G.R. No.

209287

July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN; JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON, PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN,
CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE,
BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN,
ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR,
YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209135
AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN
MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE SENATE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209136
MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209155

ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.;
AND THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209164
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E.
DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209260
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209442
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE
AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ,Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.;
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, REPRESENTED BY
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA; AND THE BUREAU
OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA V. DE LEON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209517

CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN CEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST
VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.; ROSALINDA
NARTATES, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
CONSOLIDATED UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY (CUENHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR HIMSELF AND AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAP-DSWD CO); ANTONIA
PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU EMPLOYEES UNION
(EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT
OF THE KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG
MMDA (KKKMMDA),Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209569
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC),
REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC)
No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.

At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987

Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed
by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this
provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from
programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of
the President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of
the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to augment the
appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government. But
the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of
transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Antecedents
What has precipitated the controversy?
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the
DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of
Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp
up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds
had been released to the Senators based on their letters of request for
funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had
been made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up
spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross
domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained that the funds under the
DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
Services;2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased
from the previous year; and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects
that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases had
been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the
pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel

Services4 appropriations that would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero
based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments
also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to
the agencies of the National Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of
savings,6 namely: (1) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his office in
the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for
Certain Purposes) and Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure
Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013, particularly their provisions on the (a) use of
savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c) priority in the
use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal
bases the special provisions on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs
of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM
brought the DAP to the consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and
made this present controversy inevitable. That the issues against the DAP
came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over
Congressional pork barrel "an appropriation of government spending meant
for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district"7 excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel
controversy.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances
relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other, as follows: G.R. No.
209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136 (Luna), on October 7,
2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas),8 on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209164
(PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16,
2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), on October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442
(Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on November6,
2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Courts attention
NBC No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of
Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No.

541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and
offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current
allotments.
In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues
raised and joined.
Issues
Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the
parties during the oral arguments were limited to the following, to wit:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies
to assail the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP. Subsumed in this issue
are whether there is a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the
standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances
allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the term is used in
Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not
provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the
system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public accountability
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it authorizes the release
of funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary
restraining order to restrain the implementation of the DAP, NBC No. 541,
and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP.
In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed
funds in order to support its argument regarding the Presidents power to
spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing unprogrammed
funds to support projects under the DAP was considerably discussed. The
petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica)
dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their respective memoranda. Hence, an
additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in
accord with the GAAs.
During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed
Sec. Abad to submit a list of savings brought under the DAP that had been
sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or abandoned
programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certified copy of
the Presidents directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and
(e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to the DAP.9
In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:
(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25,
2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and
their Realignment);10
(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the
DAP, namely:
a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for
FY 2011);
b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of
Funds for FY 2012);

c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency
Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30,
2012);
d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for
FY 2013);
e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary
Treatment of Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);
f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised
Guidelines on the Submission of Quarterly Accountability Reports on
Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);
g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund
Release System in the Government).
(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from
discontinued projects and unpaid appropriations for compensation from 2011
to 2013
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on
January 21, 2014 directing the respondents to submit the documents not yet
submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or its Members,
submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understanding the
factual bases of the DAP, to wit:
(1) First Evidence Packet11 containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM
through Sec. Abad, inclusive of annexes, listing in detail the 116 DAP
identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as follows:
a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed
Disbursement Acceleration Program (Projects and Sources of Funds);
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus
Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment);
c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to
Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);
d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of
funds for other priority projects and expenditures of the Government);

e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed

Priority Projects and Expenditures of the Government);
f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to
Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to Fund the
Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration Program); and
g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for
the Task Force Pablo Rehabilitation Plan).
(2) Second Evidence Packet12 consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with
their corresponding Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and
appropriation covers;
(3) Third Evidence Packet13 containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects
under the DAP;
(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 identifying the DAP-related portions of the
Annual Financial Report (AFR) of the Commission on Audit for 2011 and 2012;
(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 containing a letter of Department of
Transportation and Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to
Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds from his agency, inclusive
of annexes; and
(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 a print-out of the Solicitor Generals visual
presentation for the January 28, 2014 oral arguments.
On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence
Packet,18 which listed the sources of funds brought under the DAP, the uses
of such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal bases
thereof.
On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in
further compliance with the Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:
(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to
the effect that the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets
for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections arising from sources
not considered in the original revenue targets, which certifications were
required for the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special
Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI, and Article XLV of the 2011, 2012
and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive
Department for the use of the Constitutional Commissions and other

branches of the Government, as well as the fund releases to the Senate and
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
RULING
I.
Procedural Issue:
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include
applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or
temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of the petitions is
individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco)

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

G.R. No. 209136 (Luna)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209260 (IBP)

Prohibition

G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica)

Certiorari

G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE)

Certiorari and Prohibition

G.R. No. 209569 (VACC)

Certiorari and Prohibition

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication in the absence of adverse claims between the parties;19 that the
petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no allegations were made to
the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the
DAP and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not
immediately confer upon the petitioners the legal standing to sue
considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the
issuance of NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending
power of Congress;20 and that even if the petitioners had suffered injury,

there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related
issuances before the Commission on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.21
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition are not proper actions for directly assailing the constitutionality
and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive issuances
implementing the DAP.22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no
authorized proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for
questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or
controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the
constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate;
that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of
the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set
itself up as a reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in
violation of the principle of separation of powers; and that, in the absence of
a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any
decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can
validly render.23
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual
situations that the petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the
COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial
courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by
petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the
COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 24
The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are
bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress
concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon
its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories
of judicial power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created
court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the legislative
power.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was
confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving
rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the
1987 Constitution were laid out during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a
former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed
provisions on the Judiciary, where he said:
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that
his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We
can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be
highly derogatory to human dignity." This is why the first part of the second
paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of
courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has,
also, another important function. The powers of government are generally
considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and

the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of
the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given
law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold emphasis
supplied)26
Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion
clarified the scope of judicial power in the following manner:
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x
The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty
of courts of justice to settle actual controversies" The term "actual
controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to questions
which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse to
decide those political questions. But do I understand it right that this is
restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases which are not actual
yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for
declaratory relief.
May I ask the Commissioners opinion about that?
MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory judgments.
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty
to decide.27
Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of
judicial review and the great responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of Government.
Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission,28 Justice Jose P.
Laurel intoned:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several department and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
xxxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other department; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. x x x29
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and
correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition,
and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under
Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and
final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present
system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company:30
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of
certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the Kings Bench, commanding
agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause
pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice,
for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection
of the record whether the inferior courts judgment was rendered without
authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they
would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other
remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record
was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was
limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law
and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much
the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the
exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by
laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a
superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the
requirements for that purpose, viz:
xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is
not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must
be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal

hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive

duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that
it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an
inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court
and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing
to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself.32 The Court
expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:33
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued
in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary
writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering
said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction,
or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order
to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is
the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power
by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy
is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation
that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without
or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial
court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition
are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or

prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only

by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials.34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and
undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court is
not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been
thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any
assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with
the republican system of checks and balances.35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel,
the Court has become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will
not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial power in order to
review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executives
spending power.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review were
complied with
The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the
following, namely: (1) there must bean actual case or justiciable controversy
before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
and must be the very litis mota of the case.36
The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the
exercise of judicial power by the Court.37 An actual case or controversy, in
the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38

x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite

legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words, "[t]here must
be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional
issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The
incompatibility of the perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of
the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict
between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite
ripeness considering that the challenged executive acts were already being
implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that
such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the
allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public
funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of
such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy
that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.
It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral
arguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your Honors,
may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully served its
purpose, the Administrations economic managers have recommended its
termination to the President. x x x."39
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a
program, and urged that its termination had already mooted the challenges
to the DAPs constitutionality, viz:

DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases

brought to challenge its constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge should
no longer be at the level of the program, which is now extinct, but at the
level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under the now
defunct policy. We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among
the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify, the full details we will have
provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the
constitutional authority of the President and the Legislature to respond to the
dynamic needs of the country and the evolving demands of governance, lest
we end up straight jacketing our elected representatives in ways not
consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles.40
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.41
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a
supervening event that effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily,
the Court had in the past exercised its power of judicial review despite the
cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1)
when there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case
involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public
interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4)
when the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.42
Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were
ultimately sustained by the Court here, these cases would definitely come
under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from exercising
its power of judicial review.
Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."43 The concept
of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed in De Castro v.
Judicial and Bar Council,44 where the Court said:
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the
determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present
need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct
any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient

functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is

required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the
direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had
locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera
was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse
Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines
v. Felix, and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a
mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of
its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court
liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance."
Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury
test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided
to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far reaching
implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The
liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in
several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic

organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of

laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a
supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on
the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such
petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against
as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition
that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a
public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or
taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may
appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless
equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. MacapagalArroyo, the Court aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer"
standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp
v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different
category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is
affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the
mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the
duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With
respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and
a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied."45
The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.46 that "[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional
law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been
personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but
by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest."
Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have
invoked their capacities as taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and
implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances involved the illegal
disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing the further

dissipation of public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and
G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their right as citizens to sue for the
enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political
branches of the Government.47
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its
legal standing to bring cases upon constitutional issues.48 Luna, the
petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a lawyer. The
IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for
the rule of law and of paramount importance of the question in this action,
not to mention its civic duty as the official association of all lawyers in this
country."49
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established
sufficient interest in the outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi
on each of them.
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of
the Chief Executive to disburse and allocate public funds, whether
appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As
such, the determination of such important issues call for the Courts exercise
of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised."50
II.
Substantive Issues
1.
Overview of the Budget System
An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court
in properly appreciating and justly resolving the substantive issues.
a) Origin of the Budget System
The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had
derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse).51
In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act)
defined "budget" as the financial program of the National Government for a
designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of estimated receipts

and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective
based on the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The
term was given a different meaning under Republic Act No. 992 (Revised
Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services and
products, or benefits that would accrue to the public together with the
estimated unit cost of each type of service, product or benefit.52 For a
forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the financial plan
of the Government,53 or "the master plan of government."54
The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In
reality, financing public goals and activities was an idea that existed from the
creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory and sovereignty of
the State, its government must perform vital functions that required public
expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for
war activities, preservation of peace and order, security, administration of
justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services.56 In order to
finance those expenditures, the State raised revenues through taxes and
impositions.57 Thus, budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues
for specific government functions.58 The States budgeting mechanism
eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its
government and changes in its market economy.
The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public
financial institutions. This is because of the countrys past as a colony
successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of time. Many
aspects of the countrys public fiscal administration, including its Budget
System, have been naturally patterned after the practices and experiences
of the western public financial institutions. At any rate, the Philippine Budget
System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the
development of a progressive democratic government, namely: (1) to carry
on all government activities under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed,
authorized and executed in accordance with the Constitution, prevailing
statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide
for the periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the
Government in such detail so that persons entrusted by law with the
responsibility as well as the enlightened citizenry can determine the
adequacy of the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the
true financial position of the Government.59
b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System

The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the
American Regime up to the passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A Budget
Office was created within the Department of Finance by the Jones Law to
discharge the budgeting function, and was given the responsibility to assist
in the preparation of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine
Legislature.60
As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget
procedure were established, and subsequently strengthened through the
enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by President
Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to
serve as the agency that carried out the Presidents responsibility of
preparing the budget.62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went into effect on
January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also
provided a line-item budget as the framework of the Governments
budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance of a "balanced
budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing revenues.
CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954
of Republic Act (RA) No. 992,whereby Congress introduced performancebudgeting to give importance to functions, projects and activities in terms of
expected results.64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the role of the Budget
Commission as the fiscal arm of the Government.65
The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of
budgetary reforms that culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177 that
President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No. 1405, issued on June
11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission into the
Ministry of Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.
The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and
Management (OBM) under EO No. 711. The OBM became the DBM pursuant
to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.
c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66
Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget
Preparation; (2) Budget Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4)
Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others but they
overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
c.1.Budget Preparation67

The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a

Budget Call by the DBM. The Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier
set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) as well as
policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the
preparation and submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of
two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call, which is addressed to all
agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate
Budget Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled
corporations (GOCCs) and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and
agencies submit their respective Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. To
boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked the various
departments and agencies to partner with civil society organizations and
other citizen-stakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals,
which proposals are then presented before a technical panel of the DBM in
scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and agencies
are given the opportunity to defend their budget proposals. DBM bureaus
thereafter review the Agency Budget Proposals and come up with
recommendations for the Executive Review Board, comprised by the DBM
Secretary and the DBMs senior officials. The discussions of the Executive
Review Board cover the prioritization of programs and their corresponding
support vis--vis the priority agenda of the National Government, and their
implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the
National Expenditure Program (NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and
Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of spending for
each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is
submitted in the form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs
and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation of key PAPs in the NEP,
especially those in line with the National Governments development plan.
The Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of each department
and agency, including the number of positions and amounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the
President and the Cabinet for further refinements or reprioritization. Once the
NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the Cabinet, the DBM
prepares the budget documents for submission to Congress. The budget
documents consist of: (1) the Presidents Budget Message, through which the
President explains the policy framework and budget priorities; (2) the BESF,

mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,68 which contains the
macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the
expenditures and funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous
years; and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two
categories, specifically: (1) capital expenditures or outlays; and (2) current
operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses whose
usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the
Government, including investments in the capital of government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.69 Current operating
expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current
consumption the benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal
year.70 The two components of current expenditures are those for personal
services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating
expenses(MOOE).
Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions
into: (1) economic development expenditures (i.e., expenditures on
agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications,
commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts); 71 (2)
social services or social development expenditures (i.e., government outlay
on education, public health and medicare, labor and welfare and others); 72(3)
general government or general public services expenditures (i.e.,
expenditures for the general government, legislative services, the
administration of justice, and for pensions and gratuities);73 (4) national
defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security expenditures
and expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order);74 and (5) public
debt.75
Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of
funds, i.e., general fund, special fund or bond fund.76
On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and
cover all income or receipts of the government treasury used to support
government expenditures.77
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two
principal sources, stating: "The revenue which must defraythe necessary
expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some fund which
peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is
independent of the revenue of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of

the people."78 Adam Smiths classification relied on the two aspects of the
nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial
personality, and, second, the State as a sovereign or entity possessing
supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State could hold property and
engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi private income or
revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the
second aspect, the State could collect by imposing charges on the revenues
of its subjects in the form of taxes.79
In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following
sources, to wit: (1) tax revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to finance
government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e., proceeds from sales of
fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and gains on such
sales like sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and
other properties recorded as fixed assets); 81 (3) grants(i.e., voluntary
contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on specific
purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not require any
monetary commitment on the part of the recipient);82 (4) extraordinary
income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by government
corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of
the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts);83 and (5) public
borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations generally with interest
from domestic and foreign creditors of the Government in general, including
the National Government and its political subdivisions).84
More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows:85
General Income

Specific Income

1.

1. Income Taxes

Subsidy Income from National

Government

2.

Subsidy from Central Office

3.

Subsidy from Regional

Office/Staff Bureaus

4.

Income from Government

Services

5.

Income from Government

Business Operations

2. Property Taxes
3. Taxes on Goods and Services
4. Taxes on International Trade and
Transactions
5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax
Revenue
7. Other Specific Income

6.

Sales Revenue

7.

Rent Income

8.

Insurance Income

9.

Dividend Income

10. Interest Income

11. Sale of Confiscated Goods and
Properties
12. Foreign Exchange (FOREX)
Gains
13. Miscellaneous Operating and
Service Income
14. Fines and Penalties-Government
Services and Business Operations
15. Income from Grants and
Donations

c.2. Budget Legislation86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time
Congress receives the Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand
the BESF, up to the Presidents approval of the GAA. This phase is also known
as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation
of the Legislative through its deliberations.
Initially, the Presidents Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives
Appropriations Committee on First Reading. The Appropriations Committee
and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct budget hearings to
examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter, the House of
Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB).87
The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of
Representatives Appropriations Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary

session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third Reading before the
House of Representatives version is transmitted to the Senate.88
After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the
GAB. To expedite proceedings, the Senate may conduct its committee
hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives deliberations.
The Senates Finance Committee and its Sub-Committees may submit the
proposed amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the
House of Representatives has formally transmitted its version to the Senate.
The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third Reading. 89
The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to
sit in the Bicameral Conference Committee for the purpose of discussing and
harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their versions of the GAB. The
"harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the President for
approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message
where budget items are subjected to direct veto,91 or are identified for
conditional implementation.
If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
GAB for the ensuing fiscal year, the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the GAB is
passed by the Congress.92
c.3. Budget Execution93
With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the
implementation of the budget. The Budget Execution Phase is primarily the
function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures,
namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2)
to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release Program; (3) to release
allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the
DBM. Prior to this, the various departments and agencies are required to
submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans and
performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the
monthly cash program, the estimate of monthly income, and the list of
obligations that are not yet due and demandable.
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a
Cash Release Program (CRP).The ARP sets a limit for allotments issued in

general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly, quarterly and
annual disbursement levels.
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued
by the DBM. Allotments are lesser in scope than appropriations, in that the
latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend. Allotments may be
released in two forms through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix
(ABM),94 or, individually, by SARO.95
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to
incur obligations96 on behalf of the Government in order to implement their
PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring of personnel,
entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services, and using
utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a
disbursement authority so that cash may be allocated in payment of the
obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically issued is
referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which issuance is based
upon an agencys submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required
documents. The NCA specifies the maximum amount of cash that can be
withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart
from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash Availment Authority(NCAA) to
authorize non-cash disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for
departments with overseas operations to allow the use of income collected
by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.
Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget
Execution Phase and is usually accomplished through the Modified
Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable against the
National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability98
Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures
that the government funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized to
achieve the States socio-economic goals. It also allows the DBM to assess
the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of
implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
An agencys accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1)
performance targets and outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)

review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted by the Commission

on Audit(COA).
2.
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any
Administration.99 The national budget the Executive prepares and presents to
Congress represents the Administrations "blueprint for public policy" and
reflects the Governments goals and strategies.100 As such, the national
budget becomes a tangible representation of the programs of the
Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and services for
which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and
allocated.101 Embodied in every national budget is government spending.102
When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made
efficiency and transparency in government spending a significant focus of his
Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an improved fiscal deficit
of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to July of 2011, it
also unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and
payment schedules.103 The World Bank observed that the Philippines
economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be weakened
should the Government continue with its underspending and fail to address
the large deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The economic situation prevailing
in the middle of 2011 thus paved the way for the development and
implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track
public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-impact
budgetary PAPs to be funded from the "savings" generated during the year
as well as from unprogrammed funds.105 In that respect, the DAP was the
product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way
of accelerated spending.106 The Administration would thereby accelerate
government spending by: (1) streamlining the implementation process
through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),and
(2) front loading PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the
following year.108
Did the stimulus package work?

The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial
implementation of the DAP, revealed that the DAP was partially successful.
The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3 percentage points to GDP
growth by the fourth quarter of 2011.110 The continued implementation of the
DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure
spending rebounded from a 29% contraction to a 34% growth as of
September 2013.111
The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy
instrument that the Government could use to direct the economies towards
growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on public
infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability for
prospective investors.113 The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this
reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the economy and
infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3)
translation into disbursements.114
b. History of the implementation of
the DAP, and sources of funds
under the DAP
How the Administrations economic managers conceptualized and developed
the DAP, and finally presented it to the President remains unknown because
the relevant documents appear to be scarce.
The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the
memorandum of October 12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the approval of
the President to implement the proposed DAP. The memorandum, which
contained a list of the funding sources for P72.11 billion and of the proposed
priority projects to be funded,115 reads:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
xxxx
SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM
(PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF FUNDS)
DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011
Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program totaling P72.11 billion. We are already working with all
the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the projects therein.

A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program

Fund
Sources

Amount
(In
million
Php)

Description

Action
Requested

Declare as
savings and
approve/
authorize its
use
for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2011
Unreleased
Personal
Services (PS)
Appropriation
s

30,000

Unreleased Personnel
Services (PS)
appropriations which
will lapse at the end of
FY 2011 but may be
pooled as savings and
realigned for priority
programs that require
immediate funding

FY 2011
Unreleased
Appropriation
s

482

Unreleased
appropriations (slow
moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance)

FY 2010
Unprogramm
ed
Fund

12,336

Supported by the GFI

Dividends

Approve and
authorize its
use
for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2010
Carryover
Appropriation

21,544

Unreleased
appropriations (slow
moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance) and
savings from Zero-based
Budgeting

With prior
approval from
the President
in
November
2010
to declare as

FY 2011
Budget
items for
realignment

7,748

TOTAL

72.110

Initiative

savings and
with
authority to
use
for priority
projects

FY 2011 Agency
Budget items that can
be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
disbursing projects
DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA 2.497 Billion
DOT 1.000 Billion
DepEd 270 Million

For
information

B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program

(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)
GOCCs and GFIs
Agency/Project
(SARO and NCA Release)

Allotment
(in Million
Php)

1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2

1,868

2. NHA:

11,050

a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents

to
Camarin A7
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
c. On-site development for families living

450
500
10,000

100
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers
3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of
ageing physical plant and medical
equipment

357

4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of

centralized credit information system

75

5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the

PIDS
office and building construction

100

6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance

and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC

400

7. PHIC: Obligations incurred (premium

subsidy for indigent families) in JanuaryJune
2010, booked for payment in Jul[y] Dec
2010. The delay in payment is due to the
delay in the certification of the LGU
counterpart. Without it, the NG is obliged to
pay the full amount.

1,496

8. Philpost: Purchase of foreclosed property.

Payment of Mandatory Obligations, (GSIS,
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking Privilege

644

9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B

capitalization under the BSP Law

10,000

10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment

Renovation

280

11. LCOP:

105

a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program

b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program
(Stem-Cell Research subject to legal
review and presentation)

35
70

12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion

570

TOTAL

26,945

NGAs/LGUs
Agency/Project

Allotme
nt
(SARO)
(In
Million
Php)

Cash
Requireme
nt
(NCA)

13. DOF-BIR: NPSTAR

centralization of data
processing and others (To be
synchronized with GFMIS
activities)

758

758

14. COA: IT infrastructure

program and hiring of
additional litigational experts

144

144

15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing

Facilities and Communication
Equipment

30

30

2,959

2,223

16. DA:
a. Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated Community Based Multi-

Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
Farming
b. Mindanao Rural
Development Project

1,629

1,629

919

183

411

411

1,293

1,293

1,293

132
5,432

18. DBM: Conduct of National

Survey of
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips

625

625

19. DOJ: Operating requirements

of 50 investigation agents and
15 state attorneys

11

11

20. DOT: Preservation of the Cine

Corregidor Complex

25

25

21. OPAPP: Activities for Peace

Process (PAMANA- Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B)

1,819

1,819

425

425

275

275

c. NIA Agno River Integrated

Irrigation Project
17. DAR:
a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2
b. Landowners Compensation

22. DOST
a. Establishment of National
Meterological and Climate
Center
b. Enhancement of Doppler
Radar Network for National

Weather Watch, Accurate

Forecasting and Flood Early
Warning

190

190

23. DOF-BOC: To settle the

principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS

2,800

2,800

24. OEO-FDCP: Establishment of

the National Film Archive and
local cinematheques, and other
local activities

20

20

25. DPWH: Various infrastructure

projects

5,500

5,500

26. DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin

Client Cloud Computing
Project

270

270

27. DOH: Hiring of nurses and

midwives

294

294

28. TESDA: Training Program in

partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors

1,100

1,100

29. DILG: Performance Challenge

Fund (People Empowered
Community Driven
Development with DSWD and
NAPC)

250

50

30. ARMM: Comprehensive Peace

and Development Intervention

8,592

8,592

31. DOTC-MRT: Purchase of

additional MRT cars

4,500

32. LGU Support Fund

6,500

6,500

33. Various Other Local Projects

6,500

6,500

34. Development Assistance to the

Province of Quezon

750

750

TOTAL

45,165

44,000

C. Summary
Fund Sources
Identified for
Approval
(In Million
Php)

Allotments
for Release

Cash
Requirements for
Release in FY
2011

72,110

70,895

GOCCs

26,895

26,895

NGAs/LGUs

45,165

44,000

Total

72,110

For His Excellencys Consideration

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
[/] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
OCT 12, 2011
The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another
memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011116 requesting
omnibus authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances for

fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December 12,

2011 read:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
xxxx
SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and
its Realignment
DATE: December 12, 2011
This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to
consolidate savings/unutilized balances in FY 2011 corresponding to
completed or discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional
projects or expenditures.
In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects
even if their implementation carries over to 2012 without necessarily
impacting on our budget deficit cap next year.
BACKGROUND
1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the
agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same,
have identified savings out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act. Said
savings correspond to completed or discontinued projects under certain
departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the following:
1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during
preparation of the budget;
1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going priority projects; and
1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF,
Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund
1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as
a result of on-going priority projects and implementation of new activities
2.0 x x x x
2.1 x x x
2.2 x x x

ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS

3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus
authority to pool savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last November 25,
2010.
4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM
shall secure the corresponding approval/confirmation of the President.
Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be within the
authorized Expenditure level.
5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be
sourced from the said pooled appropriations in FY 2010 that will expire on
December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may be declared as
savings to fund additional expenditures.
5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be
spent for the projects that we have identified to be immediate actual
disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire on
December 31, 2011.
5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY
2011 Unreleased Appropriations, most of these are the same projects for
which the DBM is directed by the Office of the President, thru the Executive
Secretary, to source funds.
6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that
have been chosen given their multiplier impact on economy and
infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and their
translation into disbursements. Please note that we have classified the list of
proposed projects as follows:
7.0 x x x
FOR THE PRESIDENTS APPROVAL
8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the Presidents
approval for the following:
8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized
balances and its realignment; and
8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding.

For His Excellencys consideration and approval.

(Sgd.)
[/] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
DEC 21, 2011
Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund
proposed projects were contained in various other memoranda from Sec.
Abad dated June 25, 2012,117 September 4, 2012,118 December 19,
2012,119May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President
apparently approved all the requests, withholding approval only of the
proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum, as borne
out by his marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects
should still be "subject to further discussions."122
In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC
No. 541 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of
Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),123 reproduced herein
as follows:
NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541
July 18, 2012
TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and
other Offices of the National Government, Budget and Planning Officers;
Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned
SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of
Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012
1.0 Rationale
The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987), periodically reviews and evaluates the departments/agencies
efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds for the delivery of
services and production of goods, consistent with the government priorities.

In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational

efficiency of the government, the President is authorized to suspend or stop
further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of unutilized allotment
releases can be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as
mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of EO 292.
For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its
spending targets. In order to accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal
targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be implemented to
optimize the utilization of available resources.
Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of
obligations and disbursements per initial review of their 2012 performance.
To enhance agencies performance, the DBM conducts continuous
consultation meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting them to identify
slow-moving programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their
performance (both pertaining to internal systems and those which are
outside the agencies spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate
strategies and improvement plans for the rest of 2012.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have
continued to post low obligation levels as of end of first semester, thus
resulting to substantial unobligated allotments.
In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized
the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments.
This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available allotments to
fund and undertake other priority expenditures of the national government.
2.0 Purpose
2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments of agencies as of June 30, 2012 to fund priority
and/or fast-moving programs/projects of the national government;
2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the
withdrawal of said unobligated allotments; and
2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn
allotments.

3.0 Coverage
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as
of June 30, 2012 of all national government agencies (NGAs) charged against
FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current
Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the
implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared
as savings by the agencies concerned based on their updated/validated list
of pensioners.
3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified
programs, projects and activities of the departments/agencies reflected in
the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects as may be
identified by the agencies.
4.0 Exemption
These guidelines shall not apply to the following:
4.1 NGAs
4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy
under the Philippine Constitution; and
4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding
allocation scheme i.e., distribution of a predetermined budget ceiling.
4.2 Fund Sources
4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;
4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment
conditions per General Provisions of the GAA:
Confidential and Intelligence Fund;
Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery,
Repair and Maintenance, Supplies and Materials and Utility which shall be
used for the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement incentive benefit;

 Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the

last quarter after taking into consideration the agencys full year
requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water, Illumination, Power
Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent.
4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart);
4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government Fund, International
Commitments Fund, PAMANA, Priority Development Assistance Fund,
Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to LGUs, among
others;
4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and
4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and
Special Accounts in the General Fund.
5.0 Guidelines
5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement
activities notwithstanding the implementation of the policy of withdrawal of
unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter, FY 2012. Even
without the allotments, the agency shall proceed in undertaking the
procurement processes (i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of
bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to GPPB Circular Nos. 022008 and 01-2009 and DBM Circular Letter No. 2010-9.
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments
that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall
submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget
accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);
Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this
Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM as basis
for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the
agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as
of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual

obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level shall approximate

to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).
5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which
remained unobligated as of June 30, 2012 shall be immediately considered
for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following considerations:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects
are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the given fiscal
year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply
that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation capacity or
agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.
5.5. Consistent with the Presidents directive, the DBM shall, based on
evaluation of the reports cited above and results of consultations with the
departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as of June 30,
2012 through issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders
(SAROs).
5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the
magnitude of withdrawn allotments. The report shall highlight the agencies
which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this Circular.
5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:
5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs
concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn;
5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and
projects of the agency/OU; or
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to
fund priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget but
expected to be started or implemented during the current year.
5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to
DBM a Special Budget Request (SBR), supported with the following:
5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);
5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and

5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes
i.e., Proof of Posting and/or Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.
5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories
shall be until the end of the third quarter i.e., September 30, 2012. After said
cut-off date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled and form part of the
overall savings of the national government.
5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority
programs and projects as cited under item 5.7.3 of this Circular, shall be
subject to approval of the President. Based on the approval of the President,
DBM shall issue the SARO to cover the approved priority expenditures
subject to submission by the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and supported
with PFP and MCP.
5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn
allotments (both 2011 and 2012 unobligated allotments) shall be within the
approved Expenditure Program level of the national government for the
current year. The SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the
appropriation source of the release to determine the extent of allotment
validity, as follows:
For charges under R.A. 10147 allotments shall be valid up to December
31, 2012; and
For charges under R.A. 10155 allotments shall be valid up to December
31, 2013.
5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other
reportorial requirements is reiterated for monitoring purposes.
6.0 Effectivity
This circular shall take effect immediately.
(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
Secretary
As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all
agencies and departments as of June 30, 2012 that were charged against the
continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012 GAA (R.A. No.
10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs,
but such allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the
concerned agencies from which they were withdrawn; or (2) realigned to

cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned agencies;
or (3) used to augment existing PAPs of any agency and to fund priority PAPs
not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or
implemented in 2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was made subject to
the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies
like "realignment" and "augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn
unobligated allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be
implemented and funded, that is (1) by declaring "savings" coming from
the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated
allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing
unprogrammed funds; and (3) applying the "savings" and unprogrammed
funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.
c. DAP was not an appropriation
measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it
Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not
enact a law to establish the DAP, or to authorize the disbursement and
release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas, PHILCONSA, IBP,
Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the appropriations funded under the DAP
were not included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP,
Araullo, and COURAGE, the DAP, being actually an appropriation that set
aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its
validity. VACC maintains that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations
that were separate and distinct from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated
the GAAs without congressional authorization and control.
The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and
implemented the DAP violated the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and
implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an
appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of
the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully
executed.

We agree with the OSGs position.

The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption
and implementation being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main
actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to
faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but
would have nothing more to do during the Budget Execution Stage. Indeed,
appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund,
or sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the
public treasury, to be applied to some general object of governmental
expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."124 As pointed out in
Gonzales v. Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as
nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the
Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while
appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart
or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of
debt or dues from the State to its creditors."126
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully
execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget
to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation.127 He
could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings
and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings
pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded under
the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money
had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the
GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp the power vested in
Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly
adopted by the Executive to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to dissect the

mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and

utilization of the public wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of
whether the Executives implementation of the DAP was consistent with the
Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.
a. Although executive discretion
and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution
We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all
issues and needs that may come into play once the budget reaches its
execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to achieve a
sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The
heads of offices, particularly the President, require flexibility in their
operations under performance budgeting to enable them to make whatever
adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing
conditions.128 In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President
the flexibility to meet unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the
efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in
allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs,129particularly when the funds are
grouped to form lump sum accounts.130 It is assumed that the agencies of the
Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader
appropriation items.131 This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the
Executive may adopt during the budget execution phase. The DAP as a
strategy to improve the countrys economic position was one policy that
the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the
GAAs.
Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be
counterproductive. In Presidential Spending Power,132 Prof. Louis Fisher, an
American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included budget
policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:
[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted.
There are many number of reasons why obligations and outlays by
administrators may have to differ from appropriations by legislators.
Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of

expenditures. Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate

in fields that are highly technical and constantly undergoing change. New
circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the decisions
reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable for
Congress to adjust to each new development by passing separate
supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control expenditures by
confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect
its power of the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities
and complexities of public policy require executive discretion for the sound
management of public funds.
xxxx
x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial
discretion for administrators. They need to exercise judgment and take
responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed toward
executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion,
but channel it and use it to satisfy the programs and priorities established by
Congress.
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds
within their respective offices, the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal
autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the separation of
powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has
recognized this, and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon,133 viz:
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must
have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to
another within the Executive has not been the mere offshoot of established
usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of the
American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the
Governor-General to direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be
returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from the
general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18,

1909 by the First Philippine Legislature,135was the first enabling law that
granted statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The authority
was without any limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the GovernorGeneral to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any
bureau or office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally
been appropriated for that bureau or office.
From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of
funds that could be transferred, thereby limiting the power to transfer funds.
Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or miscellaneous
expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the transferred
funds were to be used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for
miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.
In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items
under miscellaneous expenses to any other item of a certain bureau or office
was removed.
During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer
funds continued to be governed by the GAAs despite the enactment of the
Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did not include a
provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in the extent of
the Presidents power to transfer funds was again experienced during this
era, with the President being given more flexibility in implementing the
budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the
appropriations in the Executive Department could be made in the "interest of
the public, as the President may determine."136
In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the
Presidents seemingly unbounded discretion in transferring funds.137 Its
Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit the
transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and the
independent constitutional bodies, but to allow instead their respective
heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in their respective
budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention
was to further restrict, not to liberalize, the power to transfer
appropriations.139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and Appropriation
initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to augment,
and suggested that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be
made "by not more than ten percent if the original item of appropriation to
be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than five

percent if the original item of appropriation to be augmented exceeds one

million pesos."140 But two members of the Committee objected to
the P1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount was arbitrary and
might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate
the P1,000,000.00 threshold, and settled on the ten percent limitation.141
In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the
Convention, which adopted the following final version under Section 16,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may by law
be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of
funds from one item to another, unless Congress enacted a law authorizing
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional omissions to transfer
funds for the purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item
in the GAA of their respective offices. The leeway was limited to
augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the
funds to be transferred should come from savings from another item in the
appropriation of the office.142
On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its
Section 44 that:
Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the
authority to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or
activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any
appropriation of the Executive Department in the General Appropriations Act,
from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or
agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 16 (5) of the Constitution.

In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of
Section 44 for contravening Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution, ruling:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege
granted under said Section 16. It empowers the President to indiscriminately
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely
disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an
undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.143
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification
by the people of the 1987 Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of Article VI is
identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x
xxxx
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
xxxx
The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission
included Section 25(5), supra, to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the
power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the President and the
other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court stated in
Nazareth v. Villar:144
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule
should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill
is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary

allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section
25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are
authorized to transfer appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective
appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no
room for the petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as
untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in
Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the
general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with
exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even
the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an
express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in
determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular
case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something
from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within
the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence
of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to
all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict
construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general
provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a
statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by
which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a
restricted construction.
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a
limitation on the Presidents discretion over the appropriations during the
Budget Execution Phase.

b. Requisites for the valid transfer of

appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra,
must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds
within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and (3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
b.1. First RequisiteGAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution,
must have an implementing law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is
the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first requisite, the GAAs
should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high
officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item
in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal

autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item
in this Act from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by
the DBM as justification for the use of savings under the DAP.145
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of
2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying
the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section 25(5), supra.
The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only
transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the
transfer was to an item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect
was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of
funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs even if the item
belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and
2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted
provisions cannot be used to claim authority to transfer appropriations from
the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional commission.
Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in
the counterpart provision in the 2013 GAA, to wit:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in
their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for
the current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section
25(5), supra, existed, there still remained two other requisites to be met,
namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings from
appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for
the purpose of augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective
offices.
b.2. Second Requisite There were
no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?

The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the unreleased
appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments were not actual
savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the relevant
provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood
to refer to the excess money after the items that needed to be funded have
been funded, or those that needed to be paid have been paid pursuant to the
budget.146 The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the
PAPs for which the funds had been appropriated were actually implemented
and completed, or finally discontinued or abandoned. They insist that
savings could not be realized with certainty in the middle of the fiscal year;
and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as
savings because such PAPs had not actually been abandoned or discontinued
yet.147 They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing the withdrawn funds to be
reissued to the "original program or project from which it was withdrawn,"
conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not
been completed, abandoned or discontinued.148
The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the
difference between the appropriation authorized by Congress and the actual
amount allotted for the appropriation; that the definition of "savings" in the
GAAs set only the parameters for determining when savings occurred; that it
was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the
Constitution with the authority to augment) who ultimately determined when
savings actually existed because savings could be determined only during
the stage of budget execution; that the President must be given a wide
discretion to accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated
allotments were savings inasmuch as they were clearly "portions or balances
of any programmed appropriationfree from any obligation or
encumbrances which are (i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which
the appropriation is authorized"
We partially find for the petitioners.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in
mind. The first principle is that Congress wields the power of the purse.
Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to fund; and the
amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the
Executive, as the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws,
is expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget in
accordance with the provisions of the GAA.149 The Executive is expected to

faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit
the expenditures within the allocations, unless exigencies result to
deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions
provided by law. The third principle is that in making the Presidents power to
augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for
flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes its own
power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive.
But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority
over the purse as to let the Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the
fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something
that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as
opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or
hypothetical.150
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against
expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then indubitable that the
power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which the funds
had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist, for only then could savings be properly realized. This
interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress
power of the purse.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013,
reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in
this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still available
after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from
appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)
from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to
meet and deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services
approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure
indication that savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the
appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation being no
longer existent.

The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of

savings in the GAAs conveyed the notion that the appropriation was at that
stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the appropriation
was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the enumeration
of the three instances for savings to arise, which showed that the
appropriation referred to had reached the agency level. It could not be
otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the
agency level could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the
appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or
abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without
pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were
realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from
"pooling of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services
appropriations which will lapse at the end of the year, unreleased
appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per ZeroBased Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for
the treatment of unreleased or unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere
description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have
not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be
generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has
already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued either an ABM
(for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance),
and consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be. Appropriations
remain unreleased, for instance, because of noncompliance with
documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or simply
because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually
reach the agencies to which they were allocated under the GAAs, and have
remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo, unreleased
appropriations refer to appropriations with allotments but without
disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met
the statutory definition of savings, would seriously undercut the

congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had not even
reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which
Congress had allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in
its plantilla and did not receive an allotment and NCA for such vacancies,
appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already
constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first
part of the definition of "savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances
of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the
three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such,
unobligated allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings
without first determining whether any of the three instances existed. This
signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated allotments had
disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that
MOOE appropriations are deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations
within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated monthly from the
excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the Mandatory
Expenditures and Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the
physical impossibility to obligate and spend such funds as MOOE for a period
that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are
not savings and cannot be transferred.
The DBMs Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which
became the basis of NBC No. 541) stated:
ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS
5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the
agencies operations, particularly on the implementation of their
projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking the same,
have been continuously calling the attention of all National Government
agencies (NGAs) with low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to
speedup the implementation of their programs and projects in the second
quarter.
6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the
concerned agencies and with call-up letters sent.

7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the departments
disposal, the level of financial performance of some departments registered
below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements for the first
semester still not being met.
8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated
balances as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current allotments
shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based
on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies and their
catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments would be based on whether the allotments pertained to slowmoving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in clear terms the
criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:
3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as
of June 30, 2012 ofall national government agencies (NGAs) charged against
FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No. 10147) and FY 2012 Current
Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the
implementation of programs and projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared
as savings by the agencies concerned based on their undated/validated list
of pensioners.
A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the
"withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies with low levels of
obligations"151 "to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects."152 But
the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the original
programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the
allotments were withdrawn"153 supported the conclusion that the PAPs had
not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the purpose for which
the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not
yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings
impossible.

Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released
allotments in 2011 charged against the 2011 GAA that had remained
unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects
are assumed to be implementation-ready and doable during the given fiscal
year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply
that the agency has a slower-than-programmed implementation capacity or
agency tends to implement projects within a two-year timeframe.
Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the
unobligated allotments for continuing and current appropriations as of June
30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of the appropriations
for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65, General Provisions
of the 2011 GAA, viz:
Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and
capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release and
obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions
applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of
the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No. 9970 shall be
made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report
on these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and
capital outlays authorized in this Act shall be available for release and
obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special provisions
applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of
the year in which such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on
these releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee
on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed
form or by way of electronic document.154
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and
its relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of the
appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.

Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all

allotment classes in the 2013 GAA (R.A. No. 10352), to wit:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. All appropriations authorized in
this Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purposes
specified, and under the same special provisions applicable thereto, until the
end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations
shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House
Committee on Appropriations, either in printed form or by way of electronic
document.
Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad
sought omnibus authority to consolidate savings and unutilized balances to
fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:
7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register
below program, even with the availability of funds at their disposal, the
targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be met. It is
important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year if
these remain unobligated.
8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances
at the end of every quarter, both for continuing and current allotments shall
be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based
on the list of slow moving projects to be identified by the agencies and their
catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief
Lifes pan of one year, was further shortened to only a quarter of a year under
the DBMs memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings
in order to have a larger fund available for discretionary spending. They aver
that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated allotments in the middle of
the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing
appropriations under the GAAs.155
The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated
allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing
agencies based on their own assessment that they could not obligate those

allotments pursuant to the Presidents directive for them to spend their

appropriations as quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy.156
We agree with the petitioners.
Contrary to the respondents insistence, the withdrawals were upon the
initiative of the DBM itself. The text of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to wit:
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments
that shall be withdrawn, all departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall
submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following budget
accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);
Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this
Circular, the agencys latest report available shall be used by DBM as basis
for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall compute/approximate the
agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as
of same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual
obligations of P 800M then the June 30 obligation level shall approximate
to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer
of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and
that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of
appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that
could be allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget
deficit" under the GAAs,157 thus violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011,
2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of allotments.158
In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a
spending, not saving, policy as a last-ditch effort of the Executive to push
agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy did not
amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred to the
decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological
reasons; and that the withdrawal of allotments under NBC No. 541 was made
pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code, by
which the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop

further expenditure of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his

judgment the public interest so required.
The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of
unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations were
invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of
unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be
considered as impoundment.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:159 "Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean
the retention or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized
impoundment only in case of unmanageable National Government budget
deficit, to wit:
Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No
appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded through
retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations to
be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds appropriated for the
purposes, programs, projects and activities authorized under this Act, except
those covered under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant to
Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or
deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act shall be effected only in
cases where there is an unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section
shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual national government budget
deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets consistent with the
full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and
approved by Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,
or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of
such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee and approved by the President.
The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.

The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be

regarded as impoundment because it entailed only the transfer of funds, not
the retention or deduction of appropriations.
Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012
and 2013 GAAs) be applicable. They uniformly stated:
Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund
releases from appropriations provided in this Act shall be transmitted intact
or in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or deduction as
reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by law, or upon
direction of the President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance
with this provision to the extent that sub-allotments by agencies to their
subordinate offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by
the DBM.
The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments
upon their release from the DBM, which was a different matter altogether.
The Court should not expand the meaning of the provision by applying it to
the withdrawal of allotments.
The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative
Code of 1987 to justify the withdrawal of unobligated allotments. But the
provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further
expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as
otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his
judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the
head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services
appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in
accordance with Section 38, supra, but instead transferred the funds to other
PAPs.
It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations
that remained unexpended at the end of the fiscal year were to be reverted
to the General Fund.1wphi1 This was the mandate of Section 28, Chapter
IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing

Appropriations.- Unexpended balances of appropriations authorized in the
General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the
General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be
available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment:
Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays shall remain valid until fully
spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for
current operating expenditures may be specifically recommended and
approved as such in support of projects whose effective implementation calls
for multi-year expenditure commitments: provided, finally, that the President
may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to
meet non-recurring expenditures in a subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the
annual budget preparation process and the preparation process and the
President may approve upon recommendation of the Secretary, the reversion
of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded by said
continuing appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased
appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the
fiscal year.
b.3. Third Requisite No funds from
savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the
transfer should be "to augment an item in the general appropriations law for
the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or increase in
size, amount, or degree.160
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that
the appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit:

x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or

project with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent
evaluation of needed resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case
shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation
from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.

In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be

deficient before it could be augmented from savings. Note is taken of the fact
that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate
President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal
autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in
their respective appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for
the current year in any item of their respective appropriations.
As of 2013, a total of P144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through
the DAP.161
Of this amount P82.5 billion were released in 2011 and P54.8 billion in
2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported that 9% of the total DAP releases were
applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.163
The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the
following PAPs that had not been covered with appropriations in the
respective GAAs, namely:
(i) P1.5 billion for the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army;
(ii) P1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;
(iii) P700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164
(iv) P50 million to P100 (million) each to certain senators;165
(v) P10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones
under the National Housing Authority;
(vi) P10 billion and P20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;
(vii) P5.4 billion landowners compensation under the Department of Agrarian
Reform;
(viii) P8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development
program;
(ix) P6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments
(x) P5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the
Department of Tourism and the Department of Public Works and Highways;

(xi) P1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;

(xii) P1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health units;
and
(xiii) P4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects.166
In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were
implemented, had appropriation covers, and could properly be accounted for
because the funds were released following and pursuant to the standard
practices adopted by the DBM.167 In support of its argument, the OSG has
submitted seven evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other
pertinent documents relative to the implementation and fund transfers under
the DAP.168
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence
packets, we conclude that the "savings" pooled under the DAP were
allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the
pertinent GAAs.
For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted
Disaster Risk, Exposure, Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under
the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) covered the amount
of P1.6 Billion,169 broken down as follows:
APPROPRIATIO
N
CODE

PARTICULARS

A.03.a.01.a

Generation of new knowledge and

technologies and research capability
building in priority areas identified as
strategic to National Development
Personnel Services
Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses
Capital Outlays

AMOUNT
AUTHORIZED

P 43,504,024
1,164,517,589
391,978,387
P 1,600,000,000

the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that
Congress had appropriated only P537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for
personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

Personnel Maintenan Capital

Services ce
Outlays
and Other
Operating
Expenditur
es
III Operations
.
a Funding Assistance to
. Science
and Technology
Activities
1 Central Office
.
a. Generation of
new
knowledge and
technologies and
research
capability building
in
priority areas
identified as
strategic to
National
Development

177,406,
000

TOTAL

1,887,365, 49,090,0 2,113,861,

000
00
000

1,554,238,
000

1,554,238,
000

537,910,0
00

537,910,00
0

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by
almost 300% the appropriation by Congress for the program Generation of
new knowledge and technologies and research capability building in priority
areas identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted
funds for personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby
substituted its will to that of Congress. Worse, the Executive had not earlier
proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the NEP
that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.170

It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set
aside any amounts for an expense category sufficiently indicated that
Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP
concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself
did not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that
any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any appropriation under
the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond
the authority laid down by Congress in enacting the GAAs. That happened in
some instances under the DAP.
In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council
for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology Research and Development
(DOST-PCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the Advanced Failure Analysis
Laboratory, which reads:
APPROPRIATI PARTICULARS
ON
CODE

A.02.a

Development, integration and

coordination of the National Research
System for Industry, Energy and
Emerging Technology and Related Fields
Capital Outlays

AMOUNT
AUTHORIZE
D

P
300,000,000

the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not
correspond to the program specified in the GAA, whose particulars were
Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following activities: (1)
Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry, Energy and Utilities;
(2) Dissemination of Science and Technology Information; and (3)
Management of PCIERD Information System for Industry, Energy and Utilities.
Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination of the
National Research System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology and
Related Fields the particulars stated in the SARO could fall under the broad
program description of Research and Management Services as appearing in
the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not
being specifically stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative
authorization, could not validly fund and implement such PAP under the DAP.
In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the
Executive enjoyed sound discretion in implementing the budget given the

generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified under
the GAAs;172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to spend the
initial appropriations under his authority to declare and utilize savings,173 and
in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to
spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which included
the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that
allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was
still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his
power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from
Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress,
not in the Executive.174 Moreover, leaving the spending power of the
Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo the principle of separation of
powers.175
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of
its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget
proposal submitted by the Executive.176 Its power of the purse is touted as
the very foundation of its institutional strength,177 and underpins "all other
legislative decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the
legislative and executive branches of government."178 Such enormous power
encompasses the capacity to generate money for the Government, to
appropriate public funds, and to spend the money.179 Pertinently, when it
exercises its power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the
PAPs for which public money should be spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the
final say on matters of appropriations.180For this purpose, appropriation
involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle of the Public Fisc,
asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control,
prohibiting expenditure of any public money without legislative
authorization."181To conform with the governing principles, the Executive
cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by
resorting to either public or private funds.182 Nor could the Executive transfer
appropriated funds resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by
so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The
terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.

b.4 Third Requisite Cross-border

augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be authorized to augment
any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for
one office are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call such
transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra,
refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with
respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives, with respect
to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?
During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making
some cross-border augmentations, to wit:
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of
Budget and Management, did the Executive Department ever redirect any
part of savings of the National Government under your control cross border
to another department?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Can you tell me two instances? I dont recall having read your material.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of
Representatives. They started building their e-library in 2010 and they had a
budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to complete its

250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit observation

informed the Speaker that they had to continue with that construction
otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments therein may suffer
from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of
Representatives was not enough to complete 250 Million, they wrote to the
President requesting for an augmentation of that particular item, which was
granted, Your Honor. The second instance in the Memos is a request from the
Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good
governance programs of the government and therefore, part of that is a
requirement to conduct audits as well as review financial reports of many
agencies. And in the performance of that function, the Commission on Audit
needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and
litigators to help them with their audit work and for that they requested
funds from the Executive and the President saw that it was important for the
Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and
consultants and the request was granted, Your Honor.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not
supported by appropriations
SECRETARY ABAD:
They were, we were augmenting existing items within their (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and
the tenor or text of the Constitution is quite clear as far as I am concerned. It
says here, "The power to augment may only be made to increase any item in
the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices." Did you not feel
constricted by this provision?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer
of appropriations, Your Honor. What we thought we did was to transfer
savings which was needed by the Commission to address deficiency in an
existing item in both the Commission as well as in the House of
Representatives; thats how we saw(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?

SECRETARY ABAD:
In an extreme instances because(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, thats
your feeling.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the
Commission and the House of Representatives, we felt that we needed to
respond because we felt(interrupted).183
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00
and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively to the
COA184 and the House of Representatives.185 Those transfers of funds, which
constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the Executive to the
COA and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows:186

AMOUNT
(In thousand pesos)

OFFICE

PURPOSE

DATE
RELEASE
Reserve
D
Imposed

Releases

Commission
on
Audit

IT Infrastructure Program 11/11/11

and hiring of additional
litigation experts

143,700

Congress
House of
Representati
ves

Completion of the
07/23/12 207,034
construction of the
(Savings of
Legislative Library and
HOR)
Archives
Building/Congressional elibrary

250,000

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President

"made available" to the "Commission on Elections the savings of his
department upon [its] request for funds"187 This was another instance of a
cross-border augmentation.
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:
99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings
of his department to another department upon the latters request, provided
it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own
appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other
department access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be
applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the
Constitution.188
In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
representing Congress, announced a different characterization of the crossborder transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid" instead of "augmentation,"
viz:
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the
DAP. What were these cross-border transfers? They are transfers of savings
as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So, that makes it
similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a cross-border which
appears to be in violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the
sense that the border was crossed. But never has it been claimed that the
purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the
government or agency of the government. The cross-border transfers, if Your
Honors please, were in the nature of [aid] rather than augmentations. Here is
a government entity separate and independent from the Executive
Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. Hes in charge of the whole operation although six or
seven heads of government offices are given the power to augment. Only the
President stationed there and in effect in-charge and has the responsibility
for the failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one
reason or another, the money is not enough to hold election. There would be
chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an aid to a
department like COA. The President is responsible in a way that the other
heads, given the power to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well allow
this, if Your Honor please.189

JUSTICE LEONEN:
May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the
position now, I think, of government is that some transfers of savings is now
considered to be, if Im not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I correct in
my hearing of your argument?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Thats our submission, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution?
Where do we actually derive the concepts that transfers of appropriation
from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be considered a
said? What particular text in the Constitution can we situate this?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your
Honor please. It is drawn from the fact that the Executive is the executive incharge of the success of the government.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis
for this theory of the government?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Yes, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to
Congress. That there are opportunities and there have been opportunities of
the President to actually go to Congress and ask for supplemental budgets?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
If there is time to do that, I would say yes.
JUSTICE LEONEN:

So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary

situation?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Very extra-ordinary situations.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Yes, if Your Honor please.190
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of
funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing cross border
transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as augmentation,
or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid
Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds
provided in the GAAs for 2011, 2012,and 2013. The respondents stress,
however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under the DAP as
savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently, the
release and use of unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions
under Section 25(5), supra.
The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have
confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as separate sources of
funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds were still
subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified the
instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released and the
purposes for which they could be used.
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the
unprogrammed funds was that the revenue collections must exceed revenue
targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal because
such condition was not met.191

The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the
unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the unprogrammed
funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances occur, to
wit: (1) the revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets
proposed in the BESFs submitted by the President to Congress; (2) new
revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered in
the BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for foreign assisted projects were
secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such
as perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted projects.192 This view of the
DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment.193
The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed
appropriations" as appropriations that provided standby authority to incur
additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue collections
exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are
generated.194 Contrary to the DBMs averment that there were three
instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM the
collection of new revenues from sources not originally considered in the
BESFs was not included. This meant that the collection of additional
revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the
unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered in the
BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the revenue
collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in
order to justify the release of the unprogrammed funds.
The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds
could be released was bolstered by the following texts of the Special
Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:
2011 GAA
1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted
by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution, including savings generated from programmed
appropriations for the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources
not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to
cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in
case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a

perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED, FURTHERMORE,
That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations for
the first two quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of
the President, release the pertinent appropriations under the Unprogrammed
Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said savings net of
revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the release of the balance of the
total savings from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject
to fiscal programming and approval of the President.
2012 GAA
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted
by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not
considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover
releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case
of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a
perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections
arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets
may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund" gave the
authority to use such additional revenues for appropriations funded from the
unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic
requirement that revenue collections must still exceed the original revenue
targets.
In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues
generated from newly-approved foreign loans were clear to the effect that
the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis" for the
issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of the amount
of the loan. In such instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the
revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan proceeds, and the mere
perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs
the additional revenues from sources not considered in the BESFs must be
taken into account in determining if the revenue collections exceeded the
revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the 2013 GAA, which

was substantially similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already
made this explicit, thus:
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only
when the revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets submitted
by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article
VII of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not
considered in the aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr:
PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted
projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall
be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not
considered in the revenue target would not be enough. The total revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify the
release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-approved
foreign loans).
The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the
correct interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections should exceed the
original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean that the
total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target stated in the
BESF, but the respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the
collections for each source of revenue as enumerated in the BESF, with the
condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from a
particular source already exceeded the stated target.
The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the
corresponding revenue target stated for each source of revenue, to wit:
TAX REVENUES
Taxes on Net Income and Profits
Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services
General Sales, Turnover or VAT
Selected Excises on Goods
Selected Taxes on Services
Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions

NON-TAX REVENUES
Fees and Charges
BTR Income
Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
Income from Investments
Interest on Bond Holdings
Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
NG Income Collected by BTr
Dividends on Stocks
NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit
Privatization
Foreign Grants
Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from
the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to the effect that the revenue collections had
exceeded the original revenue targets,195 they complied by submitting
certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance (DOF) pertaining to
only one identified source of revenue the dividends from the shares of
stock held by the Government in government-owned and controlled
corporations.
To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG
presented the certification dated March 4, 2011 issued by DOF
Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:
This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of
Financing for 2011, the programmed income from dividends from shares of
stock in government-owned and controlled corporations is 5.5 billion.
This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury,
the National Government has recorded dividend income amounting to P23.8
billion as of 31 January 2011.196

For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by
National Treasurer Roberto B. Tan, viz:
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National
Government for the period January to March 2012 amounted to P19.419
billion compared to the full year program of P5.5 billion for 2012.197
And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013
issued by National Treasurer Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National
Government for the period January to May 2013 amounted to P12.438 billion
compared to the full year program of P10.0198 billion for 2013.
Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to
build and operate the NAIA expressway amounting to P11.0 billion in June
2013.199
The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to P23.8
billion in 2011, P19.419 billion in 2012, and P12.438 billion in 2013 the BTr
had exceeded only the P5.5 billion in target revenues in the form of
dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the P10 billion in
target revenues in the form of dividends from stocks in 2013.
However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original
revenue targets was to be construed in light of the purpose for which the
unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standby
appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs
should the revenue collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the
budget or when additional foreign project loan proceeds were realized. The
unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as
not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should new or additional
revenue sources be realized during the year.200 Given the tenor of the
certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not yet supported by the
corresponding resources.201
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding
requirements of the proposed programmed appropriations. In contrast, the
unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations, were to be released only
when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations
required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not
individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses.
The requirement that revenue collections must exceed revenue target should

be understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of
the revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the
unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess revenue as to one
source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure
because it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in
contravention of the Governments surplus budget policy.202
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents view.
5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges
The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the
system of checks and balances, and the principle of public accountability.
With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection
Clause,203 Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it
[was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP was not made
available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail
themselves of the DAP funds, and others being unaware of the availability of
such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue favoritism" in favor of select
legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection
Clause because no reasonable classification was used in distributing the
funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed
themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts they
respectively received.
Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and
balances, Luna submits that the grant of the funds under the DAP to some
legislators forced their silence about the issues and anomalies surrounding
the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators
to identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and
execution of the GAAs, a function that exclusively belonged to the Executive;
that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative
encroachment in the functions of the Executive; and that the President
arrogated unto himself the power of appropriation vested in Congress
because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of the funds under the DAP for PAPs
not considered in the 2012 budget.

Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of
public accountability enshrined in the Constitution,204 because the legislators
relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive, and exhibited a
reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.
The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in
the release of funds under the DAP could be raised only by the affected
Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based on the violation
of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the constitutionality of the
DAP, the arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement
of the legislators to the funds, not to the proposition that all of the legislators
should have been given such entitlement.
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause,
which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks
factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and Congressmen
being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about
some of them having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with
relevant data. Also, the claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could
not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only
by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would
be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the
releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only
such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore when and
how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a
denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently,
the Court was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of
equal protection. To have the Court do so despite the inadequacy of the
showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and
the outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the
claim of denial of equal protection has been made.
The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the
hands of the legislators from conducting congressional inquiries into the
legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency eliminated
any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is fundamental that
speculation would not support any proper judicial determination of an issue
simply because nothing concrete can thereby be gained. In order to sustain
their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the

petitioners must discharge the basic burden of proving that the constitutional
infirmities actually existed.205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot
overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the assailed executive
act.
We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation
through the various circulars and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the
system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional system. Our
earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances infringing the
doctrine of separation of powers effectively addressed this particular
concern.
Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the
adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an assumption by the
Executive of Congress power of appropriation, we have already held that the
DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts that the
Executive could properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the
extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp up or accelerate the
economy of the country.
6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally
infirm, we must now deal with the consequences of the declaration.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional
cannot give rise to any right or obligation.206 However, the generality of the
rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule may at times be
impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the need to except from

the rigid application of the rule the instances in which the void law or
executive act produced an almost irreversible result?
The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine,
definitely not a novel one, has been exhaustively explained in De Agbayani v.
Philippine National Bank:207
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its
being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil
Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may
not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to
the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must
have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the
judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to
obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure
is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power
of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],

is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be

ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official."
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect.208 But its use must be subjected to
great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an
unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of
equity and fair play.209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have
met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and
implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity
and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or
unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to
include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi
legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita,
Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council:210
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of
the operative fact doctrine should be limited to statutes and rules and
regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same
status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Thus, the minority concludes that the phrase executive act used in the case
of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank refers only to acts, orders, and
rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The minority also
made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit
that the operative fact doctrine applies to executive acts, which are
ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.

We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of
Malabang case elaborates what executive act mean. Moreover, while
orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch
have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and
jurisprudence, the phrase executive act does not have such specific
definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in the cases cited by
the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term executive act is
confined to the foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act is broad
enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under
the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in
question or nullified by the Court.
A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma)
as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was declared
unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. In said
case, this Court ruled that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these
offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as
Chairman of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act.
Prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said executive act,
certain acts or transactions were made in good faith and in reliance of the
appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its
subsequent invalidation.
In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that
despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians,
certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have existed so as not to
trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer
v. Military Commission No. 34, it was ruled that military tribunals pertain to
the Executive Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
or those of his authorized military representatives.
Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules
and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the
same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature.

Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine
only to executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said
principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the
President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in
the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad
sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with
the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to
acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or
executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or
orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not
unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the
higher interest of justice, equity and fairness.
Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative
agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law,
springing from the powers of the President under the Constitution and
existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have
produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said
decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact
doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,211 the
Court likewise declared that "for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there
must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law or executive
issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did
not apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, viz:
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by
the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect.
This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a
rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer
in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or
ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice may not
be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not
formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public and can
be availed of only by those with informal contacts with the government
agency.

It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the
DAP and its related issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The DAP itself,
as a policy, transcended a merely administrative practice especially after the
Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda
and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments
made available to the different agencies and departments was consistently
applied throughout the entire Executive. With the Executive, through the
DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle the budget
execution phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP
by virtue of his primary responsibility as the Chief Executive of directing the
national economy towards growth and development. This is simply because
savings could and should be determined only during the budget execution
phase.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use
of savings pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered
in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers, as well as to
augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear
violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP
unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation
constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well
as juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and
unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser
and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to
undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP.
That scenario would be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity
alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be
beyond debate that the implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably
positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the country. To count
the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public
infrastructure, could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless,
hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to apply the doctrine of operative fact
to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy results
by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the
doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always the
consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can be
invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used

to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice;212 but where no such
result would ensue, the general rule that an unconstitutional law is totally
ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact
can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose
beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but cannot apply
to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals
determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and
related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and
unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and
without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the
General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by
any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite
the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue
collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the
conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206510

September 16, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.;

MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of
Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,

Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A
Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO,
Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A.
TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN
MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA, THERESA A.
CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A.
EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet,
MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON.
ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s,
HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the
President, . HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of
National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL
JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA,
Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN
EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the
Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine
Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise CoDirector, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR, J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under
Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws and
regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian
over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern
Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide."

Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the
south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20
kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are
considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11,
1988. Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of
Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the
global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It
was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing
excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The
97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for
internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited
Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant
natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example
representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an
area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3 otherwise
known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure
the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic,
biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha
Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations."
Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated
and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including
fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board
(TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of
the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial
waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the
purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."4 On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January
13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1wphi1

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port
of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No
cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift,
expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US
Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets
over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F.
del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navyled salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in
representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H.
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises CoDirector ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A
Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr.,
Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense), Secretary
Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), ViceAdmiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, AFP),
Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant),
Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and
Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the
"Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations
of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of
such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan,
Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights

to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts
committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); nonpayment of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement
officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain
provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court
to nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of
the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners
respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the
filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and
desist all operations over the Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well
as an additional buffer zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan'
because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for
breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume responsibility
for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental
damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving,
recreation, and limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous
communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and
an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until
further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without
limitation:

a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive

portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States
representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines
and environmental accountability] under Philippine authorities as provided in
Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence
administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers and
individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive
criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of
this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the
settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha
Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other
States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of
witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including seizure
and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the grounding
of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify
each other of the disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the
grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration,
repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans
covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement
approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in
accordance with the Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a
deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a
bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas
affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents'

experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar

grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the
name of transparency and accountability such environmental damage
assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and
technical support to the TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense,
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to review the
Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider
whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any
violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for
purposes of protecting the damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction")
and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating
equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of
nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section
2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other
respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such
other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring
supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition,
petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex
parte against the US respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO
and ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1)
the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have

become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were
already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3)
the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as
regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the
executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of
petitioners to file the present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a
case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the
act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized
grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this
Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public
right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first
time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other.
G.R. No. 181760

October 14, 2014

ATTY. ANACLETO B. BUENA, JR., MNSA, in his capacity as Regional

Director of Regional Office No. XVI, Civil Service Commission,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, Petitioner,
vs.
DR. SANGCAD D. BENITO, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has
the power to appoint officers in the region's civil service. However, if there is

no regional law providing for the qualifications for the position at the time of
appointment, the appointee must satisfy the civil service eligibilities required
for the position in the national government to be appointed in a permanent
capacity.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the Court of Appeals
resolution,2 dismissing the appeal of the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Regional Office) for
failure to file a memorandum. The Regional Office appealed the Regional Trial
Courts decision,3 ruling that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I,
does not require career executive service eligibility.
On August 27, 2004, Dr. Parouk S. Hussin (Regional Governor Hussin), then
Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, appointed
Dr. Sangcad D. Benito (Dr. Benito) as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I,
ina temporary capacity.4 On June 20, 2005, Regional Governor Hussin
reappointed Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, this
time in a permanent capacity.5 To change the status of Dr. Benitos
appointment from temporary to permanent, Regional Governor Hussin
requested the Civil Service Commission Regional Office for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao to attest to Dr. Benitos permanent
appointment.6 However, the Regional Office, through Regional Director
Anacleto B. Buena, Jr. (Regional Director Buena), returnedthe appointment to
the Regional Governor. According to the Regional Office, Dr. Benito did not
possess the career executive service eligibility required for the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent.7
On August 24, 2005, Dr. Benito filed a petition for mandamus8 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Lanao del Sur, to compel the Regional Office
to attest to his permanent appointment as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent. He argued that the position does not belong to the Career
Executive Service under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of
the Administrative Code of 1987.9 Consequently, the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent does not require career executive service
eligibility.10
Dr. Benito claimed that it was the Regional Offices ministerial duty to attest
to his appointment.11 Under Article VII, Section 19 of Republic Act No.
9054,12 the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao is the appointing authority for positions in the civil service in the
region. Since the appointing authority already exercised his discretion, the
Regional Office allegedly had no choicebut to attest to Dr. Benitos
appointment.13
In his answer,14 Regional Director Buena claimed that the position of
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent meets the following criteria for
positions in the Career Executive Service: The position is career, ranks higher
than Division Chief, has a salary grade of 25, and entails performance of
executive and managerial functions and supervisory responsibility over a
division.15 The permanent appointee to the position must, therefore, have
career executive service eligibility.16
According to Regional Director Buena, the Regional Office recognizes the
autonomy of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. However, until the
region enacts its own regional civil service law, the Regional Office shall carry
on with the Civil Service Commissions mandate under the Constitution to
promote and enforce civil service laws and rules.17
For Dr. Benitos failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a
petition for mandamus, Regional Director Buena prayed that the trial court
dismiss the petition for mandamus.18
The trial court noted that Dr. Benito did not appeal to the Civil Service
Commission proper the Regional Offices refusal to attest to his appointment.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that the petition for mandamus raised a
purely legal question. The case, therefore, falls within the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.19
As to whether the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent
requires career executive service eligibility, the trial court held that it did not.
Under Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 021011 dated August 1,2002,
only "director positions" in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
require career executive service eligibility. Considering that the Career
Executive Service Board had not declared the position of Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent a director position, the trial court ruled that the
position does not require career executive service eligibility.20 The Regional
Office "ha[d] no choice but to attest to [Dr. Benitos] appointment in
accordance with Civil Service Laws."21
Thus, in the decision22 dated September 12, 2005, the trial court granted Dr.
Benitos petition for mandamus. It ordered the Civil Service Commission

Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to attest to

the permanent appointment of Dr. Benito as Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent of the Department of Education, Division of Lanao del Sur-I. 23
In the meantime, Regional Director Buena retired.24 The Regional Office,
through Regional Director Grace R. Belgado-Saqueton, thus, filed a motion
for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its order25 dated May 19,
2006. The notice of appeal26 filed was initially denied due course in the
order27 dated August 16, 2006. On reconsideration, the trial court reversed
itself and granted the Regional Offices notice of appeal.28
The Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal. On November 8, 2006,
the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective
memoranda.29
Dr. Benito filed his memorandum30 on December 27, 2006. As for the
Regional Office, it filed a manifestation, requesting representation by the
Office of the Solicitor General and an additional 30 days to file a
memorandum.31
The 30th day within which to filea memorandum lapsed without the Regional
Office filing the required memorandum. Thus, in the resolution 32 dated June
8, 2007, the Court of Appeals declared the Regional Offices appeal
abandoned and dismissed:
While We could have granted CSCs prayer for an additional period, per JRD
Report dated April 12, 2007 however, no Memorandum for the appellant was
filed as per docket book entry. Consequently, considering that appellant is
the initiator of the instant appeal, We are constrained to dismiss the same
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17; Section 10, Rule 44; and Section 1(e), Rule 50
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby deemed
ABANDONED and DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17; Section 10, Rule
44; and Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.33
The Regional Office, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a motion
for reconsideration. The Associate Solicitor handling the case assumed
responsibility for the non-filing of the memorandum, citing her alleged heavy
workload as an excuse. She subsequently filed the required memorandum on
behalf of the Regional Office.34

In his comment on the motion for reconsideration, Dr. Benito argued that the
delay of seven (7) months and 22 days in the filing of the memorandum was
inexcusable negligence.35
In the resolution36 dated January 14, 2008,the Court of Appeals denied the
Regional Offices motion for reconsideration.
On April 1, 2008, the Regional Office filed a petition for review on
Certiorari37 on which Dr. Benito commented.38 A reply39 to the comment was
filed. Afterwards, this court considered this case submitted for deliberation in
the resolution40 dated December 1, 2009.
On March 6, 2012, this court resolvedto require the parties to move in the
premises.41 On June 19, 2012, this court clarified its March 6, 2012 resolution
and required the parties to notify the court of new or intervening significant
developments relevant to the case, if any. The parties were likewise required
to signify their interest in resolving the legal matters in this case.42
Dr. Benito filed the compliance43 dated August 20, 2012, on which the
Regional Office commented.44
In the petition for review on certiorari for the Regional Office, the Associate
Solicitor handling the casepleads for this courts "kind understanding on her
human limitations as a government lawyer handling numerous cases."45She
contends that "[the Regional Office] should not be made to bear the
prejudice on account of [her] failure to submit the required memorandum."46
The Regional Office argues that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
respondent Dr. Benitospetition for mandamus. A petition for mandamus,
according tothe Regional Office, is filed only when there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case,
appeal to the Civil Service Commission proper was still available. Worse, the
petition for mandamus was allegedly filed as a substitute for a lost appeal.
Consequently, the Regional Offices action on the attestation had already
become final and executory, "bar[ring] . . . resort to any judicial
action."47 The trial court should not have entertained the petition for
mandamus.48
On the merits, petitioner Regional Director Buena maintains that the position
of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent requires career executive
service eligibility, citing Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
02101149 dated August 1, 2002. Since the resolution does not distinguish
between a holder of a government position in the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao and one ina regular agency of the national government,
the qualifications for positions in the national government must apply to
positions in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.50
In his comment, respondent Dr. Benito emphasizes that the Regional Office
took seven (7) months and 22 days to file a memorandum with the Court of
Appeals.51 He argues that the failure of petitioner Regional Director Buenas
counsel to file the memorandum is inexcusable negligence. Consequently,
the negligence of petitioner Regional Director Buenas counsel binds the
Regional Office.
In his compliance52 dated August 20, 2012, respondent Dr. Benito added that
the issuance of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 100623 and,
subsequently, the Regional Assemblys enactment of the Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 279 or the ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010 confirm that
the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent does not require
career executive service eligibility.53
The issues for our resolution are the following:
I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Civil Service
Commission Regional Office for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanaos appealfor its failure to file the required memorandum;
II. Whether respondent Dr. Benito correctly availed himself of a petition for
mandamus against the Civil Service Commissions refusal to attest to his
appointment; and
III. Whether the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent
requires careerexecutive service eligibility.
We rule for the Civil Service Commission Regional Office.
I
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Civil Service Commissions
appeal for failure to file the required memorandum
Failure to comply with the Rules orwith any order of the court is a ground to
dismiss the action.54 Specifically on the appellants failure to file a
memorandum with the Court of Appeals, Rule 44, Section 10 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 10. Time for filing memoranda in special cases. In certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties
shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a nonextendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the
clerk that all evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the
record.
The failure of the appellant tofile his memorandum within the period therefor
may be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellants failure to file the required
memorandum within the reglementary period is a ground for the Court of
Appeals to dismiss the appeal:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed
by the Court of Appeals,on its motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
....
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of
his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules[.]
In this case, the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda. Instead of filing the memorandum, the Regional Office
requested additional 30 days to file the pleading. The additional period
requested lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required
memorandum. The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly dismissed the
appeal.
That "the case was not properly calendared in the list of due dates of the . . .
Associate Solicitor [handling the case]"55 and the Associate Solicitors
"overwhelming workload"56 do not justify counsels failure to file the
memorandum on behalf of the Regional Office. We have ruled that heavy
workload is no excuse for failure to comply with the reglementary periods
under the Rules.57
Nevertheless, considering the important question before us, we take
cognizance of the petition and resolve the case on the merits.58
II
A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Civil Service
Commission to attest to the appointment of respondent

Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for
mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting froman office, trust, or station. It may
also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act
or duty.59 An act is ministerial if the act should be performed "[under] a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporations]
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."60 The
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to
perform the act specifically enjoined by law.61 This is opposed to a
discretionary act wherein the officer has the choice to decide how or when to
perform the duty.62
In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court
has ruled that the Civil Service Commissions attestation is a ministerial duty
once it finds the appointee eligible for the position. The Commission "is
limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not
the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the
law."63 If the appointee possesses the required civil service eligibility, the
Commission has "no choice but to attest to the appointment."64 As this court
explained in Luego v. Civil Service Commission:65
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving orreviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but
to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Laws.66 Mandamus, therefore, is the proper remedy to compel the Civil
Service Commission to attest to a valid appointment as this court ruled in
Villegas v. Subido.67
In Villegas, Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas appointed Gregorio A. Ejercito as
City Legal Officer pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185. Mayor Villegas then
sent the appointment of Atty. Ejercito to the Civil Service Commission for
attestation.68

The Commission disapproved the appointment, reasoning that Atty. Ejercito

did not meet the required trial work experience. Arguing that Atty. Ejercito
possessed the requirements under the civil service law, Mayor Villegas filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the Commission to attest to Atty. Ejercitos
appointment.69
Finding that Atty. Ejercito possessed the required civil service eligibility, this
court granted the petition for mandamus. The Civil Service Commission was
ordered to approve the appointment of Atty. Ejercito as City Legal Officer of
Manila.70
In this case, respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the correct remedy.
Given his claim that he possesses the required civil service eligibility for the
position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, he correctly filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission to approve
his appointment.
The Regional Office argues that respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the
wrong remedy considering that the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of
appeal to the Civil Service Commission proper was still available. The trial
court should have dismissed respondent Dr. Benitos petition for mandamus.
True, the general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law when filing a petition for
mandamus.71 Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that a party "exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts."72 The Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Casesin the Civil Service,73 then effective when Dr.
Benito was appointed, states:
Section 71. Complaint or Appeal to the Commission. Other personnel
actions, such as, but not limited to, separation from the service due to
unsatisfactory conduct or wantof capacity during probationary period,
dropping from the rolls due toAbsence Without Official Leave (AWOL),
physically and mentally unfit, and unsatisfactory or poor performance, action
on appointments (disapproval, invalidation, recall, and revocation),
reassignment, transfer, detail, secondment, demotion, or termination of
services, may be brought to the Commission, by way of an appeal.
Section 72. When and Where to File. A decision or ruling of a department or
agency may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the

party adversely affected to the Civil Service Regional Office and finally, to
the Commission Proper within the same period.
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the same office which
rendered the decision or ruling within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, there are exceptionsto the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. A party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the
following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved ispurely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess ofjurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not providea plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.74
In this case, the facts are undisputed. Respondent Dr. Benito is not career
executive service eligible. The question is whether the position for which he
was appointed requires career executive service eligibility. This is a purely
legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

All told, respondent Dr. Benito did not err in filing a petition for mandamus
with the trial court.
III
The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the
Career Executive Service
Under the civil service law, positions in the Career Executive Service are:
"Under secretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau
Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department
Service, and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the
President."75
In the exercise of its legal mandate, the Career Executive Service Board
issued Resolution No. 945 dated June 14, 2011, where it set the following
criteria to determine whether a position belongs to the Career Executive
Service:
1. The position is career;
2. The position is above division chief; and
3. The position entails performance of executive and managerial functions.
Aside from satisfying the criteriaset by the Career Executive Service Board,
the holder of the position must also be a presidential appointee.76
Applying these principles in thiscase, we rule that the position of Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service.
The position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a career position.
Appointment to the position is based on merit and fitness and gives the
appointee an opportunity for advancement to higher career positions,77such
as Schools Division Superintendent. If permanently appointed, the appointee
is guaranteed security of tenure.78
The position is above Division Chief. An Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent has a salary grade of 25.79
As to functions and responsibilities, the Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent assists the Schools Division Superintendent in performing the

following executive and managerial functions under Republic Act No. 9155 or
the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001:
1. Developing and implementing division education development plans;
2. Planning and managing the effective and efficient use of all personnel,
physical and fiscal resources of the division, including professional staff
development;
3. Hiring, placing and evaluating all division supervisors and schools district
supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and nonteaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division
superintendent;
4. Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the national government
and the local government units to the schools and learning centers;
5. Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic education programs
and for this purpose strengthening the role of division supervisors as subject
area specialists;
6. Promoting awareness of and adherence by all schools and learning centers
to accreditation standards prescribed by the Secretary of Education;
7. Supervising the operations of all public and private elementary, secondary
and integrated schools, and learning centers; and
8. Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper
authorities.80
In fact, the law recognizes that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service. Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 9155 explicitly provides that an appointee to the position
must be a career executive service officer:
SEC. 7. Powers, Duties and Functions.
....
No appointment to the positions of regional directors, assistant regional
directors, schools division superintendents and assistant schools division
superintendents shall be made unless the appointee is a career executive
service officer who preferably shall have risen from the ranks. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Osea v. Malaya,81 this court took judicial notice of the Career Executive
Service Boards Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, where the
Board identified the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent as
a Career Executive Service position.82
Even Regional Governor Hussin admitted that the President appoints the
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent.1wphi1 In his letter-request for
attestation of respondent Dr. Benitos appointment, he said:
Our stand is that Dr. Benito, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent being
an appointee of the ARMM Regional Governor need not possess the said
eligibility. More importantly, if the agencies of the National Government who
have fiscal autonomy enjoys the exemption, then the more for an appointee
of the ARMM for the reason that in the ARMM we do not only exercise fiscal
autonomy but weare an Autononmous [sic] Local Government Unit with
unique structure. We emphasize that the other Assistant Schools
Superintendents in the ARMM were appointed by the President thus, they
were required to have the 3rd level eligibility pursuant to Presidential Decree
1.
In view of this, we are submitting the herein appointment for the approval of
your Office.83 (Emphasis supplied)
It is settled, therefore, that the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent belongs to the Career Executive Service. The appointee to
the position must be career executive service eligible.
Permanent appointment to positionsin the Career Executive Service
presupposes that the appointee has passed the Career Executive Service
examinations.84 In this case, respondent Dr. Benito does not possess the
required career executive service eligibility. He, therefore, cannot be
appointed to the position of Assistant Schools Division Superintendent in a
permanent capacity. The Civil Service Commission cannot be compelled to
attest to the permanent appointment of respondent Dr. Benito.
The Regional Governor has the power to appoint civil servants in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under Article VII, Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 9054.85 In Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 279 or the
ARMM Basic Education Act of 2010, the Regional Assembly set the
qualification standards of Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of
Divisions of the Department of Education in the Autonomous Region:

Sec. 45. Qualification Standards of Schools Division Superintendent and

Assistant Schools Division Superintendent.1wphi1 No person maybe
appointed Schools Division Superintendent or Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent unless he is natural born citizen of the Philippines; a native
inhabitant of the Autonomous Region; a registered voter in any province or
cityin the region for at least five years prior to his appointment.
. . . The Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, at the time of his
appointment, shall at least be a Masters Degree holder; five years of
supervisory and administrative experiences; with relevant trainings; and
possesses appropriate civil service eligibility.
....
Nevertheless, when respondent Dr. Benito was appointed Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent in 2005, there was yet no regional law providing for
the qualifications for the Assistant Schools Division Superintendents of
Divisions of the Department of Education in the Autonomous Region.
Consequently, the civil service eligibilities required for positions in the
national government shall likewise be required for appointments to positions
in the Autonomous Region. Article XVI, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9054
provides:
SEC. 4. Civil Service Eligibility. Until the Regional Assembly shall have
enacted a civil service law, the civil service eligibilities required by the
central government or national government for appointments to public
positions shall likewise be required for appointments to government positions
in the Regional Government. As may be necessary, the Civil Service
Commission shall hold special civil service examinations in the autonomous
region. For a period not longer more than six (6) years from the approval of
this Organic Act, the central government or national government shall
endeavor to provide appropriate civil service eligibility to applicants coming
from the autonomous region for government positions therein. The minimum
qualifications prescribed by law shall, however, be met.
All told, respondent Dr. Benito did not possess the required civil service
eligibility at the time he was appointed Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent. Consequently, he cannot be appointed in a permanent
capacity to the position. The Civil Service Commission cannot be compelled
through a writ of mandamus to attest to the permanent appointment of
respondent Dr. Benito.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Regional

Trial court, Branch 9, Lanao del Sur's September 12, 2005 decision in Special
Civil Action Case No. 1538-05 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194139

January 24, 2012

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P.
BAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly
assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of
the decision of the Division in due course.
For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the order dated August 13, 2010 (denying the affirmative
defenses raised by the petitioner),1 and the order dated October 7, 2010
(denying his motion for reconsideration),2 both issued by the COMELEC First
Division in EPC No. 2010-42, an election protest entitled Claude P. Bautista,
protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee.3
Antecedents
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the
position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010
automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results
led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner
(with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.4
Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of
election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May
24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42).5 The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First
Division.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,6 the petitioner averred as his
special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash
deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of
the acts or omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed
order denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner, 7 viz:
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission (First
Division) makes the following observation:
1. Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) on June 3, 2010 as evidenced by O.R. No.
1118105; and
2. Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the
Protestant set forth the specific details of the acts and
omissions complained of against the Protestee.
It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3, 2010
is a substantial compliance with the requirement of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of said Resolution.
Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially complied with
Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-mentioned Resolution.
In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to DENY
the Protestees special affirmative defenses.
SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not
discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the conduct
of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph 2,9 Rule 19 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804,10 requiring all decisions to clearly and distinctly express
the facts and the law on which they were based; and that it also contravened
Section 7(g), 11 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the
matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1,12 Section
5,13 and Section 6,14 all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had introduced
the requirement for the "detailed specification" to prevent "shotgun fishing
expeditions by losing candidates;"15 that such requirement contrasted with

Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure,16 under which the
protest needed only to contain a "concise statement of the ultimate facts"
constituting the cause or causes of action; that Bautistas protest did not
meet the new requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that
in Pea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,17 the Court upheld the
dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) for not specifically alleging the electoral anomalies and irregularities
in the May 8, 1995 elections.
In his opposition,18 Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the
ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;19 that the rules of the COMELEC required the
initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions constituting the electoral
frauds, anomalies and election irregularities, and to contain the ultimate
facts upon which the cause of action was based; and that Pea v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal did not apply because, firstly, Pea had
totally different factual antecedents than this case, and, secondly, the
omission of material facts from Peas protest prevented the protestee
(Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being apprised of the issues that he must meet
and made it eventually impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot
boxes had to be collected.
On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed
order,20 denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration for failing to show
that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:
The Protestees August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to
Certify the Case to the Commission En Banc" relative to the Order issued by
the Commission (First Division) dated August 13, 2010 is hereby DENIED for
failure to show that the assailed order is contrary to law
Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the
protestants petition have substantially complied with the
requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the
opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the issues
raised in the protest but also those set forth in the Protestees
answer. When substantial compliance with the rules is satisfied,
allowing the protest to proceed is the best way of removing any
doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of the electorate. All other
issues laid down in the parties pleadings, including those in the
Protestees special and affirmative defenses and those expressed in

the preliminary conference brief, will best be threshed out in the

final resolution of the instant case.
The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the
Commission En Banc is DENIED considering that the 13 August 2010
Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant
case with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in
this Court.
Issue
The petitioner submits that:
THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS
THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN FORM AND CONTENT.
The petitioner argues that Section 9,21 Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to summarily dismiss the protest for
being insufficient in form and content; and that the insufficiency in substance
arose from the failure of the protest to: (a) specifically state how the various
irregularities and anomalies had affected the results of the elections; (b)
indicate in which of the protested precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-ballots"
used; (c) identify the precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to
accurately account for the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with
particularity how many additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of
the grounds he protested. He concludes that the COMELEC First Division
gravely abused its discretion in allowing the protest of Bautista despite its
insufficiency.
Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere
fishing expedition to be outrightly dismissed in light of the elections being
held under an automated system. In support of his urging, he cites Roque, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections,22 where the Court took judicial notice of the
accuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines and CCS computers, such that
allegations of massive errors in the automated counting and canvassing had
become insufficient as basis for the COMELEC to entertain or to give due

course to defective election protests.23 He submits that a protest like

Bautistas cast doubt on the automated elections.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and Bautista
both posit that the COMELEC had the power and prerogative to determine
the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest; and that certiorari did
not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted within its discretion.
Additionally, the OSG maintains that the assailed orders, being interlocutory,
are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take cognizance of
the petition for certiorari.
Ruling
We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision
or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated,
the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent
observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections24 are
enlightening, viz:
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the
Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief,
or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the
commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof." [emphasis supplied]
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings
and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final
decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division,
certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court
has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may
be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly
provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that
there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the
Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion
for reconsideration is mandatory.xxx25
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC
First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first
decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to
appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en
banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court
conceded in Kho v. Commission on Elections.26 In that case, the protestant
assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division admitting an answer with
counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition
for certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division. The
Court granted the petition and nullified the assailed order for being issued
without jurisdiction, and explained the exception thuswise:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the
COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First
Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996
that no final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which
will necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the
Commission en banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election
cases must be heard and decided first in division and any motion for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Apparently, the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February
28, 1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all
interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue
regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and do
not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something to be
done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is
clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case pending in a
division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the division itself,
and not on the Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure explicitly provides for this,
Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx
xxx
(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on
interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division
which issued the order. (emphasis provided)
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
confirms that the subject case does not fall on any of the instances over
which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:

Section 2. The Commission en banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in

cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a
vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other cases
where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of
all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an
action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en
banc.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy
is one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it
shown that the present controversy a case where a division is not
authorized to act nor a situation wherein the members of the First
Division unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the
Commission en banc. Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the
circumstances shown above, can not be the proper forum which the
matter concerning the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred
to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the
instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer the
controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible
under its present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter
is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not
authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer
to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly
resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in

which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be

reviewed.
However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application
herein, because the COMELEC First Division had the competence to
determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions
complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.
For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the COMELEC broad powers
involving not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of elections but also the resolution and
determination of election controversies.27 The breadth of such powers
encompasses the authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations
contained in every election protest and to decide based on such allegations
whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly
dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.
The Court has upheld the COMELECs determination of the sufficiency of
allegations contained in election protests, conformably with its imperative
duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within its command,
who was the candidate elected by the electorate.28 Indeed, in Panlilio v.
Commission on Elections,29 we brushed aside the contention that the election
protest was insufficient in form and substance and was a sham for having
allegations couched in general terms, stating:
In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioners argument that the
protestant had no cause of action, as the allegations of fraud and
irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to
order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states
the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of
general jurisdiction, as follows:
The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a
string of categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when
there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal,
examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of
the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination
and counting of ballots deposited therein.

