous conduction.


still

might

introspection

some

add

Careful psychological

that

my moved hand

some motor nerves,


a

certain

optical

intermediary between
proper willing as such and that change in the brain on
which nervous conduction and actual moving finally

imaginary idea of

is

depend.

Would
phenomena
sense from

me

it

then

be

advisable

of our conscious series

those

which

that another kind

are

to

separate

which are

non-spatial

of distinction

all

those

spatial in
It

would lead

any

seems
to

to

more

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


important results
three

this distinction starts

portions of

different

2*75

from the fact that


easily be

phenomena may

dis

tinguished in that part of our continuous series of conscious

events which begins with the stimulation of

ends with the moving of

my

The Elements of Givenness in

The

last spatial

phenomenon
thing

the

following

of conscious events

of

conscious

the

of the

irritation

is

of the

again a

to do with the brain


of

portion

events

brain

series

"

tangible

optic nerve.

The

relating to the

of that series

is

certain

"

portion of the series

last

whatever, though also

the conscious

Brain

is

as

phenomenon

But the middle portion

brain.

and

of the first of these portions

to

phenomenon

spatial

first

relating

retina

their Relation to the

phenomenon

continuous line

of the

my

hand.

composed

had nothing
this

middle

of different

links following one another uni vocally.

Thus the being

my

rather to

the conscious
of

my

series, so far as it

begins with the stimulation

and ends with

moving of my hand,
and at the same time we

different

notice that the

of

them

with

"

brain, or

body, gives a very clear reason for dividing

retina

into three

or not being related to the

portions

the

phenomena belonging

to the first

and third

are all spatial, whilst the second portion, beginning

seeing the

lamp,"

consists of spatial

and non-spatial

elements.

Now

seems to be very important at this point of


our analysis to inquire whether we could not say a little
it

more about

the

spatial, portion of

last

phenomenon

of

the

first,

our conscious series and about

purely
its rela-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

276
tion

to

portion

the first

of the

last,

of

relating

to

it,

phenomenon
both of them

purely spatial,
the

brain as a

spatial something.

Spatial

and Non-spatial Elements among


Relate

But

we must

first

to the

analyse a

which do not

those

Brain

little

what

further

is

meant

by saying that the second portion of our continuous series


of conscious events consists

of spatial

and of non-spatial

Indeed, the middle portion of our conscious series,

elements.

which does not

relate to the brain at all, does not absolutely

lack the characteristic of spatiality.

Its first

and

its last

elements certainly do not lack this characteristic, the


of

them being the

"

optical

lamp,"

and the

last, as

first

we have

probably a certain optical idea of

my moving the
and some of the so-called associative phenomena
concerned in "identification" and
finding -similar" are

said,

hand

"

But nevertheless, there remains a fundamental

spatial too.

difference

between the

of our series and the

last

first

phenomenon

of the

of

phenomenon
The

its

in spite of their both being spatial.

first

portion

second portion,

first

phenomenon

of the middle portion of the series does not relate to the


in

brain

any

phenomenon
last

way, but

my

hand,

if

of the last portion of


again.

lamp

as

and a similar relation holds

element of the middle

moving

the

is

portion,

the

an

optical

between the

optical

idea of

compared with the first phenomenon


our series which relates to the brain

Thus we understand that the middle portion of the

conscious series, so far as

it

relates to spatiality, does so in

quite another sense than do the

first

and the third

portions,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


which

to

relate

spatiality exclusively.

277
comes

Spatiality

into account here only in the sense of a relation to so-called

external
to the

"

The

"

"

things

brain

last

or imaginary

"

or

any

part of

element of the

first

"

"

ideas

my

"

body."

portion of our conscious series

univocally followed by the middle portion of

is

by

its first

element, the

"

but not

of things,

it,

and

first

"

seeing the

lamp

not, however,

element alone, but thereafter by all the rest


by
of the middle portion.
Here we are faced by a very
this first

important problem.

& THE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE CEREBRAL PORTIONS OF


ELEMENTS
The Last Cerebral Element of
to the Scientific

the First Portion.

Analysis of Acting

The principle of univocal determination


the

last

phenomenon

relating to

non-cerebral
as they are.

here

come

results

my

the

of

brain, be

first

portion

demands that
of our series,

such as to allow the whole of the

phenomena of the middle portion


But what is the consequence of
into

close

gained already

Relations

relation

with

another

in

part

some
of

be such

to
this

our

We

analytical
lectures,

Whilst
though from quite a different point of view.
dealing with the analysis of action as a phenomenon in
Nature,

we gave

the

name

"

historical basis of reacting

"

to

one of the chief features upon which acting rests


acting
not only depends on the individuality of the stimulus
:

which

is

present but also on the specificity of all former


1

do not say the principle of

"causality."

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

278

stimuli and

the words

all effects

of them.

We

"

"

association,"

memory,"

and so on are generally used

"

tion

be called

historical basis

"the

But

naturalist.
"
"

psychology

said that in psychology


"

at

"

experience,"

are

with

dealing

most exclusive nature,

of the

by the true

reacting"

we

present

what can only

to signify

of

abstrac

for all that is

regarded as psychological in our present consideration.

is

The second portion of our conscious series now shows us


fully developed what from another point of view had been
included in the one phrase of the

we understand

so

the brain in the

first

And

basis."

portion of our conscious series must


"

"

to

historical basis

Now, on the other hand,

manifestation.
"

historical

that the ultimate event that relates to

be such as to allow the

basis

"

come
"

this

into

historical

has been created by series of phenomena similar to

that is to say, cerebral pheno


the one we are studying
mena were also included in these series and thence it
;

follows that the ultimate process

the conscious series

such a

all

in

be

different, say,

what

it

way

was the

we

of the first

are studying, whenever

awake the

as to

first

of

acts at

must

going on from
But, as all

portion of our conscious series

are not different the fourth time from


first,

its

second, and third times.

the former steps of the

it

historical basis,

on the fourth time of


first,

portion

what they were the

1
second, and third times, they cannot bear in themselves

the sufficient reason for the becoming different with conse


cutive repetitions of the ultimate
portion.

must

lie

in the brain itself as a phenomenon.

ultimate process of the


1

phenomenon

of that first

Therefore the reason of this becoming different

Except perhaps

first

in as far as

"

certain

portion of any conscious series

functional adaptation

"

comes into play.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


of our type

a cerebral process

is

279

thus proved to become

different each different time of its happening, because the

brain itself has been changed by the former happening of this


process

and the brain has changed in such a manner as


on

to allow the second portion of the conscious series to go

as

also

is

Therefore

does.

it

the lamp

is

not only

a lamp, and reminds

identified as

"

me

seen

"

of all

but

my

former experience.
In other words, as in our former chapter, we have here
stated again what is to be regarded as actually cerebral in
the

of the

phenomenon

The brain is

"

"

historical basis

certainly important

elements of the historical basis

but

"

"

memory

no

The question may

tion,

happening

In

"
"

Identification

whether the second portion


beginning with seeing the lamp

arise here

of our conscious series

may

elements which are

peculiarities.

mechanical foundations of

of.

On

in our instance

may

other,

be spoken

is not.

does not use them.

it

depend on so-called physico-chemical

this sense, but in

and what

manifests, so to say, the

may some day probably be shown

Its manifesting property

to

it

"

"

not be broken into parts by single

"

cerebral."

Might not

so-called associa

at different points of the second portion of

our series and most decidedly at the beginning, where the


"

"

"

seen smoking lamp

"

is

identified

as being a

smoking

lamp, might not this association be the immediate conse


quent to a cerebral antecedent, i.e. speaking idealistically,
to a conscious elemental event referred to

the last element of the

first

"my

brain,"

as

portion of the whole conscious

280

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

series

was

detailed discussion of this problem

belong to so-called physiological psychology.


tion here that there

are strong reasons,

it

only men
seems to me,

which allow us to deny a limine such a possibility.


the

we

"

identifying the

lamp,"

it

must be kept

here have not two psychical events,

secondly the identifying, but only one

second time

is quite

firstly,
;

would

in

As

mind

to

that

the seeing, and

the lamp seen the

immediately a different thing psychically

from the lamp seen the

first

There

time.

is

no need there

fore to refer to the brain in the midst of the second portion

of our series.

It

must have been

for this reason that

we

said the brain

"

by a first stimulus with respect to


same stimulus the second and third time.
"

altered

reacting to the

its

was

fully agree here with the excellent analysis of

naissance

series.

recon

"

given by Bergson.

The

But

"

let

"

"

Intra-psycJiical Series

us return to the three portions of our conscious

The

first

of them, as

we now have

learned, ends in

such a cerebral act as will allow the second portion to go on


in its specificity
and this second portion, of course, ends by
The second
allowing the appearance of the last portion.
;

portion alone
its

ends

is

it

is

not of a cerebral character at

but at both

all,

connected with cerebral phenomena.

are very important consequences resulting from


mental relation.
First let us
1

Mature

et

try to find

M^noire, Paris, Alcan.

partisan of the

"interaction"

this

There
funda

a proper terminology for the


Relimke, on the other hand, though a

theory, regards

what we

shall call the

"intra-

compare his
permanently broken by cerebral acts
Psychologic, and his excellent little book, Die Seele des Menschen.
"

psychical series

as

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

281

second portion of our conscious series as contrasted with

and third

first

portion.

It is well understood, I hope, that in the

my

of consciousness

consciousness

is

ences a later state

been

whole of the

we have only been dealing with pheno


we have studied how one state of

present discussion

mena

its

influenced

by a former one and

influ

in this respect all of our objects

have

"
"

But, in spite of that, the psychical

ones.

psychical

phenomena we have studied differ from one another in so


far as their first and their third portion consist in conscious
phenomena which have the peculiarity of being objectified
by the Ego as relating to what is called my body and
"

"

"

my

brain

"

series of our

but

is

in particular, whilst the second portion of the

phenomena

is

not objectified in such a manner,


"

either objectified to so-called

for instance, or not objectified at

other

all.

things,"

Without

the lamp

forgetting,

phenomena we study are without excep


us give the name of intra-psychical series

therefore, that the

tion psychical, let

"

"

whole

to that second portion of the

of

our conscious series

of subjective events which does not stand in relation to


so-called

body

in

And now
and

let

any

my

respect.

THE DIRECT PROOF OF VITALISM

let

us abandon our strictly subjective view

us look upon the Given as science does.

We,

of

the
course, have no intention of taking a leap into realism
Given will not cease to be a phenomenon to me, but we
;

"

"

now
sum

shall call

of

"

Nature

"

or

"

the Objective

phenomena presented

that part of the

me which

to

relate to so-called bodies in space

"

and out

am

of this

forced to
"

Nature

"

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

282

we

in the first place study

"

"

my

body

as the

most immediate

object in biology.
"

My
If
"

we now
"

my

body
remarkable

as

Body

"

my

Object

try to relate the results of our discussion to

in this sense of

"

my

object,"

fact that certain processes

on in

regard as going

we

find the

which we are forced

body may show a gap

my

most
to

in the midst

of them, so that there exists a point where their consecutive

univocal line
to

impossible

interrupted in

is

understand

as bodily processes
"

relating to

my

its

i.e.

body

conscious

my

There

is

as far

objectified as
is

"

"

reality

far as states presented to conscious

ness are reality, but there

regards

it

its first half,

phenomena

are concerned.

"-

between the two halves as

"

such a manner that

second half from

is

no reality between them as

body."

From our

we gave

subjective point of view

name

the

"

"

intra -psychical

which

fills

series

to

that line of conscious

the gap in the whole of the

the point of view of natural science

do

so,

we

are

we

events

phenomena

from

are not allowed to

not allowed to mix up psychical elements

with phenomena which have been objectified into so-called


But now there must be created some sort
physical ones.
of scientifically legitimate correlate
series of the

subjective point

of

to

the intra -psychical

view as advocated before.

Here then we meet our old friend the

"

psychoid"

again, a

sort of entelechy as a natural factor.

We

thus have shown on the mere basis of subjective or

introspective analysis that vitalism


necessary as far as
biology.

is

not only possible but

body is regarded as an object of


From the point of view of strict idealistic episte"

"

my

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


which

inology,

Givenness

"

studies

physical assumptions at

all,

conscious states related to

without

Psychology can

the phenomenological series of

my

body

is

broken by a series of

gap in the bodily world

this

fill

"

"

intra-psychical series
l

saying merely

"

restrict

my

least for

by the
itself to

body, a factor which

and may be

called

is

an

"

psychoid."

Thus phenomenological idealism leads ly


on into vitalism, at

sense.

a natural factor concerned in

is

in

intensive manifoldness

has to

science

that there

the events going on

my

any meta

which cannot be related to that body in any

states

"

"

283

itself straight

one single object of biology

body.
Other Living Bodies
It

"

my

now remains
"

as

body

beyond the limits between


a natural object and other living realities,
for us to pass

in order to establish our

vitalism in the

directly proved

most general form


and this transition is by no means
difficult.
The first step leads from my body as a pheno
menon objectified into a constituent of Nature to the bodies
;

in Nature
of other

of

my

to the bodies
which are very similar to mine
We have actually proved that the behaviour
:

men.

body

in

Nature cannot be understood by a mere

1
Modern authors very often do not appreciate clearly this state of things.
Everything we know about is "psychical," they say, and in this way a real
monism or psycho-monism is the end. That is certainly true, but is
at the same time of no use to natural science.
Natural science deals with
objectified spatial phenomena, and its only aim is to discover the principles
and laws that are valid for these. Therefore with regard to spatial pheno
"

"

"

"

mena exclusively the problem of "mechanism or vitalism" arises. That the


complete series of phenomena which are immediately presented to consciousness
is not a
mechanistic series even if the word "immediate is understood
"

"

"

in

an enlarged meaning

is

self-evident

"

"vitalism

lose their

meaning

in this field.

the

terms

"

mechanism

"

and

284

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

combination of single events relating to extensities, and


thence it follows by analogy that the behaviour of the bodies

men

of other

will also not be explainable in such a way,

that to account for

it

a sort of intensive manifoldness, an

entelechy or psychoid, must also be introduced.


reach

quite the

method, as

same

conclusion,

we have reached

So

by our new and

we

direct

already indirectly, by analysing

The next step leads from


men to higher animals which show at least some similarities
in behaviour, and we even may be led to the lowest organisms

action as a natural phenomenon.

in this

way

as far as their behaviour in acting

is

concerned.

But, of course, such a method of demonstration would


as

soon as phenomena

or morphogenetic kind are studied, and


indirect proof, as applied
lectures,

is

or

of the instinctive

by us

in so

it

is

many

fail

metabolical

here that the

of the previous

the only one admissible.

"

"

Understanding

Vitalism

The present rather subtle discussions have not been


undertaken with the object merely of proving vitalism as a
I hope at least that this has
fact of theoretical biology
;

been done sufficiently by our previous analytical researches.


Our object is philosophical in this section and not merely
scientific:

prepare

we

did not want here to prove vitalism but to

its epistemological justification,

If in fact

we have

which

is

much

more.

got a direct sort of proof of the autonomy


some of them, by a mere

of life-phenomena, or at least of

analysis of phenomenological Givenness,

by an analysis of

the complete series of conscious events as such, by an analysis


we can fairly claim

of self-consciousness, in other words,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


now we

that

285

understand vitalistic becoming on the basis of

our most intimate psychological experience.


itself to be the vitalistic agent.
So the

The Ego

feels

common view

and so our analysis has shown.


This
and understanding
self-feeling

asserts,

"

what

starting-point of

In

is

sense, claims that

and that every

form the

about

opinion

life-phenomena,

neither analytical nor theoretical in any


"

"

can

move my body by my

living being has a so-called

can do the same.

unscientific

will

to follow.

is

common

the

fact,

which of course

it

"

"

"

"
"

soul

"

will,"

by which

This view, suggested by ordinary

now be

can

experience,

said

to

have

been

transferred from a non-analytical and non-theoretical to an

and theoretical sphere, and

analytical

aftd psychologically justified in this

am

have been proved


I
In fact,
sphere.
to

"

"

a link in the univocally determined series of pheno


"

mena, so

far as I

"

will

my

volition

is

both influenced and

influencing.

am

my

conscious of this faculty of

willing in quite

an immediate manner, not through experiences but only on


the occasion of experience.
to say,

awakes
sort.

peculiar

my

And

knowledge of

Whenever any

this experience, which, so

willing, is

reality is either liked or disliked,

action

And

as

am

willing

events

far

as

always of a very

state of the phenomenological

seems suitable

my
in

volition

this

particular

conscious of yet more concerning

know

that by

which end in

my

comes into

my

case.

power of

will there can result external

typical

complications of

elemental

realities, and that these complications are not referable in

any way

My

to other complications pre-existing in space.

power

of volition is thus

the only

immanent and

286

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

a priori means of my consciousness by which I am able to


understand how the happening of specific complicated

without pre-existing external specifying causes is


It has often been remarked already that certain
possible.

results

other most general terms relating to what

is

given have a
"

For instance, I only understand causality


the
as
necessary relation between a certain earlier and a
"

similar origin.

certain later state of events in space, because I


to speak, to feel causality, or, in particular,
I

"

understand

herence

"

"

reality in the form of

"

am

able, so

"

force."

Again,

substance and in

only because I feel the permanence of

my Ego

In exactly the same sense I


varying states.
feel that I am a willing agent as far as the origin of the
Complicated out of the Non-complicated is concerned.

in spite of

At

its

this point our analysis will

chapter.

But

must enter
nature.

at first

we must

be resumed in the next

leave

pure analysis, and

into very important discussions of a polemical

2.

POLEMICAL PART

The theory of so-called psycho -physical parallelism


It asserts that
negates what we believe we have proved.
as in

and

any

actions

also

natural

every

there

an

is

physico-chemical causality

unbroken
that

series

there

part of events filling the gap between


that

mechanical causality runs

a bodily,

a.

i.e.

so

phenomenon
is

in

of

no

man s

bodily,

of

non-bodily

two bodily parts


the

throughout

brain

as

material system.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS CURRENT FORMS


OF PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PARALLELISM

Parallelism has assumed two chief forms, one of

decidedly

realistic

and

metaphysical,

the

other

them

pseudo-

idealistic,

Metaphysical Parallelism already Refuted

form goes back to Spinoza.


One unknowable
itself
in
two
unbroken
reality manifests
independent but
and
series
of
the
the physical
events,
psychical
parallel

The

first

Both of them are complete in themselves, there


It affects the complete
no interaction between them.

series.
is

ness of the psychical

side,

though not the unbrokenness


287

288

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

and completeness of the physical

materialism

cession to metaphysical

the psychical as a mere

a certain con

if

series,

made by regarding

is

"

"

of the physical.

epiphenomenon

This form of parallelism, of course, being metaphysical


throughout, cannot be refuted by an immanent introspective
psychological

like

analysis

by

called

but can only be refuted

ours,

by showing on the

general considerations, or

basis of so-

happening that the completeness of the

objective

physical series does not exist.

means we

the latter

By

have already refuted parallelism in our analysis of

As
the

place to

first

what was

said before
"

it

impossible to regard the

is

"

"

Lotze

in

argument that

as a parallel resultant

soul

of single mechanical events, since a


i.e.

me add

to general anti-parallelistic arguments, let


l

action.

"

resultant

in the clear,

mechanical meaning of the term always relates to the


of forces acting upon one and the same material ele

effect

ment.

Besides this the

strict parallelistic theory,

maintain

"

ing the completeness of both

may

Eeal,

"

its

be refuted by showing that

of a very remarkable kind.

But

which,

course,

is

simply

of the

leads to absurdities

upon the

acts

upon

physical, so the

that any

this implies

inorganic event or state has


of

it

aspects

Only the psychical

the psychical, only the physical

theory advocates.

"

or

sides

"

and every

"

"

its

psychical

counterpart,

Kickert

absurd.

has

well

observed against parallelism that, according to this theory,


the effect of alcohol on the

to

human mind would be

C 2 H 6 but of the psychical


C 2H 6 0. C 2 H 6 as such would only
"

effect of

It

body.

seems to

me

that there

is

"

that
act

See page 115, note

1.

"

corresponds

upon the human

no reason whatever to

assume that every inorganic event or state


1

not the

"

"
"

represents

Festschrift fur Sigwart, 1900.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

Inorganic events, to a certain extent

something psychical.

it

sums

are

at least, always

This alone,

but psychical events are not.

seems to me, overthrows

and may even be regarded


It is not in

lelism.

