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21 March, 1944.
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From: The Commanding General.

To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Via: The Comnandi^ General, First Marine

amphibious Corps.
Subject: Combat Report of the 3d Marine Division in
the Bougainville Operations, 1 November

­
28 December, 1943.

Enclosures: (a) Narrative of the Campaign (D-3 Report) -?\u25a0*

(3) Report D-l Section -*>. is
Report D-2 Section -/>

­
(C)
(D) Report D-4 3ection -p. -fo
(2) Report Division Air 'Officer -p- 53
(F) Reoort 3d Marines -r >''
(G) Reoort 9th Marines -.'-- *­ 1

(H) Report 21st Marines -p./

(I) Report 12th liarines -f. i
7*
(J) Reoort 19th Marines -PZ^
(X) Report Service Troops -p.^r
(L) Report Special Troops -cm
(ii) Report 2d aarine *talder's -f 3^X.
1. The Combat Report of the 3d *<iarine Division in the

Operations at impress /tu^usta Bay, Bougainville, British Solomon

Islands, from 1 November to 26 December, 1943, is presented as

a narrative based on the Resorts of the Executive Staff Sections

and the several Administrative and Tactioal Units of the

Division,
which Reports are appended to the narrative as annexes. The

annexes amplify, in detail, the incidents related in the narrative*

2» The purpose df the Combat Report is to establish an

historical record of the campaign* The recommendations and

suggestions for modifications of tactics, technique, organization, ,

and materiel, which are a part of the Reports of Subordinate Units,

are herein included as an essential part of the record Inasmuch as

the cause of a recommendation is an effect of an experience in

combat. m
'
.. ,^

'/fen? k \u25a0'

a. H. TURIIaG^/
DISTRIBUTION: ComSoPac (4)
CliC (10) one (1) Historical Section.
VPhibCorps (2)
IllPhibComs (2)

CTF 31 (2)

MC3 (2)

3d Marines (4)

9th Marines (4)

12th Marines (&)

19th Marines (1)

21st Marines iA\ !!\u25a0\u25a0

3pTrs3dMarDiv
ServTrs3di4arDiv
CGiZxec Staff
File

GROUP 3 'D0..,.;/, . \u25a0

­ \,-
-. -\u0084^i^iK«B(h
70991 FllHni photUofiiW declassified DOD »'« swiw
 • HEnDgJARTERS,
•
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

lURRaIIVS OF THE

-
CAMPAIGN
(D 3 REPORT)

Instructors Iteadinfc thi#,Doctnwnt

(*%e No **—)
Sign Below

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Bougainville Island w^ ?
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Daitish solomon Islands

Islands

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SCALE 1»2>4O tQOO I

 *
DECLASSIFIED
1975
J/i3/rn HEaD'^JARTZRS,

DKtASSIFifI)r
THIRD MaAIUE DIVISION, FL££T M*Ai;i£ FOxiCS,

—-\u25a0
NARRATIVE OF THE C*MP*iaH

D-3 REPORT FOR THE OPERATION

*T EMPRE3o AUGUST* B*Y,

BOUGAINVILLE, 8.3.1.
1. PLAHHIHQ.
Preliminary planning by this Division for operations
in the Empress Augusta Bay area began on receipt of verbal in­
structions from the First Marine Amphibious Corps. A formal
directive was issued later as a Letter of Instruction dated 27
September, 1943. By this letter as corrected, the 3d Marine
Division was reinforced by the 3d Def Bn, the 2d Raider Regt
(Provisional) and a number of artillery, engineer, signal, naval,
air and service units. The mission assigned was to land in the
vicinity of CrtPS TOROKIHA. seise, occupy, and defend an initial
beachhead ( to include PURU/tTA ISLiiND and TOROKIIIj* I3LhKD) between
the L»flUI4» and TOROKinA"*RIVERS and approximately Z2SQ yards deep
from CxtPE lOROKIHA. The Division was* to be prepared to continue 1
the attack in coordination with the 3?th Inf Dlv uoon the latter s
arrival subsequent to D day, in order to extend the initial beach­
head and establish long range radars, naval bass facilities and
airfields in the TOROKIPA AREA.
Tactical planning met with several limitations immed­
iately. The transportation made available for the movement of
the 3d Mar Dlv Rein for the initial landing consisted of eight
combat transports and four combat cargo vessels. It would thore—
fore be necessary to transport the Division reinforced to the
area in echelons. Intelligence information regarding the strength,
and disposition of the enemy forces in the iQxiOKll^ jiREh was
meager. Photo study revealed little other than the fact that
the entire area was covered by dense Jungle. On £n?E TQaOKII«a
ltaelf were some signs of activity, but, due to the defiseness of
the growth, its extent and characteristics could not be ascer­
tained. Squally obscure was the site and extent of the swamp
areas immediately inland from the beaches, nor was there any
reliable hydrographlc information obtainable.
Valuation of the eneay strength and known dispositions
on BJUGAIir/ILLS. coupled with the known characteristics of the
TOROKII** oAZtt. fie. the Jungle covered swamp areas, its lack of
roads) brought the conclusion that whatever the defenses tho Jap­
anese had established in tho area, they must be localized and
restricted by the terrain to small detachments; that large rein­
forcements, such as could endanger the landing of the bulk of
the Division, could not be brought to the area readily and
committed, except by sea; that the enemy air power would be em­
ployed in force immediately on our landing.

In weighing these factors in light of the mission, the

tactical plan had to bo based on these considerations:
(1) Include initially at the exoenae of the conbatant
elements, a high percentage of noncoabatant per­
sonnel for airfield site reconnaissance and tho
immediate initiation of airfield construction.

-1­
DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
• _ •
(2) Unload the ships simultaneously in a minimum
of time bo thoy could withdraw.
(3) Obtain maximum dispersal of men and supplies con­
sistent with tactical safety for protection against
air attack.
(4) Be so disposed as to develop without delay a beach­
head in whatever direction ground reconnaissance
dictated after landing.
(5) Be prepared to resist immediately a seaborne attack.,
and/or counter landing.
(6) Provide air defonso of the beachhead as soon as
practicable.
The considerations listed dictated the following
deolsions:
(1) To embark three task units in the ships allotted,
two to be reinforced Infantry regiments of 4
Landing Teams each, and the third basically anti­
aircraft artillery of the 3d Def Bn. With each
of these units were assigned the detachments of
Engineer, *ir, llaval Base, Signal and 3ervice
Trooos whose mission was the Immediate development
of the ;»ir and Haval Base facilities.
(2) To restrict the loading of the shloa to about 500
tons each in order to be able to unload within
five to six hours total elapsod time.
(3) To land all elements simultaneously, combatant
elements covering non-combatant elements.
(4) To seize a broad shallow beachhead, initially,
in order to contain immediately whatever Japanese
defenses had been Installed, to institute vigorous
terrain reconnaissance inland for location of
routes of ingress and airfield sites, and to dis­
perse troops and stores against air attack.
(5) To be prepared to shift elements laterally
without
delay in order, either to reinforce, or to develop
the beachhead to the direction reconnaissance
dictated*
(6) To bo prepared to organize beach and
air defenses
immediately on landing.
(7) To transport to impress
*£usta Bay area the
remaining echelons of the Division as rapidly
as the availability of ships and distance permitted.
The plan as completed divided the equipment and sullies
or toe organization into three categories:
m
- Those items essential to live and fight for ten
days. This included at least ten days rations,
3 units of fire for the weapons embarked,^nd^
fuel for the same period.
Btbtn- SSiflEß^"- - - -°"->:

B Those items required for the continuation of

combat, additional munition*, rations, fuel,
and the engineering tools and equipment for the

C
- development of the beachhead area and airfields*
All other items not Included in * or B.
Category A was to accompany the assault echelon,
Category B vac to be forwarded with subsequent echelons, and
Category C was to remain stored with the rear eohelon on Guadal­
canal pending further instructions. Thus the equipment and supplies
carried initiallycame within the tonnage limitation* imposed for
tactioal safety of the transports.
The plan of landing was to employ twelve beaches, one
per ship, eleven extending west from CLiPg MROKIHA some 8000 yards
and one on the north (inner) shore of FUHU*Jp I?JUnj JP *11 elements
were to land simultaneously, the 3d Mar reinforced by the Raider
Regiment (less one Landing Team) in the right seotor (6 beaches),
the 9th Mar reinforced by one LandlxurXoam (Raider) in the loft
sector (5 beaohes), and on PUKLUIA laLiJip (1 beach). Two groups
of the 3d Def Bn were to land in the right seotor and two in the
left sector. Each combat team was to overrun and destroy all
enemy beach defenses, seise an initial shallow beachhead and
institute vigorous reoonnalssanoe Immediately to the front and
flanks, meanwhile unloading the ships as rapidly as possible and
installing beach defenses, and prepared to shift laterally in
either direction.

2. REHEARSAL.

Teams began embarkation at £Utt&ftfc£ftUab °*

With the completion of the plan of attack, the Combat
313 October, 1943, and
proceeded to ETaTE. flffl jfflHpigg. where complete rehearsal of the
landing was exeouted. The Defense Bn task unit exercised at
fffftPnfcfrftlinl «U foroes rendezvoused enroute to &EMBSUU&
3.
The initial landing was executed as originally planned
but subsequent disposition of tactioal units ashore was precipi­
tated by the faot that stronger resistance than expected was met
on the right flank. Beach and surf conditions to the west of the
KOROMOKIIU RIVER were found to be unsuitable for oontlnued use as
landing beaches (some 70 landing oraft broaohed on these beaohes
D-day) , and ground reoonnalssanoe disclosed that the llUM^»Mlm> ­
PIVj» TiUILarea constituted the main overland access to our vital
beachhead area for the enemy, as it became apparent that no
immediate enemy oontaot was forthcoming on the left (west) flank,
it was deolded to exeoute the redlspostlon of units as previously
planned for consolidation of the beachhead. Therefore, the (2)
left Landing Teams, Ist and 2d Bns, 9th Mar, ware moved in suc­
cession to the right (fast) sector. The right LT, Ist Bn 3d Kar,
wae brought into reserve in the left sector and the oenter LT,
2d Bn 3d Mar, moved to the right of the left sector. As of 5
Hoy 43, the disposition of troops consisted of five battalions
on a limited beachhead line, a battalion in reserve in the left
seotor, a Aaider battalion plus one Co with Aegtl Hq in reserve
in the right seotor, a Raldsr company blocking the PjVA Tftj^fc
beyond the beachhead, and a Raider battalion less two (2) ooapanles
occupying PURIUTj* iaLnHD.