In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court considered the

allegations in an election protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in
form and substance.
Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud and
irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxes and
examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance with
Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. Where allegations in a protest
or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in the
interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of voters,
ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election
be brought before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes
recounted.lawphi1
In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the
protest and counter-protest warranted the opening of the contested ballot
boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the conflicting
claims of petitioner and private respondent.
The petitioner adds that with the Court having noted the reliability and
accuracy of the PCOS machines and consolidation/canvassing system (CCS)
computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,30 Bautistas election
protest assailing the system and procedure of counting and canvassing of
votes cast in an automated system of elections should be immediately
dismissed.
We are not persuaded.
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an
election protest to challenge the outcome of an election undertaken in an
automated system of elections. Instead, the Court only ruled there that the
system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS
machines and CCS computers met the minimum system requirements
prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436.31 The Court did not
guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections,
as can be gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat:
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would
go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence,
and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010.
Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the

voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software
embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as
part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent
constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and
enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road,
however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be
rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It
would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest
elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist
Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the
system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections
to succeed, credibly.32
In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other
submissions of the petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 207412

August 7, 2013

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG, PETITIONER,

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS AND DEAN CARLOS C.
BAYLON, RESPONDENTS.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 207542
MICAH P. ESPIA, JOSE MARIE F. NASALGA AND CHE CHE B.
SALCEPUEDES, PETITIONERS,
vs.
DR. CARLOS C. BA YLON, DR. MINDA J. FORMACI ON AND DR.
EMERLINDA ROMAN (TO BE SUBSTITUTED BY ALFREDO E. PASCUAL,
BEING THE NEW UP PRESIDENT), UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
BOARD OF REGENTS, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:

This case involves the consolidated petitions of petitioner Flord Nicson

Calawag in G.R. No. 207412 and petitioners Micah P. Espia, Jose Marie F.
Nasalga and Che Che B. Salcepuedes in G.R. No. 207542 (hereinafter
collectively known as petitioners), both assailing the decision1 dated August
9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 05079. The CA
annulled the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo,
Branch 67, granting a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondent Dean Carlos Baylon of the University of the Philippines Visayas
(UP Visayas).
The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP
Visayas under a scholarship from the Department of Science and TechnologyPhilippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. They
finished their first year of study with good grades, and thus were eligible to
start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. The petitioners
then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and
obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea to be their thesis adviser, as well as
the other faculty members consent to constitute their respective thesis
committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the petitioners sent to
Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of their thesis
committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members and the
thesis advisers approval of their titles, as well as the approval of Professor
Roman Sanares, the director of the Institute of Marine Fisheries and
Oceanology.
Upon receipt of the petitioners letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos
addressed to Professor Sanares, questioning the propriety of the thesis topics
with the colleges graduate degree program. He subsequently disapproved
the composition of the petitioners thesis committees and their tentative
thesis topics. According to Dean Baylon, the petitioners thesis titles connote
a historical and social dimension study which is not appropriate for the
petitioners chosen masters degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered the
petitioners to submit a two-page proposal containing an outline of their
tentative thesis titles, and informed them that he is forming an ad hoc
committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of the thesis
committees.
The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
RTC, asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners
thesis committees and approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the

RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon,

and order him to perform such acts while the suit was pending.
The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean
Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this order
before the CA through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order (TRO).
The CAs Ruling
The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTCs order, holding
that the petitioners had no clear right to compel Dean Baylon to approve the
composition of their thesis committees as a matter of course. As the college
dean, Dean Baylon exercises supervisory authority in all academic matters
affecting the college. According to the CA, the petitioners reliance on Article
51 of the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas is misplaced. Article 51
provides:
Art. 51. The composition of the thesis committee shall be approved by the
dean of the college/school upon the recommendation of the chairperson of
the major department/division/institute. The GPO shall be informed of the
composition of the thesis committee and/or any change thereof.3
Despite the mandatory language provided for composing the thesis
committee under Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas,
the CA construed it to mean that the Deans approval is necessary prior to
the composition of a thesis committee.
Lastly, the CA held that the case presents issues that are purely academic in
character, which are outside the courts jurisdiction. It also noted that Dean
Baylon has been accommodating of the petitioners, and that the
requirements he imposed were meant to assist them to formulate a proper
thesis title and graduate on time.
The Petitions for Review on Certiorari
In G.R. No. 207412, Calawag argues that the CAs decision should be set
aside for the following reasons:
First, Calawag was entitled to the injunction prayed for, as he has clear rights
under the law which were violated by Dean Baylons actions. These are the
right to education, the right to due process, and the right to equal protection
under the law. According to Calawag, Dean Baylon violated his right to due

process when he added to and changed the requirements for the constitution
of his thesis committee, without prior publication of the change in rules.
Calawags right to equal protection of the law, on the other hand, was
allegedly violated because only students like him, who chose Dr. Balea for
their thesis adviser, were subjected to the additional requirements imposed
by the dean, while the other students thesis committees were formed
without these impositions. Hence, Calawag and the three other petitioners in
G.R. No. 207542 were unduly discriminated against.
Second, a reading of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980,4 and Republic Act No.
95005 shows that the college deans functions are merely administrative,
and, hence, the CA erred in its construction of Article 51 of the Graduate
Program Manual of UP Visayas, as well as its proclamation that the college
dean has supervisory authority over academic matters in the college.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 207542, petitioners Espia, Nasalga and
Salcepuedes argue that the CAs decision should be set aside for the
following reasons:
First, the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas and the Guidelines for the
Master of Science in Fisheries Program are clear in providing that Dean
Baylon has a formal duty to approve the composition of the petitioners
thesis committees upon the latters compliance with several requirements.
Thus, when the petitioners complied with these requirements and Dean
Baylon still refused to approve the composition of their thesis committees,
the petitioners had a right to have him compelled to perform his duty.
Second, Dean Baylon cannot arbitrarily change and alter the manual and the
guidelines, and cannot use academic freedom as subterfuge for not
performing his duties.
Third, the thesis adviser and the thesis committees, in consultations with the
students, have the right to choose the thesis topics, and not the dean.
The Courts Ruling
Having reviewed the arguments presented by the petitioners and the records
they have attached to the petitions, we find that the CA did not commit an
error in judgment in setting aside the preliminary mandatory injunction that
the RTC issued against Dean Baylon. Thus, there could be no basis for the
Courts exercise of its discretionary power to review the CAs decision.

"To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, x x x the petitioners must

establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. Since a preliminary mandatory
injunction commands the performance of an act, it does not preserve the
status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction [presents a fourth requirement: it] is justified only in a clear case,
free from doubt or dispute. When the complainants right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of
injunctive relief is improper."6
The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right that needs the protection of a preliminary mandatory
injunction. We support the CAs conclusion that the dean has the discretion
to approve or disapprove the composition of a thesis committee, and, hence,
the petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition of
their thesis committees.
Calawags citation of Executive Order No. 628, s. 1980 and Republic Act No.
9500 to show that the dean of a college exercises only administrative
functions and, hence, has no ascendancy over the colleges academic
matters, has no legal ground to stand on. Neither law provides or supports
such conclusion, as neither specifies the role and responsibilities of a college
dean. The functions and duties of a college dean are outlined in the
universitys Faculty Manual, which details the rules and regulations governing
the universitys administration. Section 11.8.2, paragraph b of the Faculty
Manual enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which
include the power to approve the composition of a thesis committee, to wit:
11.8.2 Administration
xxxx
b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The
Dean/Director shall be responsible for the planning and
implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the Dean/Director
shall exercise the following powers and responsibilities based on the
recommendations forwarded to him/her, through channels:
xxxx

Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special Project**

Committees and Masters or doctoral examination/oral defense panel for
each student[.]7 (emphases and italics ours)
By necessary implication,8 the deans power to approve includes the power
to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP
Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in approving or
disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this
provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and the
Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the
CAs interpretation that the thesis committees composition needs the
approval of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites
provided in Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX of the
Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.9
Anent the petitioners argument that Dean Baylon acted arbitrarily in
imposing additional requirements for the composition of the thesis
committee, which according to Calawag violated their right to due process,
we hold that the deans authority to approve or disapprove the composition
of a thesis committee includes this discretion. We also note the CAs finding
that these additional requirements were meant to assist the petitioners in
formulating a thesis title that is in line with the colleges master of fisheries
program. Absent any finding of grave abuse of discretion, we cannot
interfere with the exercise of the deans prerogative without encroaching on
the colleges academic freedom.
Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning
gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and objectives and
how best to attain them.10 They are given the exclusive discretion to
determine who can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can
confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates.11
This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for
graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this
shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with
their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have
arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment.12
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis
for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of
Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,13 we held that the right to
education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution

provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course of

study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the
procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a
person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply with.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DENY giving due course to the petitions
in G.R. No. 207412 and G.R. No. 207542.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199139

September 9, 2014

ELSIE S. CAUSING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON,
SR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The issue is whether the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal
Mayor during the election period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar
to the Office of the Mayor just a few steps away constituted a prohibited act
under the Omnibus Election Codeand the relevant Resolution of the
Commission on Elections.
The Case
Petitioner Elsie Causing (Causing) assails the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections En Banc(COMELECEn Banc) promulgated on September 9, 2011
dismissing her complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 docketed as E.O.
CaseNo. 10-131 entitled Elsie S. Causing v. Hernan D. Biron, Sr. charging
Municipal Mayor HernanD. Biron, Sr. (Mayor Biron) of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo
with violating COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261 (g),
(h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code.1
Antecedents
On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum
No. 12, Series of 2010,2 which reads:

Office Order No. 12

Series of 2010
MRS. ELSIE S. CAUSING
Municipal Civil Registrar
LGU Barotac Nuevo
Exigencies of service so requiring, you are hereby detailed at the Office of
the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of this Order and shall likewise
receive direct orders from the undersigned as to particular functions our
office may require from time to time.
For your information and strict compliance.
xxxx
On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing
Catalina V. Belonio (Belonio), another municipal employee, to the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and
duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of the order.
Office Order No. 13 reads:
Office Order No. 13
Series of 2010
MS. CATALINA V. BELONIO
Administrative Officer III
Office of the Municipal Mayor
Exigencies of service so requiring, you are hereby detailed at the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar and assume the functions and duties as LCRDesignate effective upon receipt of this Order.
As such, you are hereby authorized to sign and issue documents relative
thereto including the claim for travel allowance and seminar expenses.
For you information and compliance.
x x x x3
On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series
of 2010, and Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010, respectively reading as
follows:
Memorandum No. 17

You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor effective
immediately upon receipt of this Order and signing of MCR documents shall
likewise be done at my office where you will be provided with a table for this
particular function.
For clarity purposes preparation ofsuch documents relative to civil
registration provided for under R.A.No. 9048 and R.A. 9255 shall be done at
the office of MCR, after which, the said documents shall be forwarded to you
for your signature.
Additional duties and functions shall likewise be under my direct supervision.
Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed accordingly.
For your strict compliance.4
Memorandum No. 17-A
You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor effective
immediately upon receipt of this Order. You have to take action on R.A. 9048
and sign MCR documents at my office where you will be provided with a
table for this particular function.
For clarity purposes, preparation of documents relative to civil registration
shall be done at the office of MCR, after which, the said completed
documents shall be forwarded to you for your signature.
Additional duties and functions shall likewise be under my direct supervision.
Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed accordingly.
For your strict compliance.5
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing filed the
complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election
Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May
28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the
Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1,
Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8737, Series of 2009, to wit:
xxxx

5. The issuance of Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 by the municipal
mayor ordering my detail atthe Office of the Municipal Mayor, made within
the election period and without prior written authority from the COMELEC is
illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No 1 in connection with
Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 (Series of 2009) otherwise
known as " In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibition against appointment or
hiring of new employees, creating or filing of new positions, giving any salary
increase or transferring or detailing any officer or employee in the civil
service and suspension of local elective officials in connection with the May
10, 2010 national and local elections;
xxxx
8. Further, said transfer of detail does not fall under any of the exceptions to
the requirement of prior authority from the COMELEC, as provided under
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
x x x x6
In his counter-affidavit,7 Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of
transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of
her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing
with her co-employees and with the public transacting business in her office
had been received;8 that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to
take personnel actions and other management prerogatives for the good of
public service; that Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the
Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or detailed to another
office in order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted
to a lower position that diminishedher salary and other benefits.9
On March 1, 2011, Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor
(PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of
probable cause to charge MayorBiron with the violation of Section (h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by Resolution No. 8737.
On September 9, 2011, the COMELEC En Bancaffirmed the findings and
recommendation of PES Doronilla,10observing that Mayor Biron did not
transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically report to the
Mayors office and to perform her functions thereat; and that he did not strip
her of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her
of her supervisory functions over her staff.11
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issues
Causing submits that Office Order 12 and Office Order 13 were gross
violations of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, that
implemented Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code; that
the prohibition contained in said provisions covered any movement during
the election period, whether it was by reassignment, appointment,
promotion, or demotion, regardless of rank, level or salaryof the affected
personnel; that her detail to the Office of the Mayor was a clear case of
personnel movement prohibited by law;12 and that Mayor Biron violated the
provisions because he did not secure from the COMELEC the prior authority
to transfer or detail her during the election period.13
In addition, Causing claims that the COMELEC En Banccommitted grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of PES Doronilla to the effect that
there was no probable cause to hold Mayor Biron liable for violating the
Omnibus Election Code; and that the COMELEC En Banc totally disregarded a
crucial piece ofevidence the existence of Office Order No. 13 that had
ordered the detail of Belonio as the Local Civil Registrar-designate.14
In his comment,15 Mayor Biron insists that the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed because of the petitioners failure to file a motion for
reconsideration in the COMELEC, and because of her failure to attach copies
of equally important documents pertinent to the case.16 He emphasizes that
Office Order No. 12 was issued by his office for the purpose of closely
supervising her in performing her functions after complaints about her
behavior in dealing with her co-workers and withthe public transacting
business in her office had been received by his office.17 He accuses her of
willfully suppressing evidence, specifically the two office orders that clarified
that she would still be performing the functions of her office, albeit in the
Office of the Mayor.18
Mayor Biron reiterates his counter-affidavit, namely: (a) that there was no
transfer or detail involved, and any movement of Causing, if at all, was a
purely physical transfer, that is, only a few steps from her office to the Office
of the Mayor, without any change in the present work, agency, position, rank
and compensation;19 and (b) that granting without admitting that the
movement constituted reassignment, the same was not covered by the
provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, which expressly limited the
prohibition to either transfer or detail only.20 Mayor Biron posits that Office
Order No. 13 purportedly ordering the detail of Belonio as Local Civil

Registrar-designate was a mere piece of paper, which Belonio never

received.21 He points out that his actions were upheld by the decision dated
August 13,2010 of the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission
dismissing the appeal by Causing of the assailed office orders.22
Finally, Mayor Biron asserts that Causing did not demonstrate that the
COMELEC En Banccommitted grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
findings that there was no probable causeto hold him liable for violation of
the Omnibus Election Code.23
On its part, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),24 defends its questioned resolution, stating that the words transferand
detail, having already acquired legislative and jurisprudential meanings,
should not be understood in their literal sense; that Causing was neither
transferred nor detailed; that she was not moved to a different office with the
same rank, level and salary, or to another agency;25 and that Mayor Birons
act of transferring the office space of Causing was intra vires, and found legal
support in the power of supervision and control accorded to local chief
executives under the Local Government Code.26
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
1.
Procedural Issue:
Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition for
certiorari
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorariby the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court(1997) contains a separate rule(Rule 64) on the review of the decisions
of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.27 Rule 64 is generally
identical with certiorariunder Rule 65,28 except as to the period of the filing of
the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but,
in the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution assailed.29

Mayor Biron indicates that Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration
before coming to the Court. Causing submits, however, that she was not
required to file the motion for reconsideration because the only recourse of
an aggrieved party from the decision of the COMELEC was the filing of the
petition for certiorariunder either Rule 64 or Rule 65.30
The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
civil action for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorariwill lie is intended to
afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and
factual aspects of the case.31
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid
down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for
certiorariwithout first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quohas no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the
petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of
due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order ofarrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are
a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parteor in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely oflaw or public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing
exceptions was applicable herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the
motion for reconsideration, especially because there was nothing in the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure thatprecluded the filing of the motion for
reconsideration in election offense cases.32
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.
2.

Substantive Issues:
Mayor Birons acts did not violate the Omnibus Election Code and the
COMELEC Resolution
On the merits, the petition should also fail.
E.O. Case No. 10-131 was founded on Mayor Birons alleged violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737,Series of 2009, in relation to Section 261(g),
(h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code, which respectively provide:
Resolution No. 8737
Section 1. Prohibited Acts
A. During the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 09, 2010, no
public official shall, except upon prior authority of the Commission:
1. Make or cause any transfer or detail whatsoever of any officer or
employee in the civil service, including public school teachers. "Transfer" as
used in this provision shall be construed as any personnel movement from
one government agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another withor
without the issuance of an appointment.
xxxx
Section 261(g), (h) and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
xxxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or
giving salary increases. - During the periodof forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or
appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether
national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of
the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless,
it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper

functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not
be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be
appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the
date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this
provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or
remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations.
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. - Any public official
who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or
employee in the civil service including publicschool teachers, within the
election period except upon prior approval of the Commission. x x x x
(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer. The provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election
period, any public official who suspends, without prior approval of the
Commission, any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer,
unless said suspension will be for purposes of applying the AntiGraft and
Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the suspension and removal of elective
officials; in which case the provisions of this section shall be inapplicable.
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737
were transfer and detail. Transferis defined in the Resolution as "any
personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one
department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government
agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment;" while
detailas defined in the Administrative Code of 1987is the movement of an
employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment.33 Having acquired technicaland legal meanings, transferand
detailmust be construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving
Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the
contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred
her office area from its old location tothe Office of the Mayor "some little
steps" away.34 We cannot accept the petitionersargument, therefore, that
the phrase "any transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and all
kinds and manner of personnel movement,"35 including the mere change in
office location.

Moreover, Causings too-literal understanding of transfershould not hold

sway because the provisions involved here werecriminal in
nature.1wphi1 Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election
offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.36 It is a
basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be
resolved in favor of the accused.37 This means that the courts must not bring
cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. In
short, no act can be pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made so by
statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege). So,
too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them.
Equally material is that Mayor Birons act of transferring the office space of
Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials
and employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the
faithful discharge of their duties and functions.38 His explanation that he
transferred Causings work station from her original office to his office in
order to closely supervise her after his office received complaints against her
could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her
tasks, and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil
Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.
The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor Birons "crystal clear
intention" to replace and transfer her during the election period.39 As the
COMELEC En Bancfound, Belonio did not receive the order, and Causing
remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio
uncompleted. Without the actual appointment of Belonio as the Municipal
Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to criminally charge Mayor Biron
ofviolating Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case,
Causing initiated an administrative case in the Civil Service Commission to
challenge her "reassignment" pursuant to the same office orders. In that
administrative case, she referred to the personnel movement not as a
transferor detail, but as a reassignmentthat constituted her constructive
dismissal.40
On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City
ruled thatalthough Mayor Biron used the word detailin referring to the

personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took place,
albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment, viz: In the instant case,
Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR).
She was merely required to physically report to the Mayors Office and
perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she
isstill the MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her usual work
station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as
she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared.
While she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor
as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however, does not mean
that she has lost supervision over them. That difficulty, nonetheless, is not
tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor Biron prefers to ensure
that Causing faithfully discharging her duties as MCR is principally an
exercise of his sound judgment and discretion. He alone has the discretion to
decide when to resort to the necessity of implementing changes in the
workplace as he occupies the ideal vantage point and is in the best position
to determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy those needs.
Besides, contrary to the allegations of Causing, none of the elements of
constructive dismissal is present.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Elsie B. Causing is DISMISSED. Office
Order No. 12. Dated May 28, 2010 and Office Orders No. 17 and 17-A dated
June 01, 2010 of Mayor Hernan D. Biron, Sr. of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo are
AFFIRMED.41
Considering that reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election
Code, there was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES
the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections promulgated on September 9, 2011 dismissing E.O. Case No. 10131 entitled Elsie S. Causing v. Hernan D. Biron, Sr.; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185128
January 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review1 on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing the Decision2 dated July 31, 2006 and
Resolution3 dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision4 dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291,
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted "raid," which prompted them to
immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to
petitioner's house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence
is a two-storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor.
When they went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that
they will implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area,
SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small
structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no
avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits
of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the
place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to
get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder
sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner
including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men
who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline

substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heatsealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination,
the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging
him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The
Information5 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his
possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as "shabu," all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or
prescription from any competent authority.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded
not guilty.7 Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic
Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner,
Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be
summarized as follows:
On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was
installing the electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons
Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the
owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home
around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his
wife that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According
to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found
the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a
storage place by his father.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge
against him in the Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del
Castillo "alyas Boy Castillo," GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months
as Maximum of Prision Correccional.
The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
with the law.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed
the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is
DISMISSED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO. 570-9-119724;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF
WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR OF THE
NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED THAT
IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT FOR
COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT ALSO,
PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED USED BY
THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER

WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE

CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE ELEMENT OF
"POSSESSION" AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN VIOLATION OF
THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE SAID COURT
PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE BEEN
ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10,
2009, enumerated the following counter-arguments:
I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S.
Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.
II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are
admissible in evidence against him.
III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.11
Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who
applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from
failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not
introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was
conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.
Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located
about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the "permissible
area" that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and
that the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the
places to be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities and not to private individuals

such as the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of
shabu inside the nipa hut.
As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG
dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and
regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is
in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the
same is sufficient to convict.
This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.12 According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable
cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.13 A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.14 The judge, in determining probable cause, is
to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by
a fixed and rigid formula,15and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.16 The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.17 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,

and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched.18 A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered
that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.19 In the present case, Search
Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the
items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from
the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered
as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual,
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being
applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search
warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the
testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:
Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.
Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.
Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?

A Nelson Gonzalado.
Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.
Q What happened after that?
A We searched the house, but we found negative.
Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?
A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.
Q What about you, where were you?
A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.
Q What about the barangay tanod?
A Together with Milo and Pogoso.
Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative
what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop
because he ran from his shop, so we searched his shop.
Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?
A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.
Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano,
Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.
Q What happened at the shop?
A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded
paper.
Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?
A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Q Was that the only item?

A There are others like the foil, scissor.
Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others
inside the electric shop?
A Yes.21
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the
items that were actually seized were found in another structure by
a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:
FISCAL:
Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still
recall what took place?
A We cordoned the area.
Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?
A We waited for the barangay tanod.
Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?
A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's
wife.
Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?
A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.
Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the
search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate
Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic
shop near his house, in front of his house.
Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was
clean.
Q What did you do afterwards, if any?

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.
Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben
run from that store and furthermore the door was open.
Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.
xxxx
Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?
A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader
Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there
were other persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.
Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.
Q What about you?
A I also followed suit.
Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw
him open the folded paper which contained four shabu deck.
Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the
folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.22
SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?
A At his residence, the two-storey house.

Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search
at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.
Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.
Q And what happened afterwards, if any?
A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.
Q And who among the team went inside?
A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.23
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and
a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.

A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by

competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an
agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the
function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388
of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life
and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced
environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in
authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay
tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of
the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in
evidence, petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish
constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be
meritorious.
Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying,24 unless attended with arbitrariness or
plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal25 as in the present case.
It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of
Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession
of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the

accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not

authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.26
In People v. Tira,27 this Court explained the concept of possession of
regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place
where the contraband is located, is shared with another.28
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must
be sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or
possession.29 The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated
drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he
has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found.30 The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns
the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that
petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision,
noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by
occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which
housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being
the case, he has control of the things found in said structure.31
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also
provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles
were found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating
their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.32 During the

direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the

electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:
FISCAL CENTINO:
Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.
Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.
Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed
to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.
Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.33
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was
an electrical shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was
owned by petitioner, thus:
ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that
correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the
shop.
Q Now, this shop is within a structure?
A Yes.
Q How big is the structure?
A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and
at the other side is a structure rented by a couple.34
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and

dominion and the character of the drugs.35 With the prosecution's failure to
prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion, there
casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is
critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the
accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.36 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.371wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191672

November 25, 2014

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, FRANCISCO T. DUQUE
III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The independence of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is explicitly
mandated under Section 1,1 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Additionally, Section 2,2 Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution prohibits its
Members, during their tenure, from holding any other office or employment.
These constitutional provisions3 are central to this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition brought to assail the designation of Hon. Francisco
T. Duque III, Chairman of the CSC, as a member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the (a) Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c)
the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).

Antecedents
On January 11, 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed
Duque as Chairman of the CSC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed
Duques appointment on February 3, 2010.
On February 22, 2010,President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO
864), whose complete text is quoted as follows:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 864
INCLUSION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IN THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES/DIRECTORS OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND
WHEREAS, Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters;
WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution mandates, among
others, that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel
agency of the government, shall establish a career service and adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, and shall strengthen the
merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate
conducive to public accountability; WHEREAS, Section 14, Chapter 3, Title IA, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)
expressly states that the Chairman of the CSC shall bea member of the
Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of government entities whose
functions affect the career development, employment, status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees, such as the
Government Service Insurance System, Foreign Service Board, Foreign Trade
Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and such other similar boards as
may be created by law;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 24, 1972, explicitly
empowers the President of the Republic of the Philippines to reorganize the
entire Executive Branch of the National Government, as a vital and priority

measure to effect the desired changes and reforms in the social, economic
and political structure of the country;
WHEREAS, Section 18 (a), ArticleIV of Republic Act No. 7875 (An Act
Instituting a National Health Insurance Program For All Filipinos and
Establishing the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation For The Purpose) or
otherwise known as the "National Health Insurance Act of 1995", Section 42
(G) of Republic Act No. 8291 (An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 1146,
as amended, Expanding and Increasing the Coverage of Benefits of the
Government Service Insurance System, Instituting Reforms Therein and For
Other Purposes) or otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997, Article 176, Chapter 3 of Presidential Decree No. 626
(Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), and Presidential
Decree No. 1530 (Instituting a System of Voluntary Contributions for Housing
Purpose[s]) or otherwise known as the "Pag-ibig Fund" reveal that while the
Chairman of the CSC is not included in the list of those who could sit as a
member of the Board of Directors of the Philhealth or of the Board of Trustees
of the GSIS, ECC and the Pag-ibig Fund, said laws did not expressly repeal
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
and Presidential Decree No. 1; WHEREAS, it is settled that repeals by
implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject;
WHEREAS, a scrutiny of the mandated functions and duties of the Board of
Trustees of the GSIS, ECC and HDMF and the Board of Directors of the
PhilHealth shows that the same are all geared towards the advancement of
the welfare of government officials and employees, which functions fall
within the province of the CSC;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order and direct:
Section 1. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission shall sit as an ExOfficio member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission and the Home
Development Mutual Fund and the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation pursuant to Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
Section 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 22nd day of February, in the year of Our Lord,
Two Thousand and Ten.4
Pursuant to EO 864, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the following government-owned or governmentcontrolled corporations (GOCCs): (a) GSIS; (b) PHILHEALTH;(c) ECC; and (d)
HDMF.
On April 8, 2010, petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the
constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative
Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear
violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
The Case
The Court is confronted with the proper interpretation of Section 1 and
Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 to ascertain the constitutionality of the
designation of Duque, in an ex officio capacity, as Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF.
Petitioner asserts that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292 violate the independence of the CSC, which was constitutionally
created to be protected from outside influences and political pressures due
to the significance of its government functions.5 He further asserts that such
independence is violated by the fact that the CSC is not a part of the
Executive Branch of Government while the concerned GOCCs are considered
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government.6 In this
situation, the President may exercise his power of control over the CSC
considering that the GOCCs in which Duque sits as Board member are
attached to the Executive Department.7
Petitioner argues that Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292
unduly and unconstitutionally expands the role of the CSC, which is primarily
centered on personnel-related concerns involving government workers, to
include insurance, housing and health matters of employees in the
government service.8 He observes that the independence of the CSC will not
be compromised if these matters are instead addressed by entering into a
memorandum of agreement or by issuing joint circulars with the concerned

agencies, rather than allowing a member of the CSC to sit as a member of

the governing Boards of these agencies.9
Petitioner notes that the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF do
not mention that the CSC Chairman sits as a member of their governing
Boards in an ex officiocapacity.10 Such being the case, the President may not
amend the charters, which are enacted by Congress, by the mere issuance of
an executive order.11
Petitioner posits that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292 violate the prohibition imposed upon members of constitutional
commissions from holding any other office or employment.12 A conflict of
interest may arise in the event that a Board decision of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concerning personnel-related matters is
elevated to the CSC considering that such GOCCs have original charters, and
their employees are governed by CSC laws, rules and regulations.13
In their Comment, respondents maintain that Duques membership in the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is constitutional.
They explain that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title IA, Book V of EO
292 preserve the independence of the CSC considering that GOCCs with
original charters such as the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are excluded
from the supervision and control that secretaries and heads exercise over the
departments to which these GOCCs are attached.14 Ultimately, these GOCCs
are exempted from the executive control of the President.15
As to the matter of conflict of interest, respondents point out that Duque is
just one member of the CSC, or of the Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, such that matters resolved by these bodies may be resolved with
or without Duques participation.16 Respondents submit that the prohibition
against holding any other office or employment under Section 2, Article IX-A
of the 1987 Constitution does not cover positions held without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities. Relying on the pronouncement in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,17 they assert that since the 1987
Constitution, which provides a stricter prohibition against the holding of
multiple offices by executive officials, allows them to hold positions in ex
officio capacities, the same rule is applicable to members of the
Constitutional Commissions.18 Moreover, the mandatory tenor of Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 clearly indicates that the CSC
Chairmans membership in the governing bodies mentioned therein merely

imposes additional duties and functions as an incident and necessary

consequence of his appointment as CSC Chairman.19
Respondents insist that EO 864 and Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of
EO 292, as well as the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, are
consistent with each other. While the charters of these GOCCs do not provide
that CSC Chairman shall be a member of their respective governing Boards,
there islikewise no prohibition mentioned under said charters.20 EO 864,
issued in conformity with Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292,
could not have impliedly amended the charters of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF because the former relates to the law on the CSC while the
latter involve the creation and incorporation of the respective GOCCs. 21 As
their subject matters differ from each other, the enactment of the
subsequent law is not deemed to repeal or amend the charters of the
GOCCs, being considered prior laws.22
Issue
Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or
Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity,
impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition
against the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions?
Our Ruling
The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the
constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, but
declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex
officio capacity as a member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
1.
Requisites of judicial review
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of

constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case.23
Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) only disputes the locus standi
of petitioner who has filed this suit in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned
citizen and lawyer.24 In view of the earlier dispositions by the Court in similar
public law cases initiated by petitioner, we again affirm his locus standito
bring a suit of this nature. In Funa v. Agra,25 the Court has recently held:
x x x [T]he locus standi of the petitioner as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen
and a lawyer to bring a suit ofthis nature has already been settled in his
favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he
brought. In Funa v. Villar, for one, the Court has held:
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained
or will sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a
"material interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act.
However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly
injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to
sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule
on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which
the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import,
has waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public
interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation
of a law or any other government act. In David, the Court laid out the bare
minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be
extended standing to sue, thusly:
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has

"far-reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will
guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus,
assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant
petition.20 (Bold emphasis supplied)
In Funa v. Ermita, the Court recognized the locus standi of the petitioner as a
taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer because the issue raised therein
involved a subject of transcendental importance whose resolution was
necessary to promulgate rules to guide the Bench, Bar, and the public in
similar cases.
The Court notes, however, that during the pendency of this petition, Duques
designation as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and PHIC
could have terminated or been rendered invalid by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 10149,26 thus causing this petition and the main issue
tendered herein moot and academic. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act
No.10149, which took effect on June 6, 2011, state:
SEC. 13. Number of Directors/Trustees.The present number of
Directors/Trustees provided in the charter of the GOCCs shall be maintained.
SEC. 14. Ex Officio Alternates.The ex officio members of the GOCC may
designate their respective alternates who shall be the officials next-in-rank to
them and whose acts shall be considered the acts of their principals.
SEC. 15. Appointment of the Board of Directors/Trustees of GOCCs.An
Appointive Director shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
from a shortlist prepared by the GCG.
The GCG shall formulate its rules and criteria in the selection and nomination
of prospective appointees and shall cause the creation of search committees
to achieve the same. All nominees included in the list submitted by the GCG
to the President shall meet the Fit and Proper Rule as defined un this Act and
such other qualifications which the GCG may determine taking into
consideration the unique requirements of each GOCC. The GCG shall ensure
that the shortlist shall exceed by at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of
directors /trustees tobe appointed. In the event that the President does not
see fit to appoint any of the nominees included in the shortlist, the President
shall ask the GCG to submit additional nominees.
xxxx

SEC. 17. Term of Office.Any provision in the charters of each GOCC to the
contrary notwithstanding, the term of office of each Appointive Director shall
be for one(1) year, unless sooner removed for cause: Provided, however,That
the Appointive Director shall continue to hold office until the successor is
appointed. An Appointive Director may be nominated by the GCG for
reappointment by the President only if one obtains a performance score of
above average or its equivalent or higher in the immediately preceding year
of tenure as Appointive Director based on the performance criteria for
Appointive Directors for the GOCC.
Appointed to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. The appointment of a director to fill such vacancy shall be in
accordance with the manner provided in Section 15 of this Act.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all incumbent CEOs and
appointive members of the Board of GOCCs shall, upon approval of this Act,
have a term of office until June 30, 2011, unless sooner replaced by the
President: Provided, however, That the incumbent CEOs and appointive
members of the Board shall continue in office until the successor have been
appointed by the President.
A moot and academic case is one thatceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.27
2.
Unconstitutionality of Duquesdesignation as member
of the governing boards of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF
Nonetheless, this Court has exercised its power of judicial review in cases
otherwise rendered moot and academic by supervening events on the basis
of certain recognized exceptions, namely: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is
of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the
public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 28
The situation now obtaining definitely falls under the requirements for the
review of a moot and academic case. For the guidance of and as a restraint
upon the future,29 the Court will not abstain from exercising its power of
judicial review, the cessation of the controversy notwithstanding. We proceed

to resolve the substantive issue concerning the constitutionality of Duques

ex officio designation as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
The underlying principle for the resolution of the present controversy rests
on the correct application of Section 1 and Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, which provide: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions,
which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Section 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any
business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor
shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with,
or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Section 1, Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
"independent."Although their respective functions are essentially executive
in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in
the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions
conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are
subject only to review on certiorariby the Court as provided by Section 7,
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.30 To safeguard the independence of
these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others,31 imposes under
Section 2, Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and
disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen their
integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in
any way may be affected by the functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or
in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.32

The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is

the disqualification from holding any other office or employment during
Duques tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to
interpret this disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article
IX-B of the Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary.
Section 7, paragraph (2),Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
In Funa v. Ermita,33 where petitioner challenged the concurrent appointment
of Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communication and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry
Authority, the Court reiterated the pronouncement in Civil Liberties Union
v.The Executive Secretary on the intent of the Framers on the foregoing
provision of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when
such is allowed by law orby the primary functions of their positions, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
xxxx
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception
to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language
of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to bea positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language

used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to

be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.34
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position
(i.e., President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated
under Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or
employment in the Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Respondents insist that Duques ex officio designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the
primary functions of his position as the CSC Chairman. To support this claim,
they cite Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292, to wit:
Section 14. Membership of the Chairman in Boards.The Chairman shall be a
member of the Board of Directors or of other governing bodies of
government entities whose functions affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, such as the Government Service Insurance System, Foreign
Service Board, Foreign Trade Service Board, National Board for Teachers, and
such other similar boards as may be created by law.
As to the meaning of ex officio, the Court has decreed in Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary that
x x x x The term ex officiomeans "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to
an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred
upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex
officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority other
than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment. x x x

xxxx
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. x x x35
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the
central personnel agency of the government and is principally mandated to
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service;
to strengthen the merit and rewards system; to integrate all human
resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. Its
specific powers and functions are as follows:
(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the
merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws;
(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and
adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective
personnel administration in the government;
(4) Formulate policies and regulations for the administration, maintenance
and implementation of position classification and compensation and set
standards for the establishment, allocation and reallocation of pay scales,
classes and positions;
(5) Render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civil Service
matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices and
agencies and which may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari;
(6) Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance with law
and exercise control and supervision over the activities of the Commission;
(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. Any entity
or official in government may be called upon by the Commission to assist in
the preparation and conduct of said examinations including security, use of
buildings and facilities as well as personnel and

transportation of examination materials which shall be exempt from

inspection regulations;
(8) Prescribe all forms for Civil Service examinations, appointments, reports
and such other forms as may be required by law, rules and regulations;
(9) Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarily
confidential, highly technical or policy determining;
(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the
development and retention of qualified and competent work force in the
public service;
(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it
directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or
rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders,
or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions, orders, or rulings may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty (30) daysfrom receipt of a copy thereof;
(12) Issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum for the production of
documents and records pertinent to investigation and inquiries conducted by
it in accordance withits authority conferred by the Constitution and pertinent
laws;
(13) Advise the President on all matters involving personnel management in
the government service and submit to the President an annual report on the
personnel programs;
(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel
matters in the Civil Service including extension of Service beyond retirement
age;
(15) Inspect and audit the personnel actions and programs of the
departments, agencies, bureaus, offices, local government units and other
instrumentalities of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations; conduct periodic review of the decisions and actions
of offices or officials to whom authority has been delegated by the
Commission as well as the conduct of the officials and the employees in
these offices and apply appropriate sanctions when necessary;

(16) Delegate authority for the performance of any functions to departments,

agencies and offices where such functions may be effectively performed;
(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and
employees, and accredit government services and evaluate qualifications for
retirement;
(18) Keep and maintain personnel records of all officials and employees in
the Civil Service; and
(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency
and such other functions as may be provided by law.36
On the other hand, enumerated below are the specific duties and
responsibilities of the CSC Chairman, namely:
(1) Direct all operations of the Commission;
(2) Establish procedures for the effective operations of the Commission;
(3) Transmit to the President rules and regulations, and other guidelines
adopted by the Chairman which require Presidential attention including
annual and other periodic reports;
(4) Issue appointments to, and enforce decisions on administrative discipline
involving officials and employees of the Commission;
(5) Delegate authority for the performance of any function to officials and
employees of the Commission;
(6) Approve and submit the annual and supplemental budget of the
Commission; and
(7) Perform such other functionsas may be provided by law.37
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC
Chairmans membership in a governing body is dependent on the condition
that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board
member must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. Based on this,
the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO
292 because matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of
government employees are among the primary functions of the CSC and are
consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairmans

membership therein must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his

position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3,
Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
However, there is a need to determine further whether Duques designation
as Board member of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution and the condition laid down in Section 14,
Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292. It is necessary for this purpose to
examine the functions of these government entities under their respective
charters, to wit:
The GSIS Charter, Republic Act No. 8291
SECTION 41. Powers and Functions of the GSIS. The GSIS shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(a) to formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act, as
well as the effective exercise of the powers and functions, and the discharge
of duties and responsibilities of the GSIS, its officers and employees;
(b) to adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of receipts and
expenditures including salaries and allowances of the GSIS personnel; to
authorize such capital and operating expenditures and disbursements of the
GSIS as may be necessary and proper for the effective management and
operation of the GSIS;
(c) to invest the funds of the GSIS, directly or indirectly, in accordance with
the provisions of this Act;
(d) to acquire, utilize or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law, real or
personal property in the Philippines or elsewhere necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Act;
(e) to conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and valuations to
determine the financial condition of the GSIS and taking into consideration
such studies and valuations and the limitations herein provided, re-adjust the
benefits, contributions, premium rates, interest rates or the allocation or reallocation of the funds to the contingencies covered;
(f) to have the power of succession;
(g) to sue and be sued;

(h) to enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every kind and
description with any person, firm or association or corporation, domestic or
foreign;
(i) to carry on any other lawful business whatsoever in pursuance of, or in
connection with the provisions of this Act;
(j) to have one or more offices in and outside of the Philippines, and to
conduct its business and exercise its powers throughout and in any part of
the Republic of the Philippines and/or in any or all foreign countries, states
and territories: Provided, That the GSIS shall maintain a branch office in
every province where there exists a minimum of fifteen thousand (15,000)
membership; (k) to borrow funds from any source, private or government,
foreign or domestic, only as an incident in the securitization of housing
mortgages of the GSIS and on account of its receivables from any
government or private entity;
(l) to invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any establishment, firm
or entity;
(m) to approve appointments in the GSIS except appointments to positions
which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature according to the Civil Service rules and regulations: Provided, That all
positions in the GSIS shall be governed by a compensation and position
classification system and qualifications standards approved bythe GSIS
Board of Trustees based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and shall be subject to the periodic review by the Board no more than
once every four (4) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or
increases based on productivity and profitability;
(n) to design and adopt an Early Retirement Incentive Plan (ERIP) and/or
financial assistance for the purpose of retirement for its own personnel;
(o) to fix and periodically review and adjust the rates of interest and other
terms and conditions for loans and credits extended to members or other
persons, whether natural or juridical;
(p) to enter into agreement with the Social Security System or any other
entity, enterprise, corporation or partnership for the benefit of members
transferring from one system to another subject to the provision of Republic
Act No. 7699, otherwise known as the Portability Law;

(q) to be able to float proper instrument to liquefy long-term maturity by

pooling funds for short-term secondary market;
(r) to submit annually, not later thanJune 30, a publicreport to the President
of the Philippines and the Congress of the Philippines regarding its activities
in the administration and enforcement of this Act during the preceding year
including information and recommendations on broad policies for the
development and perfection of the programs of the GSIS;
(s) to maintain a provident fund, which consists of contributions made by
both the GSIS and its officials and employees and their earnings, for the
payment of benefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(t) to approve and adopt guidelines affecting investments, insurance
coverage of government properties, settlement of claims, disposition of
acquired assets, privatization or expansion of subsidiaries, development of
housing projects, increased benefit and loan packages to members, and the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act;
(u) any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, to authorize the
payment of extra remuneration to the officials and employees directly
involved in the collection and/or remittance of contributions, loan
repayments, and other monies due to the GSIS at such rates and under such
conditions as itmay adopt. Provided, That the best interest of the GSIS shall
be observed thereby;
(v) to determine, fix and impose interest upon unpaid premiums due from
employers and employees;
(w) to ensure the collection or recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or
accountabilities, includingunpaid premiums or contributions in favor of the
GSISarising from any cause or source whatsoever, due from all obligors,
whether public or private. The Board shall demand payment or settlement of
the obligations referred to herein within thirty (30) days from the date the
obligation becomes due, and in the event of failure or refusal of the obligor
or debtor to comply with the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or
proper actions or suits, criminal, civil or administrative or otherwise, before
the courts, tribunals, commissions, boards, or bodies of proper jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days reckoned from the expiry dateof the period fixed in the
demand within which to pay or settle the account;

(x) to design and implement programs that will promote and mobilize
savings and provide additional resources for social security expansion and at
the same time afford individual members appropriate returns on their
savings/investments. The programs shall be so designed as to spur socioeconomic take-off and maintain continued growth; and
(y) to exercise such powers and perform such other acts as may be
necessary, useful, incidental or auxiliary to carry out the provisions of this
Act, or to attain the purposesand objectives of this Act.
The PHILHEALTH Charter, Republic Act No. 7875
SEC. 16. Powers and Functions The Corporation shall have the following
powers and functions:
(a) to administer the National Health Insurance Program;
(b) to formulate and promulgate policies for the sound administration of the
Program;
(c) to set standards, rules, and regulations necessary to ensure quality of
care, appropriate utilization of services, fund viability, member satisfaction,
and overall accomplishment of Program objectives;
(d) to formulate and implement guidelines on contributions and benefits;
portability of benefits, cost containment and quality assurance; and health
care provider arrangements,payment, methods, and referral systems;
(e) to establish branch offices as mandated in Article V of this Act;
(f) to receive and manage grants, donations, and other forms of assistance;
(g) to sue and be sued in court;
(h) to acquire property, real and personal, which may be necessary or
expedient for the attainment of the purposes of this Act;
(i) to collect, deposit, invest, administer, and disburse the National Health
Insurance Fund in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(j) to negotiate and enter into contracts with health care institutions,
professionals, and other persons, juridical or natural, regarding the pricing,
payment mechanisms, design and implementation of administrative and
operating systems and procedures, financing, and delivery of health
services;

(k) to authorize Local Health Insurance Offices to negotiate and enter into
contracts in the name and on behalf of the Corporation with any accredited
government or private sector health provider organization, including but not
limited to health maintenance organizations, cooperatives and medical
foundations, for the provision ofat least the minimum package of personal
health services prescribed by the Corporation;
(l) to determine requirements and issue guidelines for the accreditation of
health care providers for the Program in accordance with this Act;
(m) to supervise the provision of health benefits with the power to inspect
medical and financial records of health careproviders and patients who are
participants in or members of the Program, and the power to enter and
inspect accredited health care institutions, subject to the rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Corporation;
(n) to organize its office, fix the compensation of and appoint personnel as
may be deemed necessary and upon the recommendation of the president of
the Corporation;
(o) to submit to the President of the Philippines and to both Houses of
Congress its Annual Report which shall contain the status of the National
Health Insurance Fund, its total disbursements, reserves, average costing to
beneficiaries, any request for additional appropriation, and other data
pertinent to the implementation of the Program and publish a synopsis of
such report in two (2) newspapers of general circulation;
(p) to keep records of the operations of the Corporation and investments of
the National Health Insurance Fund; and
(q) to perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the attainment
of the objectives of the Corporation and for the proper enforcement of the
provisions of this Act
The HDMF Charter, Republic Act No. 9679
SEC. 13. Powers and Functions of the Fund. The Fund shall have the powers
and functions specified in this Act and the usual corporate powers:
(a) To formulate, adopt, amend and/or rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act, as
well as the effective exercise of the powers and functions, and the discharge
of duties and responsibilities of the Fund, its officers and employees;

(b) To adopt or approve the annual and supplemental budget of receipts and
expenditures including salaries and allowances of the Fund personnel, to
authorize such capital and operating expenditures and disbursements of the
Fund as may be necessary and proper for the effective management and
operation of the Fund;
(c) To submit annually to the President of the Philippines not later than March
15, a report of its activities and the state of the Fund during the preceding
year, including information and recommendations for the development and
improvement thereof;
(d) To invest not less than seventy percent (70%) of its investible funds to
housing, in accordance with this Act;
(e) To acquire, utilize, or dispose of, in any manner recognized by law, real or
personal properties to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(f) To set up its own accounting and computer systems; to conduct
continuing actuarial and statistical studies and valuations to determine the
financial viability of the Fund and its project; to require reports, compilations
and analysis of statistical and economic data, as well as make such other
studies and surveys asmay be needed for the proper administration and
development of the Fund;
(g) To have the power of succession; to sue and be sued; to adopt and use a
corporate seal;
(h) To enter into and carry out contracts of every kind and description with
any person, firm or association or corporation, domestic or foreign;
(i) To borrow funds from any source, private or government, foreign or
domestic;
(j) To invest, own or otherwise participate in equity in any establishment, or
entity; to form, organize, invest in or establish and maintain a subsidiary or
subsidiaries in relation to any of its purposes;
(k) To approve appointments in the Fund except appointments to positions
which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature according to the civil service rules and regulations: Provided, That all
positions in the Fund shall be governed by a compensation and position
classification system and qualification standards approved by the Fund's
Board of Trustees based on a comprehensive job analysis, wage

compensation study and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided,

further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with prevailing
compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to the periodic
review of the Board no more than once everyfour (4) years without prejudice
to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability.
The Fund shall, therefore, be exempt from any laws, rules and regulations on
salaries and compensations;
(l) To maintain a provident fund, which shall consist of contributions made by
both the Fund and its officers and employees and their earnings, for the
payment ofbenefits to such officials and employees or their heirs under such
terms and conditions as it may prescribe;
(m)To design and adopt an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP) for its own
personnel;
(n) To establish field offices and to conduct its business and exercise its
powers in these places; (o) To approve restructuring proposalfor the payment
of due but unremitted contributions and unpaid loan amortizations under
such terms and conditions as the Board ofTrustees may prescribe;
(p) To determine, fix and impose interest and penalties upon unpaid
contributions due from employers and employees;
(q) To ensure the collection and recovery of all indebtedness, liabilities and/or
accountabilities, including unpaid contributions in favor of the Fund arising
from any cause or source or whatsoever, due from all obligors, whether
public or private; to demand payment of the obligations referred to herein,
and in the event of failure or refusal of the obligor or debtor to comply with
the demand, to initiate or institute the necessary or proper actions or suits,
criminal, civil, administrative, or otherwise, before the courts, tribunals,
commissions, boards or bodies of proper jurisdiction: Provided, however,
That the Fund may compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest,
penalty or civil liability to the Fund in connection with the collection of
contributions and the lending operations of the Fund, under such terms and
conditions as prescribed by the Board of Trustees: Provided, further, That the
Board may, upon recommendation of the Chief Executive Officer, deputize
any member of the Fund's legal staff to act as special sheriff in foreclosure
cases, in the sale or attachment of the debtor's properties, and in the
enforcement ofcourt writs and processes in cases involving the Fund. The
special sheriff of the Fund shall make a report to the proper court after any

action taken by him, which shall treat such action as if it were an act of its
own sheriffs in all respects;
(r) To design and implement other programs that will further promote and
mobilize savings and provide additional resources for the mutual benefit of
the members with appropriate returns on the savings/investments. The
program shall be so designed as to spur socioeconomic take-off and maintain
continued growth;
(s) To conduct continuing actuarialand statistical studies and valuations to
determine the financial condition of the Fund and taking into consideration
such studies and valuations and the limitations herein provided, readjust the
benefits, contributions, interest rates of the allocation or reallocation of the
funds to the contingencies covered; and
(t) To exercise such powers and perform such acts as may be necessary,
useful, incidental or auxiliary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
The ECC Charter, Presidential Decree No. 626
ART. 177. Powers and duties. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and duties:
(a) To assess and fix a rate of contribution from all employers;
(b) To determine the rate of contribution payable by an employer whose
records show a high frequency of work accidents or occupational disease due
to failure by the said employer to observe adequate safety measures;
(c) To approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and
the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System;
(d) To initiate policies and programs toward adequate occupational health
and safety and accident prevention in the working environment,
rehabilitation other than those provided for under Art. 190 hereof, and other
related programs and activities, and to appropriate funds therefor. (As
amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1368).
(e) To make the necessary actuarial studies and calculations concerning the
grant of constant help and income benefits for permanent disability or death,
and the rationalization of the benefits for permanent disability and death
under the Title with benefits payable by the System for similar contingencies;
Provided; That the Commission may upgrade benefits and add new ones
subject toapproval of the President; and Provided, Further, That the actuarial

stabilityof the State Insurance Fund shall be guaranteed; Provided, Finally,

that such increases in benefits shall not require any increases in contribution,
except as provided for in paragraph (b) hereof. (As amended by Sec. 3, P.D.
1641).
(f) To appoint the personnel of its staff, subject to civil service law and rules,
but exempt from WAPCO law and regulations;
(g) To adopt annually a budget of expenditures of the Commission and its
staff chargeable against the State Insurance Fund: Provided, that the SSS
and GSIS shall advance on a quarterly basis the remittances of allotment of
the loading fund for this Commission's operational expenses based on its
annual budget as duly approved by the Ministry of Budget and Management.
(As amended by Sec. 3, P.D. 1921).
(h) To have the power to administeroath and affirmation, and to issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in connection with any question or
issue arising from appealed cases under this Title.
(i) To sue and be sued in court;
(j) To acquire property, real or personal, which may be necessary or
expedient for the attainment of the purposes of this Title;
(k) To enter into agreements or contracts for such services or aid as may be
needed for the proper, efficient and stable administration of the program;
(l) To perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the attainment
of the purposes of the Commission and proper enforcement of the provisions
of thisTitle. (As amended by Sec. 18, P.D.850). (Emphasis supplied.)
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective
charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for
which they were created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development,
employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to
perform other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related.
All of these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are
carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may exercise
these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position

as CSC Chairman, such as imposing intereston unpaid or unremitted

contributions,38issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care
providers,39 or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid
loan amortizations.40 The Court also notes that Duques designation as
member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
entitles him to receive per diem,41 a form of additional compensation that is
disallowed by the concept of an ex officioposition by virtue of its clear
contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio
position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.
Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques
designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section
17,42 Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all
government offices in the Executive Branch. An office that is legally not
under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.43 The
Court has aptly explained in Rufino v. Endriga:44
Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive,
Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent
constitutional bodies, ormust be a quasi-judicial body or local government
unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and
constitutional basis for its existence.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of
government.1wphi1 The CCP is also not one of the independent
constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local
government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall underthe Executive branch. Under
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or
order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of
the President."
Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the
CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the
President "shall have control of all executive . . . offices," x x x Section 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office
oneperforming executive functions outside of the independent constitutional
bodies from the Presidents power of control. There is no dispute that the

CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial

functions.
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers
in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by
the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises
"control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be
no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch
is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since
there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control
over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is
not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is
withoutany legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the
status of a government corporation and are deemed attached to the
Department of Health45 and the Department of Labor,46 respectively. On the
other hand, the GSIS and HDMF fall under the Office of the President.47 The
corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are exercised
through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the
President of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the
control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President without
impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
3.
Effect of declaration of unconstitutionality
of Duques designation as member of the
governing Boards of theGSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF - The De FactoOfficer Doctrine
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not validly hold office as Director or Trustee
of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of
CSC Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer
while he served his term as Director or Trustee of these GOCCs. A de jure

officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified
and whose term of office has not expired.48
That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a
Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF. In Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary,49 the Court has said:
During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered. Ithas been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office
and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is,
undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the
public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed
from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances
or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by
them.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, ifthe office is an appointive office, and whose
appointment is valid on its face.50 He may also be one who is in possession of
an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is
meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal,
so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.51 Consequently, the acts of
the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure
officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.52
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of
Duque as a Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF,
were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office.53 This clarification is necessary in order
to protect the sanctity and integrity of the dealings by the public with
persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duque's official
actions covered by this clarification extend but are not limited to the
issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda approving appointments to
positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on

compensation and employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out

the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEAL TH, ECC and HDMF.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292; ANNULS AND VOIDS Executive Order No. 864 dated February
22, 2010 and the designation of Hon. Francisco T. Duque III as a Member of
the Board of Directors/Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System;
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation; Employees Compensation
Commission; and Home Development Mutual Fund in an ex officio capacity in
relation to his appointment as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE of Sections 1 and 2, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Francisco T. Duque III was a
de facto officer during his tenure as Director/Trustee of the Government
Service Insurance System; Philippine Health Insurance Corporation;
Employees Compensation Commission; and Home Development Mutual
Fund.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179267

June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for
herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8
million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering
to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love
their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and

more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's
groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the
duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors
and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local
government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for
assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No.
06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old
and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children,
namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old;
and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was
often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some
men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank
manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of
their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent
confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their
accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that
caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on
him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private
respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for
fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small
boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said
that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to
private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the
brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted
suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor.
Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her.
Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every
week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that

she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry
with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and
told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told
private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid
that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with
him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of
deep wells. He is the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings,
Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which
he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute
control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws
a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the
use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together
with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from
Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other
benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16After
private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to
hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo,
petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses
the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence
against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,
which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling
or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining
Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from
the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the
house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262
states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private
respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from
the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or
anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove
things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the
family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday,
26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to
take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about
this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily
residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with
the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact
directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts,
cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be
subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm
licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in
his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including
rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash
he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March

2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his

Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter,
an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month,
under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente
lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat
that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is
ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued
an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following
additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of
the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever
they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in
two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental
expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter
of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the threeday notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and
returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and
(2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a
more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of
the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject
only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in
the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight
(8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and
that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that
the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment
and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for
rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to
the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children
upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed
to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment
against her and their children, private respondent filed another
application24for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading,
Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private
respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men
allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy
resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner
allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed
a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known
as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days,
which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or
indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives,
employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook
Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household
helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from
the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not
contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner
including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise
he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be
rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006;
and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW
508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail
to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner
another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the
conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in
which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona
shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are
ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these
above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation without the
personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature
in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie
that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of
these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the
aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6,
2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an

Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the
TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated,
the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and
renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698),
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued
in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court
dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional
issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed
with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied
in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that
The Issues
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE

THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT
R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262
AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEBSP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may
not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the
RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited

authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of

constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the
"Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first
mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon
all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46 The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but
in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such

constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition
to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent
to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition
to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the
subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from
the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised
therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief
which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is

a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person
not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the
case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is
founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents
and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should
not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The
question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need
for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and
will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct
testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be
done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a
hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides
that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court
may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time

until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or

renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs
of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner
could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily
running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the
petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining
order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted
an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day
TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper,
and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before
judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that
a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be
enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does
not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v.
Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or
with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted
as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen
or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for
his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief
in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable
injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial
court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their

children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will
defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with farreaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty
as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we
should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so
we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize
spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the
husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which
became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa PimentelEjercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what
she called a "synthesized measure"62 an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in
Intimate Relationships Act"63 providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure.
We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me
that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well
as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which
the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses
or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on
record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being

abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,

prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims.
This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related
with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether
to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR
group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader
scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure.
Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect
women's rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have
not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the
scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in
their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or
not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially
in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always
feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came
up with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to
be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although
Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special
needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for
one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain
baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe
we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other
family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of

Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular
bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that
proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is
inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is
going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather
than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by
the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan.
But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused.
As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to
seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to
find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular

measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of
the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even
then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However,
none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a

statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate

operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does
not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that
it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A.
9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and,
as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery

for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles
in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women.
With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a
form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue,
passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence
Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women
is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against
women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and
that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by
which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of
gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in
his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its
Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western
societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority
of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even
kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even
the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the
late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit
the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed
the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or
stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that
of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became
the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to
beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to
pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to
inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In
person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple
focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife
abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by
suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They
fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the
feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in
1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million
women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had
assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical

Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the

nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak
English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals
when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family
violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double
the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women
will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime...
Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are
severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve
sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child
abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only
the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social
and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps
because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who
find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose
that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by
their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their
male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against
Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN
General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General
Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have
been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN
itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all
these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation
building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on
the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March
8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations
omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on
violence against women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002
representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first
semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which
represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated
cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out
of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and
more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's
intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative
statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004
to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the
different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 2011*
Reported
Cases

20
04

20
05

20
06

20
07

20
08

20
09

201
0

201
1

Rape

99
7

92
7

65
9

83
7

81
1

77
0

1,0
42

832

Incestuou
s Rape

38

46

26

22

28

27

19

23

Attempte
d Rape

19
4

14
8

18
5

14
7

20
4

16
7

268

201

Acts of
Lasciviou
sness

58
0

53
6

38
2

35
8

44
5

48
5

745

625

Physical
Injuries

3,5
53

2,3
35

1,8
92

1,5
05

1,3
07

1,4
98

2,0
18

1,58
8

Sexual
Harassme
nt

53

37

38

46

18

54

83

63

RA 9262

21
8

92
4

1,2
69

2,3
87

3,5
99

5,2
85

9,9
74

9,02
1

Threats

31
9

22
3

19
9

18
2

22
0

20
8

374

213

Seduction

62

19

29

30

19

19

25

15

Concubin
age

12
1

10
2

93

10
9

10
9

99

158

128

RA 9208

17

11

16

24

34

15
2

190

Abduction
/Kidnappi
ng 29

16

34

23

28

18

25

22

Unjust
Vexation

90

50

59

59

83

70
3

183

155

Total

6,2
71

5,3
74

4,8
81

5,7
29

6,9
05

9,4
85

15,
104

12,9
48

62

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center
(WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse
and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are
relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or
more incidents of domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the
other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at
the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A.
9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of

animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as
violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while
there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads,
"but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace
to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation
by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and
sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less
seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of
the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the hands of the
offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate
Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat
it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves.
Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant
to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against
our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J.

Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent
language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under
R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an
"opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such
remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on
women does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an
"anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant
consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to
take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out
that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from
a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A.
9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and

other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a
party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to
the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing
conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened
by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,

physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision
are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics
of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced

by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the

difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that
will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner
insists92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money
or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional
anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person"
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the
offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case
of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter
upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of

POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns,
money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their
abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of
the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will
take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his

property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered
harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements
of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests,103 among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall
likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the
court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the
immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring
him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The
date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise
be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of
being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be
heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two
days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a
motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his

children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave
him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing
that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each
time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now
be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in
the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of
the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the
imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily
for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private
respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the
case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on
Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation
in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual
agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the
petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial
power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and
such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests
the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1wphi1 A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall
be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex
parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally

serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the
Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or
her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to
inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a
preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with
the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay
officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend

assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that

they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal
are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to
maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal
breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must
be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume
that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in
mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202809

July 2, 2014

DENNIS L. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the January 18, 2012 Decision1 and
the July 23, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95120, which reversed and set aside the November 18, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila (RTCJ, by dismissing, without
prejudice, the petition for naturalization filed by Dennis L. Go (petitioner).
The Facts
On October 13, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.)No. 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,3 with the
RTC, where it was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-107591.
Petitioner made the following allegations in his petition: 1] that he was born
on May 7, 1982 in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both Chinese
nationals; 2] that he was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with
residence address at No. 1308-1310 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where he had been residing since birth; 3] that he spoke English and Tagalog
and has spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine
schools where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics were
taught as part of the school curriculum; 4] that he believed in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution, was of good moral character and had
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted
government as well as with the community; 5] that he is not opposed to
organized government or is affiliated with any association or group of
persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments; 6] that he did not defend or teach the necessity or propriety of
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of mens ideas; 7] that he was neither a polygamist nor a
believer in polygamy; 8] that he had never been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude and was not suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases; 9] that he was not a citizen or subject of a
nation at war with the Philippines; 10] that it was his intention in good faith
to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign state or sovereignty, particularly to
China of which he was a citizen; 11] that he would reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and 12] that he was exempt from the
filing of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG)under C.A. No. 473, Section 5, as he was born in the Philippines and
received his primary, secondary and tertiary education in the country.
On September 11, 2003, the RTC set the initial hearing of his petition on
August 17, 2004. In compliance with the jurisdictional requirements under
Section 9 of C.A. No. 473,4 the notice was published in the Official Gazette
and in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, and was posted in a conspicuous place at the
Office of the Clerk of Court.
During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the
requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr. Joseph
Anlacan (Dr. Anlacan), Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas (Dr. Tordesillas), Silvino J.
Ong (Ong), Teresita M. Go (Teresita),and Juan C. Go (Juan). Dr. Anlacan
testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on
petitioner, he had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test.5
Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported that petitioners medical
examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioners family, stated
that being their neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since
childhood through his association with the family in times of celebration.
Teresita claimed that she had personally known petitioner since birth
because he was the son of her brother-in-law. She described him as a peaceloving person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the
barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by profession, also claimed that he
knew petitioner personally and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support
in his favor.
After petitioner presented his evidence and formally offered the same,6 the
Republic, through the OSG, posed no objection as to the relevancy and
competence of his documentary evidence. The OSG further manifested that
it had no evidence to present and requested that the case be submitted for
decision based on petitioners evidence.7 The OSG, however, later moved for
the reopening of trial for the admission of its documentary evidence. 8 It
informed the RTC that it had received a report, dated November 23,2006,
issued by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),9 tending to prove
petitioners non-compliance with the requirements of the law on
naturalization.
On April 3, 2007, petitioner manifested to the RTC that he had a clearance
issued by the NBI as proof of his lack of criminal record, and that he was not

the same Dennis Go who was the subject of the NBI Investigation Report
being offered in evidence by the OSG.
After the conduct of a clarificatory hearing, the RTC issued its October 24,
2008 Order10 admitting the evidence adduced by both parties, but denying
the motion of the OSG to re-open trial.
On November 18, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for
naturalization ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth
by law. Among these were petitioners lack of a derogatory record, his
support for an organized government, his being in perfect health, his
mingling with Filipinos since birth and his ability to speak their language, and
his being a law abiding citizen. The RTC likewise found that petitioner
presented convincing evidence that he was not disqualified for naturalization
as provided for under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473.11 The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition of DENNIS L. GO for
Naturalization as a Filipino Citizen is hereby GRANTED. Upon finality of this
Decision, before a Certificate of Naturalization may be issued to him
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 530, Petitioner must take his oath
of allegiance and fidelity to the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.12
Not in conformity, the OSG moved for reconsideration and the reopening of
trial for the second time. This time, it sought to be admitted, as evidence, a
background investigation report13 issued by the Bureau of Immigration (BOI)
stating the following reasons to oppose the petition, among others: that
petitioners parents remained as Chinese citizens up to the present; that
petitioners aunt arrogantly refused to allow them to engage in an interview
while at their residence; and that the retail business of petitioners family
must be subjected to an investigation for unexplained wealth and tax
deficiencies.
On May 18, 2009, after an exchange of pleadings by the parties, the RTC
denied the OSGs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments:
1) Evidence proving that petitioner did not possess the qualifications or was
disqualified from acquiring Philippine citizenship may be received anytime
prior to the finality of judgment granting the application for naturalization;

2) Petitioner failed to prove that he had all the qualifications entitling him to
the grant of Philippine citizenship;
3) Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible;
4) Petitioners character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the grant of Philippine
citizenship; and
5) Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioners
application for naturalization.
Petitioner countered that the RTC correctly denied the OSGs motion for
reconsideration as it was given several opportunities to present its evidence
and oppose the petition, but did not. The OSG may not file a motion for the
purpose of re-opening the case on a piece-meal basis on the pretext that the
government could, at all stages of the proceedings, raise the issue of noncompliance with naturalization laws. In any case, the background
investigation by the BOI yielded no reasonable ground to deny the petition
for naturalization because the citizenship of his parents had nothing to do
with it. The RTC decision contained an exhaustive discussion showing that he
possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for
by law.
In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and
dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the
CA, while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioners ability to
write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, may be inferred, he
failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was
not able to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing
in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as
a good warranty of his worthiness.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner insists that the findings of facts by the RTC are fully supported by
the evidence extant in the records of the case, rendering its reversal by the
CA, as unwarranted and erroneous. The RTC was in a better position to
examine the real evidence and observe the demeanor of the witnesses
presented.

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political

community. It denotes possession within that particular political community
of full civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications.
Reciprocally, it imposes the duty of allegiance to the political
community.14 The core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights,
that is, the right to participate in government principally through the right to
vote, the right to hold public office and the right to petition the government
for redress of grievance.15
No less than the 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino
citizens.16 Among those listed are citizens by naturalization, which refers to
the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a
native-born citizen. Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can
be judicial or administrative. Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after
hearing the petition for citizenship and receipt of evidence showing that the
petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required
by law, the competent court may order the issuance of the proper
naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil
registry. On the other hand, Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9139 provides that aliens
born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by
administrative proceeding by filing a petition for citizenship with the Special
Committee, which, in view of the facts before it, may approve the petition
and issue a certificate of naturalization.17 In both cases, the petitioner shall
take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a sovereign nation.
It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be
given away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of
the Court, that they have complied with all the requirements of the law.18 The
reason for this requirement is simple. Citizenship involves political status;
hence, every person must be proud of his citizenship and should cherish it.
Verily, a naturalization case is not an ordinary judicial contest, to be decided
in favor of the party whose claim is supported by the preponderance of the
evidence. Naturalization is not a right, but one of privilege of the most
discriminating, as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting, as it does,
public interest of the highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under
the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor.19
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must
show substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, an
applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements, establish his or
her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications

enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses
to support his allegations.20 In Ong v. Republic of the Philippines,21 the Court
listed the requirements for character witnesses, namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;
2. That they are "credible persons";
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines; and
8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the
Naturalization Law.
In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a
witness, for purposes of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he
becomes an insurer of the character of the candidate.22 The Court, in Ong,
explained:
a "credible" person is, to our mind, not only an individual who has not been
previously convicted ofa crime; who is not a police character and has no
police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose "affidavit" or
testimony is not incredible. What must be "credible" is not the declaration
made, but the person making it. This implies that such person must have a
good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright;
that he is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be
taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the worthiness of the
petitioner.
In consonance with the above dictum, in Lim Ching Tian v. Republic,23 the
Court explained that the "law requires that a vouching witness should have
actually known an applicant for whom he testified for the requisite period
prescribed therein to give him the necessary competence to act as such. The
reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a way an
insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of

necessity compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is,

therefore, imperative that he be competent and reliable. And he is only
competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral fitness if he has
had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the
period he has allegedly known him." The law, in effect, requires that the
character witnesses be not mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant,
but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the latter as to be competent
to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of the
requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.
In this case, the OSG mainly harps on the petitioners failure to prove that his
witnesses are credible.
The Court agrees.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioners
witnesses did not establish their own qualification to stand as such in a
naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner did not present evidence
proving that the persons he presented were credible. In the words of the CA,
"he did not prove that his witnesses had good standing in the community,
known to be honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and
that their word may be taken at face value, as a good warranty of the
worthiness of petitioner."24
While there is no showing that petitioners witnesses were of doubtful moral
inclinations, there was likewise no indication that they were persons whose
qualifications were at par with the requirements of the law on naturalization.
Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses good
standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most
importantly, reliability. As a consequence, their statements about the
petitioner do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded of in
naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the part of the witnesses,
unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioners claim of worthiness. An
applicant for Philippine citizenship would carefully testify as to his
qualifications, placing emphasis on his good traits and character. This is
expected of a person who longs to gain benefits and advantages that
Philippine citizenship bestows. Therefore, a serious assessment of an
applicants witnesses, both as to the credibility of their person and their very
testimony, is an essential facet of naturalization proceedings that may not be
brushed aside.

Further, petitioners witnesses only averred general statements without

specifying acts or events that would exhibit petitioners traits worthy of the
grant of Philippine citizenship. For instance, a statement in their affidavits as
to petitioners adherence to the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution is not evidence, per se, of petitioners agreement and zeal to
Philippine ideals. These appear to be empty declarations if not coming from
credible witnesses.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of
petitioners witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos.
While almost all of the witnesses testified that they knew petitioner since
birth and that they had interacted with petitioners family in times of
celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a
genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions.
Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on petitioners alleged
social interaction with Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner
yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members
of his household. In fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an
interview by BOI agents.
To the Court, this is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs,
traditions and ideals.1wphi1 This leads to the inescapable conclusion that
petitioner failed to prove that he has all the qualifications entitling him to the
grant of Philippine citizenship. Filipino citizenship is predicated upon oneness
with the Filipino people. It is indispensable that an applicant for
naturalization shows his identification with the Philippines as a country
deserving of his wholehearted allegiance. Until there is a positive and
unequivocal showing that this is so in the case of petitioner, the Court must
selfishly decline to confer Philippine citizenship on one who remains an alien
in principles and sentiment.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's
failure to state his former residence in the petition was fatal to his
application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission had deprived the trial
court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the
inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a
jurisdictional requirement, without which the petition suffers from a fatal and
congenital defect which cannot be cured by evidence on the omitted matter
at the trial.25

Here, a character witness had unwittingly revealed that he and petitioner

were neighbors in Sto. Cristo Street before the latter's family transferred to
their declared residential address in Oroquieta Street. This proves that
petitioner's former residence was excluded in his allegations contained in the
published petition. In effect, there was an unpardonable lapse committed in
the course of petitioner's compliance to the jurisdictional requirements set
be law, rendering the trial court's decision, not only as erroneous, but void.
WHEREFORE, the pet1t1on is DENIED. The January 18, 2012 Decision and the
July 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 95120 are
AFFIRMED. As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the dismissal is
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213181

August 19, 2014

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,

vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an
independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called
upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its
constitutional mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1the Court laid to rest issues such
as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the position
of Chief Justice vis--vis the appointing power of the President, the period
within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight
appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC,2 the Court
provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBCs
composition and membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually
undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm.
The heart of the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of
the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power.

More significantly, this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its
acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to
the Highest Tribunal of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no
less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014.
Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC
announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said
vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of
the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza
(Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position.
Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of
candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014,
Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014,
Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate
Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice
Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16,
2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
(Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself
available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be
informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that
the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the
JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working
days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting
witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and
notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the
JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting
witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under

the same conditions that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants;
3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to
another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from
participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof
where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by
Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal
memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardelezas integrity as
posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno
questioned Jardelezas ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in
a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international
arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Courts ante-rooms where
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima)
informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was
summoned by the JBC at around 2:00oclock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to
defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered
that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed.
Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to
cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive
should also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC,
Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for
himself Jardelezas explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as
he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a
written statement6 expressing his views on the situation and requested the
JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the
next day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was
excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardelezas
request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations
and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.

Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which
included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with
six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B.
Daway with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the
online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Courts
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5)
nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardelezas letterpetition in
view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the
President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules
that petitioner may still wish to pursue."8 The said resolution was
accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the
position taken by the majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolutions declaration as to his
availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the
JBC to include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice
viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice
Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of
votes to qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardelezas petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his
earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same
was raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting.
By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the
Court en bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been
transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated action on
his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters,
especially those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardelezas petition would reveal that his resort to
judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the

shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process;
and 2) the JBCs erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his
constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections
against his integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this
challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list
of nominees.
Jardelezas Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition,
the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardelezas arguments, as follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardelezas right to due process
in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30,
2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by
Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof
and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived
of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process
when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014
meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made
known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a
telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his
application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived
of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC
fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was
also divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4,
JBC-009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. The Council may receive written opposition
to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted
for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to
cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true.
In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require
the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.