289

strict

parallelism

as refuting every kind of paral

any way

how

intelligible

move

the

ments or changes of the parts of a mechanical or energetical


system, that is, of a system which is notoriously a mere
aggregation

of

its

something, or could be the


that
like

is
"

"

be

could

parts,

"

"

"

wholeness

in

of a something

Erscheinung

quite certainly not an aggregate.


"

by

accompanied
There

is

nothing

any mechanical system except in a

On

purely formal geometrical sense.

the contrary,

it is

the

chief characteristic of an energetical or mechanical system

that every event occurring in

independent of the whole,


own immediate conditions and
it is

and only dependent on its


If part of a machine of any kind whatever is broken
cause.
or disturbed, single events may go on well and typically in
unbroken and undisturbed

the

For

part.

reason

this

mechanical or energetical system


a "machine"
though
result
of
manifestation
of an in
well
be
the
the
may

it

manifold

tensively

whole,

can

be

never

its

parallel

or

"

Erscheinung."

Pseudo-idealistic Parallelism Refuted

The second form


but

in

is,

called

reality
"

being
not

identified

indefinite

The

realistic

is

and metaphysical

regarded

as

being

number

with

"my

of possible subjects
is

But

this

exclusively,

Ego"

parallelistic statement then

All so-

also.

phenomenological, as

only with regard to a subject.

"

is

fact,

of parallelism pretends to be idealistic,

is

assumed

as follows

subject

but

an

to exist.

What
19

are

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

290

perceptions of things or conceptions of any kind whatever


for myself,

that

to

is

or changes of energy

say for subject A, are movements


and potentials in the mechanical or

physico-chemical system called the brain for subjects B,


C,

D, and so on.

must

Strict idealistic criticism

that

about

nothing

the

subjects

knowable.

B,

the

real

C,

and

Thus the theory

object to this doctrine,

and absolute
so

on

known

is

an

fails as

existence

of

even

or
"

"

one.

idealistic

one very remarkable difficulty


in this doctrine, which may best be formulated shortly
Besides that

in

the

there

is

way.

following

corresponding movements

supposed to

in

be parallel to

sees

the

As

brain
seeing

of
;

again

then this

new

act of

but

seeing must have a corresponding parallel


brain of B\ this movement in the brain

seen by

lamp,

which are

Bs

itself

of

As

the

sees

act

B may
seeing

short,
is

pseudo-idealistic

throughout

phenomenological,

maintaining the
into

parallelism,

absurdities.

granting

but

at

the

that

existence

far

In

reality

same time

"

"

be

must

have a cerebral correspondence which only


as
and so on, ad inftnitum.
as it is seen, say by B
"is"

of

the

in

of different subjects,

is

driven

new

parallel is always
"psychical"
found to be wanted on going to the bottom of the matter,
and this want of a new parallel never ends.

In this respect the plain metaphysical parallelism is


clearer, operating as it does with the Physical and the
Psychical as two types of manifestations of the Keal.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

291

Parallelism Impossible on a Truly Idealistic Basis

Let us

now

return

the

to

of

sphere

strict

idealism,

chosen as our basis of analysis, and let us see whether


there be any possibility whatever of the parallelistic
doctrine on such a foundation.

We

simply ask

fashion that to
(a

+ &)

of

"

imaginable or thinkable in any

it

is

"

my

"

seeing a

"

parallelly

means

to

"

in

know

if strict

thinking

idealism
at

principle

or a change

"

correspond
;

"

to

be,"

or at

being perceived by,

that in

"

"

"

myself,"

already

To

be simultaneous with

the other hand, means

being perceivable to

brain

my

my

movement

there corresponds parallelly a

energetical intensities

We

or to

lamp

is

on

least

maintained.

least

my

brain

may rank among the things perceivable.


Then we have the following chain of events as postulated

as a whole

by the

parallelistic doctrine,

idealism.

the lamp

see

I either see or touch a

But

object.

my

at

very same moment,

the

specific fact in
"

"

this

perceived fact

perceiving the fact

"

each link being checked by

"

is

the brain as

for the latter a

able fact or change in the brain

is

new

perceiv

required, the perceiving

of which requires another fact or change, and so on


as in

of

"
"

to

parallels

which never ends.

We can express
I see the

the
1

lamp

retina, the

The

just

parallelism founded on a pseudoanalysis


basis.
There is a series of postulates with regard

our

idealistic

my

most obviously not

"perceived

certainly not green.

the whole problem

still

little differently.

after the occurrence of all the changes in

optic nerve,
fact"

may

and the brain that

be green, but

my

"perceiving

the

have
fact"

is

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

292

But / know

perceived, let us say tactually, before.


before I could perceive in

that

is

must

first

supposed to

that,

any form the cerebral parallelism

my

accompany

seeing the lamp, there

have been a perceivable change in the retina and


These must be
nerves, or the tactile skin and nerves.
changed

before

corresponds to
effects

parallel

can perceive

my

the

Thus the

seeing the lamp.

would always be

change that

cerebral

so-called

with regard to that

late

which they are said to be


in other words,
parallel
there would be no parallelism at all.
Thus on the basis of strict idealism the parallelistic
"

to

"

is

theory

a simple impossibility.

Idealism therefore

strictly

implies that the series of bodily causality with regard to

body when I

am

acting

is

broken.

In other words

We

implies vitalism in a certain field of reality.


it is for

vitalism.

this reason

and

for

no other that we

"

my

Idealism
repeat

understand

"

We

have shown by an analysis which was free from


any metaphysical prepossessions whatever that the willing
plays its elemental part in my acting, and we
Ego
"

"

have

now proved by

another

similar

analysis,

the

to
"

is
that any kind of
parallelism
Our
or
on
the
basis
of
idealism, pure
impure.
impossible
on
an
idealistic
basis
of
hold
course,
good
arguments,

first

but

"

polemical,

There are

many

authors that have not realised this truth.

Verworn,

for instance, in his

Allgemeine Physiologic begins by establishing pure idealism,


then concludes wrongly that all science is psychology (comp. page 283, note
as he does not see that the Given consists of two parts, only one of
1)

which is objectified in space and at the end, strange to say, rejects vitalism
and advocates the physico-chemical explanation of life most emphatically.
2
Compare the various writings of H. Bergson (Essai sur les donnees
immtdiates de la Conscience, 5th ed., Paris, 1906 Matiere et Mdmoire, 1896).
There are many points of contact between his and my way of regarding,
;

reality

and

life in

particular.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


exclusively
is

that

is

to say, they only hold

regarded as equivalent to

by a

conscious

subject."

"

293
"

"

if

good

being

being perceived or concerned

As soon

as

any metaphysical

concessions with regard to absolute or independent being

and we ourselves shall make them anon

made

are

fall to

arguments

our

But in that case our analysis

the ground.

of action takes their place.

A NEW FORM OF PARALLELISM

/3.

we

If finally

turn back to the part which

"

my

body

"

and

play in objectified nature, that

"

its

psychoid

say the part which they play as


science,

we

met

are

difficulty, or rather

My
as

"

the

at the first glance

to

to

of natural

objects

by a rather strange

ambiguity.

body and the part played by

phenomena

is

the

Ego

it

were

first

considered

only, just like volition, judging,

objectified

my body was understood as belonging to


nature, though also within the bounds of idealism.

What was

the intra-psychical series in the

etc.

afterwards

Of

the psychoid in the second.


series

the psychoid

is

became

of consciousness, whilst

only a concept, or better


fill

case

course, the intra-psychical

was an immediate experience

factor in nature, created to

first

still

a conceived

a gap in the chain of events,

which otherwise might exist in objectified nature, as has


now been proved both indirectly and directly. The direct
proof of

"

its

existence,"

in the sense of

fication, has been based in part

parallelistic doctrine

ends in a sort

phenomenal objectiupon the impossibility of the

and now apparently our discussion


For there can be

of parallelism again

no doubt that the immediate conscious experience of the

294

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


"

intra-psychical series

to the part played

"

is

parallel

by the

"
"

But, in fact, this

psychoid.

from what

is

called so in

as impossible to

accept

is

parallelism

common

quite different

We

practice.

parallelism

in

common

its

namely, in the sense that the intra-psychical series

by a

paralleled
acts

the

of

series of events

of

type

events

by
But our new

objectively,
class.

so-called
of
sort

anything of the kind.


excursion

into

composed of

If for

sensations,

metaphysics,

once

i.e.

an

hypothetic character of absoluteness

do to the

full

we

the
a

might be

speaking

or,

or

energetical

not assert

does

about

assertion

as in fact

extent at the end of this book

we

the
shall

we may say

"the

parallel to, or rather an

Conscious," is

form,

allow ourselves an

that the intra-psychical series, or briefly


"

it

single conscious

the mechanical
of parallelism

regard

Psychical,"

epiphenomenon

metaphysical happening (unexplainable in


detail, but most certainly not resembling anything mechanical,
not even by analogy) which interferes with the meta
of

certain

physical correlate of so-called mechanical reality.

CONCLUSIONS

Among
one whose
"

my

all

the living bodies in Nature there

vitalistic

"

"

body

autonomy can be proved

"

its

psychoid

of the intra-psychical

point of view is

series,

changed

is

certainly

directly, viz.

being the immediate correlate


as soon as the introspective

for the point of

view of natural

science.

In these words the chief results of the present chapter


are summarised.

The argument brought forward here against the doctrine

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

295

of parallelism and establishing the discontinuity of material


causality

idealistic introspection,

by

though

it

occurred to

me

independently before I had any knowledge of the


You
existing literature, cannot claim to be quite new.
will find it in a
entitled,

somewhat

different

form in Busse

und Korper, SeeU und

Geist

Leib,

work

where

the

whole problem of parallelism is discussed critically at great


length, with reference to the opinions of the majority of
psychologists and philosophers

the writings of Leclair

and you

and Bergson,

will also find

it

in

not mentioned by

Busse.

But what

is

new, I believe,

my

is

direct refutation of parallelism

on the

vitalism as a general doctrine.

By

ly establishing the

Ego

as acting

established, at least for one natural

Let

us carefully note

doctrine

is

the Ego

that

connexion of the

idealistic basis

with

refuting parallelism,
its

by
body

and

will, vitalism

my

to refute the

is

own.
parallelistic

by no means to establish the independence of


willing

or

of the

psychoid

manifestations

of

On
mutual
close
know
a
that
the contrary, we
dependence
very
But
exists here, and we have tried to discover what it is.

mechanical or energetical constellations in the brain.

dependence

and parallelism

are

two absolutely

different

things.

And now we

are prepared to pass from psychology to

epistemology.
1

Der Realismus der modernen Naturwissenschaft, Prag, 1879.


2

See page 292, note

2.

B.

THE CATEGORY

"INDIVIDUALITY"

CATEGORIES IN GENERAL

a.

Definitions
I

"

UNDERSTAND

"

vitalism, for

"

"

am

a vitalistic factor

myself.

In the same way I understand causality in Nature, and


for I can accomplish
pushing and pulling in particular
;

pushing and pulling in Nature with parts of my own body.


And I understand what an unchangeable substance is,
with

its

changeable attributes, since I

feel

myself such an

unchangeable enduring substance in spite of the changeable

phenomena present to my consciousness.


So far vitalism would seem to be psychologically
and

it

what

would only require some further analysis

justified,

to realise

understanding of vitalism really implies.


Is any other kind of direct and positive justification of

my

vitalism possible

Mere psychological
uncertain

self-analysis can only afford a rather

and doubtful conviction, it seems to me, with


Nature irrespective of my own

regard to what happens in


It is true, what
acting.
gives

me

"

"

I immediately feel whilst acting

a clue to understand certain

in Nature, but that

phenomena observed

would always remain an understanding


296

297

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

by mere analogy, and there might be very many types of


phenomena in Nature which would be unintelligible by this
means.

You
gory

know what an

all

ontological category

is.

cate

a constituent of the irreducible conceptual scheme

is

according to which reality becomes

the object of

human

Whilst Aristotle and the medieval logicians

consciousness.

regarded categories as the unchangeable characteristics of


absolute objectivity, Leibnitz, Locke,

the conceiving

mind

Hume, and Kant put

in the place of that objectivity,

and

thus brought the whole question into the subjective sphere.


Of course we can only say a few words here about

by no means solved to universal


which relate to the
present day

the different problems


the

at

satisfaction

epistemological nature of categories.

category

is

a certain concept or proposition which

applied in any attempt to understand the Given.

me

It

is

seems

hardly any doubt with regard to the


mere presence of such categories in the human mind. Even
Hume and his modern disciples would not deny it, though

to

that there

is

they see nothing more in the categorical system than the


mere effect of a habit
or an
economy of the mind,
"

"

"

"

which may be strengthened by


We our
inheritance."
selves do not believe that individual habit or economy
would have been able to endow the categories with the
"

character

of

absolute

validity

which

they

possess

at least with regard to the subject

any kind

of

to

us

concept

both
of

"

"

inheritance

undoubtedly
and to admit

with regard to them would seem

metaphysical
inheritance

is

and

self-contradictory, for

itself

result

of

the

categorical

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

298

Fundamental

At

we

this point

The

siderations.

Difficulties

are led to

some rather

difficult

con

categories allow of statements regarding

which cannot be denied, which must

so-called objectivity

be admitted as soon as their meaning is understood


in
this logical sense they are a priori, i.e. prior to ordinary
:

Even the concept

experience.

relation to subjectivity,

is

due

of objectivity
to them.

itself,

But the

with

its

categories

are not prior to ordinary experience in the temporal sense

they are

awaked during the process

of conscious experience,

but are logically a priori, since they are


awaked
only
and are not induced or inferred. They are independent of
"

"

the amount of ordinary experience.

So

far there is

hardly any difficulty of a serious character.

The question now

arises

Are the

categories properties

which are inherent in the conscious Ego in such a way that


the

forced

is

Ego

exclusively
properties

Is the

Ego

in possession of

successors

"

at

least in the

chief intentions

was held by many of


vogue nowadays, and Kant

psychologism,"
it

much

is

in

himself must be said to have


it,

certain innate

This view, recently styled rather inappropri

ately the theory of

Kant s

Givenness with their aid

conceive

to

first

made

edition

went in another

Without any doubt

certain concessions to

of the Kritik, though his


direction.

apply the categorical


system when I conceive the Given and in particular Nature
I feel forced to

This name would be good with reference to ordinary psychology as an


But it is a little ambiguous, as the name "psychology
also might be used in a very wide sense, embracing the knowledge of every
thing that is related to mental life in any sense, including epistemology,
1

"

inductive science.

ethics,

and

aesthetics.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

would be no experience about

I feel convinced that there

Nature at

my

seems to me,

wrong, but

is

And

possessing this system.

yet

psychologism," as the ultimate foundation of the

categories, it
It

without

all
"

so-called

299

is

not

wrong.

(as

Kant himself supposed

in

the second edition of the Kritik of Pure Reason, and as

many

of

his

modern

followers

on a mere

say) because

psychological basis of apriorism the character of objective

and universal validity would be wanting to our aprioristic


statements.
Objective and universal validity in an absolute
form

is

which

in fact quite unattainable

by the human mind,

validity will always remain a question

"universal"

by what the majority

of its subjective conviction controlled


2

agree

The

to.

to

"

categories therefore, though they

objectify,"

do not guarantee objectivity in an absolute sense these


two derivates of the word objective have been very often
"

"

"

"

But any

confused.

"
"

basis

psychological

of

apriorism,

any foundation of the categories that rested


in any sense is in fact not
upon ordinary psychology
that

is to say,

"

"

sufficient

nay, more,

ordinary psychology

it

Here and

illogical

itself rests

that a something called


1

is

"

the categories.

upon

my Ego

because all

throughout,

"

is

To say

forced to apply its

when

referring to absoluteness, the reader will find


epistemological point of view changed to a certain extent, as compared
with the epistemological chapters of my Naturbegriffe und Natururteile (1904).
later on,

my

2
I fully agree with those of Kant s critics who maintain that Kant himselj
regarded his "transcendental deduction" as sufficient to refute "psycho
But it is another question whether Kant was right to think so.
logism."
It seems to me that the ultra-psychological foundation of the categories can

only be demonstrated by the argument in the text and not by means of


Kant s transcendental deduction, and that absolute objectivity can only be
introduced by a certain other argument that will interest us in the last
Absolute objectivity is quite certainly unattainable by
part of this book.

means
"my"

of

Kant

fiction.

"deduction";

the Bewusstsein uberhaupt

is

nothing but

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

300

categorical

conceive

to

implies

properties

constituent of the

the

nothing of the

as the bearer

Ego

term

innate

"

would be

place here

necessity,

which

system created by these

itself

"

properties,"

to

of properties

"

properties, very

much

is

and
say

out of

apply to the Ego the category of


substance-inherence, which also forms part of the categorical
to

Thus, in order to

system.

psychologism

The Ego

as a

uses
"

certain

substance

what

explain
the

of

the result of

are,

themselves

categories

"

is

categories

my

categorical

has an intelligible meaning


reasoning, and
being forced
Therefore
only on the basis of the categorical system itself
my establishing the categories, at any rate, cannot be founded
"

"

upon psychology.
But what are we
difficulty

An

do in the face of this enormous

to

Irreducible

Kind of

"

"

Experience

Foundation of

the

Categories

me

All that the categorical system allows

Given

the

is

prior

logically

to

ordinary

therefore not ordinary experience

my

discovery,

rather

or

categorical system itself

quite certainly not


of the word, not

my

itself.

experience

The discovery
"

experience
"

and

But what about

becoming conscious

"

"

to say about

of

the

of this system

in the ordinary

is

meaning

in the sense of inference,

experience
Is
not experience in a certain most general sense ?
not the becoming consciously convinced of a certain

but
it

is it

something
1

What

about

"other"

length.

Compare the next section (/3) with


which cannot be discussed here at greater

subjects?

regard to this strange problem,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


Kant

founded

different

his

Tafel

forms

possible

der

judgments

Was

regarded, so to say, as objectified reasoning.

kind of

certain

"
"

these forms of judgments were possible

not be a certain kind of

it

being

not a

become convinced that

to

experience

the

upon

Kategorien

of judgments

301

And would

it

"

"

to discover

by intro
what
kinds
of
elemental
spective analysis immediately
concepts and relations pertaining to Givenness are quite
inevitable to

my mind

Thus, I think,

experience

we may

be permitted to say in a very

neutral form that the categorical system

immediate

by

analytical

The

experience

This sort of

irreducible kind.
"

is

revealed to

"
"

an

of

me

absolutely

"

"

experience

categories are valid as they

are,"

and

simply

states,

same time

at the

expresses the conviction that all science, including psychology,


rests

upon the

"

"

Ego,"

and that even such concepts as


form part of the
Keality,"
Object,"

categories,

Subject and

"

We

categorical system.

have a good opportunity

shall soon

of verifying what we have learned,

Few Remarks on

The

and Ordinary Experience

categories are established in the conscious stream of


in the irreducible form of "experience"

immediate Givenness
just

Categories

in a special case.

but

described

once acquired

they are capable

of

directing the conscious subject, systematising in this

further truly

empirical ordinary

understand the Given as far as

Thus

categories

experience

it is

become axiomatic.

and propositions in

science, so

for

way all
we only

formulated categorically.
Indeed,

all

concepts

far as they are based

the categorical system, ought to be called axioms

upon

the word

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

302

"

"

being reserved for certain suppositions with

postulate

regard to contingent constellation in Givenness, as will be

shown by

analysis later on.

Categories

also be said to create scientific themes,

may

whether these themes may be solved easily or with difficulty


or never.
The theory of matter is a good instance of a

theme that

categorical

is,

so to speak, half-solved.

It will

be important for our future discussion to keep well in mind


that the existence of categorical themes and their solution
are two absolutely different things.

But the very nature of

the categories implies the confidence that this solution

is

not impossible.

The Problem of

Now

the

System of Categories

the further question arises

discoverable

among

In other words

system
is it one whole

is

this

Kant himself

Is there

any

relation

the single constituents of the categorical

system a real

did not

"

system,"

make any attempt

show that only these kinds of categories can exist and


His
deduction
no others.
only proves the general fact
to

"

"

of their being founded

and

upon the various forms of judgment

their being pre-requisites of ordinary experience.