7
 (Cont'd).

the 3d Bn SwiTray,
Before the 9ZbTWav t landed
land Initially on the
left,could be shifted to the right sector,
mated as a composite
an enemy fo?ce
battalion, transported from RABAUL inestl
e 5J r2? er ?» made a counter-landing on 7 Ilov 43,
?left
e5? flank Prompt developmeAt of the
Jußt beyond the
of the beachhead.
employment Snemv
arrived SeSJet
by X Co, 3d Bn 9th Mar, and rapid of the left
reserve battalion (Ist Bn 3d Mar), plus the newly tor
2l8 Bn
destroyed the major portions of the enemy and completely
!!*?&
routed the remainder, so that by the evening of a Uov
« they
no longer constituted a threat to our beachhead
On the afternoon of 8 Uov 43, the enemy made mnt-«nr
with the daider company blocking the
the 3d flaider Bn (less two PJV* ?LIL? oTt \w
oomptnlesJ^lSs^twrcoopanle; 43
of 2d
aaider Bn. four companies in all,
and mortars, and drove the enemy back
attacked,supported by artillery
towards Ply* VlLL«a£ after
a very heavy fire fight. Movement to the
for both flafeTWaT^itrlcted
forces due to deep swamp on each side of the PIvII^XL
On the morning of 10 Ilov 43, the 9th Mar (less 1Bn]
a close support air strike, passed through the Haiders TOTwTna
in
of Bns; found the enemy had withdrawn, occupied PIV* VILLAGE column
and

SiS8
off J?
r imme4la i; ******
The poor coordination and tiaing-oTtEirenemy
at^i^^i*
offensive reaction, caught the Japanese
balance, so that the threat to both or either flank
moved irt the spaoe of three days. In both these actions was re­
artillery

*. -i*
* * The 148th InfCT, having arrived on 8 Nov 43, commenced
1 t
Sf iS'r? 55
on 10 l,ov S
r
Bn 9th l^
K'J^S?
43. The 3d
8 On 9 Wov «5 thle waa comoleted
Mar moved to the right flenk of the
?i^ r BeC 0 p Or t0 tha aUac^ of 10 Nov 43.
inland and ito ri w
the east, thus
The 3d Mar moved
creating a center sector of the
beachhead.
*' * '
On 8 i:ov 43, Ca, IM*C arrived
and, at 1200, 9 Hoy 43, assumed command ofat
*****
SMPRS33 AUSL'STA BAY
all forcesTrTtnat
area, relieving the CO, 3d Mar Dlv as CG, SMPRS33 jkUGPSi* Attk
l^rl^r^t^ vcre'lffT^er^ ia^rcal~
control of CO, 3d Mar 5
2 ac «t
Div until a later date.
L

4J^ Battle
O1 B,vr8 . v
*
J*1 fxception of the engagement of tho 2d Bn
«J
of %jte in^!!
,vr
of the Cocoanut Orbve, near the Junction
j^H, and jy^J W£^ TxUIL across the PIV iivai,
12-1^ i,ovWJ^
43,
subsequent to which the enemy
A

no Indication of enemy strength until 20 Hoy withdrew7"th^rT"waB

During this
period the main attention of the Division was 43.
directed
lng, development of supoly routos under extremely to oatroll­
conditions, and the extension of the beachhead line difficult
in the Div
sector to include the proposed inland air field sites
been selected by ground reconnaissance. which had

elements of
*! 37th Div, U3A, continued to arrive,
*w *._
the
beachhead was extended inland with the 37th Div
tne left (west) sector
and the 3d Mar Div defending
occupying
(east) sector, the right
extension of the beachhead in the 3d I4ar Div
sector was necessarily slow due to:

kcussi ED
ll^^tdwvltlGV^--"
(1) Enemy resistance
forks area,
1 (Cont'd).

in foroe in the entire PIVA H1V251

(2) Extremely swampy ground unsuitable for continued•

occupation, located east of the PIV* aivaa and
south of the £»3T WEST TiUIL and.
(3) The great difficulties encountered in road con­
struction and ingress through swamps for supply
routes to the troops, Special precautions had to
be exercised to the ond that our forces be not
advanced beyond our means of supply and evacuation*
as the beachhead was being extended* Japanese resistance was
developed to the north and east of the PIVA HIYSI forks and north
of the E*3T WEST TRAIL, The first indication of enemy resistance
in strength appeared on 20 Nov 43. This developed into the
BATTLE Cg Ply* rOrtKS which was continued on through 25 Hoy 43 by
the 3d Har, reinforced during the latter phases by elements of
the 2d A&lder Aegt, the 9th Mar, and the 21st Mar. artillery was
constantly employed in increasing force until on 24 lloy 43, seven
battalions fired the preparation for the 3d «tar attack. This
attack destroyed the major portion of the enemy foroe (estimated
as a relnforoed regiment) and completely routed the remainder,
most of whom fled well to the 6ast of the TOaOCH* RIVZR.

On 25 Hoy 43 the Ist Bn 9th Mar and six companies of

the 2d Haider Regt passed through the 34 Mar and, against light
retiring resistance, occupied the hill mass east of the PIVA RIVKR
dominating the EfJR VXBT TRAIL. Reoonnalssanoe to the TcKKSa
SSSM urns initiated Immediately. On 23 Soy 43, the CO, SdTlarDiv
ordered the 3d and 9th Marines to exohange subseetors, thereby
allowing the latter, whloh had been only lightly engaged at any
time so far, to take over an active subseotor and the 3d Mar to
oocupy the relatively quiet sector on the right (south) flank of
the beachhead. This exohange of sectors was initiated on 24 Uov
43 and oompleted 26 Hoy 43. The 21st Mar remained in the center
eubseotor and the 2d Balder Aegt returned to Corps town; The
3d Mar badly depleted by battle casualties, sickness, and ex­
haustion, was relnforoed in Its new seotor by the Ist Bn, 145th
Xnf (Begtl reterw) and other special units.
When reeonnalssanoe disclosed that the enemy was not
oooupying the hillmass Just west of the TOaaciliA RIVER, even
--
though supply and evacuation would be most dimoult, the CO,
3d Mar Dlv, initiated advance to and occupation of that general
line Hills 1000, 600, and 500, and the high ridge running
westward from Hill1000. The first stsp was the occupation of
an OPLR by: the 3d Parachute Bn and units of the 9th, 21st and 3d
Marines, pending construction of amphibian tractor routes for
supply and evacuation through the dense Jungle swamp*. On 10
Deo 45 the three Infantry regiments advanced to and occupied
the FBL without incident. In the meantime, however, the 3d
Parachute Bn, outpostlng Hill1000 and a portion of the sub-
sector to be oooupied by the 2ist Marines, had beoome engaged
with an enemy force, estimated as a reinforced company, strongly
entrenched on the east slope (nose) of HUI 1000. After repeated
attacks by units of the 21st Mar, supported by artillery and dose
air bombardment, this foroe was eliminated on the evening of 18
_
Deo 43. '_. IT^
,*-»

-6­

DECLASSIFIED

 The line above oMoffbed, with minor adjustments,

became the MLR of 3d Mar Dlvs seotor of FBL. The enemy having
fled to areas east and northeast of the TOROK^IjtA RIVES , and
further activities being limited to local and distant patrolling,
deliberate organlratlon of the ground was initiated immediately
together with continued construction of roads and trails over
the swamp and hills of the subs actors. These projects wore 85%
complete at the time of relief of 3d Mar Div by the Amerlcal
Division.
belief of front line elements of the 3d Mar Div
commenced 21 Dec 43 with relief of the 3d d&r by the 3d Haider
Aegt and attached troops, and oontlnued as elements of tho
Jtsdrloal Division arrived at TOftOKIUx. GO, 3d Mar Div relinquished
command of the East Seotor to GO, *merlcal Division at 1600, 28
Dec 43.
Detailed aooounts of the various operations may be
found in reports by organisations of 3d Mar Div, enclosed herewith*
4. COMMSHTB.
The unloading of the ships transporting and accompany-
ing initial landings affects the tactioal plan in numerous ways.
In general there is need for employing, during the unloading

period, approximately 33 l/$2 of the personnel embarked in order

to attain the maximum eff ioienoy possible and thereby to reduce

the unloading time to a minimum, Beoause a oertain percent of

this labor Is performed by naval, personnel who have no combat

mieelona at the moment, tint total result affects the combat

troops to the extent of at least 2%f of the total effective
strength. There are two solutions to this labor problem, the

most obvious one being to transport labor troops whose sole pur­
pose is to handle the details of the unloading. This is not

entirely satisfactory inasmuch as it oauses the landing of elements

which are not suitable for ground oombet at a time when they may

be a hindrance to the operation. Further, their Maintenance and

•apply creates an additional burden on those funotlons without

adding anything to the efflolenoy of the foroe landed Immediately

that the unleadias le oompleteoV The following solution would

also provide the vital labor. When the estimate of the strength

neoeeeary to aocompllsh the oombat mission has been determine!,

the eeatatant unite should have their strength increased tX& in

the ranks of private and private first olaae or organised replace­

ments should be embarked to the strength of 25^ of the oombat

troops. This additional strength would provide the shore party

labor initiallywithout Jeopardising tactioal strength and unity

of ooabat organiaations. Oji the completion of the unloading this

personnel le iismediately available for replacement of oombat

losses, for garrison or other duties, or may be returned to rear

areas in same ships.