His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again,
the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified
against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused
him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno.
The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor,
witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the
Constitution itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings
does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it
dispense with the need to honor petitioners right to due process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from
the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity
requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find
application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicants
integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the
body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking
hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an
objection. Chief Justice Serenos interpretation of the rule would allow a
situation where all thata member has to do to veto other votes, including
majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without
need for factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the
part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10
of JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position
requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC.
The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able
to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of
the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of
Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs
the Presidents constitutional power to appoint.Jardelezas exclusion from the
shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the Presidents choices. Simply put, the
President would be constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees,
when five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the
President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a
process tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules
of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the
petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice
viceAssociate Justice Abad.

Comment of the JBC

On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardelezas
petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant
favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available against
a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees
to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a pending
case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued
in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation of
its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not
lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus
must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to
the act demanded. In Jardelezas case, there is no legal right to be included
in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional
and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used
to legally demand that ones name be included in the list of candidates for a
judicial vacancy. Ones inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the
discretion of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was
deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of
the JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno
would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his
integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the
government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and
his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima
likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against
his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself.
Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on
the allegations against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in
essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements
so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and
in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to
enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to
the voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to

cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a factfinding body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The members
are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of the
accusations against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are
merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of
a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the
JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the truth or falsity of
an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid
undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or
her own appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a
general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains
an affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicants
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief
Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative
vote of all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process,
Chief Justice Serenos vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he
needed the votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4)
affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant
Reynaldo B. Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the
shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority
rule" was considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as
Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona,
all pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect,
he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while retaining
the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by
law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his
personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics.
Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official
capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the said
capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal
defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the
fiduciary relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardelezas prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to
mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be

filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to
exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an
injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive
Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC009, particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases where
the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject
JBC rule impairs the bodys collegial character, which essentially operates on
the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
gives rise to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in order to
disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a majority vote,
is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said
provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and full
participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone
objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the
collegial nature of the JBC and the very purpose for which it was created to
shield the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further, Section
2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative of due process for it does not allow an
applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity.
While other provisions of the JBC rules provide mechanisms enabling an
applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule
does not afford the same opportunity. In this case, Jardelezas allegations as
to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously show that he was
neither informed ofthe accusations against him nor given the chance to
muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject
provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be
operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this
scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential.
In the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been
applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains
their respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary
thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the
inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Other pleadings

On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations
of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15,
2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of
business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the JBC,
this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to the filing
of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the Integrity
Objection."13 Obviously, Jardelezas Reply consisted only of his arguments
against the JBCs original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of the
Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit commentsinintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty.
Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the
position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former
President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBPNorthern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against
Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the
essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC
and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however,
was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are
interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the
conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to
the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10
JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition
does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead,
it bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the
comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality
of the rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach
dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which
the gaping wound presented to the Court suffers.

The issues for resolution are:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE
DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
(WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT
"QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY" AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER
SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE
COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR
OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE
SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The Courts Ruling
I Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume
jurisdiction over the case
A - The Courts Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the
JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
[Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope
of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and
complied with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the
work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal
allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available.
"Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.
Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and
duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is
required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.17 There is no question that the JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary
and it may not becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a
writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasijudicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is
a term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers
or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action using discretion of a judicial nature."18 It asserts that in the
performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary,
the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. Hence, the resort
tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.

In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of

votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on
integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the
Constitution but by the Councils own rules. For said reason, the Court is of
the position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review
vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy
to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the
Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicants
integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBCs existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the
fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has
been tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making
certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and
suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is
shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or
disqualified.

In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the
"whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are
developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who
aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman."
Given this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and
uniformity in JBCs guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria
had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the
minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and
heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of
its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of
JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of
competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21 "soundness of physical and
mental condition,22 and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of
qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicants good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicants reputation may be
shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials
and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts,
National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the
JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback
from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant,
the merits of which shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term
is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of persons
character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of
JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all
the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration
of his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a
higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an
applicant is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the
voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post
becomes "unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the
preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as
an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all
the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as
used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is
challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into
operation when the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no
application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicants
moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 to Jardelezas case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental CommentReply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on
his actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the
Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of
integrity: a supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of
insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardelezas
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal
memorandum related to Jardelezas manner of representing the government
in a legal dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially
invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014,
where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity
required tobe a member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, the Chief
Justice shared withthe other JBC members the details of Jardelezas chosen
manner of framing the governments position in a case and how this could
have been detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBCs original comment, the details of the Chief Justices claim against
Jardelezas integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof

were only supplied to the Court in the JBCs Supplemental Comment-Reply.

Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardelezas demand to make the accusations
against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of
the integrity question in its original Comment due to its significant bearing
on the countrys foreign relations and national security. At any rate, the Court
restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in this disposition. The
confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires the
observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly
affect the countrys position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the
original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on
Jardelezas integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the
handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his
moral character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main
point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications
of immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act
of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact
remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement"
in legal strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The
approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by
the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity."
The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the
exercise ofhis discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was
established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to
trounce upon the countrys interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form
of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to
him28provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his
client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and
technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a

legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct

bearing on his moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their
reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be
classified as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was
no clear indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might
have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a
different manner of presenting the countrys arguments, and there was no
showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno
was not certain that Jardelezas acts were urged by politicking or lured by
extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final say on the
conduct of the countrys advocacy in the case, has given no signs that
Jardelezas action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the countrys trust
and interest. While this point does notentail that only the President may
challenge Jardelezas doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical to assume that
he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records are
bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment
of the Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardelezas inclusion in the
disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international
cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging
case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardelezas professional background,
while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a
connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and
not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives,
therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original
ground of its invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardelezas
alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time
onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the
minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its
origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of
"immorality" against Jardeleza.32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the

"immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents
that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of
San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to
"take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants," it
might as well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid
issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Courts discussion supra. Unlike the
first ground which centered onJardelezas stance on the tactical approach in
pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and
acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyers deliberate
participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on
ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who
engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the
Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never
gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality,
when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was
more than professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As
the Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conduct inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.36 Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds
to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have
the personal characteristic ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has
a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person
or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where
she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public
eye and community approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a
weakness in ones values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not
only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law,
but because it erodes the publics confidence in the Judiciary. This is no

longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of

disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of
our vital securities market.40Manipulative devices and deceptive practices,
including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the
securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair advantage
in the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants
are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of
stock marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market,
such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would
eventuallyfeel more secure with their money invested elsewhere.41 In its
barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on
knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time.
Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person
toengage in fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity"
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions
on integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the
subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been
informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished
the basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum
that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain,
during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the
unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the
alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by
the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a
10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within which any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC
Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be
in writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in
order for him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof;
and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and
sequential series of steps in securing a candidates right to due process.

The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza
the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as
a body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the
nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not
aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative
offense but toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--vis the requirements
for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer
the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of
rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally,
Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June
30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose totread
on his view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser,
prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC
proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties respective arguments, the
Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby
demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the
finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBCs
constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot
be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of
an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established
rules on evidence. Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is
far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument
that an applicants access tothe rights afforded under the due process clause
is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and
administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings,
their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not
demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for
the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience
and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the
office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an
applicant's trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is

qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant

to become a part of the roster from which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion,
however, does not automatically denigrate an applicants entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit.44 Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to
verifyand finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit
from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to
explain ones self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases
where an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance
of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty
of JBC torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in
the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an
applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the
situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capriciousassessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an
exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also
compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties
mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following
provisions pertinent to this case:

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step
to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and
non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council
may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet
background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant,
and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify
to validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition
to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted
for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to
cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an
applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true.
In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
[Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza
urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010,46 squarely applies
to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and
Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-010
recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness of JBC
proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of
the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder
consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who
prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.

The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in
ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly
relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in
the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as
well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the
complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days
from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or
opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in
executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates
and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its
own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the
Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to
interview for its further consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the
dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the
Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the
dateand place of the interview.
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview,
only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among
other things, the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or
opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet
in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates
which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of
the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be

gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing
under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the
JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition
is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth
or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has
the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an
applicants integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to
accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory,
however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an
oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that
shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither
intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend nominees nor
proposes thatthe JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an
application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the
observance of due process is a part of JBCs discretion when an opposition to
an application is made of record. While it may so rely on "other means" such
as character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in
forming a judgment of an applicants qualifications, the Court cannot accept
a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the application of a fundamental
right whenever a persons integrity is put to question. In such cases, an
attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to explain
himself.
The JBCs own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The
subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBCs deference to
the grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary
thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that:
any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in
writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the
Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition
against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof
within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so
desires; and the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or
opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under
the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers
"any" complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and
3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC010 does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords

an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to answer

the accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of
due process.
Application to Jardelezas Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on
whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events
leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza
the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact
that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he
could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief
Justice Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to
propound questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his
actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with
public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged
insider trading which led to the "show cause" order from the Philippine Stock
Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side,
as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of
the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from
him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was
precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the
opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must
be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged
the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections
in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both
Jardelezas written and oral statements would be made part of the record.
After Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested
that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had
already completed the process required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination
that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in
Jardelezas deprivation of his right to due process.

As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does

not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process
is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and
was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances
still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the
Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same
would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording
provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with
the Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list
of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC
members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only applicable
to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount
the fact that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting
would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the
Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the
application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only
during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite
Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day
when a resource person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council
to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition,
why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in
confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every
possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be
amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in
the invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in
his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the
privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release
to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him
based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the
same manner, Jardelezas right to be informed and to explain himself would
have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the
circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to
instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense.
Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of
his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance

to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a

meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It
would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital
affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014
meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on
June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to
affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea
of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare
by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient
time to intelligently muster his response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes
anidle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardelezas grievance is not an imagined slight but a real
rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to
answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the
proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical
fruition of the Courts findings, the Court now declares its position on
whether or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time when
the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009 as to Jardelezas legal strategy in handling a case for the
government.
2. While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall
within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would have
warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded due
process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial
posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nomineesto the
President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010.

4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the
JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity
nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have
been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the
unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity
rule" as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of
nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza
received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to
observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partys right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process
is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an
opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this,
the Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to
guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in
proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that
it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its
erroneous application on the original ground against Jardelezas integrity. At
the risk of being repetitive, the Court upholds the JBCs discretion in the
selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be
applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by
Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only
conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate
Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the
President. Need to Revisit JBCs
Internal Rules

In the Courts study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of
the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and
should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the
"unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or
abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicants right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a
veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any
assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively
gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members
in view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can
recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote
ofthe Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial
impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it
has been, used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings
n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its
precise definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague,
nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a
candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be
formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due
process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity
and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar
nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted
should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum
requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an
endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court.1wphi1 In
deference to the Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his
appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's
worthiness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that

Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist
submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and
ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the
President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 197788

February 29, 2012

RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the

said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he
was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one
(1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to
open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon
cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused
spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two
(2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
"Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial
was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist
testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for
himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs5committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested
for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the
discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu.
The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, selfserving and unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y
ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
(1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P 300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance
with law.

SO ORDERED.6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12
October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the
Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January
2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF
THE POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT
SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest
was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he
claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC
held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in
this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance
No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for
violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a
helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers,
albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on
the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused
because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is,
a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being
caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore
be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide
open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though
unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period
so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation
of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:

SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile

Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when
applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket
(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles
occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been "under arrest." There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty,
or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during
which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as
waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified
that the only reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner
had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for
the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention
to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed
at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant
to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation,
nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length
of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails
the "freedom of action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the
detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore
a policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away
without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda
opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of
situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated.
Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person
pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against
self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist
pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast
majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists
expectations, when he sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that
he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and
waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then
be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to
continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary
traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which
frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they
seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such
that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the
aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge
that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions.
But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps
most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x
xx
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a socalled "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal
arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect
of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained
pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree
associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125
(1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic
stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for
practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections

prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977)

(per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was
only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop,
he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have
been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort
be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the
time that his traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive
the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be
deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of
an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
"arrested" upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting
the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and
must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against them.14 It may
also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were
complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had been arrested
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also
be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the
police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
"inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself,"
"which work to undermine the individuals will to resist," and as much as
possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary.
Those purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected
of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then
there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time
after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in
their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless
search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances.15None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually concealed
inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was
not immediately apparent.16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence. 17 It must
be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that
petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession
does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this

determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent

and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether
the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating evidence
would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden
of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was
obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh
heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual
conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the
stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.20
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct
a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification
for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead,
police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search
incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at
trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident
to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis "both
legitimate and weighty," x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial
arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an
officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at

234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from
the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty,
and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop,
on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a
so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973)
("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to
the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a
routine traffic stop.1wphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110;
Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver
and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without
the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to
search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they
may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any
passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any
passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of
the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an
occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon,
Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full
search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein,
pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search
incident to arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once
Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence
necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence
of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the
offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be
exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls
for the acquittal of the accused.26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190793

June 19, 2012

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 37, Section 1 of
the Commission of Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, 1 in relation to
Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolutions dated 26
October 2009 and 4 January 2010 issued by the COMELEC in SPP Case No.
09-073 (PP).2
On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition
for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or
accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital

Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections.3 In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson,
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L.
Acedillo (Acedillo).4 The Petition was docketed as SPP No. 09-073 (PP) and
raffled to the Second Division of the COMELEC (COMELECSecond Division). 5
In its Order dated 24 August 2009, the COMELECSecond Division directed
MAGDALO to cause the publication of the Petition for Registration and the
said Order in three daily newspapers of general circulation, and set the
hearing thereof on 3 September 2009.6 In compliance therewith, MAGDALO
caused the publication of both documents in HATAW! No. 1 sa Balita, Saksi sa
Balita and BOMBA BALITA (Saksi sa Katotohanan).7
On 3 September 2009, a hearing was conducted in which MAGDALO (a)
established its compliance with the jurisdictional requirements; (b) presented
Acedillo as its witness; and (c) marked its documentary evidence in support
of its Petition for Registration. The following day, MAGDALO filed its Formal
Offer of Evidence.8
On 26 October 2009, the COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.9 The relevant
portions of the assailed Resolution read:
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance
with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that
the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some
members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent
civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full
battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process
defying the laws of organized societies. x x x
xxx

xxx

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
On 3 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for resolution.11

Meanwhile, on 27 November 2009, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation of Intent

to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the 10 May 2010
Elections (Manifestation of Intent), in which it stated that its membership
includes "[f]ormer members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
Anti-Corruption Advocates, Reform-minded citizens."12 Thereafter, on 30
November 2009, it filed its Amended Manifestation, which bore the following
footnote: 13
With all due respect to the Honorable Commission, the MAGDALO PARA SA
PAGBABAGO ("MAGDALO") manifests that the instant MANIFESTATION is
being filed ex abutanti (sic) cautelam (out of the abundance of caution) only
and subject to the outcome of the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Magdalo in SPP No. 09-073 (PP) from the Resolution
dated 26 October 2009 of the Second Division of the Honorable Commission
denying its Petition for Registration/Accreditation as a Political Party based in
the National Capital Region [NCR], which motion is still pending the (sic)
Honorable Commission En Banc. It is not in any way intended to preempt the
ruling of the Honorable Commission but merely to preserve the possibility of
pursuing the Partys participation in the Party-List System of Representation
in the eventuality that their Petition is approved.
Thereafter, MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution
dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to participate in
the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.14
In its assailed Resolution dated 4 January 2010, the COMELEC En Banc
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.15
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO argues that (a) the COMELEC Resolutions
were not based on the record or evidence presented; (b) the Resolutions
preempted the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, in
which several members of the military are being tried for their involvement
in the siege of the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood); and (c) it has
expressly renounced the use of force, violence and other forms of unlawful
means to achieve its goals. Thus, MAGDALO prays for this Court to: (a)
reverse and set aside the 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 COMELEC
Resolutions; (b) grant its Petition for Registration; and (c) direct the COMELEC
to issue a Certificate of Registration.16 The Petition likewise includes a prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and/or Injunctive Relief to direct the COMELEC to allow
MAGDALO to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local

Elections.17 However, this Court denied the issuance of a TRO in its

Resolution dated 2 February 2010.18
To support the grant of reliefs prayed for, MAGDALO puts forward the
following arguments:
The findings of the assailed resolutions on the basis of which the Petition was
denied are based on pure speculation. The Resolutions speculated as to the
alleged motives and/or intentions of the founders of petitioner Magdalo,
which claims are not based on evidence but on mere conjecture and pure
baseless presuppositions;
The assailed Resolutions effectively preempted the court trying the case. The
subject Resolutions unfairly jumped to the conclusion that the founders of
the Magdalo "committed mutiny", "held innocent civilian personnel as
hostage", "employed violence" and "use[d] unlawful means" and "in the
process defied the laws of organized society" purportedly during the
Oakwood incident when even the court trying their case, [Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City], Branch 148, has not yet
decided the case against them;
and
The Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of founders of the Magdalo and their basic right of to [sic] due process of
law.19
On the other hand, the COMELEC asserts that it had the power to ascertain
the eligibility of MAGDALO for registration and accreditation as a political
party.20 It contends that this determination, as well as that of assessing
whether MAGDALO advocates the use of force, would entail the evaluation of
evidence, which cannot be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari. 21
However, MAGDALO maintains that although it concedes that the COMELEC
has the authority to assess whether parties applying for registration possess
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the applicable
law, the latter nevertheless committed grave abuse of discretion in basing its
determination on pure conjectures instead of on the evidence on record. 22
Preliminary to the examination of the substantive issues, it must be
discussed whether this case has been rendered moot and academic by the
conduct of the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. Although the
subject Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO was intended for the

elections on even date, it specifically asked for accreditation as a regional

political party for purposes of subsequent elections.23
Moreover, even assuming that the registration was only for the 10 May 2010
National and Local Elections, this case nevertheless comes under the
exceptions to the rules on mootness, as explained in David v. MacapagalArroyo:24
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
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The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The second and fourth exceptions are clearly present in the case at bar. The
instant action brings to the fore matters of public concern, as it challenges
the very notion of the use of violence or unlawful means as a ground for
disqualification from party registration. Moreover, considering the expressed
intention of MAGDALO to join subsequent elections, as well as the occurrence
of supervening events pertinent to the case at bar, it remains prudent to
examine the issues raised and resolve the arising legal questions once and
for all.
Having established that this Court can exercise its power of judicial review,
the issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it denied the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground
that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means.
This Court rules in the negative, but without prejudice to MAGDALOs filing
anew of a Petition for Registration.
The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory mandate to ascertain the
eligibility of parties and organizations to participate in electoral contests. The
relevant portions of the 1987 Constitution read:

ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

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Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
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ARTICLE IX CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

C. The Commission on Elections
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Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers

and functions:
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(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or

coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit citizens arms of the
Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which
are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Echoing these constitutional provisions, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (BP
881), otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, states:
Sec. 60. Political party. "Political party" or "party," when used in this Act,
means an organized group of persons pursuing the same ideology, political
ideals or platforms of government and includes its branches and divisions. To
acquire juridical personality, qualify it for subsequent accreditation,
and to entitle it to the rights and privileges herein granted to
political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with
the Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition

with others, fails to obtain at least ten percent of the votes cast in the
constituency in which it nominated and supported a candidate or candidates
in the election next following its registration shall, after notice and hearing,
be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registered political party in
such constituency.
Sec. 61. Registration. Any organized group of persons seeking registration
as a national or regional political party may file with the Commission a
verified petition attaching thereto its constitution and by-laws, platforms or
program of government and such other relevant information as may be
required by the Commission. The Commission shall after due notice and
hearing, resolve the petition within ten days from the date it is submitted for
decision. No religious sect shall be registered as a political party and no
political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall
be entitled to accreditation. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, reads in part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in
the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the

two-step process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in
Liberal Party v. COMELEC:26
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of
our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
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x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party,

organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take
place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has
been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.27 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the COMELEC to
ascertain the eligibility of parties or organizations seeking registration and
accreditation, the pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this
discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.
In view of the facts available to the COMELEC at the time it issued its
assailed Resolutions, this Court rules that respondent did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
A. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice of the Oakwood incident.
MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to
have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence
on record, but on mere speculation and conjectures.28 This argument cannot
be given any merit.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken of matters that are of
"public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration."29 Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies
to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly acceptable by
reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable
facts.30 Thus, in Saludo v. American Express,31 this Court explained as follows:
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice
has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the

community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly

known x x x as to make it indisputable among reasonable men."32
This Court has, in a string of cases, already taken judicial notice of the
factual circumstances surrounding the Oakwood standoff. 33 The incident
involved over 300 heavily armed military officers and enlisted men led by
the founding members of MAGDALO who surreptitiously took over Oakwood
in the wee hours of 27 July 2003. They disarmed the security guards and
planted explosive devices around the building and within its vicinity. They
aired their grievances against the administration of former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), withdrew their support from the
government, and called for her resignation, as well as that of her cabinet
members and of the top officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). After the ensuing negotiations for
these military agents to lay down their weapons, defuse the explosives and
return to the barracks, the debacle came to a close at 11:00 p.m. on the
same day.34 That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively
covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these
facts as public knowledge,35 and took cognizance thereof without requiring
the introduction and reception of evidence thereon.
B. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals.
In the instant Petition, MAGDALO claims that it did not resort to violence
when it took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military,
was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and
staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the
incident.36 These arguments present a very narrow interpretation of the
concepts of violence and unlawful means, and downplays the threat of
violence displayed by the soldiers during the takeover.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties,
organizations and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification
is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party
which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to
accreditation."
Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the
accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury.37 It also denotes physical

force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed

against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty.38 On the
other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a
crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to
exist.39
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with
violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the
siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the
administration of former President Arroyo, and to divulge the alleged
corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the
state.40 Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the
top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign.41 To achieve these goals,
MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises
in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building.
These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances
of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted
clear acts of violence.
The assertions of MAGDALO that no one was held hostage or that no shot
was fired42 do not mask its use of impelling force to take over and sustain the
occupation of Oakwood. Neither does its express renunciation of the use of
force, violence and other unlawful means in its Petition for Registration and
Program of Government43obscure the actual circumstances surrounding the
encounter. The deliberate brandishing of military power, which included the
show of force, use of full battle gear, display of ammunitions, and use of
explosive devices, engendered an alarming security risk to the public. At the
very least, the totality of these brazen acts fomented a threat of violence
that preyed on the vulnerability of civilians. The COMELEC did not, therefore,
commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a
manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to violence or
threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
C. The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or
unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No. 032784.
MAGDALO contends that the finding of the COMELEC that the former pursues
its goals through violence or unlawful means was tantamount to an
unwarranted verdict of guilt for several crimes, which in effect, preempted

the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and violated the right to
presumption of innocence.44 This argument cannot be sustained.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section
61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the
eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in
character.45 In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess
whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation
pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and
not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this process does not entail any
determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the evaluation
of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v.
Marcelo46 is nonetheless analogously applicable:
An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal case, such that
the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same
disposition for the latter, although both may arise from the same set of facts.
The most that we can read from the finding of liability is that the respondents
have been found to be administratively guilty by substantial evidence the
quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding. The requirement
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedurethat the proposed witness should
not appear to be the "most guilty" is obviously in line with the character and
purpose of a criminal proceeding, and the much stricter standards observed
in these cases. They are standards entirely different from those applicable in
administrative proceedings.47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, there is a well-established distinction between the quantum of proof
required for administrative proceedings and that for criminal actions, to wit:
As an administrative proceeding, the evidentiary bar against which the
evidence at hand is measured is not the highest quantum of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, requiring moral certainty to support affirmative findings.
Instead, the lowest standard of substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, applies.48 (Emphasis omitted.)
In the case at bar, the challenged COMELEC Resolutions were issued
pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to
join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence is applicable. In finding that MAGDALO resorts to
violence or unlawful acts to fulfil its organizational objectives, the COMELEC
did not render an assessment as to whether the members of petitioner

committed crimes, as respondent was not required to make that

determination in the first place. Its evaluation was limited only to examining
whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of
disqualifications for registration as a political party. In arriving at its assailed
ruling, the COMELEC only had to assess whether there was substantial
evidence adequate to support this conclusion.
On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 is a criminal action charging
members of MAGDALO with coup dtat following the events that took place
during the Oakwood siege. As it is a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary. Therefore, although the registration case before the
COMELEC and the criminal case before the trial court may find bases in the
same factual circumstances, they nevertheless involve entirely separate and
distinct issues requiring different evidentiary thresholds. The COMELEC
correctly ruled thus:
It is at once apparent that that [sic] the proceedings in and the consequent
findings of the Commission (Second Division) in the subject resolution did not
pre-empt the trial and decision of the court hearing the cases of the Magdalo
members. These are two different processes. The proceedings in the
Commission is [sic] a petition for registration of Magdalo as a political party
and the Commission is empowered to ascertain facts and circumstances
relative to this case. It is not criminal in nature unlike the court case of the
Magdalo founders. Thus, the Second Division did not violate the right of the
Magdalo founders to be presumed innocent until proven guilty when it
promulgated the questioned resolution. There is likewise no violation of due
process. Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege
given to groups who have qualified and met the requirements provided by
law.49
It is unmistakable from the above reasons that the ruling of the COMELEC
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO has not, as
respondent could not have, preempted Criminal Case No. 03-2784 or violated
the right of petitioners members to a presumption of innocence.
Subsequent Grant of Amnesty to the Military Personnel involved in the
Oakwood standoff
It must be clarified that the foregoing discussion finding the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC is based on the facts
available to it at the time it issued the assailed 26 October 2009 and 4
January 2010 Resolutions. It is crucial to make this qualification, as this Court

recognizes the occurrence of supervening events that could have altered the
COMELECs evaluation of the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. The
assessment of the COMELEC could have changed, had these incidents taken
place before the opportunity to deny the Petition arose. In the same manner
that this Court takes cognizance of the facts surrounding the Oakwood
incident, it also takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty in favor of the
soldiers who figured in this standoff.
This Court, in People v. Patriarca,50 explained the concept of amnesty, to wit:
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants
to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the
offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
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In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty
is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act
which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief
Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. x x x"51(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution,52 President Benigno S.
Aquino III issued on 24 November 2010 Proclamation No. 75,53 which reads in
part:
GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF AND
THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, it is recognized that certain active and former personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP)
and their supporters have or may have committed crimes punishable under

the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War and other laws in connection
with, in relation or incident to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Pen
Incident;
WHEREAS, there is a clamor from certain sectors of society urging the
President to extend amnesty to said AFP personnel and their supporters;
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution expressly vests the
President the power to grant amnesty;
WHEREAS, the grant of amnesty in favor of the said active and former
personnel of the AFP and PNP and their supporters will promote an
atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just, comprehensive and
enduring peace and is in line with the Governments peace and reconciliation
initiatives;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 19, Article VII of
the Philippine Constitution, do hereby DECLARE and PROCLAIM:
SECTION 1. Grant of Amnesty. Amnesty is hereby granted to all active and
former personnel of the AFP and PNP as well as their supporters who have or
may have committed crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the
Articles of War or other laws in connection with, in relation or incident to the
July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the
November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula Incident who shall apply therefor;
Provided that amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of torture, crimes against
chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.
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SECTION 4. Effects. (a) Amnesty pursuant to this proclamation shall

extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in connection, incident or
related to the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the February 2006 Marines
Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Peninsula Manila Hotel Incident
without prejudice to the grantees civil liability for injuries or damages
caused to private persons.
(b) Except as provided below, the grant of amnesty shall effect the
restoration of civil and political rights or entitlement of grantees that may
have been suspended, lost or adversely affected by virtue of any executive,
administrative or criminal action or proceedings against the grantee in

connection with the subject incidents, including criminal conviction or (sic)

any form, if any.
(c) All enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank
of up to Technical Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of up to
Senior Police Officer 3, whose applications for amnesty would be approved
shall be entitled to reintegration or reinstatement, subject to existing laws
and regulations. However, they shall not be entitled to back pay during the
time they have been discharged or suspended from service or unable to
perform their military or police duties.
(d) Commissioned and Non-commissioned officers of the AFP with the rank of
Master Sergeant and personnel of the PNP with the rank of at least Senior
Police Officer 4 whose application for amnesty will be approved shall not be
entitled to remain in the service, reintegration or reinstatement into the
service nor back pay.
(e) All AFP and PNP personnel granted amnesty who are not reintegrated or
reinstated shall be entitled to retirement and separation benefits, if qualified
under existing laws and regulation, as of the time [of] separation, unless they
have forfeited such retirement benefits for reasons other than the acts
covered by this Proclamation. Those reintegrated or reinstated shall be
entitled to their retirement and separation benefit[s] upon their actual
retirement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted Concurrent
Resolution No. 4 on 13 and 14 December 2010, respectively.54 Relevant
portions of the Resolution partly read:
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION CONCURRING WITH PROCLAMATION NO. 75 OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED 24 NOVEMBER
2010 ENTITLED "GRANTING AMNESTY TO ACTIVE AND FORMER PERSONNEL
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES PUNISHABLE
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE ARTICLES OF WAR AND OTHER LAWS
IN CONNECTION WITH THE OAKWOOD MUTINY, THE MARINES STAND-OFF
AND THE PENINSULA MANILA HOTEL INCIDENT
WHEREAS, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
President shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of Congress;
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WHEREAS, both Houses of Congress share the view of the President that in
order to promote an atmosphere conducive to the attainment of a just,
comprehensive and enduing peace and in line with the Governments peace
and reconciliation initiatives, there is a need to declare amnesty in favor of
the said active and former personnel of the AFP and PNP and their
supporters;
WHEREAS, it is the sense of both House of Congress that it is imperative that
an amnesty partaking the nature proclaimed by His Excellency, the President
of the Philippines, is necessary for the general interest of the Philippines; xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
In light of the foregoing, to still sustain the finding, based on the participation
of its members in the Oakwood incident, that MAGDALO employs violence or
other harmful means would be inconsistent with the legal effects of amnesty.
Likewise, it would not be in accord with the express intention of both the
Executive and the Legislative branches, in granting the said amnesty, to
promote an atmosphere conducive to attaining peace in line with the
governments peace and reconciliation initiatives.
Nevertheless, this Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions of the
COMELEC as regards the use of violence.1awp++i1 Thus, should MAGDALO
decide to file another Petition for Registration, its officers must individually
execute affidavits renouncing the use of violence or other harmful means to
achieve the objectives of their organization. Further, it must also be
underscored that the membership of MAGDALO cannot include military
officers and/or enlisted personnel in active service, as this act would run
counter to the express provisions of the Constitution:
ARTICLE XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall take an oath or
affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
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(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and

benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed
forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.
No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan
political activity, except to vote.1wphi1

(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time,
be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government including government-owned or controlled corporations or any
of their subsidiaries. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view
of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO,
the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be
interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from
party registration.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4
January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration
by MAGDALO.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC G.R. No. 225973 - SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, et al., Petitioners v.
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, (in his capacity as the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of the Philippines), et
al., Respondents. G.R. No. 225984- REP. EDCEL LAGMAN (in his personal and
official capacities and as Honorary Chairperson of the Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance [FIND], et al., Petitioners v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 226097 LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, et al., Petitioners v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 226116 - HEHERSON
T. ALVAREZ, et al., Petitioners v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 226117 - ZAIRA PATRICIA B.
BANIAGA, et al., Petitioners v. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 226120 - ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, et
al., Petitioners v. SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, sued in his capacity as
Secretary of National Defense, et al., Respondents. G.R. No. 226294 - LEILA
M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as Senator of the Republic and as Taxpayer,
Petitioner v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, et al.,
Respondents. Promulgated: November 8, 2016 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~-~~~-~ DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.: The petitions
seek to prevent the interment of the remains of the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos (Marcos) at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). ~ Dissenting
Opinion 2 G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and

226294 The LNMB was formerly known as the Republic Memorial Cemetery.
On 27 October 1954, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 86, "changing the Republic Memorial Cemetery at Fort WM McKinley,
Rizal Province, to Libingan ng mga Bayani." More than a decade later, then
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208 on 28 May 1967, excluding
approximately 1,428,800 square meters from the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation for the site of the LNMB, and reserving the same for national
shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines
Commission. The National Shrines Commission was subsequently abolished
and its functions transferred to the Military Shrines Service of the Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office of the Department of National Defense under
Presidential Decree No. 1076, issued by then President Marcos on 26 January
1977. On 11 September 2000, Acting Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff Jose M. Calimlim, by order of the Secretary of National Defense,
issued AFP Regulation 161-375 (AFPR G 161-375), 1 on the allocation of
cemetery plots at the LNMB. Under AFPR G 161-375, the deceased persons
who are qualified to be interred at the LNMB are: a. Medal of Valor Awardees;
b. Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP; c. Secretaries of National Defense;
d. Chiefs of Staff, AFP; e. Generals/Flag Officers of the AFP; f. Active and
retired military personnel of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees
who died in line of duty, active reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA)
who died in combat operations or combat related activities; g. Former
members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the Philippine Coast
Guard (PCG) and the Philippine National Police (PNP); h. Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; i.
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased
persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and j.
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National
Artists, widows of Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and
Chief[ s] of Staff. AFPR G 161-375 also enumerates those not qualified to be
interred at the LNMB, namely: AFPR G 161-375 superseded AFPR G 161-374
dated 27 March 1998, which in tum superseded AFPR G 161-373 issued on 9
April 1986. v Dissenting Opinion 3 G.R.Nos.225973,225984,226097,226116,
226117, 226120, and 226294 a. Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/ discharged from the service; and b. Authorized
personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving
moral turpitude. (Emphasis supplied) In a Memorandum dated 7 August
2016, the Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Delfin Lorenzana
ordered the AFP Chief of Staff Ricardo Visaya to undertake the necessary

preparations to facilitate the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, in compliance

with the verbal order of President Rodrigo Duterte on 11 July 2016. The DND
Memorandum resulted in the filing of these petitions, which oppose the
implementation of the DND Memorandum for the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB. I vote to grant the petitions on the ground that Marcos is not qualified
to be interred at the LNMB, and thus the Memorandum dated 7 August 2016
of DND Secretary Lorenzana was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Marcos is disqualified from being
interred at the LNMB Assuming that Marcos was qualified to be interred at
the LNMB as a Medal of Valor Awardee, and as a former President of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief, he ceased to be qualified when he was
ousted from the Presidency by the non-violent People Power Revolution on 25
February 1986. AFPR G 161-375, which respondents rely on to justify the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, specifically provides that "personnel who
were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" are not
qualified to be interred at the LNMB. Marcos, who was forcibly ousted from
the Presidency by the sovereign act of the Filipino people, falls under this
disqualification. Dishonorable discharge from office In Marcos v. Manglapus, 2
the Court described Marcos as "a dictator forced out of office and into exile
after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the
country."3 In short, he was ousted by the Filipino people. Marcos was forcibly
removed from the Presidency by what 258 Phil. 479 (1989). Id. at 492. ~
Dissenting Opinion 4 G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117,
226120, and 226294 is now referred to as the People Power Revolution. This
is the strongest form of dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted
out by the direct act of the sovereign people. The fact of Marcos' ouster is
beyond judicial review. This Court has no power to review the legitimacy of
the People Power Revolution as it was successfully carried out by the
sovereign people who installed the revolutionary government of Corazon C.
Aquino. The people have spoken by ratifying the 1987 Constitution, which
was drafted under the Aquino government installed by the People Power
Revolution. The Court has been steadfast in dismissing challenges to the
legitimacy of the Aquino government, and has declared that its legitimacy is
not a justiciable matter that can be acted upon by the Court. 4 As the
removal of Marcos from the Presidency is no longer within the purview of
judicial review, we must accept this as an incontrovertible fact which has
become part of the history of the Philippines. This ouster, which was directly
carried out by by the sovereign act of the Filipino people, constitutes
dishonorable removal from service. Marcos was forcibly removed from the
position as President and Commander-in-Chief by the Filipino people. In

Estrada v. Desierto, 5 the Court reiterated the legitimacy of the removal of

Marcos and the establishment of the Aquino government: No less than the
Freedom Constitution declared that the Aquino government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that
the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people
power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits
out of the constitutional loop.6 (Emphasis supplied) The removal of Marcos
from the Presidency, therefore, was a direct exercise of the sovereign act of
the Filipino people that is "beyond judicial scrutiny." It cannot be said that
this removal was an "honorable" one. Truly, there is nothing more
dishonorable for a President than being forcibly removed from office by the
direct. sovereign act of the people. Respondents argue that because Marcos
was not dishonorably discharged in accordance with the procedures and
guidelines prescribed in Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term
of Enlistment (Circular 17, dated 2 October 1987, Series of 1987, of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines), Marcos was honorably separated from
service. Joint Resolution, Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines v. President
Aquino, G.R. No. 73748; People's Crusade for the Supremacy of the
Constitution v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73972; Ganay v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73990, 22
May 1986 (unsigned Resolution). 406 Phil. I (2001). Id. at 43-44. v Dissenting
Opinion I disagree. 5 G.R.Nos.225973,225984,226097,22611~ 22611 7,
226120, and 226294 First, Marcos was separated from service with finality,
having been forcibly ousted by the Filipino people on 25 February 1986.
Circular 17, issued more than one year after such separation from office,
cannot be made to apply retroactively to Marcos. When Circular 17 was
issued, Marcos had already been finally discharged, terminated, and ousted as President and Commander-in-Chief - by the Filipino people. Circular 17
requires certain administrative procedures and guidelines in the discharge of
incumbent or serving military personnel. There is a physical and legal
impossibility to apply to Marcos Circular 1 7 since it was issued long after
Marcos had been separated from office. Second, even assuming that Circular
17 can be given retroactive effect, Marcos was still dishonorably discharged
from service since Circular 1 7 cannot prevail over the sovereign act of the
Filipino people. Marcos was ousted by the direct act of the Filipino people.
The sovereign people is the ultimate source of all government powers. 7 The
Constitution specifically declares that "sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them." 8 Thus, the act of the
sovereign people in removing Marcos from the Presidency, which is now
beyond judicial review, and thus necessarily beyond administrative review,

cannot be overturned by a mere administrative circular issued by a

department secretary. The reality is, more than one year before Circular 1 7
was issued, Marcos had already been removed with finality from office by the
sovereign people for reasons that are far from honorable. Circular 17, a mere
administrative issuance of a department secretary, cannot be applied
retroactively to undo a final act by the sovereign people. The power of all
government officials, this Court included, emanates from the people. Thus,
any act that runs afoul with the direct exercise of sovereignty by the people,
such as the removable of a dictator, plunderer and human rights violator,
cannot be countenanced. The sovereign act of the Filipino people obviously
prevails over a mere administrative circular issued by a department
secretary. Equal Protection Clause The respondents assert that the
disqualifications under AFPR G 161- 375 are inapplicable to former presidents
as the disqualifications under AFPR G 161-375 apply only to military
personnel and not to non-military personnel. See Negros Oriental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 239 Phil. 403
(1987). Article II, Section I, 1987 Philippine Constitution. ~ Dissenting
Opinion 6 G.R. Nos.225973,225984,226097,226116, 22611~
226120,and226294 I disagree. The disqualifications prescribed under AFPR G
161-375 are reasonable per se considering that the LNMB is a national
shrine. 9 Proclamation No. 86 renamed the Republic Memorial Cemetery to
LNMB to make it more "symbolic of the cause for which Filipino soldiers have
died" and "to truly express the nation's esteem and reverence for her war
dead." The disqualifications are safeguards to ensure that those interred at
the LNMB indeed deserve such honor and reverence. However, to submit to
respondents' view that the disqualifications under AFPR G 161-375 apply
only to military personnel, and that the President, even as Commander-inChief, is not a military personnel subject to such disqualifications, 10 negates
the purpose for which the LNMB was originally established, which is to honor
Filipino soldiers who fought for freedom and democracy for our country.
Indeed, Marcos is the very antithesis of freedom and democracy because he
was a dictator as declared by this Court. Respondents' view will discriminate
against military personnel who are subject to the disqualifications. Applying
only to military personnel the disqualifications will unduly favor non-military
personnel who will always be eligible, regardless of crimes committed
against the State or humanity, to be interred at the LNMB as long as they are
included in the list of those qualified. This will lead to the absurd situation
where a military officer who was dishonorably discharged would be
disqualified, while a deposed President who was dishonorably discharged
through an act of the sovereign people for committing plunder, human rights

violations, and other atrocious acts would still be qualified to be interred at

the LNMB. The term "personnel" is not defined anywhere in Circular 17 and
thus, we must refer to its common usage. Personnel is defined as "the people
who work for a particular company or organization." 11 The enumeration of
the people qualified to be interred at the LNMB includes both military (such
as the Generals, Flag Officers and Active and Retired Military personnel of
the AFP) and civilian (such as Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense,
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and widows of former
Presidents) personnel. Thus, the term "personnel" as used in the provision for
disqualifications should refer to both military and civilian personnel.
Significantly, paragraph 4 of AFPR G 161-375, the provision which
enumerates those not qualified to be interred at the LNMB, does not use the
JO II Proclamation No. 208, issued on 28 May 1967. Consolidated Comment
(of public respondents) in G.R. No. 225973, G.R. No. 225984, and G.R. No.
226097, pp. 54-55. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/personnel?
utm campaign=sd&utm medium=serp&utm source=jsonld (last accessed 14
September 2016). W' Dissenting Opinion 7
G.R.Nos.225973,225984,226097,226116, 22611~ 226120,and226294 word
"military" to define personnel, while for other provisions in the regulation, the
term "military" is specifically used to classify "personnel." If as respondents
argue, the disqualifications should apply only to military personnel, then
AFPR G 161-375 would be a patent violation of the Equal Protection Clause as
it would indiscriminately create unreasonable classifications between civilian
and military personnel for purposes of interment at the LNMB. Such
classification serves no purpose and is not germane to the purpose of
interment at the LNMB. The Equal Protection Clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws." The Equal Protection Clause
applies not only to statutes or legislative acts but to all official state actions.
12 As explained in Bureau of Customs Employees Associations (BOCEA) v.
Hon. Teves: 13 Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly
constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate

governmental objective. 14 To be valid, a classification must be reasonable

and based on real and substantial distinctions. The Court, in the landmark
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 15 held: All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 16 Thus, for a
classification to be valid and compliant with the Equal Protection Clause, it
must (1) be based on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the 12 13
14 15 16 1-United Transport Koalisyon (J-UTAK) v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206020, 14 April 2015, 755 SCRA 441; Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth
Commission o/2010, 651Phil.374 (2010). 677 Phil. 636 (2011 ). Id. at 660.
158 Phil. 60 (1974). Id. at 87. v Dissenting Opinion 8 G.R. Nos. 225973,
225984, 226097, 226116, 22611 7, 226120, and 226294 purpose of the law,
(3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and ( 4) apply equally to all
members of the same class. 17 In this case, however, there is no substantial
distinction between the military and civilian personnel, for purposes of
interment at the LNl\113, that would warrant applying the disqualifications to
military personnel and not to civilian personnel. In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 18 the Court found that the
rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) were unduly
discriminated against when all the rank-and-file employees of other
Government Financial Institutions (GFis) were exempted from the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) while the SSL continued to be applied to the rankand-file employees of the BSP. The Court held that while the exemption from
the applicability of the SSL is a privilege that is within the prerogative of the
legislature to grant, the validity or legality of the exercise is still subject to
judicial review, such that if it is exercised capriciously and arbitrarily, the
Court is duty bound to correct it. The Court held: 17 18 It bears stressing that
the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-andfile of the seven other GFis and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file
employees breached the latter's right to equal protection. In other words,
while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within
the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the
exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review. So when the
distinction made is superficial, and not based on substantial distinctions that

make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a

matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct.
As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work
and Pensions, once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination"
contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded to one
group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to
provide that favorable treatment. The disparity of treatment between BSP
rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFis definitely bears
the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor
and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket
and total exemption of the seven other GFis from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis. Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to Tiu v. CA,
361 Phil. 229 (1999). 487 Phil. 531 (2004). ~ Dissenting Opinion 9
G.R.Nos.225973,225984,226097,226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical,
are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest. 19
(Italicization in the original) Therefore, under the Equal Protection Clause,
persons who are in like circumstances and conditions must be treated alike
both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case, as
those enumerated in the AFPR G 161-375 are all granted the privilege of
being interred at the LNMB, consequently, the disqualifications must also be
made applicable to all of them. There is no substantial or reasonable basis
for the disqualifications to be made applicable to military personnel only
when civilians alike may be dishonorably dismissed from service for the
same offenses. To sustain respondents' view would give rise to an absurd
situation where civilians, eligible to be interred at the LNMB would have the
absolute and irrevocable right to be interred there, notwithstanding that
military personnel, likewise eligible to be interred at the LNMB, may be
disqualified. There is no real or substantial basis for this distinction. The
conditions for disqualification should likewise be applied to civilian personnel
as the privileges conferred on them - interment at the LNMB - is the same
privilege conferred on military personnel. Marcos' interment at the LNMB is
contrary to public policy Jurisprudence defines public policy as "that principle

of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."20
The Constitution grants the Legislative branch the power to enact laws and
establish the public policy behind the law. The public policy is prescribed by
the Legislature and is implemented by the Executive. The Executive must
implement the law by observing the highest standards of promoting the
public policy. These standards are embedded in the Constitution,
international law and municipal statutes. By these standards, the DND
Memorandum ordering the interment of Marcos at the LNMB is contrary to
public policy. 19 20 Id. at 582-583. Citations omitted. Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.,
724 Phil. 198, 207 (2014 ), citing Avon Cosmetics, Inc. v. Luna, 540 Phil. 389,
404 (2006). v Dissenting Opinion 10 I G.R.
Nos.225973,225984,226097,226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294 Section
11, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
This public policy is further established in Section 12 of Article III which
prohibits the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate free will and mandates the rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices. Also, following the doctrine of incorporation,21
the Philippines adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention
Against Torture. Through the provisions of the Constitution and international
law, the State binds itself to enact legislation recognizing and upholding the
rights of human rights victims. Congress, by enacting Republic Act No. 10368
or "The Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013,"
established as a "policy of the State" to recognize the heroism and sacrifices
of victims of (a) summary execution; (b) torture; (c) enforced or involuntary
disappearance; and ( d) other gross human rights violations during the
Marcos regime. Section 2 ofR.A. No. 10368 states: Consistent with the
foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize the
heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary
execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross
human rights violations committed during the regime of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to
February 25, 1986 and restore the victims' honor and dignity. The State
hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or
provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths,
injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under the
Marcos regime. (Emphasis supplied) R.A. No. 10368 mandates that it is the
"moral and legal obligation" of the State to recognize the sufferings and

deprivations of the human rights victims of Marcos' martial law regime.

Interring Marcos on the hallowed grounds of the LNMB, which was
established to show "the nation's esteem and reverence" for those who
fought for freedom and democracy for our country, extols Marcos and
exculpates him from human rights violations. This starkly negates the "moral
and legal obligation" of the State to recognize the sufferings and
deprivations of the human rights victims under the dictatorship of Marcos.
The legislative declarations must be implemented by the Executive who is
sworn under the Constitution to "faithfully execute the law." The Executive, in
implementing the law, must observe the standard of recognizing the rights of
human rights victims. Marcos' interment at the LNMB will cause undue injury
particularly to human rights victims of the 21 Article II, Section 2 states: "The
Philippines x x x adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land xx x." v Dissenting Opinion 11 G.R. Nos.
225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294 Marcos
regime, as well as the sovereign people who ousted Marcos during the
People Power Revolution. Marcos' interment at the LNMB is thus contrary to
public policy. The sufferings and deprivations of the human rights victims
during the martial law era are well documented. The United States District
Court of Hawaii in In Re Estate of Marcos 22 held Marcos guilty of widespread
human rights violations and awarded one billion two hundred million U.S.
Dollars ($1,200,000,000) in exemplary damages and seven hundred sixty-six
million U.S. Dollars ($766,000,000) in compensatory damages to human
rights victims. The judgment of the district court was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos. 23 Finally, government
funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. 24 Since
Marcos was ousted by the sovereign act of the Filipino people, he was
dishonorably discharged from office. Consequently, Marcos' dishonorable
discharge serves to convert his burial into a private affair of the Marcos
family. Hence, no public purpose is served by interring his remains at the
LNMB. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 225973,
225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, and 226294 and to DECLARE the
DND Memorandum dated 7 August 2016 VOID for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806
April 7, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.

JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN

CITIES, ALAMINOS CITY, PANGASINAN, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then
presided by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante (Bustamante). Judge Bustamante
retired on November 6, 2010.
Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit
of the MTCC was conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In a Memorandum1 dated October 6,
2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista Villanueva
(Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial audit findings that, as
of audit date, there were 35 cases for decision (21 of which were already
beyond the reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending incidents for
resolution (19 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) in
Judge Bustamantes court. At the end of his Memorandum, DCA Villanueva
gave Judge Bustamante the following directives:
1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure
to: [a] decide within the reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870,
1937, 1978, 2056 and 2205, LRC Nos. 28, 65 and 70, and Criminal Case Nos.
5428, 6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721, 8163, 8390, 8395, 8654, 9022 and
9288; and, [b] resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos. 1668 and 2132,
Criminal Case Nos. 8004, 8005, 8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196,
9232 and 9235;
2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to
SUBMIT copies of the decisions to this Office within three (3) days after your
compulsory retirement; and
3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases
enumerated in item (II) above, and to SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this
Office within the same period indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph.2
Judge Bustamante submitted a letter3 dated November 8, 2010,4 addressed
to DCA Villanueva, in which he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC
and Criminal Cases submitted before my last day in office on November 5,
2010 except Civil Cases Nos. 1937 (Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago) and 2056 (Cale
vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when I was not yet the
Presiding Judge. I found out that there is [a] need to retake the testimonies of
the witness concerned so as to attain substantial justice.
As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it
was because of the volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the
Auditors when they came over to audit, I have already started deciding with
drafts attached to the records but I was overtaken by more pressing matters
that I have to take immediate attention, like urgent motions, motions to
dismiss, motions to quash, approval of bails. All of these are in addition to
my trial duties.
I have to work as early as 7:30 oclock in the morning, and sometimes at
7:00 oclock, with the desire to finish everything on time. I burned my candle
at night just [to] comply with my duties within the time frame but because of
human frailties, I failed to do so on time because as I said[,] of the volume of
work in this court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases submitted for
decision before I retired except, as above stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and
2056 because of the reasons already stated.
Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for
resolution, as follows:
In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos.
1668 and 2132. However, the motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil
Case No. 2222, considering the opposition of the plaintiff because of their
counterclaim, I believed the motion needs further hearing, hence, the motion
was not resolved. Similarly, the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2254
needs further hearing, and if no order setting the motion for hearing, it may
be an oversight because of the submission of several cases for decision
almost at the same time.
In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases
Nos. 9015 & 9016 (People vs. Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos.
9148 & 9149 (People vs. Anselmo, Jr.) while Crim. Case No. 9196 was set for
further hearing.
On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it
may have been an oversight because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil

Case No. 2222 and pre-trial conference for the marking of documentary
evidence has been subsequently set but the counsel for the accused failed to
appear.
The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not
resolved because of the prayer of the parties in open court for them to await
the resolution of the civil cases they filed before the Regional Trial Court, as
they are working for the settlement of these civil cases, which may have [an]
effect in these cases.
The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously
resolve the matter.5
In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies
of the decisions and resolutions he referred to in his letter.
The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24, 2011,
reporting viz:
(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his
court. Of the 33 cases decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the
reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the reglementary period.
Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary
period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates
(ranging from 1 year and 8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due
dates) and 10 were decided within a year after their respective due dates
(ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).
(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending
incidents in his court, all of which were resolved beyond their respective
reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to 3 years, 8 months, and 16
days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending incidents in
his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further
hearing; (b) there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending
before other courts; and (c) oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge
Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the pending incidents for
hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related
cases before other courts have already been decided.
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamantes explanations/reasons for his delay in
deciding cases and resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge

Borromeo R. Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross
inefficiency.
In a Resolution7 dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter.
Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that
although he already retired from the service on November 6, 2010, he has
yet to receive his retirement benefits (except for his accumulated leave
credits), because of the pendency of the instant administrative matter
against him. Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative
matter be resolved soonest so he could already receive his retirement
benefits or that his retirement benefits be released but a certain amount
commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose be withheld.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important
duty of a member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts
is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be
compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide
litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition
of their cases.8
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently
mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As
the Court summed up in Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar9:
Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all
cases within three months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the
Judicial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1),
Surigao City, the Court held that:
A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the
time a case is submitted for decision. Judges are to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the period specified in the
Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient
justification for his non-compliance therewith.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should
administer justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges
shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court
held that:
A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him.
Without an extension granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a
single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that
merits administrative sanction.
The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates
judges to attend promptly to the business of the court and decide cases
within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987
Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90
days from submission.
Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to
preserve the integrity, competence and independence of the judiciary and
make the administration of justice more efficient. Time and again, we have
stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and
delay that have long plagued our courts.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the
90-day reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative liability except
when there are valid reasons for the delay. (Citation omitted.)
This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within
the constitutionally prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration
of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy
disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute.10
A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. 11 Heavy
caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the
mandatory period for disposition of cases.12 The Court usually allows
reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload
of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day

reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally granted.13 But
Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of
extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay
that merits administrative sanction.1wphi1
Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamantes explanation that
he failed to decide Civil Case Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN). These two cases were allegedly
heard when he was not yet the presiding judge of the MTCC. Relevant herein
is the ruling of the Court in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan14:
The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. In Administrative Circular
No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided that "A case is
considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the
parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for
deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for
decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing,
the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier.
Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to
interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was
previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the
latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same." x x x (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)
The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially
heard Civil Case Nos. 1937 and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for
decision on November 20, 2009 and February 27, 2010, respectively. Even if
it were true that the two cases were heard by the previous presiding judge of
the MTCC, there is no showing that from the time the cases had been
submitted for decision until Judge Bustamantes retirement on November 6,
2010, Judge Bustamante made an effort to have the TSN completed.
Although technically, the 90-day period would have started to run only upon
the completion of the TSN, the Court finds Judge Bustamantes lack of effort

to have the TSN completed as the root cause for the delay in deciding the
two cases.
The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases
were left unresolved because of the need for further hearings in the same.
The incidents were already submitted for resolution and, as the OCA
observed, Judge Bustamante only saw the need for further hearings in said
cases after the conduct of the judicial audit. In addition, Judge Bustamante
did not submit any order setting the cases for hearing.
Least acceptable of Judge Bustamantes explanations for his delay in
deciding cases and/or resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge is
responsible, not only for the dispensation of justice but also for managing his
court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. Since he is
the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions,
he should know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution,
especially those pending for more than 90 days.15
There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve
pending incidents within the reglementary period, and without authorized
extension from the Court and valid reason for such failure, Judge Bustamante
is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Under the amendments to Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge, for which the
respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not more
than P20,000.00.
Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left
undecided/unresolved or decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period
by Judge Bustamante; as well as the fact that Judge Bustamante had already
retired and can no longer be dismissed or suspended, it is appropriate to
impose upon him a penalty of a fine amounting to P20,000.00, to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering decisions and orders, and
imposes upon him a FINE of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203766

April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan

Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 203818-19
AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203922
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
(APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203936
AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its
President Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203958
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.
(KAKUSA), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203960
1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1CARE), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203976
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
(ARARO), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203981
ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP
(ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin,
the partys Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204002
ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204094

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204100
1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI)
formerly PGBI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204122
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC.,
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204125
AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D. Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204126
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA
(KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG

MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo

R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204139
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni
Catalua Causing, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204141
BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan,
President, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204153
PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka
Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204158
ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS
R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M.

PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON

THEIR BEHALF, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204174
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President
Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204220
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204236
FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204238

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204239
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF
MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204240
AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS
MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael
Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204263
A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS
AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204318
UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTYLIST, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204321

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its
Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204323
BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin
Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S.
LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204341
ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST,
represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204356
BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204358

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL

PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204359
SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY
(SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204364
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA,
PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners
thereof, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204367
AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204370
AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo
T. Tuazon, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204374
BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA
MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204379
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye
Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER,
DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204402
KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G.
Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204410
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204421
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein
by its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204425
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS,
ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204426
ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND
HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO
M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC Chairperson
and Commissioners, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204428
ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General,
Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204435
1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204436
ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President,
Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204455
MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204484

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary
General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204485
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204486
1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st
KABAGIS), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204490
PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE,*
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions

for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations
assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system,
or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated
13 November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4 December
2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280
groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
G.R.
No.

SPP No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Bancs automatic review of the COMELEC

Divisions resolutions approving registration of
groups/organizations
Resolution dated 23 November 20128
1 20437
9

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng
Sining (ASIN)

- The "artists" sector is not

considered marginalized
and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2 20445
5

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers
Savings and

- A non-stock savings and

loan association cannot be

3 20442
6

12-011
(PLM)

Loan
Association, Inc.
(Manila
Teachers)

considered marginalized
and
underrepresented; and
- The first and second
nominees are not teachers
by
profession.

Association of
Local Athletics
Entrepreneurs
and Hobbyists,
Inc. (ALA-EH)

- Failure to show that its

members belong to the
marginalized; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4 20443
5

12-057
(PLM)

1 Alliance
Advocating
Autonomy Party
(1AAAP)

- Failure of the nominees to

qualify: although registering
as a regional political party,
two of the nominees are
not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees
do
not belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5 20436
7

12-104
(PL)

Akbay
Kalusugan
(AKIN), Inc.

- Failure of the group to

show
that its nominees belong to
the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6 20437
0

12-011
(PP)

Ako An Bisaya
(AAB)

- Failure to represent a
marginalized sector of
society, despite the

formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.
Resolution dated 4 December 201213
7 20443
6

12-009
(PP),
12-165
(PLM)

Abyan Ilonggo
Party (AI)

- Failure to show that the

party represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector,
as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in
the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8 20448
5

12-175
(PL)

Alliance of
Organizations,
Networks and
Associations of
the Philippines,
Inc. (ALONA)

- Failure to establish that

the
group can represent 14
sectors; - The sectors of
homeowners
associations, entrepreneurs
and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not
belong

to the marginalized and

underrepresented.
B. Via the COMELEC En Bancs review on motion for
reconsideration
of the COMELEC Divisions resolutions denying registration of
groups
and organizations
Resolution dated 7 November 201215
9 20413
9

12-127
(PL)

Alab ng
Mamamahayag
(ALAM)

- Failure to prove track

record as an organization;
- Failure to show that the
group actually represents
the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that
the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to
represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

1 20440
0 2

12-061
(PP)

Kalikasan Party-List
(KALIKASAN)

- The group reflects an

advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not

belong
to the sector which the
group
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 14 November 201217
1 20439
1 4

12-145
(PL)

Association of
Guard, Utility
Helper, Aider,
Rider, Driver/
Domestic
Helper,
Janitor, Agent
and
Nanny of the
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

- Failure to prove
membership base and track
record;
- Failure to present
activities
that sufficiently benefited
its
intended constituency; and
- The nominees do not
belong
to any of the sectors which
the group seeks to
represent.

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

1 20449
2 0

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa
Pinoy (PPP)

- Failure to show that the

group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector,
as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks
to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the

COMELEC Second Divisions resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas
(PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital

Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that
seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." 20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI,
ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure
a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013
issued Resolution No. 9604,21 and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners
in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups
and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following
groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections:
G.R.
No.

SPP
No.

Group

Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1

203818 12-19
154
(PLM)
12177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol
Political Party
(AKB)

Retained registration and

accreditation as a political
party, but denied participation
in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

203766 12161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum,
Inc. (Atong
Paglaum)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

203981 12187
(PLM)

Association for
Righteousness
Advocacy on
Leadership
(ARAL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to comply, and for
violation of election laws;
- The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

204002 12188
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural Concerns
(ARC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

204318 12220
(PLM)

United
Movement
Against Drugs
Foundation
(UNIMAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The sectors of drug
counsellors and lecturers,
veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track

record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.
Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226
6

204100 12196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine
Guardians
Brotherhood,
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to define the sector
it seeks to represent; and
- The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

204122 12223
(PLM)

1 Guardians
Nationalist
Philippines, Inc.
(1GANAP/
GUARDIANS)

Cancelled registration
- The party is a military
fraternity;
- The sector of community
volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

20426

Blessed
Federation of
Farmers and
Fishermen
International,
Inc. (A
BLESSED
Party-List)

Cancelled registration
- Three of the seven
nominees do not belong to
the sector of farmers and
fishermen, the sector sought
to be represented; and
- None of the nominees are
registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

12257
(PLM)

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

203960 12260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc. (1-CARE)

Cancelled registration
- The sector of rural energy
consumers is not
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The partys track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

1
0

203922 12201
(PLM)

Association of
Philippine
Electric
Cooperatives
(APEC)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 23 October 201229

1
1

204174 12232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo
Party-List Party
( AT )

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

1
2

203976 12288
(PLM)

Alliance for
Rural and
Agrarian
Reconstruction,
Inc. (ARARO)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The interests of the peasant
and urban poor sectors that
the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

1
3

204240 12279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na
Reporma Para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
(AGRI)

Cancelled registration
- The party ceased to exist for
more than a year immediately
after the May 2010 elections;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

1
4

203936 12248
(PLM)

Aksyon
Magsasaka-Partido
Tinig ng
Masa (AKMA-PTM)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually

belong to the farmers sector;

and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.
1
5

204126 12263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng
Nagkakaisang
Agilang
Pilipinong
Magsasaka
(KAP)

Cancelled registration
- The Manifestation of Intent
and Certificate of Nomination
were not signed by an
appropriate officer of the
party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

1
6

204364 12180
(PLM)

Adhikain at
Kilusan ng
Ordinaryong
Tao Para sa
Lupa, Pabahay,
Hanapbuhay at
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

1
7

204141 12229
(PLM)

The True
Marcos Loyalist
(for God,
Country and
People)
Association of
the Philippines,
Inc. (BANTAY)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to show that
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to prove that two of
its nominees actually belong
to the marginalized and

underrepresented.
1
8

204408 12217
(PLM)

Pilipino
Association for
Country Urban
Poor Youth
Advancement
and Welfare
( PA C YAW )

Cancelled registration
- Change of sector (from
urban poor youth to urban
poor) necessitates a new
application;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

1
9

204153 12277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda
Nationwide
Party (PASANG
MASDA)

Cancelled registration
- The party represents drivers
and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

2
0

203958 12015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng
mga Nakulong
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of

guilt beyond reasonable

doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 30 October 201232
2
1

204428 12256
(PLM)

Ang Galing
Pinoy (AG)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

2
2

204094 12185
(PLM)

Alliance for
Nationalism and
Democracy
(ANAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to represent an
identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

2
3

204239 12060
(PLM)

Green Force for

the Environment
Sons and
Daughters of
Mother Earth
(GREENFORCE)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is an advocacy
group and does not represent
the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

2
4

204236 12254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K
Association, Inc.
(FIRM 24-K)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

2
5

204341 12269
(PLM)

Action League
of Indigenous
Masses (ALIM)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the partys
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the

marginalized.
Resolution dated 7 November 201235
2
6

204358 12204
(PLM)

Alliance of
Advocates in
Mining
Advancement
for National
Progress
(AAMA)

Cancelled registration
- The sector it represents is a
specifically defined group
which may not be allowed
registration under the party-list
system; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

2
7

204359 12272
(PLM)

Social
Movement for
Active Reform
and
Transparency
(SMART)

Cancelled registration
- The nominees are
disqualified from
representing the sectors that
the party represents;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

2
8

204238 12173
(PLM)

Alliance of
Bicolnon Party
(ABP)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the
construction industry, the

sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238
2
9

204323 12210
(PLM)

Bayani Party
List (BAYANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

3
0

204321 12252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura
Natin Isulong
(AANI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
partys nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

3
1

204125 12292
(PLM)

Agapay ng
Indigenous
Peoples Rights
Alliance, Inc.
(A-IPRA)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees are members of the
indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and

- Failure to prove that its five

nominees are bona fide
members.
Resolution dated 7 November 201241
3
2

204216 12202
(PLM)

Philippine
Coconut
Producers
Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party is affiliated with
private and government
agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

3
3

204220 12238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod
Party-List
(ABANG
LINGKOD)

Cancelled registration
- Failure to establish a track
record of continuously
representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

3
4

204158 12158
(PLM)

Action
Brotherhood for
Active
Dreamers, Inc.
(ABROAD)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation - Failure to show
that the
party is actually able to
represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

3
5

204374 12228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng
mga Magsasaka
Para sa mga
Magsasaka
(BINHI)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- The party receives
assistance from the
government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 28 November 201245

3
6

204356 12136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers
Party (BUTIL)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The partys nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have

actively participated in the

undertakings of the party.
Resolution dated 3 December 201246
3
7

204486 12194
(PLM)

1st
Kabalikat ng
Bayan
Ginhawang
Sangkatauhan
(1st
KABAGIS)

Cancelled registration and

accreditation
- Declaration of untruthful
statements;
- Failure to exist for at least
one year; and
- None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

3
8

204410 12198
(PLM)

1-United
Cancelled accreditation
Transport
- The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The partys nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

3
9

204421 12,
157
204425 (PLM),
12191
(PLM)

Coalition of
Senior Citizens
in the
Philippines, Inc.
(SENIOR
CITIZENS)

Cancelled registration
- The party violated election
laws because its nominees
had a term-sharing
agreement.

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,

1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA,

AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI,
A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from
this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all
petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were
granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
G.R. No.

SPP No.

Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

20381819

12-154
(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

203981

12-187
(PLM)

Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

Leadership (ARAL)

204002

12-188
(PLM)

Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

203922

12-201
(PLM)

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(APEC)

203960

12-260
(PLM)

1st
Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936

12-248
(PLM)

Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(AKMA-PTM)

203958

12-015
(PLM)

Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976

12-288

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

(PLM)

Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094

12-185
(PLM)

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(ANAD)

204125

12-292
(PLM)

Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100

12-196
(PLM)

1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

(1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141

12-229
(PLM)

The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240

12-279
(PLM)

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216

12-202
(PLM)

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(COCOFED)

204158

12-158
(PLM)

Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122

12-223
(PLM)

1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766

12-161
(PLM)

Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

204318

12-220
(PLM)

United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(UNIMAD)

204263

12-257

Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(PLM)

International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174

12-232
(PLM)

Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

204126

12-263
(PLM)

Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

Magsasaka (KAP)

204364

12-180
(PLM)

Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139

12-127 (PL)

Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220

12-238
(PLM)

Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

LINGKOD)

204236

12-254
(PLM)

Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

204238

12-173
(PLM)

Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

204239

12-060
(PLM)

Green Force for the Environment Sons and

Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321

12-252
(PLM)

Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

204323

12-210
(PLM)

Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

204341

12-269
(PLM)

Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

204358

12-204
(PLM)

Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

for National Progress (AAMA)

204359

12-272

Social Movement for Active Reform and

204356

(PLM)

Transparency (SMART)

12-136
(PLM)

Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402

12-061 (PL)

Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394

12-145 (PL)

Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408

12-217
(PLM)

Pilipino Association for Country Urban Poor

Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428

12-256
(PLM)

Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

204490

12-073
(PLM)

Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

204379

12-099
(PLM)

Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)

204367

12-104 (PL)

Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426

12-011
(PLM)

Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455

12-041
(PLM)

Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374

12-228
(PLM)

Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370

12-011 (PP)

Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435

12-057

1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(PLM)

(1AAAP)

204486

12-194
(PLM)

1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410

12-198
(PLM)

1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

204421,
204425

12-157
(PLM)
12-191
(PLM)

Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)

204436

12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

204485

12-175 (PL)

Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484

11-002

Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153

12-277
(PLM)

Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

MASDA)
The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating in the partylist system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections.
The Courts Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since
the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in
disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions
for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the partylist system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Party-List System
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.50 The voter
elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her
legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization
of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 5, Article VI
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
law.
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,
stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of
the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the partylist system should be read in light of the following discussion among its
framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the
party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.
Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of
sectors and who constitute the members of the sectors. In making the
proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems
precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which sectors will have reserved
seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that
certain sectors would have reserved seats; that they will choose among
themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the
problem of which sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the
sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are
the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be
represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach
sectoral representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine
sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a
caucus of which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And
as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the
law become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who
are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise
the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there

are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a
farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the
person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral
representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some people two
votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by
presenting a party list system. Under the party list system, there are no
reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a
sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register and present
candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the
party list system, every voter has two votes, so there is no discrimination.
First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one
vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked: What party or organization or
coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be
attached a list of the parties, organizations or coalitions that have been
registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can
be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or
a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants
the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for
any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the votes
that had been garnered by each party or each organization one does not
have to be a political party and register in order to participate as a party
and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that
had been cast in favor of a party, organization or coalition.
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of
the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30
percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of
these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of 15
names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to
meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National Assembly. At
the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages.
Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5
percent; a womens party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2
1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all
of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National

Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative

districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is
a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the National
Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups,
they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets only one
percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any
representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a common
interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of
the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those are the
dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may not
have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may
not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have votes
on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out
that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no voice in
the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So,
that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list
system.
BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we
speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be
referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system,
we do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be
included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the
party list system.
xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or

proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for
opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors
to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling
on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit
within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is
not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to
classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as
political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must
they be under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well
as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field
sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is
adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list
system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field
district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system,
they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and
says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system
and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a
farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin
ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove
that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties
can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that
they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented
in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na
isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito
sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my
question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner
Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under
the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates.
On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the
party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares
that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay
hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an

inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO
fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a
political party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If
such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are
to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are
final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list
system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."53
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent
seats to sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to
reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly
explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong
Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection
(2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions the first
headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of
the total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half
were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The proposal was opposed by some
Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors
that needed representation. He was of the view that reserving seats for the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development

into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to

further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the
other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and lessmoneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes
in the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political
parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when
it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives from participating in the
party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be
automatically lifted starting with the 2001 elections). The advocates for
permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a
compromise that the party-list system be open only to underrepresented
and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by
allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates
from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The
majority was unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and
in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able
to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three
consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which
time they would be expected to gather and solidify their electoral base and
brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran
political groups.54(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain
sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system
exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the partylist system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that
they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but they can garner,
in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system
will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for
both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative
district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in

the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly
written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more
that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall
be "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and
"regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had
the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties
to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and
regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1),
could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different
groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The
text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1)
national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National
and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral
lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that,
during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except

the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list
system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly
negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties
representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only
for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of
the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there
will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under
the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure
ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that
implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not
participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as
candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the

geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising
the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election
purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party
or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is
different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides
that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government." On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A.
No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a
political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from
each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties
under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative
district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to

prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political
party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be
organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector.
There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political
party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is
sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not
all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure,
"professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented,"
not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political
constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding
that the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain
sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to
refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice
and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may,
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to nonrepresentation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in
R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2 seeks "to
promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives.
While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the
specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require
that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and
underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead
to absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of

R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the
applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to
the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For
these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees
of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have
a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or
her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically
"marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income
group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.58
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties
of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
"marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand,
limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their
nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized
and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
and will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and
underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have
the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and
transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and
infirmity," even as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative
district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor
represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national
or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those
that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to
those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the
opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for
the accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even
major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution
to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared
statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.
"However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline,
that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang
Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register
sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely
formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their
sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major
political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the
May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political parties can
participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is
expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major
political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their
sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their
sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will
facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of
Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to
participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who
"lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in lawmaking. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that
fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral
wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or
youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution,
by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a
majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing
is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political
party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list
nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the
nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election,
able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during
his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his
term.1wphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or

organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral
parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong
to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for
such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for
qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House
of Representatives." x x x.
xxxx
Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. x x x.
xxxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for
partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating

to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.
xxxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees. x x x.
Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong
Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political
parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lipservice that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list
elections.
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can
participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority
expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties
from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the
law."61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted
in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in
clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now
come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing
jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we
must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned
and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT,
this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats,
reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing
formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as
we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend
our rule62 that a party may appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of
the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining
who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)

national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies."
It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
"marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be

disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political
or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been
disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their
sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners,
but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions,
which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory
injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13
May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted
mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of
ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination

whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and
to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct
summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182601

November 10, 2014

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY

FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUNOZ,Petitioners,
vs.
MORENO GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court challenging the decision1dated January 21, 2008 and the
resolution2 dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No.
91541.
The appealed decision affirmed the Order dated March 16, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Quezon City, denying Joey M. Pestilos,
Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry Fernandez, and Ronald Munoz's
(petitioners) Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation, as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedent Facts
The records of the case reveal that on February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in
the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso (Atty. Generoso) at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon
City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside.3
Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station 6 (Batas an Hills
Police Station) to report the incident.4Acting on this report, Desk Officer SPOl
Primitivo Monsalve (SPOJ Monsalve) dispatched SP02 Dominador Javier (SP02
Javier) to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance.5 SP02 Javier,

together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A2C Alano Sayson
and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour
after the alleged altercation6 and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.7
Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This
prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills
Police Station for investigation.8 The petitioners went with the police officers
to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.10
In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th h day of February, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, qualified with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of
the crime of Murder directly by overt acts, by then and there stabbing one
Atty. MORENO GENEROSO y FRANCO, with a bladed weapon, but said
accused were not able to perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of Murder by reason of some cause/s or accident other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, said complainant was able to
parry the attack, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On March 7, 2005, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation12 on the ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of
the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police
station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure
for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule
112 of the Rules of Court.13
On March 16, 2005, the RTC issued its order denying the petitioners' Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.14 The court likewise denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.15

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule
65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the R TC for the denial of their
motion for preliminary investigation.16
The Assailed CA Decision
On January 21, 2008, the CA issued its decision dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.17 The CA ruled that the word "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest
executed by SP02 Javier carried the meaning of a command. The arresting
officer clearly meant to arrest the petitioners to answer for the mauling of
Atty. Generoso. The CA also recognized that the arrest was pursuant to a
valid warrantless arrest so that an inquest proceeding was called for as a
consequence. Thus, the R TC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
The CA saw no merit in the petitioners' argument that the order denying the
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void for failure to
clearly state the facts and the law upon which it was based, pursuant to Rule
16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that the RTC had
sufficiently explained the grounds for the denial of the motion.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion in
its Resolution of April 17, 2008;18hence, the present petition.
The Issues
The petitioners cited the following assignment of errors:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY ARRESTED WITHOUT A
WARRANT.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY ARRESTED WHEN
THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE POLICE PRECINCT.
III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW
UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
The petitioners primarily argue that they were not lawfully arrested. No
arrest warrant was ever issued; they went to the police station only as a
response to the arresting officers' invitation. They even cited the Affidavit of
Arrest, which actually used the word "invited. "
The petitioners also claim that no valid warrantless arrest took place under
the terms of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. The incident
happened two (2) hours before the police officers actually arrived at the
crime scene. The police officers could not have undertaken a valid
warrantless arrest as they had no personal knowledge that the petitioners
were the authors of the crime.
The petitioners additionally argue that the R TC' s Order denying the Urgent
Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation is void because it was not
properly issued.
The Court's Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC Order. The
criminal proceedings against the petitioners should now proceed.
It is unfortunate that the kind of motion that the petitioners filed has to reach
this Court for its resolution. The thought is very tempting that the motion
was employed simply to delay the proceedings and that the use of Rule 65
petition has been abused.
But accepting things as they are, this delay can be more than compensated
by fully examining in this case the legalities surrounding warrantless
warrants and establishing the proper interpretation of the Rules for the
guidance of the bench and the bar. These Rules have evolved over time, and
the present case presents to us the opportunity to re-trace their origins,
development and the current applicable interpretation.
I. Brief history on warrantless arrests
The organic laws of the Philippines, specifically, the Philippine Bill of
1902,19 and the 1935,20 197321 and 198722Constitutions all protect the right of

the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and

seizures. Arrest falls under the term "seizure. "23
This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to
the writings of Sir Edward Coke24 and The Great Charter of the Liberties of
England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the
bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.25 The
Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required
the Crown to proclaim certain liberties26 under the feudal vassals' threat of
civil war.27 The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum
later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.28 It provides:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised29 of his Freehold, or
Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.30 [Emphasis
supplied]
In United States v. Snyder,31 the United States Supreme Court held that this
constitutional provision does not prohibit arrests, searches and seizures
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.32 With regard
to an arrest, it is considered a seizure, which must also satisfy the test of
reasonableness.33
In our jurisdiction, early rulings of the Court have acknowledged the validity
of warrantless arrests. The Court based these rulings on the common law of
America and England that, according to the Court, were not different from
the Spanish laws.34 These court rulings likewise justified warrantless arrests
based on the provisions of separate laws then existing in the Philippines.35
In 1905, the Court held in The United States v. Wilson36 that Section 3737 of
Act No. 183, or the Charter of Manila, defined the arresting officer's power to
arrest without a warrant, at least insofar as the City of Manila was concerned.
In The United States v. Vallejo, et al.,38 the Court held that in the absence of
any provisions under statutes or local ordinances, a police officer who held
similar functions as those of the officers established under the common law

of England and America, also had the power to arrest without a warrant in
the Philippines.
The Court also ruled in The United States v. Santos39 that the rules on
warrantless arrest were based on common sense and reason.40 It further held
that warrantless arrest found support under the then Administrative
Code41which directed municipal policemen to exercise vigilance in the
prevention of public offenses.
In The United States v. Fortaleza,42 the Court applied Rules 27, 28, 29 and
3043 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code which were
provisions taken from the Spanish Law.
These rules were subsequently established and incorporated in our Rules of
Court and jurisprudence. Presently, the requirements of a warrantless arrest
are now summarized in Rule 113, Section 5 which states that: Section 5.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forth with delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) above has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.44
For purposes of this case, we shall focus on Section 5(b) the provision
applicable in the present case. This provision has undergone changes

through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in
our jurisprudence.
We shall first trace the evolution of Section 5(b) and examine the applicable
American and Philippine jurisprudence to fully understand its roots and its
appropriate present application.
II. Evolution of Section 5(b), Rule 113
A. Prior to the 1940 Rules of Court
Prior to 1940, the Court based its rulings not just on American and English
common law principle on warrantless arrests but also on laws then existing in
the Philippines. In Fortaleza,45 the Court cited Rule 28 of the Provisional Law
for the Application of the Penal Code which provided that:
Judicial and administrative authorities have power to detain, or to cause to
be detained, persons whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of
some offense. It will be the duty of the authorities, as well as of their agents,
to arrest:
First. Such persons as may be arrested under the provisions of rule 27.
Second. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
greater than that of confinamiento.
Third. A person charged with a crime for which the code provides a penalty
less than that of confinamiento, if his antecedents or the circumstances of
the case would warrant the presumption that he would fail to appear when
summoned by the judicial authorities.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply, however, to a
defendant who gives sufficient bond, to the satisfaction of the authority or
agent who may arrest him, and who it may reasonably be presumed will
appear whenever summoned by the judge or court competent to try him.
Fourth. A person coining under the provisions of the preceding paragraph
may be arrested, although no formal complaint has been filed against him,
provided the following circumstances are present:

First. That the authority or agent had reasonable cause to believe that an
unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed.
Second. That the authority or agent had sufficient reason to believe that the
person arrested participated in the commission of such unlawful act or
crime." [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In the same decision, the Court likewise cited Section 3 7 of the Charter of
Manila, which provided that certain officials, including police officers may,
within the territory defined in the law, pursue and arrest without warrant, any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances,
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace.
In Santos,46 the Court cited Miles v. Weston,47 which ruled that a peace officer
may arrest persons walking in the street at night when there is reasonable
ground to suspect the commission of a crime, although there is no proof of a
felony having been committed.
The Court ruled in Santos that the arresting officer must justify that there
was a probable cause for an arrest without a warrant. The Court defined
probable cause as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable
man in believing that the accused is guilty. Besides reasonable ground of
suspicion, action in good faith is another requirement. Once these conditions
are complied with, the peace officer is not liable even if the arrested person
turned out to be innocent.
Based on these discussions, it appears clear that prior to the 1940 Rules of
Court, it was not necessary for the arresting officer to first have knowledge
that a crime was actually committed. What was necessary was the presence
of reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime; and that the same grounds exist to believe that
the person sought to be detained participated in it. In addition, it was also
established under the old court rulings that the phrase "reasonable
suspicion" was tantamount to probable cause without which, the warrantless
arrest would be invalid and the arresting officer may be held liable for its
breach.48
In The US. v. Hachaw,49 the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest of a
Chinaman because the arresting person did not state in what way the

Chinaman was acting suspiciously or the particular act or circumstance

which aroused the arresting person's curiosity.
It appears, therefore, that prior to the establishment in our Rules of Court of
the rules on warrantless arrests, the gauge for a valid warrantless arrest was
the arresting officer's reasonable suspicion (probable cause) that a crime was
committed and the person sought to be arrested has participated in its
commission. This principle left so much discretion and leeway on the part of
the arresting officer. However, the 1940 Rules of Court has limited this
discretion.
B. The 1940 Rules of Court
(Restricting the arresting
officer's determination of
probable cause)
Rules 27 and 28 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code
were substantially incorporated in Section 6, Rule 109 of the 1940 Rules of
Court as follows:50
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant - When lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
These provisions were adopted in toto in Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964
Rules of Court. Notably, the 1940 and 1964 Rules have deviated from the old
rulings of the Court. Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the
offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless
arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or

reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been

committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.
However, under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required
that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the
element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of
an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable
suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In other words, the 1940 and 1964
Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless
arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court.
C. The more restrictive 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial
changes and was re-worded and re-numbered when it became Section 5,
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when. lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
As amended, Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the
restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly,
however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should
not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed."