Hegel s
system of the categories, on the other hand, founded upon
his dialectical method, does not guarantee completeness and
does not clearly separate primordial and derived categorical
1

But, no doubt,

concepts.

it

will be the chief task of the

philosophy of the future to establish a rational system of


the categories in the place of the mere aggregative systematics of the present day.
1

and

The same
of

many

is true of the categorical systems of


others of minor importance.

Hartmann and Cohen,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

We

now

303

shall study the theory of the categorical

system
with special regard to our bio-philosophical purpose.
Our
task does not require a complete analysis of this system
however desirable it might be but will be accomplished

by the discussion of two main classes, the categories of


1
relation and of
modality in the terminology of Kant.
"

"

/3.

THE CATEGORY OF NECESSITY

Let us begin with a few words about one category of


the latter class, which seems to us to stand at the head of
all

necessity

univocal

or

which has been

determination,

shortly discussed from a narrower point of view on a former


occasion.

All that

"

"

"

is,"

of necessity,

is

whether immediately

or mediately derived from other necessities.

expressed in the concept of


in its metamathematical

"

function

"

This axiom,

in its widest, say

meaning and connected in some way

with the logical principle of identity, embraces all others.


Therefore it is much wider than the axioms of substanceinherence, causality, and so on, in short, than any axiomatic

statement with regard to any special kind of relation.


Vitalism, in what form soever
to

it,

as

we know

already,

it

appears,

must be subject

and need not repeat

here.

The Fundamental Paradox

But necessity only

relates to Givenness.

We

here reach

a very important point, already mentioned in a more general

We

1
do not mean to say that we agree with Kant s system of the
in the first place, we are far from allowing that his four main
categories
groups are co-ordinated with one another. But to open up here the problem
;

of the categories as such

necessary manner.

would complicate our special theme

in

an un

304

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

form,

when we were

with

dealing

the character

of

the

categories.
My thinking necessity cannot be regarded as
necessary," and therefore, as we have said, the categorical
"

"

"

it
system cannot be founded upon ordinary psychology
cannot be founded at all, it simply
A very strange
antinomy meets us here
my thinking as a conscious
"

"

"

is."

"

"

act

is

your

not subject to necessity but creates necessity, but


and,

thinking
"

thought

to

strange

my own

say,

"

having

are elements of phenomenological Givenness to

myself and may even be a very real element in Nature, in


the form of a book, for instance.
My having thought
"

"

and your thinking are therefore necessarily and univocally


Is therefore my
determined with respect to my thinking."
"

"

thinking,"

actings, free

any of

are
?

On

my

"

a previous occasion

the psychoid cannot be regarded as


tions, because

it

is

and present

qita actual

actings,"

"

we maintained
"

free

an element of Nature

in its manifesta

we were

that

dealing

At present I am deal
then with the psychoids of others.
ing with myself, not even with my psychoid but with my
"

thinking."

"

Of

Freedom

course, this

is

"

a Mere Negation

not the place to discuss at

full

length

the philosophical problem of problems, and therefore I only


of the
freedom of
say that, in my opinion, we may speak
in
a
mental
acts
of
negative sense,
my
thinking or of any
"

"

my

But our reason

in the sense of non-necessity.

conceive

anything

positive

under

this

is

unable to

expression.

For

we are so obliged to conceive under the form of necessity


having thought," as soon as
that, as we have said, even my
"

it

looked upon as
belongs to the past, must perforce be

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

We

necessitated.

equivalent

my

of

sufficient reason

it

regard

my

Ego,

for

as

it

is

for all manifestations of psychoids in

"

natural

contained

the

we only know

true,

And

manifestation.

its

the

if

psychoid, had

though,

it,

about this reason after

perforce

305

others

this holds

"

it is

always

we know about the reason of any of their


we simply throw back the accomplished fact

post factum that

manifestations

upon
"

"

"

"

necessitated

to us

before.

psychoid and

then say it is
by a something that was by no means known
There can be no doubt that our reason is
of

faculty

limited in this way.

the

Freedom thus escapes


would mean subjection

analysis altogether,

"

for

"

analysis

to necessity.

THE CATEGORIES OF RELATION

7.

Our proper and final conception of vitalism will be


based upon a study of the categories of relation, and thus
I refer to Bergson s profound reflections on "libertt."
I doubt whether
"Intuition" is not a
As
he has solved the problem.
legitimate solution.
Even the "elan vital" must be
he says himself, we are all born Platonists
conceived categorically if clearly conceived.
2
In no other field may the antinomy of the concept of necessity be better
I know that my past actions have
understood than in the field of morality.
been univocally determined, and yet I feel free whilst acting and may judge
in short, I feel
about my past actions that they "ought not to have been
1

"

responsible.

And

make other

people responsible for their actions in spite

It is true, with regard


their actions were necessitated.
on account of inevitability is generally regarded as a
pardoning
sign of a high moral level, and thus the antinomy may seem to be solved
here.
But is pardoning myself an act of morality ?
Almost all moral philosophers have searched for a solution of this
No other solutions indeed seem
antinomy on metaphysical grounds.

of ray

knowing that

"

to others,

possible.

"

Personally

we must

confess

that

the

solution

offered

by

Schopenhauer appears to us better than any other. To a certain extent but


only with regard to the starting-point this "solution" is identical with the
Kantian one.
20

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

306

we

enter upon the chief part of our whole bio-philosophical

system.

We

have learnt in a former chapter

of

these lectures

that entelechy, though not a substance in the proper

mean

ing of the word as used in the inorganic sciences, resembles


"

substance

"

endures in spite of changes


have also learnt that eutelechy, though it is not

and we

in so far as

causality in

the

it

proper meaning of the word, resembles

causality in so far as it determines changes in nature

We may say

univocal necessity.

and substance, but that

it

that entelechy

causality

something more, that

also

is

is

with

entelechy implies causality and substance, just as causality


implies substance because

it

cannot be thought of without

a bearer that endures in spite of all change.

What

then

"

There seems

"

is

entelechy categorically

no place left for it, at least in the categorical system of


Kant, where so-called "interaction,"
Wechselwirkung
"

"

in

German, takes the third and

last

place

among the

categories of relation.
i

Introspective Psychology

and

the Categories of Substance

and Causality
In the

first place,

let

more intimately
causality and substance

us study a

little

which the categories of


come to consciousness and acquire their bearing on

the

way

in

Categories,

regard to

that

all
"

"

experienced

we know, render

possible with

given except themselves, they being


immediately and irreducibly during our

create nature so far as the latter


;

experience

science.

is

becoming conscious of Givenness.


chaos

"

"

the cosmos

Categories, in other words,


is

a cosmos instead of a

is systematised in science.

Categories are

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELEOHY

by only a limited amount of


with Givenness, but, as soon as they are

consciousness

to

brought

307

acquaintance

brought to consciousness, they direct consciousness in all


future experience of Givenness the systematisation of nature
:

by means
It

becomes a

of categories thus

is

"

problem."

by psychological introspective

that

experience

categories are, though not created, yet most immediately

The category

awaked.

ness in this immediate

of substance

is

brought to conscious

way by experiencing

the permanence

of the

Ego during the change

states

the category of causality becomes conscious, whenever

of the consecutive conscious

move

bodies in nature by the movement of


which
is a body in nature itself.
my body,
By mere analogy at first the categories of substance

feel

that I

parts of

and of causality are applied

to

the relations of bodies in

nature among one another, without relation to

my

body

psychological self-experience thus being the connecting link

One body

between the categories and objective nature.


pushes the other, so

it

of a

just as

is

said,

because
"

"

moving

force,"

"

It

force."

applied

is

"

am

is

in

possession

only by degrees that categories become

external nature directly;

to

it

in possession of such

in

other words, that

Theoretical
categories."
they are strictly conceived as
mechanics in fact has to a great extent freed itself from
"

the

"

physiological

so-called

connexion

"

anthropomorphic

between the categories and external Givenness.


The category of substance thus became the foundation of
all theories

of matter, the category of causality

foundation

of

classical

or

causality,

as

dynamics

in

any

said,

And

its

became the

forms,

the

whether

category

of

must be formulated here

in

electro-dynamical.

we have

of

308

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

such a way as to imply substantiality in a certain sense


1
though it is more than substantiality.
Inorganic events can thus claim to be

means of the
word

"

of

categories

understand

"

"

"

understood

substance and

by
the

causality,

being used here in a sense higher than

the merely psychological.

New

The Problem of a

Are there no

been possible

Jiave

entelecliy

categorical

means?

offer us a

It

means

categorical

of understanding vitalism

same way as mechanics or energetics were under


Would our analytical discussions about vitalism and

in the

stood

Category of Relation

at

all

The question

if there

were

no

such

in fact, seems to

itself,

to its solution.

key
seems to

defect

in

shortly

the

me

we encounter

that

system

categorical

among

of

here

a very grave

Kant.

To put

it

the categories of relation the place of his

Wechselwirkung," which only is a


on
commentary
causality, has to be taken by a
quite different kind of category, and this new category

"

Gemeinschaft

"

"

or

sort of

must be such

as to allow of the scientific analysis of

It is true, in the

Kritik der Urtheilskraft,

Kant most

life.

fully

but he did not regard


teleology,"
not
as a category, but only as of a certain
regulative,"

discussed the concept of

"

"

it

"
"

of

any

constitutive

importance.

be demonstrated by showing what

much

is

wrong will
Kant was too

this is

right.

a Cartesian with respect to our problems.

von Hartmann,
1

That

as

far as I

Once more we repeat that

know,

"energy"

is

is

standard of measurement of causality (see p. 162).


causality would be the ultimate units of matter.

Eduard

the only philosopher


not substance, but only a
The substance that exhibits

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


who most

decidedly established

"

"

finality

But we

309

as the third real

develop our views


without reference to the discussion and terminology of this
of

category

author.

relation.

shall

Unlike causality,
considered purely as a
teleology,"
kind of description, never relates to single phenomena in
"

such, but always applies to the spatial or


of phenomena in its specificity.
combination
We
temporal
ask for what purpose ? whenever we see anything happen
that bears on the realisation of a certain typically combined

nature

as

"

"

"

"

whole,

either

typical

or on account of

ask

this

man

asks

least

one

its

question
it

on account of any kind of symmetry

We

existence in indefinite exemplars.


in

because

the

particular

we know

simple uneducated

that there

elemental

does

exist

at

itself

combining factor, manifesting


our own will.
with regard to nature
But what does
this mean except that our experience with regard
to
this

one factor has awaked a certain category which now

seeks for further application, just as did the categories of

substance and causality, which at


spective psychology exclusively

note in this connexion that


in the child the
A
rc )le

new

first

belonged to intro

It is very interesting to

among

primitive peoples and

category, here in question, plays a far

than causality all facts in nature which relate


greater
to any kind of constellation being conceived as due to
:

1
When this chapter was already definitively written I learnt from the
Logik der reinen Erkenntnis of Cohen that this author regards the concepts
But he does not draw
and "individual" as true categories.
"purpose"
the conclusions, it seems to me, that ought to be drawn from such a state
ment, and his theory of the Organic, therefore, does not go beyond a sort of
mechanical causality remains the ultimate effective and con
Kantianism
stitutive principle of nature, the two organic categories he introduces do
not serve to formulate natural agents of a new and special class.
:

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

310

elemental principles of willing, or rather as facts forming


parts of

nature

some constellation that


becomes

in

so-called

way

over

science.

Does the

and

parents

children as mechanical systems

this

causality

in practical life

his

regard

really

on

at least
it

In

foreseen.

Later

"animated."

shadows the new category


But can it ever overshadow
materialist

is

friends

and

for a

new

category carrying

in itself its proper intellectual theme,

why

not formulate as

But

if

there

is

the

way open

strictly as possible the real science of this category


I

hope we have tried already to begin this work.

8.

THE CATEGORY

"INDIVIDUALITY"

Previous Preparatory

In our

last

immediately,

lecture,

whilst

we formulated

human

being knows

awaked

to consciousness

Work

analysing

my own

scientifically facts

we showed how

the

new

application

of

new

besides substance and causality,

stood at

if

we

is

And

discovered

phenomena which

certain types of constellations of natural

the

category

by introspective psychology.

in our so-called indirect proofs of vitalism

needed

acting

which every

category

of

relation,

they were to be under

all.

What

did

we

actually

do

in

our

discussion

of

the

of
the harmonious -equipotential system ?
formulated the problem like a mathematical equation,

differentiation

We

and by discussing the precise nature


found the solution.
introduced as

if

it

certain

of

the

"

unknown,"

problem we
was

our

"

E"

was found already, and then we showed

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

311

by analysis what this unknown might stand for and what it


It was found to be irreducible, autonomous, and
might not.
not an aggregate of extensities.
These were all negations,
and could only be negations in the realm of the categories
of substance and causality, as the
necessary relations

between changes in spatial nature.


Negations now become affirmations

psychological

new

awaked a

has

self -analysis

introspective

after

category.

Entelechy now becomes a positive concept, created as the

We

manifestation of the new category that was wanted.

now

"

understand

entelechy.

superseded by the

"

of entelechy

"

category

upon a

acquire their proper

moment when

only at the

meaning

intelligible

new

ultimate results of our

though they are by no means

indirect proofs of vitalism

tion

The

"

special category of

the founda

own

its

is

appreciated.

In

we

truth,

established

We

consciously.

new

worked

on

new

it

quite

field of

nature

But that implied the semi-conscious conception of


Otherwise it would have been im
category.

non-mechanical character of
!

theme

the

studied the question whether a certain

possible for the whole problem

all

already

new category without knowing

category came into action in this special

or not.

the

have

by the

I venture to

life

about the mechanical or


to

have been formulated at

say that the mechanists also march

under the banner of the new category which they deny.


They know a certain manifestation of it from themselves,

and then ask

"

They would not


regard

it

Is

the category also at work elsewhere

like to find

it,

elsewhere, but that

they

shown by the very fact that


which otherwise would be meaningless.

as a possibility

they discuss

it

"

is

312

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE

"

"

Individuality
I

propose to give the


l

structivity

This

the

to

new

name

category

name would seem perhaps

and explanation.

leads to

we

are

to require

studying

some

was chosen in order

It

aspect of the category as

morphic as

of individuality or

In

little

conhere.

justification

to render the

psychological and anthropo


"

"

by saying that individuality


individual construction and is elemental in itself
possible.

fact,

the role of this category seems better expressed

any other way.

Some

special category

than in

we must have

in

order to acquire any systematised experience about specific

and typical constructions at


such experience without it. 2

all

there would not be

The construction

itself

any

may

be spatial or temporal or both that is to say, the whole


of the construction may be a typical order of elements in
;

space or in time or in both

no matter,

its

logical aspect

remains construction of individual wholeness in spite of

its

being composed of parts.


1
At the end of the "Beweis" of his "Dritte Analogic der Erfahrung"
Gemeinschaft
or
Kant uses the word "Composition" instead of his
Does it not look as if he had here perceived the
Wechselwirkung.
"

"

"

"

true third category of relation


2

not the place for a real "deduction" of the category of in


I only say here that it might easily be discovered as an analogy
dividuality.
to a certain class of judgments, or rather of the logical elementalities con
cerned in judgments, just as Kant discovered his "table of categories."
But judgments would have to be studied completely for this purpose.
Strange to say, this has never been done either by Kant or by Kantians the
final judgment ("in order that," "damit," "afiuque") has always been
This

is

The disjunctive judgment, which


And yet it is irreducible
belongs to another main group altogether, has wrongly taken its place.

overlooked.

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


"

"

Finality

The

313

a subclass of Individuality

awaked

categorical concept of causality, at first

the form of the faculty of pushing and

in

pulling, needs

great deal of refining, so to say, in order to become useful


for natural science

in the end pushing

So

only as sz^classes of causality.


of

category

individuality

it

it

needs

and pulling appear


must be with the

sifting

anthropomorphisms must be eliminated, and


this process the special

kind of

scientifically,

at the
"

"

constructivity

end of

known

myself by

This subclass of constructive individuality,

in causality.

apparent in

my

acting, alone deserves the

names

of finality

in the proper sense, or purposefulness or teleology:

alone

the

is

to

introspection will only appear as a s?^5class, as

"

"finis

distinct manner,

here

consciously anticipated in a clear and

and here alone does

special type of each single phase of

it

account for the

what the

"
"

individual

In a certain sense we even might apply


the name of finality to each single performance of such a
factor performs.

totality of occurrences as acting

You

is.

will

remember

in

this connexion that with regard to morphogenetic entelechy

was only by descriptive analogy that we applied the


words willing," judging," and knowing."

it

"

"

"

Bergson (IS Evolution creatrice) denies "finalisme radical," the term


being understood, as far as I can see, in the sense of a general plan of the
At the end of this book we shall do the same.
universe in every detail.
But Bergson also objects to finalit6" as a principle of life; he puts his
1

"

11

granting that it resembles "finalism" more than


but I
I think that our "individuality" meets the point
mechanism.
consider it as a category and believe that Bergson also found nothing but a
elan

new
of

vital"

"intuition."
Individuality, in fact, rests upon a sort
as far as all categories rest upon it.
Bergson only analyses
and yet there is "vitalism."
in ontogeny le tout est donne

category by his

"intuition"

phylogeny

Compare
ii.

in its place

1908.

my

article

on Bergson in Zeitschr.

f.

d.

Ausbau

d.

Entw.-lehrc,

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

314

CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES IN THE CATEGORICAL CONCEPT

OF INDIVIDUALITY

Well-known

difficulties

concept of causality.

Of

mention them

and so

to

all,

cannot be our task here

may

be enough to remind you

of such problems as the actio in distans, the

the time between cause and

force,

ontological

it

course,
it

the

in

up

crop

"
"

of a

seat

the boundaries

effect,

between two bodies in pushing, and so on. The infinitesimal


calculus was invented in order to overcome these difficulties,

which

to a great extent are difficulties of space-analysis


relates to

for causality

changes in space exclusively

always
both cause and effect are spatial changes.
We therefore must not be astonished,

now, whilst entering

upon

category of individuality,
difficulties

different

at once,

from

the

we meet with

though almost

which

those

seems to me,

it

scientific

all

appear

refining

quite a
of

in

them
the

if

the

of

number
are

of

quite

analysis

of

causality.

An
If

Analogy

we were

of nature
is,

to

a Mere Functional Conception of Causality

satisfied

as certain

with a mere functional conception


to be
that

modern authors pretend

with a conception of nature which simply states on what

elemental natural factors any being or happening univocally


depends, without distinguishing different kinds and degrees
of necessary dependence,

the

difficulties

would not be very numerous.


reason as follows

We

we should meet

then

might

simply

The whole process by which individuality manifests


itself

may

be called the process of individualisation.

We

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


study the question

What

precise events at a given

315

are the factors determining the

moment

of the process

Let

(E) be the psychoidal or entelechian factor itself,


denoting the end," and the function
denoting that not
</>

"

</>(...)

"

"

the end

Let

but something depending thereon is at work.


be the state, i.e. the amount of the whole constructive
itself

individualisation already accomplished, and let a be


specific alteration of this state

the events

formula

moment

at the

coming from without. Then


would be expressed by the

1
:

If it can be

shown that
(f>

other elements

it

all this

is at

(E) cannot be resolved into

some

follows that

category of individuality

But

some

factor based

upon the

work.

would not amount

to very

much;

it

would

be far too summary, so to say.

No

"

Causa Finalis

"

Let us begin our further analysis by referring once more


to our formula.

We

have written
<f>

(E) and not

E\

this implies a

very

important statement indeed.