When kXA's are employed with the assault echelon, the

shore party organisation should be embarked in «PD*s, LSD's or

-
LST's and accompany the assault. aKA's cannot accommodate suffi­
cient personnel aboard to constitute their own shore parties, and

Afta's.aay accommodate only their own in addition to the Landing

Team embarked, otherwise, the Landing Team suffers such a drain

on its personnel that its oombat offeotiveneM «*4mmVßrefe

mftttfflEfl 10

 • •
wetAsstfe
.. * ,«.
"JYiJJV
?Justif beachhead
led by providing
(Cont'd).

Xan ln§ of •i1 •leaents simultaneously In any

without a Division reserve oan onlybe

the least taotioal unit with a local

reserve, and by Baking detailed plans calculated for the ex­

ecution of a lateral shift of force to Beet unexpected threat.
?lans in this instance were suoh that the time interval provided
*?«£}* JOBBltjiemt of the local reserve would permit a lateral
shift of reinf orolng units to sect the situation. In the execu­
tion of the landing at TQBflgHa the soundness of this plan was

proved, the result being that reserve force continued to be In­

creased in the area of contact during the early phaees of aotlon
there.
The value of the early and continued employment of
Bases* artillery fire cannot be overestimated. It is the one
am of the ground foroee with which the eoaaandor oan influence
the aetlon over his entire front without the movement of troops.
The largest nuaber of batteries possible, consistent with the
sue of the landing force, should be in the initial landing force,

along with the proper artillery heedquartere to Bake centralised

tiro oontrol possible*

tfhero units not ordinarily a part of the Division are

'

attached for a particular operation, these units should be attached

well in advance of D-Day. Shis is necessary In order that both

the Division and special units asy becone acquainted with each
other and execute their initial planning together.
. Without the oonstsnt use of amphibia** an the right

(cast) ecctor of the beachhead, the devslopacnt and final ocou­

paucn of this sector verti have been delayed by at least two

weeks and very probably acre. •Aaphlbs* were the only «esjn of
tr#Mßort that could negotiate the ewaapy areas at all time..
Ftob DJJay on they vere in constant use tor forward displacement
!f!S!^ M *Ad oquMnt, anT?orcvi«ttttion of wounded. To say
that they were "invaluable* would constitute an understatement.
In this ease they wore a vital necessity.
In the seisure of suooescive objeotlvee in Jungle war­
fare the mm ot action usually become broader and broader and

lines beoope thin and overextended to the very Halt of safety

aplnsjtpenete'atlon or infiltration. Under suoh condition* in
tgc moMVUmiiA nsßpsian.
JTlWii ftesaslgn, the following mi
the foiiowins was found to
found to
im th« be the
euo method when contact was imminent:
(a) When reconnaiesanoe discloses
the pretence of
enemy force out front, oontain the advanoe elements
of the enemy with thin lines (division front) and

hit him Immediately with a highly mobile striking

force, well out front, strongly supported by artillery.

it«fc«M« -4~J?X Js* *•!*«*•*

°* for the purpose of eetab-
*» *ree
i

MtJnA oth v *"WUIUUom. svsrything should be

J^ordinated ?to the capture and seisure of the areaneoessary
«2^J?f. W ur 3r
S JJ w?rrJ ttCh "•Wlittw, Initially, the first
priority should
SE^XSL*!* ?*
be
011 1 1
? :, t*l
•
the taotioal situation together with means for
handi ftOttXd *• «»3Loyed for thie pur­

»BS9SS/f/rn

 • •
UcpXU A BiOJC|E|IImp*IQU (Confd).
EJEULft•udinLU
The Jap is not a cross-country fighter. As a general
rule he operate on or near a road, trail, or beach line which

afford him the easiest aeans of ingress, supply, and retreat.

* relatively small foroe oan defend a large area by

blocking the trails until reserves oan be brought up, if required.

Mar Dlv was faced with three mo«t formidable obstacles

--
Throughout the JMPRI33 jiUftUaT* Bi*y operation the 3d
Jap
forces, deep swanp, and dense Jungles. It is believed that seldom
have troops experienced a more difficult ooobinatlon of combat,
supply and evacuation than was encountered in this operation* From
its very inception it was a bold and hazardous operation. Its
suooess was dus to the planning of all echelons, and the indomitable
will,courage, and devotion to duty of all members of all organi­
tatlone participating.

ffTlClirtL*

'i ?':'.<^. ;

J. a. STUaRT

>

DECLASSIFIED
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 • •

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• •
 • •

—a

 *
#

. HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
flCsUl A AAm IN THE FIELD.

lr«wl?flo XlfffII
r V^fHf|(||;G|uloM
I'4
17 March 1944>
REPORT CF STRENGTH
AKD CASUALTIE^TR THZ. OPERATIC AT EMPRESS
BAY,
AUGUSTA 30UGAl:rVTLLE.
1. Casualty figures for this division durir^ the

Bougainville oa^paign were as follows:

KjA WIA
0 WO £ni 0 Enl C WO E, 0 V.O Enl
SpTre r~ 0 3 2 0 31 0 0 1 3 0 35

ServTrs i 0 5
5 2 1 30 0 0 1 3 1
1 55
4 1 79 20 0 378 2 0 15 26 1 472
3dMar
9thMar 1 0 30
30 7 2 125 0 0 3 8 2 158

12thKar 1 0 9
9 3 1 25 0 0 1 4 1 35
19thHar 0 0 4
4 1 0 49 0 0 1 1 0 54

21stKar
TOTAL 15 1 177 41 6 833 2 0 61 58 6 1071

B. Total burials effeottd by this division were ac follows

0 WO Efll 511
Cemttery #1 IS. 0 126 1
Cemetery #2 0 0 16 0
Cemetery #3 11 1 147 0
\u2666TOTAL 24 1 289 1
\u2666TfceM figures include personnel of II4AC, Third Marine
DiYlaion and miso#llaneoug naval units attached for the operation.
9. Total nuab#s of patients evacuated sick were ac follows:
WO Snl
TO 143T
4. Total number of patients evacuated wounded were as
follows:

0 i£ Enl

10 0 256
Losses in non-effectives throughout period of operation:
5.

KZA
MIA 2 0
tI- >? -Wh
61
*
Slok(Evao) 79 9 1431
Wounded( EvaoJjy^C^Sgg
TOTAL 106 10 1925
Died of wounds reoelved in oombat:

4 0 66
7. Average strength present

Auth strength 938

0 WO
735 S5 13676
Enl
93 18006
for
BECLASSIFIED
IS
ENCLOSURE (B)
 altlce by cat:vory against aKra*e ~
(1) md authorized st:\?:i«t:h ( 2} :
(2)
\\- -£- , foil Tot -I
i 1.60 T7oB .98 THJi'
J.A
ok< .vac)
.26
10. OS 14.51 10.46 10.45
.48 .43
I-ixM'ao) 1.2& --»?\u25a0-\u25a0 Iny^ 1.83
.21
3.42
1.07
-
9.68 7.9E
.34
144£1 4 4£
.33
7.93
1.40

C. 8. WITS,
LtCol., U3MC,
D-l.

E!JCLO3UHE (P)

# Ma^/fki
HJT/fr
IHTELLIOE'TCS SECTION, HSAD^UARTtSS,
§^MgkM m WARIMS DIVISION,
TVIRD MAQTW?
i TVrVTHTfiW
MARINE FORC2,
Vt V>r"V MAQTVT SYIRr
FLSST

EMP3SSS AUGUSTA BAY OPERATION,

1. The performance of the Divisional Intelligence Agencies
during the Empress Augusta. Bay operation was, on the whole,
satisfactory." In order to avoid a tedious narration of
trivialities; and mattere of importance to the Division
Intelligence Section only, this report will be oonfinAd to
pertinent comments and r?oommsndatlons«
2. For a resume of enemy operations during the period see
Annex A, "Enemy Operations.
3. Dlv
(a) In g?nerfll the organisation of the section was
Adequate; but it is considered that a reduction of p?r*onncl
in two oi> see *n& an Increase and redistribution in another,
bp.eed on Teble of Organisation strength (B->9B), is
nble. (See following discussion).
(b) Intelligence Pnl,t.
(1) In order to effectively carry out the n«#eflsra*y
olcriopl and administrative funotions of the Int«lllf«*et
Unit a total of six olerks wp« found necesMry, Vht one, at
present authorised, being inadt<ms.te t The distribution 9t
the clerks should b? as follows:
Combpt Intflligenoe
--
Language
Reproduction and Photography-
Public Relations
- 3
1
1
1
The four clerks at present authorised for the API unit art
neoeeeary, one being suffioient. Therefore a net in­
not
crease of one clerk over the authorised allowance for th*
eootlon is recommended.
(2) Based on experience gained during the opera­
tion, it is considered that the liaison offioers are an
invaluable asset in maintaining a continuous flow of infor­
mation between higher and lover echelons.