This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation
for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
D. The Present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Section 5(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further
amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of
the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested
has committed the crime.
Hence, as presently worded, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears
that for purposes of Section S(b ), the following are the notable changes:
first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting
immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be
arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the
arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
It is clear that the present rules have "objectified" the previously subjective
determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime;
and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime.
According to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimize arrests based
on mere suspicion or hearsay.51
As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been
committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
For purposes of this case, we shall discuss these elements separately below,
starting with the element of probable cause, followed by the elements that
the offense has just been committed, and the arresting officer's personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has

committed the crime.
i) First Element of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Probable cause
The existence of "probable cause" is now the "objectifier" or the determinant
on how the arresting officer shall proceed on the facts and circumstances,
within his personal knowledge, for purposes of determining whether the
person to be arrested has committed the crime.
i.a) U.S. jurisprudence on probable cause in warrantless arrests
In Payton v. New York,52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution does not prohibit arrests without a
warrant although such arrests must be reasonable. According to State v.
Quinn,53 the warrantless arrest of a person who was discovered in the act of
violating the law is not a violation of due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however indicated in Henry v. United States54 that
the Fourth Amendment limited the circumstances under which warrantless
arrests may be made. The necessary inquiry is not whether there was a
warrant or whether there was time to get one, but whether at the time of the
arrest probable cause existed. The term probable cause is synonymous to
"reasonable cause" and "reasonable grounds."55
In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should
make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The
standards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause
assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a
case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause
determination of a warrantless arrest is based on information that the
arresting officer possesses at the time of the arrest and not on the
information acquired later.56
In evaluating probable cause, probability and not certainty is the
determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Probable
cause involves probabilities similar to the factual and practical questions of
everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act. It is a
pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particular
circumstances and the particular offense involved.57

In determining probable cause, the arresting officer may rely on all the
information in his possession, his fair inferences therefrom, including his
observations. Mere suspicion does not meet the requirements of showing
probable cause to arrest without warrant especially if it is a mere general
suspicion. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy information as
well as personal knowledge. Thus, the arresting officer may rely on
information supplied by a witness or a victim of a crime; and under the
circumstances, the arresting officer need not verify such information. 58
In our jurisdiction, the Court has likewise defined probable cause in the
context of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al.,59 the Court held that personal knowledge of facts
must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
i.b) Probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, distinguished from probable cause in preliminary
investigations and the judicial proceeding for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for triat.60 In Buchanan v.
Viuda de Esteban,61 we defined probable cause as the existence of facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In this particular proceeding, the finding of the existence of probable cause
as to the guilt of the respondent was based on the submitted documents of
the complainant, the respondent and his witnesses.62

On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that
based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review
in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable
cause63 to issue a warrant of arrest.
In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on
his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain
to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making.the
arrest.
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged,64 or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts.65
It is clear therefore that the standard for determining "probable cause" is
invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor,
and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested or held for trial, as the case may be.
However, while the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all
determine "probable cause," within the spheres of their respective functions,
its existence is influenced heavily by the available facts and circumstance
within their possession. In short, although these officers use the same

standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or

circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which they must determine
probable cause.
Thus, under the present rules and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should
base his determination of probable cause on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the
crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on
the evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited
facts, evidence or available information that he must personally gather
within a limited time frame.
Hence, in Santos,66 the Court acknowledged the inherent limitations of
determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of its
determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect
too much of an ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the
subtle reasoning of a judicial officer. Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to
make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own belief to prevent
the escape of the criminal.67
ii) Second and Third Elements of Section 5(b), Rule 113:
The crime has just been committed/personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it
We deem it necessary to combine the discussions of these two elements as
our jurisprudence shows that these were usually taken together in the
Court's determination of the validity of the warrantless arrests that were
made pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Posadas v. Ombudsman,68 the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on
December 8, 1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor
Posadas requested the NBI's assistance. On the basis of the supposed
identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the
crime. With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested
committed the crime. Hence, the Court invalidated the warrantless arrest.

Similarly, in People v. Burgos,69 one Cesar Masamlok personally and

voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly
recruited him to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical
harm. Upon receipt of this information, a joint team of PC-INP units was
dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field. Indeed, the
arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police
officers had in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It
cannot be also said in this case that there was certainty as regards the
commission of a crime.
In People v. del Rosario,70 the Court held that the requirement that an offense
has just been committed means that there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these
requirements because he was arrested only a day after the commission of
the crime and not immediately thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers
were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime. Hence, they
had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as
the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana,71 the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing
of the victim and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed
sources. The unlawful arrest was held invalid.
In Rolito Go v. CA,72 the arrest of the accused six ( 6) days after the
commission of the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just
been committed. Moreover, the "arresting" officers had no "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the gunman who had
shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that
the accused was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in the name
of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute "personal
knowledge."
In People v. Tonog, Jr.,73 the warrantless arrest which was done on the same
day was held valid. In this case, the arresting officer had knowledge of facts

which he personally gathered in the course of his investigation, indicating

that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
In People v. Gerente,74 the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held
that the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. The
warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Alvario,75 the warrantless arrest came immediately after the
arresting officers received information from the victim of the crime. The
Court held that the personal knowledge of the arresting officers was derived
from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to Alvario as
the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the
warrantless arrest. In People v. Jayson,76 there was a shooting incident. The
policemen who were summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim.
The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant only moments after
the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the
accused was the assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol,77 a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the
policemen immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the
victims saw four persons walking towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was
wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the policemen. When the
group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court
held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA,78 there was an initial report to the police concerning a
robbery. A radio dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who
proceeded to Alden Street to verify the authenticity of the radio message.
When they reached the place, they met with the complainants who initiated
the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined
them in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was
spotted in the vicinity. Based on the reported statements of the
complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense just
committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria,79 the Court held that Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense.

In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call
from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team
headed by SP03 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while Judge Abelita III, who
was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident.
P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him
of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to
the police headquarters as he had been reported to be involved in the
incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded
to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run
towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the
driver's seat as Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the
back of the driver's seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and
arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act of trying to get
away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough
to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the
existence of probable cause. Based on these discussions, it appears that the
Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. However, we note that the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" under Section S(b ), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to
the Black's Law Dictionary,80"circumstances are attendant or accompanying
facts, events or conditions. " Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police
officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if,
based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the
crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination
of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be
made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with
the element of immediacy.

In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these
facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts
as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or
perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This
guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable
cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive
investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from
the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information
gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external
factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand, with the element of
immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause
would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or
circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.
The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable
cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the
police officer could effect a valid warrantless arrest.
In light of the discussion above on the developments of Section 5(b), Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and our jurisprudence on the
matter, we hold that the following must be present for a valid warrantless
arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting
officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to
be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal
knowledge. The requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies
the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with
the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests.
Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless
arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the
requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting
officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the
petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and
circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the
petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe

that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the

petitioners? We rule in the affirmative.
III. Application of Section S(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure in the present case: there was a
valid warrantless arrest
We deem it necessary to review the records of the CA because it has
misapprehended the facts in its decision.81From a review of the records, we
conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in
effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners. We note, however, that
the determination of the facts in the present case is purely limited to the
resolution of the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners.
Based on the police blotter82 entry taken at 4:15 a.m. on February 20, 2005,
the date that the alleged crime was committed, the petitioners were brought
in for investigation at the Batasan Hills Police Station. The police blotter
stated that the alleged crime was committed at 3:15 a.m. on February 20,
2005, along Kasiyahan St., Brgy. Holy Spirit, Quezon City.
The time of the entry of the complaint in the police blotter at 4:15 a.m., with
Atty. Generoso and the petitioners already inside the police station, would
connote that the arrest took place less than one hour from the time of the
occurrence of the crime. Hence, the CA finding that the arrest took place two
(2) hours after the commission of the crime is unfounded.
The arresting officers' personal observation of Atty. Generoso's bruises when
they arrived at the scene of the crime is corroborated by the petitioners'
admissions that Atty: Generoso indeed suffered blows from petitioner
Macapanas and his brother Joseph Macapanas,83 although they asserted that
they did it in self-defense against Atty. Generoso.
Atty. Generoso's bruises were also corroborated by the Medico-Legal
Certificate84 that was issued by East Avenue Medical Center on the same
date of the alleged mauling. The medical check-up of Atty. Generoso that
was made about 8:10 a.m. on the date of the incident, showed the following
findings: "Contusion Hematoma, Left Frontal Area; Abrasion, T6 area, right
midclavicular line periorbital hematoma, left eye; Abrasion, distal 3rd
posterolateral aspect of right forearm; Abrasion, 4th and fifth digit, right

hand; Abrasion on area of ih rib (L ant. Chest wall), tenderness on L

peripheral area, no visible abrasion. In addition, the attending physician, Dr.
Eva P. Javier, diagnosed Atty. Generoso of contusion hematoma, periorbital L.,
and traumatic conjunctivitis, o.s.
To summarize, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the
complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers
responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged
mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso
and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners
as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85and Atty.
Generoso86 lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when
the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny
their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated
a different version of what transpired.87
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and
which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that
they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners'
warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers'
observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These
circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.
Similar to the factual antecedents in Jayson,88 the police officers in the
present case saw Atty. Generoso in his sorry bloodied state. As the victim, he
positively identified the petitioners as the persons who mauled him;
however, instead of fleeing like what happened in Jayson, the petitioners
agreed to go with the police officers.
This is also similar to what happened in People v. Tonog, Jr.89 where Tonog did
not flee but voluntarily went with the police officers. More than this, the
petitioners in the present case even admitted to have been involved in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they had another version of what
transpired.
In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent
upon the courts to consider if the police officers have complied with the

requirements set under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, specifically, the requirement of immediacy; the police
officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and lastly, the
propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to
be arrested committed the crime.
The records show that soon after the report of the incident occurred, SPOl
Monsalve immediately dispatched the arresting officer, SP02 Javier, to render
personal assistance to the victim.90 This fact alone negates the petitioners'
argument that the police officers did not have personal knowledge that a
crime had been committed - the police immediately responded and had
personal knowledge that a crime had been committed.1wphi1
To reiterate, personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms
of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at the scene
while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the
crime.
Considering the circumstances of the stabbing, particularly the locality where
it took place, its occasion, the personal circumstances of the parties, and the
immediate on-the-spot investigation that took place, the immediate and
warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently, the
inquest proceeding that the City Prosecutor conducted was appropriate
under the circumstances.
IV. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to
mean as an authoritative command
After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of
the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest
the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary.92

Notwithstanding the term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest,93 SP02 Javier

could not but have the intention of arresting the petitioners following Atty.
Generoso' s account. SP02 Javier did not need to apply violent physical
restraint when a simple directive to the petitioners to follow him to the police
station would produce a similar effect. In other words, the application of
actual force would only be an alternative if the petitioners had exhibited
resistance.
To be sure, after a crime had just been committed and the attending
policemen have acquired personal knowledge of the incidents of the crime,
including the alleged perpetrators, the arrest of the petitioners as the
perpetrators pointed to by the victim, was not a mere random act but was in
connection with a particular offense. Furthermore, SP02 Javier had informed
the petitioners, at the time of their arrest, of the charges against them
before taking them to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation.94
V. The Order denying the motion for preliminary
investigation is valid
In their last ditch attempt at avoidance, the petitioners attack the R TC Order
denying the petitioners' urgent motion for regular preliminary investigation
for allegedly having been issued in violation of Article VIII, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution95 and Rule 16, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.96
The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly states that the Court is
not persuaded by the evidentiary nature of the allegations in the said motion
of the accused. Aside from lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in
the exercise of its sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue
and hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this
Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts
found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC
decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the
decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only
prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case.

Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the
reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the
petition, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated January 21, 2008 and the
resolution dated April 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91541. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to proceed
with the criminal proceedings against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180308

June 19, 2012

PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION, ENRIQUE L. LOCSIN AND

MANUEL D. ANDAL, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES, HON. SEN. RICHARD
GORDON AND HON. SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assails and seeks
to enjoin the implementation of and nullify Committee Report No.
3121 submitted by respondents Senate Committees on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and on Public Services
(respondents Senate Committees) on June 7, 2007 for allegedly
having been approved by respondent Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines (respondent Senate) with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
The Factual Antecedents
The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government-sequestered
organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35%
interest in shares of stocks.2 Petitioner PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC), meanwhile, is a private corporation duly

organized and existing under Philippine laws and a holding company

whose main operation is collecting the money market interest
income of PHILCOMSAT.
Petitioners Enrique L. Locsin and Manuel D. Andal are both directors
and corporate officers of PHC, as well as nominees of the
government to the board of directors of both POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.3 By virtue of its interests in both PHILCOMSAT and
POTC, the government has, likewise, substantial interest in PHC.
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), regularly
received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, however, POTC
suffered its first loss. Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a P7-million
loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By 2005, PHC's
operating expenses had ballooned tremendously. Likewise, several
PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc.
(TCI), a wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been
allegedly advanced without the appropriate accountability reports
given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.4
On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government
continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during
the Second Regular Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the
Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No.
4555directing the conduct of an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the
anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors.
PSR No. 455 was referred to respondent Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted eleven (11)
public hearings6 on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were
invited to attend these hearings as "resource persons."
On June 7, 2007, respondents Senate Committees submitted the
assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it noted the need to
examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC. After due proceedings, the respondents
Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by the
PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that

PCGG was negligent in performing its mandate to preserve the

government's interests in the said corporations. In sum, Committee
Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and
transfer of the jurisdiction over the shares of the government in
POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office
(PMO) under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement
of government nominees as directors of POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
On November 15, 2007, petitioners filed the instant petition before
the Court, questioning, in particular, the haste with which the
respondent Senate approved the challenged Committee Report No.
312.7 They also claim that respondent Senator Richard Gordon acted
with partiality and bias and denied them their basic right to
counsel,8and that respondent Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, despite
having voluntarily recused himself from the proceedings in view of
his personal interests in POTC, nonetheless continued to participate
actively in the hearings.9
Issues Before The Court
The basic issues advanced before the Court are: (1) whether the
respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in approving Committee
Resolution No. 312; and (2) whether it should be nullified, having
proposed no piece of legislation and having been hastily approved
by the respondent Senate.
The Court's Ruling
The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to
PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated
cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L.
Sabio,10 which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as
follows:
"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of

inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the
respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers
necessary and proper for its effective discharge.11
On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative
inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on
the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The
wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative
inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21
would be rendered pointless.121wphi1
Hence, on the basis of the pronouncements in the Sabio case, and
as suggested13 by the parties in their respective pleadings, the
issues put forth in the petition14 have become academic.
Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation15 that their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to counsel was violated during the
hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to
be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and
therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. 16 Since
petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as
resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to
counsel.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196425

July 24, 2012

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. CESAR

V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an exofficio member of the Monetary Board, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its
Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the
Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of
the President",1 and to permanently prohibit respondents from
administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of
the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and
corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to
submit its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent
portions of E.O. 12 provide:
Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions.
(a) x x x

xxx

xxx

(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the

authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its
agencies or instrumentalities xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. After

completing its investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc
shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The
report and recommendations shall state, among others, the factual
findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend
(sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newlyestablished Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The full
text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13
ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND
TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND
RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and
advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the different
departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the
government bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency in
government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides
that the President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive
Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provides for the continuing
authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure
of the Office of the President;

WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing

Authority to the President of the Philippines to Reorganize the
National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the
President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government
and may, at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate,
merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and units of
the National Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or
otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No.
9970 (General Appropriations Act of 2010) authorizes the President
of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or
key positions in any department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government
to fight and eradicate graft and corruption in the different
departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government
bureaucracy to promote economy and efficiency in the government.
SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC).
To enable the Office of the President (OP) to directly investigate
graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive
Department including heads of government-owned and controlled
corporations, the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is hereby abolished and
their vital functions and other powers and functions inherent or
incidental thereto, transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with the
provisions of this Executive Order.
SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to the Legal and

Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and

Adjudicatory Division shall be created.
The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall
perform powers, functions and duties mentioned in Section 2
hereof, of PAGC.
The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the
recommending authority to the President, thru the Executive
Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of
ODESLA.
SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of
PAGC. The personnel who may be affected by the abolition of the
PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under
existing laws if applicable. The Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the necessary
funds for the benefits of the employees.
SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the
Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets and Liabilities of PAGC. The
winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition
or transfer of their functions, positions, personnel, assets and
liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the
applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or Attached to the Office of
the President) dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be
implemented not later than 31 December 2010.
The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the
Department of Budget and Management, shall ensure the smooth
and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and windingup of the activities of PAGC.
SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules,
regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby
revoked or modified accordingly.

SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect

immediately after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima
filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit2 for grave
misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio
Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three
Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same
transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B.
Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-100426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is
available to him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has
resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon
the following grounds:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF
THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE

OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates
that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create
the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by
creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasijudicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of
congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate
quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also
encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers
that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed
against the due process requirement and equal protection clause
under the 1987 Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the
following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any

other Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies to the
Office of the President from other departments or agencies. 4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora 5 the Court
affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a reorganization
in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express
grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to
reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does
not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of
the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the
policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the
President's continuing authority in this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable
of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office
of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to
a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
292.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is

limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office
of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other
way around.7
Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing
with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by
allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation
or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring
functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v.
Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the
President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from
one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of
the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies
from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the
other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security
but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken
fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC
was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two
(2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II
and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the
President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions
of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office
of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the
Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of

abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is

allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went
beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him to reorganize the
executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely
involve the abolition of an office but the creation of one as well. He
argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court in
several cases does a reorganization include the act of creating an
office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate
and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new,
additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that
pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to
the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the
President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA could take on the
additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the
existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It
involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through
legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good faith. A
reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency.13It appears in this case that the
streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper
was pursued with such purposes in mind.

In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization

the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and
promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the
economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that
while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's
operation in the 2010 annual budget,14 no separate or added
funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the
transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA
needed to discharge its functions and maintain its personnel would
be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the
President's Offices under the General Appropriations Act of
2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not
indicate the manner by which the appropriation for the Office of the
President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational
funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation
by the President. The contention is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public
funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed
upon him is the power to recommend the budget necessary for the
operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the
necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that
each government agency in the executive department would need
to operate in the most economical and efficient manner. 17 Hence, the
express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 of the Presidents authority to "direct
changes in the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and
consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes
the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize the executive
offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the
executive department, he is likewise given constitutional authority
to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the

savings in other items of the appropriation for his office. 19 In fact, he

is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department which is included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total amount appropriated by Congress in the
annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds
for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's
own office budget without committing any illegal appropriation.
After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing
funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not
vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with
judicial power which is reserved to the Judicial Department and, by
way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to
administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields
quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its
Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its
appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation
of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly
states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and
duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints against all presidential
appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a factfinding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the
power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court

ruled in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights,25 and later

reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission: 26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be
considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end
that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IADODESLA as his fact-finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all,
as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive
Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed
necessitates the corresponding power in the President to conduct
investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the
executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of
the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not
encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him
notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and administrative
cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office
of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at

any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another

investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the Ombudsman to
(1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative
disciplinary case for grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke
the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IADODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the
Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and appointive
officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means
exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the
existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a
criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA
is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations
and recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President.
As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's
constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due
Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal
protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IADODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying
upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the
laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government.29 It is embraced under the due process
concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as

to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."30 The equal

protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to
reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial
distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we
ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated
that
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority
of the President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that,
in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to
discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to
appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to
investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in
office.33 Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the highlevel position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his
right to order an investigation into matters that require his
informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential
appointees occupying upper-level positions in government from
non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower
positions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of the
Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial

distinctions that exist between elective and appointive public

officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
xxxx
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the
purest expression of the sovereign power of the people.1wphi1 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by
their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such
officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials
are concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process
was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the
administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient
opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary
Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process,35 which simply means having the opportunity to
explain ones side.36 Hence, as long as petitioner was given the
opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with
because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order
requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with
respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His

own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his

subsequent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform
its duties as an impartial tribunal, contending that both the IADODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to
invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to
show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in
the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been
presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the
performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion,
therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the
illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the
President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189669

February 16, 2015

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and PETRON

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision1of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution2 dated
September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are:
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling,
offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by
illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing the
duly registered trademark and device of respondent Petron. Petron
then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation team who
sent their people to investigate. The investigators went to
respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur,
bringing along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total and
Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled. Respondent's
employees then refilled said empty cylinders at respondent's
refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought to the
Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that respondent
was not authorized to distribute and/or sell, or otherwise deal with
Petron LPG products, and/or use or imitate any Petron trademarks.
Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent for the purpose of
apprehending and prosecuting establishments conducting illegal
refilling, distribution and/or sale of LPG products using the same
containers of Petron and Shell, which acts constitute a violation of
Section 168,3 in relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as
An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles,
Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found
commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders
stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. They also witnessed trucks
coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with Gasul,
Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit said cylinders
in different places, one of them a store called "Edrich Enterprises"
located at 272 National Highway, San Nicolas, Iriga City. The

investigators then bought Shellane and Gasul cylinders from Edrich

Enterprises, for which they were issued an official receipt.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for
Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1,6 in relation to Section
1707 of R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. On
October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said
Applications and Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were
issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
respondent's premises in an orderly and peaceful manner, and
articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only grounds cited
were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of
four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search
and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not
owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich
Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. In an
Order dated February 21, 2003, the RTC-Naga denied the Motion to
Quash.
However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an
Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in said
motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the
impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTCNaga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent pointed
out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any
compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which
does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the
commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner opposed the
Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for
respondent to raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of
the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of
the Omnibus Motion Rule.

In an Order dated July 28, 2003,the RTC-Naga issued an Order

granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing
Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its
Decision dated March 13,2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing the
search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision was denied per Resolution dated September 14, 2009.
Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, petitioner presents herein the following issues:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT VENUE IN
AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS
BECAUSE A SEARCH WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL CASE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASHIS NOT SUBJECT TO THE OMNIBUS
MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY
NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.8
Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the

application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action
is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b) thereof,
the application for search warrant in this case should have stated
compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga
instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court
that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged
crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant
was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory
nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the
application is filed in a court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of
persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and
search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be
construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing
the search warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for
a search warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to comply with
the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they
had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in the
application, the more pressing question that would determine the
outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in taking into
consideration the issue of said defect in resolving respondent's
motion for reconsideration where the issue was raised for the very
first time? The record bears out that, indeed, respondent failed to
include said issue at the first instance in its motion to quash. Does
the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to quash search warrants?
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation
to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be
included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be
deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take
cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action

pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar
by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.9 It should be stressed
here that the Court has ruled in a number of cases that the omnibus
motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search
warrants.10 Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v.
People,11 that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the
accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known
during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised
in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x."12
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial
court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in
the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the
issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available
and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash. What
remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of the
defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in
respondent's motion for reconsideration was an issue of jurisdiction,
the CA rationcinated, thus:
It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions in
criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory.13

Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally

flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals,14 and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web
Corporation v. People of the Philippines,15 to wit:
x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application for a
search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal
action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts
of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are
completely different from those for the institution of a criminal
action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process.1wphi1 A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name
of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural
concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action. x x x16 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the wrong

conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings for
applications for search warrants with criminal actions themselves.
As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said applications are not
criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional
does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the
application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is
not one involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted
case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all
courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the
RTC-Naga to have even taken into consideration an issue which
respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not
involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite
clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes
such as a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous admonition
in Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,17 that:
We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining
supplemental motions x x x which raise grounds that are already
deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants to
file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or
frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated
September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80643 are REVERSED. The
Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24, denying respondent's motion to
quash, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC

June 13, 2012

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES

AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR

CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND

OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA
RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE
JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
In a letter,1 dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research
Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ),
sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She
also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the
Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of
updating their database of information on government officials.
In her Letter,2 dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcherwriter also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and
PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same abovestated purpose.
The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August
18, 2009.3 On the same day, the Court resolved to create a special
committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests for SALN
and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend
appropriate action on such requests.4
On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate
Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario submitted its Memorandum 5 dated
November 18, 2009 and its Resolution6 dated November 16, 2009,
recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that
would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access

to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the

Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other
personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA and the
Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. In particular, these requests include
the:
(1) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM,7 dated September 10, 2009, issued by
Atty. E. H. Amat, Acting Director, General Investigation Bureau-B of
the Office of the Ombudsman, directing the Office of Administrative
Services, Supreme Court to submit two (2) copies of the SALN of
Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado of the Sandiganbayan for the
years 1997-2008, his latest PDS, his Oath of Office, appointment
papers, and service records.
(2) LETTER,8 dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public
Transparency Reporting Project, asking permission to be able to
access and copy the SALN of officials and employees of the lower
courts.
(3) LETTER,9 filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim, seeking copies
of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices
Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin,
Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.,
Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno.
(4) LETTER,10 dated August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo,
Reporter, GMA News and Public Affairs also requesting for copies of
the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices
Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin,
Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr.,
Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno, for purposes of producing a story on transparency and
governance, and updating their database.
(5) LETTER,11 dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo, requesting
for a copy of the 2010 SALN of any Justice of the Supreme Court as

well as a copy of the Judiciary Development Fund, for purposes of

her securing a huge percentage in final examination in
Constitutional Law I at the San Beda College Alabang School of Law
and for her study on the state of the Philippine Judiciary,
particularly the manner, nature and disposition of the resources
under the JDF and how these have evolved through the years.
(6) LETTERS, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh, Lead
Convenor of Kaya Natin! Movement for Good Governance and Ethical
Leadership, addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, 12 Associate
Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,13 Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro,14 Arturo D. Brion,15 Diosdado M. Peralta,16 Mariano C. Del
Castillo,17 Jose Portugal Perez,18 and Maria Lourdes P.A.
Sereno,19 requesting for copies of their SALN and seeking
permission to post the same on their website for the general public.
(7) LETTER,20 dated December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria,
Executive Director, Newsbreak, seeking copies of the SALN of the
Supreme Court Justices covering various years, for the purpose of
the stories they intend to put on their website regarding the
Supreme Court and the Judiciary.
(8) LETTERS, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe Manalang of
Unlimited Productions, Inc., addressed to Associate Justices
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,21 Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,22 Mariano C.
Del Castillo23and Jose Portugal Perez,24 and Atty. Enriqueta EsguerraVidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court25requesting for copies of the
SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for the years 2010 and 2011.
(9) LETTER,26 dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas,
Executive Director, PCIJ, requesting for copies of the SALN, PDS or
CVs of the Justices of the Supreme Court from the year they were
appointed to the present.
(10) SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM, 27 issued on
January 17, 2012, by the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court,
in connection with Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, requiring the Clerk of Court, among
others, to bring with her the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
for the years 2002 to 2011.

(11) LETTER,28 dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo "Ka Nilo" H. Baculo,
Sr., requesting copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for
the years 2008 to 2011, for his use as a media practitioner.
(12) LETTER,29 dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre of
GMA News, requesting for copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court
Justices for the networks story on the political dynamics and
process of decision-making in the Supreme Court.
(13) LETTER,30 dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana, Head,
News Operations, News 5, requesting for copies of the 2010-2011
SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for use as reference materials
for stories that will be aired in the newscasts of their television
network.
(14) LETTER,31 dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo,
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Malacaang,
addressed to Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court,
Supreme Court, seeking her comments and recommendation on
House Bill No. 5694,32 to aid in their determination of whether the
measure should be certified as urgent.
(15) Undated LETTER33 of Benise P. Balaoing, Intern of Rappler.com,
a news website, seeking copies of the 2010 SALN of the Justices of
the Court and the CA for the purpose of completing its database in
preparation for its coverage of the 2013 elections.
(16) LETTER,34 dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa, Chief
Executive Officer and Executive Officer and Executive Editor of
Rappler, Inc., requesting for copies of the current SALN of all the
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan also for the purpose of completing its database in
preparation for its coverage of the 2013 elections.
(17) LETTER,35 dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A. Seir, Junior
Researcher, News Research Section, GMA News and Public Affairs,
requesting for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for the calendar
year 2011 for the networks use in their public affairs programs.

(18) LETTER,36 dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor
of Solar Network, Inc., requesting for copies of the 2011 SALN of all
the Justices of the Supreme Court.
(19) LETTER,37 dated May 30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News
Editor, TV5 requesting for copies of the SALN of the Justices of the
Court for the last three (3) years for the purpose of a special report
it would produce as a result of the impeachment and subsequent
conviction of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
(20) LETTER,38 dated May 31, 2012, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon,
Assistant Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office, Office of the
Ombudsman, requesting for 1] certified copies of the SALN of
former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for the years 2002-2011, as
well as 2] a certificate of his yearly compensation, allowances, and
bonuses, also for the years 2002-2011.
(21) LETTER,39 dated June 8, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, requesting
a copy of the SALN of any present Supreme Court Justice, for the
purpose of completing her grade in Legal Philosophy at the San
Beda College of Law.
Pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,40 the
Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, issued its
Resolution41 dated October 13, 2009, denying the subpoena duces
tecum for the SALNs and personal documents of Justice Roland B.
Jurado of the SB. The resolution also directed the Ombudsman to
forward to the Court any complaint and/or derogatory report against
Justice Roland B. Jurado, in consonance with the doctrine laid down
in Caiobes v. Ombudsman.42 Upon compliance by the Ombudsman,
the Court, in its Resolution43dated February 2, 2010, docketed this
matter as a regular administrative complaint.44
Also, considering the development in Impeachment Case No. 0022011 against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, the Court, on January
24, 2012, resolved to consider moot the Subpoena Ad Testificandum
Et Duces Tecum issued by the Senate impeachment court.45
In resolving the remaining pending incidents, the Court, on January
17, 2012 required the CA, the SB, the CTA, the Philippine Judges
Association, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the

Philippines, the Philippine Trial Judges League, and the Philippine

Women Judges Association (PWJA), to file their respective
comments.
In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the abovementioned courts and the various judges associations that while the
Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to
matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the
independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition
to the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being
expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the
various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in
accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the
Judiciary.
After a review of the matters at hand, it is apparent that the matter
raised for consideration of the Court is not a novel one. As early as
1989, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the matter of SALN
disclosure in Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino,46 where the Court
denied the request of Atty. Alejandrino for the SALNs of the Justices
of the Court due to a "plainly discernible" improper motive.
Aggrieved by an adverse decision of the Court, he accused the
Justices of patent partiality and alluded that they enjoyed an early
Christmas as a result of the decision promulgated by the Court.
Atty. Alejandrino even singled out the Justices who took part in the
decision and conspicuously excluded the others who, for one reason
or another, abstained from voting therein. While the Court
expressed its willingness to have the Clerk of Court furnish copies of
the SALN of any of its members, it however, noted that requests for
SALNs must be made under circumstances that must not endanger,
diminish or destroy the independence, and objectivity of the
members of the Judiciary in the performance of their judicial
functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions,
kidnapping, extortion, blackmail or other untoward incidents. Thus,
in order to give meaning to the constitutional right of the people to
have access to information on matters of public concern, the Court
laid down the guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus:

1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of

any Justice or Judge shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be
(Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the purpose of the
request.
2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important
as the right to information which is subject to the limitations
provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and
just adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of
deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely
available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a
litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the
court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed
matter will come before it under circumstances from which it may,
also reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good
faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for information and,
with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to
warn the court of the unpleasant consequences of an adverse
judgment, the request may be denied.
3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the
person making the request and the request for information appears
to be a "fishing expedition" intended to harass or get back at the
Judge, the request may be denied.
4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or
where the nature of their work exposes Judges to assaults against
their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but
should be immediately reported to the military.
5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.
In the 1992 case of Re: Request for Certified True Copies of the
Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth,47 the request
was denied because the Court found that the purpose of the request
was to fish for information against certain members of the Judiciary.
In the same case, the Court resolved to authorize the Court
Administrator to act on all requests for copies of SALN, as well as
other papers on file with the 201 Personnel Records of lower court
judges and personnel, provided that there was a court subpoena

duly signed by the Presiding Judge in a pending criminal case

against a judge or personnel of the Judiciary. The Court added that
for requests made by the Office of the Ombudsman, the same must
be personally signed by the Ombudsman himself. Essentially, the
Court resolved that, in all instances, requests must conform to the
guidelines set in the Alejandrino case and that the documents or
papers requested for must be relevant and material to the case
being tried by the court or under investigation by the Ombudsman.
In 1993, the Court, in Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn
Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth of former Judge Luis
D. Dictado,48 ruled that the OCA may extend its granted authority to
retired members of the Judiciary.
With respect to investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman in a criminal case against a judge, the Court, in Maceda
v. Vasquez,49 upheld its constitutional duty to exercise supervision
over all inferior courts and ruled that an investigation by the Office
of the Ombudsman without prior referral of the criminal case to the
Court was an encroachment of a constitutional duty that ran afoul to
the doctrine of separation of powers. This pronouncement was
further amplified in the abovementioned case of Caiobes. Thus:
x x x Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the
Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to
have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending
with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would
not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give
due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of
the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter
is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities

but also administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case

of Maceda v. Vasquez (221 SCRA 464[1993]).
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that the case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which
impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the
Constitution is relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN and
other documents of public officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional
provision, the Court, in the landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte,
Jr.,50 elucidated on the import of the right to information in this
wise:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of
the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information
on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey

to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words
if access to such information of public concern is denied x x x.
x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government. (Emphases supplied)
In Baldoza v. Dimaano,51 the importance of the said right was
pragmatically explicated:
The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of
the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if
they are denied access to information of general interest.
Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is
interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law.
Thus, while "public concern" like "public interest" eludes exact
definition and has been said to embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because such
matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,52 the
Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the
information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and
interest. In other words, a "duty to disclose" sprang from the "right
to know." Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command
while the latter is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of
members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in
the manner provided by law:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of

office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In
the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. [Emphasis
supplied]
This Constitutional duty is echoed and particularized in a statutory
creation of Congress: Republic Act No. 6713, also known as "Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees":53
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and
employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,
their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall
file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed
value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks,
stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;

(e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file
the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30)
days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary
authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate
government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and
also their business interests and financial connections in previous
years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any
office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may
file the required statements jointly or separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall be
filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national
office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of
the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy
Ombudsman in their respective regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said
ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of
every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best
of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in
the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information,
with its companion right of access to official records, is not
absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution
also provides that the peoples right to know is limited to "matters
of public concern" and is further subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
Jurisprudence54 has provided the following limitations to that right:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade
secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4)
other confidential information such as confidential or classified
information officially known to public officers and employees by
reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against
access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is
undoubtedly subject to regulation.
In this regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the
limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of
government officials and employees, viz:
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed
under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable
hours.

(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or

reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they are
filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to
pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing
of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the
public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement.
After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in
an ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or
use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general public.
Moreover, the following provisions in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 provide:
Rule IV
Transparency of Transactions and Access to Information
xxxx
Section 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official
information, records or documents to any requesting public, except
if:
(a) such information, record or document must be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or security or the conduct of foreign
affairs;
(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of an individual in
imminent danger;

(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the

concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions as may
be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document compromises drafts or
decisions, orders, rulings, policy, decisions, memoranda, etc;
(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature where
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy;
(f) it would disclose investigatory records complied for law
enforcement purposes, or information which if written would be
contained in such records or information would (i) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (ii) deprive a person of a right to a fair
trial or an impartial adjudication, (iii) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by
the confidential source, or (iv) unjustifiably disclose investigative
techniques and procedures; or
(g) it would disclose information the premature disclosure of which
would (i) in the case of a department, office or agency which agency
regulates currencies, securities, commodities, of financial
institutions, be likely to lead to significant financial speculation in
currencies, securities, or commodities or significantly endanger the
stability of any financial institution, or (ii) in the case of any
department, office or agency be likely or significantly to frustrate
implementation of a proposed official action, except that
subparagraph (f) (ii) shall not apply in any instance where the
department, office or agency has already disclosed to the public the
content or nature of its proposed action, or where the department,
office or agency is required by law to make such disclosure on its
own initiative prior to taking final official action on such proposal.
xxxx
Rule VI
Duties of Public Officials and Employees

Section 6. All public documents must be made accessible to, and

readily available for inspection by, the public during working hours,
except those provided in Section 3, Rule IV.
The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents
stems from the inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these
personal documents, to control its very office to the end that
damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the
right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured.55
In this connection, Section 11 of the same law provides for the
penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN and the
information contained therein, viz:
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee,
regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a
casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine
not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension
not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of
the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or
agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute.
Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos (P 5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the
court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative
proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a
public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories, with public officials or employees, in
violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as
the public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.

(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against

any person who obtains or uses a report for any purpose prohibited
by Section 8 (d) of this Act. The Court in which such action is
brought may assess against such person a penalty in any amount
not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P 25,000.00). If another
sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter
shall apply.
Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis--vis the various
requests made, the Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public
access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and
other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its
implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth
in the decretal portion.
The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates
regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their
requests for access to such personal information and their
publication. However, custodians of public documents must not
concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the
persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury
which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law.56 While public officers in the custody or
control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner
in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of
the records.57 After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. 58
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests contained in
the (1) Letter, dated July 30, 2009, of Rowena C. Paraan; (2) Letter,
dated August 13, 2009, of Karol M. Ilagan; (3) Letter, dated April 21,
2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project; (4)
Letter, filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim; (5) Letter, dated
August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo; (6) Letter, dated October

11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo; (7) Letters, all dated December 19,
2011, of Harvey S. Keh; (8) Letter, dated December 21, 2011, of
Glenda M. Gloria; (9) Letters, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe
Manalang; (10) Letter, dated December 19, 2011, of Malou
Mangahas; (11) Letter, dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo "Ka Nilo" H.
Baculo; (12) Letter, dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne EscaroAlegre; (13) Letter, dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana;
(14) Letter, dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo; (15)
undated Letter of Benise P. Balaoing; (16) Letter, dated April 27,
2012, of Maria A. Ressa; (17) Letter, dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann
A. Seir; (18) Letter, dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk
Editor of Solar Network, Inc.; (19) Letter, dated May 30, 2012, of
Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5; (20) Letter, dated May 31,
2002, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon of the Office of the Ombudsman;
and (21) Letter, dated June 7, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, insofar as
copies of the 2011 SALN, PDS, and CV of the Justices of the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of
Tax Appeals; Judges of lower courts; and other members of the
Judiciary, are concerned, subject to the limitations and prohibitions
provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations,
and the following guidelines:
1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the
Court Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their
respective heads of offices.
2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV
of the members, officials and employees of the Judiciary, and may
cover only previous records if so specifically requested and
considered as justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in
par. 1 above, under the terms of these guidelines and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.
3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the
Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the
Court En Banc.

4. Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific

purpose and their individual interests sought to be served; shall
state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated
purpose; and shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request
form secured from the SC website. The use of the information
secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the
media, their interests should go beyond pure or mere
curiosity.1wphi1
6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall
additionally be supported by proof under oath of their media
affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their
respective organizations as legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of
the media, must have no derogatory record of having misused any
requested information previously furnished to them.
The requesting parties shall complete their requests in accordance
with these guidelines. The custodians of these documents 59 (the
respective Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals for the Justices; and the
Court Administrator for the Judges of various trial courts) shall
preliminarily determine if the requests are not covered by the
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713 and its
implementing rules and regulations, and in accordance with the
aforecited guidelines. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall refer the
matter pertaining to Justices to the Court En Banc for final
determination.
SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 185124

January 25, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL

IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA),Petitioner,
vs.
RURAL BANK OF KABACAN, INC., LITTIE SARAH A. AGDEPPA, LEOSA
NANETTE AGDEPPA and MARCELINO VIERNES, MARGARITA TABOADA,

PORTIA CHARISMA RUTH ORTIZ, represented by LINA ERLINDA A.

ORTIZ and MARIO ORTIZ, JUAN MAMAC and GLORIA
MATAS, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the 12 August 2008
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and 22 October 2008 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 65196.
The assailed issuances affirmed with modification the 31 August
1999 "Judgment" promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, Judicial Region, Kabacan, Cotabato. The RTC had fixed
the just compensation for the value of the land and improvements
thereon that were expropriated by petitioner, but excluded the
value of the excavated soil. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is
represented in this case by the National Irrigation Authority (NIA).
The Facts
NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3601 on 22 June 1963. It is primarily
responsible for irrigation development and management in the
country. Its charter was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 552
on 11 September 1974 and P.D. 1702 on 17 July 1980. To carry out
its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to
exercise the power of eminent domain.1
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the
Malitubog-Marigadao Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it
filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the
expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a
total of 14,497.91 square meters.2 The case was docketed as Special
Civil Case No. 61 and was assigned to RTC-Branch 22. The affected
parcels of land were the following:
1) Lot No. 3080 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T61963 and registered under the Rural Bank of Kabacan

2) Lot No. 455 covered by TCT No. T-74516 and registered under
the names of RG May, Ronald and Rolando, all surnamed Lao
3) Lot No. 3039 registered under the name of Littie Sarah
Agdeppa3
On 11 July 1995, NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa
Nanette A. Agdeppa and Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of
Lot No. 3039.4
On 25 September 1995, NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to
allege properly the area sought to be expropriated, the exact
address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIA
further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of
the properties after depositing with the Philippine National Bank
the amount of P 19,246.58 representing the provisional value
thereof.5
On 31 October 1995, respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative
and Special Defenses and Counterclaim.6They alleged, inter alia,
that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land,
because it was not a sovereign political entity; that it was not
necessary to expropriate their properties, because there was an
abandoned government property adjacent to theirs, where the
project could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned
by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that NIAs valuation of their
expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the
improvements on the land that should have placed its value at P 5
million; and that NIA never negotiated with the landowners before
taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and
irreparable damages to their properties valued at P 250,000.7
On 11 September 1996, the RTC issued an Order forming a
committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the
expropriated properties to establish the just compensation to be
paid to the owners. The committee was composed of the Clerk of
Court of RTC Branch 22 as chairperson and two (2) members of the
parties to the case.8
On 20 September 1996, in response to the expropriation Complaint,
respondents-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda, Portia Charisma Ruth

Ortiz, Lina Erlinda Ortiz, Mario Ortiz, Juan Mamac and Gloria Matas
filed their Answer-in-Intervention with Affirmative and Special
Defenses and Counter-Claim. They essentially adopted the
allegations in the Answer of the other respondents and pointed out
that Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma Ruth Ortiz were the
new owners of Lot No. 3080, which the two acquired from the Rural
Bank of Kabacan. They further alleged that the four other
respondents-intervenors were joint tenants-cultivators of Lot Nos.
3080 and 3039.9
On 10 October 1996, the lower court issued an Order stating it
would issue a writ of possession in favor of NIA upon the
determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of
the expropriation proceedings.10 The lower court later amended its
ruling and, on 21 October 1996, issued a Writ of Possession in favor
of NIA.11
On 15 October 1996, the committee submitted a Commissioners
Report12 to the RTC stating the following observations:
In the process of ocular inspection, the following were jointly
observed:
1) The area that was already occupied is 6x200 meters which is
equivalent to 1,200 square meters;
2) The area which is to be occupied is 18,930 square meters, more
or less;
3) That the area to be occupied is fully planted by gmelina trees
with a spacing of 1x1 meters;
4) That the gmelina tress found in the area already occupied and
used for [the] road is planted with gmelina with spacing of 2x2 and
more or less one (1) year old;
5) That the gmelina trees found in the area to be occupied are
already four (4) years old;
6) That the number of banana clumps (is) two hundred twenty
(220);

7) That the number of coco trees found (is) fifteen (15). 13

The report, however, stated that the committee members could not
agree on the market value of the subject properties and
recommended the appointment of new independent commissioners
to replace the ones coming from the parties only.14 On 22 October
1996, the RTC issued an Order15 revoking the appointments of Atty.
Agdeppa and Engr. Mabang as members of the committee and, in
their stead, appointed Renato Sambrano, Assistant Provincial
Assessor of the Province of Cotabato; and Jack Tumacmol, Division
Chief of the Land Bank of the PhilippinesKidapawan Branch. 16
On 25 November 1996, the new committee submitted its
Commissioners Report to the lower court. The committee had
agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated
should be P 65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). As regards the improvement on
the properties, the report recommended the following
compensation:
a. P 200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4) years old
b. P 150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old
c. P 164 for each coco tree
d. P 270 for each banana clump17
On 03 December 1997, the committee submitted to the RTC another
report, which had adopted the first Committee Report, as well as
the formers 25 November 1996 report. However, the committee
added to its computation the value of the earthfill excavated from
portions of Lot Nos. 3039 and 3080.18 Petitioner objected to the
inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of
the value of the land.19
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 August 1999, the RTC promulgated its "Judgment," 20 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW of all the foregoing considerations, the court

finds and so holds that the commissioners have arrived at and were
able to determine the fair market value of the properties. The court
adopts their findings, and orders:
1. That 18,930 square meters of the lands owned by the defendants
is hereby expropriated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
through the National Irrigation Administration;
2. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants the amount
of P 1,230,450 for the 18,930 square meters expropriated in
proportion to the areas so expropriated;
3. That the NIA shall pay to the defendant-intervenors, owners of
Lot No. 3080, the sum of P 5,128,375.50, representing removed
earthfill;
4. That the NIA shall pay to the defendants, owners of Lot No. 3039,
the sum of P1,929,611.30 representing earthfill;
5. To pay to the defendants the sum of P 60,000 for the destroyed Gmelina trees (1 year old);
6. To pay to the defendants the sum of P 3,786,000.00 for the 4-year
old G-melina trees;
7. That NIA shall pay to the defendants the sum of P 2,460.00 for
the coconut trees;
8. That all payments intended for the defendant Rural Bank of
Kabacan shall be given to the defendants and intervenors who have
already acquired ownership over the land titled in the name of the
Bank.21
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
Decision of the RTC to the CA, which docketed the case as CA-G.R.
CV No. 65196. NIA assailed the trial courts adoption of the
Commissioners Report, which had determined the just
compensation to be awarded to the owners of the lands
expropriated. NIA also impugned as error the RTCs inclusion for
compensation of the excavated soil from the expropriated

properties. Finally, it disputed the trial courts Order to deliver the

payment intended for the Rural Bank of Kabacan to defendantsintervenors, who allegedly acquired ownership of the land still titled
in the name of the said rural bank.22
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 12 August 2008, the CA through its Twenty-First (21st) Division,
promulgated a Decision23 affirming with modification the RTC
Decision. It ruled that the committee tasked to determine the fair
market value of the properties and improvements for the purpose of
arriving at the just compensation, properly performed its function.
The appellate court noted that the committee members had
conducted ocular inspections of the area surrounding the
expropriated properties and made their recommendations based on
official documents from the BIR with regard to the zonal valuations
of the affected properties.24 The CA observed that, as far as the
valuation of the improvements on the properties was concerned, the
committee members took into consideration the provincial
assessors appraisal of the age of the trees, their productivity and
the inputs made.25 The appellate court further noted that despite
the Manifestation of NIA that it be allowed to present evidence to
rebut the recommendation of the committee on the valuations of
the expropriated properties, NIA failed to do so.26
The assailed CA Decision, however, deleted the inclusion of the
value of the soil excavated from the properties in the just
compensation. It ruled that the property owner was entitled to
compensation only for the value of the property at the time of the
taking.27 In the construction of irrigation projects, excavations are
necessary to build the canals, and the excavated soil cannot be
valued separately from the land expropriated. Thus, it concluded
that NIA, as the new owner of the affected properties, had the right
to enjoy and make use of the property, including the excavated soil,
pursuant to the latters objectives.28
Finally, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that recognized
defendants-intervenors Margarita Tabaoda and Portia Charisma
Ruth Ortiz as the new owners of Lot No. 3080 and held that they
were thus entitled to just compensation. The appellate court based

its conclusion on the non-participation by the Rural Bank of Kabacan

in the expropriation proceedings and the latters Manifestation that
it no longer owned Lot No. 3080.29
On 11 September 2008, the NIA through the OSG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 12 August 2008 Decision, but that motion
was denied.30
Aggrieved by the appellate courts Decision, NIA now comes to this
Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issues
The following are the issues proffered by petitioner:
The Court of appeals seriously erred in affirming the trial courts
finding of just compensation of the land and the improvements
thereon based on the report of the commissioners.
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the payment of just
compensation for lot no. 3080 should be made to respondents
margarita taboada and Portia charisma ruth Ortiz. 31
The Courts Ruling
On the first issue, the Petition is not meritorious.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's
loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent
to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full and ample.32 The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal
action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. 33

In the instant case, we affirm the appellate courts ruling that the
commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be
awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by
petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the
procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when
it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just
compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of
committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties,
subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas
affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on
the properties.34 When the members were unable to agree on the
valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court
selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the
task of determining the value of the land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection
of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to
determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties,
interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other
factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town
center.35 Further, the committee members also considered Provincial
Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of
Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the
properties and the improvements for taxation purposes.36
We can readily deduce from these established facts that the
committee members endeavored a rigorous process to determine
the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the
expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to,
oversimplify the process undertaken by the committee in arriving at
its recommendations, because these were not based on mere
conjectures and unreliable data.
In National Power Corporation v. Diato-Bernal,37 this Court
emphasized that the "just"-ness of the compensation could only be
attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the
value of the condemned property. The reliable and actual data we
referred to in that case were the sworn declarations of realtors in

the area, as well as tax declarations and zonal valuation from the
BIR. In disregarding the Committee Report assailed by the National
Power Corporation in the said case, we ruled thus:
It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and
devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First, the market values of
the subject propertys neighboring lots were mere estimates and
unsupported by any corroborative documents, such as sworn
declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or
zonal valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the
contiguous residential dwellings and commercial establishments.
The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the
community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of
respondents property. Finally, the market sales data and price
listings alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.
As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land
prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is
manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the commissioners
hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the
submission of the alleged "market sales data" and "price listings."
Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that the recommended just
compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than
two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is
settled that just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of
the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. Clearly, the
recommended just compensation in the commissioners report is
unacceptable.38
In the instant case, the committee members based their
recommendations on reliable data and, as aptly noted by the
appellate court, considered various factors that affected the value
of the land and the improvements.39
Petitioner, however, strongly objects to the CAs affirmation of the
trial courts adoption of Provincial Ordinance No. 173. The OSG, on

behalf of petitioner, strongly argues that the recommendations of

the committee formed by the trial court were inaccurate. The OSG
contends that the ordinance reflects the 1999 market values of real
properties in the Province of Cotabato, while the actual taking was
made in 1996.40
We are not persuaded.
We note that petitioner had ample opportunity to rebut the
testimonial, as well as documentary evidence presented by
respondents when the case was still on trial. It failed to do so,
however. The issue raised by petitioner was adequately addresses
by the CAs assailed Decision in this wise:
A thorough scrutiny of the records reveals that the second set of
Commissioners, with Atty. Marasigan still being the Chairperson and
Mr. Zambrano and Mr. Tomacmol as members, was not arbitrary and
capricious in performing the task assigned to them. We note that
these Commissioners were competent and disinterested persons
who were handpicked by the court a quo due to their expertise in
appraising the value of the land and the improvements thereon in
the province of Cotabato. They made a careful study of the area
affected by the expropriation, mindful of the fact that the value of
the land and its may be affected by many factors. The duly
appointed Commissioners made a second ocular inspection of the
subject area on 4 September 1997; went to the BIR office in order to
get the BIR zonal valuation of the properties located in Carmen,
Cotabato; interviewed adjacent property owners; and took into
consideration various factors such as the location of the land which
is just less than a kilometer away from the Poblacion and half a
kilometer away from the highway and the fact that it is near a
military reservation. With regard to the improvements, the
Commissioners took into consideration the valuation of the
Provincial Assessor, the age of the trees, and the inputs and their
productivity.
Thus, it could not be said that the schedule of market values in
Ordinance No. 173 was the sole basis of the Commissioners in
arriving at their valuation. Said ordinance merely gave credence to
their valuation which is comparable to the current price at that

time. Besides, Mr. Zambrano testified that the date used as bases
for Ordinance No. 173 were taken from 1995 to 1996.41
Moreover, factual findings of the CA are generally binding on this
Court. The rule admits of exceptions, though, such as when the
factual findings of the appellate court and the trial court are
contradictory, or when the findings are not supported by the
evidence on record.42 These exceptions, however, are not present in
the instant case.
Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, we affirm the findings of
the CA, which sustained the trial courts Decision adopting the
committees recommendations on the just compensation to be
awarded to herein respondents.
We also uphold the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the
value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation.
There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil
from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial
court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has
no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just
compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to
compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could
only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al.,43 we held that
rights over lands are indivisible, viz:
[C]onsequently, the CAs findings which upheld those of the trial
court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that
its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the
underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed. Moreover, the Court
sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion
of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is
drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface
and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works
or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws

and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements

of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the
subsoil under it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and

possession of their properties in the event the latter are reclassified
as mineral lands because real properties are characteristically
indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled
to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate
expropriation proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right extends
to the sub-soil insofar as necessary for their practical interests
serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would limit the
right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which such area
offers to the surface owners. Presumably, the landowners right
extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to
obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond
such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law.
Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial courts Decision when it
ruled thus:
We agree with the OSG that NIA, in the construction of irrigation
projects, must necessarily make excavations in order to build the
canals. Indeed it is preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not
only for the value of the land but also for the soil excavated from
such land when such excavation is a necessary phase in the building
of irrigation projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is
of no moment and is of no concern to the landowner who has been
paid the fair market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG,
the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the
surface area only. Further, NIA, now being the owner of the
expropriated property, has the right to enjoy and make use of the
property in accordance with its mandate and objectives as provided
by law. To sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the
landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time

when it was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or

just compensation, and would discourage the construction of
important public improvements.44
On the second issue, the Petition is meritorious.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the
payment of just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080
registered in the name of the Rural Bank of Kabacan to the
defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the
rural bank in the proceedings and the latters subsequent
Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of that lot. The
appellate court erred on this matter.
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the
expenditure of public funds.45 In this kind of proceeding, we require
trial courts to be more circumspect in their evaluation of the just
compensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated
property.46 Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on
the Rural Bank of Kabacans mere declaration of non-ownership and
non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to validate
defendants-intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment.
The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a
conveyance of real property to be valid.1wphi1 It should be noted
that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered by TCT No.
T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid,
the conveyance must be embodied in a public document47 and
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds where the property
is situated.48
We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found
no proof of conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot
No. 3080 from its registered owner, the Rural Bank of Kabacan, to
defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the
name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not
participate in the expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested
that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The trial court should have
nevertheless required the rural bank and the defendantsintervenors to show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance
of the subject lot. The court cannot rely on mere inference,

considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be

awarded solely owner based on the latters proof of ownership.
The trial court should have been guided by Rule 67, Section 9 of the
1997 Rules of Court, which provides thus:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership
of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit
of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled
thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or
sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use
or purpose if entry has already been made.
Hence, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts Order
to award payment of just compensation to the defendantsintervenors. There is doubt as to the real owner of Lot No. 3080.
Despite the fact that the lot was covered by TCT No. T-61963 and
was registered under its name, the Rural Bank of Kabacan
manifested that the owner of the lot was no longer the bank, but
the defendants-intervenors; however, it presented no proof as to
the conveyance thereof. In this regard, we deem it proper to remand
this case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to establish
the present owner of Lot No. 3080 who will be entitled to receive
the payment of just compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008
CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to
the defendants as owners of the expropriated properties and
deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for the reception of evidence to establish the present
owner of Lot No. 3080. No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206666

January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,

ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are (1) a Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 64,
in relation to Rule 65, both of the Revised Rules of Court, by Atty.
Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the
April 1, 20131 and April 23, 20132 Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En bane, respectively, in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), entitled "Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada" for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) a
Petition-in-Intervention3 filed by Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), wherein he
prays to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the
City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas (former President Estrada) disqualification to run
for and hold public office.
The Facts
The salient facts of the case are as follows:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
The dispositive part of the graft courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 26558 finding the accused, Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of PLUNDER, defined in and penalized by Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the
prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable

doubt, the Court finds the accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of plunder, and
accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion
Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in
accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of
sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as
long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the
forfeiture in favor of the government of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty[-]Two Million Seven
Hundred Ninety[-]One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), with
interest and income earned, inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00), deposited in the name and account
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty[-]Nine Million Pesos
(P189,000,000.00), inclusive of interests and income earned,
deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as
"Boracay Mansion" located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty.
Edward S. Serapio are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the
said accused or their duly authorized representatives upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and

subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise,

the hold-departure orders issued against the said accused are
hereby recalled and declared functus oficio.4
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by
way of pardon, to former President Estrada. The full text of said
pardon states:
MALACAAN PALACE
MANILA
By the President of the Philippines
PARDON
WHEREAS, this Administration has a policy of releasing inmates who
have reached the age of seventy (70),
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention for six
and a half years,
WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no
longer seek any elective position or office,
IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred upon me
by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency to JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of Plunder and
imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights.
The forfeitures imposed by the Sandiganbayan remain in force and
in full, including all writs and processes issued by the
Sandiganbayan in pursuance hereof, except for the bank account(s)
he owned before his tenure as President.
Upon acceptance of this pardon by JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, this
pardon shall take effect.
Given under my hand at the City of Manila, this 25th Day of October,
in the year of Our Lord, two thousand and seven.

Gloria M. Arroyo (sgd.)

By the President:
IGNACIO R. BUNYE (sgd.)
Acting Executive Secretary5
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada
"received and accepted"6 the pardon by affixing his signature beside
his handwritten notation thereon.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate
of Candidacy7 for the position of President. During that time, his
candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC: (1) SPA No. 09024 (DC), a "Petition to Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy" filed by Rev. Elly Velez B. Lao Pamatong, ESQ; (2) SPA
No. 09-028 (DC), a petition for "Disqualification as Presidential
Candidate" filed by Evilio C. Pormento (Pormento); and (3) SPA No.
09-104 (DC), a "Petition to Disqualify Estrada Ejercito, Joseph
M.from Running as President due to Constitutional Disqualification
and Creating Confusion to the Prejudice of Estrada, Mary Lou B"
filed by Mary Lou Estrada. In separate Resolutions8 dated January
20, 2010 by the COMELEC, Second Division, however, all three
petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i)
the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada
by former President Arroyo restored the formers right to vote and
be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for
reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections,
however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the
second highest number of votes.
Of the three petitioners above-mentioned, only Pormento sought
recourse to this Court and filed a petition for certiorari, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 191988, entitled "Atty. Evilio C. Pormento v.
Joseph ERAP Ejercito Estrada and Commission on Elections." But in
a Resolution9 dated August 31, 2010, the Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering
that former President Estrada lost his presidential bid.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured

into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, 10 this
time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of
Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before
the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC).
Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former
President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of
his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26558 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion
Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state
respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:
SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office,
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
(Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.12
The COMELEC, Second Division, opined that "[h]aving taken judicial
cognizance of the consolidated resolution for SPA No. 09-028 (DC)
and SPA No. 09-104 (DC) and the 10 May 2010 En Banc resolution
affirming it, this Commission will not be labor the controversy
further. Moreso, [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof
sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this
Commission declaring categorically that [former President
Estradas] right to seek public office has been effectively restored
by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo. Since this Commission has already spoken, it will no longer
engage in disquisitions of a settled matter lest indulged in wastage
of government resources."13
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was
denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013.
On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Courts jurisdiction by
filing the present petition. She presented five issues for the Courts
resolution, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT ESTRADAS PARDON WAS NOT CONDITIONAL;

II. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN
AS MAYOR OF MANILA UNDER SEC. 40 OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTCODE OF 1991 FOR HAVING BEEN CONVICTED OF
PLUNDER, AN OFFENSE INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
III. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION ON THE GROUND
THAT THE CASE INVOLVES THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES IT ALREADY
RESOLVED IN THE CASES OF "PORMENTO VS. ESTRADA", SPA NO. 09028 (DC) AND IN "RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ESTRADA EJERCITO,
JOSEPH M. FROM RUNNING AS PRESIDENT, ETC.," SPA NO. 09-104
(DC);
IV. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADAS PARDON NEITHER
RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED HIS PERPETUAL
ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE; and
V. RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
NOT HAVING EXERCISED ITS POWER TO MOTU PROPRIO DISQUALIFY
RESPONDENT ESTRADA IN THE FACE OF HIS PATENT
DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE BECAUSE OF HIS
PERPETUAL AND ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION TO SEEK PUBLIC
OFFICE AND TO VOTE RESULTING FROM HIS CRIMINAL CONVICTION
FOR PLUNDER.14
While this case was pending beforethe Court, or on May 13, 2013,
the elections were conducted as scheduled and former President
Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor.
The next day, the local board of canvassers proclaimed him as the
duly elected Mayor of the City of Manila.
On June 7, 2013, Lim, one of former President Estradas opponents
for the position of Mayor, moved for leave to intervene in this case.
His motion was granted by the Court in a Resolution15 dated June 25,
2013. Lim subscribed to Risos-Vidals theory that former President

Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold public office as the pardon
granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his perpetual
disqualification. Further, given that former President Estrada is
disqualified to run for and hold public office, all the votes obtained
by the latter should be declared stray, and, being the second placer
with 313,764 votes to his name, he (Lim) should be declared the
rightful winning candidate for the position of Mayor of the City of
Manila.
The Issue
Though raising five seemingly separate issues for resolution, the
petition filed by Risos-Vidal actually presents only one essential
question for resolution by the Court, that is, whether or not the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is
qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the
pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
In her petition, Risos-Vidal starts her discussion by pointing out that
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was conditional as
evidenced by the latters express acceptance thereof. The
"acceptance," she claims, is an indication of the conditional natureof
the pardon, with the condition being embodied in the third Whereas
Clause of the pardon, i.e., "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has
publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office."
She explains that the aforementioned commitment was what
impelled former President Arroyo to pardon former President
Estrada, without it, the clemency would not have been extended.
And any breach thereof, that is, whenformer President Estrada filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for President and Mayor of the City of
Manila, he breached the condition of the pardon; hence, "he ought
to be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence x x x and disqualifies him as a candidate for the mayoralty
[position] of Manila."16
Nonetheless, Risos-Vidal clarifies that the fundamental basis upon
which former President Estrada mustbe disqualified from running
for and holding public elective office is actually the proscription
found in Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 ofthe OEC.

She argues that the crime of plunder is both an offense punishable

by imprisonment of one year or more and involving moral turpitude;
such that former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for
and hold public elective office.
Even with the pardon granted to former President Estrada, however,
Risos-Vidal insists that the same did not operate to make available
to former President Estrada the exception provided under Section
12 of the OEC, the pardon being merely conditional and not absolute
or plenary. Moreover, Risos-Vidal puts a premium on the ostensible
requirements provided under Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their
accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases
supplied.)
She avers that in view of the foregoing provisions of law, it is not
enough that a pardon makes a general statement that such pardon
carries with it the restoration of civil and political rights. By virtue
of Articles 36 and 41, a pardon restoring civil and political rights
without categorically making mention what specific civil and
political rights are restored "shall not work to restore the right to
hold public office, or the right of suffrage; nor shall it remit the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification for the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal."17 In other words, she considers the above

constraints as mandatory requirements that shun a general or

implied restoration of civil and political rights in pardons.
Risos-Vidal cites the concurring opinions of Associate Justices
Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P. Feliciano in Monsanto v.
Factoran, Jr.18 to endorse her position that "[t]he restoration of the
right to hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason
of conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot
be left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be
statedin express, explicit, positive and specific language."
Applying Monsantoto former President Estradas case, Risos-Vidal
reckons that "such express restoration is further demanded by the
existence of the condition in the [third] [W]hereas [C]lause of the
pardon x x x indubitably indicating that the privilege to hold public
office was not restored to him."19
On the other hand, the Office ofthe Solicitor General (OSG) for
public respondent COMELEC, maintains that "the issue of whether or
not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his
right to run for public office had already been passed upon by public
respondent COMELEC way back in 2010 via its rulings in SPA Nos.
09-024, 09-028 and 09-104, there is no cogent reason for it to
reverse its standing pronouncement and declare [former President
Estrada] disqualified to run and be voted as mayor of the City of
Manila in the absence of any new argument that would warrant its
reversal. To be sure, public respondent COMELEC correctly exercised
its discretion in taking judicial cognizance of the aforesaid rulings
which are known toit and which can be verified from its own
records, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
on the courts discretionary power to take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, orare capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to them because of their
judicial functions."20
Further, the OSG contends that "[w]hile at first glance, it is apparent
that [former President Estradas] conviction for plunder disqualifies
him from running as mayor of Manila under Section 40 of the [LGC],
the subsequent grant of pardon to him, however, effectively
restored his right to run for any public office."21 The restoration of

his right to run for any public office is the exception to the
prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC, as provided under Section
12 of the OEC. As to the seeming requirement of Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., the express restoration/remission of
a particular right to be stated in the pardon, the OSG asserts that
"an airtight and rigid interpretation of Article 36 and Article 41 of
the [RPC] x x x would be stretching too much the clear and plain
meaning of the aforesaid provisions."22 Lastly, taking into
consideration the third Whereas Clause of the pardon granted to
former President Estrada, the OSG supports the position that it "is
not an integral part of the decree of the pardon and cannot
therefore serve to restrict its effectivity."23
Thus, the OSG concludes that the "COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions."24
For his part, former President Estrada presents the following
significant arguments to defend his stay in office: that "the factual
findings of public respondent COMELEC, the Constitutional body
mandated to administer and enforce all laws relative to the conduct
of the elections, [relative to the absoluteness of the pardon, the
effects thereof, and the eligibility of former President Estrada to
seek public elective office] are binding [and conclusive] on this
Honorable Supreme Court;" that he "was granted an absolute
pardon and thereby restored to his full civil and political rights,
including the right to seek public elective office such as the mayoral
(sic) position in the City of Manila;" that "the majority decision in
the case of Salvacion A. Monsanto v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,which
was erroneously cited by both Vidal and Lim as authority for their
respective claims, x x x reveal that there was no discussion
whatsoever in the ratio decidendi of the Monsanto case as to the
alleged necessity for an expressed restoration of the right to hold
public office in the pardon as a legal prerequisite to remove the
subject perpetual special disqualification;" that moreover, the
"principal question raised in this Monsanto case is whether or not a
public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement toher former position
without need of a new appointment;" that his "expressed
acceptance [of the pardon] is not proof that the pardon extended to

[him] is conditional and not absolute;" that this case is a mere

rehash of the casesfiled against him during his candidacy for
President back in 2009-2010; that Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code "cannot abridge or diminish the pardoning power of the
President expressly granted by the Constitution;" that the text of
the pardon granted to him substantially, if not fully, complied with
the requirement posed by Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code as it
was categorically stated in the said document that he was "restored
to his civil and political rights;" that since pardon is an act of grace,
it must be construed favorably in favor of the grantee;25 and that his
disqualification will result in massive disenfranchisement of the
hundreds of thousands of Manileos who voted for him.26
The Court's Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored allhis civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the
petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former
President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored
on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that
is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of
one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President
Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective
office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that
includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil
and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President
Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May
13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in
2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did
not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual

absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former

President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public office.
She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the
foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to
and accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify
which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former
President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former
President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto
otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other
acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence
for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted
by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the
only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain
to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet
resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of

election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable

recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be
argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to
delimit the pardoning power of the President.
In Cristobal v. Labrador27 and Pelobello v. Palatino,28 which were
decided under the 1935 Constitution,wherein the provision granting
pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with
what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by
the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.29 thereby establishing
that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action."
Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that
the exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court,
except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the
Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the
Presidents power of pardon by acts of Congress, specifically
through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming
majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they flatly
rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning
power of the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and
corruption" that would be enumerated and defined by Congress
through the enactment of a law. The following is the pertinent
portion lifted from the Record of the Commission (Vol. II):
MR. ROMULO. I ask that Commissioner Tan be recognized to
introduce an amendment on the same section.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tan is recognized.
SR. TAN. Madam President, lines 7 to 9 state:
However, the power to grant executive clemency for violations of
corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation.

I suggest that this be deletedon the grounds that, first, violations of

corrupt practices may include a very little offense like stealing P10;
second, which I think is more important, I get the impression,
rightly or wrongly, that subconsciously we are drafting a
constitution on the premise that all our future Presidents will bebad
and dishonest and, consequently, their acts will be lacking in
wisdom. Therefore, this Article seems to contribute towards the
creation of an anti-President Constitution or a President with vast
responsibilities but no corresponding power except to declare
martial law. Therefore, I request that these lines be deleted.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President,may the Committee react to that?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, please.
MR. REGALADO. This was inserted here on the resolution of
Commissioner Davide because of the fact that similar to the
provisions on the Commission on Elections, the recommendation of
that Commission is required before executive clemency isgranted
because violations of the election laws go into the very political life
of the country.
With respect to violations of our Corrupt Practices Law, we felt that
it is also necessary to have that subjected to the same condition
because violation of our Corrupt Practices Law may be of such
magnitude as to affect the very economic systemof the country.
Nevertheless, as a compromise, we provided here that it will be the
Congress that will provide for the classification as to which
convictions will still require prior recommendation; after all, the
Congress could take into account whether or not the violation of the
Corrupt Practices Law is of such magnitude as to affect the
economic life of the country, if it is in the millions or billions of
dollars. But I assume the Congress in its collective wisdom will
exclude those petty crimes of corruption as not to require any
further stricture on the exercise of executive clemency because, of
course, there is a whale of a difference if we consider a lowly clerk
committing malversation of government property or funds involving
one hundred pesos. But then, we also anticipate the possibility that
the corrupt practice of a public officer is of such magnitude as to
have virtually drained a substantial portion of the treasury, and

then he goes through all the judicial processes and later on, a
President who may have close connections with him or out of
improvident compassion may grant clemency under such conditions.
That is why we left it to Congress to provide and make a
classification based on substantial distinctions between a minor act
of corruption or an act of substantial proportions. SR. TAN. So, why
do we not just insert the word GROSS or GRAVE before the word
"violations"?
MR. REGALADO. We feel that Congress can make a better distinction
because "GRAVE" or "GROSS" can be misconstrued by putting it
purely as a policy.
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. May I speak in favor of the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDENT. Please proceed.
MR. RODRIGO. The power to grant executive clemency is essentially
an executive power, and that is precisely why it is called executive
clemency. In this sentence, which the amendment seeks to delete,
an exception is being made. Congress, which is the legislative arm,
is allowed to intrude into this prerogative of the executive. Then it
limits the power of Congress to subtract from this prerogative of the
President to grant executive clemency by limiting the power of
Congress to only corrupt practices laws. There are many other
crimes more serious than these. Under this amendment, Congress
cannot limit the power of executive clemency in cases of drug
addiction and drug pushing which are very, very serious crimes that
can endanger the State; also, rape with murder, kidnapping and
treason. Aside from the fact that it is a derogation of the power of
the President to grant executive clemency, it is also defective in
that it singles out just one kind of crime. There are far more serious
crimes which are not included.
MR. REGALADO. I will just make one observation on that. We admit
that the pardoning power is anexecutive power. But even in the
provisions on the COMELEC, one will notice that constitutionally, it

is required that there be a favorable recommendation by the

Commission on Elections for any violation of election laws.
At any rate, Commissioner Davide, as the principal proponent of
that and as a member of the Committee, has explained in the
committee meetings we had why he sought the inclusion of this
particular provision. May we call on Commissioner Davide to state
his position.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I am constrained to rise to object to the proposal. We
have just approved the Article on Accountability of Public Officers.
Under it, it is mandated that a public office is a public trust, and all
government officers are under obligation to observe the utmost of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, to lead modest lives
and to act with patriotism and justice.
In all cases, therefore, which would go into the verycore of the
concept that a public office is a public trust, the violation is itself a
violation not only of the economy but the moral fabric of public
officials. And that is the reason we now want that if there is any
conviction for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which, in effect, is a violation of the public trust character of
the public office, no pardon shall be extended to the offender,
unless some limitations are imposed.
Originally, my limitation was, it should be with the concurrence of
the convicting court, but the Committee left it entirely to the
legislature to formulate the mechanics at trying, probably, to
distinguish between grave and less grave or serious cases of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Perhaps this is
now the best time, since we have strengthened the Article on
Accountability of Public Officers, to accompany it with a mandate
that the Presidents right to grant executive clemency for offenders
or violators of laws relating to the concept of a public office may be
limited by Congress itself.
MR. SARMIENTO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Sarmiento is recognized.

MR. SARMIENTO. May I briefly speak in favor of the amendment by
deletion.
Madam President, over and over again, we have been saying and
arguing before this Constitutional Commission that we are
emasculating the powers of the presidency, and this provision to me
is another clear example of that. So, I speak against this provision.
Even the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions do not provide for this
kind of provision.
I am supporting the amendment by deletion of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Tingson would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Tingson is recognized.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, I am also in favor of the
amendment by deletion because I am in sympathy with the stand of
Commissioner Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo. I do believe and we should
remember that above all the elected or appointed officers of our
Republic, the leader is the President. I believe that the country will
be as the President is, and if we systematically emasculate the
power of this presidency, the time may come whenhe will be also
handcuffed that he will no longer be able to act like he should be
acting.
So, Madam President, I am in favor of the deletion of this particular
line.
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Colayco would like to be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Colayco is recognized.
MR. COLAYCO. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I seldom rise here to object to or to commend or to recommend the
approval of proposals, but now I find that the proposal of
Commissioner Tan is worthy of approval of this body.

Why are we singling out this particular offense? There are other
crimes which cast a bigger blot on the moral character of the public
officials.
Finally, this body should not be the first one to limit the almost
absolute power of our Chief Executive in deciding whether to
pardon, to reprieve or to commute the sentence rendered by the
court.
I thank you.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now?
MR. ROMULO. Commissioner Padilla would like to be recognized, and
after him will be Commissioner Natividad.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. Only one sentence, Madam President. The
Sandiganbayan has been called the Anti-Graft Court, so if this is
allowed to stay, it would mean that the Presidents power togrant
pardon or reprieve will be limited to the cases decided by the AntiGraft Court, when as already stated, there are many provisions
inthe Revised Penal Code that penalize more serious offenses.
Moreover, when there is a judgment of conviction and the case
merits the consideration of the exercise of executive clemency,
usually under Article V of the Revised Penal Code the judge will
recommend such exercise of clemency. And so, I am in favor of the
amendment proposed by Commissioner Tan for the deletion of this
last sentence in Section 17.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we ready to vote now, Mr. Floor Leader?
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one more.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Natividad is recognized.
MR. NATIVIDAD. I am also against this provision which will again
chip more powers from the President. In case of other criminals
convicted in our society, we extend probation to them while in this

case, they have already been convicted and we offer mercy. The
only way we can offer mercy to them is through this executive
clemency extended to them by the President. If we still close this
avenue to them, they would be prejudiced even worse than the
murderers and the more vicious killers in our society. I do not think
they deserve this opprobrium and punishment under the new
Constitution.
I am in favor of the proposed amendment of Commissioner Tan.
MR. ROMULO. We are ready tovote, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Is this accepted by the Committee?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee, Madam President, prefers to
submit this to the floor and also because of the objection of the
main proponent, Commissioner Davide. So we feel that the
Commissioners should vote on this question.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the proposed
amendment of Commissioner Tan to delete the last sentence of
Section 17 appearing on lines 7, 8 and 9, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few Members
raised their hand.)
The results show 34 votes in favor and 4 votes against; the
amendment is approved.30 (Emphases supplied.)
The proper interpretation of Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing pronouncements solidify the thesis that Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to
abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the
President to pardon persons convicted of violating penal statutes.