We

know

already

that our entelechy

is

no

kind

of

A cause is only a
though it resembles causality.
change in space which univocally determines another change
But what
in space
entelechy therefore is not a cause.
causality,

then of the famous


the term

is

"

causa finalis

"

Simply

this,

that

completely absurd without further explanation.


we know, there is no proper causa
"

In the
1

"

first place, as

This formula will be found discussed at

morphogcnetischer Vorgunge (1899) and in


p. 172.

my

full length in my Localisation


Organische Regulationen (1901),

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

316

and in the second, how could

The

"

end

instance,

is

"

is

not yet

be

to

determines a psychoid in

it

which

the end,

reached, be an acting factor at


determines entelechy to be what it is

reached but

called imagination

but

"

the end

the end in one s imagination

"

its

specificity

does not act

the

all

for

so-

by

"

having

"

acts

Entelechy and Causality

But

is

it

It

tions

simply

neither entelechy nor

really true that

factor similar to it is causality


is

true

by reason

to

correspond

any

and the

of definitions,

irreducibilities

causality

defini

to

relates

singularities only, but entelechy has to do with the construc

tion of complexes
caiisa is spatial
its

though

reference

to

which are

like its effect,

effects

We

are.

spatial

effects

And

unities.

besides this

but entelechy is not spatial,


thus may say that with

the

category of

individuality

implies causality in a certain sense, just as causality implies

substance.

But there

other hand, entelechy


behind,"

is
is

no identity
by no means

as is occasionally asserted

who have

at
"

all

and, on the

causality seen from

by those philosophers

not realised that individuality or teleology

is

as

true a category as causality, able to establish really elemental

and irreducible natural

We

agents.

shall get a still

more

explicit idea of the relation

between individuality and causality, if we remember that all


factors created on the basis of
such as
individuality
That
are intensive manifoldnesses.
entelechy, for instance
they are composite, though not in space, and
but merely conceptual
their single
constituents, qua
In so far as the single manifestations
single, act into space.

is

to say,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


of the

constituents

single

the

of

entelechy are concerned, there

is

intensive

317

manifoldness

something like a

"

cause,"

Now the principle no


though an extra-spatial cause.
effect without a cause
remains true there indeed is some
"

"

thing single

responsible for this single

spatial effect in all

spatial manifestations of entelechy, but

tion of

the converse

be a

"

it is

the manifesta

an element of a composite intensive unity.


cause

true

is also

and have

"

every single change in space may


effect
but this effect will
"

"

its

not always be in turn a spatial change.

It

may

also be

sort of affection of a single constituent of entelechy,

then will lead to some kind of manifestation of


the chain of causes and effects
is

unspatial.

We

have

And

is

unbroken

proposed

to

it.

Thus

but part of

name

apply the

which

it

of

finality to those singlenesses in a manifestation of individu

manner

ality that take the place of causes in the

though they are not

causes

"

"

described,

pure and simple.


"

In

this

"

way

implies

individuality

causality.

Entelechy Supra-personal

As

entelechy

is

is, is

meaningless.

but

would be

it

are in space as
so

many

unspatial, the question

Entelechy

where

"

entelechy

the individualising agent,

just the reverse of truth to assume that there

many

enteleclw es as there are individuals, or

kinds of enteleclu gs as there are different forms

or types of individual

would be wrong,
others

is

"

that in

for

many

entelechian manifestations.
the

simple reason

cases there

besides

This

many

might be formed two or

word entelechtw occurs in the text on many


If, in spite of this, the
occasions, this is only for the sake of terminological simplicity. For instance,
1

the phrase "forces and


acts of manifestation of

entelechies"
entelechy."

means, strictly speaking,

"forces

and

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

318

more individuals out

one by an

of

artificial

separation of

In this sense entelechy, though individualising, is


as E. von Hartniann pointed out
supra-individual itself
parts.

most clearly

or

rather be said to be

may

f CATEGORIES AND FACTORS IN

"

supra-personal."

"

NATURE

"

Before turning to our most important task, namely, to

show how

the

category

establish a clear

and

of

individuality

serve

may

to

distinct class of agents or factors in


"

nature, the concept of

with special relation to the

nature

"

categories requires a general analysis.

All

the

The

Nature."

"Ideal

elemental

"

Ontological

constituents

that

Prototype"

science

operates

with are modelled and formed according to the categorical


system, each of them corresponding to a special ontological
category of relation.

and time serve

quality, space,
to each

and

Specificities

with regard to quantity,

to give the definite character

and the general notions of actuality


Thus the constituents
complete the picture.

constituent,

possibility

of nature, which are

known

as

"

"

"

mass,"

potential

force,"

"

energy of distance," constant," etc., are created.


All these instances are such as occur in the sciences of
the Inorganic

causality are at

only the two categories of substance and of

work

here, as far as ontological relation is

concerned.

The system of
1

all

these constituents and their relations

Bergson also has seen this point.

the organic finality would be


formed by the self-limitation

He adds

"

difficulties

note

1.

extcrnc,"

that, considered as

as even in

of totipotent parts.

"finaliU"

ontogeny the whole


I

believe

disappear from our new categorical point of view.

is

that these

Comp.

p. 313,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


in

general

meaning

is

"

inorganic nature

ideal

of the word.

319

"

in the

scientific

Ideal inorganic nature as a whole

corresponds to the totality of possible relations which

may

be established from the point of view of pure ontology or


in the sense of Kant, always in
transcendental logic
"

"

combination with the simple categories of quantity, quality,


space, time, actuality, and possibility.

On

the basis of

number

of

number

all

irreducible

the categories just


principles

of

named a

relation,

certain
certain

"

of
ontological prototypes" as they might properly
be called, are established, and the task of science is to co
1
ordinate natural Givenness with these ontological prototypes.

Natural Givenness can only claim to be


understood
far as this co-ordination has been successful.
"

Now

all

inorganic nature, as the total system of

constituents at

work

in

it, is

in space

and

all

"

so

the

all potentialities,

such as potentials, potential energies, constants, have their


then means that one
Causality
proper spatial locality.
"

"

spatial

change

is

univocally followed by another.

Organic Nature

The category

of individuality quite certainly allows of

creating elemental constituents with regard


Kant maintained,
rests upon the
logic"
1

as

is

generally known,

faculty of

"synthetic

to spatial

that his

nature,

"transcendental

judgments a priori."

It

may

appear questionable whether in fact this concept meets the point, and
whether it would not be more advisable to speak of the faculty of establishing
a certain system of irreducible concepts as the fundamental faculty of reason
But I agree that this
ing, all proper "judging" a priori being analytical.

would only be another explanation of the same fundamental fad of conscious


Poincare, in his Science et Hypothese, advocates the view that a
good deal of so-called synthetic apriorism is analytical, since it simply rests
upon definitions. This assumption, it seems to me, though not wrong, is
ness.

certainly incomplete. The


definitions and no others ?
"

question

arises:

"Why

are

there just these

320

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

SCIENCE
"

but not

This

spatial nature.

in

"

created

the most important

Therefore

characteristic of this category.


of external nature

is

all

constituents

on the basis of individuality,

such as entelechies and psychoids, are completely and abso


All that is imaginable must have
lutely unimaginable.
spatial characteristics,

and

it

quite impossible to form

is

an imaginable idea of something that

is

manifold but not

in space.

All constituents of nature the ontological prototype of

which

based upon individuality can only be conceived

is

but never imagined, though their effects are realised in


All entelechies and psychoids are
imaginable nature.
in
this
sense, but they are not voovpeva in the
voov/jieva
transcendent sense of Kant, for they are constituents of the

world of

(fraivofjieva,

given to the

as far as the

Thus

Ego.

"

world

entelechies,

"

they relate to

is

though transcending

the realm of the Imaginable, do not by reason of their logical


character as sitch form constituents of metaphysics in the

sense of something absolute and independent of a subject

Even

if

morality,

new kind

there were need to assume yet another

of category to be at

work

here,

would not depart

from phenomeuality in the widest sense.


Thus, whilst
wJiat

may

nature

in

of which
so

of
1

or

be

"

nature

as

the

totality

of

any way, and include


acting, and morality, all

principles,

whole analysis
acquires a far more

indeed relate to spatiality,

called

"

related to spatiality in

vitalistic

Once more

"the

we conceive

objective

Givenness

repeat, that entelechy

Psychical."

Even

if

we were

is

the

not identical with

"consciousness"

to proceed from our methodological

and psyche would


("solipsism") to metaphysics, entelechy
not be identical, though they might then be nothing but two forms under
which one and the same reality is expressed. Com]), also p. 294.
critical idealism

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


coherent aspect than

it

321

does under the views of orthodox

Kautians.

With Kant,

as with a Cartesian in this respect, nature

only in space

is

and

receives

life

The whole
and

parts,

the

"

is

more

this is the
is

moral world

a very

Givenness

of

morality,

it,

the

sphere of voov^eva, or
sense, the absolute

which had been affirmed just


part,

life,

is

science."

Giveimess appear quite irreconcilable.


In opposition to this Kantian doctrine
that

the

concept

of

nature

at least said to

Thus the three

"

to

itself,

regrettable, because one part of

transferred to

and because a second

inaccessible

a world by

ambiguous position altogether.


broken into two or even three

intellectual inaccessibility of

before

is

things in the transcendent

intelligible

be

"

must be

it

parts

seems

enlarged,

to

so

of

me
that

always in the sense of objectified Givenness,


consists of one completely spatial and one only partly
1
The logical process, in fact, on the basis
spatial portion.
"

nature,"

which

of

"

the

concept

of

"

force

as

an

irreducible

seems to me, do the chapter of Kant s Kritik,


durch Freiheit, in Verbindung mit deni
and the
Erliiuterung
allgcineinen Gesetze der Naturnotwendigkeit
following this chapter, acquire a really clear meaning, even from the point
of view of the "analytical" part of the Kritik itself.
Kant s "Freiheit" only
has an understandable sense if conceived as a non-mechanical and nonspatial form of determinated and natural happening just like our eutelechy.
Nothing metaphysical comes into account here as long as acting is studied
As to "my" acting and "my" thinking
as an element in Givenness.
1

Only

in this

"Moglichkeit

der

way,

it

Causalitat

"

"

"

Dialektik
page 304. That the so-called "antinomies" of Kant s
All of them are capable of
are not really such, has often been noticed.
being solved within the range of Givenness and do not touch at all the
problem of the "Absolute." Mind within the range of Givenness is more
Also the problem of the finiteness
perfect than Kant allowed it to be.
"

"

see

is very understandable and soluble within


It was a mistake
Givenness, and does not perforce relate to something else.
with all sorts of problems about
of Kant to connect his
thing-in-itself

cr intiniteuess of the universe


"

"

pure Givenness.
21

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

322

constituent

the

an

ideal

as

an irreducible constituent of ideal nature

entelechy

are formed, the

first

nature,

is

spatiality

of

concept

with the aid of causality, the second

with the aid of individuality,


as

and

of
"

"

exactly the same so far

is

excluded the second time.

Let us not

forget that even a force or a potential energy or a constant,

though they are in space, are not immediately imaginable


but only conceivable
in the sphere
realities
they are
of the conceptual world, but only express possibilities with
"

"

regard to the real in the sense of immediately imaginable

Givenness.

The sphere

of reality has to be enlarged in

order to embrace them.

It is just the

same with entelechy,

except that entelechy has no spatial localisation.

we may be permitted

If

concept of morality in
conception of

"

nature

"

to say a

this

place,

few words about our

we

the Kantian

find

How

untenable once more.

morality have any meaning whatever to a

human

could
being,

were to relate to something not only quite inaccessible


to science, but even, as Kant claims, absolutely unknowable
if it

and undiscussable, and not

something that forms a


It seems to me
part of Givenness in the widest sense ?
if it were not, it would
that morality is Givenness itself
be

undiscussable.

categorical

concept

acting

very

enlarged
is

natural

i.e.

the

special

and

Morality,

the actions of other


in our

to a

of

men and

meaning
acting,

application

itself.

elemental kind to

oneself, relates

to

"

nature

"

of the word.

Therefore, moral

at

of

least

part

misleading to oppose morality to nature

part of nature

of

it,
:

and

it

morality

is
is

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

323

Conclusions

Thus we may
are

and psychoids

finally say that entelechies

truly
potentials and constants
they all
are not immediately, but only in an
enlarged meaning
as

are

as

of the word.

are as products of the intellectual

all

They

elaboration of Givenness

all of

them, and morality

too, are

parts of one system, which

humanity

in

some day may be revealed


completeness, and may then receive

its

to
its

Nature is one, whether it be


metaphysical interpretation.
natura
naturata
or
also
natura naturans," to
merely
"

"

"

And Life is
speak in the terminology of the scholastics.
understood
the
of
by
concept
entelechy just as well
as is inorganic nature by the concepts of energy, force,
"

"

mass,

In

There

etc.

certain

is

no need of further

we may

sense

"

explanation."

say that

all

conceptual

constituents of nature are created in order to understand


logically the singularities
to

generalities

in this

subsumed

of Givenness as being

sense also

there

between the natural agents which only


those which
are in
space.

is
"

no difference
"

relate

to

and

"

"

It

seems to

me

mistakes of Kant,

that

tend

many modern
to

subdivide

philosophers, exaggerating certain


philosophy, that is "knowing,"

number of branches, entirely lacking in connexion. Psychology


logic and ethics, nature and the "intelligible world," science
It seems to
history, are regarded as being respectively quite apart.

into a
logic,

and
and

me

that nothing can be farther from the truth than this.


Experience is one,
and Givenness is one, and philosophy as the understanding of Givenness by
;

experience
follow their

"

must be one

also,

whether the different branches


for a while

"

of experience
or not.
But this
"

separate methodological path


not the place for a system of philosophy. The reader will note, I hope,
from various remarks, that we regard as very nearly related psychology
and epistemology and logic, science and history, nature and morality.
is

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

324

77.

Though a theory

RATIONAL SCIENCE
of epistemology

not the theme of

is

these lectures, yet the connexion of constituents of nature,

based upon categories, with immediate Givenness, requires a


few words of explanation.

Rational Science and


All

that

science

Ideal Nature

"

beyond

goes

mere description and

empirical classification deserves the predicate


"

"

only so far as

it is

science

istics

of reason.

it is

"

"

rational,"

for

based upon the character

These characteristics of reason

faculty of forming categorical statements that

may

are

the

be concepts

or propositions, and the faculty of concluding from premises.

The raw material

and

ceptible Givenness in space


is

in

transformed by

immediate per
This raw material

of science, of course,

is

in time.

"
"

into the concept of ideal nature

science

so far as categorical statements, say ontological proto

connected with mere spatio-temporal inductive


Whether this connexion is possible at all
generalisations.
types, are

and within what


which we

limits

that

shall briefly discuss later on.

Rational Science and


It is

"

Causal

"

Science

very far from the truth to regard rational and causal

science as one and the same.

But

are in fact very often confused,


logical error is

In

a problem of a special kind,

is

its

due

to the

rational

and

it

and causal science

seems to

me

that this

ambiguous word explaining.

legitimate use this word denotes the relation of

the general to the singular.

single event in Givenness,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


say the

fall

325

of a certain stone with a certain acceleration, is

explained by a generality resting upon a categorical principle

by the law of

in this case

such

is

"

"

causal

one in this instance, and

by the use of the term

you

The generality

gravitation.

"

force,"

be formulated

may

"

or

as

potential,"

or whatever

prefer.

But people

"

also

"

of

speak

explaining

when they

which has nothing

apply the category of causality

to do

formulated

with explaining singularities by categorically


to immediate givenness with regard to
generalities
temporal sequence.

explained

In this case the falling of the stone

you know

if

In a logical

a child.

its
is

was pushed from a table by


sense there would not be a whit of
that

it

explanation in this case, unless you were in possession of

Newton

s,

or at least Galilei

law.

In short, the law resting upon a categorical principle


explains falling in general, in the real sense of the
"

of

"

explaining

knowledge

the

child

act

particular case of falling in quite a secondary

word

explains

meaning

of

"

the word.
It

Causal

"

explaining

ought rather to be called

Ideal Nature
It seems to

me

always simply

causal

historical.

reference."

and Natural Factors

that the confusion of rational explanation

and causal

reference

always due

to

nature

"

is

so

common nowadays

the following reasons

is

almost

Wherever laws

of

upon the principle of causality are the


which explain," they do so not merely in their
general statements in the sphere of mere ideal

resting

"

generalities

property of

concepts, not merely as constituents of

"

ideal

nature,"

but more

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

326

particularly in so far as they have served to create typical

Thus the

agents or factors in immediately given nature.

law of Newton

is

not only an expression of the generality

of attraction, formulated with respect to quantity, but by

Newton we

the law of

are entitled to

endow the bodies here

before us with potential energies and forces as parts of the

given world in
in the
to

its

contingent specificity.
Though remaining
domain of concepts we here proceed from a Platonic

an Aristotelian point of view.

Thus, in our instance of

the child pushing a stone from the table so that


constituents of the general

it falls,

the

law of Newton are concerned in

any factor concerned in the causal series of events inaugurated


The child not only pushes a stone," but a
by the child.
"

stone endowed with a definite

with regard to the earth


will fall

when

it is

in its course

it

amount

of potential energy

for this reason that the stone

leaves the surface of the table.

But explaining and causal reference remain two very different


kinds of necessary connexion all the same
one of them
logical, the

Now
also.

all

other ontological.

we have

The concept

said holds with regard to entelechy

of entelechy as an effective extra-spatial

intensively manifold constituent of nature, based upon the

category of individuality, explains, say, the restitution of the

Ascidian Clavellina in general.

The

the particular specimen before us


historically, not

into

two

parts,

The

unknown

referred

given organism that actually

causally

or

my
my

cutting the animal

in detail

by the operation.

creating

historical reference lies in the fact that

animal and thus creating

"

"

is

by the mere act of


and not even by

restitutive stimulus

restitution, however, of

my

cutting the

a restitutive stimulus
is the

a special

affects

point of manifestation of

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


a natural factor,

viz. of

327

a certain form of entelechy, just as

the child in our instance pushed not only

"

stone,"

but

a stone endowed with a specific potential energy.


By these considerations, it seems to me, not only the

and ontological

similarities between entelechy and


the other natural agents have been put into the clearest

logical

evidence, but also the general


"

ideal nature

"

or

"

between laws of

relations
"

and factors in natural


conceived and not merely immediate

Platonic ideas

Givenness

as far as

Givenness

have acquired a certain sort of

it is

final elucidation.

deeper analysis, of course, would belong to a theory of

knowledge.

The Problem oj Enteleckian Systematics

Now,
still

is

as to entelechy just as with respect to space there

third kind of

typical features of a

In this sense the

"

explaining."

certain

type of entelechian

specific

manifestation, say of a dog or a bee,


"

"

by entelechy

explained
explaining
rational

is

nearly

sense,

as a whole.

related

though

is

it

to

may

be said to be

This

explaining

not identical

new
in

with

sort of

the

real

it.

We

approach the realm of this sort of explaining if we now turn


to devote a few words to the problem of entelechian systematics,

shortly mentioned already on another occasion.

It certainly

is

a problem whether or not the category of

how many types


might
culminating in man

individuality would allow us to predict

manifestations of entelechy
possible,

and

for

what

reasons these manifestations are

of space
they actually are in fact, just as the category
1

It

would be

the categories of

useless for our purposes to


"imagination"

make

of

be

what

allows

a sharp distinction between

and the categories of ontology.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

328

number

the

us to predict

of

and

bodies

regular

their

Here we meet the problem of systematics

characteristics.

once more.

No

attempt has been made, so far, to answer the first


of these questions, except a few rather fanciful constructions

by the school of
what the ground

In

Schelling.

fact, it

of division for a

is

to see

difficult

system of entelechian

It probably could only be gained

manifestations could be.

from introspective psychology, 1 from an analysis of different


but that would not go beyond mere
types of volition
;

analogy at present.

As

the second question, the problem

to

"
"

these

why

connected in one unity, it


kind of
special
explaining

very singularities are

"

the

that

third

here

is

above

"

mentioned comes into play. The old French morphologists,


2
Cuvier for instance, saw this problem
has
only E. Kadi
;

seen

it

but

own

in our

non-causal

and

geometry,

"

"

Explaining

day.

connexion,
in

But there

is

the problem of necessary

which

everything

also

exists

its

plays

connected

would occur here on the

Grunde des Seins

voiu

It

with

role

in

geometry.

basis of the

"

Satz

"

in

Schopenhauer s terminology.
not even an attempt at a solution of

fundamental problem.
A few aprioristic special

this

different

forms

of

entelechian

statements

with

manifestation,

regard

though

witli regard to systematics, are indeed possible.

to

not

It might,

To a certain extent Bergson


types of organic
beings plants, echinoderms and molluscs, arthropods, vertebrates from
This common source would
the character of his supra-conscious e /art vital.
also explain the harmonies among those
especially that between
tries to derive the different

ty[>es,

plants and animals in general.