DECMSSIOE»

DECLASSIFIED
\ %' (3) The lnngurge personnel performed outstandingly
documents. Two epptured documents, «h:n
eneny
In Interrogating prisoners md translatingtrpnslax.a,
\u25\a0; gpve information as to plannrd rnsmy schemes of mnneuv-r
which pernltted our forcre to take cffectlv? counter
men sure e. Prior to the op-rption two rierl iSseona oy
generation Jrpancse) were pp signed to the division
ComSoPac. An Additional one we assigned r.ft-r tn:
lpndlng. The >!isei p-rform:d lnvplupblc work km v

to the division prior to future orerptions

-
le highly r-eoan*nded if ooepible thpt cix be «eelgncd
thrrc to
pnd
be fisslgned to thf Division Intrlllgence Section
one to op ch lnfpntry r?ci^irnt. Except for the r>mplpy­
ment of Nisei «c priditionnl r.rrsnnnel where orrctlcpblc,
it is consid-rsd th»t the lp.nguflge r^rsonnel fluthorlzed
for the Division «r3 pdequpte.
(4) (p) Except for the mpnnlng of Division OPs
r*iich were nonoxietpnt due to th? terrain, it le con­
sidered thrt tho obs-rvere p.t present assigned to the
Division Intelligence Section pr: Inpd^qup.to rrA vlth­
out vp.lue. A veil trrined reconnaissance compr.ny
pttpchc-d to Division Hrpdouprters, «nd under the operr­
tionnl control of D-2 T^nuld hpve proved lnvwlupbl?.
It In etrongly r.a fiomn3 ended thpt the present observers
be eliminpted pnd p^eclpl scout compftny be organized
p.nd mp.de an lntegrpl pprt of tho Division Hgndouprtere
Bpttnllon to o-Dcrrte under the control of 3-2 for the
performing of the following epeolp.l functione.
(1) Amphibious reeonnpleennce pntrole fie
nec^esftry prior to the actual, operation.

(2) Special distant patrol operations

required.

(3) Manning Of Division OPe as reoulred.

(4) As special details to assist organ­
isation oommrnders in the gathering, segregating and
guarding of enemy documents, equipment Mid material on
the scene of oombat operations until proper disposition
of same can be made.
(b) The light tank battalion scout company was
not able to perform its normal functions during the
operation; And it is doubtful if it can be used in its
normal joapa.olty in the South Paoifio Area. It is
recommended, therefore, that the scout company be re*
organised as a speolal infantry rifle company oomposcd
of a company headquarters, three rifle platoons eAoh
of twenty four enlisted and consisting of a platoon
headquarters And three squads; and a normal infantry
rifle company yeapo ns platoon. Sufficient radio per­
sonnel should be included to permit each rifle platoon
-2­

• ...
DECLASSIFIED

«... #
 • •
\u25a0^ \u25a0\u25a0^F Wmluni^atlon while on patrols. The scout company ac re­
organised to be lnoluded ac an integral unit of the Division
Headquarters Battalion; but under the control of D-2 for
operations and training.
(c) irs

(1) It vps found that the personnel authorized for

the Aerial Photo Interpretation Unit was in exoeee of that
required. It la considered that tvo offioers and six en-*
listed (API) plus one clerk can adequately perform the
necessary photo interpretation work for the Division,
(2) After the landing, one API officer was loaned
to the 12th Marines and thereafter one set of each photo
coverage received was forwarded directly to the Artillery
Regiment as quickly ac possible* It was found that by
allowing the artillery organisation to oonduot and follow
through on their own interpretation of aerial photographs
that the delay incident to Division Intelligence personnel
determining targets and transmitting the information to the
artillery was saved* It le strongly reoommended that two
API officers be assigned to artillery regiments for the
purpose Indicated above.
4. &
(a) During the planning phase suitable vertloals,
mosaics and obliques should be made available in time for
complete distribution down to and inoluding platoon leaders
prior to embarkation. Photo coverage received prior to and
during the operation were excellent; but an lnoreased quanti­
ty sufficient for distribution above le highly desirable
prior to the initial landing.
(b) It wae found impossible to pick up enemy positions
in the Jungle from aerial photographs. Except for the de­
fensive positions oh Cape Torokina, at no time were any of
the subsequent enemy defenelve positions determined from
aerial photographs. Artillery targets beyond the beach head
line were determined by noting the gradual lnoreaee in the
uee of tralle and oroe sings aoroee the Torokina River. Due
to the Jungle the great majority of close in *lr searches
requested were neg-tive.
<o) It ie not considered that the taking of aerial
photographs in Jungle areae after landing is of any value
until the enemy has been definitely located In strong
defensive positions. No aerial photo eoverags was reouested
of the situation.
,3 ­
on this operation until D plue 20 daye due to the fluidity

JEtIASSIFIB fJL
DECLASSIFIED
(d) After D plus 20 days # twice weekly coverage of
of the beaoh head ares .was of marked assistance In the trac­
ing and correct orienting of the Increasing road network
within th# beaoh he*d area; and in terrain lntsrpretation.
(c) The Piper Cubs assigned to the artillery for
air spot missions were also used for air reconnaissance
missions and as such were invaluable. It is recommended
thpt Pt least ona flfflfehlblnn ol*ne be r>lrcd under ths
oontrol of ths Division initially. Th?se
planes Capable of operating from vne water, wouxd be avail­
able to the division possibly from D^day. until the estab­
lishing of air fields ashore, thus initiallygreatly expedi­
ting requests for reconnaissance and small photographic
missions. During the early stages of the landing end t>rlor
to the establishing of the fighter strip on Caps Toroklna,
reconnaissance and photographio planes were based at such
a distanoe from' the beach head and performing so many other
missions that on occasions there was an Interval of two or
three days between the reouest for and the fulfilling of a
mission*
6. R
(a) All combat photographers mutt be thoroughly trained,
not only in the technique of taking photogt-rphaj bit alto
what to take. Insufficient pictures of aotual oombat opera­
tions were made.
,fb) The processing of all photographic prints and
negatives should be done by the Division Intelligence Section.
The regiments were not oapablo of p*ooe«slng prints or
developing negatives on the operation due to the lots or
destruction or their equipment upon landing. If all film
liprocessed by the Division Photographio Officer he it able
to maintain a much greater degree of supervision over the
type of pioturVs submitted by the combat photographers and
can issue instructions and orders accordingly. Ruining of
good negatives due to poor processing would also be eliminated
(o) A total of 1587 still photographs and 38,000 feet
of motion picture film were taken and submitted during the
operation.

(d) Prior to the arrival of the reproduction and

photographio trailers, undeveloped film was forwarded to
higher echelons by the first available transportation. After
the arrival of the trailers all photographio ooverags, was
processed by the Division Photographio Officer. The- trailers
were also used to process aerial photo film, a total of 16

<*a . .
- *­
rolls of 9 inoh aerial film being processed. 3,124 9 x 18
J.noh prints were made from film developed.

• itciircsfii
,4

• #
 Thirteen oombat correspondent e (one officer and 12 enlieted)
wrote a combined total of 734 neve artlolee b/»eed on various
notions of the oampalgn. Seven magazine articles, including.
two based on picture sequenoes, were transmitted, A total
of 680 nevs pictures, with complete captions by correspond­
ents, have been transmitted. It is considered that the
performance ejf the combat correspondents during the operation
was highly satisfactory and they continually exposed them­
selves under fire at great personal ride in order to obtain
stories of greater nevs value. Orsat emphasis vas placed
on the forwarding of the initial photographs taken for press
purposes vith the greatest possible apeed.
7.
(a) Sufficient tentage to house the office personnel
was not available until P plus seven days. As a result,
the Intelligence Seetlon suffered extreme difficulty in
fmnot lotting during the frequent rains of the first week,
•ufflt&eftt tentaf e to protect eaulpsient and essential
personnel M*t be made available a* soon as possible After
landing.
(b) In general., Intelligence information vas rsoelved
from lover mnlts with a minimum of delay. All oomsmnloatlon
agencies functioned satlsfaetorifjr throughout the operation
and itit ooneidercd that the prison t agencies of oommunlca­
tlon are ample for normal 'lntelligence requlrments.
(c) The usual local security patrols vere maintained:
at all times for a distance of from 400 to 2,000 yards to
the front. After the establishing of the final beaoh bead
line, eeoh regiment sent a dally oombat patrol to cover
the ar«a in front of the regimental sector for a distance
of 4,000 yards. Zn addition oombat units provided 9000181
recomalssanos patrols to aooomplish missions designated
by Division. Patrol reports vere In general satisfactory
and in some oats* were outstanding* Zn many oases patrol
leaders vere not sufficiently trained or Instructed in what
to look for and hoy to rsport It vith the. result that their
Information was praotioally without value. Zn jungle terrain,
patrols are the only oertaln renns of obtaining definite
information on the terrain to the front; and all unit intell­
igence offie ere and potential patrol leaders should be in­
doctrinated with the fact that aoeurate terrain information
advances. -­
Is almost a vital as enemy Information, especially during
6

flffltt»f/fl>
p{
- -^^^^fc#
AMfAPvW&WBBBF
number of
cpptured
weapons" turnfa^n was
equipment pnd the
unsatisfactory due, It is
considered, to the following conditions:
(a) The persistent Instinct of personnsl to
retain Items as souvenirs even though they had been thorough­
ly Instructed to the contrary *>rtor to' the landing.
(b) The drain on personnel required for supply
and evacuation purposes did not leeve, in organisations,
sufficient personnel to collect, segregate, and guard captured
material on the scene of oombrt.
(o) Transportation problems ovor poor trails
were so aoutc that, due to the demands of supply and evacua­
tion, captured material oould not be moved and therefore
vpB abandoned or destroyed In the Jungle.
(2) It Is considered that the only practicable
method of assuring that captured material, and documents
are not lost, destroyed, or retained as souvenirs is to
have special units, supervised by offlocrs, right on the
scene whose primary miselon Is to gather, segregate, protect
from the clem ants, and safeguard captured material and
doouments until proper disposition 6f same can be made.
Regiments do not have suff latent spare personnel to perform
the above tasks and It is believed that special units sent
down from higher echelons to assist organisation tommandera in
the gathering and safeguarding of captured material would
prove to be of inestimable value. See discussion on special
scout company under paragraph 3 above.