The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidals interpretation that the

said Articles contain specific textual commands which must be
strictly followed in order to free the beneficiary of presidential
grace from the disqualifications specifically prescribed by them.
Again, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects. A pardon shall not work the restoration
of the right to hold publicoffice, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
xxxx
ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal Their
accessory penalties. The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for
life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and
that of perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall
suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphases
supplied.)
A rigid and inflexible reading of the above provisions of law, as
proposed by Risos-Vidal, is unwarranted, especially so if it will
defeat or unduly restrict the power of the President to grant
executive clemency.
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba
legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should
be no departure.31 It is this Courts firm view that the phrase in the
presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President
Estrada "is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos Vidal
that there was no express remission and/or restoration of the rights

of suffrage and/or to hold public office in the pardon granted to

former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal
provisions must be followed by the President, as they do not
abridge or diminish the Presidents power to extend clemency. He
opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the Presidents
pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form.
They only provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned
with areas where or the instances when the President may grant
pardon; they are only concerned with how he or she is to exercise
such power so that no other governmental instrumentality needs to
intervene to give it full effect.
All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President
wishes to include in the pardon the restoration of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, or the remission of the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification,he or she should do so
expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or
her intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably.
To belabor the point, the President retains the power to make such
restoration or remission, subject to a prescription on the manner by
which he or she is to state it.32
With due respect, I disagree with the overbroad statement that
Congress may dictate as to how the President may exercise his/her
power of executive clemency. The form or manner by which the
President, or Congress for that matter, should exercise their
respective Constitutional powers or prerogatives cannot be
interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is
the essence of the principle of separation of powers deeply
ingrained in our system of government which "ordains that each of
the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere."33Moreso, this fundamental principle must be
observed if noncompliance with the form imposed by one branch on

a co-equal and coordinate branch will result into the diminution of

an exclusive Constitutional prerogative.
For this reason, Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should
be construed in a way that will give full effect to the executive
clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging in an overly
strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import
of the pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and
duly signed by the Chief Executive himself/herself. The said codal
provisions must be construed to harmonize the power of Congress
to define crimes and prescribe the penalties for such crimes and the
power of the President to grant executive clemency. All that the
said provisions impart is that the pardon of the principal penalty
does notcarry with it the remission of the accessory penalties unless
the President expressly includes said accessory penalties in the
pardon. It still recognizes the Presidential prerogative to grant
executive clemency and, specifically, to decide to pardon the
principal penalty while excluding its accessory penalties or to
pardon both. Thus, Articles 36 and 41 only clarify the effect of the
pardon so decided upon by the President on the penalties
imposedin accordance with law.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The
first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former
President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is
the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the textof the pardon
that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is

recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and
political rights.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as
follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of
suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided,
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where
they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession
in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license
or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office
in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned

officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens. (Emphases supplied.)
No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
to which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence
of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
xxxx
(b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Recently, in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections,35 the
Court unequivocally referred to the right to seek public elective
office as a political right, to wit:
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office
specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that
restores their right to run for public office. The petitioners failure
to comply there with in accordance with the exact tenor of the law,
rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet
to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is
ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public
elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right.
Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted

tohim, he regained his FULL civil and political rights including the
right to seek elective office.
On the other hand, the theory of Risos-Vidal goes beyond the plain
meaning of said penal provisions; and prescribes a formal
requirement that is not only unnecessary but, if insisted upon, could
be in derogation of the constitutional prohibition relative to the
principle that the exercise of presidential pardon cannot be affected
by legislative action.
Risos-Vidal relied heavily on the separate concurring opinions in
Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.36 to justify her argument that an absolute
pardon must expressly state that the right to hold public office has
been restored, and that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has been remitted.
This is incorrect.
Her reliance on said opinions is utterly misplaced. Although the
learned views of Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Florentino P.
Feliciano are to be respected, they do not form partof the
controlling doctrine nor to be considered part of the law of the land.
On the contrary, a careful reading of the majority opinion in
Monsanto, penned by no less than Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,
reveals no statement that denotes adherence to a stringent and
overly nuanced application of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code that will in effect require the President to use a
statutorily prescribed language in extending executive clemency,
even if the intent of the President can otherwise be deduced from
the text or words used in the pardon. Furthermore, as explained
above, the pardon here is consistent with, and not contrary to, the
provisions of Articles 36 and 41.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him.
Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running
for any elective local position. Risos-Vidal argues that former
President Estrada is disqualified under item (a), to wit:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving

moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence[.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 12 of the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but
it provides for an exception, to wit:
Section 12. Disqualifications. x x x unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphasis supplied.)
As earlier stated, Risos-Vidal maintains that former President
Estradas conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for
the elective local position of Mayor of the City of Manila under
Section 40(a) of the LGC. However, the subsequent absolute pardon
granted to former President Estrada effectively restored his right to
seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading Section
40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC.
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of
the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides
a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty.
In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been
granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run
for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
Take notice that the applicability of Section 12 of the OEC to
candidates running for local elective positions is not unprecedented.
In Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,37 the Court acknowledged
the aforementioned provision as one of the legal remedies that may
be availed of to disqualify a candidate in a local election filed any
day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not
later than the date of proclamation.38 The pertinent ruling in the
Jalosjos case is quoted as follows:
What is indisputably clear is that false material representation of
Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since
the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by
prision mayor, a petition under Section 12 ofthe Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be

properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his

petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly
provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to petitioner.39 (Emphasis supplied.)
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make
the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of
the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion
that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose
a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term
"civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates
that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." 40 Whereas
clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking,
they are not part of the operative language of the statute. 41 In this
case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone
operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
On this matter, the Court quotes with approval a relevant excerpt of
COMELEC Commissioner Maria Gracia Padacas separate concurring
opinion in the assailed April 1, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC in
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), which captured the essence of the legal effect
of preambular paragraphs/whereas clauses, viz:
The present dispute does not raise anything which the 20 January
2010 Resolution did not conclude upon. Here, Petitioner Risos-Vidal
raised the same argument with respect to the 3rd "whereas clause"
or preambular paragraph of the decree of pardon. It states that
"Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek

any elective position or office." On this contention, the undersigned

reiterates the ruling of the Commission that the 3rd preambular
paragraph does not have any legal or binding effect on the absolute
nature of the pardon extended by former President Arroyo to herein
Respondent. This ruling is consistent with the traditional and
customary usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case of
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court ruled on the
legal effect of preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses on
statutes. The Court stated, viz.:
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be
the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional
on Respondents promise never to seek a public office again, the
former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the
pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained
to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.42 (Emphasis supplied.)
Absent any contrary evidence, former President Arroyos silence on
former President Estradas decision torun for President in the May
2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the political
party of former President Arroyo, after the latters receipt and
acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore
him to his rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by
the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence
available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a detailed review
ofthe four corners of said document, nothing therein gives an iota of
intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a limitation,
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such
that the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public
office will result ina revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the

Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing

situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not
used as a condition to the efficacy orto delimit the scope of the
pardon.
Even if the Court were to subscribe to the view that the third
Whereas Clausewas one of the reasons to grant the pardon, the
pardon itself does not provide for the attendant consequence of the
breach thereof. This Court will be hard put to discern the resultant
effect of an eventual infringement. Just like it will be hard put to
determine which civil or political rights were restored if the Court
were to take the road suggested by Risos-Vidal that the statement
"[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights" excludes the
restoration of former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to
hold public office. The aforequoted text ofthe executive clemency
granted does not provide the Court with any guide asto how and
where to draw the line between the included and excluded political
rights.
Justice Leonen emphasizes the point that the ultimate issue for
resolution is not whether the pardon is contingent on the condition
that former President Estrada will not seek janother elective public
office, but it actually concerns the coverage of the pardon whether
the pardon granted to former President Estrada was so expansive as
to have restored all his political rights, inclusive of the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office. Justice Leonen is of the view that
the pardon in question is not absolute nor plenary in scope despite
the statement that former President Estrada is "hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," that is, the foregoing statement
restored to former President Estrada all his civil and political rights
except the rights denied to him by the unremitted penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification made up of, among others, the
rights of suffrage and to hold public office. He adds that had the
President chosen to be so expansive as to include the rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, she should have been more clear
on her intentions.
However, the statement "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," to the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute, meaning,

it was not only unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope, complete

and plenary in character, as the term "political rights"adverted to
has a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence.
With due respect, I disagree too with Justice Leonen that the
omission of the qualifying word "full" can be construed as excluding
the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office.
There appears to be no distinction as to the coverage of the term
"full political rights" and the term "political rights" used alone
without any qualification. How to ascribe to the latter term the
meaning that it is "partial" and not "full" defies ones
understanding. More so, it will be extremely difficult to identify
which of the political rights are restored by the pardon, when the
text of the latter is silent on this matter. Exceptions to the grant of
pardon cannot be presumed from the absence of the qualifying word
"full" when the pardon restored the "political rights" of former
President Estrada without any exclusion or reservation.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the
pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the
absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon
which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited
pardon.
To reiterate, insofar as its coverageis concerned, the text of the
pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the assertions of Risos-Vidal,
the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
The Court has consistently held that a petition for certiorariagainst
actions of the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to patentand substantial denial of due
process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent
in matters falling within its domain.43

As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the

arbitrary exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal
hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
such an abuse must be patent and gross.44
The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately
demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a "whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion orrefusal to
perform a positive duty enjoined by law" or were so "patent and
gross" as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
On the foregoing premises and conclusions, this Court finds it
unnecessary to separately discuss Lim's petition-in-intervention,
which substantially presented the same arguments as Risos-Vidal's
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and petition-inintervention
are DISMISSED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections, Second Division, and the Resolution dated
April 23, 2013 of the Commission on Elections, En bane, both in SPA
No. 13-211 (DC), are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179736

June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,

vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and non-interference demands respect."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court assails the July 10, 2007 Decision3and the September 11, 2007
Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01473.
Factual Antecedents
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28,
against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel
of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6 that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc.
(Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop
building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005,
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages
with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is
adjacent to petitioners property;9 that the court, in that case,
denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to
support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up
and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going
construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners
right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be
ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined
from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they

did not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order
their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction.17 They
also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere
stockholders.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the
application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and
approval of a bond by petitioners, which the Court sets
at P50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue against the
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are
hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that
they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side
of petitioners lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the
back where petitioners property can no longer be viewed within a
distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec,
facing the road.
IT IS SO ORDERED.20
Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the
same in its Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance
with the Order dated 18 October 2005.
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition
for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed
to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. 27 The
CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of
the controversy is not used as a residence. 28 The CA alsosaid that
since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not
have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere
stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The
assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued
by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.32
Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:
I.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005
AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
II.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO
VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS
CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED
SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD

CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING,

THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.
III.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT
AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE
CORPORATE VEIL.
IV.
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED
THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF
RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND
CONSIDERATION.33
Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation
of petitioners right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the
proper parties to this suit.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction because respondents installation of a
stationary camera directly facing petitioners property and a
revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same
property constitutes a violation of petitioners right to
privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which
enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of
others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of
anothers residence, petitioners opine that it includes business
offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming
arguendo that petitioners property is used for business, it is still
covered by the said provision.37
As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this
case, petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the
same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldos

corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the
real owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras
were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular
inspection conducted by the court.39
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that
petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property
involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that
they had nothing to do with the installation of the video surveillance
cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of
the building,41 as additional security for its building.42 Hence, they
were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
Our Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our
laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons
ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted
interference by the public in matters in which the public is not
necessarily concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the
right to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and
protects them against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the
State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their
houses. No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding
social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1)
of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded

therefrom and only certain individuals
are allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an
individuals right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against
abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It
states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
xxxx
This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his
right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It
includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively
into the residence of another without the consent of the
latter."49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is
entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M.
Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is
entitled to privacy, because the law covers also "similar acts." A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to
enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may
extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or
deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers

residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations

which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his
right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application
of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
The "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test is used to determine
whether there is a violation of the right
to privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v.
Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy;
and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of
privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends
on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places
where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected,
was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the
privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act
No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary
Injunction, ruled that:
After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application
for a temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building,

violated the right of privacy of petitioners, who are the owners of

the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents
property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development
and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of
the land of petitioners.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why
petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving
camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going
construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of
the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in
setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory
premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their
properties at the back. Respondents camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do
that over the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of
petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a
business office or as a residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners property or
covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a
clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance
of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that
the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part
of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed
by the court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of
discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not
entitled to an injunctive writ.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the
proper parties to this suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a
correlative legal obligation to redress a
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of

the defendant's act or omission which

had violated the legal right of the
former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. A real party-in-interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation
to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the
defendants act or omission which had violated the legal right of the
former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA
reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not
have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning,
however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the
registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that
they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance
cameras.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed
the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which
could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the
hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill
testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance
cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not
seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for
mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents
before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has
already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family
concerning the boundaries of their respective properties. 62 With
these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents
are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and

distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a familyowned corporation managed by the Choachuy family. 63
Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their
claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to
enter the compound of Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The
counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap
inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the
set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And
when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated
October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is
that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras
are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the
personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that
respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a
shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing,
we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6,
200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in
Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202692

November 12, 2014

EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under
Rule 45 are the December 28, 2011 Decision1and July 18, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567.
The assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-27010708 which, in turn, affirmed that of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco)
guilty of drunk driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section
56(f) of Republic Act No. (RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of
Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed against
petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to
Branch 14 of that court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated
informations, docketed as Crim. Case No. 052527-CN for the first
offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively
read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then the driver and owner of a car, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and operate the
same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city,
while under the influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of
Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully resist
and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio Paulino, SPO4
Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the
Philippine National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified
and appointed, and while in the actual performance of their official
duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving
and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing

him under arrest for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as
falling under, thus to be governed by, the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both
charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution
presented in evidence the oral testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino
(Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos
Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while in the witness
box, among which was Exh. "A", with sub-markings, the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest10executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other police
officers. The defenses witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of
Sydeco himself, his wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecutions version of the incident, as summarized in and/or
as may be deduced from, the CA decision now on appeal is as
follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4
Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz III and another officer were manning a
checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner Quirino Ave.,
Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they
spotted a swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE988. Petitioner was behind the wheel. The team members, all
inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to
alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station
situated nearby,before he resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who the
policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being drunk and
insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner
started talking rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp.
Aguilar blurting: "Pg ina mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli." Atthat
remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that
his team had seen him swerving and driving under the influence of
liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who put up resistance. Despite

petitioners efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually

succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng
Maynila where he was examined and found to be positive of
alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that hospital,
marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate
Police Station for disposition.12 Petitioner, on the other hand,
claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question, adding in this
regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries,
robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his
Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-Affidavit14 appended thereto,
petitioner averred that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he
together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress,
respectively, in his restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay
City, were on the way home from on board his pick-up when
signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred
to above. Their flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and
its occupants, the policemen then asked the petitioner to open the
vehicles door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive
he refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience.
Instead, he opened the vehicle window, uttering, "plain view lang
boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of the
policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner
that he was drunk, pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in
the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioners explanation about being sober
and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant
was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on
the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at the same time blurting,
"Pg ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang
sinasabi." The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the drivers
seat and pushed him into the police mobile car, whereupon he,
petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The policemen
then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they
succeeded in securing a medical certificate under the signature of
one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of
alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol
breath examination was conducted. He was thereafter detained
from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the afternoon of June
13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo
actual medical examination where the resulting medical certificate
indicated that he has sustained physical injuries but negative for

alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his ComplaintAffidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police
officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of
R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place the
erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his drivers license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner
guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, his
conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal Case
No. 052527-CN; and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and
pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) for Criminal Case No.
052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land
Transportation Office the result of this case, stating further the data
required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions
that the MeTC erred in: 1) according credit to the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records custodian of Ospital
ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing
physician, and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of
arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4 Efren Bodino, and PO3
Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in
court to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner, addressing the first issue thus raised in

the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucatings failure to testify

relative to petitioners alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical
certificate, is not fatal as such testimony would only serve to
corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino, noting
thatunder the Rules of Court,17 observations of the police officers
regarding the petitioners behavior would suffice to support the
conclusion of the latters drunken state on the day he was
apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution
has the discretion as to how many witnesses it needs to present
before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single credible
witness as to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to
warrant a conviction. The RTC cited established
jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not
necessarily with the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered." Following the denial by the RTC of his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a petition
for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a
Decision dated December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a
Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt affirmed that of the
RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 22, 2010 of the RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties by the police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by
Dr. Harvey Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the
Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to
the trial courts findings of fact does hold sway when, as here, it

appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof weight and

substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in
a case under appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal
prosecutions throws the whole case wide open for review, inclusive
of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace
officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and
employees are bound to discharge their duties with prudence,
caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject
area and during the period material appearednot to have performed
their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of the norm
expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioners purported
swerving vehicle. They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed.
But they did not demand the presentation of the drivers license
orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as
required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which
specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License. Law enforcement
and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director
shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations x x x confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and
issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the Bureau therefor which
shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said
receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and
shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.) Instead of
requiring the vehicles occupants to answer one or two routinary
questions out of respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of
Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists right of "free passage
without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged
petitioner in what appears to be an unnecessary conversation and
when utterances were made doubtless not to their liking, they
ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing
three (3) empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that
petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. Then
petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark

apparently pissed the police officers off no end as one of them

immediately lashed at petitioner and his companions as "mga
lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous
response to an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo
Pano, graphically described this particular event in his sinumpaang
salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis,
nag flash light sa loob ng sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at
buksan ang pintuan ng nasabing sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at
pinigilan niya ako at ang aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG
BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG" pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as
isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO HETO MAY CASE PA
KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang
kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan habang ang isang pulis ang biglang
sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan sa ulo si
Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit
ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril. x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya
aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at nang
mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada
habang hawak ang kanilang baril.24
Panos above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the
arresting officers themselves who admitted that they originally had
no intention to search the vehicle in question nor subject its
occupants to a body search. The officers wrote in their
aforementioned joint affidavit:
xxxx

That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for

violation of RA 4136 (Driving under the influence of liquor), and
violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x committed
on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x
He began to raise his voice and converse with us rudely without
considering that we are in uniform, on duty and performing our job.
P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and
driving under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting
him to our police station in which our intention was to make him
rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x (Emphasis
added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to
stop, to be precise, petitioner has not committed any crime or
suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily
understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a
lane to another or to turn aside from a direct course of action or
movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a sign
indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes
the nature ofreckless driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. Noperson shall operate a motor
vehicle on any highway recklessly or without reasonable caution
considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility
and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the
atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the
safetyor rights of any person or so as to cause excessive or
unreasonable damage to the highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let
alone constitutive of reckless driving. To constitute the offense of
reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere
negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and
wantondisregard of the consequences is required.26 Nothing in the
records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or overtaking
zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred
at around 3:00 a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb and property
to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the
petitioners car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as

required under Section 29 of RA 4136. Instead, they inspected the

vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step down of
their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk
mainly because of the cases of beer found at the trunk of the
vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place what exactly prompted
you to arrest the accused (sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section
56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at
yung sasakyan ay hindi maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you
spotted the vehicle of the accused swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the
vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya
pinahihinto?"
xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the
confrontational stand-off between the police team, on one hand,
and petitioner on the other, was the latters refusal to get off of the
vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence
on a plain view search only. Petitioners twin gestures cannot
plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. 28 He may have

sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this

would make him a criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner
has not, when flagged down, committed a crime or performed an
overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He
did not try to avoid the road block established. He came to a full
stop when so required to stop. The two key elements of resistance
and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are:
(1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender;
and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person
or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending
team are persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioners act of exercising
ones right against unreasonable searches30 to be conducted in the
middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience
let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation of Art. 151 of the
RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and under
dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the
rights it guarantees, but in the courage of the people to assert and
use them whenever they are ignored or worse infringed.31 Moreover,
there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the
checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner and his
companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle and body search.
And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of
the occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence
refers to as a "stop and frisk" action. As SPO4 Bodino no less
testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the
vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of
their intention toinvite him to Station 9 so he could rest before he
resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the
apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their
duties, dragged the petitioner out of the vehicle and, in the process
of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the face. None
of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioners
allegation aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the
Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for intoxication. What the policemen
claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the fiftyfive year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their

authority granted under RA 4136. They relied on the medical

certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner showed
no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged
not only because the petitioner insisted at every turn that he was
not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed to testify as to
its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe
Ospital ng Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has
a record of the certificate. The trial court, in its decision, merely
stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not
testified upon by the doctor who issued it.1wphi1 Instead, the
Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented by the
Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was
unable to testify to affirm the contents of the Medical Certificate he
issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath), this court
finds that the observation of herein private complainants as to the
accuseds behavior and condition after the incident was sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding x x x x
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person Under Section 15 of
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the trial, the
affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct
testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same."32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the
medical certificate Dr. Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to
petitioners intoxicated state, as the former was not able to testify
as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the
assumption that he and his fellow police officers were acting in the
regular performance of their duties. It cannot be emphasized
enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of
liquor are differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine
with legally acceptable certainty whether a person is drunk in

contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving

under the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course
changed with the approval in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and
Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33a term defined under its Sec.
3(e) as the "act of operating a motor vehicle while the drivers blood
alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath
analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly
by the [DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g)
of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver of a private motor vehicle with
gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC
[blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive
proof that said driver isdriving under the influence of alcohol.
Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot plausibly be
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious
reason: he had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone
conclusively, for reaching during the period material the threshold
level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05%
or over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34 penal laws shall be given
retroactive insofar asthey are favorable to the accused. Section 19
of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136. Verily, even
by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586
alone, petitioner could very well be acquitted for the charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the supposed
inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its
Resolution35 of November 21, 2006 found, on the strength of
another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila
conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12,
but later hour, probable cause for slight physical injuries against
P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to indicate that
the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least
cancelled out, the purported Dr. Balucatings finding as to
petitioners true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after
the unfortunate incident, lost no time incommencing the
appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr.
Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without

examining him. The element of immediacy in the filing lends

credence to petitioners profession of innocence, particularly of the
charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not
to be overlooked is the fact that petitioner,in so filing his complaint,
could not have possibly been inspired by improper motive, the
police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa.
Withal, unless he had a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept
the notion that petitioner would expose himself to harms way by
filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is
thus required that every circumstance favoring ones innocence be
duly taken into account.37 Given the deviation of the police officers
from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic
violation by perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand
executing an arrest, the blind reliance and simplistic invocation by
the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the
conduct of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v.
Ambrosio,38 the presumption of regularity is merely just that, a
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
And to be sure, this presumption alone cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overcome by proof
that obliterates all doubts as to the offenders culpability. In the
present case, the absence of conclusive proof being under the
influence of liquor while driving coupled with the forceful manner
the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at
least cast doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and
resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance
tips in favor of innocence or at least infavor of the milderform of
criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic, almost
elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies
on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its evidence
and noton the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is hereby acquitted of

the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal

Case No. 052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV.

BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." Article II, Section 1, Constitution
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No
unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to
expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how
seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates
during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We are
asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens who
are not candidates during elections.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
COMELECs Notice to Remove Campaign Materials2 dated February
22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27, 2013.
The facts are not disputed.

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a

private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in
size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within
public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH
Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic
Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and
lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. 6Those
who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners
as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form
"Team Buhay":7
TEAM BUHAY

TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV

Angara, Juan Edgardo

Honasan, Gregorio

Casio, Teddy

Magsaysay, Mitos

Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko

Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio

Escudero, Francis

Villar, Cynthia

Hontiveros, Risa

Party List Buhay

Legarda, Loren

Party List Ang Pamilya

Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan
Party List Bayan Muna

Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin
was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for
the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage
of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her
capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the
tarpaulins removal within three (3) days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
requirement of two feet (2) by three feet (3).9
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among
others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending
this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be
allowed to remain.11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a
letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise,
it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners.
The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies
available to petitioners. The letter provides as follows:
Dear Bishop Navarra:
It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty.
Mavil Majarucon, had already given you notice on February 22, 2013
as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church
vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list
groups with the following names and messages, particularly
described as follows:
Material size : six feet (6) by ten feet (10)
Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN

Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES

Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM
BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY
Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY
OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY
The three (3) day notice expired on February 25, 2013.
Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in
violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 promulgated on January
15, 2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division
of the said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election
propaganda material is only two feet (2) by three feet (3), please
order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda
material, otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election
offense case against you.
We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help
the Commission on Elections inensuring the conduct of peaceful,
orderly, honest and credible elections.
Thank you and God Bless!
[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this
petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.14 They
question respondents notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter
issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be
given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents
from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of
the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a
decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of

respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently

restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
order.15
After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing
the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19,
2013.16
On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment17 arguing that
(1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to
question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin
is an election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC
pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the
Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering
its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.18
During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were
directed to file their respective memoranda within 10 days or by
April 1, 2013, taking into consideration the intervening holidays. 19
The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are: 20
I.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION
OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE
COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL
ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A
REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]
A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS
FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE
NOT CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE[;]

II.
WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS
ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA"
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]
III.
WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION
(PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENT[;]
A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF
EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY
TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]
B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]
IV.
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION
OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE
COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]
V.
WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS
TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.
I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This courts jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that
the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or
judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 21

Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC.
Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a
grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. 22 As
a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not
subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited
only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power."23 Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and
letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IXC, Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on COMELECs power to decide
all questions affecting elections.25 Respondents invoke the cases of
Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26Repol v. COMELEC,27 Soriano, Jr. v.
COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v. COMELEC,30 to
illustrate how judicialintervention is limited to final decisions,
orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.31
These cases are not applicable.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race
of Eastern Samar filed the election protest.32At issue was the
validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.33 No
motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the
COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not have
jurisdiction and clarified:
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution]34 to
mean final orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en
banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a
division.The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an
interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections.35 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC,
this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repolwas

another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in

Pagsanghan, Samar.36This time, the case was brought to this court
because the COMELEC First Division issued a status quo ante order
against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending
appeal.37 This courts ponencia discussed the general rule
enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.38 However, consistent
with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it clarified
the exception:
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural
requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed
over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the
principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the
decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of
COMELEC in electoral contests despite not being reviewed by
the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the
status quo anteorder issued by the COMELEC Division was
unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an
election protest case involving candidates for the city council of
Muntinlupa City.41 Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this court a

petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC

First
Division.42 While the petition was pending in this court, the
COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest
case.43 Sorianoapplied the general rule that only final orders should
be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however,
acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a
disqualification case of one of the mayoralty candidates of
Meycauayan, Bulacan.45 The COMELEC Second Division ruled that
petitioner could not qualify for the 2007 elections due to the
findings in an administrative case that he engaged in vote buying in
the 1995 elections.46 No motion for reconsideration was filed before
the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this
case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed
resolution was a nullity.47
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election
protest case involving the mayoralty candidates of Taguig
City.48 Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her
motion for reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition
for lack of form and substance.49 This court clarified the general rule
and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order.
While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that
these exceptions did not apply.50
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by
respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this court from
taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve
election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing
candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for
public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right
to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This
case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its

regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the

COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection laws.
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation:
the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect" caused by
respondent COMELECs notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
notice51 dated February 22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27,
2013 ordering the removal of the tarpaulin.53 It is their position that
these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom of expression
and violate the principle of separation of church and state and,
thus, are unconstitutional.54
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined
from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is
defined as the authority "to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and
defines its powers."55 Definitely, the subject matter in this case is
different from the cases cited by respondents.
Nothing less than the electorates political speech will be affected
by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is
motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move
people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change
the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the
basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this
kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of
the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect
speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions
on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech

and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will

define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELECs notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents
acts are capable of repetition. Under the conditions in which it was
issued and in view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a
"chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their
voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens who wish
to express their views regarding the election and other related
issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the
COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such
proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for
raising grave abuse of discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For
petitioners, it referred to this courts expanded exercise of
certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether ornot there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.56(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate
to decide all questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3)
of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
....
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
Respondents reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the

COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are
confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any
jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action
effectively abridging meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of
COMELECs notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under
Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word
"affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that
COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and allquestions
that arise during elections. COMELECs constitutional competencies
during elections should not operate to divest this court of its own
jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article
VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision provides for this
courts original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and
prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction
of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by
COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of
the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this courts
power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any
grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This
includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts
constitutional mandate to protect the people against governments
infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional
mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take
jurisdiction over this case.
I.C
Hierarchy of courts

This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the

doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before
this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners failure to file the proper suit
with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for
the dismissal of their petition.57 They add that observation of the
hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor.58 While respondents claim that while there are exceptions
to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present
in this case.59
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this courts
discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to
it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and
importance of the issues raised. . . ."61 Petitioners submit that there
are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct resort
[with] this Court."62
In Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the
application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy
of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored
without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that
are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus
leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court
may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy.64
In Baez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are
allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
citing Vergara v. Suelto:65
The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it
is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should

not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary
writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where
serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or
another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner.
Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of
the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent
to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution.67 To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring
the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented
before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their
territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case that
makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action.
The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are,
however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not
be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil

actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues thatmay not necessarily be novel unless there
are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new
ground or further reiterating in the light of new circumstances or
in the light of some confusions of bench or bar existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of
the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Courts role to interpret the
Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when
these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in
respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose
of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad
rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance
and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for
certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition."70 As correctly pointed out by
petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality
of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the
government.72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not
only petitioners right to freedom of expression in the present case,
but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court
involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the
political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private
citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an
eminent political theorist:

[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a

technique for arriving at better social judgments through
democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith
and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was
awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's
mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason,
and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization
virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a
creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community.
It contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration,
skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full
potentialities.It spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical,
conformist, irrational and stagnant.73
In a democracy, the citizens right tofreely participate in the
exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is
recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may
provide, as public participation in nation-building isa fundamental
principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free
expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this
court.
A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of
transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh
the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional
issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the
paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for
substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the
paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression
which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles
laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of
freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of
elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote
for ones chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice
to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It
may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily
includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of

these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the

immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this
court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that
will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the
United States v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the case
as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important
issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take
cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression
involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage
includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which
this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through
jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this
court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence
of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined
judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to
the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored.
This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the
elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed
that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain

situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this

court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ.
COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz,80 cited by
petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that
would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every province
were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or
contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that
constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."81
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC
through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on
their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom
respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt
affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in
the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be
guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that
could free them from the injurious effects of respondents acts in
violation of their right to freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this
basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify
the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies
in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort
to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found
to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an
inappropriate remedy."82 In the past, questions similar to these
which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts included citizens right to bear
arms,83government contracts involving modernization of voters
registration lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85

This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import.

Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur
at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. While
generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case
falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved
by this court directly.
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its
reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the ambit of
this courts power of review. They cite Justice Vitugs separate
opinion in Osmea v. COMELEC86 to support their position:
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the
Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee equal access
to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section
26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial or
irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any
event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to the
specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression
concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of
constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it
is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or
between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society but it is to me
a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on
Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to
media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as giving real life
to the candidates right of free expression rather than being viewed
as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the
enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be
best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court
to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives
of the Court to pass upon.87

This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is
not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich
and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for
media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of
expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, asan
exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of
the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not
proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.
In Taada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the
concept of what constitutes a political question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political,
and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer
of the government, withdiscretionary power to act.89 (Emphasis
omitted)
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on
what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly
the legislature, the creation of the textof the law is based on a
general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in
order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus,
the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts
that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on
existing facts established on a specific case-to-case basis, where
parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts
understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of
government is essential in order to ensure that the rights of the
general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this
balance, branches of government must afford due respectand
deference for the duties and functions constitutionally delegated to
the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence

dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can
craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence
or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by
this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the
powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the
executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine
is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify
certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of their
respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law.
In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with
deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that
power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes
judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon
a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by
abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question
doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide.91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine
has undergone an evolution since the timethat it had been first
invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken
the historical and social context of the case and the relevance of

pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored constitutional

doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v.
Singson92 and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of
Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution involving the removal
of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times past,
this would have involved a quint essentially political question as it
related to the dominance of political parties in Congress. However,
in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review
noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional
provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by
which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach
was again reiterated in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. 94
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared
again that the possible existence ofa political question did not bar
an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with
grave abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the
question of whether there was grave abuse of discretion in the
Presidents use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent
and suppress lawless violence.
In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to
whether a former President resigned was not a political question
even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political
legitimacy of a successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in
such crises may use the resolution of constitutional issues as
leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates
a duty for it to exercise its power of judicial review expanding on
principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve social conflict.
This courts understanding of the political question has not been
static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar
Orbos,97 this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which
the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the
wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue

involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or

whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial
review. And such review does not constitute a modification or
correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute
interference with the functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the
political question was discussed most extensively in Francisco v.
HRET.99 In this case, the House of Representatives arguedthat the
question of the validity of the second impeachment complaint that
was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide was a political
question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and
dissenting opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court
becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution which
expanded the definition of judicial power as including "the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired
Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power
considerably constricted the scope of political question. He opined
that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is
available even against the executive and legislative departments
including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their
discretionary powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the
political question, as applied in the following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution limits resort to
the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court,under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide. x x
x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice

Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this
Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a
recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.x x x (Emphasis and italics
supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.101 (Citations omitted)
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered
justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers
or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the
right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged
demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt
that a political question brings.
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist that
petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En
Banc or any of its divisions.102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the
requirement in Rule 65 that "there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 103 They
add that the proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed
issuances was in the course of an administrative hearing to be
conducted by COMELEC.104 In the event that an election offense is
filed against petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they claim that
petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is
clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness
is the "prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished
or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of
government] before a court may come into the picture."106
Petitioners exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and
their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the
elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election
offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to
curtail petitioners speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative

remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the
violation of their freedom of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our
constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales,107 Justice Carpio in a
separate opinion emphasized: "[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of
protected expressions, political expression would occupy the
highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the
subject of fair and honest elections would be at the
top."108 Sovereignty resides in the people.109 Political speech is a
direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental
right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the
exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may
be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to
immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when
the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe
administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable
injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention."111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the
present case. First, petitioners allegethat the assailed issuances
violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of
separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question.

Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency

of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as
well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax
or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when
compelling reasons so warrant, or whenthe purpose of justice
requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient
cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
the court".112 Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC
has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek to participate
in the elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by
the publicin the manner they feel would be effective is one of those
cases.
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by
private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin.113 However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates
and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution,
which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special

privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.114 (Emphasis supplied)
Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC
during the plebiscite for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.116 Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision
prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day
before and on plebiscite day.117 Sanidad argued that the prohibition
was a violation of the "constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press. . . ."118 We held that the "evil sought to
be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise
holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in
terms of advertising space or radio or television time."119 This court
found that "[m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates[,]"120 thus, their right to expression
during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither
franchise holders nor candidates. II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the
Constitution as follows:122
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize
election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
(Emphasis supplied) Based on the enumeration made on actsthat

may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects

candidates.
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued
by COMELEC. This was followed bythe assailed letter regarding the
"election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity
promoting for or against the candidates and party-list
groups. . . ."123
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign
materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may
authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common
poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public
places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like,
wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not
exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be
authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10)
public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6)
feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful propaganda
material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof,
and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably
and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and
regulations implementing the Fair Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and
candidates may post any lawful campaign material in:
a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the
requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next following
section; and
b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.
The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the
designated common poster areas and those enumerated under

Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons

posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and
other persons who caused the posting. It will be presumed that the
candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials
outside the common poster areas if they do not remove the same
within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the
Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful
election propaganda are posted or displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called
upon by the Election Officeror other officials of the COMELEC shall
apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate
charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in
their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of
campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties,
and petitioners are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda"
also states that these are "allowed for all registered political
parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations
participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to
the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political
parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for
a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda
refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with
candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the
candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda
are released would ensure that these candidates and political
parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political
party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with
any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On
the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their
advocacy against the RH Law. Respondents also cite National Press
Club v. COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the

Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech

during election period.127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and
donation of space and time for political advertisements, limiting
political advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time.
This case was brought by representatives of mass media and two
candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They argued that the
prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily
infringes on the freedom of speech of the candidates.128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition
in National Press Club. However, this case does not apply as most of
the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the
instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club,
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,129 only refers to a particular
kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or
television.130 Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did not
infringe upon the right of reporters or broadcasters to air their
commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their
qualifications, and program for government. Compared to
Sanidadwherein the columnists lost their ability to give their
commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press
Clubdoes not involve the same infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary
on the candidates for the 2013 national elections because of the
COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merelya regulation on the
campaigns of candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press
Clubdoes not apply to this case.
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Election Code, defines an"election campaign" as
follows:
....
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity"
refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a

particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall

include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other
groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding
interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public
office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials
designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or
against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of
enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to
a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of
parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan
election activity. Public expressions or opinions or discussions of
probable issues in a forthcoming electionor on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in
a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as
part of any election campaign or partisan political activity
contemplated under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only
to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of the
definition is that the act must be "designed to promote the election
or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public
concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on

votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke

their right to freedom of expression.
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the
removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental right to freedom
of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an
election propaganda subject to their regulation pursuant to their
mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized
are valid and constitutional.131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section
4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an
opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the
public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner
Primicias.134 Section 1119 requires a Mayors permit for the use of
streets and public places for purposes such as athletic games,
sports, or celebration of national holidays.135 What was questioned

was not a law but the Mayors refusal to issue a permit for the
holding of petitioners public meeting.136 Nevertheless, this court
recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech, to
peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, albeit
not absolute,137 and the petition for mandamus to compel
respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted.138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but
COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC
resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABSCBN from conducting exit surveys.139 The right to freedom of
expression was similarly upheld in this case and, consequently, the
assailed resolution was nullified and set aside.140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on
expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech
should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The
primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a
compelling state interest clearly allowed in the Constitution. The
test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of
society framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of
expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and
of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word "expression"
was added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for
having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer.
On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the
Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if
not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word "speech,"
because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would
refer to means of expression other than speech.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee

say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression or of the
press . . . ."141 Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to
freedom itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government because speech
is the beginning of thought."142
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected
speech.143 Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to
signal others, uses conventional actions because he orshe
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience
in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the
actions."144 "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to
the claims by . . . either accepting the speech acts claims or
opposing them with criticism or requests for justification."145
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated
as a form of speech sometimes referred to as symbolic
speech[,]"146 such that "when speech and nonspeech elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, the communicative
element of the conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression]."147

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire

continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and
even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu,148 students who were members of the religious sect Jehovahs
Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the
flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. 149 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how the salute is a
symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of
expression.150 He adds that freedom of speech includes even the
right to be silent:
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been
said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the
liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the
liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic
manner of communication that conveys its messageas clearly as the
written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be
compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of valid
religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on
the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their
religion bids them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no
place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse
ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or
eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment
thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or
proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as inthis
case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than
the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected by
the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when
the soul within rebels.151
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III,
Section 4 of the present Constitution,this court has applied its
precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak, 152 petitioners
objected to the classification of the motion picture "Kapit sa

Patalim" as "For Adults Only." They contend that the classification

"is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible
restraint of artistic expression."153 This court recognized that
"[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the
communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic
impulse."154 It adds that "every writer,actor, or producer, no matter
what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the
censor."155 This court found that "[the Boards] perception of what
constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive."156 However,
the petition was dismissed solely on the ground that there were not
enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the
classification made by the Board.157
II.B.3
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information
conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in
point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin
allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages from
greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier
for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared
with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving vehicles have
lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts
and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their
attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will
understand its message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of
the message to the reader. From an ordinary persons perspective,
those who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their
message than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The
perceived importance given by the speakers, in this case
petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message. The
effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put
by the speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers themselves.

Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more

convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when they
make the effort to emphasize their messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces,
therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain,
and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate.
Rather than simply placing the names and images of political
candidates and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow
for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates platforms
for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of
ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a
more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated
electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance
and accountability in our government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the
candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms
of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage
by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the
character of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline political
arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather
than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact
encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter
have the better incentive to demand discussion of the more
important issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the
former have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints
and instead focus on appearances and empty promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and
place.158 They are fundamentally part of expression protected under
Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen
the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public
affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.

Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy"

submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue isa critical,
and indeed defining, feature of a good polity."159 This theory may be
considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision
making with the participation of all who will beaffected by the
decision."160It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every
democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people.161 To ensure
order in running the states affairs, sovereign powers were
delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key
government positions to represent the people. On this note, the
theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the
people to make government accountable. Necessarily, this includes
the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to
governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out
grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and
encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies."162
In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and
the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs."163 This court has, thus, adopted the principle that
"debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide
open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."164
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a
market place of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes
in that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free
trade in ideas:"165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is

the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of

the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to
"consider, test, and develop their own conclusions."167 A free, open,
and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones.
This promotes both stability and change where recurring points may
crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of course, free speech is
more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and
economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase Justice
Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for
the thought that agrees with us."168 In fact, free speech may "best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger."169 It is in this context that we should guard against any
curtailment of the peoples right to participate in the free trade of
ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human
dignity. This right is "a means of assuring individual selffulfillment,"170 among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc,171 this court
discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's
enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete
fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well
as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded
these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one,
"[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic role [in
providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for

deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community

spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental
interference."173 They also "provide a buffer between individuals and
the state - a free space for the development of individual
personality, distinct group identity, and dissident ideas - and a
potential source of opposition to the state."174 Free speech must be
protected as the vehicle to find those who have similar and shared
values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to
"protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses
perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic
governance]."175 Federalist framers led by James Madison were
concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: "the citizenry at
large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by
despotic federal officials"176 and the minorities who may be
oppressed by "dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture
[the] government for their own selfish ends[.]"177 According to
Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part." 178 We
should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in
light of any potential oppression against those who find themselves
in the fringes on public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve
theory.179 This provides that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent
reduce the likelihood of violence[.]"180 "[A] dam about to burst . . .
resulting in the banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger
behind the walls of restriction"181 has been used to describe the
effect of repressing nonviolent outlets.182 In order to avoid this
situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a
need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This
includes "free expression and political participation"183 in that they
can "vote for candidates who share their views, petition their
legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature
alerting other citizens of their concerns[,]"184 and conduct peaceful
rallies and other similar acts.185 Free speech must, thus, be
protected as a peaceful means of achieving ones goal, considering

the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over

to violent means just to drive a point.
II.B.5
Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high
degree of protection. Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis
election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
voted for it.186 As such, it is subject to regulation by COMELEC under
its constitutional mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under
Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows: SECTION 1.
Definitions . . .
....
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or
exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate
or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the
election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In
broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped
announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages
or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of
personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including,
but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and microblogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of
pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to
communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and
candidates."188 They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of
approval and appreciation of the named public officials act of
voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those who
voted in its favor.189 It was "part of their advocacy campaign against
the RH Law,"190 which was not paid for by any candidate or political

party.191 Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively

restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be
declared unconstitutional and void."192
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as
"highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values."193 These
rights enjoy precedence and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills,
this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of
expression:
Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished
by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt
to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, ofthe influential
and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and
such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."195 (Citations omitted)
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage."196 A similar idea
appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice
Barredos concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales v.
COMELEC:197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental
point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the
power and right of the people toelect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the
language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The
Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1,
Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines
is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be
governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in
office by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it

tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and

peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in
relation to suffrage or asa means to enjoy the inalienable right of
the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our
democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of
public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and
unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all
times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to
undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to
December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully
gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who
would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute
to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I
consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and
redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as
the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly
enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be
next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic]
whether as to degree or time.198 (Emphasis supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this
court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to
regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the
State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be
injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or
society. The difference in treatment is expected because the
relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may
vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctionshave
therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation
ofthe permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of
speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander
or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are
not entitled to constitutional protection and may be
penalized.199 (Citations omitted)
We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political
speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,"200 "foster[ing]

informed and civicminded deliberation."201 On the other hand,

commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no more
than propose a commercial transaction."202 The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political
speech. In Justice Brions dissenting opinion, he discussed that
"[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting,
makes it subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec
Resolution No. 9615."203 He adds that "[w]hile indeed the RH issue,
by itself,is not an electoralmatter, the slant that the petitioners
gave the issue converted the non-election issue into a live election
one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea to support one
and oppose the other."204
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily
mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political
party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615, or the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No.
9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case
requires, states:
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda"
refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or
exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate
or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the
election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In
broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped
announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages
or announcements used by commercial advertisers. Political
advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of
personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including,
but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-

blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of

pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are
not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:
1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity"
refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall
include any of the following:
....
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained
in blogs shall not be considered acts of election campaigning or
partisan politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in
the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and members of the Civil
Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and
its effects and parameters should be deemed narrowly tailored only
in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also appears that
such wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly
appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political
speech.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized
the need for full discussion of public affairs. We acknowledged that
free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of

free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of official dom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the
government for redress of grievances, allowing for criticism, save
for some exceptions.207 In the 1951 case of Espuelas v.
People,208 this court noted every citizens privilege to criticize his or
her government, provided it is "specific and therefore constructive,
reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of
the entire government set-up."209
The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of
the Election Law provision "penaliz[ing] the anonymous criticism of
a candidate by means of posters or circulars."211 This court
explained that it is the posters anonymous character that is being
penalized.212 The ponente adds that he would "dislike very muchto
see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public
opinion."213
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing
individuals to vent their views. According to this court, "[i]ts value
may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from
the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensurea true ferment of ideas." 215
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms
against their government contributes to every societys goal for
development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for the
better and ideas that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose.
Necessarily, it also makes the government accountable for acts that
violate constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmea v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling print space and
air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracyenhancing measure.216This court mentioned how "discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates in an

election are essential to the proper functioning of the government

established by our Constitution."217
As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest
public purposes in the context of elections when the free exercise
thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are
supporting what issues."218 At the heart of democracy is every
advocates right to make known what the people need to
know,219 while the meaningful exercise of ones right of suffrage
includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in
order to make their choice.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance
of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression especially
in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of
the right of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include
vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to
people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the
generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free,
clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls
all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is
the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage.221(Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of
expression and must be protected by this court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god
of rights to which all other rights and even government protection
of state interest must bow."222
The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even
some forms of protected speech are still subjectto some
restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the

regulation is content-based or content-neutral.223 Content-based

regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or
the subject of the expression.
II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a
content-neutral regulation. The order was made simply because
petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for
lawful election propaganda.224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size
regulation is content-based as it applies only to political speech and
not to other forms of speech such as commercial
speech.225 "[A]ssuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to
be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, its still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a
constitutionally sanctioned objective."226
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either contentneutral or content-based.227 Regardless, the disposition of this case
will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech,
the proposed speech is content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC
contained in the questioned order applies only to posters and
tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver
opinions that shape both their choices. It does not cover, for
instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of
expression of non-candidates will be adjudged as "election
paraphernalia." There are no existing bright lines to categorize
speech as election-related and those that are not. This is especially
true when citizens will want to use their resources to be able to
raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what
has happened in this case. COMELECs discretion to limit speech in
this case is fundamentally unbridled.

Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The
content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity,
and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.228 Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger
rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposedare neither
overbroad nor vague.229 (Citations omitted)
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented
must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high."230 "Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to
justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state
interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no
reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size
of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based
on the subject matter of the utterance or speech."232 In contrast,
content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents
of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. 233
This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints
starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v. Fugoso.234 The ordinance
in this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to
determine the public places that may be used for the procession
ormeeting, but not the power to refuse the issuance of a permit for
such procession or meeting.235 This court explained that free speech
and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be so regulated

that it shall not beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of others having

equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or
society."236
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National
Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited the passing of animaldrawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours.238 This court
similarly discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry
outthe legislative policy that "aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public."239
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado240 recognized that "more
or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement. . . ."241 It is with this backdrop that the state is justified
in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and
manner of the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized
the steps that permit applicants must follow which include
informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date,
public place, and time of the assembly. 242 This would afford the
public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid
objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the
standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the
opportunity to be heard.243 This ruling was practically codified in
Batas Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly
Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as
a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v.
Ermita,244 this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does
not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and
manner.245 In 2010, this court found in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Atienza246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed
grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without
first affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.247

We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.

The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its
medium.
II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the
provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are content-neutral
regulations as these "restrict the mannerby which speech is relayed
but not the content of what is conveyed."248
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned
acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating
such restraints on freedom of speech.249 "When the speech
restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a
substantial governmental interest is required for its validity,"250 and
it is subject only to the intermediate approach.251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have
prescribed in several cases.252 A content-neutral government
regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of
speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of
the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is
protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates. On the
second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be
important or substantial, it must also be compelling as to justify the
restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally
declared principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of
children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as
parens patriae,254 constitute a substantial and compelling

government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV

broadcast."255
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal
opportunity for public information campaigns among candidates in
connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible election.256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to
posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information
campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different
sizes gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post
larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates with more money
and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against
candidates with more humble financial capabilities."257
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as
important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his
choice and exercise his right of free speech."258 In any case, faced
with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent
course would be to "try to resolve the tension in a way that protects
the right of participation."259
Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only
require that the private property owners consent be obtained when
posting election propaganda in the property. 260 This is consistent
with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without
due process of law.261 The present facts do not involve such posting
of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner.
Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to
recommend effective measures to minimize election spending.
Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
....

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize

election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
(Emphasis supplied) This does not qualify as a compelling and
substantial government interest to justify regulation of the
preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on
the two feet (2) by three feet (3) size limitation under Section 6(c)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the
Fair Election Act that provides for the same size limitation.263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the
paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of
expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of
marginal significance."264 In fact, speech with political
consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged and not
curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not
serve the objective of minimizing election spending considering
there is no limit on the number of tarpaulins that may be posted. 265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the
legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so
at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction
must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be
demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the actor to
make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression
of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render
ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise
freedom of expression.
The COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the
effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences. These
should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more
meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower
test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.

The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to

further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of petitioners
and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a
"chilling effect" on robust discussion during elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In
the words of Marshall McLuhan, "the medium is the
message."266 McLuhans colleague and mentor Harold Innis has
earlier asserted that "the materials on which words were written
down have often counted for more than the words themselves." 267
III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of
private individuals for the endorsement of their electoral
campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when
endorsement materials in the form of tarpaulins, posters, or media
advertisements are made ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are
really paid for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the
constitutional value that provides for equal opportunities for all
candidates.
However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this
case, this is not the situation that confronts us. In such cases, it will
simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part
of the COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any
relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by
the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true
that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to
hide the candidates real levels of expenditures. However, labelling
all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the
debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would be too

broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case.
Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement
will be the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of
a candidate, others will spend their own resources in order to lend
support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement between
the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of
donating funds to the campaign, they will instead use their
resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party
would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the constitutional and
statutory limits of campaign spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what
candidates and political parties will carry in their election posters or
media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an
advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical
devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the positions of
those who run for a political position on this social issue be
determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a
stand on a social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally
will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a
"literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and
ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,"268 and this may target
any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It
seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often used for
"political and social criticism"269 "because it tears down facades,
deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more
thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned
and spoofed."270 Northrop Frye, wellknown in this literary field,
claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit or humor
founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the
other is an object of attack."271 Thus, satire frequently uses
exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a
list of dead individuals nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of

Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the

candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin
caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of those in
the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the
list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its
author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church
of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual
messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from candidates
and political parties are more declarative and descriptive and
contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective.
Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with
a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example
"Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote
for [z], Iba kami sa Makati."
This courts construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression
has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that
entails evaluation of the speakers viewpoint or the content of ones
speech. This is especially true when the expression involved has
political consequences. In this case, it hopes to affect the type of
deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility on
the part of any human institution no matter how endowed with the
secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails that
we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanitys lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides
space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance has always been a
libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Billof Rights.
There are occasional heretics of yesterday that have become our
visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us pause. The
unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and
comfortably disregards provides us with the checks upon reality
that may soon evolve into creative solutions to grave social
problems. This is the utilitarian version. It could also be that it is
just part of human necessity to evolve through being able to
express or communicate.

However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical

document. It contains other provisions which, taken together with
the guarantee of free expression, enhances each others value.
Among these are the provisions that acknowledge the idea of
equality. In shaping doctrine construing these constitutional values,
this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce
narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to
unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as
exercised in reality and, thus, render them meaningless.
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two
paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving
priority to equality vis--vis liberty.272
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech
prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political
equality prevails over speech."273 This view allows the government
leeway to redistribute or equalize speaking power, such as
protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting
voices often systematically subdued within societys ideological
ladder.274 This view acknowledges that there are dominant political
actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status,
have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is
especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of
the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to
find ones authentic self or to participate in the self determination
of ones communities is not new only to law. It has always been a
philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social
theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized
inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms
exercised within such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already

established machinery of discrimination."275 In his view, any

improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal
society, without subversion, only strengthens existing interests of
those in power and control.276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like
freedom of expression may become meaningless if not taken in a
real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract
compromises liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomythis is almost a tautology,
but a tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic
judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine ones own life: to
be able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer
and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is never the
contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or
happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is
capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making
possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the
other is not that of finding a compromise between competitors, or
between freedom and law, between general and individual interest,
common and private welfare in an established society, but of
creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by
institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In
other words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the
existing societies.277 (Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument with all opinions
presented to and deliberated by the people "implies a necessary
condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating
and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access
to authentic information, and that, on this basis, their evaluation
must be the result of autonomous thought."278 He submits that
"[d]ifferent opinions and philosophies can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the
marketplace of ideas is organized and delimited by those who
determine the national and the individual interest."279 A slant
toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a natural right
of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use
extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be

inadequate."280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks

away and transcends from established hierarchies, power
structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society
he refers to as "repressive tolerance."
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal
scholars for "stringent protections of expressive
liberty,"281 especially by political egalitarians. Considerations such
as "expressive, deliberative, and informational interests,"282 costs or
the price of expression, and background facts, when taken together,
produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive
liberties.283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive
liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that "public discussion is a
political duty."284 Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper
tier of his twotier model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting
stringent protection.285 He defined political speech as "both
intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about
some issue."286
But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for
such liberties.287 Fair access to opportunity is suggested to mean
substantive equality and not mere formal equalitysince "favorable
conditions for realizing the expressive interest will include some
assurance of the resources required for expression and some
guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common
concern will not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed
citizens."288 Justice Brandeis solution is to "remedy the harms of
speech with more speech."289This view moves away from playing
down the danger as merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs
seriously and embrac[ing] expression as the preferred strategy for
addressing them."290 However, in some cases, the idea of more
speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the
need for context and "the specification of substantive values before
[equality] has full meaning."291 Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon
adds that "equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a
substantive sense."292 Thus, more speech can only mean more

speech from the few who are dominant rather than those who are
not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmea v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the
validity of Section 11(b) ofthe Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. 293 This
section "prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes,
except to the Commission on Elections."294 This court explained that
this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in
order to ensure media equality among candidates.295 This court
grounded this measure on constitutional provisions mandating
political equality:296 Article IX-C, Section 4
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity,
time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its increments. (Emphasis supplied)

Article II, Section 26

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitutions
guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that take
equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.
The other view
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of
equality of opportunity or equality inthe ability of citizens as
speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under
this view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own
individual evaluations of speech, and government is forbidden to
intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas
are best left to a freely competitive ideological market."297 This is
consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as
well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of
speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision
uses negative rather than affirmative language. It uses speech as
its subject and not speakers.298 Consequently, the Constitution
protects free speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or
associations of its speakers.299 Pursuant to this, "government must
leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own
devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech."300
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion in Osmea v. COMELEC
formulates this view that freedom of speech includes "not only the
right to express ones views, but also other cognate rights relevant
to the free communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be
informed on matters of public concern."301 She adds:
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of
elections qualifications of voters and candidates, education,
means of transportation, health, public discussion, private
animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voters resistance to

pressure the utmost ventilation of opinion of men and issues,

through assembly, association and organizations, both by the
candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to
truly reflect the will of the electorate.302 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only
to emphasize free speech primacy such that"courts, as a rule are
wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail
speeches with political content,"303 thus:
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some
elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of the
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed
to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes submission "that the
market place of ideas is still the best alternative to censorship." 305
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the
argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court in the campaign
expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo "condemned restrictions
(even if content-neutral) on expressive liberty imposed in the name
of enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others and thereby
equaliz[ing] access to the political arena."306 The majority did not
use the equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on
the amount which a person can speak, which takes out of his
exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough,
deprives him of his free speech."307
Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political
campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public information and
runs counter to our profound national commitment that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 308
In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to
raise funds does not ease the plight of those without funds in the

first place . . . [and] even if ones main concern isslowing the

increase in political costs, it may be more effective torely on market
forces toachieve that result than on active legal
intervention."309 According to Herbert Alexander, "[t]o oppose
limitations is not necessarily to argue that the skys the limit
[because in] any campaign there are saturation levels and a point
where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar."310
III. C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into
consideration the constitutional respect for human potentiality and
the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to
express and their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete
guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will have
in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as
well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of
drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority.
In a sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and
effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will
have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than
those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas
will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of
society.To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view
normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the
speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view, thus,
restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make
judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This
should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in
opportunity must provide limits to some expression during electoral
campaigns.

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral

campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political
parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place,
and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmea v. COMELEC
and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by
persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of
a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies
of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is
unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee
of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the
electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and
robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a
private citizen which will not amount toan election paraphernalia to
be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally
valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or
who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that,
taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)
reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing
the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably
the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation
must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. For this purpose,
it will notmatter whether the speech is made with or on private
property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First,
as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of
petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio
Carpio, the present law Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and

Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this

case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election
posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the
intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances,
posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by the
general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will
amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression311 and the meaningful
exercise of the right to suffrage,312 the present case also involves
ones right to property.313
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the
circumvention of regulations relating to election propaganda by
applying such regulations to private individuals.314 Certainly, any
provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not
confronted with this possibility. Respondents agree that the
tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also
agreed, during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither
commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political party to post
the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the
tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to
use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz:315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.316 (Citation omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where
decals and stickers should be posted is "so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property."317 Consequently,
it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides

thatno person shall be deprived of his property without due process

of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it
includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the
Constitution, in the 14th Amendment, protects these essential
attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is
elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of
it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal
of a persons acquisitions without control or diminution save by the
law of the land. 1 Cooleys Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245
US 60 [1917])318
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private
property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of
regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the
burden of justification on the part of the Government must be
exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in
this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it
prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, except inthe common poster areas
sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot
post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own front
dooror on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never
require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous and
partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or
regulation, may do.319 Respondents ordered petitioners, who are
private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property.
The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the
unconstitutionality of COMELECs interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to
property. There may be no expression when there is no place where

the expression may be made. COMELECs infringement upon

petitioners property rights as in the present case also reaches out
to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest
they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners
property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable.
It must also acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise
property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to
prevent the posting of election propaganda in private property
without the consent of the owners of such private property.
COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent
with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in
seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their
own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the
right to property.
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in
issuing the questioned notice and letter violated the right of
petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church
and state.320 This takes many forms. Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution, for instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the none
stablishment clause.322 Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.323
The second aspect is atissue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz,
imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any
secular regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence.
They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not
all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression. This
notwithstanding petitioners claim that "the views and position of
the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH
Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral
teachings. . . ."325
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from
the reality that every act can be motivated by moral, ethical, and
religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal
world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths,
to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular character that
may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same
faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any
religious bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not
conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of adjudication
cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The
Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu326 in claiming that the
court "emphatically" held that the adherents ofa particular religion
shall be the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be
considered ecclesiastical in nature.327 This court in
Ebralinagexempted Jehovahs Witnesses from participating in the
flag ceremony "out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter
how] "bizarre" those beliefsmay seem to others."328 This court found
a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the
compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an early
attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent
neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies
that take religion specifically intoaccount not to promote the
governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or
effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a persons or institutions religion. As Justice Brennan explained,
the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt,
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a
regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative
purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does
not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face,
"does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic
church."332 That the position of the Catholic church appears to
coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law
does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious
speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates
classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their
respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to
support their claim that the expression onthe tarpaulin is an
ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful,
the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon
this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as
regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of
its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political
consequences and not religious speech.

Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v.

National Labor Relations Commission333 cited by petitioners finds no
application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does
not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the
jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the Austriacase such as
"proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities
withattached religious significance."334
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what
it thought was its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.
COMELECs general role includes a mandate to ensure equal
opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech
of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature
of those who are running for public office.Their message may be
construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list
organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team
Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected
speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or
of life on the basis of a single issue and a complex piece of
legislation at that can easily be interpreted as anattempt to
stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may
agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are
other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of
petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider
being more broad-minded and non-judgmental. Some may have

expected that the authors would give more space to practice

forgiveness and humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an
enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code
that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided
by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but
also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not
only by those in the minority. This can often be expressed by
dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their
point dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean
that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that they
have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by
petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention,
cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the
interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioners actions will have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms:
expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to
debate contemporary issues. This is not speechby candidates or
political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate
telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the
substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we
should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial
right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by
petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary
restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The
act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February
22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared
unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170701

January 22, 2014

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADOTUA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul
the Decision1
dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CAG.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent)
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified
Petition2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua
Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a
protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her
husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that
she and her children had suffered from petitioners abusive
conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the
children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to
her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of
her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in
Makati City. They have three children, namely, Joshua Raphael born
on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27, 2000, and
Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her
Affidavit3 attached to the petition, respondent claimed, among
others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and

cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he
wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation
case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared; there was
also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried
chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in
order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him
with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and
insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to
the house as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection
order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding his
financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to
lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work,
petitioner with companions went to her new home and forcibly took
the children and refused to give them back to her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO),4 which we quote in full:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from
date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection
Order, the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered
to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or
through another, physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse
against the herein petitioner (respondent) and other family and
household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner
(respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in any
psychological form of harassment;
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the
Law are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately and to

use necessary force and measures under the law to implement this
Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9,
2005 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift
TPO, petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged, among
others, that he had been maintaining a separate abode from
petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who
verbally abused and threatened him whenever their children's stay
with him was extended; that respondent had been staying with a
certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety and moral
implications of such set-up; that despite their written agreement
that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home, the
latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said
Zuiga; and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually
and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition
and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO
issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot
and to avoid grave and irreparable injury, issued a temporary
restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their agents
from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case
No. 0464-05.7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation,8 praying that the
enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and all

the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was,

subsequently, conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed
Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No.
0464-05 is UPHELD.10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent
under RA 9262 is still pending before the RTC; thus, the factual
matters raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition for
certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of the
herein proceedings, petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash
warrant issued by the RTC and which matter could not also be a
subject of this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005
and that the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by
the RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
thereof as the same were in complete accord with the provision of
RA 9262.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance
of the TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such issuance
is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter raised herein
was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO,
such matter could be resolved without having to rule on the
constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that the
requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the
very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following
issues:
I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
THE LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO)
DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED
THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS
AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS
FINDINGS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS
MOTA OF THE CASE.11
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not
deciding the issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue
presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in
his Comment to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift
TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without
awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA assailing the TPO issued for violating the
due process clause of the Constitution. Contrary to the CA's finding
that the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTCs
alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be
resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262
and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is assailing the
validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order
is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must first be
decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of
a protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit
to declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15
of RA 9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of
the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law and had

properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned

provision simply encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to
basic constitutional rights which affects his life, liberty and
property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on
the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that
such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some
or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for
thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance
of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may
obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The
TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of
the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section
15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that
the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary
to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the
victim and any designated family or household member safety in the
family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children

to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by

the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented," the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after
raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property
of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such
violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to
verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death,
if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of
the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by
the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order

the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference
and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition
for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to
him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of
legislative power to the court and to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5
hereof." Hence, the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature.15 The act of Congress entrusting us with
the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the
redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay,
Section 14 pertinently provides:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and
How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to
desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.
A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex
parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad.
If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be
accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the
Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after
the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.1wphi1
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in
nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code
to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order
in the barangay."17
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23,
2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for the
issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of
the TPO is ex parte, there must be a judicial determination of the
basis thereof. He contends that the allegations in respondent's
affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a

husband and wife which are not grave or imminent enough to merit
the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection
Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on
the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that
such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some
or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for
thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance
of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The
court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice
of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the
filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is
basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent
need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of
the TPO. Thus, it is within the courts discretion, based on the
petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the
violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a
TPO have been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical

harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall
include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the
purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her
child of custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own
money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to
engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by
force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation
directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate
family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally
or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or

psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include,

but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he
cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to
convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat
out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from
crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her
nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often
to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed
separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial
support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the
issuance of a TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the
enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2),
f, h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or

personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to

amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.18We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented
during the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent
Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28,
2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939,
upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the Temporary
Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch
respondent's Petition for a Permanent Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182069

July 03, 2012

ARNOLD D. VICENCIO, Petitioner

vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR and HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., in
their capacity as Acting Chairman and Commissioner, respectively,
of the Hon. Commission on Audit, and ELIZABETH
ZOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Pctitiur; for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65
of the Rules or Court, secking to annul Decision No. 2008-022 dated
15 February 2008 of the Commission on Audit (COA). 1
On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang
Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided over by Hon. Benjamin
Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City

Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled "An Ordinance Granting Authority

to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter
into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the
Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas
of Concern x x x."2
On 9 December 2003 and 1 March 2004, the City of Malabon,
represented by Hon. Galauran, entered into separate Contracts for
Consultancy Services with Ms. Jannette O. Vijiga,3 Mr. Meynardo E.
Virtucio4 and Mr. Hernando D. Dabalus (2003 Consultancy
Contracts).5
Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner was elected
City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became
the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of
the Sanggunian Secretariat.
To complement the manpower requirements of the existing
Sanggunian Secretariat, petitioner deemed it necessary to hire the
services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and
upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of
the legislative machinery of the city.
Petitioner thus wrote a letter dated 19 July 2004 to Atty. Danilo T.
Diaz , the City Legal Officer of Malabon, inquiring as to whether it
was still necessary for the SPM to ratify a newly entered contract of
consultancy services between it and the candidate for the
consultancy position. The letter states in part:
This is an inquiry regarding the hiring of consultants by virtue of an
ordinance giving authority to the City Vice Mayor to enter into
consultancy services (Ordinance no. 15-2003).
As you very well know, the services of the consultants hired by the
former administration, particularly by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, ended last June 30, 2004. Hence, we are confronted
by this inquiry: Would there still be a need for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to ratify a newly entered contract of consultancy
services between the SP and the candidate for said consultancy
position? Kindly render your humble opinion on the matter. 6

Atty. Diaz then responded to the said inquiry through a letter dated
26 July 2004, which categorically stated that ratification was no
longer necessary, provided that the services to be contracted were
those stipulated in the ordinance. The letter states thus:
In response to your query contained in your letter dated July 19,
2004, regarding the hiring of consultants for the Sanggunian
Secretariat by virtue of Ordinance No. 15-2003, giving authority to
the City Vice Mayor to enter into consultancy services and whether
there is still a need for ratification of said consultancy contract by
the Sanggunian, the answer is, such a ratification is no longer
necessary provided that the contract of consultancy services to be
executed is precisely the services stipulated in said ordinance. In
essence, the Ordinance no. 15-2003 already stated what
consultancy services should be secured and hence, if the contract
for consultancy services to be executed is precisely those as
provided in said ordinance, ratification is a mere suplasage.7
On 21 January 2005, the SPM adopted City Ordinance No. 01-2005
entitled "An Ordinance Appropriating Funds to Cover the Various
Expenditures and Activities of the Local Government of Malabon City
for the Period from January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2005." The
total amount of funds appropriated was P 511,070,019 for the
spending of the entire city government. Out of this
amount, P 792,000 was earmarked for consultancy services under
the Legislative Secretariat.
On 1 February 2005, petitioner, representing the City Government of
Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services with
Ms. Jennifer S. Catindig8 and Atty. Rodolfo C. delos Santos (2005
Consultancy Contracts).9 On 11 February 2005, another Contract for
Consultancy Services was entered into between Mr. Marvin T.
Amiana10 and the city government.
After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants
rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, they were
correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts
therefor.
On 19 December 2005, Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No.
2005-12-01911 was issued by Ms. Atenie F. Padilla, Supervising

Auditor of the City Auditors Office, Malabon City, disallowing the

amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty
pesos (P384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The AOM
disclosed the following pertinent findings:

City Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 was used
as basis of authority in hiring consultants. Analysis of the said
City Ordinance revealed that it specifically authorized the
former Vice-Mayor, Hon. Mark Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into
a contract for consultancy services in the Sangguniang
Secretariat covering the period June to December 2003 only.
Said ordinance does not give authority to the incumbent City
Vice-Mayor Arnold D. Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005.

Progress accomplishment report for the month, to determine

the services rendered were not attached to the disbursement
vouchers.

No information as to what method had been made by BAC in

the hiring of individual consultants whether through the
selection from several registered professionals who offered
consulting services or through direct hiring without the
intervention of the BAC.

Copies of the approved contracts together with supporting

documents were not submitted to the City Auditors Office
within five (5) days from execution of the contract for review
and evaluation contrary to COA Circular No. 76-34 dated July
15, 1976, thus the City Auditors Office was precluded to
conduct timely review/evaluation to inform management of
whatever deficiencies noted so that immediate remedial
measures could be properly taken.12

On 12 May 2006, respondent Elizabeth S. Zosa issued Notice of

Disallowance (ND) No. 06-009-101 (05)13containing the result of the
evaluation conducted on the AOM issued by Ms. Padilla. The persons
held liable for the disallowed amount relative to the hiring of the
three consultants were the following: (1) petitioner, in his capacity
as City Vice-Mayor, for certifying that the expenses/cash advances
were necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision
and for approving the transaction; (2) Mr. Eustaquio M. Angeles, in

his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, City Accountant, for certifying to

the completeness and propriety of the supporting documents of the
expenditures; and (3) Ms. Catindig, Atty. Delos Santos, and Mr.
Amiana, as payees. The above-named persons were further directed
to settle the said disallowance immediately. Pursuant to Sections
48, 50 and 51 of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445, the parties
found liable had a period of six months within which to file an
appeal. The disallowance was anchored on the following findings:
- There was no authority for the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Arnold
D. Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005. City Ordinance No. 152003 dated October 30, 2003 which was used as basis of authority
to hire consultants specifically authorized the former Vice-Mayor,
Hon. Mark Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into a contract for
consultancy services in the Sangguniang Secretariat covering the
period June to December 2003 only.
- There were no Progress Accomplishment Reports for the month, to
determine the services rendered.
- No information as to what method had been made by BAC in the
hiring of individual consultants whether through the selection from
several registered professionals who offered consulting services or
through direct hiring without the intervention of the BAC. 14
On 22 June 2006, the SPM wrote a letter15 informing Ms. Padilla that
the three consultants hired by petitioner rendered services covering
the period January to December 2005. In its view, the hiring of these
consultants and the services they rendered were in good faith.
Aggrieved by the disallowance, petitioner appealed it to the
Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA. On 12 June
2007, the ASB issued Decision No. 2007-030,16 the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
Premises considered, the instant appeal of Hon. Arnold Vicencio is
hereby denied. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101
(05) dated 12 May 2006 involving the amount of P384,980.00
representing fees to consultants Mr. Marvin T. Amiana, Atty. Rodolfo
Delos Santos and Ms. Jennifer Catindig, is hereby affirmed. However,
the instant appeal of Mr. Estaquio Angeles is hereby granted. Mr.

Angeles is therefore excluded from the persons liable listed under

Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101 (05).17
Thereafter, herein petitioner filed a letter dated 7 July
2007,18 addressed to Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, COA Chairperson.
The letter prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the earlier
Decision of the ASB. On 15 February 2008, public respondent issued
the assailed Order. It appears that the letter of petitioner was
treated as an appeal to the Commission Proper of the COA and was
subsequently denied. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for
reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal, is denied. 19
On 28 March 2008, the instant Petition was filed, raising the
following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT
AFFIRMED ASB DECISION NO. 2007-030, RELATIVE TO THE
DISALLOWANCE OF DISBURSEMENTS CONCERNING THE SERVICES
RENDERED BY HIRED CONSULTANTS FOR THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD NG MALABON.
On 8 April 2008, this Court directed respondents to comment on the
Petition. On 28 July 2008, they filed their Comment, in which they
averred that Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized the
expenditure of funds for the compensation of consultants only from
June to December 2003. Thus, the contracts for consultancy entered
into in 2005 were contrary to the ordinance cited and were
therefore void for being unauthorized and bereft of any legal basis.
There is also no room for interpretation of the ordinance, as the
same is clear, and, additionally, actually contains no preamble.
Further, respondents argue that to allow the disbursement of public
funds to pay for the services of the consultants, despite the absence
of authority for the same, would allow a circumvention of the
applicable COA rules and circulars.
Petitioner thereafter filed his Reply to the Comment, in compliance
with this Courts 12 August 2008 Resolution. In his Reply, he

contended that he had the authority to enter into the consultancy

contracts pursuant to Ordinance No. 15-2003. As the ordinance was
ambiguous, there was a need to interpret its provisions by looking
into the intent of the law. He also manifested that the Ombusdman
had dismissed the administrative and criminal Complaints for
violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6713 and for Usurpation of
Authority, previously filed against him over the same transactions.
The Ombudsman held that, while Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
mentions then Vice-Mayor Yambao, the intent in passing the law
may not be ignored. It was the intention of the city council to
authorize the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy
contracts, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao only. Petitioner also argued
that the ends of substantial justice and equity would be better
served by allowing the disbursement for consultancy services that
have already been rendered.
We deny the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the Petition has a procedural flaw that
should merit its outright dismissal. Through the Verification and
Certification attached to the instant Petition, petitioner states that
the contents of the Petition "are true and correct of [his] own
personal knowledge and belief and based on authentic records
and/or documents."20
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading
required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or "knowledge, information and belief,"
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. A pleading, therefore, in
which the verification is based merely on the partys knowledge and
belief as in the instant Petition produces no legal effect, subject
to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
remedied.21
In any case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COA in issuing the assailed Decision.
Petitioner contends that the ordinance authorizes the Office of the
Vice-Mayor, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao in particular, to enter into
consultancy contracts. Notably, it was even Hon. Vice-Mayor
Benjamin C. Galauran, who was acting Vice-Mayor at the time, who

entered into the 2003 Consultancy Contracts. Petitioner also argues

that there is no indication from the preamble of the ordinance,
which can be read from the minutes of the SPM meeting, that the
ordinance was specifically designed to empower only Vice-Mayor
Yambao, or to limit such power to hire for the period June to
December 2003 only.
We disagree.
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the
following are the powers and duties of a city vice-mayor:
ARTICLE II
The City Vice-Mayor
SECTION 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. (a) The city vicemayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign
all warrants drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all
officials and employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except
those whose manner of appointment is specifically provided in this
Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the
latter in the event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section
44, Book I of this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the
city mayor in cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section
46, Book I of this Code; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
(b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation
corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-eight (28) for a highly
urbanized city and Salary Grade twenty-six (26) for a component

city, as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing

guidelines issued pursuant thereto.
Under this provision, therefore, there is no inherent authority on
the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of
the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city
mayor.22 Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into
contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the
ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized
Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services.
As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of
the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a
"continuing authority" for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
Ordinance No. 15-2003 provides in full:
City Ordinance No. 15-2003
An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay
G. Yambao, to Negotiate, and Enter into a Contract for Consultancy
Services in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their
Respective Areas of Concern, as Aforementioned, To Wit:
(1) A Legal Consultant
(2) A Consultant on Education Affairs and
(3) A Management Consultant
That said consultants shall be paid/compensated at the rate of
Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00) each, per month, effective
upon approval of this ordinance subject to the usual accounting and
auditing procedures, rules and/or regulations;
That the source of funds for appropriations thereof shall be made
available for expenditures to be earmarked for
payment/compensation for said consultants, covering the period
from June to December of 2003, thereby authorizing further the City
Vice Mayor to effect the necessary funding thereof, pursuant to the

pertinent provision, aforecited, in Chapter 4, Section 336 of R.A.

7160;
That copies of this ordinance be furnished all concerned for their
information and guidance.
Adopted: October 30, 2003.23
Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation.1wphi1 It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor
to enter into consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern.
Further, the appropriations for this particular item were limited to
the savings for the period June to December 2003. This was an
additional limitation to the power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to
contract on behalf of the city. The fact that any later consultancy
contract would necessarily require further appropriations from the
city council strengthens the contention that the power granted
under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was limited in scope. Hence,
petitioner was without authority to enter into the 2005 Consultancy
Contracts.
Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.24 Thus, the ordinance should be applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted
to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or
absurd or would lead to an injustice.25 In the instant case, there is
no reason to depat1 from this rule, since the subject ordinance is
not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Section 103 of P.O. 1445 declares that expenditures of government
funds or uses of government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
found to be directly responsible therefor. The public official's
personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds
was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner's act of
entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit
without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local
Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on the opinion
of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his

good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal
liability under P.D. 1445.
In sum, the COA's assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance
with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power
as conferred on it by the Constitution26
The COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy
that government funds and property should be fully protected and
conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should
be prevented.27 Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed
to the COA.
WHEREFORE, the Commission on Audit Decision dated 4 January
2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195390

December 10, 2014

GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., and the PROVINCE OF

CAMARINES SUR, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court filed by former Governor Luis Raymund
F. Villafuerte, Jr. (Villafuerte) and the Province of Camarines Sur
(petitioners), seeking to annul and set aside the following issuances
of the late Honorable Jesse M. Robredo (respondent), in his capacity
as then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), to wit:

(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83dated August 31, 2010,

pertaining to the full disclosure of local budget and finances, and
bids and public offerings;2
(b) MC No. 2010-138 dated December 2, 2010, pertaining to the use
of the 20% component of the annual internal revenue allotment
shares;3 and
(c) MC No. 2011-08 dated January 13, 2011, pertaining to the strict
adherence to Section 90 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10147 or the
General Appropriations Act of 2011.4
The petitioners seek the nullification of the foregoing issuances on
the ground of unconstitutionality and for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination
and audit on the manner the local government units (LGUs) utilized
their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 19931994. The examination yielded an official report,showing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
(LGC). Thus, on December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95216,5 enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of
the development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a
reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds,
like the 20% development fund, "shall bespent judiciously and only
for the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are
intended."6
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and
Department of Budget and Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri
issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005,7 pertaining to the guidelines
on the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for
development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the
LGUs in undertaking development projects. The said memorandum

circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for

development projects should be utilized for social development,
economic development and environmental management. 8
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG
Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83,9entitled "Full
Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public
Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The pertinent
portion of the issuance reads:
Legal and Administrative Authority
Section 352 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the
posting within 30 days from the end of eachfiscal year in at least
three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local
government unit a summary of all revenues collected and funds
received including the appropriations and disbursements of such
funds during the preceding fiscal year.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 9184, known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act, calls for the posting of the
Invitation to Bid, Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed and Approved
Contract in the procuring entitys premises, in newspapers of
general circulation, the Philippine Government Electronic
Procurement System (PhilGEPS) and the website of the procuring
entity. The declared policy of the State to promote good local
governance also calls for the posting of budgets, expenditures,
contracts and loans, and procurement plans of local government
units in conspicuous places within public buildings in the locality,
inthe web, and in print media of community or general circulation.
Furthermore, the President, in his first State of the Nation Address,
directed all government agencies and entities to bring to an end
luxurious spending and misappropriation ofpublic funds and to
expunge mendacious and erroneous projects, and adhere to the
zero-based approach budgetary principle.
Responsibility of the Local Chief Executive

All Provincial Governors, City Mayors and Municipal Mayors, are

directed to faithfully comply with the above cited [sic] provisions of
laws, and existing national policy, by posting in conspicuous places
within public buildings in the locality, or inprint media of community
or general circulation, and in their websites, the following:
1. CY 2010 Annual Budget, information detail to the level of
particulars of personal services, maintenance and other operating
expenses and capital outlay per individual offices (Source Document
- Local Budget Preparation Form No. 3, titled, Program
Appropriation and Obligation by Object of Expenditure, limited to
PS, MOOE and CO. For sample form, please visit www.naga.gov.ph);
2. Quarterly Statement of Cash Flows, information detail to the level
of particulars of cash flows from operating activities (e.g. cash
inflows, total cash inflows, total cash outflows), cash flows from
investing activities (e.g. cash outflows), net increase in cash and
cash at the beginning of the period (Source Document - Statement
of Cash Flows Form);
3. CY 2009 Statement of Receipts and Expenditures, information
detail to the level of particulars of beginning cash balance, receipts
or income on local sources (e.g., tax revenue, non-tax revenue),
external sources, and receipts from loans and borrowings, surplus
of prior years, expenditures on general services, economic services,
social services and debt services, and total expenditures (Source
Document - Local Budget Preparation Form No. 2, titled, Statement
of Receipts and Expenditures);
4. CY 2010 Trust Fund (PDAF) Utilization, information detail to the
level of particulars of object expenditures (Source Document - Local
Budget Preparation Form No. 3, titled, Program Appropriation and
Obligation by Object of Expenditure, limited to PDAF Utilization);
5. CY 2010 Special Education Fund Utilization, information detail to
the level of particulars of object expenditures (Source Document Local Budget Preparation Form No. 3, titled, Program Appropriation
and Obligation by Object of Expenditure, limited to Special
Education Fund);

6. CY 2010 20% Component of the IRA Utilization, information detail

to the level of particulars of objects of expenditure on social
development, economic development and environmental
management (Source Document - Local Budget Preparation Form
No. 3, titled, Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object of
Expenditure, limited to 20% Component of the Internal Revenue
Allotment);
7. CY 2010 Gender and Development Fund Utilization, information
detail to the level of particulars of object expenditures (Source
Document - Local Budget Preparation Form No. 3, titled, Program
Appropriation and Obligation by Object of Expenditure, limited to
Gender and Development Fund);
8. CY 2010 Statement of Debt Service, information detail to the
level of name of creditor, purpose of loan, date contracted, term,
principal amount, previous payment made on the principal and
interest, amount due for the budget year and balance of the
principal (Source Document - Local Budget Preparation Form No. 6,
titled, Statement of Debt Service);
9. CY 2010 Annual Procurement Plan or Procurement List,
information detail to the level ofname of project, individual item or
article and specification or description of goods and services,
procurement method, procuring office or fund source, unit price or
estimated cost or approved budget for the contract and
procurement schedule (Source Document - LGU Form No. 02, Makati
City. For sample form, please visit www.makati.gov.ph.)[;]
10. Items to Bid, information detail to the level of individual
Invitation to Bid, containing information as prescribed in Section
21.1 of Republic Act No. 9184, or The Government Procurement
Reform Act, to be updated quarterly (Source Document - Invitation
to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid, as prescribed in Section 21.1 of
R.A. No. 9184. For sample form, please visit www.naga.gov.ph);
11. Bid Results on Civil Works, and Goods and Services, information
detail to the level of project reference number, name and location of
project, name (company and proprietor) and address of winning
bidder, bid amount, approved budget for the contract, bidding date,
and contract duration, to be updated quarterly (Source Document

Infrastructure Projects/Goods and Services Bid-Out (2010), Naga

City. For sample form, please visit www.naga.gov.ph); and
12. Abstract of Bids as Calculated, information detail to the level of
project name, location, implementing office, approved budget for
the contract, quantity and items subject for bidding, and bids of
competing bidders, to be updated quarterly (Source Document Standard Form No. SF-GOOD-40, Revised May 24, 2004, Naga City.
For sample form, please visit www.naga.gov.ph).
The foregoing circular also statesthat non-compliance will be meted
sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.10
On December 2, 2010, the respondent issued MC No. 2010-138,11
reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for
desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to
the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality oflife for
all. It also listed the following enumeration of expenses for which
the fund must not be utilized, viz:
1. Administrative expenses such ascash gifts, bonuses, food
allowance, medical assistance, uniforms, supplies, meetings,
communication, water and light, petroleum products, and the like;
2. Salaries, wages or overtime pay;
3. Travelling expenses, whether domestic or foreign;
4. Registration or participation feesin training, seminars,
conferences or conventions;
5. Construction, repairor refinishing of administrative offices;
6. Purchase of administrative office furniture, fixtures, equipment or
appliances; and
7. Purchase, maintenance or repair of motor vehicles or
motorcycles, except ambulances.12 On January 13, 2011, the
respondent issued MC No. 2011-08,13 directing for the strict
adherence toSection 90 of R.A. No. 10147 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2011. The pertinent portion of the issuance
reads as follows:

Legal and Administrative Authority

Section 90 of Republic Act No. 10147 (General Appropriations Act)
FY 2011 re "Use and Disbursement of Internal Revenue Allotment of
LGUs", [sic] stipulates: The amount appropriated for the LGUs share
in the Internal Revenue Allotment shall be used in accordance with
Sections 17 (g) and 287 of R.A. No 7160. The annual budgets of
LGUs shall be prepared in accordance with the forms, procedures,
and schedules prescribed by the Department of Budget and
Management and those jointly issued with the Commission on Audit.
Strict compliance with Sections 288 and 354 of R.A. No. 7160 and
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, entitled "Full Disclosure of
Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public offering" is hereby
mandated; PROVIDED, That in addition to the publication or posting
requirement under Section 352 of R.A. No. 7160 in three (3) publicly
accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit, the
LGUs shall also post the detailed information on the use and
disbursement, and status of programs and projects in the LGUS
websites. Failure to comply with these requirements shall subject
the responsible officials to disciplinary actions in accordance with
existing laws. x x x14
xxxx
Sanctions
Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be dealt with in accordance
with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In particular, attention is
invited to the provision of the Local Government Code of 1991,
quoted as follows:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions - An elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on:
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence,
or dereliction of duty. x x x15(Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur,
joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the
instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed

issuances of the respondent for being unconstitutional and having

been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On June 2, 2011, the respondent filed his Comment on the
petition.16 Then, on June 22, 2011, the petitioners filed their Reply
(With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order).17 In the
Resolution18 dated October 11, 2011, the Court gave due course to
the petition and directed the parties to file their respective
memorandum. In compliance therewith, the respondent and the
petitioners filed their Memorandum on January 19, 201219 and on
February 8, 201220 respectively.
The petitioners raised the following issues:
Issues
I
THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HEISSUED THE ASSAILED
MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
LOCAL AUTONOMY AND FISCAL AUTONOMY ENSHRINED IN THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991[.]
II
THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HEINVALIDLY ASSUMED LEGISLATIVE
POWERS IN PROMULGATING THE ASSAILED MEMORANDUM
CIRCULARS WHICH WENT BEYOND THE CLEAR AND MANIFEST
INTENT OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991[.]21
Ruling of the Court
The present petition revolves around the main issue: Whether or not
the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local
and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.