*
See in particular his Geschichte der biologischen Theories, vol.

1905

vol.

ii.

in preparation.

i.,

Leipzig,

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


for

be

instance,

organism, that
its

would

organisation, either

tion, that

predicted

it

to say

is

nature

by regeneration or by

on the basis of

of an

re-differentia

an harmonious- or

either

But

system.

not gained from

is

the very

restore itself, after disturbances of

complex -equipotential

distinction

from

329

this

aprioristic

an analysis of entelechy

as such, but from an analysis of the nature of the perfect

organism.

A FEW REMARKS ON THE PROBLEM OF TIME

0.

We

know

that

autonomous

vital

phenomena
we are

founded upon natural factors and laws which


to

by the aid of a special category of

conceive

We

individuality.

know

also

in

what

are

able

relation,

these

relations

with regard to inorganic factors and laws


they act with regard to space
they are non-

factors stand

and how
spatial

But one point

but manifest themselves in space.

of great importance has only been incidentally mentioned

the relation of entelechy to time.

Somewhat mysteriously
"

being

and

becoming are

enters into the


sense.

That

ontological

timeless,"

is

to

entity,

said

united

in

in

entelechy,

say,

cannot

concept

of a

us

See page 149.

first

though an

definite

amount

par

consider

Compare

also

"

itself

Platonic idea,

timeless, the non-historical

Let

chapter

entelechy,"

manifest

this, at the first glance at least, seems

the

former

time

namely, into ideas in the Platonic

any case without taking a


to

my

the

to be

elemental

completely
of time

in

and

contradictory

which expresses the

excellence.

process

of

morphogenesis

Organische Rcgulationen (1901),

p.

204.

330

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

once

more.

stages

The

validity

fact

that,

so-called

be

may

case an
it

"

open

under

embryo

we have

A,

even

or

external

of a plant

completely

conditions.

Now

the so-called cotyledons.

its first leaves,

stages in

on the

having performed
is

not affected by the

said on a former occasion that the fact of there

be understood

of

typical

In any
would not form a flower until

certain

consecutive

being

is

shortened

or

lengthened

had formed

of

experiments of Klebs have shown, in


forms, such as plants, the different stages

the

as
"

suppressed

statements

of these

succession

perfect the next stage begins.

is

stage

is

Morphogenesis

when one

stage

summoned

to

all

well

may

morphogenesis

assumption that entelechy by

A,

by the

i.e.

existence

spatial

In this

perform the next stage B.

way morphogenesis would

consist

its

in a

action between entelechy and matter.

permanent inter
But even then, the

always wants time in order to


manifest itself completely.
This is true even if the single
steps in the process of an entelechian manifestation are

activity

of

regarded as

As

entelechy

strictly instantaneous,

i.e.

requiring the time zero.

enough to remark that a conscious


aim, say the creation of a work of art, is invariably reached
by

to acting,

stages,

it

is

one completed stage provoking the completion


The psychoid therefore cannot manifest

of the next stage.


itself

except in time.

And what

about introspective self-experience

the most immediate fact presented

the fact of
the
all

its

concept

own
of

la

duration
duree,

to the

Bergson, in fact, has

not

episternology and biology.


The important question here

le

temps

arises,

Is

conscious

the

not

Ego
made

centre

of

whether we shall

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


make

the

we have
"

"

is

is the

"

"

"

called

or not.

an

non-historical.

The Temporal

properly a

in

subjective

time seems to be,

more

"

unreal

if

will

timeless, validity

seems

it

Time
in

allow

said

is

it

cannot
to

be

the strictest sense

me

to

say

still

so,

But, on the other hand,

is.

space

Ideal nature only

so

phenomenon
you

than

i.e.

eternal,

ideal world.

this

what

of

"

ideal nature

in the sense of

have a place

"

any form a constituent

in

Temporal

331

nothing more real to immediate self-experience


than duration memory, the prerequisite of all experience,
there

"

"

is

nay, of all knowing, ordinary


tion.

Without the duration

be conscious of single

"

and
of

scientific,

my

demands dura

Ego, I might perhaps


"

Givennesses

in space, but

they

would be lacking in connexion there would not be one


no
Givenness, there would be a permanent forgetting
;

change,

no

present.

movement, no
And there would

and

past

stages,

only

the

no morphogenesis and

also be

no acting
there would only be
A would be forgotten when stage

future

but, since stage

arrived, there

would

be no connexion between the stages.

But my Ego does endure, and I do conceive change and


movement and morphogenesis and action my own and
other people

What
absolutely

s.

then

be

to

is

timeless

ideal

preferred

world

and

my

postulating

looking

upon

realisation in time as a merely subjective thing

my

of imperfection of

my

knowledge

all

as a sort

conceiving that ideal world

immediate knowledge of duration,


of all realities ?
real
as the most

an

or

my

of time

"

"

There

is

no

almost identical.

doubt

And

that
it is

memory and

duration

are

equally true that what, strictly

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

332

in particular, scientific time

called time

is

speaking,

is

nothing but a certain constituent of enlarged Givenness,


measured
on the analogy
conceptually invented and
"

"

of

and by no means

space,

In

duration.

given

fundamental.

this

add

may

identical

Bergson

respect
to

with immediately
s

analysis

is

a certain remark of Lotze s

it

that time, in the objectified or

scientific

saves

sense,

us

from assuming that instantaneous Givenness comes from


and passes into nothing.

Would then
it

implies

Then duration would

On

nature."

is

at least

something

be

really

we

a later occasion

my

constituent

entelechy,

of

see that

shall

the

in

absolute

few paths that tend

one of the

indeed

be

duration,

absolute

something

and would entelechy,

strict sense,

since

be

duration

also
"

ideal

memory
lead

to

us

towards something like absoluteness


though in another
At present let us
form than we are now speaking of.
conclude these fragmental considerations by merely saying
that

be

to

Kant

duration

into

scientific

time

introduce

to

introduce
the

in

by

implied

same sense
entelechy

as

and

this

is

timeless

in

nature would

time

be

defined

as

The

duration.

would

"

"

ideal

not

by
"

"

Temporal

objectified

duration;

the scientific meaning of the

word.

But
from

let

still

us regard the problem of

another point of view.

"

entelechy and time

It certainly is

"

one of the

most universally known facts in biology that the adult


organism is formed out of the egg by a consecutive series of
processes,
this

by a consecutive

fact is

known

every day, people

line

of stages.

so universally

even

scientific

and

is

people

And

because

observed almost

hardly realise

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


how

sufficiently

very strange this fact

the adult formed in

entelechy

You

Why

is.

333
is

not

the egg by an instantaneous act of

cannot reply to this question

*
:

Because,

of course, entelechy can only do one strictly single act at a

given

moment

"

for in the differentiation of

an harmonious-

equipotential system entelechy does produce, though not the


1
complete, yet a certain composite totality instantaneously,
and we all know that we ourselves are able to produce

certain specific individual totalities of a composite character


in strictly one element of time

We may

on the pianoforte.
this

being

But again

Why

so,

the concept

even say that on account of


of

eutelechy was

introduced.

are there consecutive stages in ontogeny

why

We can only confess

that

we do

would appear more reasonable

if

not know.

ontogeny."

Theoretically,

there were no such thing

But, on the other hand,

"

as

strike a chord

does time enter into each manifestation on the part

of entelechy

it

when we

e.g.,

we

all

know

that

a painter, though he conceives or rather imagines the picture


strictly as a

whole instantaneously, and though he

able

is

to

produce certain composite totalities also instantaneously,

is

yet far from creating the complete whole in one moment.

And

this

may

serve us as an analogy

something more about the dependence


not of entelechy

itself

it

may

teach us

of entelechian acts

on non-entelechian factors

for it

dependent on his organisation and on many


other things that a painter cannot paint a whole picture
Indeed, only on the basis of some such
instantaneously.

is

because he

dependence
1

That

is

are

totality

we

which

is

potency of a certain organ.

understand

able to

the

produced on the basis of the


See vol.

i.

page 83.

existence of

explicit prospective

334

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

The problem of
ontogeny as a consecutive series of stages.
and
time
be
said
to be partly
therefore
may
entelechy
"

"

solved by noticing the dependence of entelechian manifesta


tions on inorganic means.
partial solution.

But, I confess, this

is

only a

CONCLUSIONS OF PART II

SUMMARY

We now have tried to solve as far as we could


"

of

and the natural

"

individuality

the problem

established

factors

by

speak in the usual terminology, the problem


of teleology.
Teleology is by no means
causality seen
from behind," as many of our dogmatic philosophers

its aid, or, to

"

maintain.

Teleology or individuality

as

is

elemental as

causality.

The category
into

"

of individuality

ideal nature

"

entitles

us to introduce

a special kind of elemental constituents,

and into given nature a special kind of elemental factors,


which are unspatial but imply duration.
Entelechy and the
psychoid are types of them.

We

them

category

since

the

ontological

possessed by consciousness

for

are entitled to introduce

this

of

individuality

reason

life

is

is

really

explained by entelechy.

Immediate

psychological

category at work.
direct proofs are

found

With

self -analysis

regard

Some such

required.

they relate to typical

and

shows

to objectified

us

this

nature in

proofs have been

specific

combinations in

organic nature, which are typical and specific with regard


to space, or time, or both.
335

336

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM


sense

certain

implies

Its chief

it acts.

is

performance

the augmenta

tion of the degree of diversity of distribution

elements

action

this

and

causality

counteract true or inorganic or material

may

causality, but

in

Entelechy
substance it

among given

also be formulated with regard

may

to mechanics.

matter and

iiscs

Entelechy

material

for

causality

its

A material system
purposes."
behave differently from what it would do if controlled by
In other words, spatial conditions form only a
entelechy.
in space left to itself will

"

sum

part of the

of all conditions on

which organic becoming

It is for this reason that all vital

depends.

us as something that

new and

is

becoming strikes

primordial, though in fact

the part played by entelechy does not imply creation but


implies regulatory admission of pre-established possibilities

This final statement implies that entelechy

only.

not only to matter but also

to

This, in fact, is a point of great

own material

its

importance

"

"

is

self-purpose
purpose,"

contradictory in

we know from

as

"

a certain state of

itself,

with regard to a subject external to


Therefore, at the end of

all,

alien

purposes.

the concept of

even formally

a former discussion,

the surroundings

is

that

is

always
be

"

"

ought

to

it.

the often mentioned difference

between organisms and things made by art, with regard to


and its
material
the relation between the
dis
user,"
"

"

appears

material and user are two entities not only with

regard to objects of art

its

leading
also not

itself

in

morphogenesis or governing
"

"

and handicraft, but

For entelechy when at work

to organisms.

is

"

in

this

its

also

with regard

in the

organism
motor organs-

the material organism but only manifests

material.

The only

difference

then that

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY

337

remains between organisms and things made by art is the


following: in products of art matter is formed through an
entelechian manifestation pre-existing already, in
morpho
and
in
the
of
itself
matter
is
affected
genesis
process
acting

But

immediately by entelechy.
individualising entelechy
is

entelechy

^eternal to its

in both cases
non-spatial

work

at

is

in the last resort,

and

"material."

The Method Applied

We

now

are at the end of our theory of the individual

living organism, both scientific

In the

first

place, let

occasion of the path that

me

and philosophical
remind you again

we have

on

this

followed during our long

It seems to me that the chief and


analysis and synthesis.
most characteristic feature of our method
I might even

say

the

feature

which

alone

construction so

theoretical

enabled

far as

us to

pursue our

we have done
we

specific character of the concepts from which

the

is

started.

These concepts were not


collective
concepts, as used in
not
such
as
the
the
ordinary biology,
concepts
"

"

"

"

cell,"

"

the

nucleus,"

"

"

gastrula,"

these only had their

But the concepts we


different character

"

secretion,"

system,"

in

really

worked with were

the prospective
"

regulation,"

reacting,"

potency,"

the

the individualised stimulus

of the concepts that

we employed.

of a
"

very

basis

of

are a few instances

All of them are categorical

up by a specific arrangement of pure


and to them we owe the possibility of reaching

concepts, concepts built


categories

the equi-

historical
"

"

"

introductory remarks.

place

"

potential

our

nervous conduction

finally the realm of the pure categories themselves.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

338

Definition of the Organism

And now
we have

us briefly summarise in a special form

let

all

Let

learnt about the organic living individual.

us close our discussion with an analytical definition of the

individual living organism.

As an
stituent

object of science, or, in other terms, as a con

from the point of view

nature, or

ideal

of

of

enlarged phenomenalism, the living individual organism

is

a typical constellation of different elements which are each

chemically and

physically

characterised

a permanent change of the material

it

phenomenon

metabolism,

consists

organism exists in innumerable exemplars


of development

typical con

its

in spite of so-called

stellation is preserved

of.

i.e.

The

exhibits the

it

and possesses as

its

most im

portant properties the faculties of regulation, reproduction,

The character

and active movement.

of all the properties

organism is endowed
with is such that the organism cannot be conceived as
a constellation of inorganic parts which is inorganic qua con

or

stellation.

in

the

faculties

living

There

is

individual

something

the widest sense of the

in the

word

organism s behaviour
which is opposed to an

inorganic resolution of the same and which shows that the


is

living organism
parts, that

cally

it

is

more than a sum or an aggregate

combined body

something we
extensive but

"

insufficient to call the

call

an

"

organism
without further explanation.
Entelechy

entelechy.
intensive

manifoldness

of its

a typi

This

being not an
neither a

is

kind of energy nor dependent on any chemical material


more than that, it is neither causality nor substance in

the true sense of these words.

But entelechy

is

a factor

339

THE DIRECT JUSTIFICATION OF ENTELECHY


of nature,

not

itself

nature
cally.

though

it

only relates to nature in space and

in space. Entelechy s role


spatial
be formulated both mechanically and energeti

anywhere

may

is

in

Introspective analysis

shows that human reason

possesses a special kind of category


aid of which

it is

what entelechy

is

individuality

able to understand to
;

its

own

by the

satisfaction

the category of individuality thus

com

pleting the concept of ideal nature in a positive way.


This is a detailed analytical definition of the individual
living organism.

PART

III

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY


INDIVIDUALITY or teleology as a real ontological category
of

the problem presents itself

relation being established,

for

whether

discussion,

to Givenness

its

of

range

application

with

"

or

in

nature

"

not be

space
may
wider than the mere biology of the individual organism.

regard

To

restrict the application of individuality in a

manner

limited field would be equivalent

to this

dogmatic
to saying

that natural agents of the entelechiau class can only manifest

themselves with respect to certain chemical compounds, of


the albumen group in particular, and this, of course, would

seem

to be very strange

In

order

to

and inconceivable.

out

find

individuality as a category
cally,

we

shall

reasons which

do

best, I

actually

natural factors where

we

a.

to

which

may

relate, at least

to

of

nature

hypotheti-

review once more the

believe, to

led us

domains

set

up the entelechian

did.

RETROSPECT

We

began with certain classes of natural processes


which were of the type of specific combinations of qualitative

and quantitative cheinico-physical singularities


340

in space

and

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

341

and which were repeated in an indefinite number of


exemplars. These classes were first pronounced teleological
iu time

"

"

The question then


states and

in the descriptive sense of the word.

arose, secondly, whether the combination of these


processes was such as to allow us to regard

the

as

it

outcome of another primarily given physico-chemical com


bination of a fixed character

bination

of

processes

combination of

its

"

as

an

we understand

the

com

machine from the

artificial

whether the

or

parts

tion of our objects

In short

in

was guaranteed in

specific

immanent.

itself, i.e.

Is the teleology of our classes

combina

of the

statical

With regard to morpho


dynamical type ?
and
genesis, inheritance,
acting, the dynamical kind of
was found.
Thirdly and finally, a special
teleology
or

"

of the

was discovered, upon which our

"

category,

individuality,"

whole discussion had

rested, unconsciously at the beginning,

consciously at the end.


"

Consequences of the

worth while

Machine- Theory

"

upon the fact that the cate


gory of individuality would have also come on the scene if
the
machine-theory of life had proved to be right, say for
It is

to lay stress

"

"

Even

the case of morphogenesis.

been forced

have
"

individual

the

which

be

have

the

asked

ad injinitum,

And

here
this

if

effect

for

the

for

yet

supposed

originating.
to

for

of

its

Thus

an

that case

we should

intrinsic

reason

other
to

machine

been the basis of

its

hypothetic

have

machine

another

of

A
B

not for this actual machine

constructing," if

egg
is

ask

to

in

again

machine

C,

reason

of

constructing,

even

on

the

machine

had

we
and

proved
should
so

on

theory

of

342

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

morphogenesis the search for a really immanent-teleological


or entelechian factor would have become a scientific task

an unending task perhaps.

For,

whenever we

must

to conclude that there

liave

been in

find

we

constellations of the statical-teleological class,

typical

are forced

some former time

intrinsic activity.
The category of in
to
us
conclude
in
this
manner.
dividuality forces

some autonomous

This consideration, of course,

we have proved
work

is

superseded, as soon as

the entelechian factor to be immediately at

every single originating organic individual

in

but

it

will not be without importance for our future discussions

to

have alluded

to

here.

it

Different Types of Entelechian Effects

A
what

further distinction will also prove to be valuable for


is

to follow.

We

have called the entelechian factor

of morphogenesis typical with regard to order, whilst the

when

psychoid, except

resulted in products of art,

it

typical with regard to sequence exclusively.

entelechy always
products

manifests

the organisms.

in such constellations, as

itself

in

was

Morphogenetic

visible

constellative

The psychoid may manifest itself


in objects of art and handicraft,

but does not do so in everyday acting.

But that does not

prove anything against the character of the typical specific


combination being realised in everyday action.
The single
phases of a conversation are unities in spite of their not

being condensed, so to speak, in

There
tions

is,

visibility.

indeed, one difference between visible constella

which are the

result from acting.


vitalistic factors

effect

The

of entelechy

first

themselves

and those which

are points of manifestation of


at least as long as life endures,

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY


as long

as

there

constellations or

to

corpse

no corpse; the latter are inorganic


machines, and in this sense correspond
"Die

it is

Produkt

ihr

activity has gone over into

come

into account

know from

our previous

this difference does not

We

in our present considerations.

discussion that

in

ist

Tiitigkeit

as Hegel says

But

product.

is

only.

libergegangen,"

its

343

not a fundamental difference.

General Plan of what Follows

After these preparations

us set to work.

let

Let us try

which departments of the whole of nature


individualising processes may occur or may have

to find out in
real

occurred

at

least

hypothetically

concept of individual unity

We

know

searching for

that

in

we should be

able to find

whenever there were

in our well-defined descriptive

and

fields

the

in this case only,

"

at least

teleological,"

meaning of
2

what we are

such combinations or

sequences of states or events as are

this case,

which

is justifiable.

this word.

there at least

In

be more

may

than aggregates or sums, whilst otherwise nature, except in


1
By these words we most decidedly exclude from "teleology" everything
We therefore
that does not relate to combinations or sequences as such.
cannot agree with those who have regarded certain forms of the most

fundamental mechanical principles under a "teleological" aspect. In the


the principle
there is nothing teleological
principle of least action
is only another expression of the principle of causality with regard to
also Petzoldt,
See my Naturl>eyri/c, pp. 47 and 97
Euclidean space.
Maximft, Minima uiul Oeconomie, 1891.
Something similar is true with
regard to the principles that bear the names of Lenz and Le Chatelier, in
"

"

electricity
2

or

With

and physical chemistry.


reference to what has been

"

called

"

Gestaltqualitaten

(Ehrenfels)

(Meinong) by modern psychologists, we may say that


individuality organic or inorganic would be subsumed under

"fundierte Inhalte"

all cases of

these concepts
conversely.

which, by

the

way,

are

purely

psychological

but

not

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

344

the individual organism, might be said to show us always

same ultimate entity

the

the ultimate element of matter,

in purely external combinations.

But unfortunately the term


stood in the following analysis

"
"

teleology

must be under

much more vaguely than

it

was in our previous descriptive introduction (page 129).

We

shall not be able either to establish

with

"

my

"

acting

in the sense of

or to discover real

Kant

we must be

cover anything whatever like a

and thus

"

purpose,"

all

more than the statement

that

satisfied, if
"

whole

"

any near analogy

purposes of nature

"

or a

"

we can

dis

unity,"

or a

"

to follow will hardly be

is

of subjects for future research.

