Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan(2015); Brion, C.J.

G.R. No. 173148

Digest writer: Dodot
Petitioner: Elsa Degayo
Respondents: Cecilia Magbanua-Dinglasan, Johnny Dinglasan, Asuncion Magbanua-Porras, Mariano Pascualito, and
Amado Jr., all surnamed Magbanua
Concept: Judicial Notice
Brief Facts: Degayo and Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were contesting the ownership of a disputed area adjoining the
Jalaud River: Degayo was claiming ownership on the theory that the disputed area was an accretion to her own property;
on the other hand, Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were claiming ownership on the theory that the disputed area was an
abandoned riverbed which accrued to them, as the owners of the land where the new riverbed ran through. MagbanuaDinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership against Degayos tenants (CIVIL CASE NO. 1). After denying Degayos
motion to intervene, the RTC eventually decided in favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. which decision attained finality.
Meanwhile, Degayo filed a separate case for ownership with damages against Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. (CIVIL CASE
NO. 2). Although the RTC decided in favor of Degayo, the CA on appeal reversed, on the ground that Civil Case No. 1
constituted res judicata, and after taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1. The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for
review on certiorari filed by Degayo.
Doctrine: The taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence
is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof.
General Rule (contents of records of other cases): courts are not authorized to take judicial notice even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

Exceptions:
o Close connection with the matter in controversy.
o To determine whether or not the pending case is moot.
Justice Paras on Judicial Notice (Republic v. CA):

Its own acts and records in the same case;

facts established in prior proceedings in the same case;

authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties;

files of related cases in the same court;

public records on file in the same court;

record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same
parties;

record of another case between different parties in the same court.

FACTS:
Antecedents
1.
2.

Controversy between riparian owners (Jalaud River):

1.1. Degayos lot: used to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud River
1.2. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.s lot: opposite side of the Jalaud River
In the 1970s, the Jalaud River steadily changed its course and moved southwards.
2.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.s lot decresed in size while the banks adjacent to Degayos lot gradually increased in
land area.
2.1.1. Half of the disputed area, 52,528 sq.m. big, was made up of the original abandoned river bed, while the other
half was made up of the resurfaced area of Magbanua-Dinglasan et al.s lot.
2.2. Degayo and her tenants: believed that the disputed area was an ACCRETION to Degayos lot the tenants began
cultivating and tilling the area with corn and tobacco.
2.3. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.: believed that the disputed area was an ABANDONED RIVERBED thus, rightfully
belongs to them, to compensate for the portion of their lot over which the Jalaud River presently ran.

The Case
3.

(CIVIL CASE NO. 1)

3.1. Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed a complaint for ownership and damages against Degayos tenants (RTC of Iloilo).
3.1.1. Degayo sought to intervene her motion was denied.
3.1.1.1. NOTE: Degayo never filed anything to question the interlocutory order denying her motion to intervene.
3.2. Notwithstanding the denial of her motion to intervene (and as Civil Case No. 2 was pending), Degayo participated

in the proceedings as a witness for the defense (her tenants).

3.2.1. During her direct examination, she testified on the same matters and raised the same arguments she alleged
in her complaint in Civil Case No. 2.
3.3. RTC: rendered a decision in favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.
3.3.1. Although Degayos tenants filed an appeal, they failed to file an appeal brief causing the dismissal of their
appeal.
3.3.2. The decision became final and executory on 6 August 1999.
4.

(CIVIL CASE NO. 2)

4.1. Degayo filed a complaint for declaration of ownership with damages (RTC of Iloilo).
4.1.1. Degayo stressed that the disputed area was an accretion to her lot.
4.2. RTC: found in favor of Degayo declared the disputed area as an accretion of Degays lot.
4.2.1. After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration, Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. filed an appeal w/ the CA
4.3. CA: granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the RTC.
4.3.1. The CA noted that the disputed area was an abandoned riverbed that rightfully belonged to MagbanuaDinglasan, et al.
4.3.2. ***The CA also noted that the decision in Civil Case No. 1 was CONCLUSIVE to the title of the thing
(Conclusiveness of Judgment).
4.4. After the CA denied her motion for reconsideration, Degayo filed a petition for Review on Certiorari (R45) with the
SC.

ISSUE:
1. Does the Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constitute res judicata? (YES.)
2. ***Was the CA correct in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1? (YES.)***
RATIO:
1.

The Decision in Civil Case No. 1 constituted res judicata.

Res judicata: a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.

Final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on points on matters determined in the former suit.

Parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. (There should be an end to litigation.)
o Practical concern: overflowing dockets, scarce judicial resources, efficiency. (Salud v. CA)
o Rights and liabilities once established should remain fixed.

Most important purpose of res judicata: provide repose for both the party litigatnts and the public.

Res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the
courts to resolve other disputes.
What of Judicial error?

Should be corrected through appeals NOT repeated suits.

Relitigation: risk of inconsistent results which should be preferred?

o Since there is no reason to suppose that the subsequent determinations are necessarily more accurate, the
first should be left undisturbed.
Basis in remedial law: R39, Sec. 47.

Bar by former judgment (Claim preclusion)

Conclusiveness of judgment (Issue preclusion; collateral estoppel)

o Identities of parties and issues
o Facts or questions settled by final judgment/order binds the parties (and persons in privity with them, and
successors-in-interest) cannot be relitigated

Parties estopped from raising the same issues raised, controverted, determinative of ruling.
Case at bar:

Civil Case No. 1: adjudicated on the merits, attained finality, decided by competent court.

Identity of parties in both actions absolute identity of parties is NOT required, shared identity of interest is sufficient
to invoke the coverage of res judicata.
On contention that Degayo could not be bound because she had not been made a party in Civil Case No. 1:

Real litigant may be held bound as a party even if NOT formally impleaded because he had his day in court and
because her substantial rights were not prejudiced. (Torres v. Caluag)
o Degayo had the fullest opportunity to ventilate her accretion claim in Civil Case No 1:

Asserted that she inherited her lot from her parents, and had been in possession since 1954.

Asserted that the disputed area occupied by her tenants was the result of accretion.
o These are the same allegations asserted by Degayo in Civil Case No. 2.

These allegations had already been considered and evaluated in Civil Case No. 1.
Community of interest between Degayo and her tenants (respondents in Civil Case No. 1).
o TEST: whether the success or failure of one party materially affects the other.

Degayos rights over the disputed area is predicated on the same defenses that her tenants
interposed in Civil Case No. 1.

Both claims emanate from a singular fundamental allegation of accretion.

The disputed area in Civil Case No. 1 and Civil Case No. 2 are one and the same.
o Degayo admitted as much in her petition.
Question of ownership of the disputed area had been unequivocally settled in Civil Case No. 1.
o Abandonment of river bed NOT accretion.

SC: agreed with the uniform view of the CA, on the application of conclusiveness of judgment to the present case.
2.

***The CA may take judicial notice of Civil Case No. 1.***

The SC stated that [t]he taking of judicial notice is a matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that
the evidence is intended to achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal)
General Rule (contents of records of other cases): courts are not authorized to take judicial notice even when such cases
have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

Exceptions:
o Close connection with the matter in controversy.
o To determine whether or not the pending case is moot.
Moreover, Degayos objection to the action of the CA is merely technical:

Degayo herself repeatedly referred to Civil Case No. 1 in her pleadings, her appellees brief before the CA, and her
petition for review before the SC.
o Complaint: motion to intervene in [Civil Case No. 1], which was denied by the Court
o Appellees brief: [Civil Case No. 1] was for recovery of ownership and possession with damages

Existence of Civil Case No. 1 was jointly stipulated by the parties and mentioned by the court a quo in its decision.
SC: Under the circumstances, the CA could certainly take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in Civil Case No.
16047. There was no sense in relitigating issues that have already been passed upon in a previous civil case. That was all that
was done by the CA in decreeing the dismissal.
Justice Paras on Judicial Notice (Republic v. CA):
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same
case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same
court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment
of a case in another court between the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of another case
between different parties in the same court.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner

Spouses Antonio vs. Vda. de Monje

G.R. No. 149624: September 29, 2010
SPOUSES CONRADO ANTONIO and AVELYN ANTONIO, Petitioners, v. JULITA SAYMAN VDA. DE MONJE, substituted by her
heirs, namely: ANGELINA MONJE-VILLAMOR, LUZVISMINDA MONJE-CORTEL, MARRIETA MONJE-ORTICO, LEOPOLDO MONJE,
CONCEPCION SAYMAN-MONJE, and ROLINDA MONJE-CALO, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon were the original owners of the subject parcel of coconut land,
consisting of 15,903 square meters, particularly known as Lot No. 1 covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1020 of the
Register of Deeds of Davao.
On 02 September 1962, Andrea Pansaon who survived her husband Catalino Manguiob, together with some other heirs,
sold to Macedonio Monje 7,500 square meters only of the aforesaid property. The said deed of absolute sale was duly
notarized by Notary Public Ricardo Reyes and entered in his notarial book.
Macedonio Monje immediately took possession thereof and constructed a house worth P30,000.00.
The heirs of spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon who also died, sold the subject property which was already
sold to Macedonio Monje in 1962, in favor of Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. Manguiob.
Immediately thereafter, spouses Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. Manguiob had executed an absolute deed of sale in
favor of the formers sister-in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, the entire Lot No. [1] consisting of 15,903 square meters. The sale was
entered in the notarial book of Notary Public Juanito T. Hernandez.
Macedonio Monje knew about it only when he received a letter from Avelyn B. Antonio, informing him that she is now the
registered owner of the subject property under a new Transfer Certificate of Title.
Aggrieved, Macedonio Monje filed before the CFI of Baganga, Davao Oriental, a complaint for the annulment of the deed
of sale between the heirs of Catalino Manguiob and Carolina Balanay/Nicanor Manguiob, as well as the subsequent deed
of absolute sale by the latter in favor of Avelyn Antonio and the cancellation of TCT No. T-9643.
The aforesaid court rendered a decision declaring the 2nd and 3rd deeds of sale of the property as null and void, and the
transfer certificate title No. 9643 likewise null and void.
Plaintiff-appellants, Spouses Antonio appealed the above-mentioned decision all the way to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 69696, rendered a decision finding res judicata.
Plaintiff-appellants [herein petitioners] filed a case for a sum of money, accounting of the proceeds of the copra, damages
and attorneys fees against herein defendant-appellees before the Regional Trial Court of Baganga, Davao Oriental,
Branch 7.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order dismissing herein petitioners' complaint on the ground of res judicata.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC and dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the principle of res judicata
CIVIL LAW: Res judicata and its tests
HELD:
Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
To state simply, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case
that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in
the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Whereas, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially
passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final
judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and
continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely
motion or petition.
In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-125 and Civil Case No. 506.
However, as to identity of issues, a perusal of the records and other pleadings would show that the issue raised in Civil Case
No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 being contested by respondents
is valid. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 506, the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the
remaining 8,403 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly sold to them and whether they are entitled to an
accounting of the proceeds of the copra harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated by
respondents. The Court finds that there is no identity of issues as the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is different from,
and does not overlap with, the issue raised in Civil Case No. 506.
The Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or not there is identity of causes of action as to
warrant the application of the principle of res judicata. One test of identity is the absence of inconsistency test where i t is
determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior
judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions.
In the instant case, the reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. 506 are the payment of a sum representing the proceeds of the
copra supposedly harvested from petitioners' property and purportedly misappropriated by respondents. Petitioners also
pray for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
The more common approach in ascertaining identity of causes of action is the same evidence test, whereby the
following question serves as a sufficient criterion: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and
former causes of action? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the prior judgment is a bar to the subsequent action;
conversely, it is not. In the instant case, it is unmistakable that the pieces of evidence that would back up the cause of
action in Civil Case No. 007-125 are different from the set of evidence that would prove the cause of action in Civil Case
No. 506.
Aside from the absence of inconsistency test and same evidence test, we have also ruled that a previous judgment
operates as a bar to a subsequent one when it had touched on [a] matter already decided, or if the parties are in effect
litigating for the same thing. A reading of the decisions of the lower and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 007-125 would
show that there were neither discussions nor disposition of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 506.

[G.R. No. 143646. April 4, 2001]

SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM and ROSARIO T. LIM, petitioners, vs. PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means a pending suit. Notice of lis pendens is filed for the purpose of warning all
persons that the title to certain property is in litigation and that if they purchase the same, they are in danger of being
bound by an adverse judgment.[1] The notice is, therefore, intended to be a warning to the whole world that one who buys
the property does so at his own risk. This is necessary in order to save innocent third persons from any involvement in any
future litigation concerning the property.[2]
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Decision dated January 25, 2000 and Resolution dated June 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals[3] which set aside the order of
the trial court cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are:
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by petitioner[4] against private respondents[5] before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 195-M-94, alleging that he has been in
possession since 1960 of a 200 square meter portion of Lot 4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan covered by TCT No.
191498 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in the names of Turandut, Traviata, Marcelita, Pacita, Marlene, Mathews, Victoria
and Rosary, all surnamed Aldaba; that on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said 200 square meter portion, which
is included in the formers one-eight share in Lot 4204, consisting of 1,732 square meters; that a complaint for ejectment was
filed against him in 1993 by private respondent Henry Lim, who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by him,
being a portion of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-16375 registered in his name; that judgment was rendered
against him in the ejectment case, which he elevated to the appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered
that TCT No. T-16375 in the name of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or clever machination. On
the other hand, private respondents maintained that their title is valid and legal.
Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT T-16375.
A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by private respondents on the grounds that said notice was designed
solely to molest them/or it is not necessary to protect petitioners rights. The same was opposed by petitioner insisting that the
notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to protect his right over the property covered by TCT No. T-16375 and to avoid
sale of property pending the execution of the judgment in the case.
On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. T16375 upon the posting by private respondents of an indemnity bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied in an order dated October 7, 1998.
The issue before this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
Petitioners contend that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens by the trial court is justified because respondent had it
registered for the sole purpose of molesting them and that it is not necessary to protect his rights. According to petitioners,
the trial court correctly ratiocinated as follows:
A very thin line exists and separates the protection afforded by the notice to the plaintiff and the restriction it imposes on
the right of the defendants dominion over the property. Indubitably, the 200 square meter portion claimed by the plaintiff is
grossly disproportional to the entire 5,432 square meter property which the notice virtually hold hostage. More so, the
annotation proceeds from a still to be proven claim. Thus, based on the allegations in the pleadings, as between a bare
assertion of ownership over the claimed portion anchored on an unregistered deed of sale as against the indefeasible title
possessed by the defendants over the entire subject property, the presumption under our rules favor the latter, unless
rebutted by evidence on the contrary. As it stands, plaintiffs unregistered deed of sale, cannot, therefore, be accorded
more weight than the certificate of title in defendants name which is proof of ownership over the entire 5,432 square meter
property.
While afflictive consequences will be suffered by plaintiff if the notice is cancelled in case he is adjudged the lawful owner
of the claim 200 square meter property, defendants will likewise suffer a grave injustice if denied the remedy of cancelling
the notice, resort to which is allowed by law and discretionary on the courts upon proper showing. The injustice will take the
form of an unlawful dispossession though what is claimed only is 200 square meters, yet the entire 5,432 square meter
property is affected. Instead of serving its real purpose as laid by law pursuant to public policy, the continued retention of
the notice fosters inequity as clearly established based on the claimed portion vis a vis the unclaimed of free portion of the

5,432 square meter property. To the mind of the Court, this inequity translates to an unwanted and unjustified burden that
utterly molest the tranquil possession and enjoyment by the defendants of the subject part.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice and equity, the Court deems it wise under the prevailing circumstances to
direct the defendants to post an indemnity bond in an amount commensurate and reasonable proportionate to the per
square value of the claimed area of 200 square meter property. To the mind of the Court, thru the posting of a bond, the
claim of the plaintiff (respondent herein) would still remain protected and safeguarded even though the notice is
eventually cancelled. Equity and fair play dictate the same be resorted to by the Court relative to the peculiar
circumstances of the case.
Petitioners contention lacks merit.
Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Sec. 14 Notice of lis pendens In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the
defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province
in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties
and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the
time of filing of such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their
real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
who caused it to be recorded. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
Sec. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused registration thereof.
Petitioners claim that the notice of lis pendens practically covers his entire land covered by TCT No. T-16375 and thus molests
his right as an owner.
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof. With the lis pendens
duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For such notice serves as a warning
to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands
off the same unless of course, he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.[6] Based on this principle as well as the
express provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular property subject
of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the 200 square meter portion of the entire area is
embraced by the notice of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of such notice, respondents aim is to protect his right as
an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful
dispossession and restriction of petitioners right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT 16375 in
their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion.
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice
of lis pendens only on two grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party; or b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded
In justifying the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the trial court held that respondents unregistered deed of sale can
not be accorded more weight than petitioners certificate of title.
For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation
to show that the land belongs to him. In fact, there is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation of the
notice must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated.[7] Hence, even on the basis of an
unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. And such annotation can not be
considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title. This is based on the principle that the registration of a notice
of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does not create a right or lien. It only means that a person
purchases or contracts on the property in dispute subject to the result of the pending litigation.[8]
We observe that the trial judge was convinced that the cancellation of the lis pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should
not have required petitioners to post a bond of P2,000,000.00

The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered meaningless if petitioners are allowed to file
a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice. In Tan vs. Lantin[9], this Court held that the law does not
authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation upon the mere filing of sufficient bond by the party on
whose title said notice is annotated.
Petitioners likewise insist that since respondent lost in the ejectment suit they filed against him, it follows that he also lost
whatever right he has in the 200 square meter portion and that, therefore, he has no more right to be protected by the
notice of lis pendens. It bears emphasis that respondent caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No.
195-M-94 for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment case. Consequently, the notice of lis pendens
annotated on TCT No. T-16375 must stay.
Indeed, there is nothing in the records indicating that the notice of lis pendens is for the purpose of molesting herein
petitioners or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. L-4812