jP*
H.
V TURSON
vtv*cfccv\
Lt.cox, uacc.
> 0-2

•
•fflttHß
• tf
 • •
KMJSIFIED
HJT/Jmh
INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,
THIRD MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.
1 February, 1944
ANNEX NA tt to D-? SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
ENEMY OPERATIONS
I •GROUND.
The Cape Torolcina area was defended on Nov. Ist by the
2d Company, Ist3n, 83d Infantry plus 30 men from the regi­
mental gun company and T one ?smm gun, type 41. Total
strength was 270. On lov. sth the strength of this company
wpB 63 end the company commander, Carat. ICHIKAWA had been
replaced by the CO of the 2d Platoon, a probationary officer.
The Cape Itself was fortified with 19 pillboxes solidly
constructed of coconut logs and dirt. The one piece oi ar­
tillery was located on the Cape. 3each Green 1 (on PURUATA
ISLAND) and Beach Green 2 were defended by a platoon each
and TOROKINA ISLAND by a squad which was later reinforced
by a few Japs who escaped from FURUATA ISLAND. All other
beaches on T<*hlch our troot>B landed were undefended. It
became known subsequently that the enemy hpd based his dis­
positions on an estimate thpt allied forces vould attack
East of CAPE TCROKINA and West of CAPE MUTUPSNA.
On D-day, 1 November, as our landing boats rounded
PURUATA ISLAND on their way to 3epchee Blue 1, Green 1, and
Green 2, they were taken under cross fire by machine guns
on PURUATA ISLAND, TOROKINA ISLAND, and CAPS TOROKINA as
well as by one 75mm gun on the Cape. 3 boats were sunk and
3 damaged. As our troops hit the above beaches they were
also fired on by mortars. There were 18 enemy pillboxes
on CAPE TOROKINA and the last one was not reduced until
1900, 1November. Enemy troops defending Baach Green 2
were overcome after they had inflioted several casualties
on our troops. Enemy resistance on FJRUATA ISLAND was very
determined and consisted of several enrolaced machine guns
and well-concealed snipers*
During 2 Novaaber, fighting oontlnued on PURUATA ISLAND.
The remnants of enemy forces which had been on the Cape and
on Beach Green 2 retired to the East.
On 3 November, resistance on PURUATA ISLAND finally
eeasod during the morning. After an artillery preparation
at 1315, our troops landed on TOROKINA ISLAND and enemy
resistance cc«eed shortly thereafter.
-1­

KMttS/flfl)
#>
 DEMOTED

During the first 3 days, 192 enemy dead vere burled In

all seotors lnoludlng thoec burled by the enemy. Ons
prisoner, a Sergeant Major, wounded In the elbow was cap­
tured on 2 November Inland from Beaoh Green 2.
Enemy aotlvlty on 4, 5, and 6, November vac confined to
patrols on our flanks. 13 Japs were killed In this period.

At approximately 0600, 7 November, the enemy landed a

provisional battalion on our Vest flank. This unit was
oomposod of ths following elements:
HqCo, 2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.
sthoo,2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.
6thCo,2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.
Ist PlAt.7thCo.2dßn, 54th Inf Regt.
M&Co, 2d3n, 54th Inf Regt.
6th00,2d3n, 53d Inf Regt.
lPlflt. (38 men) Shipping Engineers.
•
The unit had oomc down from RABAUL on 4 DD1 and had
landed In 21 boats and barges along the beach from Just
Vest of our left flank up to ATSINIMA BAY. 20 of them
were killed oros sing the LARUMA RIVER by our outpost which
was near the mouth of the river, After the landing, this
foroe, moved to the East and contacted our troops holding
the Left flank, 90 of them were killed during the dayl s
fighting. Our foroes ambushed a part of this force at
dusk at a point on the beaoh 500 yards Vest of the per­
imeter and killed 29 more. Meanwhile on the right flank,
a ooßpany of Japs attaoked the PIVA ROAD blook and 8 were
killed beforo the rest withdrew. 3 more were killed by a
patrol Just off the PIVA TRAIL.

On 8 November, on the Left flank, our troops attaoked

along the boaoh to the Vest at 0915 after a 15 minute ar­
tillery preparation. They killed 100 Japs during the course
of the day* s fighting. On the Bight flank, the enemy began
adjusting mortar fire on the PIVA road blook at 0330, One
enemy battalion was reported dug in just Vest of PIVA No,
village* Our foroos attaoked and killed 200 Japs*
On 9 November, on the Left flank, one Jap was killed.
On the Right flunk the Japs attaoked, at 0600, our positions
Just Northoast of the PIVA ro*d blook. They were stopped,
and dug In, 100 yards In front of our positions. After an
artillery preparation of 800 rounds, our foroos attacked nt
0900, The onemy put up a very stubborn resistance and wlth­
drow slowly towards PIVA No. 2 leaving 100 dead behind him.
Re was using the usual tre? snipers, Ufl}'s and 90mm mortars.
-2­

• »
ftOttSfflEß
• tf
I
 -
on both flanks. Hastily abandoned bivouac areas extending
for 2200 yards along the NUMA NUMA trail North of PIVA No.
2, were estimated to have contained a battalion. Abandoned
gear included demolitions, grenades, personal pa ok 8, l-75mm
mountain gun (Type 41). l-37mm "Rapid Fire gun, 1 heavy
ma oh ine gun, several light machine guns, 80am grenade dis­
chargers, and small anas*
The enemy* e first serious effort to oounter-attaok our
beachhead wns thus defeated by vigorous attacks of our
forces whenever and wherever oontaot was mads. He lost 561
killed in the 3 days of fighting. The ertmy scheme of ma­
neuver was as follows: The provisional battalion which
landed on our Vest flank vas to go inland and harass our
perimeter on the loft flank and In front* Vhile they at­
tracted attention to the Vest and North sectors of the per*»
lmcter, the East flank was to be hit vigorously at 0600,
9 November, by the Ist and 3d Bne, of the 23d Infantry sup­
ported by Field Artillery, the Regimental Gun Company, ana
a Light Trench Mortar Company. This foroe was to attack
South and Vest from an assembly area near PHCO (Northeast
of HOPARA) and effeot a Junction with the foroe on our Left
flank In tha vicinity of PIVA No 2, Another foroe (else
unknown) was to make a landing Immediately Vest of TOROKINA
RIVER, and a platoon of 40 men and 1 officer Just East of
TOROKINA RIVER, The enemy estimated our beaohhead wi fur­
ther to the East than It actually was and his estimate of
our strength was 6-10,000 troops. There are tome Indications
that the enemy planned to send further echelons down from
RA3AUL but was prevented by 9.8*Naval and air action. The
two landings scheduled to be made East and Vest of the
mouth of the TOROKINA RIVER were not carried out*
10, 11 pnd 12 November: The enemy wns contacted only
In small patrol actions resulting in the killing of 24 Japs.
13 November: A strong enemy position was established

South of the Junotlon of the NUMA NUMA and East-Veet traUe.

Strong resistance was offered to our troops who finally

broke oontaot for the night, U. S. foroe s attacked again
the next day, 14 November, using tanks. Bf 1545 the eneoy
had withdrawn leaving 25 dead behind* 6We had been cap­
tured by our troops.
15, 16 and 17 November: Miner patrol activity. 2 Japs
were killed on the 17th.
18 November: The enemy was patrolling aggressively feel­
ing out our A Jap Lieutenant and 8 men were
positions. \u25a0

killed. The offloor was carrying a sketch which indicated

the positions of the istßn, 23d Infantry to our Immediate
front.
-3­

ft.

 19 November: 100 enfljy^ftxholee in close proximity to

our front lines were found to have been Abandoned during
the night presumably as a result of our artillery fire.
1? dc«d Jap§ wore found*
20 November: At 1230, an enaay company attacked our
troop e Just Cast of the East branch of the PIVA RIVER (196.
2-219.6). The attaok was be*ten off and enemy casualties
were thought to be heavy. About 1200 yards South of this
point, 18-20 enemy positions and some machine guns were
locrtod.
21 Novembcrt As our troops AttAOked along the last-Vest
trail, the enemy gave ground slowly fighting stubbornly All
tho time. Maohlne guns were smplaoed to the North of the
trull with fire lanes out to cover the trail* 76 dead Japs
were found* Sporrdic 75mm enemy artillery fire was ro*
oolved during tho day in our Artillerypositions in the
general art* (154*2-214.2). A company rotter of the Ist
Co, 53d Infantry was found* The 6th 00, 53d Infantry had
been idantifiod on the Left flunk 7 November*
£2 November: Tho oneay AttAOked with r+lnforoed platoons
during the day apparently probing for weak spot a, the let
and 3d Bns, 23d Infantry were displaced in dtpth North of
the East-Vtat trail* k>ohlnt gun Had laog+jar fir*mm: tta>»
tlnous all day* One ooopany tut located on biaji gpound la
tho general area (136. 3-820. 3). Shortly tHjp apon. «§»,..
tillary fire was reoelyed on the TOHMC2NA tttt*af* no**
our 155am gun positions* One g«n notltlon «a* Mi aad *§*
on fire. Bone 156 mm shells exploded*

no further fitting oownred. me MilmMm&mm Hm

Infantry wtro ldtotifijd in this tottor. It Itbelieved
that survivors of the 7 November attaok on oo loft flMifi
had oomo overland to «{# rtfht fluslu A» mm* Hm
>««
batttr ¥eT« n«rtraUtsd"by mt amU*^ talaf «Jm da;
A ofptured etttay sketoh lndloiitla« th« tsWQr as£3eyW.a»
nsuver stkovsd a 9 pronged attasli
talion headquarters posinon North pTthp^ti[<Mti Siu
(Rtgiamtal headquarters ist iaditii^d to tfem> tmsl «v?BS»
talion hoadmiarttrt)! one oa «*» North flas* —om*m «»
-4­