THE PROBLEM OF SUPRA-PERSONAL TELEOLOGY IN THE

/?.

REALM OF LIFE
History in General

In the

first

place

we

the

refer to

culture once more, as revealed in

historical

actings

of

certainly
it is

phenomena

is

We

quite

at present about such a unity.

But

Categorical individuality

scientific task

As

individuals.

is

at

is

raised even

work

it

by

sets us a

an eternal task perhaps.

in the study of the individual organism, the problematic

categorical theory of culture, of course,


its

is

more than a cumulation of the

important to notice that the problem

ourselves.

have

any positive
any group of cultural or

psychoidal and moral

know nothing

human

We

history.

denied on a previous occasion that there


right at present to maintain that

of

phenomena

human

analysis

by showing,

would have

to begin

in the first place, that there is some

kind of descriptive-teleological unity as the subject of further

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY


I

study.

confess

we do not even know

345

We

this yet.

do

not see any complication or progress in human history that


might not be explained as a cumulation in the easiest way.
As far as we know, the State in the widest sense of this

word

concerned in

Of

sum

the

is

it,

and

is

course, even

individual unity in

immanent

an

would

still

culture were

autonomous

"

"

itself.

proved, the problem of

and

historical

human

the entelechian

factor

There might perhaps some day be


the

in

teleology in history,

might

all,

also be

"

culture

"

unconscious

"

so-called

if

machine-like

Of course that would not mean

teleology.

case that

the individuals

all

individual

cultural

sphere, but

were such a thing at

"

some kind of construction or real

be unsolved.

subconscious

acting of

not a real

if

found such a factor


"

the

of

or

there
"

qua

to say in this

to be understood mechanically

is

individuals which form part of

it

would

contradict such an hypothesis from the very beginning

but

it

would express that the individual construction

given state of

culture qua

construction

is

at a

the effect of a

construction of an earlier state, which again follows from an


earlier

construction, and

so

on

ad infinitum

the

word

construction relating here to the velocity and arrangement

persons.

and

arrangement of organic individual


In either of the two possible cases just mentioned

of matter in space

the

there would be something above a mere


individuals,

whether

active at a certain

it

sum

of historical

were active at present or

moment

had been

of the past.

Thus the problem of historical teleology


must remain an open question a categorical

in

any sense

task.

would be left for the


history were evolution throughout, no place
"historical possibility"; if it were partly evolutionary, this
manner. The discussion
concept would be applicable in but a very restricted
1

It

concept of a

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

346

The History of the Individual

But might we

not

find

something

like a teleological

unity in the dements of the historical process, in the


of the single

human

individual

word

life to

part of

all,

that has happened to

amount

an affirmative answer to

and in your

life

be understood here as the

us have a certain

there anything like

Is

my own

unity or purposefulness in

you

life

sum

of

life,

the

or at least

all,

I believe that all of

of experience inclining us to give


this question

but I doubt

if it is

strong enough to be considered as a scientific fact as certain

Newton s law

as

That degree of certainty,

of gravitation.

however, would be necessary.

Phylogeny

As

to a

the

of

know
"

"

"

phylogeny

Living
absolutely

Lamarckism

There
there

in

may
may

general,

nothing,

are

of possibility

beyond the

we have

except that

"

equally

confessed
"

that

Darwinism

"

we
and

unable to solve the problem.

be a real re Xo? to be attained in phylogeny, but


also

be autonomy

pedigree of the organisms

not a real

or history of the different forms

may

in

phylogeny, and yet the

be a mere cumulation and

teleological constellation.

Of

course, the re Xo?

objective and subjective possibility as such is, of course,


of these lectures, and so is the analysis of the relation of

scoj>e

to the concepts of determination in general and freedom


"possibility"
I only say here that
(comp. Max Weber, Archiv f. Sozialiviss. 22, p. 143).
from the highest point of view there is not much room for objective "possi
at all, fitter in the face of mere causality or in the face of "individu
bility
"

ality,"

since both of these are subclasses of determination

at least in the

objective sphere (comp. page 304).


1

lergson, in bis
Comp. vol. i. page
advocates an autonomous but endless phylogeny.
30f>.

Ltvolntion

creatrice,

also

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

347

as such

might again be due to intrinsic or constellative and


machine-like teleology.
There are few domains in science

where we are

so ignorant as

Thus the category


in

biology,

so

except

we

are here.

of individuality only establishes tasks


far

as

the

individual

personal

is

concerned.

The Significance of Propagation

But

there not one class of facts which seems to show

is

beyond any doubt a purposefulness that exceeds the range


of the biological individual as such

Yes, there

is

a class

organic phenomena, which have been mentioned only


quite incidentally so far, since they have nothing to do with

of

what we have studied almost


I refer to

individual.

We
that the

exclusively, the organic personal

the simple

phenomenon

of propagation.

have already studied inheritance, that

young organism resembles

also analysed the significance of the

of an animal, or any sort of

germ

manifestation of entelechy, as

we

was found

fragments, in

parents.

But we have not

bud whatever.

have

it,

in

The

an egg or germ

of universal restitution of

said a single

word about the

of the individual organism s actively producing

is

the fact

We

ontological sense.

its

to be developed

is,

development of the egg


or

called

mere subclass

to be a

its

under the control

of entelechy.

significance

"

fragments,"

The problem

certainly unique.

Have we not

here the very source of

teleological or

all

that can be

in a higher than the ordinary

"

"

individual

1
This problem, of course, has nothing to do with the problem of sexual
I feel unable to add anything
propagation, shortly mentioned at vol. i. p. 33.
is beyond us at present.
the
there
remarks
to
the
critical
problem
positive
;

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

348
sense

Does

propagation as such were


In any case, in no
a supra-personal purpose ?

serve

to

not seein as

it

if

other sense can propagation be understood at


is

we mention it
But here also we know

7.

Let us

now

HARMONY

and

and

in this connexion

therefore that

other.

all,

in

nothing.

IN

NATURE

proceed to the analysis of a certain type of

problematic teleology which also relates to supra-personal

but

is

it

no

life,

not historical in any sense.

Nobody

the

at

present

day,

conceives teleologically in any

mountains, clouds, rivers, or

combinations on the earth.

so

far as

am

aware,

the origin of islands,

way

any other form of inorganic

But such

teleology, at least con

ceived statically, played an important role in the eighteenth


century.

And

in

same way the

the

different

types of

were considered as being in mutual teleological


correspondence, animals indeed in their present state being

organisms

certainly unable to exist without plants.

This

the real

is

concept of a harmony in nature, both organic and inorganic.


But the concept of this harmony with regard to the
Inorganic goes

still

deeper, from geology and geography to

inorganic elementalities

regarded as instances of

water attains

its

the properties of iron and salt are

"

harmony,"

and so

greatest density at

-f

is

the fact that

C.

and not

at

freezing-point.
I
1

do not hesitate to confess

The only

i>os.sible

that,

apart from historical

eutelechy
objection to this view seems to be as follows
indefinite time

might know that it cannot overcome inorganic jotentials for


and might therefore secure points of future manifestation.
would be "supra-personal" to a certain extent.

But even

this

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

349

teleology relating to the sequence of one state of politics or

economy upon another, and apart from phylogeny, there


seems to

me

to be a certain

sound foundation in the concept

of the general

harmony between organic and inorganic nature,


a something which seems to show that nature is nature
for a
certain purpose.
But I confess at the same time that I am
absolutely unable to consider this purpose in any other than
a purely anthropomorphic manner.

Let us now try to examine in a systematic way to what


of inorganic or organic constellations any kind of

classes

teleological

harmony possibly might

Of

relate.

any

course,

such harmony would be merely statical in the first place,


a given teleological arrangement and no more.
But

would be much

As

even that could be proved.


to the different types of matter and

i.e.

it

if

forces,

physics

and chemistry try to understand atoms, molecules, and


crystals as mere states of equilibrium of one elemental
material.

The

possible

forms

of

equilibrium

would

be

guaranteed by the nature of space from such a point of view.

But what about the

and

specific distribution

relative frequency

of the different classes of inorganic materiality

These, of

course, are the consequences of a former specific distribution,

which in turn

is

the consequence of a

still earlier

there anything in any of these distributions that

character of a teleological unity

Is

one.
is

of the

The only way by which

might possibly be recognised as such


would be the demonstration that it has some relation of
this hypothetic unity

That certainly
purposefulness with regard to organic beings.
sounds very anthropomorphic," but we must never forget
"

that in no other

manner would

it

be possible here to get


"

even

the

mere starting-point

for a

"

supra-biological

or

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

350

"

supra-personal

immanent

we most

or entelechian teleology

wise, our task

would not be

teleologically

were

other

it

Thus the only thing

difficult.

some point among

to search for

is

know

decidedly

absolutely nothing in this domain of nature

we can do

Of an

teleology, so to speak, of the future.

"

inorganic specificities of constellation, which might possibly


relate

to some

imaginable

purpose.

and distribution of
of the

properties

salt

And

In this

alone can be such purposes.

and of

ever-present

iron,

the

way
and

organisms

the frequency
the

remarkable

water indeed do serve to

important functions of all organisms and of men, and

assist

so does the separation of oceans and continents on the earth.

But we

shall

postpone the further discussion of this


we have reviewed another type of

central question until

possible individuality or teleology in the Inorganic.

THE PROBLEM OF A HEAL INORGANIC INDIVIDUALITY

S.

It is not the

specific

types of matter to which

distribution
I refer,

of masses in the cosmic universe.


it is

and frequency of the

but the general distribution


And, on the other hand,

not with a possible mere general

"

"

shall deal here exclusively, but with the

there

may

problem whether

or perhaps even dynamical events

allow us to speak of real inorganic individuals,


say,

we

be found in the inorganic universe such types of

constellation

to

that

harmony

inorganic

organisms.

Of course

as
or,

this

might

strange
is

quite

a different logical problem from the problem of a general


harmony of the universe, with man as its purpose. Our

new problem,

so

it

seems,

is

much

than the problem of harmony.

less

"

"

anthropomorphic

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

cosmic constellations of masses, like the single

Many

planetary systems, for instance, are


specificity, as far as

sort of

351

we know, and

mere symmetry

very typical in their

are not reducible to

any

in space, as the chemical elements

Now

are on the theory of electrons.

it

certainly

is

by no

means proved

at present that categorical teleology is appli


cable to planetary or sidereal systems, that there is
anything
like individuality to be found in

But, on the other

them.

must be granted that such a view may be possible


and may be proved some day, and we know that not only
hand,

it

an

in

Fechner,

almost

form,

poetical

but

also

other

"

philosophers, regarded planetary systems as real organisms."


This statement, of course, would not prevent a certain sort

of

"

"

with regard to

harmony

life

from also being realised

We may

in planetary arrangements.

raise the

question in

whether a bacterium, endowed with human

this connexion,

reason and living somewhere in the body of man, would be


able to discover the wholeness

and

dynamico-teleological

and would not prefer to say that, as far as


it could judge, there was no reason for applying the category
of teleology, even in the statical sense, to the very strange
nature of

its host,

"

and apparently
living.

It

"

contingent

constellation in

which

it

was

be possible that we are playing the part of

may

this bacterium as regards planetary or sidereal arrangements.

What
sidereal

is

known

actually

apart

arrangements,

particular,

relates

in

formation of the Milky

the

least a sidereal

To sum up

first

Way

star-systems in its plane.

about

from

and

the

specificity

of

planetary systems

in

place

to

the

remarkable

the distribution of

All this proves that there

many
is

at

arrangement of a rather typical character.


:

nothing

is

quite certainly

known, either

352

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

about

a harmony or a truly teleological

and individual

constellation either in the general distribution of kinds of

matter or

in

or

planetary

sidereal

But

arrangements.

there are some approximations at least to a general statical

harmonious

teleology

with

to

regard

living

and

beings

man.

CONTINGENCY AND TELEOLOGY

The Concept of Contingency

To

deny

inorganic

in

teleology

would

form

any

ultimately be the same as to admit contingency as the exof

feature

elusive

"

The term

common

With

that

"

contingent

and at

this

nothing

determined,

univocally
"

very

to

regard

of

constellation.

different

meanings in

specificity

has two

contingency

use.

maintain

inorganic

"

must

necessity, philosophy
in

happens
and that

nature

that

therefore

not

is

nothing

is

but as to events at this very point in space

moment

of time, philosophy

may speak

of

the contingency of their happening here and now, whenever


it is

not possible to discover anything like a wholeness or

a plan to
due.

which

their

Contingency
1

teleology,

in

and temporal appearance is


sense is the same as non-

local
this

whilst contingency in the other meaning

admissible to critical philosophy altogether.


If

now we wish

to

express

is

in

our general

result

with

regard to the problem of any non-biological teleology or


1

It is

worth noticing that the term

meaning when opposed

to teleology

"contingency"

it is

a negation.

only acquires a clear


this proves that

But

teleology (or rather, individuality) is a category.


A fuller discussion of the problem would belong to general philosophy.

Comp.

also page 304

and page 345,

note.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

353

individuality by using the term contingency, we may say as


follows
With reference to sidereal and planetary arrange
:

ments

as

we

history,

and

such,

are

with

reference

unable at the present

existence of any non- contingency.

answer at

all,

the

But

day to prove the


this is no final

upon the category

of

With

individuality remains.

between

founded

task

phylogeny and

to

reference to a general harmony


and
nature
the organisms, and among
inorganic

the organisms themselves, there seems to be something more


than a mere task.

a Limited Teleology

TJie Concept of

we have

as

For,

there are some

said,

inklings

of a

supra-personal harmony, at least from an anthropomorphic


point of view, some inklings of a general sort of statical

harmony
asserted.

in

In

the whole

of nature,

fact, this

word

as

the

old

"

"

harmony

that seems to be applicable to the few points


to

assert

cosmos
is

is

guaranteed in

it,

at least

The common objection


sort of enlarged

life

(and

man s

on the earth

we

are able

In any case the

positively about our subject.

such that organic

naturalists

the only one

is

life in

particular)

s surface.

to this reasoning is generally a

Darwinism.

It is pointed out that

any

given state of the Organic is not the result of purposefulness

but the survivor out of innumerable other

by contingency

it

states,

because

discovered the secret of permanent

This preliminary result is unaffected by certain analytical investigations


of the last few years, especially those of V. Goldschmidt, which have dis
covered something like a general law governing the type of a planetary

system as a whole. If the distances of the single planetary orbits from the
centre do in fact always follow a comparatively simple formula, it may be

owing

to the state of aggregation of their material at the


may be a mere question of probability.

moment

of their

formation, and

23

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

354

existence under the circumstances that prevailed.


objection to teleology as foreboded in

this

we

But

to

mere harmony

again object on our part that this presentment of the

do away with the simple truth that,


Givenness being what it is, one thing does occur in favour of
In fact, there are teleological relations between
the other.
facts is powerless to

different

organisms,

between

between water and functions of


are so,

we

say,

and

plants
life

and therefore there

in

the

Things

general.

a certain

is

amongst the elemental constituents of nature,

and

sun,

harmony

at least with

regard to their specific distribution.

As

anything more than a mere harmony of the kind


just described there are, of course, no logical reasons why
the constellation of the inorganic world as such or of history
to

as such should not be regarded as merely contingent through

out and as due to an indefinite line of contingencies in the


past, always determined from moment to moment by mere
In this case the task

probability.

by the

propounded

category of individuality with regard to the Inorganic itself


or to history as such would appear as factually insoluble.

But

we

since

actually

discover

some

sort

of

harmony

between the manifestations of entelechy and the distribution


of inorganic realities, do not at least some features of the
primordial constellation

of

the inorganic

world seem to

gain a special teleological importance, do they not seem to

be harmonious for entelechy, and does not thereby the


con
contingency of inorganic constellation cease to be
"

"

tingency

at least in certain spheres

Does not the nature

of the probability of inorganic constellations


in

specified

purpose

way

that

at

least

suggests

seem to be
a

limited

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY

We

shall

come back

and we

of view,

will

355

problem from another point


add
here
that to admit teleology
only
to this

of only a limited character implies a very important con

ception of the ultimate character of the Given as such.

f MORALITY
Morality as a Standard of Measurement of Universal Teleology

rather serious objection against the purposefulness of

one organism in favour of another follows from the considera


tion that it does not agree with our ideas of what ought
that one class of organisms

to

be,

of

pains and death

to

a critical

This objection

another.

important than any other, to

human

mind would hardly be

nourishes at the cost


is

more

feeling at least, though

inclined to call

it decisive.

For we do not know the means that were at the disposal of


the

hypothetic

supra-personal

regarded as having

made

entelechy

natural

that

harmony.

must

be

Nothing, of

problem of the sense and


Given could furnish an answer about any

course, but the solution of the

meaning

of the

type of universal teleology.


in the face of this problem

We

can do absolutely nothing

beyond simply stating that the

only sphere in which we should be able to conceive such a


solution at all would be that of morality and intellectuality.

were a meaning in the universe with relation


which may be one purpose in the
to these two purposes
If there

we

last resort

at least should be able to conceive

Thus morality and


of

measurement of

therefore

morality

discussions.

all

intellectuality

it.

become the standard

universal teleology in any sense, and

once more

enters

into

our theoretical

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

356

Morality as a Category

me now

Let

say a few additional words about the con

cept of morality from a merely ontological point of view, so


as

accentuate what

to

we have

said on this point on a

former occasion.
Morality, as a form of judging,

is

also a category, like

1
causality and individuality.

Conceiving it in this way we


guarantee the unity of the Given, whereas if we regarded
morality as something absolutely different from any other

kind of dealing with

the

Given we should be dividing

two parts absolutely irreconcilable with one


No matter what the special so-called content of

into

reality

another.

most general categorical


sense comes into play whenever the relation of two or more
morality

may

be, morality

in

its

active entelechian manifestations to each other

of reflection.
"

as

tive

And

morality as a category

is

is

as

the subject
"

constitu

any other category, and not merely regulative, since

moral acting individuals are real constituents of nature."


I finally
understand
morality
just like causality and
"

"

individuality

psychologically, since I myself

may

be one

of the individuals in question.

Thus

morality has

its

place first

in

the

system

categories, secondly in nature, thirdly in psychology

categories have.
1

of

as all

is a great difference between morality and


Theoretical
moralising.
the description of an ideal and is intellectual in the last resort.
no such thing as "you must," but only "so it ought to be." There

There

ethics

There

is
is

moral character of an author has nothing to do with his


2
moral theory.
Comp. page 320 f.
3
Tilings would turn out differently if all morality were merely apparent,
fore the personal

the community of men being in fact one supra-personal individual unity


See page 121.
In this case
using the biological individuals as means.
morality might possibly be regarded as the mere psychological or subjective

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL TELEOLOGY


and very strange

It is a very important

357

characteristic

of the category of morality that it almost


always appears in

We

the form of a negation.


not to

happen,"

but

it

judge that something

would in most cases

"

ought

though not in

be very difficult for us to say with absolute certainty

all

what

"

ought to

we

particular,

evolution in

With regard

happen."

to

history

in

therefore might say that there was a real

we were

if

it

what ought not

able to assert that the

sum

of

happen becomes less during the historical


in
a
not
process
merely cumulative way. It is worth noticing
that not a word has been said about freedom,"
responsi
to

"

and such

bility,"

"

like in this short theory of morality.

Morality relates to individuals and to individuals


Historical cumulations of
in a moral sense only

if

the immediate relation of individual to individual.

very important

only."

any kind therefore can be binding


what they ask does not contradict

in practical

This

is

life.

Morality ami Vitalism,

We

now come

morality and

a very

to

important relation between

all vitalism.

The assertion of morality implies

and

just as entclechy implies causality


It

seems to

me

of cntelcchy,

substance.

very important to realise that morality and

correlate of supra-personal individuality,

May we

the assertion

say perhaps that

"morality"

on

and not

its

as a category for itself.


part guarantees the supraare in search of (see p. 344 f.) ?

own

and culture that we


personal unity in history
1
But morality must have some sort of content. Mere "formal morality,
like that of Kant, would be as valueless as a statement of the existence of
which did not specify what they are. But a theory
relation
categories of
"

"

"

not the business of this work.