October 30, 1908
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMUALDO MENA, defendant-appellant.
The accused was convicted of the crime of coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined and penalized in article 497 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor; to the payment of a fine of 325 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment as provided by the law; and to the payment of the costs of the trial; the penalty prescribed being
imposed in its minimum degree, the trial court of having taken into consideration the extenuating circumstance of race, as
prescribed in article 11 of the Penal Code.
On or about the 21st day of December, 1907, three carabaos, the property of the defendant, trespassed upon the rice
paddies of the complaining witness, Ceferino Flora, doing considerable damage thereto. Flora took possession of the
animals and refused to return them to the defendant without compensation for the damage done. The defendant did to
deny Flora's right to compensation, but said that he was unable to make payment in kind, because at the time he did not
own any rice; and there would appear to have been some question also as to the amount damage done by the animals..
Between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, Flora and his son set out to take the carabaos to the justice of the
peace, for the purpose of depositing them in his care until the question of damages could be settled in his court. On the
road to the justice of the peace, they met the defendant in company with some of the party who were with the defendant,
Flora said that he was bringing the animals to the justice of peace, and refused to surrender them to the defendant or his
friends. Thereupon, the defendant drew his bolo, rushed at Flora's don (who was in advance of Flora himself, mounted on
one of the carabaos, and leading another with a mecate), cut the mecate by which the son was leading the carabao,
and with threats of bodily injury, compelled him to turn the other loose; and then with further threats of bodily injury,
compelled Flora himself to turn loose the carabao which he was riding.
While there is some dispute as to the details of the incident, we think the testimony of the witnesses clearly establishes the
facts as above set out. Counsel for the defendants insists that the complaining witness had no right to take possession of the
carabaos of the defendant, even though they were trespassing upon his land; that he had no right to take the animals to
the justice of the peace; and that the defendant was guilty of no offense in forcibly taking possession of his own carabaos
at the time when the incident abode related occurred.
Without entering upon a discussion of the respective rights of the parties, we are of opinion that, granting it were true that
the complaining witness had no lawful right to take possession of the carabaos or to take the carabaos to the justice of
peace, and granting further that the accused had a right to have the carabaos turned over to him, when he demanded
them of the complaining witness, nevertheless, the crime of coaccion (unlawful coercion), as defined and penalized in
article 497 of the Penal Code, was committed by him, when with violence he compelled the complaining witness to turn
over the carabaos against his will, it being clearly understood by the defendant and his friends that the complaining witness
was not seeking to appropriate the animals or to carry them off as his property, and that he merely asserted s right to the
possession of the carabaos for the purpose of taking them to the justice of the peace in order that the question of the
damages might be adjusted.
Article 497 of the Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of coaccion as follows:
He who, without being lawfully authorized so to do, prevents another, with violence, from doing something which is not
prohibited by law or compels him to do something which he does not wish to do, whether such thing by just or unjust, will be
punished with the penalty of arresto mayor, and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall within the foregoing definition of the crime of coaccion. With violence he
compelled the complaining witness to do that which he did not desire to do that is to say, to turn over the possession of
the carabaos and it matters not whether it was "just or unjust" that they should thus have been turned over to the
defendant; whether it was or was not the duty of the complaining witness to turn them over on demand, the defendant
was guilty of the crime of coaccion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce his demand when the complaining witness
refused compliance therewith.lawphil.net
The defendant was not clothed with any judicial or administrative authority, and it is a maxim of the law that no man is
authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined
cases, where one acts in the necessary defense of one's life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and manifestly
the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was taken in defense of life, liberty, or property. The carabaos
were in the possession of the complaining witness who claimed the right thereto for the purpose of turning them over to the
justice of the peace; the defendant denied the right of the complaining witness to this possession and claimed the absolute
right to possession in himself; but in forcibly depriving the complaining witness of possession of the carabaos the defendant
was not acting in defense of his right to the possession of the property from the unlawful aggression, but rather asserting his
right to take possession from another, and thus he himself became the aggressor.
A dispute having arisen as to the right of possession, and the carabaos being actually in the possession of the complaining
witness, it was the duty of the defendant if he desired to enforce his claim, to seek the aid of the proper judicial authority;

and had he thus asserted his claim in the orderly manner provided by law, he would have secured not only the possession
of the animals, but damages for their detention, upon proof of the justice of his claim.
A similar question was decided in the case of U.S. vs. Tremoya (10 Phil. Rep., 89), wherein it was held that where one was
actually in [possession under color of title, the lawful owner of the land with the true title to the possession was guilty of
coaccion, when with violence he compelled the person in possession to vacate.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-30773 February 18, 1970

FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, and NEMESIO CERALDE, respondents.
V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Atienza, Tabora & del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo and Special Counsel Perfecto V. Fernandez for
respondents Salvador Lopez, et al.
Crispin D. Baizas for respondent Nemesio Ceralde.

SANCHEZ, J.:
Directly under attack in this an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is the validity of the transfer of
petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Maria from his post of Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines (UP), to the Office
of respondent UP President Salvador P. Lopez, there to become Special Assistant in charge of public information and
relations.
Petitioner, a professor of English and Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP College in Baguio), was elected Dean
of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. His appointment as
such Dean was for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights
and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
The issues in this case can be better understood if framed in its proper setting, viz:
As far back as February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of Education presented to
President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic program1 and the physical
plant and services,2 with a cluster of special demands.3 In response, President Lopez created a committee composed of
eight graduate students, two undergraduate students, and four faculty members. This committee met 9 times with Dean
Sta. Maria in February and March 1969. On March 17, 1969, Dean Sta. Maria gave President Lopez a written summary of the
dialogues he had with the committee and enumerated in connection with the demands, the steps taken,4 the steps being
taken5 and the steps ito be taken in consultation with the faculty.6 He also recommended to the UP President the following:
a more adequate budget responsive to the needs of the college, taking into account its expanding graduate program;
improvement of the library service in terms of a better book collection and more adequate space and reading rooms,
particularly for graduate students; appointment of more faculty members on the senior level to handle the large graduate
program, and to meet the acute need for more graduate advisers, critics, and committee members; improvement of the
water system of the college; improvement of the physical plant of the college, including its classrooms, offices, toilets,
sidewalks and surrounding landscape; and construction of a graduate students' dormitory.
But the students were not to be appeased. For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did not act on some of their demands.
Respondents herein have stressed that in the meetings of the education graduate committee, Dean Sta. Maria neither
included in the agenda nor consulted the faculty about the students' demands on "foreign language proficiency
examination" and on "research and thesis writing pressures". They have brought out the fact that many members of the
faculty shared the students' grievances on the absence of definite standards and procedures on academic work, including
teaching load, administrative and committee assignments, faculty evaluation, and favoritism and discrimination.
On July 16, 1969, Adelaida E. Masuhud, President of the UP Graduate Education Student Organization., led a group who
visited President Lopez and submitted to him a progress report on the students' demands taken up with Sta. Maria since
March 26, 1969. She acknowledged that the dean had granted ten demands7 but deplored the fact that the dean had
ignored the following; submission to the faculty for decision, of the demand for abolition of foreign language requirements
and comprehensive examinations; fixing the criteria for selection, admission, appointment and promotion of faculty
members; formulation of clear-cut policies on thesis advising, faculty teaching load, and faculty membership on standing
committees; and appointment of a permanent director for the Graduate Education Studies of the SPED Program. She thus
stated: "I appreciate the efforts of the Dean in acting On some of our demands. However, the Dean has failed to take
further action on the demands that have far reaching implications for the students, faculty and the College as a whole. As
a consequence problems, confusion and demoralization of students and faculty have cropped up anew in the college."
The students threatened to boycott their classes the next day, July 17. President Lopez asked that they desist, suggested
that they instead attend a student-faculty meeting the next day in his office.