The present petition is ripe for judicial review.

At the outset, the respondent is questioning the propriety of the
exercise of the Courts power of judicial review over the instant
case. He argues that the petition is premature since there is yet any
actual controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. He points
out the lack of allegation in the petition that the assailed issuances
had been fully implemented and that the petitioners had already
exhausted administrative remedies under Section 25 of the Revised
Administrative Code before filing the same in court.22
It is well-settled that the Courts exercise of the power of judicial
review requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis motaof the case.23
The respondent claims that there isyet any actual case or
controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial review. He
contends that the mere expectation of an administrative sanction
does not give rise to a justiciable controversy especially, in this
case, that the petitioners have yet to exhaust administrative
remedies available.24
The Court disagrees.
In La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,25 the Court
characterized an actual case or controversy, viz:
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical
questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.26 (Citations omitted)

The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be

overemphasized. At the time of filing of the instant petition, the
respondent had already implemented the assailed memorandum
circulars. In fact, on May 26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10,
201127 from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur,
requiring him to comment on the observation of the audit team,
which states:
The Province failed to post the transactions and documents required
under Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, thereby violating the mandate
of full disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public
Offering.
xxxx
The local officials concerned are reminded of the sanctions
mentioned in the circular which is quoted hereunder, thus:
"Non compliance with the foregoing shall be dealt with in
accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In particular,
attention is invited to the provision of Local Government Code of
1991, quoted as follows:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions An elective local
official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office on: (c)
Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or
dereliction of duty."28
The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication
that the assailed issuances of the respondent are already in the full
course of implementation. The audit memorandum specifically
mentioned of Villafuertes alleged non-compliance with MCNo. 201083 regarding the posting requirements stated in the circular and
reiterated the sanctions that may be imposed for the omission. The
fact that Villafuerte is being required to comment on the contents of
AOM No. 2011-009 signifies that the process of investigation for his
alleged violation has already begun. Ultimately, the investigation is
expected to end in a resolution on whether a violation has indeed
been committed, together with the appropriate sanctions that come

with it. Clearly, Villafuertes apprehension is real and well-founded

as he stands to be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
issuances.
There is likewise no merit in the respondents claim that the
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies warrants the
dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the assailed
issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making or quasilegislative power of the DILG. This pertains to "the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute."29 Not to be confused
with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative
agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.30 In challenging the validity of
anadministrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agencys rulemaking power, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing
of a case in court. This was made clear by the Court in Smart
Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC),31 where it was ruled, thus:
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making orquasi-legislative power. x
x x.32
Considering the foregoing clarification, there is thus no bar for the
Court to resolve the substantive issues raised in the petition.
The assailed memorandum
circulars do not transgress the local
and fiscal autonomy granted to
LGUs.

The petitioners argue that the assailed issuances of the respondent

interfere with the local and fiscal autonomy of LGUs embodied in the
Constitution and the LGC. In particular, they claim that MC No. 2010138 transgressed these constitutionally-protected liberties when it
restricted the meaning of "development" and enumerated activities
which the local government must finance from the 20%
development fund component of the IRA and provided sanctions for
local authorities who shall use the said component of the fund for
the excluded purposes stated therein.33 They argue that the
respondent cannot substitute his own discretion with that of the
local legislative council in enacting its annual budget and specifying
the development projects that the 20% component of its IRA should
fund.34
The argument fails to persuade.
The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of LGUs.35 To highlight its significance, the entire Article X
of the Constitution was devoted to laying down the bedrock upon
which this policy is anchored.
It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution of enhancing
local autonomy that the LGC was enacted. Section 2 thereof was a
reiteration of the state policy. It reads, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of
the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the attainment ofnational
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government
units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and
resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the
national government to the local government units.
Verily, local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.36 In Limbona v. Mangelin,37 the Court elaborated on
the concept of decentralization, thus:

[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration

ordecentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden
the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it
to concentrate on national concerns. x x x. Decentralization of
power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be
autonomous. In thatcase, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. x x x.38 (Citations omitted)
To safeguard the state policy on local autonomy, the Constitution
confines the power of the President over LGUs to mere
supervision.39 "The President exercises general supervision over
them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own."40 Thus, Section 4,
Article X of the Constitution, states:
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
In Province of Negros Occidental v. Commissioners, Commission on
Audit,41 the Court distinguished general supervision from executive
control in the following manner:
The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a
superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their
functions according to law. This is distinguished from the
Presidents power of control which is the power to alter or modify or

set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of

his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that
of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President
the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate
officer involving the exercise of discretion.42 (Citations omitted)
It is the petitioners contention that the respondent went beyond
the confines of his supervisory powers, asalter ego of the President,
when he issued MC No. 2010-138. They arguethat the mandatory
nature of the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for
non-compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over
LGUs.43
The Court, however, perceives otherwise.
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of
an existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind
LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the
LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects.
It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they
have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the
assailed circular was issued in response to the report of the COA
that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some
LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was
diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in
violation of Section 287 of the LGC. This intention was highlighted in
the very first paragraph of MC No. 2010-138, which reads:
Section 287 of the Local Government Code mandates every local
government to appropriate in its annual budget no less than 20% of
its annual revenue allotment for development projects. In common
understanding, development means the realization of desirable
social, economic and environmental outcomes essential in the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a desired quality of life
for all.44 (Underscoring in the original)
That the term developmentwas characterized asthe "realization of
desirable social, economic and environmental outcome" does not
operate as a restriction of the term so as to exclude some other
activities that may bring about the same result. The definition was a
plain characterization of the concept of development as it is

commonly understood. The statement of a general definition was

only necessary to illustrate among LGUs the nature of expenses that
are properly chargeable against the development fund component
of the IRA. It is expected to guide them and aid them in rethinking
their ways so that they may be able to rectify lapses in judgment,
should there be any, or it may simply stand as a reaffirmation of an
already proper administration of expenses.
The same clarification may be said of the enumeration of expenses
in MC No. 2010-138. To begin with, it is erroneous to call them
exclusions because such a term signifies compulsory disallowance of
a particular item or activity. This is not the contemplation of the
enumeration. Again, it is helpful to retrace the very reason for the
issuance of the assailed circular for a better understanding. The
petitioners should be reminded that the issuance of MC No. 2010138 was brought about by the report of the COA that the
development fund was not being utilized accordingly. To curb the
alleged misuse of the development fund, the respondent deemed it
proper to remind LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision
for the IRA through MC No. 2010-138. To illustrate his point,
heincluded the contested enumeration of the items for which the
development fund must generallynot be used. The enumerated
items comprised the expenses which the COA perceived to have
been improperly earmarked or charged against the development
fund based on the audit it conducted.
Contrary to the petitioners posturing, however, the enumeration
was not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the
utilization of their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the
nature of the development fund by delineating it from other types
of expenses. It was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to
guide them in the proper disposition of the IRA and avert further
misuse of the fund by citing current practices which seemed to be
incompatible with the purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain
at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on
the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly,
with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended for
development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of
the enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of
undertaking development projects. In such case, however, the

concerned LGU must ascertain that applicable rules and regulations

on budgetary allocation have been observed lest it be inviting an
administrative probe.
The petitioners likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the
provision of sanctions therein is a clear indication of the Presidents
interference in the fiscalautonomy of LGUs. The relevant portion of
the assailed issuance reads, thus:
All local authorities are further reminded that utilizing the 20%
component of the Internal Revenue Allotment, whether willfully or
through negligence, for any purpose beyond those expressly
prescribed by law or public policy shall be subject to the sanctions
provided under the Local Government Code and under such other
applicable laws.45
Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did
not particularly establish a new set ofacts or omissions which are
deemed violations and provide the corresponding penalties therefor.
It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing rules to
consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund and that
non-compliance therewith may render them liable to sanctions
which are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws.
Nonetheless, this warning for possible imposition of sanctions did
not alter the advisory nature of the issuance. At any rate, LGUs
must be reminded that the local autonomy granted to them does
not completely severe them from the national government or turn
them into impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.46 InGanzon v. Court of
Appeals,47 the Court reiterated:
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism.
The Charter has not taken such a radical step.1avvphi1 Local
governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self-government.48
Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by
LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the President and

maybe held accountable for malfeasance or violations of existing

laws. "Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. And the
power to discipline and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
must be construed to authorize the President to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his
opinion the good of the public service so requires."49
Clearly then, the Presidents power of supervision is not antithetical
to investigation and imposition of sanctions. In Hon. Joson v. Exec.
Sec. Torres,50 the Court pointed out, thus: "Independently of any
statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an
investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view
of the nature and character of the executive authority with which
the President of the Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant
to him of power to exercise general supervision over all local
governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed
must be construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the
act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a
meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without
limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective. x x
x."51 (Emphasis ours and italics in the original)
As in MC No. 2010-138, the Court finds nothing in two other
questioned issuances of the respondent, i.e., MC Nos. 2010-83 and
2011-08, that can be construed as infringing onthe fiscal autonomy
of LGUs. The petitioners claim that the requirement to post other
documents in the mentioned issuances went beyond the letter and
spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known
as the Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that
budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans
of LGUs be publicly posted as well.52
Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads:
Section 352. Posting of the Summary of Income and Expenditures.
Local treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other
accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of
the fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and
conspicuous places in the local government unit a summary of all

revenues collected and funds received including the appropriations

and disbursements of such funds during the preceding fiscal year.
R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting of the
invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved
contract in the procuring entitys premises, in newspapers of
general circulation, and the website of the procuring entity. 53
It is well to remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs
with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They
remain accountable to their constituency. For, public office was
created for the benefit of the people and not the person who holds
office.
The Court strongly enunciated in ABAKADA GURO Party List
(formerly AASJS), et al. v.Hon. Purisima, et al., 54thus:
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not
for his own personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom
he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all
government officials and employees havethe duty to be responsive
to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve. 55
Thus, the Constitution strongly summoned the State to adopt and
implement a policy of full disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest and provide the people with the right to access
public information.56 Section 352 of the LGC is a response to this call
for transparency. It is a mechanism of transparency and
accountability of local government officials and is in fact
incorporated under Chapter IV of the LGC which deals with
"Expenditures, Disbursements, Accounting and Accountability."
In the same manner, R.A. No. 9184 established a system of
transparency in the procurement process and in the implementation
of procurement contracts in government agencies.57 It is the public
monitoring of the procurement process and the implementation of
awarded contracts with the end in view of guaranteeing that these
contracts are awarded pursuant to the provisions of the law and its
implementing rules and regulations, and that all these contracts are
performed strictly according to specifications.58

The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and

2011-08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of the State
to make public officials accountable to the people. They are
amalgamations of existing laws, rules and regulation designed to
give teeth to the constitutional mandate of transparency and
accountability.
A scrutiny of the contents of the mentioned issuances shows that
they do not, in any manner, violate the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. To
be clear, "[f]iscal autonomy means that local governments have the
power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance withtheir own priorities.It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof."59
It is inconceivable, however, how the publication of budgets,
expenditures, contracts and loans and procurement plans of LGUs
required in the assailed issuances could have infringed on the local
fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Firstly, the issuances do not interfere with
the discretion of the LGUs in the specification of their priority
projects and the allocation of their budgets. The posting
requirements are mere transparency measures which do not at all
hurt the manner by which LGUs decide the utilization and allocation
of their funds.
Secondly, it appears that even Section 352 of the LGC that is being
invoked by the petitioners does not exclude the requirement for the
posting of the additional documents stated in MC Nos. 2010-83 and
2011-08. Apparently, the mentioned provision requires the
publication of "a summary of revenues collected and funds received,
including the appropriations and disbursements of such funds." The
additional requirement for the posting of budgets, expenditures,
contracts and loans, and procurement plans are well-within the
contemplation of Section 352 of the LGC considering they are
documents necessary for an accurate presentation of a summary of
appropriations and disbursements that an LGU is required to
publish.

Finally, the Court believes that the supervisory powers of the

President are broad enough to embrace the power to require the
publication of certain documents as a mechanism of transparency.
In Pimentel,Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre,60the Court reminded that localfiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government
intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals.
The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic
and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the
entire country.61 Moreover, the Constitution, which was drafted after
long years of dictatorship and abuse of power, is now replete with
numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures to uphold
transparency and accountability in government, with a view of
protecting the nation from repeating its atrocious past. In
particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full
disclosure of information onall matters relating to official
transactions and those involving public interest. Pertinently, Section
28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, provide:
Article II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies Principles
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.
Article III
Bill of Rights
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
In the instant case, the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to
the policy of promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is

certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego

of the President.
It is needless to say that the power to govern is a delegated
authority from the people who hailed the public official to office
through the democratic process of election. His stay in office
remains a privilege which may be withdrawn by the people should
he betray his oath of office. Thus, he must not frown upon
accountability checks which aim to show how well he is performing
his delegated power. For, it is through these mechanisms of
transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his
constituency that he is worthy of the continued privilege.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202666

September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID

SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process
in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in
which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both
minors, were, during the period material, graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in
January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party
they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several
others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a
computer teacher at STCs high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres.
Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of
the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking
hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and
Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that
show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more,
Escuderos students claimed that there were times when access to
or the availability of the identified students photos was not
confined to the girls Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable
by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of
her students Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose
Tigol (Tigol), STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified

students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by

the schools Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;
contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample
body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in
the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr.
Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school principal
and ICM6Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they
were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in
the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap),
Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed
their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they
are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on
March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother,
Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela
from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the
mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012,
defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes.
That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO)
allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the

sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites,
arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO
remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra)
were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits
on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set
at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or
ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were
called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying
of information, data, and digital images happened at STCs
Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted
to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of
their childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas
databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit

with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before
or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained inviolation of the childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC,
through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data.
Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits,
within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed
their verified written return, laying down the following grounds for
the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper
parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas
data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to
privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision
pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one of
the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been
uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view

them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the schools policies and
rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this
Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data. 10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a
writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial
in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas
Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent
and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a

procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in

the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis
merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a persons
right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper.
Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)
(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging
the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information
uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the providers
databases, which are outside the control of the end-usersis there
a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in
this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas
not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of
Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for
the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the

aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances,
the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of
habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule
preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ
of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly
then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of
in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information
Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid
to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data
protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting
of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy

available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing
data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or
about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the
business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." 19 It
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit
of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking
carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage,
and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in
view of rapid advancements in the information and communications
technologya right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed
to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained
the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or
situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the
right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering
and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent
vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that
every individuals right to control said flow of information should be
protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators
regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree
that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable
expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known
as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to
provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of
the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible
violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South
African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v.
W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has
to take into account the changing realities not only technologically
but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the
people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately
to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent
with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the
Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized
that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational
privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace
activities, including those that occur in OSNs.

The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy

protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves
personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializingsharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would
have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in
OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability
to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided
by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of
personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under
the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to pictures, to music and
videosaccess to which would depend on whether he or she allows
one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts. Since
gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one
involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world, and to
share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of
"friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user
invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any
and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the
request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users "Public" or "Friends Only" posts,
among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or
maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the
user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile
and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed
to regulate the accessibility of a users profile31 as well as

information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng

High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their
privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a users
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal
bulletin or "wall," except for the usersprofile picture and ID, by
selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or
her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others,
from another users point of view. In other words, Facebook extends
its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to
disclose facts about [themselves] and to put others in the position
of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be
based on ones desire to interact with others, coupled with the
opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to regulate
the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as
the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users
can view that users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy

Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there

is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in
context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the
availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to
have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or upload
thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically
has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook
activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children
of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private,
through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or
to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in
cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool
to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not
be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily
accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools
would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user
uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook
page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that
only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the
photos visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not
only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or
information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question
were visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure
was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the
disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their

zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the

issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the
photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be
protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy
right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their
childrens Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the
minors privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their childrens disclosure
was only limited since their profiles were not open to public
viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their
Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing
said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioners
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos
which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these
five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my
students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This
student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school
[students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They
then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the
Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these
students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told
me that there had been times when these photos were public i.e.,
not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors
testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students act
of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the
photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escuderos claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.42

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos

sworn account that her students, who are the minors Facebook
"friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escuderos
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook
friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children
positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. GinesPerez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery,
particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant
did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or email that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses
any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber
community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still
remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of
the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are
total strangers;48

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A users Facebook friend can "share"49 the formers post, or
"tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite
its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile
details privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source
of the content. The users own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not
with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A
and B are not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B in
As post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (As
own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As 100
friends plus Bs 200 friends or the public, depending upon Bs
privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is
effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of
Facebooks proclivity towards user interaction and socialization
rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
"democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more
so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to
petitioners argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only
to the sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can
hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did

not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it

was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access
to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of
the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact,
what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents
appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the
trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are
not tantamount to a violation of the minors informational privacy
rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to
be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy settings to make
the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof
that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that
they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs
in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the users contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit
access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the users friends en masse, becomes more
manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your
childrens ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of

OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of

avoiding privacy rights violations.54As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her
own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially
minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of
many due to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes
go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general
wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons
on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students
on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC
but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it
important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin
their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the
children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber
world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these
children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a
good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, theres
no substitute for parental involvement and supervision." 59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of
teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings and
activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the
disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta
showing that, in the process, it violated the students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves
to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1wphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how
much information about themselves they are willing to give up.
Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or
uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online,

the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control.

Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by
third parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence
in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief
from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take
utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within
the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire
to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the
available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the
minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other
assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148194

April 12, 2002

WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:

On 12 December 1996, petitioner Willy Tan was found guilty of

bigamy by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal.
He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of prision correccional in
its medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months. On 23 December
1996, petitioner applied for probation. On 8 January 1997, the
application was granted by the trial court but the release order was
withheld in view of the filing by the prosecution, on 21 January
1997, of a motion for modification of the penalty. The prosecution
pointed out that the penalty for bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code was prision mayor and the impassable penalty,
absent any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, should be the
medium period of prision mayor, or from eight (8) years and one (1)
day to ten (10) years. Thus, the prosecution argued, petitioner was
not eligible for probation.
The trial court denied the motion of the prosecution for having
been filed out of time since the decision sought to be modified had
already attained finality. Indeed, petitioner had meanwhile applied
for probation. Upon motion of the prosecution, however, the trial
court reconsidered its order and rendered an amended decision,
promulgated on 10 July 1998, concluding thusly:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Willy Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is
hereby sentenced to suffer a minimum prison term of prision
[correccional] TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
to a maximum prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY." 1
On 13 July 1998, petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the trial
court and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, contending
that "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE FIRST DECISION
INCREASING THE PENALTY AFTER THE SAME HAD ALREADY BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY."2
The Court of Appeals, in a decision, dated 18 August 2000,
dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that petitioner raised a
pure question of law. Citing Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e), of the

Constitution, the appellate court explained that jurisdiction over the

case was vested exclusively in the Supreme Court and that, in
accordance with Rule 122, Section 3(e), of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the appeal should have been brought up by way of a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court and not by merely
filing a notice of appeal before the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which, on 18 May 2001,
was denied by the appellate court. The petition for review
on certiorari before this Court raised the following issues:
"I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 2,
RULE 50 ON DISMISSAL OF IMPROPER APPEAL TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS AS THE SAID SECTION REFERS TO AN APPEAL UNDER RULE
41 IN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION BUT NOT TO AN APPEAL IN CRIMINAL
CASES WHICH IS GOVERNED BY RULE 122 OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
"II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUPREME
COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ON PURE
QUESTIONS OF LAW.
"III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
BECAUSE THE APPEAL RAISED PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW, IT IS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE
APPEAL.
"IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL OUTRIGHT INSTEAD OF DECLARING THE AMENDED DECISION
VOID FOR UTTER WANT OF JURISDICTION.1wphi1.nt
"V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RULE 65 IS THE
PROPER REMEDY TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION AND IF SO IN
NOT TREATING THE APPEAL AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI."3
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
appeal in the manner prescribed by law.4 While this right is
statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would
be a violation of due process, itself a right guaranteed by the

Constitution.5 Section 3(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure states:
"Section 3. How appeal is taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. (Emphasis
supplied).
The above rule is plain and unambiguous the remedy of ordinary
appeal by notice of appeal, although not necessarily preclusive of
other remedies provided for by the rules, is open and available to
petitioner.
The notice of appeal was timely filed by petitioner on 13 July 1998,
three days after the questioned decision was promulgated. 6 It was a
remedy that the law allowed him to avail himself of, and it threw the
whole case effectively open for review on both questions of law and
of fact whether or not raised by the parties.
Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the power to hear cases on
appeal in which only an error of law is involved.7 Indeed, the Court
of Appeals, under Rule 42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is
authorized to determine "errors of fact, of law, or both." 8 These
rules are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal
cases,9 and they do not thereby divest the Supreme Court of
its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions.
Anent the argument that petitioner should have filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, it might be pointed out that this
remedy can only be resorted to when there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.10 Appeal, being a remedy still available to petitioner, a petition
for certiorari would have been premature.
In fine, petitioner had taken an appropriate legal step in filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court. Ordinarily, the Court should

have the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for further

proceedings. The clear impingement upon petitioner's basic right
against double jeopardy,11 however, should here warrant the
exercise of the prerogative by this Court to relax the stringent
application of the rules on the matter. When the trial court
increased the penalty on petitioner for his crime of bigamy after it
had already pronounced judgment and on which basis he then, in
fact, applied for probation, the previous verdict could only be
deemed to have lapsed into finality.
Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure that states
"Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may,
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation"implements a substantive provision of the Probation Law which
enunciates that the mere filing of an application for probation
forecloses the right to appeal.
"SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of
the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best: Provided,
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or
conviction.
"Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
"An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (As
amended by PD 1257, and by PD 1990, Oct. 5, 1985.)" 12

Such a waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision

and writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
judgment.13 There is no principle better settled, or of more universal
application, than that no court can reverse or annul, reconsider or
amend, its own final decree or judgment.14 Any attempt by the court
to thereafter alter, amend or modify the same, except in respect to
correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course. The assailed
amendatory judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and its decision
of 12 December 1996 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., See dissent.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., JJ., joins the dissenting opinion
of J. Mendoza.
Panganiban, J., in the result.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 109 112.

Appellant's Brief, p. 5.

Petition, p. 11; Rollo, p. 15.

Section 1(i), Rule 115, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Estoya vs. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1.

See Section 6, Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
8

Section 2, Rule 42; Section 15, Rule 44, Rules of Civil Procedure

Section 18, Rule 124, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

10

Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure.

11

Gregorio vs. Director of Prisons, 43 Phil. 650; US vs. Hart, 24 Phil.

578.
12

Establishing A Probation System, Appropriating Funds Therefor

And For Other Purposes (P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990.
13

Lanestosa vs. Santamaria, 52 Phil. 67.

14

United States vs. Ballad and Tamaray, 35 Phil. 15.

Justice Jose Feria, commenting on the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure, has this to say
"A judgment of conviction may now be modified by the court
rendering it only `upon motion of the accused.' This provision
changes the previous rulings of the Supreme Court to the effect that
such modification may be made upon motion of the fiscal, provided

the same is made before the judgment has become final or an

appeal has been perfected." (Feria, Philippine Legal Studies Series
No. 2.)
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC
G.R. No. 148194

April 12, 2002

WILLY TAN y CHUA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
The reasons for my disagreement with the majority will be spelled
out in detail, but in brief they are as follows: (1) The case before the
Court of Appeals did not involve an error of judgment but an alleged
error of jurisdiction and, therefore, appeal was not the appropriate
remedy to bring the matter to that court. (2) Even assuming the
case involved an error of judgment and therefore appeal was the
appropriate remedy open to petitioner, the appeal should have been
brought before this Court and not the Court of Appeals, and it
should not be by mere notice of appeal but by a petition for review.
(3) The correct remedy is certiorari. (4) Even equity will not excuse
petitioner's failure to observe the rules for seeking a review, and
this Court is not justified in deciding the issue which petitioner
should have first brought before the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute as to the following facts.

Petitioner Willy Tan and Mildred Gococo-Tan were married on

January 14, 1979. On November 28, 1981, while their marriage was
subsisting, petitioner contracted marriage with Estela G. Infante. On
the complaint of Mildred Gococo-Tan, petitioner and Estela G.
Infante were charged with bigamy. The case was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, which, on
December 12, 1996, found petitioner Willy Tan guilty of bigamy and
sentenced him "to suffer a prison term of prision correccional in its
medium period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months." The case against
Estela g. Infante, who was at large, was ordered archived without
prejudice to its revival upon her arrest.
On the basis of the penalty imposed on him, petitioner applied for
probation on December 23, 1996. His application was granted by the
trial court in its order of January 8, 1997, but release of the order
was withheld in view of the filing on January 21, 1997 by the
prosecution of a motion for modification of the penalty. The
prosecution pointed out that the penalty for bigamy prescribed
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and that
the maximum imposable penalty, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, is the medium period of prision mayor,
which is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Petitioner was thus not eligible for probation, it was argued.
On August 5, 1997, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion
for having been filed out of time, the decision sought to be modified
having become final when petitioner applied for probation. However,
upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court reconsidered its
order and, on April 14, 1998, amended the dispositive portion of its
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Willy tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is
hereby sentenced to suffer a minimum prison term of prision
[correccional] of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1)
DAY to a maximum prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1)
DAY.1

The decision, as thus amended, was promulgated on July 10, 1998.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice of
appeal with the trial court on July 13, 1998. Petitioner contended
that
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AMENDING THE FIRST DECISION
INCREASING THE PENALTY AFTER THE SAME HAD ALREADY BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY.2
In its decision, dated August 18, 2000, now the subject of this
review, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
petitioner's appeal on the ground that it raised a pure question of
law. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of May 18,
2001.
In dismissing petitioner's appeal from the amended decision of the
Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the appeal
raised only a question of law; that, pursuant to Art. VIII, 5(2)(e) of
the Constitution, appellate jurisdiction over the case was vested
exclusively in the Supreme Court; and that, in accordance with Rule
122, 3(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appeal should be
brought by filing with this Court a petition for review on certiorari,
not by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Rule 122, 3 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
How appeal taken.
(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the

Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty
imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death
penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court. The same shall be
automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as provided in section
10 of this Rule.
(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124,
all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The majority holds that petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals
by mere notice is justified under Rule 122, 3(a) as above quoted.
Petitioner argues that Rule 44, 15 in fact allows assignments of
errors to be made concerning questions of law or fact in appeals to
the Court of Appeals. The Court thus sustains the following
contention of petitioner:
. . . Rule 122 governing appeals in criminal cases does not direct as
it does in ordinary appeals in civil cases under Rule 41 which
provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
Under Rule 122(a), the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the
Court of Appeals in criminal cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party unfettered by any restriction on the questions that

may be raised on appeal[.] Section 3(d) Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure transposed to par. (e) cited in the footnote by
the Court of [A]ppeals decision merely provides that "All other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for certiorari." As
worded in the present rule "Except as provided in the last
paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45."
It did not direct as it does in Rule 41 that appeal in criminal cases
on pure questions of law shall only be to the Supreme Court. What
the rule directs is that when an appeal is to be made to the
Supreme Court the appeal shall be by petition for review.
Rule 41 cannot likewise to applied by analogy in appeals in criminal
cases since Rule 41 is not among the rules that was expressly
adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases. Under Section 18 of
Rule 124:
SEC. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal
cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to
procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in
original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases
insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule.
The exclusion of Rule 41 which refers to appeals in civil cases from
Rule 122 which refers to appeals in criminal cases clearly indicates
that the modes of appeal in ordinary civil actions is not applicable in
criminal cases. On the other hand, Section 18 of the Rule 122
expressly provides that Rule 44 on procedure in the Court of
Appeals in ordinary appealed cases shall be applied in criminal
cases. As will hereafter be shown[,] Rule 44, like Rules 42 and 43
alternatively allows assignment of errors on questions of fact or of
law, meaning a[n] assignment of error only on pure questions of law
are allowable in appeals to the Court of Appeals. Section 18 clearly
connotes that when the rules allow the application of a particular
rule in a particular situation, it does so expressly. Note that Rule 47
on Annulment of Judgments was also excluded.
I respectfully disagree with the majority ruling for the following
reasons:

First. Appeal is not the appropriate remedy because it is not an

error of judgment, but an error of jurisdiction allegedly committed
by the trial court, which petitioner was raising in the Court of
Appeals. The question whether the trial court could correct an error
in computing the penalty after its decision had become final was not
passed upon by the trial court in deciding the criminal case before it
but was determined by it only as an incident of the case. Indeed,
the issue in that case was whether petitioner Willy Tan y Chua was
guilty of bigamy as the trial court found. If petitioner did not agree
with his conviction, an appeal by mere notice to that effect would
have been perfectly correct under Rule 122, 3(a).1wphi1.nt
But the decision of the trial court on this question has never been
disputed by petitioner. No error of judgment had been imputed to
the trial court. Rather, what petitioner questioned was the power of
the trial court to amend its decision to correct a mistake it had
made in fixing the maximum term of the sentence, after the decision
had become final. This is a question of jurisdiction. There is
therefore no basis for applying Rule 122, 3(a) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
While a question of jurisdiction may be raised on appeal, in the
context of this case, this was not possible because the majority's
premise is precisely that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
case as its decision had become final while at the same time saying
that appeal was petitioner's appropriate remedy. Nor can it be
argued that petitioner could not have appealed until the trial court
modified its judgment because petitioner was not questioning the
original decision but only the decision as modified. Amendments
retroact to the date of the original judgment. At any rate, this only
shows the absurdity of allowing appeal when the reason of the
majority is that the decision of the trial court could no longer be
modified because it had become final. This brings me to my second
point.
Second. Even assuming that appeal was the appropriate remedy,
because it was a question of law that petitioner wanted to raise, the
appeal should have been to this Court, not the Court of Appeals, and
it should have been by petition for review on certiorari, not by mere
notice of appeal.

Art. VIII, 5(2)(e) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme

Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which only
an error or question of law is involved." This jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is exclusive by reason of 17, par. 4(4) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, which provides:
SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. - . . . .
The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to
review, revised, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in
.
(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are
involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional,
tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three
next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the
Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter
may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the
Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; . . . . (Emphasis added)
Art. VIII, 5(2)(e) of the Constitution provides that the appeal shall
be "by certiorari as the law or the rules of court may provide."
Accordingly, Rule 122, 3(d) states that "all other appeals to the
Supreme Court [in criminal cases other than those involving the
imposition of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or death] shall
be by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45." As
petitioner simply filed a mere notice of appeal with the trial court,
his appeal was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
The majority contends that the Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction over cases in which the only question is a question of
law that may be brought by mere notice of appeal filed with the trial
court because of Rule 42, 2 and Rule 44, 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which are made applicable to criminal cases by Rule
124, 184 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. These Rules state:

Rule 42, 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court
being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on
time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the
issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both,
allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct
by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations of
the petition. . . . (Emphasis added)
Rule 44, 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. Whether or
not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below,
he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or
fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the
issues framed by the parties. (Emphasis added)
Mixed questions of fact and law may be raised in the Court of
Appeals but not pure questions of law. This is clear from 17, par.
4(4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as quoted above. The exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court over appeals in which only errors or
questions of law are involved is affirmed in B.P. Blg. 129, 9 defining
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. This provision reads in part:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
....
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance

with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under PD

No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. . . .
(Emphasis added)
The phrase "errors of fact or law or both" found in Rule 42, 2 and
the phrase "any question of law or fact" in Rule 44, 15 must,
therefore, be understood to mean "question of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law" when referring to cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The reason for this is
simple. Rule 42, 2 and Rule 44, 15 are procedural rules, and it is
conventional learning that procedural rules cannot amend or change
substantive laws, such as the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1948
(R.A. No. 296), and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.
Blg. 129).
As petitioner's appeal did not involve either a question of fact or a
mixed question of fact and law, but solely a question of law, resort
to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal was erroneous,
and therefore the appeal was correctly dismissed. Under no
circumstance can the appeal be taken to the Court of Appeals
without violating the Judiciary Act of 1948 and B.P. Blg. 129.
Third. Petitioner's remedy was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, 1 for, as already shown, the question raised is not an error
of law but an alleged error of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129, 9 by means
of special civil action of certiorari. Such petition should have been
brought within 60 days from notice to petitioner of the ruling of the
trial court, which is now long over.1wphi1.nt
Nonetheless, the majority argues that this Court should relax the
rules and decide directly the question raised by petitioner in the
Court of Appeals, namely, whether the trial court could correct the
penalty imposed on petitioner after its decision had become final. It
is contended that this is necessary because a constitutional right of
petitioner has been violated, i.e., the right of petitioner not to be
placed in double jeopardy.

Rules governing jurisdiction and the procedure for appeals as

discussed above are not mere technicalities. They are part and
parcel of the system of doing justice. It is justice according to law
which we administer. As the majority notes, Rule 115, 1(i) gives
every accused the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction.
The same Rule provides, however, that the exercise of the right to
appeal must be "in the manner prescribed by law."
Nor is it tenable to invoke "demands of substantial justice" in this
case as ground for setting aside the rules. Justice is due the State
and the complainant in the criminal case as much as it is due
petitioner. Again and again, the majority harps on the fact that the
decision of the trial court had already become final and therefore it
could no longer be modified even if that was to correct a plain error
in computing the penalty. We are told that petitioner has the right
not to be placed in double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. This is not however the issue before this Court. The issue
here is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's
appeal (1) because appeals in cases in which the only error assigned
is a question of law are exclusively cognizable by this Court and
petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, not a
mere notice of appeal given to the trial court and (2) because
petitioner's remedy was really a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65.
It is I think misplaced sentimentality to argue on the constitutional
right of petitioner when he had his remedies to seek vindication of
this right but lost them by default by failing to avail himself of those
remedies in the law. What about the right of the State and of
complainant to have the correct penalty imposed on petitioner who
does not question his conviction? After all, the mistake in the
imposition of the penalty was that of the trial court, not that of the
State and the complainant.
The demands of justice would seem to indicate that petitioner be
not allowed to invoke the finality of the erroneous sentence in order
to escape his just deserts. After all, what the trial court did in this
case was to correct an error it had made in fixing the maximum term
of the sentence on petitioner. Petitioner, who does not question his

liability for bigamy, can claim no vested right in the erroneous

sentence.
To summarize them, petitioner had remedies available to him for the
correction of an error allegedly committed by the trial court. But he
lost those remedies by default. We cannot set aside the rules just so
he will be able to raise the questions which he sought to raise in the
Court of Appeals. We must abide by our rules. This is the essence of
the Rule of Law.
I vote therefore to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
PHILIP YU, Petitioner, - versus - 31\.eublic of tbe tlbiliines
~upreme lthe Philippine Islands, and Hector I. Galura, G.R. No.
159926, January 20, 2014, 714 SCRA 226, 241. 20 A/ha v. Court of
Appeals, 503 Phil. 451, 462 (2005). l'i 21 Pinasukan Seafood /-louse,
Roxas Bouley Ard, Inc. v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, now Bank
of' the Philippine Island~, and Hector I. Galura, supra note I 9, at
243. cf Decision - 8 - G.R. No. 200072 his person. 22 As a rule,
Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does
not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, however, enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem when
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over
the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. 23 Said
section provides: Section 15. Extraterritorial service. - When the
defendant docs not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or
the subject or which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by
leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service
as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant,

or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not
be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant
must answer. (l 7a) Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant
who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served
with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: ( l) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintifj; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; or ( 4) when the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines. 24 In these
instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the
country, with leave of comi; (2) by publication and sending a copy of
the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by
any other means the judge may consider ff~ . 25 su 1cient. 22 2~ 24
15 Romualdez-licaros v. licaros, 449 Phil. 824, 833 (2003). Macasaet
v. Co, Jr.,G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 200.
Ro11111aldez-licaros v. Licarns, supra note 22, at 835. Id. {/!
Decision - 9 - G.R. No. 200072 In the present case, it is undisputed
that when Philip filed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, an action which affects his personal status, Viveca was
already residing in the United States of America. Thus,
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served
on Viveca, a non-resident defendant who is not found in the
Philippines. In compliance therewith, Philip claims that Viveca was
duly served summons because: ( l) copies of the summons,
complaint, and order of the Batangas court were published in
Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation on March 27, 2008 and
April 3, 2008; 26 and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons,
complaint, and order of the Batangas court on Viveca at their
conjugal home in Pasig City, her last known address. 27 Thus, he
contends that the second mode of extraterritorial service of
summons mentioned above - by publication and sending a copy of
the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendant's last known address - was sufficiently complied with. The

Court finds, however, that such service of summons on their

conjugal home address cannot be deemed compliant with the
requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception
warranting the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment. Philip
fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as
Viveca's "last known address," well within the true meaning and
intent of the rules. But as borne by the records of the instant case,
not only is he mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his
claims of good faith. First and foremost, it is undisputed that the
parties herein are also parties in a Legal Separation case, previously
filed by Viveca way back in 1994. There was, in said case, a
disclosure of their basic personal information, which customarily
includes their respective local addresses, wherein they may be
served with court papers. In fact, as pointed out by the appellate
court, Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal home
and moved to a different local address for purposes of the pendency
of the Legal Separation case, as shown by his stipulation in his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim that "after abandoning the
conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner resided at her
parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her
present address in October 1993." Thus, Philip cannot be allowed to
feign ignorance to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally
abandoned their conjugal abode and that of all the addresses that
Viveca resided at, their conjugal home in Horizon Condominium is
her least recent address. In fact, it may very well be considered as
the address she is least likely to be found considering the
circumstances in which she left the same. Note that from the very
beginning of the Legal Separation case in 1994, all the way up until
the promulgation by the Pasig R TC of its decision thereon in 2009,
there is no showing that Viveca had ever received any document in
relation to said case, 26 27 Rollo, p. 11. Id. at 12. ~ Decision - 10 G.R. No. 200072 nor is there any proof that Philip had ever sent any
pertinent file to Viveca, at the conjugal address. There is, therefore,
no reason for Philip to assume, in good faith, that said address is in
truth and in fact Viveca's "last known address" at which she may
receive summons. His contention that the rules require the
defendant's "last known address" to be of a permanent, and not of a
temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence. In addition,
the Court is curious as to why Philip filed the instant Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage28 before the RTC of Batangas City

on February 15, 2008 when less than a year before filing the same,
he had motioned the RTC of Pasig City on April 24, 2007 to withdraw
his counterclaim for the same declaration of nullity of marriage. 29
In his petition before the Court, Philip explained that he withdrew
his counterclaim in the Legal Separation case in his "desire to
explore the possibility of having a so-called 'universal settlement' of
all the pending cases with respondent and her relatives for the sake
of his love for his four (4) children."30 Yet, in an apparent, direct
contravention of this so-called "desire," he filed an identical action
which sought the same nullity of his marriage with Viveca. Thus,
while there may be no outright admission on Philip's part as to a
sinister motive, his inconsistent actions effectively negate his
claims of good faith. It is interesting to note, moreover, that as
pointed out by Viveca, Philip does not even reside in Batangas, the
city of the court wherein he filed his Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage. In a Certification31 issued by Ricardo V.
Bautista, Barangay Chairman of Poblacion l, Calatagan, Batangas, it
was categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is not a resident of
Barangay Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas." Section 4 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, otherwise known as the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, provides: Section 4.
Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in the
case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. 32 It is, therefore,
evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous Motion to
Withdraw his Counterclaim for the Declaration of Nullity of 28 2l) J()
JI 12 Id. at 52-60. Id. at 39. Id. at 27. Id. at 226. Emphasis supplied. /
Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 200072 marriage, he even violated a basic
mandate of law so as to be able to file the same action before a
different court in a city he was not even a resident of. Thus, while
individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful
circumstances may not instantly amount to extrinsic fraud, these
circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each other, paint a
deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's
constitutional right to due process. True, the service of summons in
this case is not for the purpose of vesting the court with

jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements

of fair play or due process. But because of Philip's employment of
deceptive means in the service of summons on Viveca, said purpose
of satisfying the due process requirements was never accomplished.
To this Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas comi that
Viveca's last known address was still their conjugal home with full
and undisputed knowledge that she had already intentionally
abandoned the same and had even established a more recent, local
residence herein evinces a clear lack of good faith. As a result,
Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage suit, only finding out about the same when the
Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal Separation
case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons
at the erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented from
participating in the proceedings thereon. In Acance v. Court of
Appeals,33 where the extraterritorial service of summons on the
non-resident, US citizen, defendants therein were held to be
defective due to the absence of proof that the summons, complaint,
and order of the court were duly served at their last known correct
address, the Court ruled that"the failure to strictly comply correctly
with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies
of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in
the service of summons:M Citing Dulap, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,35 it elucidated as follows: JJ 3,1 J5 16 It is the duty of the court
to require the fullest compliance with all the requirements of the
statute permitting service by publication. Where service is obtained
by publication, the entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized
by the courts and a strict compliance with every condition of law
should be exacted. Otherwise great abuses may occur, and the
rights of persons and property may be made to depend upon the
elastic conscience of interested parties rather than the enlightened
judgment or 1 . d 36 t 1e court or JU ge. 493 Phil. 676 (2005).
Acance v. Court ojAppeals, supra, at 688. 149 Phil. 636 (1971).
Dulap, el al. v. Court o/Appeals, supra, at 649. (Citation omitted) c/f
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 200072 Indeed, due process requires that
those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. 37 When defendants are
deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even be
informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed
by the prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of

their due process rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof

necessarily suffers a fatal infirmity for courts, as guardians of
constitutional rights cannot be expected to deny persons their due
process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within
their jurisdiction.38 This Comi, therefore, deems as proper the
annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued without proper
service of summons. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 30, 2011
and Resolution dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 1 I 1414 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 147387

December 10, 2003

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO,

and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN BEHALF
AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 152161
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section
14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official,

whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was
filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M. Garcia, Francis G. Escudero
and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the
petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of
Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the Executive
Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano
R. Belmonte, Jr., the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the
Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A.
Salapuddin, then also a member of the House of Representatives.
Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free,
Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills
originating from the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled "AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF
MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES;"1

Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled "AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE
HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE
ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES."2

A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of

the Senate3 and sixteen (16) members of the House of
Representatives,4 was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions
of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee
submitted its Report,5 signed by its members, recommending the
approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on
February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras proposed an amendment to
the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P.
Dilangalen raised a point of order commenting that the House could
no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep. Sergio A.F. Apostol
thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral
Conference Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto.
Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the proposal. However,
upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the
return of the report to the Bicameral Conference Committee for
proper action.6
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives
elected anew its conferees7 to the Bicameral Conference
Committee.8 Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of
Rep. Ignacio R. Bunye, the House elected another set of
conferees9 to the Bicameral Conference Committee.10
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that the House consider the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen
observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral
Conference Report was a new one, and was a result of the
reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep.
Dilangalen then asked that he be given time to examine the new
report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the
approval of the report until the other members were given a copy
thereof.11

After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote

on the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742. The House approved the
report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no
abstention. In explaining their negative votes, Reps. Farias and
Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider.
Even Rep. Escudero, who voted in the affirmative, expressed his
doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his
vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the
Bicameral Conference Committee Report and asked if this procedure
was regular.12
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of SB
No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate
President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then Speaker of the House of
Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by
the Secretary of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives Robert P. Nazareno as "the
consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742," and
"finally passed by both Houses on February 7, 2001."
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into
law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation
of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the
subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for

election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices,

while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act
No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact
Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive
officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective
official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is
no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his
certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office
even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective
position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered
ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its
entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law,
not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that "[t]his Act shall take effect
upon its approval" is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of
the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus

Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed.
The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,13 that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the "Accountability of Public Officers:" 14
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of
the House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the
May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the
filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, urge this Court to dismiss the petitions contending,
preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute
the present suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were
overruled by the majority of the members of the House of
Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have
suffered harm as a result of the passage of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the
assailed statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power.
Invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the
petitioners allegations that "irregularities" attended the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification
signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses of Congress,
constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a proscribed
rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the

Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the
Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through Fair Election Practices," is so broad that it encompasses all
the processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of
certificates of candidacy by elective officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general
subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it eliminates
the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official
by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the
one which he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by
including the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the "unfairness" of
considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for another elective
office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are now
placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their
respective terms even if they run for any office, whether the
presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code need not be expressly stated in the title of Rep. Act
No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the
act a complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient
that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing
each and every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section
26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of
an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere
details need not be set forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective
officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive officials. A
substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials;
elective officials occupy their office by virtue of their mandate based

upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected
by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as
the former. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the "Effectivity" clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006
does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constitution as it
does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of
violations thereof presume that the formalities of the law would be
observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would
be entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court
having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue about lack of due process
is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and
Secretary General of the House of Representatives did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those
members thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001
elections. These respondents merely complied with Rep. Act No.
9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared
otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first
rule on the procedural issue raised by the respondents, i.e.,
whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to
file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as
members of the House of Representatives, and as taxpayers and
registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15 The rationale for requiring a party who challenges
the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal stake in

the outcome of the controversy is "to assure that concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."16
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several
cases involving issues of "overarching significance to our
society,"17 had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad
v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,18 this Court brushed aside
the procedural requirement of standing, took cognizance of, and
subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator
Francisco Tatad and several members of the House of
Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180
(An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then
members of the House of Representatives which impugned as
unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734
(Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in
Chiongbian v. Orbos.19 Similarly, the Court took cognizance of the
petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other
petitioners, which challenged the validity of Rep. Act No. 7716
(Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance.20
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise
allowed by this Court to challenge the validity of acts, decisions,
rulings, or orders of various government agencies or
instrumentalities in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,21 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,22 Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,23 Albano v. Reyes,24 and
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.25
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which this Court had
declared in Dimaporo26 as deriving its existence from the
constitutional provision on accountability of public officers, has
been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of
"overarching significance" that justifies this Courts adoption of a

liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter on standing. Moreover,

with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves
the Court to confront the issue now and resolve the same
forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is quite
apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of
public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now
resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional character of
the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and
the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the national elections beings
barely six months away, reinforce our stand.27
Every statute is presumed valid.28 The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one
which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the
specific purpose of the law.29
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law.30 And where the acts of the other
branches of government run afoul of the Constitution, it is the
judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same.31
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the
substantial issues raised by the petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No.
6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the
third paragraph of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered
ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules

and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions

of this Act are hereby repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus
bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or
unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of
an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.33
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and
not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every
end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of
that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be
an abstract or index of the Act.34
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the
declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the

election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of media of
communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal
opportunity for public service, including access to media time and
space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and fora among candidates and assure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public
office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.35
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act
No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the
title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. 36
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use
of media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subjectone title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.37
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the
particular matter are particularly instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it
broader so that it would cover this provision [referring to the repeal

of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? Thats

all. Because I believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the
nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that
even with the term "fair election practice," it really covers it,
because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted
earlier seemed unfair and it is an election practice and, therefore, I
think, Im very comfortable with the title "Fair Election Practice" so
that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back
again until we find the title. I mean, its one provision which I think
is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation
actually provides for fairness in election practices as the title
implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with.
To me, ha, its not a very touchy issue. For me, its even a very
correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in
the Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos
na, then we come back as a Bicam just for the title Is that what
youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly
bear with us. Im happy that there is already one comfortable
senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it.
But it would be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all
comfortable with it.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):

Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is
true that the bulk of provisions deals with the area of propaganda
and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that
indulge full coverage. It says "An Act to enhance the holding of free,
orderly, honest ... elections through fair election practices." But as
you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section
2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in that it says that it shall
ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the
existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment or
discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the
playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a
rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had
very clearly put it, that it is covered in the Declaration of Principles
and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House
contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it
expressly provides for fair election practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this,
but we are looking for a title that is more generic so that then we
have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the
theory. So, there is acceptance of this.

Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe

we should say the special provision on elected officials. So how is
that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be
changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use "An Act rationalizing the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, amending for
the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election
Code?"
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why dont we remove "fair" and then this shall be cited as Election
Practices Act?"
REP. PICHAY:
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:

The Fair Election.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to
enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and ensure
equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be "Fair Election Act."

The rest wala nang problema ano?

VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, "This Act ..."
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Youre back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is "An Act to enhance the holding ..."
Thats the House version, eh, dahil pareho, hindi ba? Then the short
title "This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act." 38
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
as a form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away
with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure

into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may
believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive
dominion of the political branches of the government.39 It is not for
this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised
in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the
legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.40 Congress is not
precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in
Dimaporo v. Mitra41 upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the
law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and
the paramount objective of election laws the fair, honest and
orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that
the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the
public.42 In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were
not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members
of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution43

The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates
the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings
are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
the other.44 The Court has explained the nature of the equal
protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.45
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.46 On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office
by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity
and are entitled to security of tenure47 while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.48
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the

civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan

political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part
in political and electoral activities.49
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep.
Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the entire law should be
nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of
the said law particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued
thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee)
members by the House during its session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the
compromise bill submitted by the BCC on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for
approval on the floor without copies thereof being furnished the
members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report
submitted by it was not signed by the Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof

as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and

rammed for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and
that its alleged Report was instantly made and passed around for
the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of
the first one that convened on November 23, 2000;
g. The "Effectivity" clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well
as that of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC that convened
on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with the
publication required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it
appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the provision that "This Act
shall take effect immediately upon its approval;"
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC
that was furnished the members during its consideration on
February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now appears in
RA No. 9006, but 16 of the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742,
reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7,
2001, did not "contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure;" and
j. The disappearance of the "Cayetano amendment," which is
Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by the BCC. In fact, this
was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the
compromise bill of Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof.
The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who
runs for president and vice-president shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.50

The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy
of the bill. The Court is not persuaded. Under the "enrolled bill
doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Courts consistent
adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g.,
creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the
House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern.52 Whatever doubts there
may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be
resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v. De
Venecia,53 viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression,
all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own
rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the "Effectivity" clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006
which provides that it "shall take effect immediately upon its
approval," is defective. However, the same does not render the

entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, 54 this Court laid down the
rule:
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be
shortened or extended.55
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code56 and the doctrine enunciated in
Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement,
took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or
a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve
themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.57 No such transgression has been shown
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053 January 2, 1997
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The case before us stemmed from a verified complaint filed by
Spouses Makadaya and Usodan Sadik charging Judge Abdallah
Casar, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao
del Norte with misconduct and misappropriation.
Judge Casar filed his answer dated February 28, 1995 averring that
the complaint is merely for harassment and intended to ruin his
reputation.
In the resolution of August 14, 1995, this Court referred this case to
Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City and Lanao del Norte, Branch 6 for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 25, 1995, the
Investigating Judge made the following findings:
The basic facts are not in dispute are not in dispute, to wit:
1. On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life
insurance with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife) in Cotabato City, Exh. 5. The application was approved
and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her name for the amount of
P30,000.00 with an accidental death benefit rider. Named as
beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya
Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.
2. On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died in Pagayawan, Tampara,
Lanao del Sur.
3. The beneficiaries and/or through their representatives sought for
and obtained the assistance of respondent, who was then a trial
attorney of the Bureau of Forest Development, Cotabato City, to
pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the insurance
benefits with Grepalife. Respondent made the necessary follow-ups
but in due course Grepalife denied the claim on the grounds of
misrepresentation and concealment.

4. On October 10, 1986, respondent, as counsel for the

beneficiaries, filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13,
Cotabato City which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2747
entitled: "Makadaya L. Sadik and Linang Minalang, plaintiffs versus
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, defendant" for Specific
Performance.
5. On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the
latter to pay to the former the sum of P30,000.00 as "benefit due
them under Insurance Policy No. 503033." The court denied
plaintiffs" claim for double indemnity of P60,000.00 under the
accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was already the
presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kolambugan-Maigo (now, MCTC of Kolambugan-Tangcal), having
assumed such office on September 1, 1989, EXh.7.
6. Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs
filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals even as defendant
likewise filed an appeal. Respondent represented the plaintiffs in
the appeal. On September 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Defendant elevated
the case on petition for review to the Supreme Court which
dismissed the petition.
7. After the dismissal of its petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife
filed a Manifestation dated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring its willingness to pay the judgment
award and depositing with said court RCBC check No. 62837 in the
amount of P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs. Copy of the
manifestation was furnished to "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, Counsel for
the Plaintiffs, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte" (pp. 44 & 55, Records).
8. On October 1, 1992, respondent collected the check from the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Br, 13, Cotabato City and
thereafter cashed it.
9. Respondent did not deliver the said money judgment to the
plaintiffs.

10. On January 26, 1995, complainants filed their administrative

complaint.
Respondent admitted that he retained the sum of P30,000.00
representing the judgment award in civil Case No. 2747 and that he
did not deliver it to the plaintiffs. He interposes the following
defenses:
1. He is not guilty of any misconduct because he accepted the case
long before he became a judge;
2. He did not misappropriate the money he collected from the court.
It is intact but he has the right to retain the amount of P30,000.00
until he is paid his expenses pursuant to Section 137, Rule 138 on
attorney's lien;
3. The complainant, Makadaya Sadik is not the real Makadaya Sadik,
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747 and being an impostor she is not
entitled to the money.
There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the
complaint in behalf of Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang, he was
not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a trial attorney of the
Bureau of Forest Development. He claimed that he was authorized
to engage in practice in behalf of relatives but presented no
documentary authority. He continued to represent the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 2747 when he joined the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office in a private capacity. In fact he took pains to emphasize that
he handled the case not as a CLAO lawyer (tsn, p. 39; 11-13-95)
although in his notices of change of address, he gave his new
addresses as follows: "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, CLAO, Capitol,
Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte" Exh. 10 and "CLAO, Kabacan
District Office, Municipal Hall Bldg., Kabacan, Province of Cotabato"
Exh. 11. (pp. 119-120, Records). Similarly in his Memorandum dated
24 October 1988, he signed as "Attorney for Plaintiffs, CLAO,
Kabacan, Cotabato," Exh. B (pp. 89-96, Records). In those instances,
while he was actually prosecuting the case in his private capacity,
he gave the impression that he was handling the case for the CLAO.
By his own admission, he was engaged in a private practice while
employed as trial attorney with the BFD and citizen's attorney with
the CLAO. He failed to produce proof of authority. But as he

correctly states, those were acts performed before he joined the

judiciary. However, he failed to mention that even after he became a
municipal judge, he continued to act as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 2747 on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. He assumed office on September 1, 1989. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court was rendered on November 17,
1989. He filed an appeal in behalf of the plaintiffs even as Grepalife
also appealed. He testified:
"Q. After that what happened?
A. The case' decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
eventually appealed again to the Supreme Court where I made
several manifestations". (tsn, p. 36; 11/13/95).
He actively handled the case on appeal. He violated Rule 5:07 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "A judge shall not engage
in the private practice of law." He reasoned out that he was forced
to continue as counsel for the plaintiffs because he failed to get in
touch with them after he received the decision of the lower court.
He even went to Davao to look for them but failed. A transparent
and flimsy justification. At that time he was stationed in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. He knew that plaintiffs are from
Pagayawan, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. He is himself a native of
Tatayawon, Tamparan. He could have easily went to his hometown
or sent someone there to get in touch with plaintiffs. He did not
have to go to Davao which is much further from Kolambugan than
Tamparan. At any rate failure to contact his clients is not reason
enough to continue as counsel for plaintiffs on appeal. The least
which he should have done was to secure permission from the
Supreme Court before proceeding with the case on appeal.
He also denies having converted and misappropriated the judgment
award of P30,000.00. He claims the amount is intact but he has the
right to retain the same until he is paid for his expenses pursuant to
Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Rule of Court. He declared:
"A. They failed to come and for all these, I estimated my expenses
to be more than Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
Q. What is your right in getting the amount of P30,000.00?

A. Well, pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court

known as attorney's liens by virtue of that I have the right to retain
the amount until payment of my expenses was paid . . ." (sic) (tsn,
pp. 38-39; 11/13/95).
This is ridiculous. The judgment award is only P30,000.00 but he
spent more than P30,000.00 to recover it. Thus despite winning the
case, the client could not collect a single cent and will still have to
pay his lawyer. This may be one reason why the ordinary layman
holds an unflattering perception of lawyers.
His evidence fails to prove the amount of expenses claimed by him.
He said that to follow-up the claim, he went to Manila six times
spending for fare alone P3000.00 for each trip. When the case was
on appeal to the Supreme Court, he went to Manila to follow-up
thrice (tsn, p. 38; 11/13/95). Except for his uncorroborated
testimony, there are only two documents showing he was indeed in
Manila. Those are Exhs. 26 and 32 indicating that he personally
served those letters to Grepalife in Manila. But there is no evidence
that he went there for this purpose alone. It is highly probable that
the visit to Grepalife was merely one of his purposes in going to
Manila. On the other hand, his claim that he went to Manila three
times to follow-up the case while it was pending with the Supreme
Court is unworthy of credence. He was then already a municipal
judge. He could not have openly exposed himself to the Supreme
Court as being engaged in private practice. Besides there is no
reason to follow-up in person any case with the Supreme Court.
Similarly, his claims that he spent a lot of money in looking for
witnesses and trying to trace the whereabouts of his clients are
self-serving, devoid of corroboration and unsupported by document
evidence. Finally, he presented the receipts for the payment of
docket fees in the amount of P580.00, Exhs. 28 and 29, which he
alleges was paid by him out of his own pocket. Standing alone,
those receipts do not prove his claim. The normal practice is for the
client to advance to his lawyer the amount for the filing fees. It is
the lawyer who pays the docket fees and he can easily procure the
issuance of the receipts in his own name. Complainant Makadaya
Sadik declared that her husband took care of the payment of the
docket fees. Respondent did not cross-examine Usodan Sadik on
this point.

In sum, respondent failed to show by clear and convincing evidence

that he did indeed spent more than P30,000.00 to prosecute the
insurance claim. His various claims of expenses for travels to
Manila, to find witnesses and to look for his clients are all designed
to inflate his demand for reimbursement and justify his withholding
of the judgment award from his clients. To be generous, the sum of
P6,000.00 corresponding to his trips to Manila in March and May,
1986 may be allowed. Added to that may be his claim for attorney's
fees, although to be generous again, he is not really entitled to it.
From the testimonies of both Usodan Sadik and respondent, it
appears that there was an agreement for the payment of
P10,000.00 if respondent succeeds in recovering the sum of
P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. But this amount was
not obtained and only the basic claim of P30,000.00 was adjudged
by the court. It is logical to assume that in such case, the amount of
attorney's fees should also be proportionally reduced to P5,000.00.
Thus his total claim is not more than P11,000.00. Nonetheless, it
appears that his reliance on Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is nothing more than an afterthought. If indeed, he was
claiming attorney's lien pursuant to said section, then he should
have known that to be entitled thereto he must comply with.certain
pre-conditions. Said section provides that with respect to judgments
for payment of money, like in Civil Case No. 2747, a lawyer shall
have a lien thereto "from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment . . . and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and the
adverse party." From July, 1993 when he learned of the dismissal of
Grepalife's petition by the Supreme Court until now, he did not file
the necessary pleadings to enforce his alleged lien. It surfaces only
when the administrative case was filed.
His last line of defense is that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is
not the real Makadaya Sadik who is the beneficiary of Lekiya Paito
and plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747. He declared:
A. As far as I know they were recruited as witnesses.
COURT: Q. You said they, are you referring to Usodan Sadik and
Makadaya Sadik?

A. Yes, Your Honor, because of the failure of the beneficiaries to

come to Court.
COURT: Proceed.
Judge Casar:
Q. Do you have any evidence for that, that Makadaya Sadik or
referring to these persons who are complainants, Usodan Sadik and
Makadaya Sadik were recruited to testify in this case, but these are
not the true complainants?
A. Yes.
Q. Who recruited them?
A. The claimants. (tsn, pp. 21-22; 11/13/95).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: WHO FAILED TO APPEAR?
A. Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang despite notice. The
claimants failed to appear and procured another persons (sic) who
are impostors. This Kunug Minalang and Sadik Paito took charge of
the witnesses and they presented another witnesses (sic).
COURT: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. ANOTHER WITNESSES OR
ANOTHER PERSON WAS PRESENTED TO TESTIFY AS LINANG
MINALANG AND SADIK?
A. At that time we needed more witnesses so the parties and
Barogong Paito agreed to testify but two persons who are principal
witnesses failed to come.
COURT: SO WHEN THEY FAILED TO COME, WHAT DID SADIK PAITO
DO?
A. They took charge of presenting another witnesses (sic).

Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "TOOK CHARGE", YOU MEAN, THEY

PRESENTED TO YOU PERSONS WHO WERE NOT REALLY LINANG
MINALANG AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. They told me that instead of them who could not go to court, they
faked another persons (sic).
Q. AND THESE PERSONS WHO WERE FAKED APPEARED AND
TESTIFIED AS LINANG MINALANG AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. As a matter of fact, only Makadaya Sadik took the stand because
Linang Minalang failed to come.
Q. MAKADAYA SADIK TESTIFIED IN COURT?
A. In reality, Makadaya Sadik failed to appear also.
Q. BUT SOMEBODY TESTIFIED AS IF HE IS MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. Yes.
Q. I WANT THIS VERY CLEAR, HADJI SARIP PAITO PRESENTED TO YOU
ANOTHER PERSON WHO CLAIM TO BE MAKADAYA SADIK BUT HE IS
REALLY NOT MAKADAYA?
A. Yes.
Q. AND THAT PERSON WHO ACTUALLY TESTIFIED CLAIMING TO BE
MAKADAYA SADIK WAS THE PERSON WHO TESTIFIED THE LAST TIME
AS MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. That is what I can recall.
COURT: PROCEED.
Judge Casar:
Q. What was the arrangement for that matter for the recruitment of
other substitute witnesses?
A. Well, I told my client, I have to give them Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos.

COURT: TO WHOM WILL THE P5,000.00 BE PAID?

A. To the substitute witnesses.
Q. YOU TOLD SARIP PAITO AND KUNUG MINALANG THAT THESE
WITNESSES BE PAID P5,000.00?
A. Yes.
Q. DID THEY AGREE?
A. I presume so because they testified.
Q. KUNUG MINALANG AND SARIP PAITO AGREED THAT THE P5,000.00
BE PAID TO THE SUBSTITUTE WITNESSES?
A. Seems to me that they agreed. (tsn, pp.34-36; 11/13/95).
By his own categorical admission, he deliberately, knowingly and
willfully agreed to procure a substitute witness, an impostor, to
pose as claimant Makadaya Sadik and testify in Civil Case No. 2747.
He even proposed that such witness be paid P5,000.00. And he
actually presented such witness as Makadaya Sadik in that case and
that impostor is the Makadaya Sadik who is the complainant in this
case. She is, respondent says, the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito, the
daughter of Batobarani Lugpangan and another woman (tsn, p. 17;
11/13/95). By any language, this is subornation of perjury.
To make matters worse, he declared that even before he filed the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2747, he was already informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulent. Thus:
"Q. What else happened?
A. Naga Datumanong approached me and told me about the facts of
the case and that this was done by unscrupulous persons.
COURT: WHAT WAS DONE BY UNSCRUPULOUS PERSONS?
A. The insurance application of Lekiya Paito, in fact, at the time of
the insurance, Lekiya Paito was killed in her hometown.

COURT: YOU MEAN LEKIYA PAITO WAS ALREADY SICK WHEN THE
INSURANCE FORM WAS MADE?
A. Yes, she was sick in Pagayawan, not in Cotabato City.
Judge Casar: So, whose work is that insurance
A. As far as I know, that is the work of Usodan Hadji Ibrahim.
COURT: THIS USODAN HADJI IBRAHIM IS NOT THE PERSON NOW IN
COURT?
A. As far as I know, he is Usodan Ibrahim.
Q. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS OR THE PERSON WHO APPEARED AS
COMPLAINANT IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. As far as I know, he is not working with me.
Q. SO THAT THIS PERSON NAMED USODAN SADIK, ONE OF THE
COMPLAINANTS, IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. Yes.
Q. AND YOU NOW CLAIM THAT USODAN IBRAHIM WAS THE ONE WHO
PREPARED THE FRAUDULENT POLICY FOR LEKIYA PAITO?
A. As far as I was told. (tsn, pp. 30-31; 11/13/95).
Yet knowing that the insurance claim was fraudulent, he filed the
complaint and compounded it by presenting false witnesses in
court. He transgressed not only the Canons of Professional Ethics
but also the Revised Penal Code. In his single-minded intent to keep
the insurance proceeds for himself and deprive complainant
Makadaya Sadik of her share, respondent duga deep hole for
himself. His cure is worse than the disease.
It is possible that the insurance taken for Lekiya Paito was indeed a
scam. It is not an uncommon occurrence in these parts to insure a
person who is near death or for an insured to fake his death and
collect the proceeds. But scam or not we are convinced that the
complainant Makadaya Sadik is not an impostor. She denied that

she is the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the

youngest daughter and she named all her brothers and sisters. And
it was respondent who presented her in Civil Case No. 2747 as
Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of the
beneficiaries of the latter's insurance policy.
The Investigating Judge then recommended that a penalty ranging
from a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000. 00) pesos to suspension
for six (6) months be imposed depending on respondent's record.
Respondent was likewise ordered to pay to herein complainant,
Makadaya Sadik, the sum of fifteen thousand (P15,000.00) pesos
less the sum of five thousand five hundred (P5,500.00) pesos
equivalent to one-half of the expenses and attorney's fees
demanded by respondent.
In the resolution of March 13, 1996, this Court referred this case to
the Office of the Court Administrator fo revaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its memorandum of August 15, 1996, the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following findings and evaluation:
The undersigned concurs with the finding of Executive Judge Salazar
that respondent be found guilty of the charges of misconduct and
misappropriation, but differs insofar as the recommended penalty is
concerned. It is an established rule that the personal behavior of a
member of the judiciary in the performance of his official duties and
in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. Respondent's act of
collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court
of RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to his
client, complainant Makadaya Sadik and her sister, is an act of
misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or dishonesty.
His defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as
attorney's lien in unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the
judgment award allegedly to secure payment of litigation expenses
and attorney's fees. He had no authority to practice law while in
government service. In continuing to handle the case of herein
complainants against Grepalife after he joined the government and
without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive of
abuse of authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code

of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge to engage in the private

practice of law. He likewise violated the Attorney's Oath in agreeing
to file Civil Case No. 2747 for the purpose of claiming the insurance
proceeds from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for.
Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen from a fraudulent
act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in his
character.
This Court has held that: "A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will
raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty . . . He should ever
strive to preserve the good name of the court on which he sits and
avoid any indiscretion that will defile its probity. The respondent
has not lived up to these exacting standards. He has betrayed his
oath and debased his position. He has impaired the image of the
Judiciary to which he owes the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep
it at all times above suspicion and worthy of the people's trust. No
less importantly, he has also injured the herein complainant, who
has yet to receive the money entrusted to the respondent for the
satisfaction of the judgment that became final and executory more
than three years ago." (Dr. Ernesto J. Yuson vs. Judge Federico V.
Noel, AM No. RTJ-91-762, 1 October 1993).
Records show that in MTJ-92-728 filed by Mayor Perlita Libardos
against herein respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct, etc. he was fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned.
He has still five (5) other administrative cases docketed against him
namely: 1) MTJ-95-1048, for gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, violation of Section 7, 15 and 17 of Rule 37 of the
New Comelec Rules of Procedures, etc.; 2) 95-1061 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions; 3) OCA-IPI No. 95-59-MTJ
for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence; and 4) OCA IPI
No. 95-59-MTJ for Falsification of Public Documents. The first two (2)
cases are pending investigation by the Executive Judge while the
two (2) others are now pending with the Court with respondent's
Comment dated 29 November 1995 and 7 December 1995 and
pending evaluation by this Office, respectively.

It is clear from the facts established that respondent does not

deserve to remain in the service of the Judiciary where honesty,
probity and integrity are indispensable credentials.
It then recommended:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court
is our recommendation that: a) Judge Abdallah M. Casar, MCTC
Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao del Norte be DISMISSED from the
service with prejudice to his appointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
this accrued leave credits; and b) he be ORDERED to turnover to
complainant Makadaya-Sadik and Linang Minalang (co-plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 2747) the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
which he received from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 13,
Cotabato City last 1 October 1993 within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice.
The Court has thoroughly studied the record of this case and has
ascertained that the findings of the investigating judge, concurred
in by the Office of the Court Administrator, are adequately
supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal
principles. Consequently, the Court hereby adopts the OCA's
recommendation of meting out the supreme penalty of dismissal on
herein respondent judge.
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to
promote justice. 1 However, the reality of justice depends, above all,
on the intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men and
women who are called to serve as our judges. 2 In a piece written by
Rosenberg, this point was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe
Pound remarked, "men count more than machinery." Assume the
clearest rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most
sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In
the long run, "There is no guarantee of justice except the
personality of the judge. The reason the judge makes or breaks the
system of justice is that rules are not self-declaring or self-applying.
Even in a government of laws, men make the decisions." 3

In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin

E. Arceo, 4 the Court emphasized the importance of the role played
by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is
able to administer justice but also upon the perception and
confidence of the community that the people who run the system
have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the
law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence,
in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private
lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating
confidence in the judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable
qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal
profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the
legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was
succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a
thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine,
higher education, or business into general disrepute. But judges are
different and more representative; revelations of judicial corruption
create suspicion and loss of confidence in legal processes generally
and endanger public respect for law. 5
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of
exceptional integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring
these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the judge
acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen.
Hence, being in a position of such grave responsibility in the
administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in a manner
befitting the dignity of such exalted office.

Respondent judge, however, not only failed in this respect but

proved himself repeatedly unworthy of his post.
The records show that even after he became judge, respondent
acted as counsel for herein complainants and misappropriated the
judgment award of P30,000.00 which rightfully belongs to
complainants. Moreover, respondent's line of defense revealed a
significant and deplorable flaw in his character. In hoping to redeem
himself, he categorically admitted that he deliberately, knowingly
and willfully agreed to handle a case involving a fraudulent
insurance claim and in the process procured and presented false
witnesses in court. Under the circumstances, this Court is amazed at
how brazen respondent has comported himself and without
compunctions at leaving a "paper trail" behind him.
This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined
P5,000.00 and sternly warned for knowingly issuing an order
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. 6 Moreover,
he has four other administrative cases docketed against him
involving various charges such as gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and
falsification of public documents.
Respondent judge's seeming propensity to transgress the very law
he is sworn to uphold makes him unfit to discharge the functions of
a judge. Judicial office demands the best possible men and this
Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards effective and efficient administration
of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
WHEREFORE, Judge Abdallah M. Casar is hereby DISMISSED from the
service for misconduct and misappropriation with FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. He is further ordered to turn over to complainant
Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) which he received from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Branch 13, Cotabato City last October 1,1993.

This judgment is immediately executory and the respondent judge is

further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions
of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy be entered in
the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. MTJ-95-1053 January 2, 1997
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The case before us stemmed from a verified complaint filed by
Spouses Makadaya and Usodan Sadik charging Judge Abdallah
Casar, Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao
del Norte with misconduct and misappropriation.
Judge Casar filed his answer dated February 28, 1995 averring that
the complaint is merely for harassment and intended to ruin his
reputation.
In the resolution of August 14, 1995, this Court referred this case to
Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City and Lanao del Norte, Branch 6 for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 25, 1995, the
Investigating Judge made the following findings:
The basic facts are not in dispute are not in dispute, to wit:
1. On February 14, 1985, one Lekiya Paito filed an application for life
insurance with the Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation
(Grepalife) in Cotabato City, Exh. 5. The application was approved
and Policy No. 0503033 was issued in her name for the amount of
P30,000.00 with an accidental death benefit rider. Named as

beneficiaries were her daughters, Linang Minalang and Makadaya

Sadik. She paid the initial premium of P410.00.
2. On October 12, 1985, Lekiya Paito died in Pagayawan, Tampara,
Lanao del Sur.
3. The beneficiaries and/or through their representatives sought for
and obtained the assistance of respondent, who was then a trial
attorney of the Bureau of Forest Development, Cotabato City, to
pursue the approval of their claim for payment of the insurance
benefits with Grepalife. Respondent made the necessary follow-ups
but in due course Grepalife denied the claim on the grounds of
misrepresentation and concealment.
4. On October 10, 1986, respondent, as counsel for the
beneficiaries, filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court, Br. 13,
Cotabato City which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2747
entitled: "Makadaya L. Sadik and Linang Minalang, plaintiffs versus
Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, defendant" for Specific
Performance.
5. On November 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the
latter to pay to the former the sum of P30,000.00 as "benefit due
them under Insurance Policy No. 503033." The court denied
plaintiffs" claim for double indemnity of P60,000.00 under the
accidental death rider. At this time, respondent was already the
presiding Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Kolambugan-Maigo (now, MCTC of Kolambugan-Tangcal), having
assumed such office on September 1, 1989, EXh.7.
6. Upon receipt of the decision, respondent as counsel for plaintiffs
filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals even as defendant
likewise filed an appeal. Respondent represented the plaintiffs in
the appeal. On September 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Defendant elevated
the case on petition for review to the Supreme Court which
dismissed the petition.
7. After the dismissal of its petition by the Supreme Court, Grepalife
filed a Manifestation dated 6 July 1993 with the Regional Trial Court,

Br. 13, Cotabato City declaring its willingness to pay the judgment
award and depositing with said court RCBC check No. 62837 in the
amount of P30,000.00 payable to the plaintiffs. Copy of the
manifestation was furnished to "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, Counsel for
the Plaintiffs, Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte" (pp. 44 & 55, Records).
8. On October 1, 1992, respondent collected the check from the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Br, 13, Cotabato City and
thereafter cashed it.
9. Respondent did not deliver the said money judgment to the
plaintiffs.
10. On January 26, 1995, complainants filed their administrative
complaint.
Respondent admitted that he retained the sum of P30,000.00
representing the judgment award in civil Case No. 2747 and that he
did not deliver it to the plaintiffs. He interposes the following
defenses:
1. He is not guilty of any misconduct because he accepted the case
long before he became a judge;
2. He did not misappropriate the money he collected from the court.
It is intact but he has the right to retain the amount of P30,000.00
until he is paid his expenses pursuant to Section 137, Rule 138 on
attorney's lien;
3. The complainant, Makadaya Sadik is not the real Makadaya Sadik,
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747 and being an impostor she is not
entitled to the money.
There is no dispute that when respondent agreed to file the
complaint in behalf of Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang, he was
not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a trial attorney of the
Bureau of Forest Development. He claimed that he was authorized
to engage in practice in behalf of relatives but presented no
documentary authority. He continued to represent the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 2747 when he joined the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office in a private capacity. In fact he took pains to emphasize that

he handled the case not as a CLAO lawyer (tsn, p. 39; 11-13-95)

although in his notices of change of address, he gave his new
addresses as follows: "Atty. Abdallah M. Casar, CLAO, Capitol,
Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte" Exh. 10 and "CLAO, Kabacan
District Office, Municipal Hall Bldg., Kabacan, Province of Cotabato"
Exh. 11. (pp. 119-120, Records). Similarly in his Memorandum dated
24 October 1988, he signed as "Attorney for Plaintiffs, CLAO,
Kabacan, Cotabato," Exh. B (pp. 89-96, Records). In those instances,
while he was actually prosecuting the case in his private capacity,
he gave the impression that he was handling the case for the CLAO.
By his own admission, he was engaged in a private practice while
employed as trial attorney with the BFD and citizen's attorney with
the CLAO. He failed to produce proof of authority. But as he
correctly states, those were acts performed before he joined the
judiciary. However, he failed to mention that even after he became a
municipal judge, he continued to act as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 2747 on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court. He assumed office on September 1, 1989. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court was rendered on November 17,
1989. He filed an appeal in behalf of the plaintiffs even as Grepalife
also appealed. He testified:
"Q. After that what happened?
A. The case' decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and
eventually appealed again to the Supreme Court where I made
several manifestations". (tsn, p. 36; 11/13/95).
He actively handled the case on appeal. He violated Rule 5:07 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which states that "A judge shall not engage
in the private practice of law." He reasoned out that he was forced
to continue as counsel for the plaintiffs because he failed to get in
touch with them after he received the decision of the lower court.
He even went to Davao to look for them but failed. A transparent
and flimsy justification. At that time he was stationed in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte. He knew that plaintiffs are from
Pagayawan, Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. He is himself a native of
Tatayawon, Tamparan. He could have easily went to his hometown
or sent someone there to get in touch with plaintiffs. He did not
have to go to Davao which is much further from Kolambugan than

Tamparan. At any rate failure to contact his clients is not reason

enough to continue as counsel for plaintiffs on appeal. The least
which he should have done was to secure permission from the
Supreme Court before proceeding with the case on appeal.
He also denies having converted and misappropriated the judgment
award of P30,000.00. He claims the amount is intact but he has the
right to retain the same until he is paid for his expenses pursuant to
Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Rule of Court. He declared:
"A. They failed to come and for all these, I estimated my expenses
to be more than Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos.
Q. What is your right in getting the amount of P30,000.00?
A. Well, pursuant to Rule 138, Section 37 of the Rules of Court
known as attorney's liens by virtue of that I have the right to retain
the amount until payment of my expenses was paid . . ." (sic) (tsn,
pp. 38-39; 11/13/95).
This is ridiculous. The judgment award is only P30,000.00 but he
spent more than P30,000.00 to recover it. Thus despite winning the
case, the client could not collect a single cent and will still have to
pay his lawyer. This may be one reason why the ordinary layman
holds an unflattering perception of lawyers.
His evidence fails to prove the amount of expenses claimed by him.
He said that to follow-up the claim, he went to Manila six times
spending for fare alone P3000.00 for each trip. When the case was
on appeal to the Supreme Court, he went to Manila to follow-up
thrice (tsn, p. 38; 11/13/95). Except for his uncorroborated
testimony, there are only two documents showing he was indeed in
Manila. Those are Exhs. 26 and 32 indicating that he personally
served those letters to Grepalife in Manila. But there is no evidence
that he went there for this purpose alone. It is highly probable that
the visit to Grepalife was merely one of his purposes in going to
Manila. On the other hand, his claim that he went to Manila three
times to follow-up the case while it was pending with the Supreme
Court is unworthy of credence. He was then already a municipal
judge. He could not have openly exposed himself to the Supreme
Court as being engaged in private practice. Besides there is no

reason to follow-up in person any case with the Supreme Court.

Similarly, his claims that he spent a lot of money in looking for
witnesses and trying to trace the whereabouts of his clients are
self-serving, devoid of corroboration and unsupported by document
evidence. Finally, he presented the receipts for the payment of
docket fees in the amount of P580.00, Exhs. 28 and 29, which he
alleges was paid by him out of his own pocket. Standing alone,
those receipts do not prove his claim. The normal practice is for the
client to advance to his lawyer the amount for the filing fees. It is
the lawyer who pays the docket fees and he can easily procure the
issuance of the receipts in his own name. Complainant Makadaya
Sadik declared that her husband took care of the payment of the
docket fees. Respondent did not cross-examine Usodan Sadik on
this point.
In sum, respondent failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that he did indeed spent more than P30,000.00 to prosecute the
insurance claim. His various claims of expenses for travels to
Manila, to find witnesses and to look for his clients are all designed
to inflate his demand for reimbursement and justify his withholding
of the judgment award from his clients. To be generous, the sum of
P6,000.00 corresponding to his trips to Manila in March and May,
1986 may be allowed. Added to that may be his claim for attorney's
fees, although to be generous again, he is not really entitled to it.
From the testimonies of both Usodan Sadik and respondent, it
appears that there was an agreement for the payment of
P10,000.00 if respondent succeeds in recovering the sum of
P60,000.00 under the accidental death rider. But this amount was
not obtained and only the basic claim of P30,000.00 was adjudged
by the court. It is logical to assume that in such case, the amount of
attorney's fees should also be proportionally reduced to P5,000.00.
Thus his total claim is not more than P11,000.00. Nonetheless, it
appears that his reliance on Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court is nothing more than an afterthought. If indeed, he was
claiming attorney's lien pursuant to said section, then he should
have known that to be entitled thereto he must comply with.certain
pre-conditions. Said section provides that with respect to judgments
for payment of money, like in Civil Case No. 2747, a lawyer shall
have a lien thereto "from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the

records of the court rendering such judgment . . . and shall have

caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and the
adverse party." From July, 1993 when he learned of the dismissal of
Grepalife's petition by the Supreme Court until now, he did not file
the necessary pleadings to enforce his alleged lien. It surfaces only
when the administrative case was filed.
His last line of defense is that the complainant Makadaya Sadik is
not the real Makadaya Sadik who is the beneficiary of Lekiya Paito
and plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2747. He declared:
A. As far as I know they were recruited as witnesses.
COURT: Q. You said they, are you referring to Usodan Sadik and
Makadaya Sadik?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because of the failure of the beneficiaries to
come to Court.
COURT: Proceed.
Judge Casar:
Q. Do you have any evidence for that, that Makadaya Sadik or
referring to these persons who are complainants, Usodan Sadik and
Makadaya Sadik were recruited to testify in this case, but these are
not the true complainants?
A. Yes.
Q. Who recruited them?
A. The claimants. (tsn, pp. 21-22; 11/13/95).
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: WHO FAILED TO APPEAR?
A. Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang despite notice. The
claimants failed to appear and procured another persons (sic) who
are impostors. This Kunug Minalang and Sadik Paito took charge of
the witnesses and they presented another witnesses (sic).