Let me add once more not to individuals that form part of a higher
such as the State has been supposed to be.
truly "individual" constellation,
In this case the individuals would only be means of the supra-individuum.

of morality

is

358

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

entelechy are connected in such a


is

to

that to assert the former

equivalent to asserting the latter, and to deny the latter

In this sense vitalism

deny the former.

to morality

How

is

"

"

I feel

morally

is

the high road

morality would be an absurdity without

could

/ knew

if

way

it.

towards other individuals,

that they were machines and nothing

more

machines, which some day I myself might be able to construct like a steam engine
To a convinced theoretical
!

materialist,

whom

to

system, morality

his neighbour is a
an absurdity.
This

is

mechanical

real
is

true,

equally

whether materialism be held as a doctrine about nature


from a point of view which
at

logical

bottom,

metaphysical
theory of
avail to

or

life

professed

manner.
is

assume

In

as

the form of that which

siders

objective

the

in

crudest uncritical

When
human

"
"

appearing

under the form


"
"

an author

feels

categorical

existence

axiom, even if

to

it

of

in

morally and con

relations morally

It is

of

in spite

his

he unconsciously
very strange to see what an
life,

up
enormous confusion of thought generally prevails in
There might be vitalism without morality

gives

appear

not wholeness but aggregation

materialistic conviction with regard to


his materialism.

no

It is of

that there might be

wholeness can never


is

mechanical

the

case

either

some have done

of a mechanical system

and phenomeno-

idealistic

incompatible with morality.

a something non-mechanical

per definitionem.

is

morality

this region.
;

but the

implies vitalism

were not yet established

Inj

as

an

oilier proofs.

But enough about a problem that does not strictly belong


The main reason for our discussing morality

our subject.

has yet to be mentioned.


1

This was also our argument against psycho-physical parallelism, see

p.

289.

PART

IV

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

OUR whole argument has rested so


phenomenalism we have analysed
;

is

certainly

my

phenomenon.

far

upon pure

were

concepts

it

In this sense, forces and

entelechies were agents in nature as part of

they

idealistic

the Given so far as

to

auxiliary

the

my

Givenness,
of

understanding

Givenness.
Is there really

no way to escape from phenomenalism to

something absolute, to

"

metaphysics,"

not exclusively

that

is

to say,
"

to

And

something that

is

what does

our argument amount to on a metaphysical

basis
It

all

"

my phenomenon

seems

to

me

that there are three possibilities, three

I might say
though dim windows only
able to see that there is such
which
at
we
are
least
through

windows, as

a thing as absoluteness.

By no means do

I believe that I

am

"

able to

We

absoluteness in the proper sense of the word.


"

"

prove

the inconceivable.

intelligibility

would not

in

the

sense

be absoluteness

And
of

prove

cannot

absoluteness implies un-

provableness,

but phenomenality.
359

"

otherwise
I

it

know very

360

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

well that the whole of Givenness

my

is

Givenness, whether

immediately perceived or conceptually transformed, that

all

sensations are mine, and all feelings and all concepts and

with regard to me, and I


know nothing else about it. In so far critical
properly
But to adhere to this
subjective idealism is quite right.
"

All of this

categories.

"

is

"

"

idealism implies the renunciation of understanding altogether,

There are three

at least in three fields of phenomenality.

regions of phenomenality which never will form part of

any

true system of Givenness, unless the bounds of idealism are

But they only can be broken with regard

broken.

"

fact of something which


to the Ego,

glass

is

room with windows of ground-

just as from a

we may

perceive the

outside without

in

to the

not exclusively with respect

"

"

"

fact

that there

any way what

knowing
Thus we are able at least

to

is

something

it is.

approach the realm of that

which alone deserves the name of truth with regard to being.


The word truth in this sense, of course, signifies something
"

"

very different from what

is

called

so in logic

and mathe

matics, logical and mathematical truth being only the validity

of relations with regard to a subject.


1

Of

course, even the

words

tively in this connexion.

This book
.to

"something"

If not,

the

and

"is"

"Absolute"

are only used figura

would not be

absolute.

not the place for any attempt to pursue this problem further.
Logical and mathematical truth is certainly "absolute" as to its validity
long as there exists a subject like the human mind (comp. the very suggestive
is

address delivered before the Third International Congress for Philosophy,


But it falls to the ground with the existence
Heidelberg, 1908, by ,T. Royce).
of the subject,

and

for

this reason,

though

"absolutely

true,"

it

is

not

In modem philosophy the theory of


metaphysically.
validity has overshadowed the theory of being.
"absolute

truth"

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
a.

361

THE THREE WINDOWS INTO THE ABSOLUTE


Morality

Thou

one of the windows to absoluteness we have

is

Morality

the

For morality towards phenomena or amongst


spoken about.
which
are merely
to my Ego
phenomena
phenomena
"

"

exclusively would
absoluteness,

dependence

be absurd.

independence

is

the

sense

the

Ego

of

"

the

me

in

any

"

"

Given."

in

Reality

in

detail.
"

not identical with

is

this

though

absolutely unintelligible to

Absoluteness in this sense


in

Morality therefore implies

of

"

reality

that

sense

remains a constituent of phenomenality and only means


that a certain domain of

it is

Reality in this

objectified.

the
nothing but the product of a certain category
But
to
forces
us
category subject-object.
morality
regard
sense

is

Givenness, or at least part of Givenness, as a

something
to

the

Absolute.

absoluteness
It is
field of

be accomplished

to

is

In

importance

morality

conceive

"

Thou."

here that history acquires

moral acting.

which

with regard

by acting

conceiving

I conceive the

field in

its

importance, as the

It is here that its general emotional

may become

clear.

is

History

not

made

of

any special scientific importance by this consideration, but


quite in general it proves to be the groundwork of morality
;

morality in general

being,

of course,

independent of the

specificity of historical constellations.

The Nature of Memory

The second
by the

fact,

"

window

the

Ego
"

into the absolute

is

constituted

already mentioned on a former occasion, that

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

362
there

such a thing as the unity of subjective experience

is

general and of

in

memory

in

particular

in other words,

the fact that not only self-consciousness itself endures, but


also

something that

an unconscious or supra-

to prove the absolute existence of

conscious
of the

what
say
It

conscious

is

is

more than

the reality of one moment.

to assert

does not imply that the Ego

Ego

Phenomenalism

Ego.

kind would only allow us to regard as reality


But to
present to consciousness at one moment.

strictest

"
"

of the

basis

This tends

presented to consciousness.

is

But

creates substances.

is

"

the

for

substance,"

implies the whole of past

it

experience in a partly latent state and therefore implies


absoluteness

in

general

which, of course, must remain

quite unintelligible again, since the


its

Ego could only explain

nature by means of the categories which in fact are

its

outcome.

The Character of Givenness

The

last

window

into

the absolute

the It

the contingency

is

immanent coherence

of immediate Givenness and the

of the

Let

single phases of Givenness in spite of its contingency.

the reason of immediate Givenness be what

the conscious Ego,


out of myself ;
indifferent to,

And

yet

it

my

is

not

very often

create

contrary

is

immanent

it

to,

coherence

I,"

consciously

or

at

least

between

the

immediate Givenness nevertheless, even

these phases are interrupted by sleep or

absence, or

may,

will.

there

single phases of

do certainly

as

"

it

else.

by

my

if

temporary

stone happens to begin

by something
I see it, then turn away for
from a high mountain
the stone in every case
a moment, and then look again

to fall

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

363

has arrived just at that point in space where I expected


find

it;

interval

in

to

broken by an

contingent Givenness, though


its

responsible for

it,

immediateness,

nor are the

Therefore, to put

it

"

one.

is

am

"

"

categories

briefly

the

not

"

responsible.

contingency

the

of

immediately given phenomena, as far as their non-aprioristic


part, that is to say, as far as

come
of

into account,

contingency in
ness with regard to the
there,

"

sensations

or

"

"

presentations

combined with the immanent coherence

this

now

"

now one

itself,

tends

to

prove

absolute

now

here and

"

"

"

It

It."

is

thing and now another.

with respect to the Ego,

it is

true

This

but not by

a?-

is

all

from

the

Ego.

Our
general

third class of facts that

now

calls

for a

show us absoluteness

further short

analysis before

in

we

resume from a new point of view our study of universal


teleology.

/5.

Immediate

THE

"

Givenness

sensible

"

POSTULATE
is

the

material

the

categories establish
categorical system has to work with
axioms with regard to this material and thus render it a
;

system
that

itself.

the

Ego

In the
is

first

place,

must now be added

it

not content with axioms with

Givenness, but from the very beginning


postulates concerning

some most general

it.

notions,

That

is

to say

regard to

also forms
:

the

some

Ego forms

which are by no means absolutely

1
A complete theory of the Absolute would have to consider in this
of nature, expressed in the
connexion what are generally called "constants
These
relations
form of
say the sixes of electrons and atoms.
"

quantitative
constants are "contingent" with regard to the reasoning mind
matter might reduce them to one or two constants.
;

a theory of

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

364

axioms

inevitable, as

the

that

but which are required in order


actual

knowledge may be selfhave mentioned the most central one of

range

We

consistent

are,

our

of

whilst dealing with our first proof of


can work experimentally only with a few
eggs of the sea-urchin, but we postulate that what holds
for one holds for them all.
This postulate is by no means
these

postulates

vitalism.

We

with the

identical

if

"

or

of univocality

in

relation

The axiom

individuality.

even

axiom

whether

determination,

true

"

of

to

necessary
or

causality

would remain

univocality

our postulate were given up.

eggs of an animal behaved quite differently,

to

two

If ever

we should not

circumstances being equal different things had


the circumstances were not
happened but we should say
that

say

But we

equal.

not say

postulate that nature

constant

"

of typical

"

when

in itself that

many

the

between

distinction

aprioristic

phenomenon

of experience, of

The

postulate

categories

in general

"understanding":

to the

relates

apparent contingency
in the contingency

it

it

most important
postulate and the

as

science.

they set up scientific tasks.

Given

in

its

As

specificity
is

all specificity

it

is

to the possibility

and contingency of immediate

See vol.

Modern empiricism, economism, humanism, pragmatism,

may

and

uniformity

a question of induction

i.

the

they are the prerequisites

induction enlarged ideologically with regard

of

The

such, relate to

maintains that there


is

will

It is

this

axioms should be most clearly understood.

axioms, based upon the


(liven as

number

have been found to

cases

be actually in connexion with them.


that

a certain

do

there most probably

features are present

be also those, which in

so uniform

is

page 148.

be called, has always confused axioms with the

]x>stulate.

or whatever it

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
Givenness tends to prove the Absolute,
uniformity of nature relates

365

the postulate of the

to absoluteness itself.

TELEOLOGY AND THE ABSOLUTE

7.

The Concept of a Limited Teleology once more

We

have said before that applying the category of


individuality or teleology to all Givenness forms at least an

and we have raised the question whether


distribution of specific qualities of matter and of

unending
the

task,

and geological formations on earth, or


distribution of sidereal and planetary masses

specific geographical

the specific

might some day be found to have some purpose, either in


And we did not absolutely
itself or at least for man.
in
that
also
some
deny
history
unity might be found in the
future.

The

teleology

now

calls for

what we

of

problem

called

some further elucidation

"

limited

"

in the first

place.

How

into the Specific of immediate

far

teleology possibly go

Granted that there

Givenness does

is

at least of the statical or constellative type

distribution of matter

and

the welfare of organisms

go

Does

singularities
teleological

it

possibly

it

be

how

far does this

extend

purposefulness

most minute

one universe
"

contingency

deal

the

Then the whole universe would be one


Nay then only would
unity in every detail.
throughout.

of

Only then would there

whatever.

But have we any reason


good

to

"

be no

in the specific

sidereal masses with regard to

"
"

purposefulness

supra-personal

to

assume

even granting a

individuality

that

it

the word that a week ago


purposeful in any sense of

is
it

o66

SCIENCE

AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

rained for five minutes, or that this morning I

met

three

dogs of a certain colour, or that a particular stone shows


certain irregularities on
I

think

universal

would care

teleology,

arguments

as

far

anybody, even

hardly

as

surface

its

this,

that

inclined

if

to

push
to

is

"
"

immediately

historical

singularities.

his

hypothetically

intelligible is absolutely

regarded as an

We
before,

and

if

wanting

outcome of

have discussed

the

accept

teleological

up to
Teleology must be
say,

right

at least intelligible by analogy in order that

admitted

to

reason

it

for

may be

its

being

any event whatever

is

its control.

this

problem of a

"

"

limited teleology

though not in relation to the very immediateness of


In fact, man is only able to judge about external

the Given.

purposefulness according to his

purpose of

man

is

intellectuality

are perhaps the same


is

own

purposes, and the highest

and morality, both of which


But the universe

in the last resort.

not perfect with regard to morality and intellectuality

throughout, and therefore cannot appear to us as teleological

Perhaps we may say that it is purposeful so


allows of the moral and intellectual perfection of

throughout.
far as it

the individual man, that

it is

a sort of moral and intellectual

That would agree with certain doctrines of


Indian and Christian philosophy it would also agree with

institution.

the

metaphysics

of

the

last

great

moral

philosopher-

Schopenhauer.

we may say hypothetically, summarising


same time what we have said before There are

Thus,
at the

I believe,

probably domains of

at least past

tions in the universe, both inorganic


organic.

The harmony

in

eutelechian manifesta

and supra-personally

nature, statical at

present, is

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
But the universe

their result.
detail a

system

teleological

unable to conceive

as a

it

"

is

"

universe

apparently but really.


constellations in the

throughout.

In other words, real teleological


discoverable

if

Inorganic
a mutual

relate to

at

to

all

different

harmony among

with special reference

classes of events

is

There

non-teleology, in the universe, not only

contingency," i.e.

would only

human mind

at least the

"

in every historical

not

is

367

organic

life

in

general, but would not apply to this particular event at this


Problematic real teleological
particular time and place.

would only

constellations in history
of the

human mind, but

It

is

very important in this connexion to notice well

that even in
individuality

the
is

field

only

known

this individuality
details

relate to general types

not to the single personalities as such.

to us

where dynamically

effective

in the biological individual

seems not to be concerned in the minutest

the single

cells

of a tissue are not as such a really

essential constituent of organisation.

And

another point

is

very important also

wherever the

category of individuality extended so far into the details


as to submit everything that

immediate

manner

control

of

at least to

an

happens in any system to the


entelechy

some such control

would either be no room for causality


least,

or

would always be posterior

at

in

in
2

all,

the

the past, there


or causality, at

to individuality.

not imaginable that individuality

dynamical teleology or entelechy

is

statical

actively

at

But

it is

work

as

or has been at work, if

We

have said before that the contingency of immediate Givenness tends


This concept of the contingency of
of absoluteness.
immediate Giveuness, of course, must not be confused with the concept of the
1

to

show us the

"fact"

contingency or non-teleology of "ideal nature."


2
This would be the mistake of the materialists, only made from the other
side!

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

368
it

nothing to work with.

finds

wants

It

"

means,"

and

matter including spatial causality is its means


in the
manner we have described. Thus, in fact, as we have said,

by no means destroys but implies causality


would be an impossibility without it it interferes
or

individuality
it

has

with

interfered

and

here

causality

there,

but not

everywhere.

The Domain of Teleology

At
to

this point

what we have

we

shall apply our results about teleology

learnt about the Absolute.

was known already to Kant that our faculty of creating


a real
of immediate plienomenological Givenness
system
It

"

"

proves a certain sort of correspondence between the active

and the passive part of experience, between categories or


rather ontological prototypes and sensible Givenuess itself.
"

"

For sensible Givenness might be imagined


special order at all.

In this case the mere

determination

would be awaked by

to allow of

any

concept of

univocal

experience in the mind, but there


of

substance

categories

But

or

causality, for

would not even be a

causality

or

field

substance as

would not be awakened by a chaotic Givenness.


most general question does not affect our

this

bio-theoretical

narrower
It

to be such as not

problem as such.

Let us therefore turn to a

field of analysis.

would not be impossible

only the category

would be wanting

of

to imagine a world in

substance were

in such

a world.

which

change
would not be

applicable

And

it

impossible to imagine a world deprived of entelechy but

endowed with causality


such a world

there would be no organisms in

the only realm of the category of individuality

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
would be

my

But there

mind.

individuality not only in

That

to say

is

my

true causality

is

system most

this fact relates to absoluteness

whenever

Might we say perhaps that there


physical basis both of
"

But

understand

let us

This

fully.

contingency and coherence

able to

and true

Ego but in the world as

it is.

sensible or immediate Givenness corresponds

to the categorical

in its

369

is

specific

tends

to

exists a

fact,

and

Givenness

absoluteness.

common meta

immediate Givenness and of our being

"

it

come back

by means of the

categories

to our theme.

Certainly, individuality does not govern

Givenness in

But the contingency of the universe


every
certain domains does not exclude
non- contingency
detail.

others

certain

in

the

organisms

and

possibly

in

in
in

some

other constellations.

What

does that

we know

that

mean with

regard to the Absolute,

show us

that objectified Givenness tends to

something about the Absolute ?


In the first place we have a factual right

to say

now

where-

ever the reasoning mind finds organic living individuals,

it

finds objectified active reason or active reason as its object.

Absoluteness in this respect therefore must be such as

some
Or,

if

unintelligible

we

to be

in

connexion with something like reason.

prefer to say so

*
:

absoluteness must be such as

become part of our phenomenological Givenness under the form not only of causality, substance, and
to be able to

inheritance, but also of individuality,

And

in the second place

i.e.

we have

objectified reasoning.

at least a hypothetic

The following formulation is probably more "Kantian" than is usually


Kant was not an "idealist" to the extent that Schopenhauer
2. Aufl., 1908.
Coinp. Riehl, Der philosophische Kriticismus, i.,
supposed.
1

admitted.

24

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

370

right to speak of certain constellations in givenness, other

than organisms, which are


statical

it

It

is

true,

of a

the sense
this

harmony

is

a teleology of constellation, of being, not a

is

teleology in

One

nature.

harmony of

statical,

in

teleological

becoming

as

the

teleology in

organisms

state of this statical teleology leads back to

an

is.

earlier

which again leads back, and so on, one of these states


At least we know
following from the other mechanically.

state,

absolutely nothing about any real entelechian non-mechanical


act in the sphere of the Inorganic.

THE PRIMARY ENTELKCHY

8.

IX

AN

THE UNIVERSE

ETERNAL TASK OF SCIENCE

But does not

this

hypothetic statical harmony

among

certain domains of nature point back to an original primary

entelechy that made


art
in

it

just as the artist

makes an

object of

In spite of the possibility of the indefinite regressus

time that we meet here,

assume

forced to

do not say

this

"of"

seems to

it

primary

me

that the

mind

eutelechy in the universe

the universe

as

soon

as

is
I

a universal

harmony of any kind is accepted. This primary


entelcchy would not have created absolute reality, but would
natural

have ordered certain parts of

would show a

and these parts therefore

it,

sort of non-contingent constellation whilst all

other constellation

of

the

elementalities of

the universe

would be contingent.
This
v\rj

"

is

and

downright
i/ouv.

Dualism,"

But how

are

the old distinction between

we

to escape dualism

when

even the categorical system of relations is dualistic through


out ?
Passive Givenness also shows us causality and

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

371

entelechy strictly separated, and whenever Givenness tended


to absoluteness, 1 absoluteness

would do the same.

It is

true that metaphysical


assumptions about the unity of the
Ego might seem to guarantee us the possibility of monism,"
"

but as soon as the Ego becomes active, it evolves its


unity
into manifoldness and therefore is unable to discover monism
anywhere.

In the sense of a primary entelechy of order of

constella

tion in the world, as a 877^01^709 in


opposition to
"

the

material,"

of

concept

eternal task of science

God

therefore

mere
as

appears

an

unintelligible in the last resort, as

religions maintain, and only approachable by analogies,


For it only is through ground-glass
like all absoluteness.
all

we are allowed
we only know the fact of

windows, as
absoluteness
absolutely

know

it

were,

scientific

"

"

look into

to

the Absolute

whilst bound to our categorical system,

quite vaguely the

Thus

that

"

how

"

we only

of the Absolute.