•
NUMA NUMA trail to & point due North of CAPS TOROKINA and
thence South toward? tho Cape; ono '.-Jest along the East-West
trail, thence South alonp the FIVAv.NUMA NUMA trail to the
vicinity of the bench; and one swinging South find West in
p. wide eves^p to
Join tho previous ftttnok nonr tho beach.
25 November: An attack by our forces ran Into strong
resistance in the area (136.2-219.1) and vac held up all
day; but the enemy withdrew during the night. Imnydi&'-ely
South of this area the enemy fired sporadio urchin* ;u.i
fire into our lines during the dry. At 1845 enomy artillery,
both 15od. and 75mn, started shelling our artillery positions
on CAPS TOROKINA, the division dumps on Beach Blue 1 nnd ar­
tillery positions Northeast of CAPE TOROKINA. This firing
continued »t Intervals until doming of 26 November nhen
all enemy activity quieted down. The second large- scale
attempt to break up our beachhead had been defected after
6 days of heavy fighting. The enony had lost 1196 dead in
this attempt. It la estimated that 450 of this number hrd
been killed by artillery fire and the balence by Infantry,
A prisoner of wpr, orotured 27 November stated that tha 23d
Infantry had suffered at least 40 t>er oent oaeualtiee end
the Regimental Commander had been killed. Units identified
vere as follows:
23d Inf (less Cd3n and 9th Co, 3d3n)
7th Co, 2dßn, 23 Inf.
lstßn, 13th Inf.
2 Go's, 45th Inf.
6th Engineers
One lOoa. platoon.
lstßn, 6th FA. (2-2 sun batteries)
2d3n, 4th Heavy FA. [2-2 gun batteries)
3d Light Mortar Bn. (less Ist Company)
sth Co, 54th Inf.
6th Co, 54th Inf.
6th Div. Signal Unit.
Ist Co, 53 Inf (t) (Co rotter only evidenoe)

'

87, 28, 29 and 30 November: No enemy aotivity except

for 20-25 15cm shells vhloh fell in tho general vicinity of

GAPE TOROKINA on 29 November. A gasoline dump was ignited

vhloh burned out a nearby 15 Seam gun position.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 December: Mo enemy aotivity

exoept for small patrol contacts.
9 December: While one of our companies was advancing
as part of a plan to straighten out the lines, they ran
into an enemy foror, eetimat^d to be ono company, in tho
vicinity of Hill10C0 (15?. 5-219. 3) at 1530. Another
company whloh was suppoccd to advance with them did not do
so bcoause of patrol pant acts on their immediate front.
Snemy snipers penetrated the gap between the two oompanlos.
*
The enemy broke off the fighting at IJJO.

So

 •
t
#>

MttASSIFIED
11, 18, 13 and 14 Dtotnbtrt Thert vtrt minor
eklrmlehee vlth tht rennantt of tht 3dßn, 23rd Inf vho were
holding potltlont in tht general vlolnlty of mil 1000
(139.6-C19.2). Tht tntmy foroe oontltttd of about 800-300
troops During thlt ptrlod our Northeaet ttotor rtoelved
eporadio ihtlllnf from 75mm art ill try and 90mm aftratart at
wtll at 50mm mortar and machine gun firt.
16 Btoambtri After a preparation by artillery and dive
bombart our troop e attacked tht Jap p© el tlone on Rill 1000
and by dark had oooupltd tht vttttrn part of tht Jap po­
altions*
16 Dtotnbtrt Tht enemy gtvt up all tht higher ground
after further attaoke by our foroee and vlthdrev into a
pooktt optn to tht Morta; but turrowndtd by our troop e on
tht Meet, South and Eatt, A Ftinforbed platoon madt ton­
taot vith oat ojf our patxolt on tht baath Satt of tht mouth
Of tht TORdCZMA XXTSU

e^aouattd, k
• fern* b»t|tt nejrt fxmmd ant «ft%lont-e>f
ttrtral o%'ff%
18 T^enamjptrt H>trt patfol tmntattt in tht
nolalty
of 'ItoaJipm «N» Hap%jgßU *b#y and 9 Japt

I*^ Thprtwirt^SeWiimmt mammgi ***^r**­

vSj »fti V7
4|KjHbeMfeft BBes
\f
4e» vBBHeImV <e» tflf 4flmam%^KNm^ VVBl&ttWl
'
'imr-%pe)am»
it,m and q. Pttembm ooatottt vtrt aadt

WBBIOII
mm) «m !»•*%•* fee tat*
fin «ma laid dew
potlttona*
oa thla

tt OejataWrt At 1000. oat of tar combat patrtlt aadt

toataat with Jape> oaaapflnf ootarti paiatftntt an till
800A. An attack by a ooapany failed to eUaUdft thorn.
Tht taamjr «mt using light mortal* and at ltatt 9 aaohint
omm, Owr otapany vlttdrtv btfort XtOO aaA. at 1000,
MO loajei of artillery flrt varo pXaaaft on tht Jap positions
-«.

i
• • 3>

\u25a0"^TeotmbTr:
... *_
_•:
—.-. _ _ patrol
A platoon If ran Into Jap prepared po­
sitions nsar (140.50-211.85; at 1000. The point was a marine
with a military dog. As coon as tne dog alerted, the Japs
opened fire, killing 4 (plus the dog) and wounding 10.
Our patrol withdrew while an Qlmm mortar concentration was
laid in. Reinforce* by another platoon, the attaok was re­
eumed but was unsuocecoful and our troops withdrew Ueut
aoross the TOROKIKA RIVER. The Jape were dug in arciml the
bases of trees and had 1 heavy mpyhine gun, 3 light machine
guns as well as 60mm mortare. Another unsuoceecful etJtaok
was made on the Jap positions in the saddle of Hill 600A.
24 Deoember: Patrols on Hill 600 Areported the eneay
had withdrawn to the No~th. About 30 covered emplacements
were found. The Jape were reported to be organising a de­
fensive position extending from the North end of Kill600 A
on a2O degrree azimuth for 500 yards. One of our patrols
had a brief fire fight at (140.6-219.8).
26 and 26 Deoembert Minor patrol oontaots were made
and on 26 Daoeoibar. Fire from enemy 76mm. lOoa artillery
and COmm mortars was reoelved in different parte of the
division sector.
27 and 28 Deoemberr There were minor patrol oontaots.
One oompany oroe fed the TOROKINA going Sast and North of
the old Jap position "and attacked it from the last. 10
Japs were killed and 10-20 fled into the bath. Our troops
wired the positions for demolition before withdrawing to
the ve S t aoross the TOROIINA RIVZR.
1600, 28 December: Oommand of the Division sector was
turned over to the Amtrtoal Division commander. There were
no enemy forces In oontaot with our lines and no known
enemy Vest of the TOROXINA RIVER. The Third Marine Division
and attached units had killed 2,111 Japs.
II NAVAL ACTION:
l Nov ember: At 0760, 2 heavy orulsers, 2 light cruisers,
and 6 destroyers were reported heading Northwest at 26 knots
about 70 miles West of 3CTKA PASSAGE.
2 November: At 0248, CTF 39 reported that he was at­
tacking on enemy surface force of cruisers and destroyers
at 6-208, 164-308. At 0438, the enemy had been defeated
and fled to the North leaving one cruiser and four des­
troyers sunk. A transport group, oomposad of 3-APA's
(Hunter Liggett, Aaerloan Legion, and Oresent City) and 1­
AKA (ALCHI3A) had not been able to complete unloading all
gear and equipment on D-day and was waiting offshore for
daylight to return to CAPE TOROKIHA to oomplete their un­
loading. This group was only 35 miles from the scene of the
battle. Task Foroe 39 was heavily attacked by 100 enemy
planes at 0824 tfiioh probably diverted a similar attack from
the transports.

-7­

DECLASSIFIED 32­
\u25a0eT.P^^'^^ovomDef: too onemy succeeded In transporting and
landing a provisionalbattalion on the Woe t flank of our
beachhead during the night of 6-7 November. Four destroyers
wcr: used for this purpose.
25 November: At 0145, 6 Japanosc destroyers were inter­
oeptod by 4of our destroyers. 2 enemy destroyers were
sunk by torpedoes, 1 by torpedoes and gunfire, and 1 by to

gunfiro alone. Tho romaining 2 destroyers were chased

within 100 miles of RABAUL. At 0435, our forces broke off

chase reporting that one of the remaining destroyers

the
was damaged.

ThT"suocees of the CAPE TOHDKINA operation was «£**£*}/

dependent on the maintenance of supply lints from GUADAa*FAL
and the prevention of sea-borne attacks
with troops from
RABAUL. This task was executed perfectly with the exception

of the relatively email foroe (450.t*oope) landed on that

the
night of 6-7 November.
enemy had plans
Captured documents indioato
to land muoh lamer forces from,«"*••*• ­
tne

by a liberal application of naval

and destroyers (supported area);
gunfire on the beachhoad but was forced to abandon
these plane because of tho excellent protection given «V
our naval forcoe plus tho losses cf nsrehipe sustained in
heavy U. B. air raide on lUBAUL on ft and 11 Bovember.

11 *
November: The beachhead aree vac straf* at 0746 by
enemy fightere. During the day and early hours of darkness
tneri
to stop
wIS three bombing attacks.
unloading and put to eea
The convoy was forced

tvioe-onoe grog art

again at 1300. There were a few casualties from theee

attacks but no serious
damage.
7 November: Betwesn 0100 and 0330 numerous bombe were

dropped. 1-260 Kg. (5601b5) boab was dropped in the

division command poet killing one war correspondent^and
one marine enlisted; and wounding another correspondent,
one marine officer, and five enlisted.
8 November: There woe an air attack on AP»e Oiioh were

unloading. A 250 Kg. dud hit the JACKSON and "»e^tnrown

over the eide by 6 membere of the crew. The FULLER was

hit by a bomb *falch killed 6 and wounded 20 men tut wae
able to continue
unloading.
13 November: Summary for first 12 days -52 alerte,

10 bombings, and 1 strafing attack.

15 November: Right after dawn enemy fighters oame in
low over the mountalne and out of the eun to boeib and strafe
the area.
-8-

iftusflnn
• ~ • 33

 • •
DECLASSIFIED
i 9November: From 0130 to 0515 there wero four
27 bombs were dropped killing1 marine officer
listed end wounding 12 enlisted.
put out of action and one battery

alerts.
and 4 :n­
l-75m= pack tovitser was
galley and switchboard
were destroyed.