COURT: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND THIS. ANOTHER WITNESSES OR

ANOTHER PERSON WAS PRESENTED TO TESTIFY AS LINANG
MINALANG AND SADIK?
A. At that time we needed more witnesses so the parties and
Barogong Paito agreed to testify but two persons who are principal
witnesses failed to come.
COURT: SO WHEN THEY FAILED TO COME, WHAT DID SADIK PAITO
DO?
A. They took charge of presenting another witnesses (sic).
Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY "TOOK CHARGE", YOU MEAN, THEY
PRESENTED TO YOU PERSONS WHO WERE NOT REALLY LINANG
MINALANG AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. They told me that instead of them who could not go to court, they
faked another persons (sic).
Q. AND THESE PERSONS WHO WERE FAKED APPEARED AND
TESTIFIED AS LINANG MINALANG AND MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. As a matter of fact, only Makadaya Sadik took the stand because
Linang Minalang failed to come.
Q. MAKADAYA SADIK TESTIFIED IN COURT?
A. In reality, Makadaya Sadik failed to appear also.
Q. BUT SOMEBODY TESTIFIED AS IF HE IS MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. Yes.
Q. I WANT THIS VERY CLEAR, HADJI SARIP PAITO PRESENTED TO YOU
ANOTHER PERSON WHO CLAIM TO BE MAKADAYA SADIK BUT HE IS
REALLY NOT MAKADAYA?
A. Yes.

Q. AND THAT PERSON WHO ACTUALLY TESTIFIED CLAIMING TO BE

MAKADAYA SADIK WAS THE PERSON WHO TESTIFIED THE LAST TIME
AS MAKADAYA SADIK?
A. That is what I can recall.
COURT: PROCEED.
Judge Casar:
Q. What was the arrangement for that matter for the recruitment of
other substitute witnesses?
A. Well, I told my client, I have to give them Five Thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos.
COURT: TO WHOM WILL THE P5,000.00 BE PAID?
A. To the substitute witnesses.
Q. YOU TOLD SARIP PAITO AND KUNUG MINALANG THAT THESE
WITNESSES BE PAID P5,000.00?
A. Yes.
Q. DID THEY AGREE?
A. I presume so because they testified.
Q. KUNUG MINALANG AND SARIP PAITO AGREED THAT THE P5,000.00
BE PAID TO THE SUBSTITUTE WITNESSES?
A. Seems to me that they agreed. (tsn, pp.34-36; 11/13/95).
By his own categorical admission, he deliberately, knowingly and
willfully agreed to procure a substitute witness, an impostor, to
pose as claimant Makadaya Sadik and testify in Civil Case No. 2747.
He even proposed that such witness be paid P5,000.00. And he
actually presented such witness as Makadaya Sadik in that case and
that impostor is the Makadaya Sadik who is the complainant in this
case. She is, respondent says, the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito, the

daughter of Batobarani Lugpangan and another woman (tsn, p. 17;

11/13/95). By any language, this is subornation of perjury.
To make matters worse, he declared that even before he filed the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2747, he was already informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulent. Thus:
"Q. What else happened?
A. Naga Datumanong approached me and told me about the facts of
the case and that this was done by unscrupulous persons.
COURT: WHAT WAS DONE BY UNSCRUPULOUS PERSONS?
A. The insurance application of Lekiya Paito, in fact, at the time of
the insurance, Lekiya Paito was killed in her hometown.
COURT: YOU MEAN LEKIYA PAITO WAS ALREADY SICK WHEN THE
INSURANCE FORM WAS MADE?
A. Yes, she was sick in Pagayawan, not in Cotabato City.
Judge Casar: So, whose work is that insurance
A. As far as I know, that is the work of Usodan Hadji Ibrahim.
COURT: THIS USODAN HADJI IBRAHIM IS NOT THE PERSON NOW IN
COURT?
A. As far as I know, he is Usodan Ibrahim.
Q. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS IS OR THE PERSON WHO APPEARED AS
COMPLAINANT IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. As far as I know, he is not working with me.
Q. SO THAT THIS PERSON NAMED USODAN SADIK, ONE OF THE
COMPLAINANTS, IS ACTUALLY USODAN IBRAHIM?
A. Yes.

Q. AND YOU NOW CLAIM THAT USODAN IBRAHIM WAS THE ONE WHO
PREPARED THE FRAUDULENT POLICY FOR LEKIYA PAITO?
A. As far as I was told. (tsn, pp. 30-31; 11/13/95).
Yet knowing that the insurance claim was fraudulent, he filed the
complaint and compounded it by presenting false witnesses in
court. He transgressed not only the Canons of Professional Ethics
but also the Revised Penal Code. In his single-minded intent to keep
the insurance proceeds for himself and deprive complainant
Makadaya Sadik of her share, respondent duga deep hole for
himself. His cure is worse than the disease.
It is possible that the insurance taken for Lekiya Paito was indeed a
scam. It is not an uncommon occurrence in these parts to insure a
person who is near death or for an insured to fake his death and
collect the proceeds. But scam or not we are convinced that the
complainant Makadaya Sadik is not an impostor. She denied that
she is the step-daughter of Lekiya Paito. She insisted she is the
youngest daughter and she named all her brothers and sisters. And
it was respondent who presented her in Civil Case No. 2747 as
Makadaya Sadik daughter of Lekiya Sadik and one of the
beneficiaries of the latter's insurance policy.
The Investigating Judge then recommended that a penalty ranging
from a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000. 00) pesos to suspension
for six (6) months be imposed depending on respondent's record.
Respondent was likewise ordered to pay to herein complainant,
Makadaya Sadik, the sum of fifteen thousand (P15,000.00) pesos
less the sum of five thousand five hundred (P5,500.00) pesos
equivalent to one-half of the expenses and attorney's fees
demanded by respondent.
In the resolution of March 13, 1996, this Court referred this case to
the Office of the Court Administrator fo revaluation, report and
recommendation.
In its memorandum of August 15, 1996, the Office of the Court
Administrator made the following findings and evaluation:

The undersigned concurs with the finding of Executive Judge Salazar

that respondent be found guilty of the charges of misconduct and
misappropriation, but differs insofar as the recommended penalty is
concerned. It is an established rule that the personal behavior of a
member of the judiciary in the performance of his official duties and
in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. Respondent's act of
collecting the judgment award of P30,000.00 from the Clerk of Court
of RTC, Cotabato City and his refusal to turn over the amount to his
client, complainant Makadaya Sadik and her sister, is an act of
misappropriation amounting to gross misconduct and/or dishonesty.
His defense that he has the right to retain the entire P30,000.00 as
attorney's lien in unacceptable. For he has no right to retain the
judgment award allegedly to secure payment of litigation expenses
and attorney's fees. He had no authority to practice law while in
government service. In continuing to handle the case of herein
complainants against Grepalife after he joined the government and
without first securing proper authority is no less constitutive of
abuse of authority. Furthermore, he violated Rule 5.06 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge to engage in the private
practice of law. He likewise violated the Attorney's Oath in agreeing
to file Civil Case No. 2747 for the purpose of claiming the insurance
proceeds from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for.
Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen from a fraudulent
act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral flaw in his
character.
This Court has held that: "A judge should always be a symbol of
rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will
raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty . . . He should ever
strive to preserve the good name of the court on which he sits and
avoid any indiscretion that will defile its probity. The respondent
has not lived up to these exacting standards. He has betrayed his
oath and debased his position. He has impaired the image of the
Judiciary to which he owes the duty of loyalty and obligation to keep
it at all times above suspicion and worthy of the people's trust. No
less importantly, he has also injured the herein complainant, who
has yet to receive the money entrusted to the respondent for the
satisfaction of the judgment that became final and executory more

than three years ago." (Dr. Ernesto J. Yuson vs. Judge Federico V.
Noel, AM No. RTJ-91-762, 1 October 1993).
Records show that in MTJ-92-728 filed by Mayor Perlita Libardos
against herein respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct, etc. he was fined P5,000.00 and sternly warned.
He has still five (5) other administrative cases docketed against him
namely: 1) MTJ-95-1048, for gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, violation of Section 7, 15 and 17 of Rule 37 of the
New Comelec Rules of Procedures, etc.; 2) 95-1061 for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions; 3) OCA-IPI No. 95-59-MTJ
for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Incompetence; and 4) OCA IPI
No. 95-59-MTJ for Falsification of Public Documents. The first two (2)
cases are pending investigation by the Executive Judge while the
two (2) others are now pending with the Court with respondent's
Comment dated 29 November 1995 and 7 December 1995 and
pending evaluation by this Office, respectively.
It is clear from the facts established that respondent does not
deserve to remain in the service of the Judiciary where honesty,
probity and integrity are indispensable credentials.
It then recommended:
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court
is our recommendation that: a) Judge Abdallah M. Casar, MCTC
Kolambugan-Tangcal, Lanao del Norte be DISMISSED from the
service with prejudice to his appointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
this accrued leave credits; and b) he be ORDERED to turnover to
complainant Makadaya-Sadik and Linang Minalang (co-plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 2747) the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
which he received from the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 13,
Cotabato City last 1 October 1993 within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice.
The Court has thoroughly studied the record of this case and has
ascertained that the findings of the investigating judge, concurred
in by the Office of the Court Administrator, are adequately
supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal

principles. Consequently, the Court hereby adopts the OCA's

recommendation of meting out the supreme penalty of dismissal on
herein respondent judge.
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to
promote justice. 1 However, the reality of justice depends, above all,
on the intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men and
women who are called to serve as our judges. 2 In a piece written by
Rosenberg, this point was emphasized, thus:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as Roscoe
Pound remarked, "men count more than machinery." Assume the
clearest rules, the most enlightened procedures, the most
sophisticated court techniques; the key factor is still the judge. In
the long run, "There is no guarantee of justice except the
personality of the judge. The reason the judge makes or breaks the
system of justice is that rules are not self-declaring or self-applying.
Even in a government of laws, men make the decisions." 3
In the recent case of Jocelyn Talens-Dabon v. Judge Hermin
E. Arceo, 4 the Court emphasized the importance of the role played
by judges in the judicial system, thus:
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is
able to administer justice but also upon the perception and
confidence of the community that the people who run the system
have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the
law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create
confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence,
in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both
the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private
lives. Only then can the people be reassured that the wheels of
justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating
confidence in the judicial system.
Insistence on personal integrity and honesty as indispensable
qualifications for judicial office reflect an awareness in the legal
profession of the immensity of the damage that can be done to the

legal order by judicial corruption. The rationale for this was

succinctly put by Jones, thus:
If a physician or a professor or a businessman is discovered to be a
thief or an influence peddler, the disclosure will not put medicine,
higher education, or business into general disrepute. But judges are
different and more representative; revelations of judicial corruption
create suspicion and loss of confidence in legal processes generally
and endanger public respect for law. 5
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of
exceptional integrity and honesty. The special urgency for requiring
these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for the judge
acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of his countrymen.
Hence, being in a position of such grave responsibility in the
administration of justice, a judge must conduct himself in a manner
befitting the dignity of such exalted office.
Respondent judge, however, not only failed in this respect but
proved himself repeatedly unworthy of his post.
The records show that even after he became judge, respondent
acted as counsel for herein complainants and misappropriated the
judgment award of P30,000.00 which rightfully belongs to
complainants. Moreover, respondent's line of defense revealed a
significant and deplorable flaw in his character. In hoping to redeem
himself, he categorically admitted that he deliberately, knowingly
and willfully agreed to handle a case involving a fraudulent
insurance claim and in the process procured and presented false
witnesses in court. Under the circumstances, this Court is amazed at
how brazen respondent has comported himself and without
compunctions at leaving a "paper trail" behind him.
This Court notes that respondent had been previously fined
P5,000.00 and sternly warned for knowingly issuing an order
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. 6 Moreover,
he has four other administrative cases docketed against him
involving various charges such as gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions and
falsification of public documents.

Respondent judge's seeming propensity to transgress the very law

he is sworn to uphold makes him unfit to discharge the functions of
a judge. Judicial office demands the best possible men and this
Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who
undermine its efforts towards effective and efficient administration
of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
WHEREFORE, Judge Abdallah M. Casar is hereby DISMISSED from the
service for misconduct and misappropriation with FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. He is further ordered to turn over to complainant
Makadaya Sadik and Linang Minalang the sum of Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) which he received from the Clerk of Court of
RTC, Branch 13, Cotabato City last October 1,1993.
This judgment is immediately executory and the respondent judge is
further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions
of his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy be entered in
the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee, - versus - G.R. No.
210798 Present: CARPIO,* J., VELASCO, JR., Chairperson, DEL
CASTILLO,** PEREZ, and REYES,JJ. BEVERLY VILLANUEVA y
Promulgated: MANALILI @ BEBANG, Accused-Appellant. Se~,tember
~4, 2016 t l ~\JC;~.:"'\ x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- .;,._ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- l\. DECISION PEREZ, J..: On appeal is the
Decision 1 dated 10 May 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027. The CA affirmed the 28 January 2011
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pifi.as City, Branch
254 in Criminal Case No. 07-0417, finding accused-appellant,
Beverly Villanueva y Manalili, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208. On 18 May
2007, an Information for the violation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 9208 was
filed against accused-appellant. The accl:lsatory portion of the
Information reads: That sometime during the period from April 25,
2007 up to May ---'---------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ * ** Additional

Member per Raffle dated 14 September 2016. Additional Member

per Raffle dated 2 September 2016. Rollo, pp. 3-27; Penned by
Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices
Francisco P. Acosta and Angelita A. Gacutan concurring. Records, pp.
381-391; Penned by Presiding Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub. ~
Decision 2 G.R. No. 210798 17, 2007, in the city of Las Pifias,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being the owner/manager of ON TAP
VIDEOKE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
recruit and hire [AAA],3 a 13- year old minor, to work as a Guest
Relations Officer (GRO) of said establishment, thereby exploiting
and taking advantage of her vulnerability as a child. 4 On
arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. 5 A
Petition for Bail was granted and accused-appellant was allowed to
post bail. The public prosecutor manifested that they will adopt the
evidence presented during the hearing of the Petition for Bail as the
same evidence in the main case, with the further manifestation that
other witnesses will be presented by the prosecution.6 Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter. The Facts The antecedent facts as culled
from the CA decision and records of the case are summarized as
follows: On 25 April 2007, AAA ran away from home after finding out
that she was adopted and after being scolded by her mother, who
became the private complainant in this case. The friends of AAA
informed private complainant that AAA was staying at the On Tap
Videoke Bar, working as a Guest Relations Officer. Private
complainant sought assistance from the Channel 2 TV program
"XXX" to regain custody over AAA. Private complainant,
accompanied by the TV crew, lodged a preliminary complaint with
the Southern Police District (SPD) Headquarters of Taguig City
against On Tap Videoke Bar and a task force was created for the
rescue of AAA. Police Officer 1 Ariel Sullano (PO 1 Su llano),
accompanied by private complainant was tasked to go inside the
videoke bar to talk to AAA. P02 Thaddeus A bas (P02 Abas) and the
other police officers were stationed outside the bar, awaiting the
predetermined signal. After the operation, AAA was taken to the
SPD headquarters, together with accused-appellant and five (5)
other videoke bar employees who were without the necessary
Mayor's and Health Permits. Private complainant executed a
complaintaffidavit against On Tap Videoke Bar and AAA was
endorsed to the Social Development Center of the Department of

Social W el.fare and Development (DSWD)-Las Pifias. Accusedappellant and the five (5) apprehended employees were booked,
investigated and underwent medical examinations. (, The real name
of the victim is withheld to protect her privacy. See People v.
Cahalquinto, 533 Phil. Records, 703 p. (2006). I. ~ Id. at 85. Id. at
172-175. Decision 3 G.R. No. 210798 On 17 May 2007, accusedappellant and the five (5) employees were referred to the inquest
prosecutor with charges for violation of R.A. No. 76107 and working
without Mayor's/ Health Permit, respectively. The Office of the City
Prosecutor charged accused-appellant with human trafficking under
R.A. 9208, instead of violation of R.A. 7610 for the reason that
accused-appellant "recruited and exploited AAA, a 13-year old
minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by taking advantage of her
vulnerability as a child."8 On 24 May 2007, a Petition for Bail was
filed by accused-appellant, alleging that the evidence of guilt was
not strong. The prosecution presented the testimonies of P02 Abas
and the private complairnmt to prove otherwise. Meanwhile, on 31
May 2007, an Affidavit of Desistance9 was executed by private
complainant, which formed part of the exhibits. The Affidavit of
Desistance was executed after the private complainant had the
opportunity to talk to AAA after the rescue operation and after AAA
revealed that she was merely allowed to stay at the videoke bar
after she ran away from home. 10 P02 Abas testified as to the filing
of the complaint and the entrapment and rescue operation
conducted. He narrated that during the operation, he was stationed
a couple of blocks from the videoke bar; 11 and that upon the
execution of the pre-arranged signal, he and his companion officers
rushed to the bar to take custody of AAA and other girls working
without permits. 12 On cross-examination, P02 Abas admitted that
he was only acting based on the preliminary complaint filed by
private complainant; 13 and that he was not aware of why AAA was
in the viedoke bar or who had custody over AAA. 14 When asked
about the other details of the investigation and the operation, he
failed to give coherent answers and insisted that his only
designation was to secure the GROs and the other persons in the
videoke bar. 15 9 it) II 12 13 14 15 The prosecution then presented
private complainant as the second An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discriminati0n, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and for
Other Purposes; otherwise known as the "Special Protection of

Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Records, p. 2. Id. at 133-134. 76 TSN, 3 July 2007, p. 25. TSN, 19
June 2007, p. 18. Id. at 19. Id. at 52. Id.at SI. Id. at 50. Decision 4
G.R. No. 210798 witness. She recounted the details of the rescue
operation and the subsequent filing of the complaint against
accused-appellant. On crossexamination, she clarified that she had
never been to the videoke bar before the rescue operation; 16 and
1:hat when she saw her daughter in the videoke bar, she was
neither drinking, singing, nor smoking. 17 When asked about the
conversation she had with her daughter after the rescue, private
complainant revealed that AAA claimed that she was neither hired
nor recruited as a GRO at the videoke bar. 18 Private complainant
further narrated that she signified her lack of intention to pursue
her complaint against accusedappellant after hearing the side of her
daughter. 19 Unfortunately, while the trial was ongoing, AAA
absconded from DSWD custody, resulting in the prosecution's
failure to obtain her testimony. The Petition for Bail was granted by
the court and accused-appellant was allowed to post bail. To
supplement the testimonies of the witnesses presented during the
bail hearing, the prosecution offered the testimony of P/Chief Insp.
Jerome Balbontin (PCI Balbontin). He narrated that on May 16, 2007,
the private complainant, accompanied by the TV crew, reported that
her missing 13-year old daughter was seen working as a GRO at the
On Tap Videoke Bar. 20 According to the witness, he was not present
during the operation21 but he sent SPOl Camaliga, P02 Andador, POI
Sullano, P02 Abas, P02 Espinosa, among others, to conduct the
surveillance and rescue. 22 He further narrated that after the
rescue operation, the TV crew interviewed the child at the police
station;23 and that unfortunately, the footage of said interview and
the rescue operation could not be obtained.24 The defense
presented Wilfred Aquino (Aquino), the videoke bar waiter, as first
witness. He testified as to the events which transpired during the
rescue operation. He narrated that two male individuals asked him
to call AAA; that AAA approached their table to speak with them;
and that after five minutes, the policemen announced the rescue
operation.25 The witness insisted that accused-appellant was not
aware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar because it was her father,
Rosito Villanueva, Sr., who allowed AAA to stay in the videoke bar.26
Wilfred also insisted that AAA has been staying in the videoke bar
for two weeks before the rescue operation; and 16 TSN, 3 July 2007,

p. 16. 17 Id. at 17-18. 18 Id.at21. 10 Id. at 22. 20 TSN, 4 September

2007, p. 6. 21 Id. at 19. 22 Id. at 9 23 Id. at 10. 24 Id. at 16. 25 TSN,
11June2009, p. 12. 26 Id. at 25. Decision 5 G.R. No. 210798 that
during such stay; she was always in the kitchen helping them wash
glasses.27 On cross-examination, he testified that his immediate
superior was Rosito Villanueva, Jr., (ViJlanueva, Jr.) accusedappellant's brother, who was the one managing the videoke bar. 28
Villanueva, Jr. was the second witness for the defense. He testified
as to the circumstances surrounding AAA's stay in the videoke bar.
He claimed that while he was on vacation, his father took over the
management of the videoke bar and allowed the temporary stay of
AAA, upon the request of their employee.29 Like Aquino, Villanueva,
Jr. claimed that accusedappellant was unaware of AAA's stay in the
videoke bar because accusedappellant had no hand in the daily
operations and management. On crossexamination, he testified that
the videoke bar was merely registered under his sister's name; and
that all earnings belonged to him because the videoke bar was put
up by his sister for him. 30 Accused-appellant maintained that at
the time the raid was conducted, she was at her sister's house. Her
brother called her to apprise her of the situation, prompting her to
rLish to the bar to handle the situation. She went with the
authorities to the SPD Headquarters and presented herself as the
registered owner of the videoke bar. Accused-appellant vehemently
denied hiring and/or recruiting AAA as a GRO, insisting that she was
not involved in the day-to-day operations. Asserting that she was
unaware that AAA was staying at the bar, accused-appellant
explained that she merely provided capital for the business and
that her brother, Villanueva, Jr., was the one managing the same.
Both accused-appellant and her brother aver that it was their father
who allowed AAA to stay at the videoke bar upon the request of one
of the waiters. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court The RTC found
accused-appellant's denial unavailing and incredible, considering
that the corroborating testimonies came from witnesses who were
not disinterested. The court found it impossible for accusedappellant unaware of AAA's stay in the videoke bar, given that she
was the registered owner thereof. The R TC gave weight on the
successful rescue operation conducted by the police and the TV
crew. In sum, the court ruled that despite the failure of the
prosecution to present AAA in court, the 27 28 29 30 Id. at 22. Id. at
29. TSN, 3 December 2009, p. 11. Id. at 24-25. ~ Decision 6 G.R. No.

210798 c'ircumstantial pieces of evidence were sufficient to

establish accusedappellant' s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, for the
reason that a direct link between accused-appellant's commission of
the crime and the minor victim was established.31 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, finding accused BEYERL
Y VILLANUEVA y MANALILI @ "BEBANG" GUILTY of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons under Section 6 of Republic Act 9208, the
Court hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of Life
Imprisonment and to pay a fine of 3 Million pesos. Her
license/permit to operate the ON TAP VIDEOKE BAR is ordered
cancelled. 32 Ruling of the Court of Appeals Accused-appellant
challenged the RTC decision on appeal, alleging that the lower court
relied on the weakness of the defense rather than on the strength
of the evidence for the prosecution. Accused-appellant argued that
the same set of evidence, which was the basis for granting the
petition for bail, was merely adopted in the main case. Thus,
accused-appellant contends that there can be no conclusion other
than that the prosecution failed to substantiate the allEgations in
the Information. Moreover, accusedappellant insisted that the lower
court erred in not giving the private complainant's Affidavit
ofDesistance due weight and consideration. The appellate court
found the appeal bereft of merit. Enumerating the different
circumstantial evidence presented, the CA ruled that the conviction
was warranted. The appellate court held that the "[affidavit of
desistance is] not the sole consideration that can result to an
acquitt?-1"33 hence, in view of the lack of circumstances to support
the Affidavit of Desistance, acquittal was not warranted. The
pertinent and dispositive portions of the decision read: 31 32 JJ 34
Thus, the trial comi did not err in imposing upon accused-appellant
the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P3,000,000.00. The
order for the cancellation of her permit to operate the ON TAP
VIDEO KE BAR is also correct. x x x xx xx WHEREFORE, the trial
court's Decision dated January 28, 2011 is AFFIRMED. 34 Records, p.
391. Id. Rollo, p. 25. Id. at 25-26. Decision 7 G.R. No. 210798 In a
Resolution35 dated 3 October 2013, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to accused-appellant's Notice of Appeal. On 19 February
2014,36 we required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed a supplemental
brief;37 whereas the Office of the Solicitor General adopted all the
arguments raised in its brief, in lieu of filing a supplemental brief.

Our Ruling The crux of the controversy is whether the circumstantial

pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution inexorably lead to
the conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking. After a thorough review
of the facts and evidence on record, we rule for accused-appellant's
acquittal. Qualified Trafficking The elements of trafficking in
persons, derived from the expanded definition found in Section 3(a)
of R.A. No. 9208 as amended by R.A. No. 10364, are as follows: (1)
The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders;" (2) The means used include "by means of
threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person;" and (3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs." The recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall still be considered "trafficking in persons" even if
it does not involve any of the means set forth in the first 35 36 37
CA rollo, p. 237. Rollo, pp. 40-41; Resolution dated 19 February
2016. Id. at 51-71. Decision 8 G.R. No. 210798 paragraph of Sec.
3(a) of R.A. No. 9208.38 Given that the person allegedly trafficked in
the case at bar is a child, we may do away with discussions on
whether or not the second element was actually proven. In an
attempt to prove the first element, the prosecution stresses the fact
that accused-appellant is the registered owner of the On Tap
Videoke Bar. The prosecution insists that by merely being the
registered owner, accusedappellant necessarily committed the act
of recruiting, maintaining or harboring AAA. Such contention is
misplaced. Recruiting, harboring, or maintaining a person for thr:
purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who may or
may not be registered owners of establishments. Thus, being the
registered owner per se does not make one criminally liable for the
acts of trafficking committed in the establishment. What the
prosecution should have done was to prove the act of trafficking by
other means, and not by mere showing that accused-appellant was

the registered owner. The defense, on the other hand, countered

the allegation by presenting testimonies of Aquino, an employee of
the videoke bar; Villanueva, Jr., manager of the videoke bar and
brother of accused-appellant; and accusedappellant herself. The
RTC found accused-appellant's denial and the corroborating
testimonies as unavailing and incredible, for the reason that such
testimonies did not come from disinterested witnesses. This Court is
not unaware of the longstanding doctrine that findings of facts and
a'ssessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the
trial court, which is in the best position to observe the witnesses'
demeanor while being examined.39 However, we take exception
from such rule, considering that there are facts and circumstances
which if properly appreciated, could alter the outcome of the case.
That the defense witnesses are closely related to accused-appellant
-one being the brother and manager of the videoke bar and the
other being an employee-is not a sufficient reason to disregard their
testimonies. The declaration of interested witnesses is not
necessarily biased and incredible.40 More importantly, there was no
evidence suggesting that the testimonies ofthe witnesses were
untruthful to begin with. 38 39 40 Section 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act: (a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall al.so be
consid~red as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any
of ~ the means set forth m the precedmg paragraph. Cirera v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181843, 14 July 2014, 730 SCRA
27, 43. People v. Sison, 267 Phil. 679, 684 (1990). Decision 9 G.R.
No. 210798 The prosecution likewise failed to prove the third
element-that the recruiting, maintaining or harboring of persons is
for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the

prosecution witnesses at the videoke bar only on the day the rescue
operation was conducted. That AAA was exploited could not be
proven by her mere presence at the videoke bar during the rescue
operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence as to
the nature of work done by AAA, if any. Testimonies as to how often
AAA was seen in the bar while entertaining customers could have
also lent credence to the prosecution's contention that she was in
the videoke bar because she was being exploited. Lack of Direct
Evidence Since AAA was not presented in court, the prosecution was
not able to offer direct evidence showing that accused-appellant
actually recruited, harbored or maintained AAA in the videoke bar
for the purpose of exploiting her. Neither can private complainant's
testimony which merely revolved around the filing of the complaint
be considered direct evidence. Private complainant's testimony, if
considered in light of all the other evidence, is weak. Private
complainant testified roughly a month after the Affidavit of
Desistance was executed and filed; thus, she had every opportunity
to deny the execution of the Affidavit during the crossexamination.
Instead of denying the veracity of such Affidavit, private
complainant confirmed its truthfulness and accuracy. 41 Though it
can be said that private complainant's affirmative answers were
only prompted by the leading questions asked by the defense
lawyer during cross-examination, it cannot be denied that the
prosecution did not even bother to rebuild its case during re-direct
examination. On re-direct examination, private complainant merely
testified as to matters regarding AAA's adoption.42 She a'lso
claimed that she came to know of accused-appellant's trafficking
activities through AAA's friends whose identities she cannot
remember. 43 However, on re-cross examination, private
complainant admitted that she did not validate such information
before she reached out to the TV program and h h . . 44 t e aut
ontles. A review of the scarce jurisprudence on human trafficking
would readily show that a successful prosecution for human
trafficking, to a certain extent, reHes greatly on the entrapment
operation.45 In entrapment, ways and~ 44 TSN, July 3, 2007, p. 36.
45 See People v. Casio, G.R. No. 21 1465, 3 December 2014, 744
SCRA 113, 124. Decision 10 G.R. No. 2I0798 means are resorted to
by the authorities for the purpose of capturing the perpetrator in
jlagrante delicto. 46 Thus, it can be said that testimonies of the
apprehending officers regarding the entrapment operation are

crucial for a conviction, most especially in cases where the victim is

unable to testify. In People v. Casio,47 the conviction for Qualified
Trafficking was brought about by the categorical testimonies of the
authorities who conducted the entrapment, on top of the victim's
testimony. In the said case, the police operatives testified as to the
actual unfolding of circumstances which led them to believe that a
crime was being committed in jlagrante delicto, to wit: During trial,
PO 1 Luardo and PO I Velosa testified that their conversation with
accused went as follows: Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like
girls, guys?) POI Luardo: Unya mga bag-a? Kanang batan-on kay naa
mi guesls naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be young
because we have guests waiting at the motel) Accused: Naa, hulat
kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I'll get them) At that point, PO I
Luardo sent a text message to PS I Ylanan that they found
prospective subject. After a few minutes, accused returned with
AAA and BBB, private complainants in this case. Accused: Kining
duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?) POI Veloso:
Maayo manna kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in
sex?) Similarly, the prosecution in the case at bar built their case
around the entrapment operation and the successful rescue of AAA;
but unfortunately for the prosecution, both P02 Abas and PCI
Balbontin are incompetent to testify as to matters which occurred
during the actual execution of the rescue and entrapment because
both witnesses were not present during the operation. The
testimonies of P02 Abas and the Chief Inspector pale in comparison
with the testimonies of the police operatives in Casio.48 Oddly, the
prosecution failed to present witnesses who could testify. 46 47 48
People v. Gatong-0, 250 Phil. 710, 711 ( 1988). Supra note 45. Id. ~
Decision 11 G.R. No. 210798 as to the actual conversation that
transpired between the undercover authorities and AAA. The
testimony of defense witness Aquino, the waiter, is the only
evidence on record which narrated certain details surrounding the
unfolding of the rescue operation. Aquino merely observed that
upon being called by the two men, who turned out to be undercover
policemen, AAA approached their table and after five minutes,
policemen announced the operation.49 AAA's act of approaching the
table of the customers after being called is not unequivocal enough
as to dispel any other possible scenarios that could have occurred
during their 5-minute conversation. In the absence of any evidence
categorically showing that a crime was being committed in jlagrante

delicto or that AA.A was performing the tasks of a GRO when she
approached the table, this Court cannot uphold accused-appellant's
conviction based on the rescue operation alone. Circumstantial
evidence did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt While it is
recognized that the lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar
the finding of guilt, 50 we still hold that acquittal is in order for the
reason that the circumstantial evidence presented does not lead to
the inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction
only if: ( 1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 51 It is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented constitutes an unbroken chain
which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. 52 The
appellate court anchored accused-appellant's conviction on the
following circumstantial evidence: 49 50 51 52 Firstly, AAA was at
the On Tap Videoke when the police, accompanied by private
complainant and the crew of the TV program XXX, conducted its
rescue operation on May 16, 2007. Secondly, while accusedappellant denied recruiting AAA, she was wearing a sexy attire at
the time of the rescue. Even defense witnesses Rosito Villanueva, Jr.
and Wilfred Aquino admitted that AAA wore sexy attires at the
videoke bar. Notably, AAA's attire was similar to the uniform of the
videoke bar's GROs. xx x TSN, 11 June 2009, pp. 32-36 People v.
Biglete, 688 Phil. 199, 207 (2002). Sec. 4 Rule 133, Revised Rule~ of
Court. People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 66~, 677 (200 I); People v.
Calonge, 637 Phil. 435, 454 (20 I 0). Decision 12 G.R. No. 210798 xx
xx Thirdly, accused-appellant showed propensity of hiring workers
without permits. Although the purpose of the rescue operation was
to recover AAA, five other (5) workers of the videoke bar were also
arrested and booked because they were working thereat without
the requisite Mayor's /Health permits. Fourthly, it appeared that
AAA was doing some kind of work at the videoke bar. As testified by
defense witness Willfred Aquino and Rosito Villanueva, Jr.: Q: What
was she doing there aside from staying there, Mr. Witness? A: She
was helping in the washing of the glasses in the kitchen, Sir. xx xx
Q: When the police arrived, AAA was there inside the Videoke Bar?
Witness: A: She was at the back of the kitchen. COURT: What was

she doing at the kitchen wearing that seductive dress, washing the
dishes? A: No, your honor. During that times she was just standing
at the back and whenever we needed something like glass, she
would hand us the glass. 53 We rule that the circumstantial
evidence cited by the appellate court does not lead to the
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime,
let alone that a crime was actually committed. As previously
mentioned, the mere presence of AAA at the videoke bar does not
prove that accused-appt llant was maintaining or harboring her for
the purpose of exploitation. In fact, such was the holding of the RTC
when it granted accused-appellant's petition for bail. Nowhere in
the text of R.A. No. 9208 can it be inferred that a presumption
arises by the mere fact of presence of a child in a videoke bar or
similar establishment. Our survey of jurisprudence likewise does not
reveal such established presumption. More to the point, the
constitutive crime of trafficking through harboring or receipt of a
person must be specifically for purposes of exploi.tation. In other
wn}s, Rollo, pp. 21-33. 16 Decision 13 G.R. No. 210798 establishing
mere presence without establishing the purpose therefor cannot be
considered as an element of trafficking. In this case, the private
complainant's affidavit of desistance categorically explained the
child's presence in the videoke bar-for humanitarian reasons of
providing shelter t? a runaway minor. That AAA was wearing skimpy
clothing similar to those worn by the GROs at the videoke bar during
the rescue operation is not inconsistent with the defense's position
that AAA merely sought refuge and shelter at the bar after she ran
away from home. It is highly possible that AAA borrowed clothes
from the videoke bar employees, considering that she ran away
from home and was unable to take all her belongings with her. That
accusedappellant showed propensity for hiring workers without
permits is irrelevant in the case at bar. One may be equipped with
the proper permits and yet still be guilty of trafficking. Accusedappellant's propensity for not following ordinances does not
necessarily prove commission of the crime of human trafficking.
Lastly, even if it be conceded that AAA was washing dishes at the
back of the kitchen, such circumstance is still not inconsistent with
the defense's position. As a token of gratitude for allowing her to
temporarily stay at the bar, AAA could have voluntarily done the
chores. From the foregoing, it is obvious that the totality of
circumstantial evidence will not lead to an inescapable conclusion

that accused-appellant committed the crime charged. It bears

stressing that "where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt,
then the evidenc'~ does not meet or hurdle the test of moral
certainty required for conviction."54 Reproduction at trial of
evidence presented in the bail hearing The prosecution manifested
that they will adopt the evidence presented during the hearing of
the Petition for Bail as the same evidence in the main case, with a
further manifestation that other witnesses will be presented during
the trial. In fact, a side by side comparison of the RTC Order
granting accused-appellant's petition for bail and the RTC Decision
convicting accused-appellant would reveal that summaries of
witnesses' testimonies contained in the former were merely lifted
and copied verbatim in the latter. After an evaluation of the
evidence and after hearing the testimonies of 54 Franco v. People,
G.R. No. 191185, 1February2016. Decision 14 G.R. No. 210798 P02
Abas and private complainant, the Petition for Bail was granted by
the RTC, to wit: At this moment the prosecution failed to
substantiate the allegations in the information that accused
recruited and hired minor [AAA] to work as Guest Relations Officer
(GRO) of her establishment, thereby exploiting and taking
advantage of her vulnerability as a child. The mere presence of the
minor at the establishment, cannot by itself, prove the fact of hiring
and recruitment. It is unfortunate at this juncture, none of the
prosecution witnesses was able to testify on this regard, and was
only able to confirm the minor's presence at the videoke bar. Even
the alleged mother of the minor testified that she never saw [AAA]
drinking, smoking or singing at the establishment. She further
testified that the minor admitted to her that she was never hired to
work at the establishment and the she was only there in order for
her to have a place to stay and reside. x x x This court is bound by
the principle that in all criminal cases, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the accused. x x x From the evidence presented so far,
without touching on the actual merits and proceedings of the
instant case, this court cannot at this point say that the evidence
against the accused is strong. 55 It should be noted that when the
prosecution witnesses were presented during the bail hearing, they
were subjected to cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations, as
well as inquiries by the court; thus, as expected, the court no longer

recalled the witnesses for additional examination during the trial.

Unfortunately for the prosecution, they were only able to present
one more witness, PCI Balbontin, before they finally rested their
case. While the Court is aware that a bail hearing is merely for the
purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
that the same is not an adjudication upon the merits, we note that
in the case at bar, the RTC Order granting the petition for bail casts
doubt upon accused-appellant's conviction. In its Order granting the
petition for bail, the RTC noted that none of the prosecution
witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment.
Considering that the only additional witness the prosecution
presented during trial was PCI Balbontin, it baffles this Court why
the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
when the Chief Inspector's testimony was limited to procedural
details regarding the filing of the complaint, forming of the task
force and the interview conducted by the TV crew. If the Chief
Inspector's additional testimony was only limited to those matters,
it follows that when the prosecution rested its case, not one of their
witnesses testified as to the fact of hiring and recruitment and
neithef} ss Records, pp. 141-142. (}'6 .. Decision 15 G.R. No.
210798 did the documentary evidence submitted establish the
same. Before this Court is essentially the sam( set of evidence that
was evaluated by the RTC when it ruled that the evidence of guilt
was not strong; we thus see no reason why the same set of
evidence, only supplemented by a testimony regarding irrelevant
procedural matters, would warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat -- he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove Nothing is more settled
in criminal law jurisprudence than that the Gonstitution presumes a
person is innocent until he is proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 56 Countless times, this Court has elucidated
that the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own weight
and not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense's evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the
guilt of the accused. In this case, the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution failed to pass the test of moral
certainty necessary to warrant accused-appellant's conviction. From
the foregoing, we rule that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 10 May 2013 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05027 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, BEYERL Y VILLANUEVA y
MANALILI @ BEBANG is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge of violation
of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 or Qualified Trafficking. I Her
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless she
is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Director of the Correctional Institution for \Vomen,
Mandaluyong City, by personal service, for immediate
implementation. The Director shall submit to this Court, within five
(5) days from receipt of the copy of the Decision, the action taken
thereon. 5() Franco v. People, supra note 54. Decision 16 G.R. No.
210798 SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167333
PEDRO LADINES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EDWIN DE RAMON, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty
without specifying the justification for doing so is an error on the
part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default
of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the
period.
The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on October 22,
2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for
homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Sorsogon
City under the judgment rendered on February 10, 2003.2
Antecedents

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging

the petitioner and one Herman Licup with homicide, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1993, in the Municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one
another, armed with bladed weapons did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one Erwin de
Ramon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which resulted to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The factual background of the charge follows.
While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala,
along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin), were watching the dance
held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the
Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner
and Licup appeared and passed by them. The petitioner suddenly
and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel
with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At
that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the
latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the
machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in
the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because
they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital
where he succumbed.4
Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on
the cadaver of Erwin, attested that the victim had sustained two
stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the
abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably
inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct weapons; and that
the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like
a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have
been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.5

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He

recounted that at the time in question, he was in the Bulabog
Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor
child; that they did not enter the dance hall because there was
trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they had then
gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident
involving Erwin on their way home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de
Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each
other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored
illwill towards him by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the
barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.
The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to
corroborate his denial. Jasareno and Palencia testified that at the
time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School,
together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor
daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a quarrel had
transpired but they did not know who had been involved; that they
had remained in the dance hall with the petitioner and his family
during the quarrel; and that it was impossible for the petitioner to
be have stabbed Erwin. Palencia added that after the dance he and
the petitioner and the latter's wife and child had gone home
together. 6
Judgment of the RTC
On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as
charged, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro
Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (I) day of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal
as maximum and to pay the sum of I150,000.00 as civil indemnity
without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay
the costs.

Meanwhile, accused Herman Licup is acquitted of the offense

charge[d] for insufficiency of evidence. The bond posted for his
liberty is cancelled and discharged.
SO ORDERED.7
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed, contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF A
REASONABLE DOUBT IN LIGHT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS THAT ACCUSED HERMAN LICUP WHO WAS
ALSO INJURED DURING THE INCIDENT HAD ATTACKED THE VICTIM
ERWIN DE RAMON.8
As stated, the CA affirmed the conviction, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed Decision dated 10
December 2003 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 53, Sorsogon City,
Sorsogon in Criminal Case No. 93-3400 finding appellant guilty of
Homicide is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.9
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner insisting that the CA
committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the
admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had
stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup
constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. 10
The State countered 11 that the insistence by Ladines raised factual
questions that were improper for consideration in an appeal by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that the CA did not
err in affirming the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced

by the petitioner was not in the nature of newly-discovered

evidence.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is without merit.
First of all, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides that the petition for review on certiorari shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to
be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.12 In appeal
by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts,
whose findings thereon are received with respect and are binding
on the Court subject to certain exceptions, including: (a) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (j) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the

parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different

conclusion.13
There is no question that none of the foregoing exceptions applies
in order to warrant the review of the unanimous factual findings of
the RTC and the CA. Hence, the Court upholds the CA's affirmance of
the conviction of the petitioner.
Secondly, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute
newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to
the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newlydiscovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new
trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is the
concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court.
The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of newlydiscovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not
without reason. The Court would be compelled, despite its not being
a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for purposes of
its appellate adjudication.
Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts
for that purpose. But the propriety of remanding for the purpose of
enabling the lower court to receive the newly-discovered evidence
would inflict some degree of inefficiency on the administration of
justice, because doing so would effectively undo or reopen the
decision that is already on appeal. 14
That is a result that is not desirable. Hence, the Court has issued
guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with
crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their
defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a
smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the
other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newlydiscovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the
following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after
trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative,
or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. 15

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the

petitioner was not newly-discovered because the first two requisites
were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the
proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy of
the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration
of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key
witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
Thirdly, homicide is punished with reclusion temporaf.16 Taking the
absence of any modifying circumstances into consideration, the RTC
fixed the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The CA affirmed the
penalty fixed by the RTC.
We declare that the lower courts could not impose 1 7 years and
four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which was
the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the
justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that although
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for
the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires
under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty
prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule
expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the
courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the
number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the
crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of
the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate
sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the
absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal.
Lastly, the lower courts limited the civil liability to civil indemnity of
P50,000.00. The limitation was a plain error that we must

correct.1wphi1 Moral damages and civil indemnity are always

granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of
human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a
definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither
pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always
occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. 17 As the
Court said in People v. Panado:18
x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is
inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such
violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love,
affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing
feeling that an injustice has been done to them.
The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each
because homicide was a gross crime.
Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no
treatment of the actual damages, the Court is in no position to dwell
on this. The lack of such treatment notwithstanding, the Court holds
that temperate damages of InS,000.00 should be allowed to the
heirs of the victim. Article 2224 of the Civil Code authorizes
temperate damages to be recovered when some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There
is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for burial and
related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate
damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is certainly
unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation
for such expenses as actual damages.19 This pronouncement
proceeds from the sound reasoning that it would be anomalous that
the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual
damages of less than P25,000.00 would only be put in a worse
situation than others who might have presented no receipts at all
but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages. 20 In
addition, in line with recent jurisprudence,21 all the items of civil
liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum computed from the
date of the finality of this judgment until the items are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on

October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of
petitioner PEDRO LAD INES is 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the
petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de Ramon: (1)
civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2)
temperate damages of P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on
all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the finality
of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
VALENTIN S. LOZADA, Petitioner, - versus - ";tMl: ___ _ FIRST
DIVISION * G.R. No. 196134 Present: SERENO, C.J, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, Acting Chairperson, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE, and
CAGUIOA,JJ MAGTANGGOL MENDOZA, Respondent. Promulgated:
OCT 1 2 2016 x------------------------------------------------------------------------~ DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: This appeal seeks the reversal of the
decision promulgated on September 28, 2010, 1 whereby the Court
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 111722, set aside the decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) upon finding that
the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
dated February 24, 2009,2 and reinstated such ruling in favor of the
respondent holding the petitioner liable for the satisfaction of the
money judgment in favor of the respondent. Antecedents The
factual and procedural antecedents are as follows: On leave. Rollo,
pp. 149-157; penned by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican (retired),
and concurred in by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and Associate
Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan. 2 Id. at 128-129. ~ Cl' Decision 2 G.R.
No. 196134 On October 13, 1997, the petitioner Magtanggol
Mendoza was employed as a technician by VSL Service Center, a
single proprietorship , owned and managed by Valentin Lozada.
Sometime in August 2003, the VSL Service Center was incorporated
and changed its business name to LB&C Services Corporation.
Subsequently, the petitioner was asked by respondent Lozada to
sign a new employment contract. The petitioner did not accede
because the respondent company did not consider the number of

years of service that he had rendered to VSL Service Center. From

then on, the petitioner's work schedule was reduced to one to three
days a week. In December 2003, the petitioner was given his regular
working schedule by the respondent company. However, on January
12, 2004, the petitioner was advised by the respondent company's
Executive Officer, Angeline Aguilar, not to report for work and just
wait for a call from the respondent company regarding his work
schedule. The petitioner patiently waited for the respondent
company's call regarding his work schedule. However, he did not
receive any call from it. Considering that his family depends on him
for support, he asked his wife to call the respondent company and
inquire on when he would report back to work. Still, the petitioner
was not given any work schedule by the respondent company.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
company on January 21, 2004 for illegal dismissal with a prayer for
the payment of his 13111 month pay, service incentive leave pay,
holiday pay and separation pay and with a claim for moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The case was docketed as
NLRC NCR Case No. 00- 01-00968-2004. A mandatory conciliation
conference was conducted, but to no avail, thus, they were ordered
by the Labor Arbiter to submit their respective position papers. In
his Position paper dated March 2, 2004, the petitioner alleged that
he was constructively dismissed as he was not given any work
assignment for his refusal to sign a new contract of employment. He
was dismissed from his work without any valid authorized cause. He
was not given any separation pay for the services that he rendered
for almost six (6) years that he worked with VSL Service Center. He
thus claimed that his termination from employment was effected
illegally, hastily, arbitrarily and capriciously. In its Position paper,
dated March 9, 2004, the respondent company vehemently denied
the allegation of the petitioner that he was dismissed from
employment. The petitioner was still reporting for work with the
respondent company even after he filed a complaint with the
arbitration board of the NLRC up to February 10, 2004. It also
denied that the petitioner was its employee since 1997. The truth of
the matter, according to the respondent company, was that it
employed the petitioner only on August 1, 2003 because the
respondent company started its corporate existence only on August
27, 2002 and started its business operation on August 1, 2003. It
further averred that respondent Valentin .>? Decision 3 G.R. No.

196134 Lozada was not an officer or employee of the respondent

company nor (sic) its authorized representative. The respondent
company finally claimed that it was the petitioner who severed his
relationship with it.3 On February 23, 2005, the Labor Arbiter
declared the dismissal of the petitioner from employment as illegal,
disposing thusly: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
rendered declaring the dismissal of complainant as illegal and
ordering his reinstatement with full backwages plus payment of his
13th month pay (less P.500.00 pesos) and service incentive leave
pay all computed three years backward, as follows: xx xx SO
ORDERED. 4 LB&C Services Corporation appealed, but the NLRC
dismissed the appeal for non-perfection thereof due to failure to
deposit the required cash or surety bond. Thus, the Labor Arbiter's
decision attained finality on August 4, 2006, and the entry of
judgment was issued by the NLRC on August 16, 2006. The
respondent moved for the issuance of the writ of execution, which
the Labor Arbiter granted on November 21, 2006. The petitioner and
LB&C Services Corporation filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution,5 alleging that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the petitioner and the respondent; and that
LB&C Services Corporation "has been closed and no longer in
operation due to irreversible financial losses."6 The Labor Arbiter
denied the motion to quash the writ of execution on April 16, 2007.7
In due course, the sheriff garnished PS,767.77 in the petitioner's
deposit under the account of Valor Appliances Services at the Las
Pifias Branch of the First Macro Banlc On November 19, 2007, the
Labor Arbiter directed the sheriff to proceed with further execution
of the properties of the petitioner for the satisfaction ofthe
monetary award in favor of the respondent. 8 6 Id. at I 50- I 52. Id.
at 152. Id. at 108-110. Id. at 109. Id. at 112-114. Id. at I 53- I 54. ~
Decision 4 G.R. No. 196134 On December 19, 2007, the sheriff
issued to the petitioner a notice of levy upon realty. The sheriff
notified the Registry of Deeds of Las Pifias City on the levy made on
the petitioner's real property with an area of 31.30 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-43336 of that office.
LB&C Services Corporation moved for the lifting of the levy because
the real property levied upon had been constituted by the petitioner
as the family home;9 and that the decision of the Labor Arbiter did
not adjudge the petitioner as jointly and solidarily liable for the
obligation in favor of the respondent. After the Labor Arbiter denied

its motion for the lifting of the levy on February 24, 2009, 10 LB&C
Services Corporation appealed the denial to the NLRC, which, on
May 29, 2009, reversed the Labor Arbiter, as follows: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondents' appeal is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the order of the labor arbiter is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. As prayed for by the respondents, the levy constituted
over such Las Pifias property which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (sic) is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED. 11 The
respondent assailed the reversal by motion for reconsideration,
which the NLRC thereafter denied. Thence, a petition for certiorari
was filed in the CA to assail the ruling of the NLRC on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As stated, the CA promulgated the assailed decision on
September 28, 2010 granting the petition for certiorari, and
reinstating the Labor Arbiter's decision. It opined that the petitioner
was still liable despite the fact that the Labor Arbiter's decision had
not specified his being jointly and severally liable for the monetary
awards in favor of the respondent; that LB&C Services Corporation,
being an artificial being, must have an officer who could be
presumed to be the employer, being the person acting in the
interest of the corporate employer; 12 that with LB&C Services
Corporation having already ceased its operation, the respondent
could no longer recover the Id. at 154. io Id. 11 Id. at 155. 12 Id. at
157. a Decision 5 G.R. No. 196134 monetary benefits awarded to
him, thereby rendering the entire procedure and the award
nugatory; and that the petitioner was the corporate officer liable by
virtue of his having acted on behalf of the corporation. Hence, this
appeal by the petitioner. Issue Was the petitioner liable for the
monetary awards granted to the respondent despite the absence of
a pronouncement of his being solidarily liable with LB&C Services
Corporation? Ruling of the Court The appeal is meritorious. A
corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors,
officers and employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the acts.
cof the directors and officers as the corporate agents are not their
personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation
they represent. 13 As a general rule, corporate officers are not held
solidarily liable with the corporation for separation pay because the
corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that
of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Mere ownership

by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all

of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground
for disregarding the separate corporate personality. 14 To hold a
director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, two
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) the complaint must~llege that the
director or officer assented to the patently unlawful acts of the
corporation, or that the director or officer was guilty of gross
negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the
director or officer acted in bad faith. 15 A perusal of the
respondent's position paper and other submissions indicates that he
neither ascribed gross negligence or bad faith to the petitioner nor
alleged that the petitioner had assented to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation. The respondent only maintained that the petitioner
had asked him to sign a new employment contract, but that he had
refused to 13 Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding, G.R. No.
185160, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 153, 160. 14 Ever Electrical
Manufacturing, Inc. (EEM/) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng Ever
Electrical/NA MA WU Local, G.R. No. 194795, June 13, 2012, 672
SCRA 562, 569. 15 Polymer Rubber Corporation v. Salamuding,
supra, at 161. 4 .. Decision 6 G.R. No. 196134 do the petitioner's
bidding. The respondent did not thereby clearly and convincingly
prove that the petitioner had acted in bad faith. Indeed, there was
no evidence whatsoever to corroborate the petitioner's participation
in the respondent's illegal dismissal. Accordingly, the twin
requisites of allegation and proof of bad faith necessary to hold the
petitioner personally liable for the monetary awards in favor of the
respondent were lacking. The CA reinstated the Labor Arbiter's
decision by relying on the pronouncement in Restaurante Las
Conchas v. Llego, 16 where the Court held that when the employer
corporation was no longer existing and the judgment rendered in
favor of the employees could not be satisfied, the officers of the
corporation should be held liable for acting on behalf of the
corporation. 17 A close scrutiny of Restaurante Las Conchas shows
that the pronouncement applied the exception instead of the
general rule. The Court opined therein that, as a rule, the officers
and members of the corporation were not personally liable for acts
done in the performance of their duties; 18 but that the exception
instead of the general rule should apply because of the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The Court observed that if the general
rule were to be applied, the employees would end up with an empty

victory inasmuch as the restaurant had been closed for lack of

venue, and there would be no one to pay its liability because the
respondents thereat claimed that the restaurant had been owned by
a different entity that had not been made a party in the case. 19 It
is notable that the Court has subsequently opted not to adhere to
Restaurante Las Conchas in the cases of Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum
House, Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth
Division20 and Pantranco Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO) v.
National Labor Relations Commission. 21 In Mandaue Dinghow
Dimsum House, Co., Inc., the Court declined to follow Restaurante
Las Conchas because there was showing that the respondent
therein, Henry Uytengsu, had acted in bad faith or in excess of his
authority. It stressed that every corporation was invested by law
with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which
it might be related; and that the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction must be resorted to with caution.22 The Court
noted that corporate directors and officers were 16 G.R. No. 119085,
September 9, 1999, 314 SCRA 24. I" ' Id. at p. 32. is Id. 19 Ever
Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. (EEMI) v. Samahang Manggagawa ng
Ever Electrical/NAMA WU local, supra, note 14, at 570. 20 G.R. No.
161134, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 402. 21 G.R. Nos. 170689 and
170705, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 598. 22 Supra, note 20, at 414. ~
Decision 7 G.R.No.196134 solidarily liable with the corporation for
the termination of employees done with malice or bad faith; and
declared that bad faith did not connote bad judgment or negligence,
but a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of wrong, or meant a breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will, or partook of the nature of fraud. In
Pantranco Employees Association, the Court rejected the invocation
of Restaurante Las Conchas and refused to pierce the veil of
corporate fiction, explaining: As between PNB and PNEI, petitioners
want us to disregard their separate personalities, and insist that
because the company, PNEI, has already ceased operations and
there is no other way by which the judgment in favor of the
employees can be satisfied, corporate officers can be held jointly
and severally liable with the company. Petitioners rely on the
pronouncement of this Court in A. C. Ransom Labor Union-CCL U v.
NLRC and subsequent cases. This reliance fails to persuade. We find
the aforesaid decisions inapplicable to the instant case. For one, in

the said cases, the persons made liable after the company's
cessation of operations were the officers and agents of the
corporation. The rationale is that, since the corporation is an
artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be
the employer, being the person acting in the interest of the
employer. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer. In the instant case, what is being made liable is another
corporation (PNB) which acquired the debtor corporation (PNEI).
Moreover, in the recent cases Carag v. National Labor Relations
Commission and McLeod v. National Labor Relations Commission,
the Court explained the doctrine laid down in AC Ransom relative to
the personal liability of the officers and agents of the employer for
the debts of the latter. In AC Ransom, the Court imputed liability to
the officers of the corporation on the strength of the definition of an
employer in Article 212(c) (now Article 212[e]) of the Labor Code.
Under the said provision, employer includes any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but does not
include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except
when acting as employer. It was clarified in Carag and McLeod that
Article 212( e) of the Labor Code, by itself, does not make a
corporate officer personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It
added that the governing law on personal liability of directors or
officers for debts of the corporation is still Section 31 of the
Corporation Code. More importantly, as aptly observed by this Court
in AC Ransom, it appears that Ransom, foreseeing the possibility or
probability of payment of backwages to its employees, organized
Rosario to replace Ransom, with the latter to be eventually phased
out if the strikers win their case. The execution could not be
implemented against Ransom because of the disposition posthaste
of its leviable assets evidently in order to evade its just and due
obligations. Hence, the Court sustained the piercing of the ~
Decision 8 G.R. No. 196134 corporate veil and made the officers of
Ransom personally liable for the debts of the latter. Clearly, what
can be inferred from the earlier cases is that the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil applies only in three (3) basic areas,
namely: 1) defeat of public convenience as when the corporate
fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation;
2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to justify a
wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or 3) alter ego cases,
where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or

business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so

organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make
it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific
provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate
officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate Iiabilitics.23
[Bold emphasis supplied] The records of this case do not warrant
the application of the exception. The rule, which requires malice or
bad faith on the part of the directors or officers of the corporation,
must still prevail. The petitioner might have acted in behalf of LB&C
Services Corporation but the corporation's failure to operate could
not be hastily equated to bad faith on his part. Verily, the closure of
a business can be caused by a host of reasons, including
mismanagement, bankruptcy, lack of demand, negligence, or lack ~
of business foresight. Unless the closure is clearly demonstrated to
be deliberate, malicious and in bad faith, the general rule that a
corporation has, by law, a personality separate and distinct from
that of its owners should hold sway. In view of the dearth of
evidence indicating that the petitioner had acted deliberately,
maliciously or in bad faith in handling the affairs of LB&C Services
Corporation, and such acts had eventually resulted in the closure of
its business, he could not be validly held to be jointly and solidarily
liable with LB&C Services Corporation. The CA imputed bad faith to
LB&C Services Corporation in respect of the cessation of its
operations because it still filed an a ppeal to t he NLRC,24 which the
CA construed as evincing its intent to evade liability. For that
reason, the CA deemed it mandatory to pierce the corporate fiction
and then identified the petitioner as the person responsible for the
payment of the respondent's money claims. However, the CA
pointed out nothing else in the records that showed the petitioner
as being responsible for the acts complained of. At the very least,
we consider it to be highly improbable that LB&C Services
Corporation deliberately ceased its operations if only to evade the
payment of the monetary awards adjudged in favor of a single
employee like the respondent. 23 Supra, note 21, at 614-616. 24
Rollo, p. 156. tS Decision 9 G.R. No. 196134 In reinstating the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the CA, although conceding that the
petitioner was not among those who should be liable for the
monetary award, still went on to pierce the veil of corporate fiction
and to declare as follows: Undoubtedly, respondent Lozada cannot

be absolved from his liability as corporate officer. Although, as a

rule, the officers and members of a corporation are not personally
liable for the acts done in the performance of their duties, this rule
admits of exceptions one of which is when the employer corporation
is no longer existing and is unable t~ satisfy the judgment in favor
of the employee. The corporate officer in such case should be held
for acting on behalf of the corporation. Here, the respondent
company already ceased its business operation. xx xx x x x The
petitioner's claim that respondent Lozada was the real owner of the
LB & C Corporation is thus correct and tenable. The conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that the respondent company never revealed
who were the officers of the LB & C Corporation if only to pinpoint
responsibility in the closure of the company that resulted in the
dismissal of the petitioner from employment. Respondent Lozada is,
therefore, personally liable for the payment of the monetary
benefits due to the petitioner, its former employee. 25 The Labor
Arbiter did not render any findings about the petitioner
perpetrating the wrongful act against the respondent, or about the
petitioner being personally liable along with LB&C Services
Corporation for the monetary award. The lack of such findings was
not assailed by the respondent. On its part, the NLRC did not
discuss the matter at all in its decision of May 31, 2006, which
ultimately attained finality. To hold the petitioner liable after the
decision had become final and executory would surely alter the
tenor of the decision in a manner that would exceed its terms.
Moreover, by declaring that the petitioner's liability as solidary, the
Labor Arbiter modified the already final and executory February 23,
2005 decision. The modification was impermissible because the
decision had already become immutable, even if the modification
was intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. The
only recognized exceptions to the immutability of the decision are
the corrections of clerical errors, the making of so-called nunc pro
tune entries that cause no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. 26 None of such exceptions applied herein. It is
fully warranted, therefore, that we quash and lift the alias writ of
execution as a patent nullity by virtue of its not conforming to, or of
its 25 Id. at 158-159. 26 Alba v. Yupangco, G.R. No. 188233, June 29,
2010, 622 SCRA 503, 508. _g Decision 10 G.R. No. 196134 being
different from and going beyond or varying the tenor of the
judgment that gave it life. To insist on its validity would be defying

the constitutional guarantee against depriving any person of his

property without due process of law. In sum, there was no
justification for holding the petitioner jointly and solidarily liable
with LB&C Services Corporation to pay to the respondent the
adjudged monetary award. To start with, the respondent had not
alleged the petitioner's act of bad faith, whether in his complaint or
in his position paper, or anywhere else in his other submissions
before the Labor Arbiter, ~ that would have justified the piercing of
the veil of corporate identity. Hence, we reverse the CA.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on September 28, 2010; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the order
issued on April 16, 2007 by Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam;
QUASHES and LIFTS the alias writ of execution; and DIRECTS the
National Labor Relations Commission Labor Arbiter to implement
with utmost dispatch the final and executory decision rendered on
May 31, 2006 against the assets ofLB&C Service Corporation only.
No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210233
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RODOLFO SY AND BELEN SY,
LOLITA SY, and SPOUSES TEODORICO AND LEAH
ADARNA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02458, to wit: (1) Resolution 2 dated
July 5, 2012, which dismissed the Republic of the Philippines'
(Republic) appeal for failure to file brief; (2) Resolution3 dated
August 20, 2013, declaring its July 5, 2012 Resolution final and
executory; and (3) the Entry of Judgment4 dated August 21, 2012.
Facts

On March 29, 1988, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), instituted an action for the cancellation of
miscellaneous sales patents and the corresponding certificates of
title issued to the spouses Rodolfo Sy and Belen Sy, and Lolita Sy
(respondents), and the reversion of the lands covered by them to
the public domain on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. 5
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21, rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents on October 10, 2007.6 Its
decision provides for the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, all considered, the Court finds preponderance of
evidence decisively in favor of the [respondents], for which reason
the regularity and validity of the patents and corresponding titles in
question are upheld and the complaint is therefore DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC decision was received on November 14, 2007 by
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region
VII-Legal Division, which was the OSG's deputized special counsel,
while the OSG received its copy on April 1, 2008. The Republic,
through the deputized legal counsel, subsequently filed a notice of
appeal on November 23, 2007, which was given due course by the
RTC in its order dated December 4, 2007.8
A notice to file brief was then sent by the CA to Atty. Ferdinand S.
Alberca (Atty. Alberca), Special Counsel of the OSG, Legal Division,
DENR, Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City, and was received on
December 1, 2009. 9 It appears, however, that no brief was filed,
hence, the CA, in its Resolution dated May 6, 2011, dismissed the
Republic's appeal "for failure x x x to file the required brief within
the time provided by the Rules of Court." 10 A copy of the said
resolution was received by the DENR Region VII-Legal Division on
May 17, 2011. 11 On May 19, 2011, a copy of the resolution was
transmitted by the DENR Region VII-Legal Division to the OSG, who
filed a motion for reconsideration on June 1, 2011. 12
In its Resolution 13 dated September 14, 2011, the CA granted the
OSG's motion and reinstated the appeal, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Republic] is

hereby ORDERED to file its Appellant's Brief within forty-five (45)
days from notice to which the [respondents] may file their
Appellee's Brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the brief
of the [Republic]. The [Republic] may file its Appellant's Reply Brief
within twenty (20) days from receipt of the Appellee's Brief.
SO ORDERED.

14

The DENR Region VII-Legal Division was, again, furnished a copy of

the resolution but the OSG was not. 15
Subsequently, the CA issued its Resolution dated July 5,
2012, dismissing the appeal on account of the Republic's failure to
file brief.1wphi1 There being no reconsideration interposed by the
Republic, the dismissal of the appeal became final and executory
and entry of judgment was made on August 21, 2012. A year after,
the CA issued Resolution dated August 20, 2013, declaring its
Resolution dated July 5, 2012 as having attained finality on August
21, 2012.
The OSG was not furnished with a copy of the CA Resolutions dated
September 14, 2011, July 5, 2012 and August 20, 2013, and the
Entry of Judgment dated August 21, 2012. It was only when the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR Region VII sent its 1st
Indorsement dated September 27, 2013 that the OSG was apprised
of the subsequent
incidents.

16

In this petition, the OSG maintains that THE [CA] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL OF THE REPUBLIC ALTHOUGH THE OSG WAS NOT NOTIFIED
OF THE RESOLUTION GRANTING THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE
APPEAL AND GIVING THE REPUBLIC A NEW PERIOD OF FORTY-FIVE
DAYS TO FILE ITS BRIEF. 17
The OSG argues that, being the Republic's statutory counsel, it
should have been furnished with the CA's resolution reinstating its
appeal, not the DENR Region VII-Legal Division. Consequently, there

was a violation of the Republic's right to due process and the CA

committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the reglementary
period within which to file its appellant's brief had lapsed. 18
The respondents' counsel, on the other hand, sought excuse from
filing a comment due to the refusal of the heirs of Leah Adarna to
cooperate with him.19
Ruling of the Court
The petition must be granted.
It is undisputed that it was the OSG who initiated Civil Case No. CEB6785 for cancellation of miscellaneous sales patents and the
corresponding certificates of title issued to the respondents.20 As
such, it is the counsel of record and remains to be so until the
culmination of the case. More importantly, Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically
empowers the OSG to "[r]epresent the Government in the Supreme
Court and the [CA] in all criminal proceedings x x x and all other
courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity
is a party." Section 35(5), meanwhile, provides that the OSG shall
"[r]epresent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings." The CA was, in fact, well aware of this. In its
Resolution dated September 14, 2011 reinstating the Republic's
appeal, the CA recognized the role of the OSG as the principal
counsel in the appellate proceedings, viz:
A closer scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the Notice
to File Brief was sent to and received by [Atty. Alberca], Special
Counsel of the OSG, Legal Division, DENR, Region VII, Banilad,
Mandaue City on December 01, 2009 as evidenced by the Registry
Return Receipt.
Mindful of the provision in Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provides for the powers and
functions of the [OSG] which is the official counsel for government
agencies in cases before this Court, to wit:
x x x x21

It is therefore rather peculiar that the CA failed to furnish the OSG

with a copy of its Resolution dated September 14, 2011, and even
continued to neglect to furnish the OSG with copies of all its
subsequent resolutions. Instead, it kept sending them to Atty.
Alberca of the DENR Region VII- Legal Division. While the OSG may
have deputized the DENR Region VII-Legal Division to assist it in the
performance of its functions, it has not totally relinquished its
position as counsel for the Republic. The deputized counsel is no
more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular
proceeding and the latter remains the principal counsel entitled to
be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and
decisions. Hence, any court order and decision sent to the deputy,
acting as an agentof the Solicitor General, is not binding until it is
actually received by the Solicitor General.22
It must be stressed that "[t]he essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard, logically preconditioned on prior
notice, before judgment is rendered."23 "Notice and hearing are
preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable
judgment, and together with the tribunal having jurisdiction of the
case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of
due process of law."24 "Even the Republic as a litigant is entitled to
this constitutional right, in the same manner and to the same extent
that this right is guaranteed to private litigants. "25
Consequently, it is clear that the issuance of CA Resolutions dated
July 5, 2012 and August 20, 2013, and the Entry of Judgment dated
August 21, 2012 was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Evaristo Tiotioen,26 the
Court even emphatically ruled that "the belated filing of an appeal
by the State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land
registration case because of the mistake or error on the part of its
officials or agents does not deprive the government of its right to
appeal from a judgment of the court."27
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 5,
2012 and August 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
02458 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Republic of the
Philippines' appeal is REINSTATED. Moreover, the Entry of Judgment

dated August 21, 2012 is ORDERED stricken off from its Book of
Entries of Judgment.
Let this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for continuation
of the appellate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO, A.C. No. 8494 Complainants, versus - ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., * Present: SERENO, CJ,
CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, **BRION ' PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ, MENDOZA, REYES, PERLASBERNABE, LEONEN, JARDELEZA, and CAGUIOA, JJ: Promulgated:
Respondent. October 5, 2016
x------------------------------------------------------~~~~=--~-------x DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.: A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and fairness in
dealing with his clients, and shall only charge fair and reasonable
fees for his legal services. He should not excessively estimate the
value of his professional services. In drawing up the terms of his
professional engagement, he should not practice deceit. The clients
are entitled to rescind the written agreement On official business.
On leave. Decision 2 A.C. No. 8494 on his professional fees if the
terms thereof contravened the true agreement of the parties.
Antecedents This administrative case stems from the complaint
brought on December 8, 2009 by the Spouses Emilio and Alicia
Jacinto, then 81 and 76 years of age, respectively, against Atty.
Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. for the latters unjust and dishonest treatment
of them as his clients. They hereby seek that he be sanctioned for
his actuations.1 The complainants averred that a private survey
team had conducted a survey of Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351 on October
10-11, 2008 pursuant to the order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39, in Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title of said lot by the
owners; that after conducting the perimeter survey, the survey
team had tried to enter the premises owned by them but they had
prevented the team from doing so because their premises had
already been segregated by virtue of the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3387; that their land covered by OCT No. P3387 had already been subdivided into nine lots; that the survey
team had then desisted from proceeding with their survey of their

land but had nonetheless informed them that they would return
another time for the survey; and that this had forced them to
consult a lawyer on the legal remedies to prevent the intrusion on
their property.2 The complainants further averred that they had
then consulted with the respondent, briefing him on their concern,
and delivering to him the documents pertinent to their land; that
after scrutinizing the documents, he had told them that he would be
initiating a case for certiorari in their behalf to nullify the order for
the reconstitution of the lost title covering Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351;
that he had then insinuated that one of their lots would be his
attorneys fees; and that they had not initially agreed to the
insinuation because the lots had already been allocated to each of
their seven children, but they had ultimately consented to giving
him only a portion of Lot No. 37926-H with an area of 250 square
meters n.3 It appears that soon after the respondent unilaterally
prepared the document so-called Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), to wit: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT KNOW ALL MEN BY
THESE PRESENTS: 1 Rollo, pp. 1-5. 2 Id. at 2. 3 Id. at 2-3. Decision 3
A.C. No. 8494 I, ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., of legal age, married
and a resident of Lot 13, Block 1, Xavier Heights Subd., Upper
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, hereinafter referred as the FIRST
PARTY; and WE, SPOUSES EMILIO JACINTO AND ALICIA JACINTO, both
legal age, and residents of Cagayan de Oro City, herein referred as
the SECOND PARTY; WITNESSETH: 1. That the FIRST PARTY shall be
the counsel/lawyer of the SECOND PARTY, regarding their parcel of
land formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-3387 with
an area of 4,138 sq. m., located at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City,
presently subdivided into 8 lots with individual certificate of titles
(sic); 2. That the First Party shall get 300 sq. m., from Lot No.
37925-G covered by TCT No. 121708 3. That this agreement shall
take effect immediately upon the signing of the parties (sic) cannot
be revoked, amended or modified by the Second Party without the
consent of the First Party.4 The complainants recalled that on
October 17, 2008 the respondent requested them to proceed to his
law office. What thereafter transpired and that led to the signing of
the MOA were set forth in their complaint, as follows: On October
17, 2008, my wife received a phone call from the office of Atty.
Bangot directing us to go to his office to sign documents they have
prepared. The phone call was relayed to me by my wife so we
immediately proceeded to his office arriving thereat at exactly 4:00

PM. The daughter of Atty. Bangot handed to us two sets of

documents for our signatures. Because of full trust to Atty. Bangot,
we did not bother reading the contents of the documents. Per
instruction, we brought the papers to their friend lawyer for
notarization and after the notarization returned to the office where
we were given our personal file, without reading every detail of the
documents. Upon arriving at our residence, I read the contents of
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Said MOA was not signed by
Atty. Bangot and did not bear the signature of witnesses. I was
surprised to know that the terms of the (MOA) did not reflect the
true intentions being contemplated in our previous discussions.
Contrary to what I have told him, a different area which is 37925-G
under TCT No. 121708 was written. I already told him that my other
lots including the lot written in the MOA could no longer be disposed
of because these lots were already committed to each of my
children. The lot area was also increased from 250 sq. m. to 300 sq.
m. Because of this situation, I called my wife and children and told
them about the problem. My daughter whose share was involved
reacted badly and she was hurt because she will then be deprived 4
Id. at 8. Decision 4 A.C. No. 8494 of her place to live in, in the
future. We continued our discussion and we decided to see Atty.
Bangot to have the MOA be revoked because we felt that we were
deceived, Atty. Bangot took advantage of our old age, thus breaking
the trust and confidence the client[]s and lawyer should uphold at
all times in the exercise of ones profession. As a gesture of
acknowledging his efforts, we offered to pay him in cash, fair
enough for the services he had rendered to us. However, he refused
to revoke the MOA because accordingly, he would consult his wife
which finally did not materialize because his wife was not amenable
which in effect showed that they have vested interest on the
property and they are bent on taking the property at any cause. He
even challenged us to file an appropriate case in court against him
rather than agree with our pleading for payment of cash. Likewise,
he refused our offer to pay his services in cash alleging that he
already filed a Manifestation in court and claimed that our
possession would not be disturbed and that he will be filing a case
for Certiorari as promised. To our surprise though, we came to know
that the Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a preparatory
pleading for certiorari. No way could it even stop the intrusion into
our property. Basically, we were deceived by Atty. Bangot into

believing that the Manifestation he filed would stop any legal

disturbance on our property and the same is preparatory for
certiorari.5 Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to bring
their complaint against the respondent. On his part, the respondent
denied the allegations of the complainants. He insisted that the
complaint against him was a harassment tactic designed to
intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute
on the validity of the MOA;6 that the MOA was valid; that the
Manifestation for Information he had filed in court prevented the
intrusion into the complainants land; that the administrative
complaint was designed to insure the derailment of his application
for a judgeship position, and to cover up the negligence of the
complainants counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2008-302
(for annulment and/or rescission of agreement), which case was
dismissed for failure to comply with the requirement for the prior
barangay conciliation proceedings; and that they had voluntarily
signed the MOA without intimidation, fraud or undue influence.7 On
August 23, 2010, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8 5 Id. at 3-4. 6 Id. at 16-19. 7 Id. at 16-19, 100120. 8 Id. at 95. Decision 5 A.C. No. 8494 Findings and
Recommendation of the IBP In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver
A. Cachapero submitted his Report and Recommendation9 finding
the complaint against the respondent meritorious, and
recommending that the respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for one year for his unfair and injudicious treatment of the
complainants as his clients. In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,10 the IBP
Board of Governors increased the duration of the respondents
recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for
two years, viz.: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering that Respondent breached his duty of candor and
fairness to his client, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. Through its
Resolution No. XXI-2014-315,11 the IBP Board of Governors denied
the respondents motion for reconsideration. Issue Did the

respondent violate his ethical duties as a member of the Bar in his

dealings with the complainants? Ruling of the Court We find and
hold that the respondent grossly violated his Lawyers Oath and his
ethical duties as an attorney because he did not observe candor and
fairness in his dealings with his clients. The findings of IBP
Commissioner Cachapero, which sufficiently described the violations
of the respondent, provide an irrefutable insight into the gravity of
the violations by the respondent, as follows: The question to ask is,
Was the MOA fair to the parties and entered into by them in good
faith? 9 Id. at 340-343. 10 Id. at 338. 11 Id. at 335. Decision 6 A.C.
No. 8494 The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin with,
the conduct of Respondent had evinced an instinctive interest in the
property of Complainants. He had the MOA executed at the same
time he filed the Manifestation for Information before the court that
was hearing LRC Case No. 98-010. Not only that, Respondents
proposal to have a MOA executed between him and the Complainant
was meant to impress that his supposed attorneys fees would be
paid on contingent basis, however, a perusal of the MOA indicates
that the payment of Respondents fee by way of a real property is
being made immediately effective upon execution of the agreement.
As to the agreement of the Complainant and the Respondent, the
undersigned gives full faith to the allegation of Complainant that
the payment of Respondents attorneys fees by way of a real
property would come from TCT No. 121709 and not T-121708.
Complainants explained that the latter lot had already been
committed to their seven (7) children especially because this lot is
situated in a prime location thus they could not have picked the
same over Lot No. 121709. The Respondent knew straightforwardly
that lot 121708 was a better lot yet Respondent gave a different
account of their agreement and took advantage of the frailty and
advance ages (sic) of his clients. But, the most shocking of all, is the
apparent inequity or disproportion between the amount of
attorneys fees (measured from the value of the property taken by
Respondent) and the effort or service already performed or still to
be performed by him. The Complainants were not made parties to
the LRC case or any other case and Respondent filed a mere twopaged Manifestation for Information in court which he did almost
effortlessly. It is not clear how the court had reacted to the
manifestation but Respondent did not follow it up with [any] other
action. Despite the same, Respondent stuck to his tale that the

Complainants had signed [the] MOA and despite his minimal

representation of the Complainants in court, he held on to his idea
that he had taken from his clients valid title to a million [pesos]
worth of real estate in payment of his fees. The undersigned does
not see fairness and judiciousness to Respondents treatment of his
clients, 81 and 76 years old, respectively, and he need not add to
his brief disquisition in this regard.12 We adopt the findings and
note the insights thus expressed. We must, therefore, highlight the
following reasons why the findings and insights should be
sustained. To determine the reasonableness of attorneys fees, the
following factors as enumerated in Rule 20.1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility may serve as a guide, to wit: (a) the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; (b)
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the
importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill 12 Id. at 342-343.
Decision 7 A.C. No. 8494 demanded; (e) the probability of losing
other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of
fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and (j) the professional standing of the lawyer. It was
not disputed that only the filing of the two-paged Manifestation for
Information constituted the respondents rendition of professional
services for the complainants. Although he did claim that the filing
of the Manifestation for Information had prevented any intrusion on
their property, thereby fulfilling his end of the contract,13 the worth
of such minimal effort was exaggerated and disproportionate when
taken in the context of the attorneys fees being Lot No. 37925-G
with 300 square meters in area. The two-paged Manifestation for
Information was not even the procedural precursor of the promised
petition for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the petition
for certiorari as he had promised. And, lastly, he did nothing more
after filing the Manifestation for Information. He certainly
transgressed the Lawyers Oath by receiving property of a
substantial value from the complainants after having made them
believe that he could ensure their land from intrusion by third
parties. He took advantage of them who had reposed their full trust
and confidence in his ability to perform the task by virtue of his

being a lawyer. He was definitely bent on obtaining Lot No. 37925-G

than in protecting the complainants interest in their property. He
exhibited this zeal by refusing their offer to give cash for his
attorneys fees instead of the land. We sadly note in this connection
that his changing the property ostensibly agreed upon with the
bigger lot as payment for his legal services14 reflected his deceit at
the start of the relationship. He maintained the deceit by ultimately
enforcing the MOA against them through the action for specific
performance. Surely, the totality of the respondents actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis
of his acts and actuations, the attorneys fees in the form of the lot
he charged from them were unconscionable and unreasonable, and
should be struck down for failing to pass muster under the
aforestated guidelines. The respondent appears to have impressed
on the complainants at the time of their negotiations that the
attorneys fees in the form of the lot would be delivered to him only
on a contingent basis. Again, he had misrepresented himself to
them because the express terms of the MOA stipulated that this
agreement shall take effect immediately upon the signing of the
parties [and] 13 Id. at 114-116. 14 Id. at 3-4. Decision 8 A.C. No.
8494 cannot be revoked, amended or modified by the Second Party
without the consent of the First Party. As worded, the agreement
was not a contingent fee arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee
arrangement is a contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to
depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a
supposed right.15 The amount of the contingent fee agreed upon by
the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for
his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much
higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration
of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing should the suit fail. Such
arrangement is generally recognized as valid and binding in this
jurisdiction but its terms must be reasonable.16 Canon 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics states that a contract for a
contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty
of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. A contract of this
nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor
client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has a

meritorious cause of action but has no means with which to pay for
the legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the
litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement is the only means by which
the poor and helpless can seek redress for injuries sustained and
have their rights vindicated.17 Considering that a contingent fee
arrangement is susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely
scrutinize it to protect the client from unjust charges. The court
looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the stipulated fee
under the circumstances of each case.18 Section 24, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides: Section 24. Compensation of
attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to
the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
(Emphasis ours) 15 Integrated Construction Services, Inc. and
Engineering Construction, Inc. v. Relova, G.R. No. L- 36424, July 31,
1975, 65 SCRA 638, 650. 16 Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
117438, June 8, 1995, 245 SCRA 30, 36-37. 17 Rayos v.Hernandez,
G.R. No. 169079, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 517, 528-529. 18
Taganas v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 118746,
September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 133, 137. Decision 9 A.C. No. 8494 All
the foregoing circumstances established that the respondent was
deceitful, dishonest and unreasonable in his dealings with the
complainants as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyers Oath,
whereby he vowed, among others, to do no falsehood, and not to
consent to the doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any
mans cause for money or malice but to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. He also breached the
following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with

his clients. Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his

client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him. Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Canon 20 A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with
clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. We have said
time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the Law is
neither a trade nor a craft but a profession whose basic ideal is to
render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its
aid. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to
attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives,
accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles.19 The
respondents behavior and deceit demonstrated a preference for
self-gain that transgressed his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty and
devotion to his clients cause. His betrayal of his clients trust
besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession. These
considerations justify suspending him from the practice of law.
Moreover, the respondent made the following allegations in his
motion for reconsideration filed with the IBP Board of Governors, to
wit: 9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty. Palasans
negligence and reckless filing of Annulment and/or Rescission of
Agreement titled Spouses Emilio Jacinto and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty.
Emelie P. Bangot docketed as Civil Case No. 2008-302 before the
Regional Trial Court, 19 Docena v. Limon, A,C. No. 2387, September
10, 1998, 295 SCRA 262, 266. Decision 10 A.C. No. 8494 Branch 41,
Cagayan de Oro City where the subject matter was the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the complainant and
respondent, said counsel resorted to another forum by filing this
administrative case where his chance of oppressing and harassing
respondent is far greater because when he filed said administrative
case Atty. Roan Libarios then one of the Officers of the IBP National
Chapter and member of the Board of Governors, representing
Eastern Mindanao, was holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig
City as such, his officemate or law partner at Butuan City (sic).
Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios eventually became the
IBP National President; x x x x 18. The statement by Commissioner
Cachapero in his Report and Recommendation, 1st sentence, 2nd

par., thereof that: On October 10 & 11, 2008, a survey was

conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351 situated at Kauswagan,
Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the reconstitution of the lost
title of the lot which was then pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 39, R-10, Cagayan de Oro City. is quite confusing and
designed to put down respondent probably at any cost and probably
by an unseen but influential hands (sic);20 The aforequoted
allegations indicated that the respondent had readily attributed the
filing of the administrative charge to the lawyer representing the
complainants in the suit against him to annul or rescind the MOA, as
well as to unseen but influential hands in the hierarchy of the IBP.
The attribution was bereft of factual and legal justifications,
however, because he did not even attempt to establish it with
satisfactory proof. We cannot but dismiss the attribution as
malicious and unfounded in view of the record establishing his
serious ethical violations. He displayed an unmitigated lack of
professionalism by casting aspersions against his peers, and
exhibited a dangerous propensity to disparage others, which should
move us to consider his violations as aggravated. To be now
considered, therefore, is the condign penalty of the respondent. A
review of precedents shows that the penalty of suspension, or even
disbarment, has been meted on similar violations and
transgressions. In Santeco v. Avance, 21 the respondent attorney
was suspended for five years for abandoning the cause of her client
without notice despite her having collected her legal fees. She also
failed to account for the money of the client and constantly refused
to submit herself to the proceedings of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon,
Jr.,22 this Court disbarred the respondent attorney who did not
promptly account for the funds he had received for the benefit of his
client, and for his deceit in dealings with his client. In Overgaard v.
Valdez, 23 the respondent attorney was disbarred for assuring the
complainant that his property involved in a civil case would be
safeguarded, and then 20 Rollo, pp. 143-145. 21 A.C. No. 5834,
December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 6. 22 A.C. No. 5829, October 28,
2003, 414 SCRA 511. 23 A.C. No. 7902, September 30, 2008, 567
SCRA 118. Decision 11 A.C. No. 8494 collecting the full amount of
legal fees amounting to P900,000.00, only to desert the complainant
after receiving the fees. The respondent attorney had further failed
to submit an answer as well as to attend the proceedings before the
IBP. Although the complainants appeared to have initially bound

themselves to give a part of their land as the respondents

professional fees, they did so apparently because he had
misrepresented to them the gravity and extent of their legal matter.
His misrepresentation was undeniably calculated to make them part
with their valuable asset in lieu of cash. He did not thereafter
render any worthy professional legal service in their favor. Verily, as
the clich goes, they did not get their moneys worth from him.
Even if this charge was his first infraction, the grossness of his
violations of the Lawyers Oath and the various relevant canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted earlier absolutely
warranted his suspension from the practice of law for five years
effective upon his receipt of this decision, with warning of sterner
sanctions should he hereafter commit a similar offense. This
duration of suspension was the penalty we prescribed in the recent
case of Mercullo v. Ramon24 where the respondent lawyer had
deceived the complainants into parting with the substantial sum of
P350,000.00 as her attorneys fees but did not subsequently
perform her professional undertaking. In addition, the respondent
should not be entitled to receive any attorneys fees in view of the
worthlessness of the professional services he supposedly rendered.
There is no question, as ruled in Sanchez v. Aguilos, 25 that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable
compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client; and that for as long as the attorney is in good
faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the
client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services.
Yet, equally without question is that the attorney should not accept
the engagement that is way above his ability and competence to
handle, for there will then be no basis for him to accept any amount
as attorneys fees; or that he should at least begin to perform the
contemplated task undertaken for the client to entitle him to be
compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. 26 WHEREFORE, this
Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR.
guilty of violation of the Lawyers Oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for five (5) years effective upon notice of this decision, with warning
that sterner sanctions will be meted on him for a similar offense;
and 24 A.C. No. 11078, July 19, 2016. 25 A.C. No. 10543, March 16,
2016. 26 Id. Decision 12 AC. No. 8494 DECLARES that he is not
entitled to recover any attorney's fees from the complainants. Let

copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar

Confidant; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of
the Court Administrator. The Office of the Court Administrator shall
disseminate this decision to all courts of the Philippines. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196140
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ELIZABETH MANALASTAS and BEA CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision1of the Court of Appeals
(CA) promulgated on September 9, 2010, and its Resolution 2 dated
March 14, 2011, denying petitioner's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration be reversed and set aside.
Sometime in 1977 to 1978, petitioner, a government-owned and
controlled corporation involved in the development of hydro-electric
generation of power and production of electricity, and the
construction, operation and maintenance of power plants,
transmission lines, power stations and substations, among others,
constructed a 230 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tiwi line and a
69 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on respondents'
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 26263, affecting an area of 26,919
square meters. Petitioner entered said land without the knowledge
or consent of respondents, without properly initiating expropriation
proceedings, and without any compensation to respondentslandowners. Because of said transmission lines, respondents
alleged that they could no longer use their land as part of a
subdivision project as originally intended, which ultimately caused
financial loss to their family. Thus, in July 2000, respondents
(plaintiffs below, who were then joined by their mother, Celedonia,
and brother, Mariano; Celedonia and Mariano are no longer
impleaded as parties in this petition as the CA Decision has attained
finality as to them)3 filed a complaint against petitioner and its

officers with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC).