"
<(

natural theology

is

task, but in no other.

possible in the sense of a

There certainly

is

thing that appears to us as reason in Givenness,


1

To be

quite clear

The problem

some

viz.

the

of the contingency or non-contingency

or limited non-contingency of the universe, and further, the problem of the


primary enteiechy in the universe, relate to Givenness as a conceptual
phenomenon ID. the first place. In this field in opposition to Kant a clear

and satisfying solution of the problem is possible the Kantian


are immanent, and are probably soluble in the immanent field.
is
quite a different problem whether and how far the solution
;

"antinomies"

It,

of course,

relates to

any

thing absolute. Or, to speak in jterms of theology the physico-teleological


proof of God, or anything like a God, may be decisive with regard to God as an
but it is quite another problem whether or
entelechian factor in Givenness
not the decision arrived at here relates to the Absolute. This then is the most
:

all the difficulties and obscurities with regard to the


important thing
Absolute are not proper to the problem of a
primary entelechy" as such,
but come upon the scene as soon as any attempt is made to refer any
Characteristics of Givenuess whatever to the absolute sphere.
Comp.
:

"

page 321, note

1.

372

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

organisms

know

and there probably

more reason than we

speak in most
the distribution of primordial matter and

decidedly,

general terms,

is

viz.

the

harmony,

or, to

velocity.
"

Certainly, the

"

primary entelechy that natural science


allows us to assume hypothetically, and epistemology allows
us to refer by analogy to absoluteness, remains far behind

any conception of a perfect absolute Being that man is able


to form in his mind.
But it does not contradict l the con
cept of

God

as formed by the reasoning imagination.

6.

On

METALOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

a former occasion

we made

a short excursion into

the theory of knowledge, showing how, on the basis of the


categorical

system,

created, and how

the

concept of an

"natural

factors or

"

ideal

agents"

nature

"

is

are established

with regard to the single actual and possible events in


conceived

Givenness.

Our former

discussion

inorganic nature as well as to the domain of

related

to

life.

In the face of our present metaphysical considerations,


the concepts
ideal nature
natural factors
and
acquire
"

"

"

"

The whole system of ideal


the
of
relations
nature," including
individuality and morality,
would appear as a description by analogy of what is

a somewhat different aspect.

absolute

in

any case the Absolute

described by analogy in this way.

"

is

such that

But

it

may

be
"

"

natural agents

with regard to single events in Givenness, say the

fall

of a

particular stone or the morphogenesis of a particular animal,


But science, and the doctrine of entelechy in particular, most strongly
contradicts any form of so-called
Pantheism."
Rntelcchy and matter are
different and external to one another throughout.
1

"

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS

373

would now appear as what might be called a sort


emanation from the Absolute, as a something that has

of
its

With regard to causal force and


an
such
emanation may actually happen
biological entelechy
before our eyes, as it does in inorganic events and in the
source in the Absolute.

living organisms.

But

it

also

may

have happened,

if

our

hypothesis of an individualised general harmony in nature

In this case the Demiurgus that science allows


to be established as its eternal task would be the highest

is justified.

orrn of all emanations.

In

all

these questions, of course,

the problem of time would appear once more.

But our

"

Science and

"

Philosophy of the Organism

ends here.
1
On a former occasion (page 2dl) \ve have said that the ideal or Platonic
existence of entelechy as a constituent of "ideal nature" does not guarantee
the permanency of the individuals which are the outcome of its manifestation
It seems to me that the problem must remain open in the
iu

any way.

In brief: in^ivtrfwaZ immortality is not provable


sphere also.
but then, of course, neither is its opposite. And a spiritual eternity that is
not individual is beyond our comprehension except in a eery general and un
"

absolute

"

specified fashion

though

this, of course, is

no argument against

its

existence.

CONCLUSIONS

THE ROUTE TRAVERSED

The Science and Philosophy


tried to analyse what is implied
"

have finished our

of the

in these

justified

Have we

of analytical studies

common

words,

task, to the best of our ability.

The science and the philosophy


?

we have
and now we
"

Organism

this

is

"

and

"

really

really undertaken two different kinds


It is true

sea-urchin seems at the

the development of the

first

glance rather remote

from the concept of categories and morality and universal


it
teleology, and thus
might seem, as many modern
philosophers maintain, as
really

two

But

if

science and

philosophy were

things, only loosely connected.

there

were

philosophers

in

among them were Leibniz and Hegel

former

who

and

times

did not take

such a short-sighted view.


And I think they are right.
Givenness is One and philosophy is the endeavour to
understand Givenness. Part of Givenness is sensations, part
of

it is

categories, part of

feeling, part of it is

memory,
and there are many other parts. That domain of Givenness
which is formed out of sensations and categories we call
Nature.

It

makes no

whether nature
is,

we

that

is

is

to say,

it is

logical difference,

it

seems

studied with regard to what

what

really

try to discover which

happens in

it,

it

to

me,

actually

or whether

elemental parts of our mental


374

METAPHYSICAL CONCLUSIONS
organisation
"

nature

"

come

means

into play in conceiving nature

and what

in the sphere of metaphysics.

The

first is

But

in the last resort there

knowledge.

375

generally called science, the latter philosophy.


is

only one kind of

human

INDEX
Absolute, the, 359 ff., 368 ft.
Acclimatisation, 12, 24 f.
Act of volition, origin of, 62 f.
Action, 33, 52 ff., 193f., 231
analogies to, 77 ff.
of apes, 107

59

criteria of,

66

ff.,

definition of, 54
degrees of, 106ff.
distribution of, 57

ff.

295,

Affection of entelechy, 228


of psychoid, 231 f.

Brain, centre,

275

43, 86, 159, 201

83 f., 255, 297


Art, works of, 133, 138
Asher, 89
Assimilation, 242, 245 ff.
Association, 58, 64 ff., 97
Atwater, 166

f.,

206

92, 136, 233,

Carnot,
ft

.,

266

Ill

80

f.,

88,

ff.

Axiom, 301, 364

different types of,

of

Givenness,

171
185 ff., 192, 232

finalis,

315

f.

Causality, 154, 156ft ., 161 ft ., 233, 286,


296, 306 f., 316 ff., 335

Cause, 158, 233, 317


Centre, brain, 4, 27, 33, 87, 95
lower brain, 102ff.
Cerebral physiology, 89 ft.

Autotropism, 13
Avebury, Lord, 109

97, 99, 103, 107

f.,

63

59

ff.,

78

117, 277

ff.

ff.

102

S.,

Categories, 296ft

Causa

Basis, historical, of reacting,

f.,

ff.

Catalysis,

50, 71 ff,

life,

330,

spheres, 93 f.
Hraus, 96,
Bredig, 186
Busse, 74 f., 114, 218, 295

107

Aristotle,

of

328,

27, 33, 87, 95

4,

lower, 102 ff.


relation to elements

Ants, 109

Autonomy

318,

connecting function, 91 ff.


functions of, 89 ff., 96 ff.

ff.

"

j>ri<,ri,

313,

Bois-Reymond, E. du, 85, 255


Boldyreff, 113
Boltzmann, 200
Born, 95

Animal intelligence, 57
Answering reaction," 72, 104
Antinomy, 304, 321, 371
of),

305,

332
Berkeley, 117
Bethe, 27, 96, 102
Bodies, classes of, 146

f.

Action and reaction, principle of, 227 f.


Action system, 21
Adaptation, 143, 229
functional, of nervous system, 54, 278

.1

f.

Bechterew, 94, 167


Becoming, principle of, 171 ff., 200
and entelechy, 176 ff.
Bees, 46 f., 58
Bergson, 66, 74 f., 99, 114, 280, 292,

of invertebrates, 109
lowest forms of, llOff.
mechanisation of, 55

Apes (acting

107

Becher, 78

f.

75

ff.,

Basis, elements of, 80,

f.,

Chain-reflex, 29, 40

102

f.

Chemistry, physiological, 247


Christian philosophy, 366

377

f.,

ft

254

f.

SCIEXCK AND PHILOSOPHY OF THK ORGANISM

378

Chromotaxi*, 24
Clausius, 171

Energy, supposed vital, 167


transformations of, 174 f.

198

f.,

Clifford, 126
Cohen, 302, 309
Connecting function (of brain), 91 ff.
141 f., 294, 320
Consciousness, 37 f.,
Constants, 202 ff., 363
Contingency, 352 f., 363, 365 ff., 371
Continuity of life, 181, 221 f.
Co-ordination, 29 f., 51
Correlation, non-causal, 157
Correspondence, individuality of, 66 ff.,
80, 85, 88, 103
Criterion of acting, first, 59 ff.
second, 66 ff.
union of both, 75 ff.
Crustacea, 112
10f>,

Crystals, 133, 146ff.

Cumulation, 118
Cuvier, 328
Darwin, Ch., 42
Darwinians, 36, 106
Darwinism, 353 f.
Death, 184, 261 f.
Definition of action, 54
of instinct, 38 f.

of organism, 338 f.
Degrees of acting, 106
Demiur^us, 371, 373

Engramma,

f.

catalysis, 186f.

causality, 161

ff.,

235,

31t>f.

chemism, 181 f.
constants, 204
divisibility, 257
energy, 164 ff.
inorganic world. 161

153

ff.

264

ff., 266
284
and localisation, 258
and mechanics. 208 ff., 218 ff.
order of, 150 f.
primary, in the universe, 370 ft.
ami substance, 238 ff., 256
Epiphenomenon, 288
Equilibrium, 149, 175 ff.
Errera, 184
Evolutio, 154
Evolution. 120 f.
Exercise, 55
Experience, 25 f., 32, 54, 56 f., 60,
107, 110 ff., 113, 140 f., 301
Explaining, 206, 324 ff.
Extensity, 241 f.

justification of,

ff.,

ff.,

64,

Fechner, 351
f.

303

f.

Fertilisation.

230

Finality, 31 3

f.

Development, 189fT.

Fitting, 10

Differentiation, 192f.
Directed agents, 11

Forma

245

Flourens, 102

Divisibility (and entelechy),

Freedom, 154

257

Functional

304

f.,

adaptation
system), 54, 278

f.

of thinking, 151 f., 297


Ehrenfels, 343
Elastic after-effect, 78, 99
End of life, 260 ff.

357
f.

Geisuler. K.,

ff.,

202

218

308

sensory nerves, 84

nervous

Giardina, 102, 105


Givenness (the Given), 125, 201 ff.,
267 ff., 28 1, 283 f., 292, 306 f., 32 Iff.,
355 f., 359 f., 362 ff., 368 f.. 374 f.
Olaser, 56
God, 371
Goldschmidt, V., 353
Goltz, 6, 58, 72, 87, 103 f.

159, 162ff.

potential, 163f.
principles of, 158ff., 195ff..

(of

Geotropism, 10

Energetics, qualitative, 208


Energy, catenation of, 175ff.
of,

f.,

physiological. 144

Economy

and entelechy, 164 ff.


intensity of, 172 ff., 177

149

Function, mathematical, 303, 314

Dualism, 370

conservation

essential is,

France, 16

ff.

Dissipation, 171, 174f., 181


Diversity, 160, 176
of distribution, 191 ff.

95

320, 335

ff.,

Fatigue, 55, 78

Descent, theory of, 262 f.


Determination, univocal, 153

specific, of

205

ff.

Descartes, 222

Dissimilation,

177,

122

98,

Entelechy, 137

and
and
and
and
and
and
and

f.,

ff..

92,

Haberlandt, 10
Hnnel. E.. 42

INDEX

3T9

Harmonious equipotential system, 189 fl


Kelvin, Lord, 171, 225
310 f., 333
Kinnaman, 106
Harmoiiy in nature, 348 ff., 353 f., 370, Klebs, 330
Hartraann, E. v., 142, 222 f., 302, Klein, A., 75
308, 318
Knowing and willing," 140
Hauptmann, C., 89
Korschelt, 96
125
f., 138, 213, 302, 374
Hegel, 118,
Kries, v., 74
.

"

ff.

Heidenhain, 4
Heliotropism, 10

Lamarckism, 36
Langley, 95
Leclair, 295

Helm, 172
Hering, 87
Hertz, 21 5 f.
Heterogeneous induction, 12

Leibniz, 117, 297, 374


Lewandowsky, 89, 104

Historical basis of reacting, 59 ff., 78


97, 99, 103, 107 f., 117, 277 ff.

Life,

f.,

different types of, 63 ff.


elements of, 80, 107 f.
History, 117 ff., 344 f., 353. 357, 361
Hobhouse, 106

Immortality, 373
Indian philosophy, 366
Individualised stimuli, 41, 43, 66, 72 f.,
101, 232
Individuality, category of, 296 ff., 310 ff.,
f.

80, 85, 88,


;

f.

Innate ideas, 44
Instinct, 33, 35
definition of,

ff.,

38

83

f.,

109

f.

f.
i

regulation of, 46 ff.


stimuli of, 41 ff., 48
Intelligence, animal, 57
Intensity (of energy), 172 ff., 177 ff.,
Interaction, category of, 306
psycho-physical, 115 ff., 143, 226

Intra-psychical series, 231, 280

ff.,

202
j

55

f.

16 ff., 24 f., 28, 31 f., 50,


62, 103, 111, 113, 141

Jensen, 176
Joest, 96
Justification of entelechy, 153

266

ff.,

ff.,

264

Machine-theory, 26, 341


MacKendrick, 184
Manifoldness, extensive, 137, 157
intensive, 138, 151, 157, 197, 283,316
Maxwell, 184, 198 ff., 225
Mayer, R., 159
Mayer-Soule, 43
Means, 131, 140, 143
Mechanics, 162, 209 ff.

Mechanism, 283
Meinong, 343
Memory, 78, 279 f., 361
Mental disease, 98

f.

Metaphysics, 202, 294, 320, 359


Metschnikoff, 19
Mimosa, 8

Moment

293

4,

f.,

96, 105,

ff.

Minkiewicz, 24

Japp, 226
Jennings,

f.,

Mach, 126, 206

f.

Inheritance, 181, 221

236

ff.

Locomotory organs, 4
Loeb, J., 15 f., 18, 29 f., 40
230
Lotze, 231, 256, 288
Lubbock, Sir John, 109
Luciani, 105

103
Individuum, 145

ff.

"

ff.,

260

Living substance, 246


Locke, 44, 297

Idealism, 116, 201 f., 292


Identification, 279 f.

335

of,

"

Hofmann, 148
Hume, 297
Hypnotism, 98

of correspondence, 66

end

origin of, 260 ff.


Limits of regulability, 182ft.,

ff.,

284

Kant, 43, 115, 117, 125, 132 f., 141,


143, 257, 297 ff., 302 f., 306, 308,
312, 319 ff.. 332, 344, 368 f., 371

of regulation, 237

Monakow, v., 89
Monism, 80, 283, 371
355

ff.,

and teleology, 355 ff.


and vitalism, 357 f.
Morgan, Lloyd, 41 f., 106
Morphogenesis, 143, 148 f., 157, 191
229 ff.
Movement, organic, 3 ff.
at random, 20 ff.

ff.,

Morality, 119

ff.,

205, 305, 320

ff.,

361
Morality, as a category, 356

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM

380

85 ff., 93
body, 266 ff., 282

Radiolaria, 4
Kadi, 58, 157, 328

Miiller, J., 45,

My own

ff.,

293

f.

Rauber, 147
Nagel, 89
Nature,
116,

321

Reflex, 8

120,

281

ff.,

f., 20, 27 ff., 32,


freely combined, 44

318ff.,

Regulation, 5, 7, 90
of instincts, 46 ff.

ff.

348 ff.
ideal, 324 ff., 372 ff.
philosophy of, 125 ff.
purpose of, 132 f., 344
Necessity, category of, 303
Nemec, 10
Nervous conduction, 4
Noll, 10, 12, 243
320 f.

harmony

in,

182 ff.
237
lU-hmke, 280
limits of,

moment

f.,

44

119

ff.,

236

of,

(of

ff.

196

Retro-differentiation,

Reversion
23 f.

Ontological prototyjie, 319


Ophiurids, 56

etc.)

tropisms,

12.

Rliumbler, 4
Rickert, 288
KL-htiiig reactions, 31, 50, 113, 141

Knbner, 166
96

f.

Ruttloff,

Sameness, 97, 110


Schelling, 125 f., 328

Palagyi, 269

Schneider, 143

Pantheism, 372
Parallelism, psycho -physical,
287 ff., 358
I ara mtci mil, 17
Pauly, 143

Schopenhauer, 45, 125, 305, 328, 366,


114

369

ff.,

Schrader, 58, 103


Schroeder, Chr. F., 49

Schwarz, 218

Pawlow, 58, 113


Pearson, 126, 206
Pfeffer, W., 11
Pfliiger, 103
Phases, principle

100

Relation, categories of, 305


Respiration, 242 ff.
Restitution, stimuli of, 229

f.

Order of entelechies, 150 f.


Organism, definition of, 338
Origin of life, 260 ff.
Ostwald, 126, 206, 235
Oxidation, 242 ff.

f.,

40

Self-motion, 198
Self- purpose,

131

Semou, 98, 122


of,

Sense (of tropism), 11, 23


Sense organs, 4

158, 234

Phenomenalism, 201 ff., 210, 362


Philosophy of nature, 125 ff.
Phonograph, 59 ff., 99
Phylogeny, 346 f., 353
Podmore, 122
Point-are, 319
Possibility, 345 f.
Postulate, 302, 363 f.
Pragmatism, 364

Sherrington, 30

Preyer, 31 f., 50, 56, 101


Propagation, 347 f.
Prototype, ontological, 319
Przibram, 147 f.
Pseudo- psychology, 53 f., 105
Psyehoid, 82 f., 96 f., 116, 139 f., 231
282 f., 293 f., 320, 335
Psychologism, 298 f.
Psychology, 53, 62, 65, 72, 115, 139
231 f., 278 f., 283, 298
Purpose, 130 ff.
of nature, 132 f., 344

Spinoza, 117, 287


Spiritualism, 122, 261

"Shock,"

1.

92

RiphonophorOi 4

288
234
Spaulding, 112
Soul, 285,
Space, 43,

f.

Specific energy of sensory nerves, 84

92,

ff.

95

Spheres (of the brain), 93

f.

Spitzy, 102
Spontaneous action, 85

righting reactions
113, 141

Starfish,
f.,
j

f.,

State, the, 118 f.


Stentor, 24 f., 56
"Stinunung,"

f.,

of,

103, 111

31,

50,

f.

13

Stimuli, individualised, 41, 43, 66, 72

101, 232
of instincts, 41

ff.,

48

f.,

INDEX
Stimuli of restitutions, 229
simple, 41, 66

381

Tropism, 9
Truth, 360

ff.

Strecker, 143

Subconsciousness, 98, 105


Substance, 238 If., 286, 296, 306
as a category, 256
inorganic, 239
"

living,"

246

Uexkuell,

f.

98

344

56

73

Unterschiedsemptindlichkeit," 18

ff.,

of

entelechy,

Systematics (of entelechies), 327

f.

225

Verworn, 176, 292


Vitalism, 43 f., 50, 54, 72
88, 92, 281 ff., 296
Volition, act of, 62 f.
Vulpius, 101

13 ft ., 24, 41
Teleology, 129 ff., 308 f., 335, 343
dynamical, 135 f., 138, 151, 341
ff.,

limited,
statical,

353
135

f.,

365

f.,

151, 341

supra-persoual, 344

340
Telepathy, 122
universal,

ff.

ft

and

ff.

error,"

Walter, 19

Ward, J., 114


Wasmann, 84,

106, 10S

Weber, law of, 12


Weber, Max, 346
Weismann, 36
Wentscher, 221

Theology, natural, 371


Third proof of vitalism, 75, 80
Thorndike, 106 f.
Time, 149, 329 ff.
Transplantation, 95
Treviranus, 45
"Trial

35, 40, 51

"

ff.,

"

Tait,

ff.,

f., 141 f.
Universal teleology, 340 ff.

ff.
ff.

356 f.
action
Suspending
179 ff., 221 f.

Taxis, 8

27

102
Unconscious, 37

Supra-personal factor in historv, 117


"

v.,

f.,

Winterstein, 243
63, 87, 107, 115

f.

Wundt,

Yerkes, 112

23, 56, 113

f.

Zwaardemaker. 166

THE END

Printed by R.

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R.

CLARK, LIMITED, Edinburgh.

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