20 November: There were several alerts between 0030

was
and 0657. A larpo fire In the dumps on fighters
started by one string of bombs. 5 Jap
PURUATA ISLAND
knocked
down by our fighters as the Japs pickedcane over for early
morning strafing. One pilot was up and nade a PW.
night.
21 November: There were seven al:rts during the
Two enemy pianos were shot down In an
early morning
fighter battle.

23 November; Number of bombs dropped during the night

some being 20 minute delay type*
26 November: There have been 86 alerts from D-day to
date. *or the first time a *faole night passed without
any alert.

1 December: During Hovcmber tho CAPE TOROKINA beach­

head had 90 alerts and 22 bombings. These caused 24
deatht and 96 wounded*
6 Deoember: One enemy plane was shot down by a night
fighter during an alert.

14-15 December: During the night there were 6 alerts

between 2010-0536. At least 6 bombs landed in the area
was done in DSIO Head-
of vhloh 2 were duds. Some damagecamp
quartore and the fighter command area. One twin
engine bomber was shot down.

16 Deoember: At 0111, one single engine twin float

monoplane was shot down by an P4U night fighter.

18 Deoember: There were alerts from midnight to 0119

and from 0139-0236. 40-60 bombs were dropped, the ocntor
of impact being between CAPE TOHOKINA and PURUATA ISLAND.
3­
Casualties were 1 dead, 10 missing, and 28 wounded. danagod.
LCVP and 1-LCM were sunk and 6-LCVP and 7-LCMnotwere
get off
Our nitfit fighter had engine trouble and did
the ground until 0210 after the bombing.

19 Deoember: 10-16 planes were over and dropped 25-30

bombs. One hit near tho fighter strip, one on PURUATA
ISLAND, and one Just off shore. There was no damage but
3 men were wounded.
20 December: About 15 planes oame over in 4 waves and
-9*

DECLASSIFIED
si
DECLASSIFIED
dropped 25-35 bombs In various parts of the beachhead area.
2 men vere killed And 9 were wounded. One Jap plane was
ehot down by a night fightor.
24 December: The enemy dropped 2 small bombs 1 nonr
the boat pool nnd lon PURUATA ISLAND. One piano straf 3d
the TOROKINA fighter etrip.
25 December: 135 alerts to date since 1 November.
27 December: One alert but the bogey did not close.
28 December: Surnnnry: For the whole period 1 November­
2Q December inclusive, there wore 136 nir nlerts. Bombs
were dropped during 27 of these plerts. Approxtnrte
casualties were 28 dead, 10 missing, And 136 wounded among
all forces located in the beach head area. One APD oarry­
ing Marines from the 3d Division was sunk by an onemy
torpedo plane on its way to CAPE TOROKINA and 38 Marines
were lost. Damage was rolntivoly small and was confined
ohicfly to dumps on PURUATA ISLAND and boats in the boat
pool.

H. V. TURTON
LtCol. UBMC
D-2

10-

-• >
Bttussma
 HJT/fr INTELLIGENCE SECTION, HEADQUARTERS,

THJRD_IU§ttn»MIIBION, FL'ST MARINE FORC2,

ufcyLnvSii \u25a0tU'
Appendix 1 to Annex A, Enemy Operations
x rcbruKry> 1944

General Plan of Enemy Defences. Cape Toroklnj

1. In gcnerpl the Cnpe Torokina defense a wore oomposed of a

defense in depth consisting of mutually supporting bunkers, •
trench systems and individual rifle pits so sited as to
cover all approaches to the Cape from the sea. The bulk
of the defensive system vas sited so rs to cover the water
approaches from the west. One 75mm RoglmantfJL Gun type "41"
(1908) was omplaccd in a bunker on the west side of the Capo
near the bass of the neck and was sited for antl boat defense.
For further details on the enemy defenses refer to Combat
Report of the Third Marines (Reinforced). For the general
plan of the enemy defenses see sketch number 1, appended.

2. All bunkers were of log construction covered with sand,

debris and vegetation for protective and camouflage purposes.
(See appended photographs). Defensive installations were
of the following types:
(a) Single 3unkers (See sketch No. 2).
Built to Accomodate one or two machine guns.
(b) Twin Bunkers (See sketch No. 3).
i'
Built in pairs with a connecting trenoh and oontaln­
ing one machine- gun
(o) Personnel and StorAga Bunkara HSae sketoh N0. 4).
Some of the bunkers hod firing ports and openings
through which fire oonld be deliver ad.
(d) Rifle Bunkers (See sketch No. 5).
Not bunkers in the true sense; but rather revetted
rifle pits with an ovsrherd covering of small logs
or sapling 8.
(c) Individual rifle pits (Sec sketch Ho. 6).
Generally scattered throughout the oape area sited
in groups to cover water approaches, or singly or
In small groups to cover approaches to bunkers.

#*: St^
Lt.Col. USMC.
D-2

DECLASSIFIED

 • .* •

SKETCH NO I
GENERfL DEFENSIVE SCHCM£ Of CAPE TOROKINfi

<i

w^- ccMMUfttcmm tmmcnl

5
n
o&enspve Bumm.
ewmns fa*muamn mm
fmmomL

Ii
!

37

 6KETCH NO I
SINGLE BUNKER LJ/TH TUO MACHINE GUNS
MEUCf\r\Qi\TLhGtvUfr// SffA/DC, SPROUTING COCONUT 6

FIRING OPgNINQS FhnhiT l/7f/ /

t
4PP#OX- ZO ID 30 DEGREES

ENTRGNCE
THIGH I'U/OE

BERCH

QNGU OF F/RE

m r m3

i%

 SKETCH MO S
TLJMBIinKERA EGCH QUMKER FROM 8' TO /Q'HfGH
uell cnnouFtAGta ljth debris a vegetat/cu

Trip wfi.j

Oh£ BUMMER.

EWNZyiEL'.._

kkv z mz
M
$1
•f
 SKETCH NO 5

MOWS OF COCONUT LOGS

FO* KOOFHV&eOVERJEO
vim sfmto
COCONUTS­

9 LOGS HtGH ON ALL SIDES

/UFLE BUNKER. HODS OF

SgWN&LUfTH SM/U.L
HOUINfkDniFOfL
RiFUMmiok oßseftntt
3'Deep

~TnpYiF_s*i

—AQNZJu^ut
Hvi I"* I<W3 *l
 SKETCH A/0 6
IWIW/>U/?L RIFLE PITS tfLOA/G BE/9CH AW fiMOUG BUkIKERS.
SCATTERED THROUGHOUT UERE LIGHT MOCHIUE GUU&
MO C <UKO Oft.ACS

t'DEEP I
i

—*-H
h—*-Hh
BERQH-

\u25a0

L'DEEP -5-
-5­ I'DEEP

1 Z'

MCV 2HO2H0 1943

*
t •
•

*
%
#
•

» <
• #

f
 HEADQUARTERS, THIRD MAPIIIE DIVI^N,
FLEST KAftiNE FORCE

29'7a;&M^, l'J*J*
MARINE DIVISION

1. PLANNING.
Third Marine Division participation in the DIPPER o^era.
tion commenced October 4, 19 W with the submission of an embarkation
plan for the movement of the Division reinforced by 3d Defense Bat­
talion, 2d Marine Raider Regt {Pro -lJional) , Ist 155 mm Arty Bn, IMAC
Naval Construction Bn, Detachment CuMAIRUORSOLS, Advance Naval Base
Unit #7, ACORN 13, Branch #3, 4th Base Depot, Advance Echelon Head­
quarters IMAC, let Echelon H&S Bn lI£AC and let Echelon Ist Corps
Signal. Bn. This plan (based on the shipping available together with
certain restrictions on the amount of cargo that could be carried)
called for some 13,900 men and 6,£GO tons of cargo in the first
echelon of eight APA's and four A&A!s for the D day landing, followed
by five LST echelons five days epart, eaoh carrying approximately
3000 troops and 5,500 tons of cargo * The organization of the 3d
Marine Division, reinforced, for this operation ie shown in Annex "A*.
COMMENT: This plan, with the addition of echelons to
transport the 3?th Division ana with minor changes to meet the situa­
tion as it developed, was successfully carried out substantially as
planned.
The AKA'e were formed into a separate transport group.
Buch a group has an excess of cargo over personnel for combat loading
and has no place In a landing against possible enemy opposition. It
is recommended that AXA's to be used on D day be fitted into other
transport groups in aooordanoe with the tactical plan rather than
being formed into a separate group.
SBPPLXKt.
The embarkation plan contemplated that the first echelon
would carry three unite of fire for troops embarked (except two unite
for heavy AA units), ten days landing rations, ten days B rations
and ttoft days fuel; and that svoosedlng echelons would carry similar
amounts for troops embarked plus additional quantities lntonded to
bring levels on hand at D plus 90 days to five units of fire and
thirty days of other supplies. Eaoh combat team was also furnished
a thirty day supply of malaria control and medical items.
OQNMEHT: This scheme worked satisfactorily but for future
operations such items as malaria control and medical supplies should
be Intrusted to the combat teams only, in amounts to mee£ immediate
requirements, the bulk of such supplies should be shipped later
after division dumps have been established* Also replenishment s in
equipment and clothing (TBA Oroup 12) should be scheduled for ship­
ment at intervals beginning about D plus 10 days.
3. SHIPMENT.
The equipment of the division was divided into three cate­
gories as indicated below.
Category kx Equipment required to live and to fight for
a limited period in a limited space.
Category B: Equipment necessary for the continuation of
combat and extension of the combat zor.u.
Category C: Equipment for which uo need was contemplated
within the first 30 days, (to be sent forward
on call).
Equipment ism assigned to the several categories axter
consideration of the the terrain of the proposed
theater and the minm mtmjmfi W^wf 03#ecJLpd. These same principles