But on July 17, the Education Graduate Student Organization boycotted their classes just the same. The President met the
striking students' representatives and the faculty members of the College of Education. Charges of favoritism were allegedly
hurled by some of the faculty members against Sta. Maria. On the other hand, the dean offered to sit down with the
students.The latter, however, refused to enter into a dialogue unless he (the dean) were first ousted.
In a separate development, the faculty members of the College of Education convened in the afternoon of July 22. They
resolved, amongst others, to recognize the right of a college dean to his position from which he cannot be removed unless
for cause (44 in favor, 2 abstained), and not to endorse the students' demand for the forced resignation of Sta. Maria (36 in
favor, 5 against, 3 abstained).
The boycott fever infected other colleges. On July 22, 1969, the newly installed members of the UP Student Council voted to
support the education students' strike. The next day, July 23, the main avenues leading to the university gates were
barricaded, buses denied entrance, and students cajoled into joining the strike. It was thus on that day that all academic
activity in the university came to a complete stand still. In the morning of July 23, at 10:00 o'clock, the UP President called a
meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained)
to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.
Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, on the same day, July 23, 1969, President Lopez issued the
transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. That order, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria, reads:
By special authority vested in me by the Board of Regents and pursuant to the Civil Service Law and the University Code,
you are hereby transferred from the College of Education to the Office of the President as Special Assistant8 with the rank of
Dean, without reduction in salary, in the interest of the service.
This transfer involves your administrative position only and in no way affects your status as professor of the University.
This order shall take effect immediately.
Simultaneously, President Lopez appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College of
Education, without additional compensation, effective July 23, 1969".
President Lopez was to explain in a press statement of July 23, 1969 that he "cannot permit the continued disruption of the
academic life of the institution"; that the transfer order was made "[i]n the interest of the service" and "as an emergency
measure" because the meetings with the faculty, students, Sta. Maria and the UP President had "proved fruitless in the face
ofthe refusal of the College of Education students to discuss any further their demands unless and until Dean Sta. Maria
resigns his position"; and that, therefore, "the complete shut-down of classes in the Diliman campus has compelled" him to
"transfer Dean Sta. Maria to other duties".
Having received the transfer order on the same day, July 23, Sta. Maria forthwith wrote a letter, which he himself hand
carried to President Lopez, requesting that "(a) a formal investigation be conducted by the Board of Regents on the
circumstances which led to the promulgation of the above order, and on the basis thereof; and (b) said order be
reconsidered and set aside forbeing manifestly unjust, unfair, unconstitutional, and contrary to law, and, therefore, null and
void."
The next day, July 24, Sta. Maria announced to the education students and faculty, through Memorandum 17, that the
transfer order "is now the subject of a pending request for reconsideration ... and, for this reason, its effectivity is necessarily
suspended", and that he shall continue "to be the Dean ... pursuant to his appointment as such for the period from January
1, 1968 to May 15, 1972."
On July 25, 1969, the education faculty signed a "Declaration of Concern" stating, amongst others, that when they gave
President Lopez a vote of confidence, they "did so in the belief and confidence that he ... will uphold the democratic
processes in the solution of the problem and will respect the fundamental rights of the individual." Similar declarations of
concern came from the faculties of law, medicine, arts and sciences, and nursing.
At President Lopez' request, a special meeting of the Board of Regents was held on July 25, 1969. President Lopez there
reported Dean Sta. Maria's transfer and Professor Ceralde's ad interim appointment as Acting Dean of the College of
Education. He told the board that because of "failure of leadership in the College of Education, a crisis of confidence
emerged in that institution"; that the ultimate result was the boycott of classes by the students "starting on July 17, 1969 in
protest against the inaction of Dean Sta. Maria on their demands submitted months ago"; and that this situation impelled
him to issue Administrative Order 77 "as demanded by the prevailing crisis."
The board confirmed Dean Sta. Maria's transfer and Professor Ceralde's appointment, considered as premature Sta. Maria's
Memorandum 17 heretofore mentioned, but gave due course to his plea for reconsideration and granted him a chance to
be heard at the next board meeting on July 29, 1969.

In the said meeting of July 29, Sta. Maria did not personally appear. He sent his counsel who manifested that Sta. Maria was
not recognizing the board's jurisdiction unless, without further hearing, the board first revoke the transfer order. The board
resolved: "... to take cognizance and consider as a new petition of Dean Sta. Maria, submitted through counsel, his
declaration that the efficacy of the President's Administrative Order No. 77 transferring him should first be suspended by the
Board and held in abeyance as a prerequisite f or the hearing being prayed for. In this connection, Dean Sta. Maria will be
asked to file a Memorandum with the Board in support of his new petition."
The foregoing had been the developments when Sta. Maria filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in this Court on July 31, 1969 against respondents Salvador P. Lopez, the Board of Regents and Nemesio R.
Ceralde.
The case is now ripe for decision.
1.
Discussion of the issues herein involved necessarily has to start with the examination of the terms of employment, the
covenant which binds petitioner with the university. The contract, it bears repeating, stipulates that the dean's five-year term
is qualified by the clause: "unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and obligations
attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines." The authority for this appointment is found in Article 79 of the university code providing that
"[t]he term of office of all deans ... shall be five years from the date of their appointment without prejudice to
reappointment and until their successors shall have been appointed.
We first look into the meaning of the phrase "unless sooner terminated" embodied in the contract of employment. Right at
the start, it would seem to us that the term "unless sooner terminated" cannot be equated or tied up with some such terms
as "terminable at will", or "removable at pleasure".
A number of reasons there are why petitioner may not be removed at pleasure before the expiry of his term. First. Petitioner's
contract of employment has a fixed term of five years. It is not an appointment in an acting capacity.9 Nor is petitioner's
designation that of an officer-in-charge as it is known in administrative practice. Second. Nothing in the rules and
regulations of the university or its charter would indicate that a college dean appointed with a term can be separated
without cause. On the contrary, reason there is to be believe that the university policy points quite to the contrary. An
instance is the resolution of the Board of Regents of June 14, 1961, fixing the term of office of the UP President. It was th ere
stated that "uncertainty of tenure and frequency of change in the incumbent of the position are not for the best interests of
the University." This concept is self-evident. Third. Again, there is nothing either in the UP charter or code empowering the UP
President or the Board of Regents to insert such a clause unless sooner
terminated as would authorize dismissal at will. Fourth. As this Court, in Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, 463, ruled, "strict
construction of law relating to suspension and removal, is the universal rule." Petitioner, with a definite term of employment,
may not thus be removed except for cause. The reasons being that the removal was not expressly declared to be
exercisable at pleasure or at will; and that the fixity of the term of office gives rise to the inference that he may be removed
from office only for misbehavior as to which he shall be entitled to notice and hearing. As was well pointed out in Lacson vs.
Roque, "[a]n inferential authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence of a defined term, ipso
facto negatives such an inference and implies a contrary presumption, i.e., that the incumbent shall hold office to the end
of his term subject to removal for cause." 10
The foregoing paves the way for the consideration of what we believe is the overriding question: Was Sta. Maria removed?
2.
Respondents stand on the premise that Sta. Maria was not removed; he was just temporarily assigned to another
position.
We may well start with the statement that a dean of a UP college holds a non-competitive or unclassified civil service
position. 11 As such, and upon the provisions of his contract of employment, he is protected by constitutional and statutory
provisions on security of term. 12 He cannot be removed during the term except for cause and after prior hearing and
investigation. 13 Which requisites are also embodied in the university charter 14 and in the university code." 15
But is there really need for a formal prior hearing? No need, respondents say. For, the Civil Service Law requires prior hearing
only in cases of removal, dismissal or suspension. Sta. Maria, respondents underscore, was not suspended, dismissed or
removed; he was merely transferred to another position without reduction in salary or rank in the interest of public service.
16 Respondents proceed to aver that the transfer was neither disciplinary nor punitive. 17 A promotion, so they claim,
because in the new position he would be an officer of the university not just of one college; 18 he would enjoy a rank at par
with senior college deans; 19 and that he would be in line for one of the vice-presidencies of the university. 20 Respondents
also say that such transfer was an emergency measure to stave off a crisis that gripped the campus the paralyzing
disruption of classes. 21 They emphasize that there was an urgent and genuine need for petitioner's talents and services in
the newly created Public Affairs and University Relations Office.
Quite interesting it is to inquire whether Dean Sta. Maria was transferred, promoted, demoted, or removed without his
consent.

3.
A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in
service." 22 Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as
authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary." 23
A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction 24 or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee
away from his permanent position", cannot be done without the employee's consent. 25 For that would constitute removal
from office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or employee is transfer can take place unless the officer of the
employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position. 26
When an officer is reduced in rank or grade and suffers a big cut in pay, he is demoted; 27 and when he is demoted, he is
removed from office. 28 But a demotion means something more than a reduction in salary: there may be a demotion in the
type of position though the salary may remain the same. 29 A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or
to force resignation also is removal. 30
4.
Concededly transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfers can be effected without the
need for charges being preferred, without trial or hearing, and even without the consent of the employee.
The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." 31 Where the appointment does not indicate a
specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title,
rank and salary. Thus, one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public Schools" and is designated to head a pilot
school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school. 32
And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is
appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. 33 Such a rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a
specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to
improve the service of the agency. 34 The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness
the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot be objected to. 35 Neither does illegality attach to
the transfer or reassignment of an officer pending the determination of an administrative Charge against him; 36 or to the
transfer of an employee from his assigned station to the main office, effected in good faith and in the interest of the service
pursuant to Section 82 of the Civil Service Act. 37
5.
The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of validity vis-a-vis the
principles just enunciated.
That the university is vested with corporate powers exercised by the board of regents and the President is a proposition
which is not open to question. 38 The board, upon recommendation of the President, is clothed with authority to hire and
fire after investigation and hearing. 39 The President, on the other hand, may fill vacancies temporarily, 40 transfer faculty
members 41 from one department to another, 42 and make arrangements to meet emergencies occurring between board
meetings so that the work of the university may not suffer. 43
To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University
of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university". His appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly,
to a specific station.
A line of distinction must be drawn between the office of dean and that of professor, say, of English and Comparative
Literature. A professor in the latter capacity may be assigned to handle classes from one college to another or to any other
unit in the university where English is offered. He may even be transferred from graduate school to undergraduate classes.
He cannot complain if such was done without his consent. He has no fixed station. 44 As for him, it can always be argued
that the interests of the service are paramount.
But a college dean holding an appointment with a fixed term stands on a different plane. He cannot, without his consent,
be transferred before the end of his term. He cannot be asked to give up his post. Nor may he be appointed as dean of
another college. Much less can he be transferred to another position even if it be dignified with a dean's rank. 45
6.
We now come to the problem of whether or not petitioners transfer from the College of Education to the Office of
the President as special assistant with the rank of dean without reduction in salary was permanent. Facts there are which
would show that far from being a temporary measure, petitioner's transfer was in fact a removal.
Respondent university president himself admitted that the transfer order was an ad interim appointment. That the transfer
was a removal has been confirmed by the UP President's reference to Sta. Maria's deanship of the College of Education as
his "former position". This plainly indicates that Sta. Maria ceased to be dean of the college. Thus:
The validity of Dean Sta. Maria's designation or appointment as Special Assistant to the President rests upon two acts:

(a)
The transfer order of July 23, 1969, which operates as an ad interim appointment under Art. 44(e) of the Revised U.P.
Code; and
(b)

The confirmation on such appointment by the Board of Regents in its special meeting on July 25, 1969. 46

And again:
The position of Special Assistant to the President with the rank of Dean carries equal, if not higher, rank than the position of
Dean of the College of Education. As Special Assistant to the President, Dean Sta. Maria has become an officer of the
University while in his former position, he was merely an officer of the college in the University. 47
Not that the foregoing stand alone. The reasons advanced by respondents to justify such transfer are quite revealing. They
pictured Sta. Maria as a bungling administrator, incompetent, inefficient, unworthy, a miscast. They averred that he did not
act on the petitions and grievances of graduate students; that he caused widespread dissatisfaction amongst faculty
members and students because of his "inaction", his "lack of sincerity and candor in dealing" with them, that he was guilty of
"inflexible arrogant attitude and actuation" as dean; that he miserably failed to avert a boycott that was caused by a "crisis
of confidence" and "failure of leadership" in his college; that he abandoned his post when he was most needed; that he
refused to accept solutions even as he failed to advance his own to mitigate the crisis; that in sum, he was a miscast in the
College of Education. 48 Of course, these are merely charges. But they collectively reflect the thinking of respondents
toward petitioner. In the picture thus presented, it would not be unreasonable to say that Sta. Maria's transfer was with the
character of permanence to take him away from his duties and responsibilities as dean, in all of which allegedly he was a
failure.
And if more were needed to show that the transfer of Sta. Maria was permanent, there is the fact that Nemesio Ceralde
was appointed "ad interim" acting dean of the College of Education. And, Ceralde's appointment was confirmed by the
Board of Regents on July 25, 1969. Again, there is respondent's averment that petitioner's new position as special assistant to
the President could be a stepping-stone to a higher position that of Vice Presidency of the university. Were his
appointment but temporary, there would be no occasion to say that he could be elevated to another position of a higher
category.
More than this, the transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university, being an academic
position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists
the President, as the title indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The position of
dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and responsibility. A special assistant
does not rise above the level of staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter, and
cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by
law; it was a creation of the university president.
It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In actual administrative practice, the
terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it
could have been intended to be. But actually he is a dean without a college.
7.
Respondents nonetheless insist that the "interest of the service" is the primary reason for the transfer. They say that
there was an urgent need to bring the academic life of the university back to normal and Sta. Maria's transfer was the only
feasible solution. They point to the need for petitioner's services in the Office of Public Affairs and University Relations
purportedly "to improve the relations of the University with its various constituencies." They cling to the principle of "least
sacrifice. 49 They urge that only three options were left to the university, namely: to keep Sta. Maria at all costs and risk an
indefinite paralysis of the university life; to give due course to the charges filed against Sta. Maria, preventively suspend him
during the investigation, and after hearing dismiss him if the evidence so warrants; and to transfer him as a non-disciplinary
measure in the interest of the service. Respondents claim that the first option was out of the question. The reason they give is
that the university could not afford an indefinite disruption of academic life. To respondents, the second was feasible but
distasteful the administration was in no mood to prejudice Sta. Maria through a proceeding that would reflect on his
record. So the university administration opted for the third method, a solution said to be the most convenient and
expeditious and based on the principle of "least sacrifice".
Implicit in the university's stand is that Dean Sta. Maria had to be uprooted from his position as a price to buy the peace of
the students and induce them to return to their classes. Such could have been an easy way to climb out of difficulties. But
transfer could be but a ploy to cover dismissal. And dismissal cannot be justified on grounds of expediency. Appropriately to
be remembered here is that due process is associated with the sporting idea of fair play; 50 it shuns oppression and
eschews unfair dealing; it obeys the dictates of justice and is ruled by reason. The Scriptures no less remind us to hear before
we condemn. 51 Fidelity to this cardinal principle must have impelled Congress, just recently, to clarify the authority to
transfer subordinate officers and employees, an authority so often misused and abused to ride roughshod over hapless civil
servants. As amended, the Civil Service Law provides that "if the employee believes that there is no justification for the
transfer, he may appeal his case ... and pending his appeal and decision thereon, his transfer shall be held in abeyance."
This was intended to fortify the protective wall built around the employee's right to security of tenure, to guard against

unbridled encroachments masquerading in the "interest of the service". And, to think that this amendment came just a few
days after Sta. Maria was transferred without prior hearing.
The current climate of activism of the young people, recognized to be worldwide, whether on or off campus, is a
phenomenon in this country that commands attention. Demonstrations and boycotts which are manifestations of such
activism are constitutionally protected. But there are limits. A fundamental precondition to the exercise of such rights, we
perceive, is that the activity should not impair the rights of others whose roots are as deep and as equally protected by ironclad guarantees. A high regard to a man's dignity is the hallmark of our law.
The students demanded Sta. Maria's ouster. The President of the university acceded to their demand. But Sta. Maria's right
to be removed only, in the words of the law, "after due process" was disregarded. That Sta. Maria's right alone was impaired
is not justification for the action taken against him. Unless, of course, justice be-replaced by collective action as the test for
validity. And, unless we admit that arbitrariness is permissible if it comes from an impersonal multitude.
Nor may it be assumed that emergency could justify disregard of constitutional rights. It would seem pertinent to observe
that a fundamental charter is for all times and for all conditions. Eloquent are these passages from the declaration of
concern from the College of Law faculty:
We, the faculty of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, view with the utmost concern the removal of Felixberto
Sta. Maria from his position as Dean of the College of Education by the President of the University of the Philippines.
As members of the academic community that is the University, as members of the Philippine Bar, and as citizens of our
Republic, we speak out in protest against this violation of the Rule of Law in our midst and the clear disregard of the
fundamental rights of one of our colleagues.
A member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines, pleading for his day in court, asking to be heard in his defense,
desirous to confront his accusers, and appealing for a hearing by a disinterested body, has been summarily condemned
without trial. He has been punished without evidence formally presented. He has been stripped of his powers and
prerogatives as Dean, in violation of that most basic and fundamental right that no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty or property without due process of law and in accordance with the regularly established procedures.
Our concern has nothing to do with the merits of the case against Felixberto Sta. Maria. We protest the procedure that was
followed in disregard of due process. Under a legal system like ours, there are established procedures to settle disputes. The
arbitrary rule of one or the mob rule of the many are alien to our free institutions. Under existing university rules and practice,
charges against students, no matter how minor, are formally investigated. Why should a dean be entitled to less?
We are aware that the action against Dean Sta. Maria was denominated a transfer to other duties in the University without
reduction in rank or salary. This thin veneer of legalism, this transparent attempt to follow the letter but not the spirit of the
Constitution, the University Charter, the U.P. Revised Code, the Civil Service Law, and the Civil Service Rules and Regulations
deceives no one. Who can, in good conscience, honestly say that Dean Sta. Maria has not been reduced in rank, privileges
and prerogatives? Who can discount his moral anguish and suffering?
The vote of confidence given by the faculty of the College of Education notwithstanding, the President of the University
remains bound by and can act only in consonance with, the Rule of Law.
We agree with the President that there should be no disruption of the academic life of the community. Like him, we want
peace, but not at any price. Peace secured at the expense of Constitutional principles is no peace at all; and the peace
just now obtained is no more than a transitory lull, a precarious interlude that could lead to even more serious disorders and
disregard of fundamental rights.
We also regard with alarm this action against Dean Sta. Maria because of its consequences on the morale of the faculty.
The exercise of independent judgment in the performance of academic responsibilities is imperilled where the force of
numbers can replace the rational solution to a controversy.
Believing that the action taken against Dean Sta. Maria is not irreversible, we submit to the President of the University this
declaration of concern, urging him to reconsider his action. 52
8.
The argument that the transfer of Sta. Maria was made in the interest of public service has dwindled in strength on
the face of the circumstances. Of course, the university is under compulsion to bring normalcy to the campus, to end the
boycott of classes. The decision to transfer could really refract the temper of the times. We do say, however, that emotion
or muscle need not displace reason.
Nor do we believe it too difficult for the authorities to hew to the line drawn by the due process clause, to cause charges to
be formalized, Sta. Maria suspended, and given a fair chance to defend himself. This procedure does not necessarily bring
about humiliation. On the contrary, it exudes the spirit of fairness.

