CHELMSFORD

NORTH GRID
TRANSFORMER
TAP CHANGER
EXPLOSION
7th May 2008
W F Bates
HM Specialist Inspector
HSE

On 7th May 2008 at 12:17pm a

transformer tap changer failed
explosively at the Chelmsford North
Substation and resulted in the death of
Mr John Higgins (the EDF engineer) who
was investigating an operational
problem on the unit.
This image shows the fire coming
through the doorway of the transformer
house, adjacent to the tap changer
compartments, soon after the
explosion.

This is a transformer in a transformer house of the same type at Peterborough.

The three round copper bars are live at 132000 Volts. They connect from the
incoming supply to the vertical insulating bushings that protrude through the roof
of the transformer house from the top of the transformer. The open door is the
equivalent to the doorway shown in the first slide. The transformer changes the
incoming 132000 Volts to 11000 Volts outgoing.

This shows the Chelmsford

transformer with
transformer house
removed, showing the
damaged tap changer
compartments at the end
nearest.

The tap changer is an AEI

ME501 installed in 1970.

This shows the tap changer.

The Selector chamber is towards the
top left with its cover plate peeled
back indicating that an explosion had
occurred within it. The Diverter
chamber is beneath the Selector with
the cover intact. The operating
mechanism compartment is towards
the front.
This where Mr Higgins was manually
winding the mechanism at the time
of the explosion. Burning oil would
have been ejected from the gap in
the tank plate over him as he stood at
the operating mechanism. He ran
from the building through the
doorway behind.

The operating mechanism compartment with

the operating handle at Peterborough.

The Peterborough selector tank above

the diverter tank.

This is the Selector tank at Peterborough. In

the centre at the bottom is the shaft
emerging from the diverter compartment
below. The shaft the passes vertically to the
top of the compartment with an epoxy
resin insert for insulation. Here it splits in
two with one shaft to the left and one to
the right. These shafts then pass to operate
mechanisms to the left and right.
The Tap Changer mechanism is a
complicated collection of gears, operating
arms, shafts and contacts that must remain
synchronised as they move to change
position.

The intact Blue phase selector switches

Yellow phase X switch and input shaft

The Red phase changeover switch was not fully engaged on contact 12 and
was overlapping the contact by approximately 12mm (20mm shown above as
remaining).

 When the blue phase changeover switch seized it caused the

selector input drive mechanism to break. The selector
mechanism to stop part way through a tap change. At this point
the blue phase contacts had not engaged, the yellow phase had
fully engaged, and the red phase contacts had only partially
engaged.
The operating mechanism continued its cycle as Mr Higgins
manually turned the operating handle. The selector mechanism
stayed in its broken partially completed state. The operating
mechanism continued to move the diverter mechanism. At the
end of the cycle the diverter operated to move the load current
from the Y contact to the partially engaged X contact in the red
phase.
This led to the explosion.

Red phase X
selector switch
moving contact.

It is concluded that the explosion occurred because selector

contacts were unable fully to engage following a tap change
operation.
The excessive current loading on the reduced contact area
caused a temperature rise which eventually led to localised
arcing and then rapid decomposition of the oil and spreading
dielectric failure.
This failure to engage was caused by the seizure of the moving
arm of the blue phase changeover switch which in turn caused
slippage or breakage of the epoxy resin drive shafts at two
locations:
The coupling at the output of the Selector input gearbox
The vertical drive shaft that linked the Blue phase Y
mechanism to the Blue phase X mechanism

ERA Technology report summary

Summary
"It is concluded that the explosion occurred because
selector contacts were unable to fully engage
following a tap changing operation. The excessive
current loading on the reduced contact area caused a
temperature rise which eventually led to localised
arcing and the rapid decomposition of the oil and
spreading dielectric failure. This failure to engage
was caused by the seizure of the moving arm
of...phase changeover switch which in turn caused
slippage or breakage of the epoxy resin drive shafts
at two locations"

Incident Management
After the incident the following recommendation was
made.
" All tap changers of this type should be checked for
free motion of the mechanism and integrity of the
epoxy resin drive linkages. Any unusual opposition to
the movement ( as experienced manually or indicated
by a tap change motor trip) should be examined
immediately and no on load tap changing operations
should be allowed until such reports are examined and
solutions implemented"

Subsequent research let to additional

recommendations for EDF
EDF put an exclusion zone around that type of tap
changer elsewhere
The checks of the 4 remaining tap changers should
include,
Check of operation of tapchanger for opposition to
movement particularly around taps 9 to 11 where the
changeover switch operates.
Check for slippage of the mechanism and incorrect
alignment of contacts in selector tank.
Check for signs of damage or degradation of the resin
bonded operating mechanism or linkages that could lead
to slippage.

Robust reporting system of transformer abnormal or

fault situations

Remedial Work - more

Further recommendations have also been made concerning subsequent
findings of remedial work described elsewhere on this type of tap changer.

Check

metallurgy of switch arms

CEGB TDCs and notices
geneva wheels
Integrity of epoxy resin drive linkages

Any stiffness in movement should be examined

immediately
No on load tap changing should be allowed until
work completed
Consider maintenance strategy

Follow Up Actions
Check
All modifications have been completed
Competence of staff in fault and maintenance work
Robust asset management system to schedule and record
work
Operation through full tapping range

Understand
Failure modes
Significance of repeated alarms and malfunctions
Risk of manual operation of tap changers

No on load tap changing should be operated live if

selector or divertor is potentially damaged
Consider maintenance strategy

HSE Prosecution
On 4th January 2013 UK Power Networks (Operations) Limited,
of Newington House, 237 Southwark Bridge Road, London,
was fined 275,000 with 145,000 in prosecution costs after
pleading guilty to breaching Section 2(1) of the Health and
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
After sentencing HSE Inspector Steven Gill said:

John Higgins lost his life in tragic circumstances that could have been
avoided had this activity had been properly assessed and managed by
UK Power Networks.
His death illustrates how dangerous work on or near electrical
distribution networks can be, and how imperative it is that employers
large or small - ensure that all activities involving high voltage
electrical equipment are properly assessed and that safe systems of
work in place.
There is no room for error or complacency when working with high
voltage equipment.

John Higgins RIP

Electrical engineer John Higgins, 59, from Colchester,
was killed at an electrical substation in Bishops Hall
Lane in Chelmsford on 7 May 2008 when a device he
was working on for manually adjusting voltage ratios,
known as a transformer tap changer, exploded.
Regulation 2(1) of Health and Safety at Work Etc Act
1974 .states: It shall be the duty of every employer
to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the
health, safety and welfare at work of all his
employees.

HSL animation
An animation explaining the incident
is available at
http://rnn.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ImageLibrary/
detail.aspx?MediaDetailsID=6241