a
were applied to the formation of the battalion landing teams to lar.*
on D day (for example, no tanks or antitank units were attached to
these landing teams).
COMMENT: The application of these rules produced a rcin­
forccd'tjattnllon landing team which could be acebmodated on one A?A
necessary
with a load limit of 500 tone (category A equipment with
supplies), with the remaining category B equipment and units to
follow in successive ochelons. This plan worked satisfactorily
spaced.
but
can bo applied only when the several echelons are closely
Troops landed with the haversack only, the knapsack and
blanket roll being embarked as organisation baggage (sea any bags, cots
ccnelon).
and pads were classed as category C and not embarked In
recommended that the knapsack be lei u
For future movements it is
behind as category B equipment.
4. shore parties.
party
Each APA was required to furnish a complete shore
of oome 550 officers and mSn, of which lj» wore for work in J-'C
the
on the beach "j^tnbeing
ship, 60 were used as "boat riders" and 200remainlngpersonnel
sole duty of unloading cargo from boats"; work,
vehicle fivers,
used for shore party fieadquartors, pioneeroorsonnol,
dunro supervisors, communicators, medical supposed teach party and
for work at inland dumps. Each AKA was furnish 120 men
Jo
to work in the holds, 50 men to ride the boats and 200 on the beach
boats. As the AKA's
with the sole duty of unloading cargo fromnecessary
carried only 350 officers and men, it was (in to make up the
difference by drawing men from the APA's addition to the regular
APA shore party). Each AFA was Joined with an adjacent; APA, the APA
shore party headquarters supervising the work on both beaches.
COMMENT: The application of those rules meant about 40#
of the entire landing force was initiallyengaged on shore party
duties. It Is believed that this number is excessive. and that with
proper organization a shore party composed of 30% of the landing
force should be sufficient (450 for an average APA). It is also
believed that the personnel capacity of the AKA's to be employed on
D day should be lnoreased so that an AKA can unload itself without
the need of drawing additional working details from the APA's.

5. FIRST PHASE.
Twelve ships unloaded simultaneously on D day (November Ist)
on a front of 8000 yards. Difficult hydrographic conditions caused
the lose of some 86 boats on their initial trip. Difficult terrain
inland (swamps) made the formation of inland dumps impracticable and
all cargo was placed on the beach itself, Just above the high water
mark. Heavy surf caused the abandonment of the three western beaches
after the personnel had landed, all cargo originally intended for'
those beaches was diverted to other beaches. The loss of large
numbers of boats slowed the unloading; this condition was aggravated
by frequent alerts which caused the ships to cease unloading and put,
to sea. Eight of the twelve ships completed unloading on D day, the
remaining four returning on D plus 1 to complete unloading.
COMMENT: Regiments gradually assumed control of their
beaches and consolidated their dumps but it was not until November 12
that division was able to assume control of the supply of rations,
ammunition and fuel. During this period organl rat ions and unite
obtained tholr supplies from the nearest shore party dump. Tc pcrrcit
the regiments to perform this function, many units remained attacn^u.
to the rogimonts that would normally have reverted to organic control
earlier. For example, the dates on which certain units reverted to
organic control is indicated below:
Nov 3d: CB Battalion (to construct roads)
Nov 4th: Artillery battalions
Nov 6th: Pioneer Bn (for permanent shore party to handle
succeeding echelons)
Nov 9th: Engineer Battalion

Nov 11th: •.Mec'icaX Companies

Nov 12";h: Service & Supply Platoons of S&S Co.

Nov 17 ch: All remaining reinforcing elements.

 •)
•
The long delay Indicated by the above table vac ca'.uod '\\
the lack of roads Inland which made it necessary (in ao far ac eupyly
and evacuation was concerned) to leave the problem in the hands of
the regimental commanders until the situation clarified and the ro­
qulrod supply routes could bo devoloped.
6, ROADS.
Initiallythere were- no roads. (The one native traM
leading inland on the right flunk broke dorvas soon as it wan sub­
jected to heavy traffic.) The beach itself was used, as a rosxi for
all lateral traffic and amphibian traotors wero used for the nov«­
ment of supplies and for the n\ acuatAon of wounded; track layli'f^
trailers pulLed by traotors wh*c aXco used where practicable. C&lffht­
een track laying trailers wi 5h rt -9 traotors had been obtained .e^ec­
lally for this operation). Tho front linos gradually advanced in­
land across the swamps until dry ground was reached. A division
inland dump was then established vDump No. 2, three miles by road
inland from tho beach). Until a road was built supplies were trans­
ported to ,thiB dumo by amphibian tractors; joeps and trailers were
also porto-ed forward by amphibian tractor for local distribution
from this forward dump. This procua6 was repeated at- a.later etap:e
of the operation to raoet a similar condition, i.e. the front lines
advanced again across swanros beyond the existing road not. The table
below show 8 the various stages.
Nov 1 to 14: Supply from boaoh dumps.
Nov 15 to 24: Bupply via amphibian traotor trail to
dump Ho. 2.
Nov 26 to D»# 8: Supply by truck to Dump No. 2.
Deo 0 to 23: Supply by truck to Dump Ho. 2 thenoe by

Thereafter:
miles inland from Dump No. 2) .
amphibian traotor to Dump No. 3 (Sir

Normal supply, by truck to regimental or

•
battalion dumps, thenoe forward by Jeep,
track laying trailor or hand carry.

•
COMMENT: On November" 13, the date on vhloh the first major
movement of supplies by amphibian traotor oommenoed, there were 64
amphibian traotors available. (XINovember 86, the date the road
opened and amphibian tractors were relieved by trucks, there were
only 28 amphibian traotors still in operation. By December 9th, 48
amphibian traotor e had been repaired and made serviceable, but by
Deoember 23rd only 12 remained In running condition. It la obvious

_.
_
that amphibian traotore are special instruments for special opera­
tions and cannot bo depended upon for hard servioe• over extended
periods. _ _\u25a0

It was notedvthat the 2* -ton oargo truck oowld negotiate

\u25a0

roads that were impassable to Jeeos. The track laying trailers

previously mentioned were reloaoca *so regiments for use In moving
supplies forward beyond the head of navigation for B*-ton truoks.
The Jeep was a useful supply vehicle only whon conditions were good;
in.mud and rain the Jeap cannot move and recourse must be had to
2i-ton truoks, traok laying trailers, anrohlblan traotors or hand
carry.

7. AMMUNITIONEXPENDITURES.
Ammunition expenditures for the two month period are in­
dloated in Annex B.

COMMENT: It should be noted that in actual rounds fired

the artillery expended considerably more than three uiilts of fire
per gun, the Browning Automatic Rifle and the 60mm mortar expended
Just three units of fire, while alj other weapons averaged a much
lower rate. (AA expenditures are n^t included ih'tKls list; such
weapons were under corps control the majority of the time). It is
bclloved these figures should be c«neld«r«A in Planning re-suoply to
meet expenditures while retaining the policy of landing three units
of flro with the troops on D day.

W i

 8. LOSS OF ESJIPMEUT.
A quantity of equipment was lost during this operation.
This matter is being handled by separate correspondence.
COMMENT. In spite of all that can be done, tromendous
losses must bo expected under difficult campaign conditions. To mc«3t
this fact, salvage operations should be started early and plans should
provide for the shipment forward, commencing about D plus 10 rays,
of replenishments in all typos of equipment. This equipment should
be earmarked for this purpose and shipping space provided for it
in the original embarkation plan. As a rough figure the TBA 90 day
replenishment allowance should be provided for c ach 30 days of active
operations.

9. EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT WITH ARMY.

The relieving Army Division left in rear areas, and this
Division delivered in the combat area such items of heavy equipment
as were common to each organization. This included machine guns,
mortars, 105mm howitzers, l/4-ton trucks, water trailers, cargo
trailers, water cans, some tentago, some pieces of engineering equip­
ment.
COMMENT: The exchange was limited to items for which
spare parts were regularly provided by each organisation and only
serviceable items were exchanged. Considerable shipping space was
saved by this exchange. However, neither division was entirely
satisfied with the equipment they received.
10. RELIEF.
Departing personnel embarked in the sane APA's and AKA's
which brought the incoming, relieving echelons, taking with them
only light equipment (maximum 50 tons per ship). The remaining
heavy equipment, guns, vehicles etc, were brought back on returning
LBT»s.
COMMENT: The relief was accomplished without moi
dent.
11. EVACUATION.
Evacuation of wounded, while difficult, was executed in
normal manner. Hospital companies were kept dose behind the regi­
ments, patients being evacuated to the Division Hospital, thenoe
through beach evacuation stations for evacuation to rear areas by.
ship or plane. The main difficulty was the lack of roads.
COMMENT: The one ton or 3/4-ton anbulanoe proved more
satisfactory than the Jeep ambulance.
12. AIRPLANE EROPS.
Supply by air was tried on several occasion* with fair
results.
COMMENT: Supply by air from distant bases, especially
where the supplies must be dropped in thick Jungle, does not appear
to be a reliable means of supply.

-4-
• • W
 • #

13. CONCLUSION:
This report covers only selected Important points of the
operation which are believed to have a boarlng on future operations.
No attempt is mado to report on matters of supply and evacuation
which, while difficult, require no special solution.
a!:itsxe3: "a" organization
of 3D uarine division reinforced.

--
nnB M
AJfftJHITIOH SXPSUPTTUrSS DURING DI^ER OP^ATION.
"C" EMPRESS AUGUSTA SAX 19TH MaRII-^S !IAP, BUD
"DI?IO!T 1:20,000 V^TH ADHI'TIST^ATr^ Ii»S7AL­
LA?IO!TS Am ROAD !ST AS <^P 20 15CSH3SR 1940
T

lIPOS3D TH^RSon.

*'. C. KALL
Colonel, USMC
D-4

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