The baneful effects of Sta. Maria's transfer were easily and promptly felt. The professors in different faculties were alarmed.
Obviously they felt that to compel a professor to give up his constitutional right is beyond tolerance. A declaration of
concern was expressed not only by the faculty of the College of Law as aforesaid but also the Colleges of Education, Arts
and Sciences, Medicine and PGH School of Nursing, all of the UP.
More than these, such transfer undermined the integrity of UP. The university buckled under strain, yielded where it should
have upheld its commitment to the rule of law. Peace may not be secured at the expense of consecrate constitutional
principles. A contrary rule could lead to more serious disorders.
9.
Respondents urge that "the traditional concepts and requirements of due press could not be made to apply to
every kind of administrative action, without the consequent inefficiency and frustration of legislative purpose." They argue
that certain types of administrative action may be taken without prior hearing and still satisfy the requirements of due
process. The existence of a public emergency, they insist, would suffice to justify summary action. To prop up their stand,
respondents cite such summary administrative actions as distraint of a delinquent taxpayer's property; 53 abatement of a
nuisance per sep; 54 cancellation of a passport of one who absconds to another country to evade criminal prosecution. 55
No question that a summary administrative action is appropriate in the cases cited. Examples can be multiplied. Thus,
without providing for a prior hearing, a bank conservator may seize a distressed bank; 56 the Food and Drug Administrator
may confiscate harmful drugs whose labels are allegedly misleading; 57 the Civil Aeronautics Board may suspend a letter of
registration; 58 and the Securities and Exchange Commission may suspend the license of a securities dealer to deal in small
offerings. 59 In all these cases, the courts have uniformly ruled that due process does not require judicial inquiry as a
condition to the exercise of administrative discretion. "It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is
at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination." 60
We can go on citing cases where regulatory agencies, in a manner of speaking, shoot first before asking questions without
offending against due process. But it is pointless to cite them here, much less rely upon them to support Sta. Maria's
unconsented transfer. For central to those cases is that they involve the exercise of regulatory authority pursuant to a
delegated police power. The reason these agencies are given such summary powers is that they come to grip with issues
that are mostly scientific and technical, issues that are "perhaps not readily reducible to the simple question-and-answer
method so dearly beloved by lawyers." 61 Hence, in place of formal hearing they resort to inspection, examination and
testing techniques regarded as sufficient substitutes upon which to base an administrative action. 62 Whether poultry is
putrid, or drug is harmful, or a ship is unseaworthy, are matters better left to scientific analysis or technical inspection without
the need of a formal hearing. Based on such examination and inspection, summary orders for condemnation or
confiscation may follow.
But the UP President's decision to summarily take the deanship away from Sta. Maria cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be cast in the same type of administrative actions that regulatory agencies exercise under a delegated police power. The
UP President's action here is unlike that, for instance, of the Central Bank in removing the officers of a floundering bank in
order to take over its management. 63 Not even the so-called emergency situation in the campus could be invoked to firm
up his summary action. Seemingly, the decision to transfer Sta. Maria was dictated by the howling protest of demonstrating
students who wanted to muscle in their demands for curriculum changes. But precisely, it is in situations such as this that one
should be on guard lest reason and justice be overwhelmed by excitement and passion.
10.
Again, respondents cite the so called "crisis of confidence" and "failure of leadership" in the College of Education.
Allegedly, these factors caused the student boycott which UP tried to avert by the expedient of banishing Sta. Maria from,
and effectively depriving him of his deanship, of the College of Education.
The boycott, we are made to understand, was called because Sta. Maria resisted the pressures exerted by the graduate
students. He refused to give in to their demands demands that sought to eliminate or influence the direction of curricular
requirements, specifically those which pertain to foreign languages and comprehensive examinations. The graduate
students, it is alleged, considered these requirements as "obsolete vestiges of colonial education, ... activities which do not
in any way add to the learning activity of the student." 64
Of course, students are entitled to petition school administrators for change in curriculum, faculty, and school regulations. 65
Elders should listen to what they say, and respond to their plea for university instructions that have relevance in their
education. 66
This is a fast changing age of ferment and activism. Every day new discoveries change man's life, morals, and attitude. The
university therefore cannot remain aloof to the contemporary scene. 67 Perhaps the Wilsonian description of the ideal
University as a place where "calm science" sits "not knowing that the world passes", a place where past and present are
discussed "with knowledge and without passion", a place "slow to take excitement" and unlike the world outside "in its selfpossession ..." 68 would now appear to be anachronistic.

The students are "probably right in much of what they say, however wrong their prescriptions for righting matters." 69 When
they protest whether against the college administration or against the Establishment, they should be accorded the full
scope of the constitutional protection to free speech and assembly. 70 On the other hand, any decision or action to give in
to their demands must not be dictated solely by their "readiness ... to shout down and in other ways to stifle the free
expression of opinion of those with whom they disagree." 71 Otherwise, the probability exists that a minority group of
students may succeed in their attempt to impose, by disruptive action, their views or their will on the majority. What indeed
is deplorable is "when we are confronted only with violence for violences sake, and with attempts to frighten or intimidate
an administration into doing things for which it can itself see neither the rationale nor the electoral mandate; when we are
offered, as the only argument for change, the fact that a number of people are themselves very angry and excited; and
when we are presented with a violent objection to what exists, unaccompanied by any constructive concept of what,
ideally, ought to exist in its place." 72
Compelling is the need to adhere to the traditional democratic processes and procedures to secure action and redress.
Decisions that are prodded by ultimatums and tantrums are generally regarded with apprehension.
It was in the face of student revolt that the university officials buckled under and gave in to the students' protest against the
continued presence of Dean Sta. Maria in the College of Education.
11.
And yet, a close look into the so-called unfulfilled demands abolition of foreign language and comprehensive
examination would reveal that. Dean Sta. Maria could not have unilaterally granted them.
On the foreign language requirement, the students manifested that it is
... absurd and obsolete. Foreign students fulfill this requirement by an examination in their language. Many of us take
Spanish for the sake of completing the requirements. We understand that these requirements in other universities equip the
students for his research. So if a student is doing research on Spanish laws governing the educational system and would
need to use Spanish, therefore he has to have a reading knowledge of Spanish. Such is not the case with us. We demand
that this requirement be abolished in the graduate's level. 73
On the comprehensive examination requirements, the students say:
... The present practice is by subject, excluding the cognates. Graduate students believe that they are taking another final
examination in a subject they have already passed. We question the absence of policy as to who should give
comprehensive examination. We demand that the College consider the use of qualifying examination aside from the
Dean's proposed admissions test. 74
These requirements, we believe, are aimed at the development of the student's depth of insight and breadth of view. This,
after all, is an end that a university education strives to attain. Foreign languages, should be conceded, widen a man's
world. Spanish, in particular, is one of the links to our past. We can but surmise that Dean Sta. Maria had cogent reasons to
sidetrack the demands. It is within the realm of probabilities that the dean wanted to preserve the high standards of
professional scholarship in the college. Perhaps he was loathe to turn his college into a factory for half-baked graduates.
The University of the Philippines, we must remember, has set a standard and established a tradition for learning and
leadership.
Consider, too, the fact that the education students are the future mentors of the youth. Necessarily, they are expected to
come through college with as thorough and extensive preparation as possible if they are to serve as educational leaders
and models for scholarship.
On top of all, Dean Sta. Maria cannot single-handy do away with these requirements. The responsibility for fixing the
academic requisites for graduation and the receiving of a degree is lodged not in the dean but in the university council,
composed of the President of the university and all faculty members from assistant professor to full professor. 75 The Dean
may only recommend proposals affecting courses of study." 76
But Dean Sta. Maria had not been remiss in his duties. Truth to tell, the students admit that Dean Sta. Maria was not after all
unreasonably inflexible, intransigent He sympathetically listened to them, and broadly satisfied those demands that were
within his power as Dean to give, short of compromising the academic standards of the university. indeed, the President of
the Education Graduate Student Organization appreciated the Dean's efforts to meet some of our demands". But Dean
Sta. Maria could go no further. He went along with the students as far as the limits of his power and discretion would allow
him to go. Only the University Council and the Board of Regents could recast the academic requirements in the way the
students wanted them to be. If so, why did they not act on the issue to avert the crisis? But perhaps the university
administration would not want to risk the downgrading of the university's academic standards.
The editor of the Philippine Collegian, writing the valedictory editorial, said:

We criticized an administration which seemed to sway to the tune of student power as a sheer force. The administration
cannot act only because of a show of might; it must have reasons for any act. And it must make these reasons known,
acting because of them without waiting for the prodding of power.
No decision of the President should be forced by emergency, or consideration of expediency. If emergency, or
expediency, or the fear of student power muscle are the only reasons for a decision, then the decision should not be taken
at all.
On the other hand, if a decision is impending, and is going to be taken anyway, then the decision-makers should not wait
to be forced into the decision by an emergency situation. They should decide, and avert that situation which is so costly in
terms of class hours and the integrity of the decision. And then, in terms of the reaction of the people involved by that
dubiously-taken decision.
Because we cannot allow it to appear that the University is being ruled by the considerations of expediency, or by the
dictates of emergency. The University must be guided by things less base and more basic. It must be ruled by reason, by
justice, by the search for truth. This should always be made clear, and always be respected. The University can be neither a
self-designed social instrument nor an institution ruled by force. It is there, if anywhere, that we must be true to reason. 77
It is because of all the foregoing that we are left under no doubt that petitioner Felixberto Sta. Maria is entitled to be
restored to his position as Dean of the College of Education.
12.
Just as we are about to draw this opinion to a close, our attention is drawn to the alleged non exhaustion of
administrative remedies. A sufficient answer would be that Dean Sta. Maria asked that he be restored to his position
pending investigation of any charge against him. But the board refused. Instead, it confirmed the ad interim appointment
of respondent Prof. Nemesio Ceralde as "acting Dean" in place of Sta. Maria. Virtually the door was closed. Nothing was left
for Sta. Maria to do but go to Court. 78
Of course, Sta. Maria stood pat on his right to keep his position as Dean. This is perfectly understandable. Hindsight now
reveals that further pursuit of administrative remedy before the Board of Regents would be but an act of supererogation At
any rate, there is no compelling reason to resort to this remedy.79 Here, the claimed right is the constitutionally protected
due process. Mandamus will lie. 80
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for is hereby granted; the transfer of petitioner
Felixberto C. Sta. Maria from his position as Dean of the College of Education, University of the Philippines, to the position of
Special Assistant to the President, University of the Philippines, as well as the ad interim appointment of Prof. Nemesio
Ceralde "as acting Dean" of the College of Education, University of the Philippines, are hereby set aside and declared null
and void; the writ of mandamus prayed for is hereby granted, and the President and the Board of Regents of the University
of the Philippines are hereby ordered to restore said petitioner Felixberto C. Sta. Maria to his position of Dean, College of
Education, University of the Philippines.
No costs. So ordered.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
There is much in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Sanchez, impressive for its grasp of the law and breadth of scholarship,
that commends itself for acceptance. Nonetheless, I feel called upon to express my concurrence separately as for me the
question at issue could be viewed from a narrower perspective. It could also be said, and this is not intended by way of
criticism, that the opinion of the Court could have accorded a more explicit recognition of the complexity of the problems
that sorely beset the President of the University of the Philippines and thus result in greater understanding and sympathy for
his efforts to arrive at a correct and just solution. As the question before us is one of power, however, even the best of
motive cannot be a substitute. Not only must the objective sought to be attained be within the law, but the means
employed must not suffer from a legal infirmity. To be more specific, in the case before us, I am unable to reach a
conclusion other than that procedural due process had not been observed in the removal of petitioner.
The view I take of the matter is thus in conformity with that expressed in the opinion of the Court. Considering all the
circumstances discussed with the fullness of detail by Justice Sanchez, the steps taken by the University administration, even
if susceptible to the interpretation that they were equivocal at most, had not been purged of the taint of unfairness thus
calling into operation the protection afforded by the due process guaranty. There should be by this time no need to stress
the obvious that insofar as security of tenure and the right to the perquisites are concerned, a public office is indeed
property of which the occupant cannot be deprived save in accordance with its dictates.1 Nonetheless, to erase any
lingering doubts on the matter, there is nothing inappropriate in reaffirming such a principle. Nor is there anything
incompatible with the principle thus reiterated with the fundamental postulate that a public office is preeminently a public
trust,the exercise of the authority thus conferred being conditioned on the official having uppermost in mind what is best for
public welfare.

Necessarily then in accordance with the security of tenure guarranty2 of the Constitution and its statutory implementation
under the Civil Service Act,3 this Court has been committed to the principle that a public official may secure judicial redress
for any suspension or removal contrary to such mandateso explicitly announced, irrespective of the motives that may have
inspired such a move, if thereby the ground for such disciplinary action is untenable or the procedure followed is irregular. A
host of decisions attests to such a long, unbroken, impressive course of adjudication.4 The decision reached by us in this
case is therefore solidly buttressed in authoritative pronouncements. It is well that it is so. Whatever inconvenience may thus
be visited on attempts concededly taken in the utmost good faith to resolve a critical impasse is more than offset by
adherence to the rule of law.
The Constitution, being the supreme law, its supremacy must be upheld, its mandates deemed controlling. There is no
justification for any of its commands being disregarded Or set at naught. As so eloquently put in Ex parte Milligan:5 "The
Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." Petitioner, if he could show that no deference was paid to his constitutional right to due process, could thus
seek judicial relief, the courts being duty bound to maintain inviolate the provisions of the fundamental law.
Nor is such a remedy precluded by petitioner pursuing a course of conduct which apparently had given cause for grave
dissatisfaction on the part of the student body. Much less could the expression of discontent on the part of the student
body, immoderate in character, giving rise to what could plausibly be looked upon from the standpoint of the University
administration as an emergency call for the application of a different principle. It is precisely under such circumstances that
the paramount character of the Constitution must be accorded due recognition. As so forcefully stressed by former Chief
Hughes: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its
grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of
emergency and they are not altered by emergency."6
It is to the credit of the opinion of Justice Sanchez that while being fully cognizant of the amplitude of the constitutional right
on the part of the students to assembly and petition, it reminds them of the limits thereof. The beneficial results that could be
expected of student activism, expressed at times with more vehemence than the occasion would call for, might not come
to pass if the boundaries of legally permissible conduct are overstepped. It would seem to me that the sense of maturity
and the spirit of calm deliberation that should permeate an academic atmosphere should be antidotes to what at times
may be the impatience and exuberance of the young carried to excess. The words of Justice Frankfurter come to mind: "It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free
speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in
order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free
speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to
reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution ."7
To the possible objection that there is an air of unreality to the preceding observation as the University administration was
confronted not by what ought to have been but what in fact was, it suffices to answer that even then deference to the rule
of law was not thereby rendered impossible. It is to be admitted that it was much more difficult under the circumstances,
but that of itself certainly could not justify its disregard. This is not to say that there was such an intent. Far from it. It must be
conceded that on the facts as shown, there was no thought on the part of the University authorities to trample on the rights
of petitioner. Their motive, as had been noted, was to solve the impasse with the best interests of the entire University
constituency uppermost. Nonetheless, the purest of motives, to repeat, does not warrant a deviation from what the law
prescribes.
Nor could reliance be had on the clause that did confer on the University administration the power to put an end to
petitioner's continuance in his position as Dean. While the term was fixed at five years, it could be "sooner terminated." In
entire good faith then, it could be interpreted as permitting what was done. If that were all, then no due process question
would have arisen. Such was not the case though. Charges, not trivial in character, were in fact lodged against petitioner.
To put an end to his term then without giving him a hearing was to condemn him, considering that apparently t ere was no
indication that such a thing was previously contemplated, until the attitude of the students did assume such belligerent
posture. It is one thing to inform an official that for the best interest of the service, and without reflection on his actuations, a
new man should be placed at the helm. It is an entirely different matter, if subjected as he was to accusations reflecting on
his performance as such official, he is summarily relieved without the formal hearing to which due process entitles him. It is
on this precise ground that I vote for the granting of the petition and concur in the result reached by the Court.

G.R. Nos. 119987-88

October 12, 1995

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case
has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre
and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth
tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of
Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.
When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without
her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her
head bashed in.
xxx
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided over by respondent
Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after
attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio
Lagunday was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision 2 on
January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessories provided for by law." 3 Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8,
1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed"
against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits
of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack
of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:
The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with the legal
requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court cannot take cognizance of the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein accused is hereby
reiterated.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with the notices of
appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's determination of guilt and its
conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on appeal. We have thus clinically limited our
narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at
hand, i.e., whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he
failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
We find for petitioner.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties
of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought

"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial fou nd
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound
by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . . 6
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death.
While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the
discretion depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed to impose the penalty of
either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three
instances. The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial
judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this
Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted
debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in
specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient
one, but it is a matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality
of laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:
[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving at a conclusi on
and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible error, then we are constrained
to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge
or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of
people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the
duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the
courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of
the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary
is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members
of the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as
harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its amendment,
modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it effect as decreed by the lawmaking body. 8
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and
civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in
which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so
doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding
that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the
decision imposing the death penalty.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators.
The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section
458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila
Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance
did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third,
the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through
those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances.
All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels
but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the
extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only
on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act
upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke
as well the constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to
liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference
with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure
and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and
whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the
operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental
encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government,
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range
from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government
action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the
due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal
thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be,
is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the
libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired
potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its
application.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the
evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene
Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two standards of judicial review
were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational
basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in
equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.57 Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.58
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio,
Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In accordance with this case, the
rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be
no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts
before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications
in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it
cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our
purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the
case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed,
they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that
experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he
ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty;
in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate
uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in
a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest
between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in
need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry
that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition
of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.
(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality
of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has
now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. 4
While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised
there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered

enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not,
as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely
different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions,
they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest
tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance
by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact
may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be
the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the
contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and
so heal the wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that
the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really
necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine
ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.
It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to
avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause,
however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to
delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P.
Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and
immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of
the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the
changing times and circumstances may require.
Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11
Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and
in so doing sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of
the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of
the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages,
as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is
entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question;
the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the
issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment

based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or
intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system
that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who,
out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption
is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed
therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic
drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense
may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily
padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous
judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by
due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as
the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him
even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as
the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only
proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these
traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and
preserve them.
A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate
killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the
reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient
famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had
spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held
that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was
required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of
the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes
was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and
dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos
but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable
connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make
it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it
could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their
transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuriesold guaranty of elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In
the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why
the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and
the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution.
There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the
grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive
Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent
of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the
competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never
have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli
despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that
pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated,
allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever
they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to
them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.

G.R. No. L-39276 February 24, 1975

JOSE ESPELETA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CELSO AVELINO, as Presiding Judge, CFI, Cebu City, Branch XIII; and SHELL PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
Buenaventura A. Reposar and Manuel Benedicto for petitioner.
Fernan, Osmea and Associates for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
It is the sad plaint of petitioner in this certiorari proceeding that he was denied procedural due process when respondent
Judge in a spirit of unwanted generosity towards private respondent corporation, Shell Philippines, Inc., acceded to its plea
that the testimony of a witness deemed by him as vital to his case be ignored and disregarded in its entirety for failure to be
present in court on the day set for her cross-examination. There was a motion for postponement, but it did not prosper. The
challenged order is self-explanatory: "The oral motion of plaintiff's counsel Rodolfo Bellaflor that the direct testimony of
Adelfa Montano, the last witness for the defendant, not having been finished and she not having been cross-examined due
to her failure to appear this morning in spite of the fact that she was duly notified in open court of today's hearing, be
considered stricken from the records, and that the plaintiff be allowed to present a rebuttal witness in connection with the
testimony of defendant Jose Espeleta, being well taken, is hereby granted. The records show that this is not the first time that
the counsel for defendant Manuel Benedicto had sent a telegram to this Court while he is in Tacloban City, requesting
postponement of the hearing of this case after having been duly notified of said hearing, which actuation is tantamount to
delaying the administration of justice. Having presented its rebuttal witness, Maximo Villarin, plaintiff closed its case. The
defendant is given ten (10) days from receipt hereof within which to offer in writing his documentary evidence, but with
regards only to those documents he identified during his testimony, considering that those presented and identified during
Montano's testimony (as well as her testimony) are already considered stricken from the records. Plaintiff Shell Philippines,
Inc. is also given the same number of days from receipt of defendant's written offer of documentary evidence within which
to submit its manifestation or objection." 1
If respondent Judge were to be sustained, then clearly evidence which for petitioner was indispensable for his side of the
case to be aired would be treated as non-existent. To that extent, he was not heard at all. Nor is it of legal relevance that
respondent Judge was provoked to take the step he did just because it was not the first time petitioner had sought
continuance, for as pointed out in the petition, private respondent did at one time move to have the hearing postponed
on the ground that its first witness would get married on the scheduled date. 2 The crucial point is to ascertain whether in
thus ruling, respondent Judge had eroded petitioner's right to a day in court. Slated differently, the specific issue then is
whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if under the circumstances
disclosed, the right to be heard of petitioner if not rendered nugatory would thus be emasculated. Not once but twice he
moved to reconsider, but respondent Judge did not budge from his stand, now assailed as being vitiated by constitutional
infirmity. 3 In view of the decidedly liberal interpretation of the cardinal precept of due process that justice be done to the
parties both procedurally and substantively, consistently adhered to from United States v. Ling Su Fan, 4 a 1908 decision, to
Philippine Maritime Industrial Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 5 promulgated of last year, petitioner is entitled to the
remedy sought.
We grant certiorari.
1.
Why there was an impairment of the right to be heard on a matter rightfully deemed essential was in the petition
set forth thus: "This case is for Recovery of Sum of Money filed by private respondents [Shell] alleging that your Petitioner
purchased products of [Shell] in the total sum of P264,250.29 and that out of this sum your Petitioner allegedly paid
P242,029.04 only leaving a balance of P22,221.25 still unpaid; while your Petitioner in his answer alleged that the unpaid
balance was only P14,376.79 and to be deducted from this amount was the sum of P8,711.28 value of the liters of gasoline
not actually delivered by private respondent to your Petitioner during the period from January, 1972 to August, 1972, and
the amount of P5,994.00 representing the cost of gasoline leakage and wastage caused by the leak of the underground
tank plus the usual allowance for evaporation. Your Petitioner therefore, felt it necessary to present Miss [Adelfa Montano],
a Certified Public Accountant to show to the lower court the true figures of the transactions after accounting. It will be
noted that the only witness for the Plaintiff was Mr. Joseph Smith, Sales representative of [Shell] and resident of 286-A
Sikatuna St., Cebu City, who was not privy to the bookkeeping and accounting of the accounts of transaction during the
entire period. Your Petitioner felt therefore the need of presenting Miss [Adelfa Montano] a Certified Public Accountant who
unfortunately was a new employee in the Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development at
the time she was supposed to continue her testimony on that fateful day of April 4, 1974 and therefore could not disregard
the orders of her superiors to make an urgent audit in Baybay, Leyte and instead informed Atty. Manuel Benedicto of her
unavailability so that Atty. Benedicto could make the proper representation with the Honorable lower court for possible
deferment." 6 The two-page answer of private respondent did not even bother to deny the importance for petitioner of the

testimony of Miss Montano stricken from the records. Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due
process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than
just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. It cannot be truly asserted
then that the proceedings satisfied the constitutional standard for a judicious inquiry. To that extent, it would make a
mockery of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a trial where the litigants are given full and unimpeded
opportunity to sustain their respective claims and to have their evidence duly considered and weighed. Unless, the
challenged order then were set aside, petitioner can assert a grievance grounded on the due process guarantee. 7
2.
Respondent Judge would justify the aforesaid order by characterizing the request for postponement as
"tantamount to delaying the administration of justice." 8 He was not exactly mindful of a 1916 admonition of this Court,
through the pen of Justice Carson, in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, 9 when it warned that "a sound discretion in this regard should
be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to
turn the scales of justice rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance." 10 Again, while it is true that it is
within a court's discretionary power to act on a motion for continuance, 11 it is far from unlimited. Due heed must be paid to
the procedural due process mandate. So it was decided as far back as 1929, in Cing Hong So v. Tan Boon Kong, 12 with
Justice Romualdez as ponente: "In cases like the present where a party litigant, without malice, fault, or inexcusable
neglect, is not prepared for the trial of a case, the court exceeds the discretion conferred upon it by law in denying to said
litigant a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the trial and to obtain due process of law and proper protection under the
law." 13 Restated differently, the controlling doctrine is summed up he words of Justice A. Reyes, in Capitol Subdivision, Inc.
v. Province of Negros Occidental, 14 promulgated in 1956: "Liberality should be exercised in granting postponements of trial
to obtain presence of material evidence and to prevent miscarriage of justice." 15 This, for the quite obvious reason: "While
the granting or refusal of motions for continuance is discretionary, that discretion must be exercised wisely with a view to
substantial justice." 16 So procedural due process requires on Luciano v. Tan, 17 the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant
postponement was cured by the Court reopening the case precisely to comply with such a basic precept. That approach
ought to have been followed by respondent Judge when he was asked to reconsider not once but twice. He ought to
have fixed a date for Miss Montano to be subjected to cross-examination, thereby complying with the constitutional
safeguard of assuring the parties their day in court.
3.
One other matter. A reminder to counsel for respondents, Rodolfo M. Bellaflor by name, may not be out of place.
His performance in this certiorari proceeding invites attention. When asked to comment, he did so in a one-page pleading.
When required to answer, he was not that terse or laconic; he actually was able to make use of two pages. In the
memorandum that he prepared for respondents, he appeared to have really extended himself. He had four pages to show
for it, although the last sheet of paper contained merely his signature and the notation that copy was furnished opposing
counsel. There is something to be said for brevity, but not in this case. It is even more deplorable that there appeared to be
a total lack of awareness of the due process implications of the petition. There was the rather unorthodox assertion that a
constitutional question was one essentially factual. It was not so much the brevity then of his pleadings but their failure to
come to grips with the crucial issue that vitiated whatever persuasive aspect they might have had. Insofar as this particular
litigation is concerned then, it may be said that he hardly lived up to the role expected of one called upon to defend his
client's cause with zeal and of an officer of the court appearing before this Tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of April 4, 1974, issued by respondent Judge is set aside,
nullified and considered as totally devoid of any force or effect. The case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings in accordance with law and in consonance with this decision, more specifically that the testimony of Miss
Montano remains in the records subject to the test of cross-examination, if any, by private respondent. Costs against Shell
Philippines, Inc.

LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 PERALTA, J.:
JULY 8, 2014 / ARDYESGUERRA
FACTS:
Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days.
The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.
Corpuz argued as follows:
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.
b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the date when crime
occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence rule (only original
documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?
Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testi fied
upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecutions formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of confidence?
No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1,
subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime. Hence, the exclusion of the period and the
wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective.
Further, the following satisfies the sufficiency of information:
1. The designation of the offense by the statute;
2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information indicates that the time of offense was committed on or about the
5th of July 1991, such is not fatal to the prosecutions cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?
Note first that the elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt;

(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.
The specific word demand need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged,
since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query
was tantamount to a demand.
May a sole witness be considered credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of
the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness
stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.
----There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on
crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years
ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that
the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in
cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may
be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law
and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The
premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is
similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be noncommensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the
court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no
punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with
penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such

eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate
Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with mercy.
Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the
penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are
questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the
legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation rate or at the
ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the
definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of
the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a selfamending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included
the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the
same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those
who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the
legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to
the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over
50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds
said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5
pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states that the penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if
the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the
penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto

mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon
or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in
its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem
that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage
caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining
the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to
the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor
medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and to prision
correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional
minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are not changed,
as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty
provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid classification. The
test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may
have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those
who commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved,
because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions,
which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the
amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions
than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for
them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress.
Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00)
Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would
... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were
suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing
Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a
similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form.
The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.;
(1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed
on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what respondent therein
deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist
statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime
would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior felony
convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.