Respondents demanded the removal of the power lines and its
accessories and payment of damages, or in the alternative, payment
of the fair market value of the affected areas totalling 26,000
square meters of respondents' land at P800.00 per square meter.
On November 17, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, defendant NAPOCOR is hereby ordered to:
1) Pay plaintiffs the amount of PESOS: NINETY-TWO MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND and THREE HUNDRED FIFTYONE (P92,827,351.00), by way of just compensation, broken down as
follows:
a) For the plaintiffs Elizabeth Manalastas and Bea Castillo:
P32,033,610.00 Value of the land
P53,816,461.00 Interest at 6% per annum for 28 years
P85,850,071.00 Total
b) For the plaintiffs Celedonia Mariano and Enrico Mariano:
P1,000,200.00 Value of the land
P5,887,080.00 Interest at 6% per annum for 9 years
P6,977,280.00 Total
2) Pay Attorney's fees to plaintiffs in the amount of Pesos: One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00).
With cost against plaintiff (sic) NAPOCOR.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal to the CA, herein petitioner argued that the RTC erred in
factoring the devaluation of the peso in the computation of the fair
market value of respondents' land. In a Decision dated September 9,

2010, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment with modification, reducing

the award to Celedonia and Enrico Mariano (respondents' coplaintiffs below) to P1,678,908.00. The CA ruled that petitioner
could no longer assail the valuation that petitioner itself
recommended, the same being a judicial admission. Moreover, the
CA pointed out that taking an inconsistent position on appeal
cannot be allowed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated March 14, 2010.
Hence, the present petition where petitioner alleges as follows:
I.
ESTOPPEL IS INOPERATIVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT; THE
INFLATION FACTOR SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION
OF JUST COMPENSATION
II.
THE DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. COURTS ARE THEREFORE NOT BOUND TO UPHOLD A
PARTY'S FORMULATION OF JUST COMPENSATION; [and]
III.
THE AWARD OF EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND
AND SEVENTY-ONE PESOS (Php85,850,071.00) WILL UNJUSTLY
ENRICH THE RESPONDENTS.5
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The bone of contention in this case is the inclusion of the inflation
rate of the Philippine Peso in determining the just compensation
due to respondents. Petitioners maintain that such inclusion of the
inflation rate in arriving at the value of just compensation has no
legal basis, and it was a palpable mistake on the part of its
representatives and counsel below to make a recommendation
factoring in said inflation rate in the computation of just
compensation. None of the parties contest the finding that the fair
market value of the property at the time of taking was Php170.00
per square meter.

It should be noted that in Secretary of the Department of Public

Works and Highways, et al. v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona
Tecson,6 the Court stressed that "just compensation is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation." In a motion for reconsideration of the Decision in
said case, the landowners argued that it would be unjust if the
amount that will be awarded to them today will be based on the
value of the property at the time of actual taking. In its Resolution
dated April 21, 2015, the Court fully explained that:
x x x the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner
for appropriating the latter's property; it is only bound to make
good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of
the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
More, the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to
the property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the
public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that the owner's loss
is not only his property but also its income-generating potential.
Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must
immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and
the potential income lost. Accordingly, in Apo, we held that the
rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate the petitioners
for the income they would have made had they been proprerly
compensated for their properties at the time of the taking. Thus:
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for prompt
payment and the necessity of the payment of interest to
compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for
property already taken. We ruled in this case that:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to
be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to
be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of
the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to
sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.

Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is

deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest[s] on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interest[s] accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good
as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred. [Emphasis supplied]
In other words, the just compensation due to the landowners
amounts to an effective forbearance on the part of the Statea
proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was
taken until the full amount of just compensation is paidin order to
eradicate the issue of the constant variability of the value of the
currency over time. In the Court's own words:
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from
the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took"
the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the
amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the
taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum
should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and
inflation of the value of the currency over time x x x.7
The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for
purposes of determining just compensation should not include the
inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of
the price of expropriated land is sufficiently recompensed through
payment of interest on the market value of the land as of the time
of taking from the landowner.1wphi1
Moreover, the fact that it was petitioner's own counsel below that
recommended the inclusion of the inflation rate in the
determination of just compensation should not be taken against
petitioner. After all, it is ultimately the courts' mandated duty to
adjudge whether the parties' submissions are correct. It is the
courts, not the litigants, who decide on the proper interpretation or
application of the law and, thus, only the courts may determine the

rightful compensation in accordance with the law and evidence

presented by the parties. It is incongruous for the court below to
uphold a proposition merely because it was recommended by a
party, despite the same being erroneous. Thus, in Secretary of
Finance v. Oro Maura Shipping Lines,8 the Court emphasized, thus:
x x x Assuming further x x x that the Collector of the Port of Manila
similarly erred, we reiterate the legal principle that estoppel
generally finds no application against the State when it acts to
rectify mistakes, errors, irregularities, or illegal acts, of its officials
and agents, irrespective of rank. This ensures efficient conduct of
the affairs of the State without any hindrance on the part of the
government from implementing laws and regulations, despite prior
mistakes or even illegal acts of its agents shackling government
operations and allowing others, some by malice, to profit from
official error or misbehavior. The rule holds true even if the
rectification prejudices parties who had meanwhile received
benefits.9
Such important principle was reiterated in the more recent Republic
v. Bacas,10 where the Court stated that even "[g]ranting that the
persons representing the government were negligent, the doctrine
of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic."11 Again,
in National Power Corporation v. Samar,12 the Court admonished the
trial court to disregard even the panel of commissioners'
recommended valuation of the land if such valuation is not the
relevant value at the time the NPC took possession of the
property.13 The cases cited by the lower court to justify its ruling
that petitioner is bound by the recommendation made by its counsel
before the trial court, are all inapplicable to the present case as said
cases do not involve agencies or instrumentalities of the State.
Lastly, in addition to the award for interests, Article 2229 of the
Civil Code provides that "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good" and
Article 2208 of the same code states that attorney's fees may be
awarded by the court in cases where such would be just and
equitable. As held in the Resolution dated April 21, 2015
in Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, et al.
v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson,14 additional compensation

in the form of exemplary damages and attorney's fees should

likewise be awarded as a consequence of the government agency's
illegal occupation of the owner's property for a very long time,
resulting in pecuniary loss to the owner. Indeed, government
agencies should be admonished and made to realize that its
negligence and inaction in failing to commence the proper
expropriation proceedings before taking private property, as
provided for by law, cannot be countenanced by the Court.
To recapitulate, the formula for determination of just compensation
to landowners does not include the factor for inflation rate, as
inflation is properly accounted for through payment of interest on
the amount due to the landowner, and through the award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in cases where there was
irregularity in the taking of property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89366 is MODIFIED, such that petitioner is
adjudged liable to PAY JUST COMPENSATION to respondents at the
rate of Php170.00 per square meter, subject to interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking in 1978
up to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum
from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and
applicable jurisprudence. Petitioner is, likewise, ORDERED to
PAY respondents exemplary damages in the amount of
Php500,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of Php200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
INDIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PHILS., INC., Petitioner, G .R. No.
184008 Present: SEP a 9 2016 -versusVELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA, FILIPINO INDIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., PEREZ, REYES, and JARDELEZA, JJ. Promulgated:
DECISION JARDELEZA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated May 15, 20082 and August 4, 2008,3 respectively, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97320. The Decision and Resolution affirmed the Securities
and Exchange Commission En Banc (SEC En Banc) Decision dated
November 30, 20064 directing petitioner Indian Chamber of

Commerce Phils., Inc. to modify its corporate name. The Facts

Filipino-Indian Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc.
(defunct FICCPI) was originally registered with the SEC as Indian
Chamber of Commerce of Manila, Inc. on November 24, 1951, with
SEC Registration Number 6465. 5 On October 7, 1959, it amended
its corporate name into Indian Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines, Inc., and further amended it into Filipino-Indian
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. on Rollo, pp. 23-39. Id
at 9-16. Ponencia by Associate Justice Isaias Dicdican, with
Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia,
concurring. Id. at 80. Rollo. pp.rl8-19. Id at 157-163. Decision 2 G.R.
No. 184008 March 4, 1977.6 Pursuant to its Articles of
Incorporation, and without applying for an extension of its
corporate term, the defunct FICCPI's term of existence expired on
November 24, 2001. 7 SEC Case No. 05-008 On January 20, 2005, Mr.
Naresh Mansukhani (Mansukhani) reserved the corporate name
"Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, Inc."
(FICCPI), for the period from January 20, 2005 to April 20, 2005, with
the Company Registration and Monitoring Department (CRMD) of
the SEC.8 In an opposition letter dated April 1, 2005, Ram Sitaldas
(Sitaldas), claiming to be a representative of the defunct FICCPI,
alleged that the corporate name has been used by the defunct FI
CCPI since 1951, and that the reservation by another person who is
not its member or representative is illegal.9 The CRMD called the
parties for a conference and required them to submit their position
papers. Subsequently, on May 27, 2005, the CRMD rendered a
decision granting Mansukhani's reservation, 10 holding that he
possesses the better right over the corporate name. 11 The CRMD
ruled that the defunct FICCPI has no legal personality to oppose the
reservation of the corporate name by Mansukhani. After the
expiration of the defunct FICCPJ's corporate existence, without any
act on its part to extend its term, its right over the name ended.
Thus, the name "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines, Inc." is free for appropriation by any party. 12 Sitaldas
appealed the decision of the CRMD to the SEC En Banc, which
appeal was docketed as SEC Case No. 05-008. On December 7, 2005,
the SEC En Banc denied the appeal, 13 thus: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant appeal is HEREBY DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Company
Registration and Monitoring Department of this Commission for its

appropriate action. 14 (Emphasis in the original.) Sitaldas appealed

the SEC En Banc decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
92740. On September 27, 2006, the CA affirmed the decision of the
SEC En Banc. 15 It ruled that Mansukhani, reserving the name Id. Id.
Id 9 Ro//o,p.8l. 10 Id at 80-85. 11 Id. at 85. 12 13 Id. Id. at at 84. 8692. f 14 Id at91. 1s Id at 150-156. Decision 3 G.R. No. 184008
"Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, Inc.," has
the better right over the corporate name. It ruled that with the
expiration of the corporate life of the defunct FICCPI, without an
extension having been filed and granted, it lost its legal personality
as a corporation. 16 Thus, the CA affirmed the SEC En Banc ruling
that after the expiration of its term, the defunct FICCPI's rights over
the name also ended. 17 The CA also cited SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 14-200018 which gives protection to corporate names
for a period of three years after the approval of the dissolution of
the corporation. 19 It noted that the reservation for the use of the
corporate name "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines, Inc.," and the opposition were filed only in January
2005, way beyond this three-year . d 20 peno. On March 14, 2006,
pending resolution by the CA, the SEC issued the Certificate of
lncorporation21 of respondent FICCPI, pursuant to its ruling in SEC
Case No. 05-008. SEC Case No. 06-014 Meanwhile, on December 8,
2005,22 Mr. Pracash Dayacan, who allegedly represented the
defunct FICCPI, filed an application with the CRMD for the
reservation of the corporate name "Indian Chamber of Commerce
Phils., Inc." (ICCPI).23 Upon knowledge, Mansukhani, in a letter
dated February 14, 2006,24 formally opposed the application.
Mansukhani cited the SEC En Banc decision in SEC Case No. 05-008
recognizing him as the one possessing the better right over the
corporate name "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines, Inc. " 25 In a letter dated April 5, 2006,26 the CRMD
denied Mansukhani's opposition. It stated that the name "Indian
Chamber of Commerce Phils., Inc." is not deceptively or confusingly
similar to "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines,
Inc." On the same date, the CRMD approved and issued the
Certificate of Incorporation27 of petitioner ICCPI. 16 Id at 153. 11 Id.
18 Revised Guidelines in the Approval of Corporate and Partnership
Names, dated October 24, 2000: xxx 14. The name of a dissolved
firm shall not be allowed to be used by other firms within three (3)
years after the approval of the dissolution of the corporation by the

Commission, unless allowed by the last stockholders representing at

least majority of the outstanding capital stock of the dissolved firm.
19 Rollo, p. 155. 20 Id. at 153. 21 Id. at 93. 22 Id. at 113. 23 Id. at I
59. 24 Id. at 107. 26s Id Rollo, p. 64. r 27 Id at 115. xxx Decision 4
G.R. No. 184008 Thus, respondent FICCPI, through Mansukhani,
appealed the CRMD's decision to the SEC En Banc. 28 The appeal
was docketed as SEC Case No. 06-014. On November 30, 2006, the
SEC En Banc granted the appeal filed by FICCPl,29 and reversed the
CRMD's decision. Citing Section 18 of the Corporation Code,30 the
SEC En Banc made a finding that "both from the standpoint of their
[ICCPI and FICCPI] corporate names and the purposes for which they
were established, there exist[ s] a similarity that could inevitably
lead to confusion."31 It also ruled that "oppositor [FICCPI] has the
prior right to use its corporate name to the exclusion of the others.
It was registered with the Commission on March 14, 2006 while
respondent [ICCPI] was registered on April 05, 2006. By virtue of
oppositor's [FICCPI] prior appropriation and use of its name, it is
entitled to protection against the use of identical or similar name of
another corporation."32 Thus, the SEC En Banc ruled, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the assailed Order
dated April 05, 2006 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
respondent is directed to change or modify its corporate name
within thirty (30) days from the date of actual receipt hereof. SO
ORDERED. 33 (Emphasis in the original.) ICC PI appealed the SEC En
Banc decision in SEC Case No. 06-014 to the CA.34 The appeal,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97320, raised the following issues: 28
Id. at 65-79. A. The Honorable SEC En Banc committed serious error
when it held that petitioner's corporate name (ICCPI) could
inevitably lead to confusion; B. Respondent's corporate name
(FICCPI) did not acquire secondary meaning; and C. The Honorable
SEC En Banc violated the rule of equal protection when it denied
petitioner (ICCPI) the use of h d . . . d 3~ t e escnptive genenc wor s.
29 Id. at 157-163. 30 Section 18. Corporate name.-No corporate
name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if
the proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar
to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to
existing laws. When a change in the corporate name is approved,
the Commission shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation
under the amended name. 31 Rollo, p. 162. 32 Id. at 160. 33 Id. at

162. 34 Id. at 164-181. ,/\/"' " Id. at 169-170. 'I Decision 5 G.R. No.
184008 In a decision dated May 15, 2008,36 the CA affirmed the
decision of the SEC En Banc. It held that by simply looking at the
corporate names of ICCPI and FICCPI, one may readily notice the
striking similarity between the two. Thus, an ordinary person using
ordinary care and discrimination may be led to believe that the
corporate names of ICCPI and FICCPI refer to one and the same
corporation.37 The CA further ruled that ICCPI's corporate name did
not comply with the requirements of SEC Memorandum Circular No.
14-2000. It noted that under the facts of this case, it is the
registered corporate name, FICCPI, which contains the word
(Filipino) making it different from the proposed corporate name.
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 14-2000 requires, however, that it
should be the proposed corporate name which should contain one
distinctive word different from the name of the corporation already
registered, and not the other way around, as in this case.39 Finally,
the CA held that the SEC En Banc did not violate ICCPI's right to
equal protection when it ordered ICCPI to change its corporate
name. The SEC En Banc merely compelled ICCPI to comply with its
undertaking to change its corporate name in case another person or
firm has acquired a prior right to the use of the said name or the
same is deceptively or confusingly similar to one already registered
with the SEC.40 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed in this case is
hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Securities and
Exchange Commission en bane in SEC EN BANC Case No. 06-014 is
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.41 (Emphasis in the original.) In its
Resolution dated August 4, 2008,42 the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by ICCPI. The Petition43 ICCPI now appeals the
CA decision before this Court raising the following arguments: 36
Supra note 2. 37 Rollo, p. 14. 39 Id. at 15. 40 Id. at 15-16. 41 Id. at
16. 42 Supra note 3. A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed
serious error when it upheld the findings of the SEC En Banc; 43 On
September 14, 2015, we resolved to require ICCPI to inform the
Court whether it complied with the SEC Decision in SEC Case No. 06014 to change or modify its corporate name. In its Manifestation
with Compliance dated April I, 2016, ICCPI informed the Court that it
complied with the SEC Decision in SEC Case No. 06-014, and is
currently using the name "Federation o!Jndian Chambers of
Commerce, Inc." However, despite compliance with the SEC

Decision, ICCPI 10iot waiving its right to pursue the petition and to
reacquire its former name. Rollo, pp. 258-261. Decision 6 G.R. No.
184008 B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error
when it held that there is similarity between the petitioner and the
respondent (sic) corporate name that would inevitably lead to
confusion; and C. Respondent's corporate name did not acquire
secondary . 44 meanmg. The Court's Ruling We uphold the decision
of the CA. Section 18 of the Corporation Code expressly prohibits
the use of a corporate name which is identical or deceptively or
confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation: No corporate
name may be allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if
the proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar
to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to
existing laws. When a change in the corporate name is approved,
the Commission shall issue an amended certificate of incorporation
under the amended name. (Underscoring supplied.) In Philips Export
B. V. v. Court of Appeals,45 this Court ruled that to fall within the
prohibition, two requisites must be proven, to wit: (1) that the
complainant corporation acquired a prior right over the use of such
corporate name; and (2) the proposed name is either: (a) identical;
or (b) deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law; or ( c)
patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to . . 1 46 ex1stmg aw.
These two requisites are present in this case. FICCPI acquired a
prior right over the use of the corporate name 44 Id. at 28-29. 45
G.R. No. 96161, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 457~ 46 Id. at 463. if
Decision 7 G.R. No. 184008 In Industrial Refractories Corporation of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 47 the Court applied the priority
of adoption rule to determine prior right, taking into consideration
the dates when the parties used their respective corporate names.
It iuled that "Refractories Corporation of the Philippines" (RCP), as
opposed to "Industrial Refractories Corporation of the Philippines"
(IRCP), has acquired the right to use the word "Refractories" as part
of its corporate name, being its prior registrant on October 13,
1976. The Court noted that IRCP only started using its corporate
name when it amended its Articles of Incorporation on August 23,
1985.48 In this case, FICCPI was incorporated on March 14, 2006. On
the other hand, ICCPI was incorporated only on April 5, 2006, or a
month after FICCPI registered its corporate name. Thus, applying

the principle in the Refractories case, we hold that FICCPI, which

was incorporated earlier, acquired a prior right over the use of the
corporate name. ICCPI cannot argue that it first incorporated and
held the name "Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce," in 1977; and
that it established the name's goodwill until it failed to renew its
name due to oversight. 49 It is settled that a corporation is ipso
facto dissolved as soon as its term of existence expires. 50 SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 14-2000 likewise provides for the use of
corporate names of dissolved corporations: 14. The name of a
dissolved firm shall not be allowed to be used by other firms within
three (3) years after the approval of the dissolution of the
corporation by the Commission, unless allowed by the last
stockholders representing at least majority of the outstanding
capital stock of the dissolved firm. When the term of existence of
the defunct FICCPI expired on November 24, 2001, its corporate
name cannot be used by other corporations within three years from
that date, until November 24, 2004. FICCPI reserved the name
"Filipino Indian Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines, Inc." on
January 20, 2005, or beyond the three-year period. Thus, the SEC
was correct when it allowed FICCPI to use the reserved corporate
name. ICCPl's name is identical and deceptively or con/ usingly
similar to that of FICCPI The second requisite in the Philips Export
case likewise obtains in two respects: the proposed name is (a)
identical or (b) deceptively or 47 G.R. No. 122174, October 3, 2002,
390 SCRA 252. 48 Id. at 260. 49 Rollo, p. 33. 50 Alhambra Cigar &
Cigarette Mam4actu~.in:Ylnc. v. Securities & Exchange Commission,
G.R. No. L-23606, foly 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 269, 274, Decision 8 G.R.
No. 184008 confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or
to any other name already protected by law. On the first point,
ICCPI's name is identical to that of FICCPI. ICCPI's and FICCPI's
corporate names both contain the same words "Indian Chamber of
Commerce." ICCPI argues that the word "Filipino" in FICCPI's
corporate name makes it easily distinguishable from ICCPI. 51 It
adds that confusion and deception are effectively precluded by
appending the word "Filipino" to the phrase "Indian Chamber of
Commerce." 52 Further, ICCPI claims that the corporate name of
FICCPI uses the words "in the Philippines" while ICCPI uses only
"Phils., Inc."53 ICCPI's arguments are without merit. These words do
not effectively distinguish the corporate names. On the one hand,
the word "Filipino" is merely a description, refen-ing to a Filipino

citizen or one living in the Philippines, to describe the corporation's

members. On the other, the words "in the Philippines" and "Phils.,
Inc." are simply geographical locations of the corporations which,
even if appended to both the corporate names, will not make one
distinct from the other. Under the facts of this case, these words
cannot be separated from each other such that each word can be
considered to add distinction to the corporate names. Taken
together, the words in the phrase "in the Philippines" and in the
phrase "Phils. Inc." are synonymous-they both mean the location of
the corporation. The same principle was adopted by this Court in
Ang mga Kaanib sa Iglesia ng Dias Kay Kristo Hesus, H.S.K. sa
Bansang Pilipinas, Inc. v. Iglesia ng Dias Kay Cristo Jesus, Haligi at
Suhay ng Katotohanan: 54 Significantly, the only difference between
the corporate names of petitioner and respondent are the words
SAL/GAN and SUHAY. These words are synonymous-both mean
ground, foundation or support. Hence, this case is on all fours with
Universal Mills Corporation v. Universal Textile Mills, Inc., where the
Court ruled that the corporate names Universal Mills Corporation
and Universal Textile Mills, Inc., are undisputably so similar that
even under the test of "reasonable care and observation" confusion
may arise. 55 (Italics in the original.) Thus, the CA is correct when it
ruled, "[a]s correctly found by the SEC en bane, the word 'Filipino' in
the corporate name of the respondent [FICCPI] is merely descriptive
and can hardly serve as an effective differentiating medium
necessary to avoid confusion. The other two words alluded to by
petitioner [ICCPI] that allegedly distinguishes its corporate name
from that of the respondent are the words 'in' and 'the' in the 51
Rollo, p. 30. 52 Id. at 3 I. SJ Id. 54 G.R. No ~7' December 12, 2001,
372 scRA 111. " id. at 17/ Decision 9 G.R. No. 184008 respondent's
corporate name. To our mind, the presence of the words 'in' and
'the' in respondent's corporate name does not, in any way, make an
effective distinction to that of petitioner."56 Petitioner cannot argue
that the combination of words in respondent's corporate name is
merely descriptive and generic, and consequently cannot be
appropriated as a corporate name to the exclusion of the others. 57
Save for the words "Filipino," "in the," and "Inc.," the corporate
names of petitioner and respondent are identical in all other
respects. This issue was also discussed in the Iglesia case where
this Court held, Furthermore, the wholesale appropriation by
petitioner of respondent's corporate name cannot find justification

under the generic word rule. We agree with the Court of Appeals'
conclusion that a contrary ruling would encourage other
corporations to adopt verbatim and register an existing and
protected corporate name, to the detriment of the public. 58 On the
second point, ICCPI's corporate name is deceptively or confusingly
similar to that of FICCPI. It is settled that to determine the existence
of confusing similarity in corporate names, the test is whether the
similarity is such as to mislead a person, using ordinary care and
discrimination. In so doing, the court must examine the record as
well as the names themselves. 59 Proof of actual confusion need not
be shown. It suffices that confusion is probably or likely to occur. 60
In this case, the overriding consideration in determining whether a
person, using ordinary care and discrimination, might be misled is
the circumstance that both ICCPI and FICCPI have a common
primary purpose, that is, the promotion of Filipino-Indian business
in the Philippines. The primary purposes of ICCPI as provided in its
Articles of Incorporation are: 56 Rollo, p. 14. 57 Id. at 32. a) Develop
a stronger sense of brotherhood; b) Enhance the prestige of the
Filipino-Indian business community in the Philippines; c) Promote
cordial business relations with Filipinos and other business
communities in the Philippines, and other overseas Indian business
organizations; d) Respond fully to the needs of a progressive
economy and the Filipino-Indian Business community; e) Promote
and foster relations between the people and Governments of the
Republics of the Philippines and 58 Supra note 54 at l 79y 59 Supra
note 45 at 464. 60 Id. Decision 10 G.R. No. 184008 India in areas of
Industry, Trade, and Culture. 61 Likewise, the primary purpose of
FICCPI is "[t]o actively promote and enhance the Filipino-Indian
business relationship especially in view of [ cun-ent] local and
global business trends."62 Considering these corporate purposes,
the SEC En Banc made a finding that "[i]t is apparent that both from
the standpoint of their corporate names and the purposes for which
they were established, there exist a similarity that could inevitably
lead to confusion."63 This finding of the SEC En Banc was fully
concurred with and adopted by the CA. 64 Findings of fact of quasijudicial agencies, like the SEC, are generally accorded respect and
even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expe1iise on the specific matters under their
consideration, and more so if the same has been upheld by the
appellate court,65 as in this case. Petitioner cannot argue that the

CA en-ed when it upheld the SEC En Bane's decision to cancel

ICCPI's corporate name. 66 By express mandate of law, the SEC has
absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over all corporations.
67 It is the SEC's duty to prevent confusion in the use of corporate
names not only for the protection of the corporation involved, but
more so for the protection of the public. It has the authority to deregister at all times, and under all circumstances corporate names
which in its estimation are likely to generate confusion.68 Pursuant
to its mandate, the SEC En Banc correctly applied Section 18 of the
Corporation Code, and Section 15 of SEC Memorandum Circular No.
14-2000: 61 Rullo, p. 117. 62 Id. at 95. 63 Id. at 162. In
implementing Section 18 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines
(BP 68), the following revised guidelines in the approval of
corporate and partnership names are hereby 64 Id. at 15. The
pertinent potiion of the CA decision reads: Thus, we fully concur
with the informed observation of the SEC en bane that, both from
the standpoint of their corporate names and the purpose for which
they were established, there is a similarity between the petitioner
and the respondent that would inevitably lead to confusion.
Therefore, there is a necessity to order the petitioner to change or
modify its corporate name to avoid confusion. 65 Nautica Canning
Corporation v. Yumul, G.R. No. 164588, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA
415, 423-424. 66 Rollo, p. 35. 67 Presidential Decree No. 902-A
(1976), Section 3. The Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all corporations, partnerships or
associations, who are the grantees of primary franchise and/or a
license or permit issued by the government to operate in the
Philippines; and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the
power to enlist the aid and support of any and all enforcement
agencies oft/rnment, civil or military. "" Supm noto 47 ot 259. tJ
Decision 11 G.R. No. 184008 adopted for the information and
guidelines of all concerned: xxx 15. Registrant corporations or
partnership shall submit a letter undertaking to change their
corporate or partnership name in case another person or firm has
acquired a prior right to the use of said firm name or the same is
deceptively or confusingly similar to one already registered unless
this undertaking is already included as one of the provisions of the
articles of incorporation or partnership of the registrant. Finding
merit in respondent's claims, the SEC En Banc merely compelled
petitioner to comply with its undertaking. 69 WHEREFORE, the

petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA dated May 15, 2008 in CAG.R. SP No. 97320 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166890 Petitioner, - versus Present: SERENO, CJ, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLASBERNABE, and CAGUIOA, JJ Promulgated: APOLONIO BAUTISTA, JR.,
JUN 2 8 2016 x--------------------- llesp~~~e~~--------------------------------~ - DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title must trace his possession of the subject land to June
12, 1945, or earlier. Any length of possession that does not comply
with the requirement cannot support the application, which must be
then dismissed for failure to comply with Commonwealth Act No.
141 (Public Land Act) and Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree). The Case The Government appeals the
adverse judgment promulgated on September 30, 2004, 1 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Subic, Zambales rendered on November 17, 1998 in
LRC Case No. N-12-10-96 entitled In Re: Application for Land
Registration of Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D, Subic Cadastre2 granting
the application of respondent Apolonio Bautista, Jr. for Rollo, pp. 6071; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (retired), with
the concurrence of Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios
(retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino
(retired). 2 Id. at 40-42; penned by Municipal Judge Miguel F.
Famularcano, Jr. /) . ' ~'' Decision 2 G.R. No. 166890 the judicial
confirmation of title of Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-0, Subic Cadastre . ".
~ ~ .... ;/ ,, Antecedents After acquiring Lot 17078 of Cad. 547-D,
Subic Cadastre, located in Capisanan, Subic, Zambales from Mario
Jardin on February 15, 1971 and Cornelia Villanueva on May 25,
1973, Apolonio, Sr. had the property declared for taxation purposes.
He had been the sole and exclusive possessor and occupant from
the time of acquisition until his death, with no party questioning his
possession and ownership, or staking any adverse claim against him
thereon. 3 He died in 1987, and was succeeded by his children,
namely: respondent Apolonio, Jr. and his siblings. Apolonio, Sr.'s
children executed an extra-judicial settlement of their father's
estate, whereby Apolonio, Jr. 's brothers and sisters waived their
rights in his favor. Thus, the property was declared for taxation
purposes in Apolonio, Jr. 's name under Tax Declaration No. 0140432A of the Municipality of Subic, Zambales. There were no arrears

in real estate taxes.4 The declared value was In3,040.00. 5 On

October 21, 1996, Apolonio Jr. commenced LRC Case No. N-12- 10-96
in the MTC. He later on testified that his father had been in actual
possession since 1969, and had eventually acquired the land from
Jardin and Villanueva through the notarized Deeds of Absolute Sale
dated February 15, 1971, and May 25, 1973; and that his father had
paid taxes on the land. The Government did not interpose any
timely objection to the testimony of Apolonia, Jr. It did not also
object to the documentary evidence (i.e., the deeds of absolute sale
and tax declarations) offered by him. Hence, the MTC admitted all
the evidence presented by Apolonia, Jr. In due course, the MTC
granted Apolonia, Jr. 's application, and declared him as the owner
in fee simple of the land, 6 and confirmed his ownership thereof. 7
The Government appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
which, on September 30, 2004, promulgated its assailed decision
affirming the ruling of the MTC. 8 The CA pointed out that the
Government did not Id at 62. Id. Idat37. Id. Id. at 40-42. Supra note I
. J4 Decision 3 G.R. No. 166890 present evidence against the claim
of Apolonio Jr.; and that the Government did not timely object to his
testimony on the ground of its being hearsay. 9 Issue In this appeal,
the Government reiterates that the testimony of Apolonio, Jr. on
possession, being hearsay, had no probative value; that the
alienation of public land should always undergo careful scrutiny;
and that the Court should carefully re-examine the factual issues
that could alter the result of the case. 10 The Government points
out that Apolonio, Jr. had given only general statements pertaining
to the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of his
father since 1971; that such statements were mere conclusions of
law, and did not prove the alleged possession; that because the
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was filed on
October 21, 1996, the applicable law was Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public land Act), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073; that, accordingly, the required period
of possession must be "since June 12, 1945 or earlier," as stated in
Republic v. Doldo!, 11 a more stringent requirement the noncompliance with which was fatal to his cause. 12 Lastly, the
Government points out that tax declarations or tax receipts did not
suffice to prove ownership of land in fee simple; that although it
was the State's policy to encourage and promote distribution of
alienable public lands as an ideal of social justice, stringent

safeguards must be adopted and applied to prevent the lands from

going to the wrong hands; and that Apolonio, Jr.' s reliance on
hearsay evidence showed his unfitness to own the land. 13 In
response, Apolonio Jr. insists that he had duly established his lawful
occupation of the land as owner in fee simple; that the Government
did not timely object to his testimony, and did not also controvert
his evidence; that the property had been properly identified; and
that the lower courts had observed the legal safeguards and
guidelines in granting his application for judicial confirmation of his
ownership in fee simple. 14 9 Id. 10 Rollo, pp. 15-18. 11 G.R. No.
132963, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 359, 364-365. 12 Rollo, p.
20. 13 Idat21-22. 14 Id. at 85-87. ~ Decision 4 G.R. No. 166890
Ruling of the Court We reverse. The Government has correctly
insisted that the requisite period of possession of the property
should conform to that provided for in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has
limited the right to apply for judicial confirmation to citizens of the
Philippines "who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. x x x" The provision is reprised by Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), adopting the length of possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
.fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. We note that
in its amendment of the Public Land Act that took effect on January
25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073 changed the length of the
requisite possession from "thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945, or
earlier." Republic v. Naguit 15 has explained this change thusly:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period
of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their
title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July
26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942,
which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,

which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx Based on the
records before us, Apolonia, Jr. presented only himself to establish
the possession and ownership of his father, Apolonia, Sr., who was
his immediate predecessor-in-interest. He did not present as
witnesses during the trial either of the transferors of Apolonia, Sr. that is, Mario Jardin or Cornelia Villanueva - to establish the
requisite length of the possession of the predecessors-in-interest of
the applicant that would be tacked to his own. His personal
incompetence to attest to the possession of the property within the
time required by law underscored the weakness of the evidence on
possession, particularly as it has not been denied that the applicant
had arrived in the Philippines only on November 28, 1987.
Considering that the possession and occupation of the property in
question L' G.R. No. 144507, January 17, 2005. 448 SCRA 442. A
Decision 5 G.R. No. 166890 by Apolonia, Jr. and his predecessors-ininterest were not shown in the records to have been "since June 12,
1945, or earlier," the application must be rejected. We should stress
that only the title of those who had possessed and occupied
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain within the
requisite period could be judicially confirmed. Indeed, alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. 16 That the
Government did not timely object to the admission of the testimony
of Apolonia, Jr., or of the other evidence presented by him was of no
consequence to the success of the application. If he had no personal
knowledge of the facts establishing the possession of property for
the requisite period, no court can give any value to his assertion,
particularly as it was conceded by him no less that he had no
personal or direct competence to know the truth of his assertion. It
was one thing for the trial court to admit the evidence, but quite
another to give it any worth for purposes of judicial adjudication.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September
30, 2004; DISMISSES the application of respondent Apolonia
Bautista, Jr. for the judicial confirmation of his imperfect title in LRC
Case No. N-12-10-96; and ORDERS Apolonia Bautista, Jr. to pay the
costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

MOMARCO IMPORT COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, - versus - FIRST

DIVISION G.R. No. 192477 Present: SERENO, C.J, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE, and CAGUIOA,JJ
Promulgated: FELICIDAD VILLAMENA, .. JUL 2 7 201& __.....
Respondent. 5 W?'" x-----------------------------------------------------------~------------------x DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: A default judgment is
frowned upon because of the policy of the law to hear every
litigated case on the merits. But the default judgment wijl not be
vacated unless the defendant satisfactorily explains the failure to
file the answer, and shows that it has a meritorious defense. The
Case Under challenge by the petitioner is the affirmance on January
14, 2010 by the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 of the trial court's default
judgment rendered against it on August 23, 1999 in Civil Case No. C18066 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 126, in Caloocan
City. 2 The defendant hereby prays that the default judgment be
undone, and that the case be remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings, including the reception of its evidence.3 1 Rollo, pp.
20-24; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok
(retired), with Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now Presiding
Justice) and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla concurring.
2 CArollo, pp. 10-12; penned by Judge Luisito C. Sardillo. Rollo, p.
16. p, Decision 2 G.R. No. 192477 I' '!., I . ~ Antecedents Civil
Case No. C-18066 is an action the respondent initiated against the
petitioner for the nullification of a deed of absolute sale involving
registered real property and its improvements situation in Caloocan
City as well as of the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of
the latter by virtue of said deed of absolute sale on the ground of
falsification. The following factual and procedural antecedents are
summarized by the CA in its assailed decision, to wit: 4 On
September 23, 1997, plaintiff filed against defendant a complaint
for "Nullification of Deed of Sale and of the Title Issued" pursuant
thereto alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of land with
improvements located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 204755. A letter from defendant corporation
dated June 12, 1997, informed plaintiff that TCT No. 204755 over
aforesaid property had been cancelled and TCT No. C-319464 was
issued in lieu thereof in favor of defendant corporation on the
strength of a purported Special Power of Attorney executed by
Dominador Villamena, her late husband, appointing her, plaintiff
Felicidad Villamena, as his attorney-infact and a deed of absolute

sale purportedly executed by her in favor of defendant corporation

on May 21, 1997, the same date as the Special Power of Attorney.
The Special Power of Attorney dated May 21, 1997 is a forgery. Her
husband Dominador died on June 22, 1991. The deed of sale in favor
of defendant corporation was falsified. What plaintiff executed in
favor of Mamarco was a deed of real estate mortgage to secure a
loan oLP.100,000.00 and not a deed of transfer/conveyance. xx xx
On August 19, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendant
corporation in default for failure of aforesaid defendant to file its
answer as of said date despite the filing of an Entry of Appearance
by its counsel dated May 4, 1998. On September 10, 1998 defendant
corporation filed its Answer with Counterclaim which denied the
allegations in the complaint; alleged that plaintiff and her daughter
Lolita accompanied by a real estate agent approached the President
of Momarco for a loan of Pl 00,000.00; offered their house and lot as
collateral; and presented a Special Power of Attorney from her
husband. She was granted said loan. Aforesaid loan was not repaid.
Interests accumulated and were added to the principal. Plaintiff
offered to execute a deed of sale over the property on account of
her inability to pay. Plaintiff presented to defendant corporation a
deed of sale and her husband's Special of Power Attorney already
signed and notarized. 4 Id. at 21-22. <;., Decision 3 GR. No.
192477 Under the order dated October 15, 1998, the petitioner was
declared in default, and its answer was ordered stricken from the
records. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the respondent to present her
evidence ex parte. On August 23, 1999, the RTC rendered the
default judgment nullifying the assailed deed of absolute sale and
the transfer certificate of title issued pursuant thereto; and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City to cancel the
petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-319464, and to
reinstate the respondent's Transfer Certificate of Title No. 204755. 5
It concluded that the act of the petitioner's counsel of formally
entering an appearance in the case had mooted the issue of
defective service of summons; and that the respondent had duly
established by preponderance of evidence that the purported
special power of attorney was a forgery. 6 The petitioner appealed
the default judgment to the CA, arguing that the RTC had gravely
erred in nullifying the questioned deed of absolute sale and in
declaring it in default. On January 14, 2010, the CA promulgated the
assailed decision affirming the default judgment upon finding that

the RTC did not commit any error in declaring the petitioner in
default and in rendering judgment in favor of the respondent who
had successfully established her claim of forgery by preponderance
of evidence. 7 On May 31, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. 8 Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
Issue The petitioner raises the lone issue of whether or not the CA
gravely erred in upholding the default judgment of the RTC; in
ordering its answer stricken off the records; in allowing the
respondent to adduce her evidence ex parte; and in rendering the
default judgment based on such evidence.9 CA rollo, p. 12. 6
Supra note 2. Supra note I . Rollo, pp. 26-29; penned by Presiding
Justice Reyes, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justice BaltazarPadilla and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion. 9 Id. at 13. ~
Decision 4 GR. No. 192477 Ruling of the Court The appeal lacks
merit. The petitioner claims denial of its right to due process,
insisting that the service of summons and copy of the complaint was
defective, as, in fact, there was no sheriff's return filed; that the
service of the alias summons on January 20, 1998 was also
defective; and that, accordingly, its reglementary period to file the
answer did not start to run. The claim of the petitioner is
unfounded. The filing of the formal entry of appearance on May 5,
1998 indicated that it already became aware of the complaint filed
against it on September 23, 1997. Such act of counsel, because it
was not for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, constituted the petitioner's voluntary appearance in the
action, which was the equivalent of the service of summons. 10
Jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant
became thereby vested in the RTC, and cured any defect in the
service of summons. 11 Under Section 3, 12 Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, the three requirements to be complied with by the claiming
party before the defending party can be declared in default are: ( 1)
that the claiming party must file a ~ motion praying that the court
declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must
be notified of the motion to declare it in default; (3) the claiming
party must prove that the defending party failed to answer the
complaint within the period provided by the rule. 13 It is plain,
therefore, that the default of the defending party cannot be
declared motu proprio. 14 Although the respondent filed her motion
to declare the petitioner in default with notice to the petitioner only
on August 19, 1998, all the requisites for properly declaring the

latter in default then existed. On October 15, 1998, therefore, the

RTC appropriately directed the answer filed to be stricken from the
records and declared the petitioner in default. It also received ex
parte the respondent's evidence, pursuant to the relevant rule. 15
10 Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules a/Court provides: Section. 20.
Voluntary appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in
the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance. 11 Cezar v. Rica/art-Bautista, G.R. No.
136415, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 322, 334. 12 Section. 3.
Default; declaration of - If the defending party fails to answer within
the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court
shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief
as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of
evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. 13 Delos Santos v.
Carpio, G.R. No. 153696, September 11, 2006, 50 I SCRA 390, 398399. 14 Trajano v. Cruz, No. L-47070, December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
712, 715. 15 Section 3, Rule 9, Rules of Court. 9' Decision 5 GR. No.
192477 The petitioner's logical remedy was to have moved for the
lifting of the declaration of its default but despite notice it did not
do the same before the RTC rendered the default judgment on
August 23, 1999. Its motion for that purpose should have been
under the oath of one who had knowledge of the facts, and should
show that it had a meritorious defense, 16 and that its failure to file
the answer had been due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. Its urgent purpose to move in the RTC is to avert the
rendition of the default judgment. Instead, it was content to insist
in its comment/opposition vis-a-vis the motion to declare it in
default that: (1) it had already filed its answer; (2) the order of
default was generally frowned upon by the courts; (3) technicalities
should not be resorted to; and ( 4) it had a meritorious defense. It is
notable that it tendered no substantiation of what was its
meritorious defense, and did not specify the circumstances of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented the filing
of the answer before the order of default issued - the crucial
elements in asking the court to consider vacating its own order. The

policy of the law has been to have every litigated case tried on the
merits. As a consequence, the courts have generally looked upon a
default judgment with disfavor because it is in violation of the right
of a defending party to be heard. As the Court has said in Coombs v.
Santos: 17 ~- A default judgment does not pretend to be based
upon the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified on the
ground that it is the one final expedient to induce defendant to join
issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff, and to do so
without unnecessary delay. A judgment by default may amount to a
positive and considerable injustice to the defendant; and the
possibility of such serious consequences necessitates a careful
examination of the grounds upon which the defendant asks that it
be set aside. In implementation of the policy against defaults, the
courts have admitted answers filed beyond the reglementary
periods but before the declaration of default. 18 Considering that
the petitioner was not yet declared in default when it filed the
answer on September 10, 1998, should not its answer have been
admitted? The petitioner raised this query in its motion for
reconsideration in the CA, pointing out that the RTC could no longer
declare it in default and order its answer stricken from the records
after it had filed its answer before such declaration of default.
However, the CA, in denying the motion for reconsideration,
negated the query, stating as follows: 16 Montinola, Jr. v. Republic
Planters Bank, No. L -66183, May 4, 1988, 161 SCRA 45, 52. 17 24
Phil. 446, 449-450 (I 913). 18 Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd v. Romillo,
Jr., No. L-64276, March 4, 1986, 141 SCRA 451, 455. ~ 'lDecision 6
G.R. No. 192477 Unfortunately, we find the foregoing arguments
insufficient to reverse our earlier ruling. These points do little to
detract from the fact that Defendant-Appellant filed its Answer only
after a period of more than four months from when it entered its
voluntary appearance in the case a quo, and only after almost a
month from when Plaintiff-Appellee moved to have it declared in
default. Verily, Defendant-Appellant's temerity for delay is also
betrayed (sic) by the fact that it had waited for a judgment to be
rendered by the court a quo before it challenged the order declaring
it in default. If it truly believed that it had a "meritorious defense[,]
which if properly ventilated could have yielded a different
conclusion [by the trial court],'' then it could very well have moved
to set aside the Order of Default immediately after notice thereof or
anytime before judgment. Under the circumstances, that would

have been the most expeditious remedy. Inauspiciously,

DefendantAppellant instead elected to wager on a favorable
judgment. Defeated, Defendant-Appellant would now have us set
aside the Order of Default on Appeal and remand the case for
further proceedings. These we cannot do. While we are aware that
we are vested with some discretion to condone DefendantAppellant's procedural errors, we do not find that doing so will serve
the best interests of justice. To remand this case to the court a quo
on the invocation that we must be liberal in setting aside orders of
default, would be to reward Defendant-Appellant with more delay. It
bears stating that the Rules of Procedure are liberally construed not
to suit the convenience of a party, but "in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding." To this end, it has been rightly
written: Procedural rules are not to be disregarded as mere
technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of
a party. x x x. It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules
have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of
justice. Justice has to be administered according to the rules in
order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice and whimsicality. 19 We
concur with the CA's justification. The RTC and the CA acted in
accordance with the Rules of Court and the pertinent jurisprudence.
The petitioner was insincere in assailing the default judgment, and
its insincerity became manifest from its failure to move for the
lifting of the order of default prior to the rendition of the default
judgment. The CA rightly observed that the petitioner had
apparently forsaken its "expeditious remedy" of moving soonest for
the lifting of the order of default in favor of "wager[ing]" on
obtaining a favorable judgment. The petitioner would not .;do so
unless it intended to unduly cause delay to the detriment and
prejudice of the respondent. 19 Supra note 8, at 27-29. ~ Decision 7
G.R. No. 192477 The sincerity of the petitioner's actions cannot be
presumed. Hence, it behooves it to allege the suitable explanation
for the failure or the delay to file the answer through a motion to lift
the order of default before the default judgment is rendered. This
duty to explain is called for by the philosophy underlying the
doctrine of default in civil procedure, which Justice Narvasa
eruditely discoursed on in Gochangco v. CF! Negros Occidental, 20
to wit: The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that
the defendant's failure to answer the complaint despite receiving

copy thereof together with summons, is attributable to one of two

causes: either (a) to his realization that he has no defenses to the
plaintiff's cause and hence resolves not to oppose the complaint, or,
(b) having good defenses to the suit, to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which prevented him from seasonably filing an
answer setting forth those defenses. It does make sense for a
defendant without defenses, and who accepts the correctness of the
specific relief prayed for in the complaint, to forego the filing of the
answer or any sort of intervention in the action at all. For even if he
did intervene, the result would be the same: since he would be
unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact, judgment
would inevitably go against him. And this would be an acceptable
result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that
the judgment did not go beyond or differ from the specific relief
stated in the complaint. It would moreover spare him from the
embarrassment of openly appearing to defend the indefensible. On
the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be unnatural
for him not to set them up properly and timely, and if he did not in
fact set them up, it must be presumed that some insuperable cause
prevented him from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake, excusable
negligence. In this event, the law will grant him relief; and the law
is in truth quite liberal in the reliefs made available to him: a motion
to set aside the order of default prior to judgment, a motion for new
trial to set aside the default judgment; an appeal from the judgment
., by default even if no motion to set aside the order of default or
motion for new trial had been previously presented; a special civil
action for certiorari impugning the court's jurisdiction.21 It is true
that the RTC had the discretion to permit the filing of the answer
even beyond the reglementary period, or to refuse to set aside the
default order where it finds no justification for the delay in the filing
of the answer. 22 Conformably with the judicious exercise of such
discretion, the RTC could then have admitted the belated answer of
the petitioner and lifted the order of default instead of striking the
answer from the records. However, the RTC opted not to condone
the inordinate delay taken by the petitioner, and went on to render
the default judgment on August 23, 1999. Such actions were fully
within its discretion. 23 We uphold the default. While 20 No. L49396, January 15, 1088, 157 SCRA40. 21 Id. at 54-55 (bold
underscoring added for emphasis). 22 Malipodv. Tan, No. L-27730,
January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA202, 213. 23 Cathay Pac[flc Airways, Ltd.

v. Romillo, Jr., supra note 18. P, Decision 8 G.R. No. 192477 the
courts should avoid orders of default, and should be, as a rule,
liberal in setting aside orders of default,24 they could not ignore
the abuse of procedural rules by litigants like the petitioner, who
only had themselves to blame. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on January 14, 2010; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA
KOIKE," Petitioner, - versus - MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, G.R. No. 215723 Present: SERENO, C.J,
Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE,
and CAGUIOA,JJ Promulgated: ~UL 2 7 2016 Respondents. _________
-::_ __ )_ _________________ x x--------------------------------------------------------DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Assailed in this petition for review
on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying
petitioner's petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code. 1 Rollo, pp. 3-54. Id. at 58-65. Penned by Judge
Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale. Id. at 66-70. ~ v . Decision 2 G.R.
No. 215723 r1: i) I '" . ._ I , , I , . ~ 'l The Facts . - .... . .... ' ...
.,..,,,, Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen,
and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. 4 Their
union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5 On June 14,
2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed
for divorce 6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture,
Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce
Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family
Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8 Seeking to have the said Divorce
Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on file with the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7,
2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code 11 before the RTC,

docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692. At the hearing, no one
appeared to oppose the petition. 12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of
Receiving/ Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" 13 and "Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike" 14 both issued by the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the
Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a
certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate"
issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was
authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that
the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the
said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The 4 6 9 Id. at 80. Id. at 59. See Certificate of Receiving;
id. at 109. Id.at81. See id. Id. at 97. 10 Id.at71-79. 11 Executive
Order No. 209, as amended, entitled "THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES," August 4, 1988. 12 Rollo, p. 58. 13 Id. at 109-110. 14
Id. at 101-107. 15 Id. at 83. J . Decision 3 G.R. No. 215723 Civil Code
of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009" 17 were
likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on
divorce. 18 The RTC Ruling In a Decision 19 dated July 31, 2014, the
RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition
of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
the foreign divorce decree and the natiol).al law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven
in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce
documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be
public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of
proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence
of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of
Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by
Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony
of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its
effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was
not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have,
at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan,

particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not

consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section
46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert
witness on the subject matter was presented and considering
further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreignjudgments and law.23 Doreen's motion for reconsideration24
was denied in a Resolutjpn25 dated November 28, 2014; hence, this
petition. 16 Id.atlll-115. 17 Id. at 116-119. 18 See id. at 62. 19 Id. at
58-65. 20 SECTION 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. 21 SECTION 25.
What attestation of copy must state.- Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court. 22 SECTION 46. Learned treatises. -A published
treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science,
or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated
therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the
subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise,
periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as
expert in the subject. 23 Rollo, pp. 63-64. 24 Id. at 169-193. 25 Id. at
66-70. 0 Decision 4 G.R. No. 2157'.23 The Issue Before the Court The
core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred
in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
The Court's Ruling At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine
law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses
foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a

foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent

marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads: Art.
26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized,
and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) Under the above-highlighted
paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. 26 'tl In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27 the Court had the
occasion to rule that: The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may
be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted) 26 Fujiki v. Marinay, 712
Phil. 524, 555 (2013). 27 642 Phil. 420 (2010). 28 Id. at 432-433. J .
Decision 5 G.R. No. 215723 Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, 29 it was
pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien
spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that
the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law
of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. 30
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
like any other fact. 31 Considering that the validity of the divorce

decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of

pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that
calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the R TC,
the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact
that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well
entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are
in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In this regard, it is
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by R TC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to the
Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. 33 Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule
45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the
CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -xx x An
appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional
Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the
Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be
final. This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5
( t) thereof that an appeal likewise "may" be dismissed when there
is error irr the choice or mode of appeal. 34 29 418 Phil. 723 (200 I).
30 Id. at 725. 31 Id. at 735. 32 Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 715 Phil. 420, 433-435 (2013). 33
See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil.
760, 766-767 (2013). 34 CGP Transportation and Services
Corporation v. PC! Leasing and Finance, Inc., 548 Phil. 242, 253- 254
(2007). J Decision 6 G.R. No. 215123 Since the said Rules denote
discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or
refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant
appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be
referred to the CA for further appropriate proceedings. It bears to
stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper
administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted
to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its
rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective,
for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the

existence of the courts. 35 WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly

procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception
of evidence to DETERMINE and RE SOL VE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.
ESTHER PASCUAL, Petitioner, ... versus - l\epublic of tbe tbilippine~
g,uprttnt Qt:ourt ;!$lanila SECOND DIVISION GR. No~ 204873
Present: CARPIO, Chairperson DEL CASTILLO, BRION, MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
~o7ujfJ'Led2016 x--------~~----~~~----~----~-~----------~~--.,-~--~
DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: This Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside
the April 13, 2012 Decision1 and the October 18, 2012 Resolution2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CR No. 32138, which affirmed
the July 25, 2008 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pifias City, Branch 201, in Criminal Case No. 04-1039, finding
petitioner Esther Pascual (Pascual) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document. Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court Pascual and
Remegio Montero (Montero) were indicted for the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document for colluding and making it
appear that they had facilitated the payment of the capital gain5
tax of private complainant Ernesto Y Wee to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) when, in truth and in fact, they converted and
misappropriated the money for their own personal benefit. The
charge against these two stemmed from the following Information
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman~~ 1 CA rol/o, pp. 107-115;
penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cru.z and concurred in by
Associate Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
~ Id. at 145-146. 3 Records, pp. 822-828; penned by Presiding Judge
Lorna Navarro-Oomingo. pee Decision 2 G.R. No. 204873 That on or
about June 26, 2003 in Las Pias City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ESTHER PASCUAL a low ranking public officer, being an employee of
the City Assessors Office, Las Pias City, while in the performance
of her official function, committing the offense in relation to her
office, and taking advantage of her official position, conspiring and
confederating with one REMEGIO MONTERO, a private citizen and
helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously defraud one ERNESTO Y. WEE thru LEONOR A. TIONGCO

in the following manner, to wit: the said accused received from said
ERNESTO Y. WEE thru LEONOR A. TIONGCO the amount of
P130,000.00 for the purpose of paying the Capital Gains Tax on a
real estate property which complainant bought in Las Pias City,
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), forge and falsify or cause
to be forged and falsified BIR Official Receipt No. 2145148, in the
amount of P102,810.00 as payment of Capital Gains Tax of said
ERNESTO Y. WEE by making it appear that they paid said amount of
P102,810.00 with the BIR, when in truth and in fact, accused fully
well knew that there was no payment made with the BIR and did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally take, convert and
misappropriate for their own personal use and benefit the aforesaid
amount of P130,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of said ERNESTO Y. WEE in the aforesaid sum. CONTRARY
TO LAW.4 Montero was arraigned on April 11, 2005, but was later
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence in a
Decision rendered on March 31, 2008. On the other hand, Pascual
was arraigned on January 10, 2007; she entered a negative plea to
the crime charged. During the trial, the State presented the
following witnesses: private complainant Ernesto Y. Wee (Wee),
Leonor A. Tiongco (Tiongco), Wees secretary, and Ma. Nimfa
Pealosa De Villa (De Villa), the Assistant Revenue District Officer of
the BIR at Las Pias City. Their collective testimonies tended to
establish these facts: Sometime in 2003, Wee and his wife Susana
Wee purchased a real property in Las Pias City. Since Wee was
based in Bacolod City, he directed his secretary, Tiongco, to go to
Manila to process the transfer of title to the said property and to
pay the capital gains tax thereon. On June 27, 2003, Tiongco
informed Wee that she had paid the capital gains tax through
Pascual, an employee at the City Assessors Office of Las Pias City,
who was referred to her by Montero, a parttime businessman from
Bacolod City and an acquaintance of Wee. According to Tiongco,
Montero told her to prepare P130,000.00 as payment for the capital
gains tax. Thereafter, she met Pascual and Montero at SM 4 Id. at 1.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 204873 Megamall, along EDSA. Pascual
personally offered to facilitate the payment through her alleged
connections or contacts at the BIR office. Tiongco asked if she
could meet Pascuals connection or contact at the BIR, but
Pascual replied in the negative. Upon Pascuals and Monteros

insistence, Tiongco issued a check for the said amount, in Monteros

name, and Montero encashed the check at the Robinsons Savings
Bank, Ortigas Branch. Montero then gave the money back to
Tiongco for safekeeping. After this, Tiongco, Pascual, and
Montero went to the BIR office located inside the Metropolis Mall in
Las Pias City. When they got there, Pascual then asked for the
money so she could facilitate payment of the taxes. At first,
Tiongco was apprehensive about giving the money to Pascual, so
she asked Pascual if she could meet the person, i.e., Pascuals
alleged contact or connection inside the BIR office. But Pascual
replied that the person would not face me at the time, and added
that she was just accommodating her (Tiongco), and that if Tiongco
wanted to pay less tax, then she had better trust her and just give
her the money. Because Pascual was insisting on getting possession
of the money, saying that she even had to go on leave from work for
two days just to accommodate her (Tiongco); and because Montero
also told her (Tiongco) that she (Tiongco) might as well make use of
the opportunity to conclude the business for that day since that was
her purpose in being there after all, Tiongco gave the P130,000.00
to Pascual and made her sign a voucher dated June 26, 2003.
Pascual and a lady companion then went inside the BIR office with
the money, and after some time Pascual came out with a photocopy
of BIR Receipt No. 2145148. Pascual told Tiongco that the original of
this BIR receipt was left inside her contact at the BIR. Pascual
then hastened to assure Tiongco that the certificate of title to Wees
property would be issued in three months time. But the three
months came and went, and despite repeated demands, Pascual still
did not deliver on her promise. Worse, the Wee spouses discovered
that the photocopy of BIR Receipt No. 2145148 was fake. The other
State witness, Las Pias City Assistant Revenue District Officer De
Villa, testified that her office did not have BIR Receipt No. 2145148
in its possession, nor did her office ever issue one such receipt to
Pascual. She affirmed that the photocopy of the receipt in question
is in fact a fake BIR receipt. Pascual waived her right to present
countervailing evidence in her defense. Ruling of the Regional Trial
Court On July 25, 2008, the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 201,
rendered judgment finding Pascual guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. The
dispositive part of the RTCs Decision reads: Decision 4 G.R. No.
204873 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds

the accused Esther Pascual GUILTY beyond reasonable [doubt] of

the complex crime of Estafa [through] Falsification of a Public
Document and pursuant to the provisions of Article 315 and Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, she is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Prision Mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the accused is sentenced to a prison term of Three (3) years of
Prision [C]orrec[c]ional to Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor and a fine
of P5,000.00. By way of civil liability, the accused is ordered to pay
the offended party the sum of P130,000.00 representing the sum
given by private complainant duly received by the accused and the
sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. SO ORDERED.5 Pascual filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but same was denied by the RTC; hence
Pascual elevated her case to the CA. Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, Pascual argued that she was convicted of an offense
that was different from that alleged in the Information; that
although she was accused of Estafa through Falsification of Public
Document, she was however convicted by the RTC under Article 171
(Falsification by public officer, employee, or ecclesiastical minister)
in relation to Article 315 (Estafa) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Pascual insisted that no evidence had been adduced tending to
prove that she falsified BIR Receipt No. 2155148. But her arguments
failed to impress the CA, which after review of the appealed case,
disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las
Pias City convicting the accused of the complex crime of estafa
through Falsification of Public Document is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.6 In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the CA ruled that
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document is not a singular
offense but a complex crime where two different offenses are tried
as one because one offense was committed as a necessary means to
commit the other, or because a single act constitutes two 5 Id. at
827-828. 6 CA rollo, pp. 114-115. Decision 5 G.R. No. 204873 or
more grave or less grave felonies. The CA rejected Pascuals
contention that the State failed to prove that she falsified the BIR
receipt in question. On the contrary, the CA found that the State
was able to satisfactorily establish clear and convincing evidence
that Pascual was responsible for falsifying such receipt. Hence, this
Petition. Issues Pascual raises the following issues in this Petition: I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY GIVING FULL WEIGHT

AND CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTIONS VERSION. II. WHETHER THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION.7
Pascual now argues that the CA erred in upholding the judgment of
the RTC and in giving full weight and credence to the States
account of the indictment against her. Anent the alleged estafa,
Pascual contends that she did not in any way beguile or mislead
Tiongco into believing that she was connected with the BIR, as
indeed the only representation she allegedly made was that she
knew someone inside that office. As to the alleged falsification,
Pascual contends that she did not take advantage of her official
position at the BIR at all because it was not her duty to make or
prepare the BIR receipt in question. Our Ruling We deny the
Petition. Both the RTC and the CA correctly found Pascual guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa through Falsification
of 7 Rollo, p. 16. Decision 6 G.R. No. 204873 Public Document. The
State was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of estafa, to
wit: (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.8 Here, Pascual defrauded Tiongco by pretending that she
had connections or contacts within the BIR to whom she could
allegedly directly pay the capital gains tax at a reduced amount and
also with whose help and assistance the transfer certificate of title
to the property purchased could be expedited. In fact, in their first
meeting, Pascual impressed upon Tiongco that she is a person of
some power and influence because she was an employee of the Las
Pias City Assessors Office and thus had connections or
contacts within the BIR and the City Registry of Deeds. Moreover,
the State was also able to establish the following elements of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document: (1) that the offender is a
public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) that he takes
advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies a document by
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding; (4) [and] that such person or persons did not in fact so
participate in the proceeding.9 We adopt the following findings of
facts of the CA as these findings are borne out by the records: It
was established that the accused won over Tiongco by appearing to

have expertly facilitated transfers of title in the past while

accelerating the payment of taxes along the way. To this end, she
assured Tiongco that she knew people from the BIR to whom they
could directly pay the capital gains tax for less. When Tiongco
appeared apprehensive, she would sound urgent (she was allegedly
absent from work for two days to accommodate Tiongco) and, at
one point, incensed (she told Tiongco that she was wasting her time
for not having the cash). To allay Tiongcos fears, the accused
consistently appeared resolute in her purpose especially when it
was time for her to pay the capital gains tax. In this instance, she
transacted inside the BIR in plain view of Tiongco and thereafter
presented her with a photocopy of the BIR receipt that later turned
out to be forged. The deceit by which the charade was accomplished
is unmistakable. Deceit as used in this instance is defined as any act
or devise intended to deceive; a specie of concealment or distortion
of the truth for the purpose of misleading. Concomitantly, for it to
prosper, the following elements must concur: (a) that an accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit;
and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation
is caused the offended party or third person. 8 People v. Remullo,
432 Phil. 643, 655 (2002). 9 Goma v. Court of Appeals, 596 Phil. 1,
10 (2009). Decision 7 G.R. No. 204873 In the present instance, the
accused made certain that Tiongco would fall prey to her artifice by
presenting herself as someone with extensive connections in the
BIR and the Registry of Deeds being herself an employee of the
Assessors Office whose function is the appraisal and assessment of
real properties essentially for taxation purposes. She did not relent
until Tiongco prepared the amount of P130,000.00 supposedly
necessary for the payment of taxes. The accused guaranteed that
the money will go as intended because she has done it many times
before and her transactions turned out well. This, of course, was
pure farce because the title of the property was not transferred to
the private respondents spouse as intended, while the capital gains
tax remained unpaid. More importantly, it was discovered later that
the BIR receipt furnished by the accused was a falsified document
per testimony of the assistant district revenue officer of BIR-Las
Pias. This constitutes as the other half of the offense. Falsification
of public document carries with it the following elements: (a) That
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (b) That
he takes advantage of his official position; and (c) That he falsifies a

document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in

any act or proceeding. Naturally, the accused attempted to deny
having forged or falsified the BIR receipt, alleging that there was no
direct evidence presented that would link her to the charge of
falsification. Indeed, there was no one from the prosecution that
witnessed the accused in the act of falsifying or forging the BIR
receipt. However, while direct evidence is scarce, the circumstances
surrounding the events that led to her indictment speak of no one
but the accused as the perpetrator of the offense. For instance, she
did not contradict Tiongcos testimony that after she received the
money intended for the payment of the capital gains tax, she and
her lady companion went inside the BIR office supposedly to pay the
capital gains tax. Neither did she deny Tiongcos testimony that she
later came out of the BIR office with the forged BIR receipt which
she furnished to Tiognco. Quite revealingly, the accused also
remained mum about the testimony of the assistant revenue district
officer, Ma. Nimfa Pealosa De Villa, who disclosed that the
document under discussion was unauthentic because it did not
come from the BIR. Clear as they are, the circumstances mentioned
earlier are indubitable manifestations that the person responsible
for the falsity is the accused herself given that she was the one who
supposedly made the transaction inside the BIR, and that she had it
in her possession before she passed it off as an official transaction
receipt from the BIR. Conviction is not always arrived at by relying
on direct evidence alone. Sometimes, the testimonies of witnesses,
when credible and trustworthy, are sufficient to bring out a
conviction and must be given full faith and credence when no
reason to falsely testify is shown. In the case at bench, Tiongcos
testimony is neither erratic nor marred by inconsistency, glaring or
otherwise. She was straightforward and narrated the events without
missing the focal points. Her testimony, along with that of the
assistant revenue district officer, is more than sufficient to espouse
the conclusion that the accused personally forged the receipt and
deceived Tiongco therewith.10 10 Rollo, pp. 30-32. Decision 8 G.R.
No. 204873 We now turn to the proper imposable penalty. The crime
committed was estafa through falsification of public document.
Being a complex crime, the penalty for the more serious crime shall
be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification under Article 171 of
the RPC has a corresponding penalty of prision mayor and a fine not
to exceed P5,000.00. On the other hand, [t]the amount of damages

is the basis of the penalty for estafa.11 Specifically, Article 315 of

the RPC provides the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of
fraud is over [P12,000.00] but does not exceed [P22,000.00]; and if
[the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00], the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional [P10,000.00], but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years x x x [and]
shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be. In this case, the amount defrauded was P130,000.00. As
such, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in
its maximum period which has a range of six (6) years, eight (8)
months and twenty one (21) days to eight (8) years, adding one (1)
year for each additional P10,000.00. Thus, the maximum term of the
imposable penalty is from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months and
twenty one (21) days to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.
Thus, as compared to the crime of falsification under Article 171
which carries a penalty of prision mayor, the offense of estafa is the
more serious crime. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime of
estafa is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months. In fine, the proper indeterminate penalty to be
imposed should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. WHEREFORE, this Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 13, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32138, is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that
petitioner Esther Pascual is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum, reckoned from finality of this Decision until fully paid.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, - versus - FLORDILINA
RAMOS, Appellant. G.R. No. 206906 Present: CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson, BRION, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA, and LEONEN, JJ.
Promulgated: ~2 5 JUL 2016 ~~
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the appeal of accused-appellant

Flordilina L. Ramos @ "Dinay" (Ramos) assailing the February 2,
2011 and the July 5, 2012 resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00983. The CA dismissed Ramos' appeal
because she failed to timely file an appellant's brief after she had
appealed the RTC decision2 finding her guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165. 3 THE CASE In two (2) separate informations, the
prosecutor charged Ramos for illegal sale and illegal possession of
shabu. On arraignment, Ramos pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Rollo, pp. 3-7; CA rol/o, pp. 13-14, 60-62. CA rollo, pp. 36-39; RTC
records, pp. 126-129. Otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of2002. ft Decision 2 G.R. No. 206906 The
evidence for the prosecution reveals that on June 22, 2005, at
around 4:00 p.m., police operatives conducted a buy-bust operation
against Ramos and another person named Carolina Porponio
(Porponio). The police officers were inside a tinted vehicle parked
about ten (10) meters away from where the confidential informant
met with the subjects. From inside the car, they saw their informant
hand the pre-marked P100.00 bill to Ramos who, in turn, gave one
(1) transparent plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu from a
Vicks Vaporub jar. When the transaction was completed, the police
officers quickly alighted the vehicle and advanced to the place
where the sale happened. They immediately arrested the subjects
and, after frisking Ramos, they recovered the Vicks Vaporub jar
which contained ten (10) more plastic sachets of shabu. Ramos, on
the other hand, gave a different version of what transpired. She
claimed that in the afternoon of June 22, 2005, on the way home
from fetching her daughter from school, she was suddenly arrested
by four (4) policemen. Her wallet was taken from her after she was
frisked. Thereafter, she was brought to the police station where she
was charged for selling shabu. Ramos also testified that she
personally knew two (2) of her arresting officers as they were her
neighbors. She said that she does not know why they would falsely
accuse her of selling shabu. However, the trial court solicited from
Ramos that she was living with her live-in partner and his father,
who were both arrested for illegal drug transactions a few years
earlier. In its July 31, 2007 decision, the RTC found that the elements
for illegal sale and possession were substantially proven by the
prosecution. The trial court said that even though the poseur-buyer

was not disclosed, the police actually saw how the drug sale
transpired. It also held that the seized drugs from Ramos were the
same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for
examination and were properly marked, identified, presented, and
admitted in evidence. The RTC accordingly sentenced Ramos to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, and imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years for illegal possession. Ramos was likewise
ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and P200,000.00 for the
respective offenses. When the case was appealed, the CA dismissed
it because Ramos counsel failed to file her appellants brief within
the period required by law. The Public Attorneys Office (PAO),
acting as Ramoss counsel de officio, filed a motion for
reconsideration and to admit the appellants brief explaining that
the notice from the CA was inadvertently sent to the handling
lawyer when he had, at that time, already been relieved of his
duties at the PAO Regional Special and Appealed Cases Unit. The
handling Decision 3 G.R. No. 206906 lawyer admitted that he was
unable to track the progress of his cases since he assumed that the
present case had already been assigned to another lawyer. In the
attached appellants brief, Ramos argued that the nonpresentation
of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecutions case as the identity
of the buyer, which was not proven in this case, is one of the
essential elements to prove in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Considering that Ramos denied outright the allegations and gave a
totally different version of the events, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to rebut her allegations by presenting the alleged
poseur-buyer. Having failed to do so, the presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, therefore, arises.
Moreover, Ramos contended that the police officers could not have
seen the minuscule plastic sachet of shabu ten (10) meters away
from where the alleged transaction had taken place, and taking into
account that they were inside a tinted vehicle. Thus, any
information that the police officers gathered from the poseur-buyer
was indubitably hearsay because he never testified during trial.
With regard to the corpus delicti, Ramos pointed out the flaws in the
post-seizure custody of the drugs allegedly recovered from her: (1)
it was only at the police station not at the place where the drugs
were confiscated where the police officers marked the confiscated
items; and (2) there were no identifying marks placed on the seized

drugs immediately after confiscation and prior to the turnover to

the investigating officer.4 Without dwelling on the merits of Ramoss
appeal, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed
the dismissal of her appeal. The appellate court noted that it took
Ramos almost two (2) years before she actually filed her brief, and
that the explanation given by the PAO lawyer was not persuasive
enough to justify the belated filing of the appellants brief.
Aggrieved, Ramos filed the present appeal before this Court. OUR
RULING After carefully examining the records of this case, we find
merit in REVERSING the resolutions of the CA as the evidence
against Ramos is insufficient to sustain her conviction for both
offenses; accordingly, Ramos should be ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt. 4 It must be noted that Ramos was arrested
along with Carolina Porponio who is likewise suspected for selling
shabu. Decision 4 G.R. No. 206906 Failure to file an appellants brief
within the prescribed period is not fatal to the case of the accused if
there are substantial considerations in giving due course to the
appeal. At the onset, our rules of procedure are more lenient to
appellants who are represented by a counsel de officio when it
comes to filing their briefs. The Rules of Court provides that the CA
may dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within
the period prescribed by the rules, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de officio. 5 In De Guzman v. People, 6 we
clarified that if the appellant is represented by a counsel de parte
and he fails to file his brief on time, the appeal may be dismissed by
the CA with notice to the appellant. However, the rule takes
exception when the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.
7 In other words, when it comes to appellants represented by a
counsel de officio, the appeal should not be dismissed outright as
the rule on filing briefs on time applied to appellants represented
by a counsel de parte is not automatically applied to them. In the
case at bar, the PAO received the notice to file brief that the CA sent
to the PAO in Cebu City, on February 19, 2009. The notice contained
an advisory that all the evidence was already attached to the record
available to the appellant, and her counsel had thirty (30) days from
receipt within which to file brief. The CA rollo, however, does not
disclose that an appellants brief was filed as of May 20, 2010. If
Ramos appeal is denied due course, a person could be wrongfully
imprisoned for life over a mere technicality. It is not contended that
Ramos failed to perfect her appeal within the reglementary period;

her counsel merely failed to file her appellants brief within the
period accorded to her. We must remember that there is a
distinction between the failure to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period and the failure to file a brief within the period
granted by the appellate court. The former results in the failure of
the appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over the appealed
decision resulting in its becoming final and executory upon failure of
the appellant to move for reconsideration.8 The latter simply results
in the abandonment of the appeal which can lead to its dismissal
upon failure to 5 Rule 124, Section 8, par. 1. 6 546 Phil. 654 (2007).
7 Id. at 659. 8 Tamayo v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 603, 605, 608
(2004), citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 411 Phil. 121 (2001). See also Republic v. Imperial, G.R. No.
130906, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 127-129; Ginete v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998, 296 SCRA 38; and
Carco Motor Sales, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 44609,
August 31,1977, 78 SCRA 526. Decision 5 G.R. No. 206906 move for
its reconsideration.9 Considering that we suspend our own rules to
exempt a particular case where the appellant failed to perfect its
appeal within the reglementary period, we should grant more
leeway to exempt a case from the stricture of procedural rules when
the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction.10 We concede
that it is upon the sound discretion of the CA to consider an appeal
despite the failure to file an appellants brief on time. However, we
are not unfamiliar with the time-honored doctrine that procedural
rules take a step back when it would subvert or frustrate the
attainment of justice, especially when the life and liberty of the
accused is at stake. Based on this consideration, we can consider
this case as an exception given that the evidence on record fails to
show that Ramos is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. For an accused
to be convicted in illegal drug cases, the prosecution must establish
all the elements of the offenses charged, as well as the corpus
delicti or the dangerous drug itself. In the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs pursuant to a buy-bust operation, the details of the purported
transaction must clearly and adequately show (1) the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, (2) the offer to purchase,
(3) the payment of consideration, and (4) the delivery of the illegal
drug.11 The manner by which all these transpired, whether or not
through an informant, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by
courts to insure that lawabiding citizens are not unlawfully led to

the commission of an offense.12 In the present case, it is

undisputed that the police operatives had no direct participation in
the transaction, it was only the confidential-informant who
transacted with Ramos. Such fact was affirmed in the direct
testimony of one of the police operatives: Q: Who acted as your
poseur-buyer in your buy-bust operation? A: Our confidential
poseur-buyer. Q: You mean to say a civilian person? A: Yes, sir. Q:
Was there police officer in your team who went with that civilian
asset when the buy-bust operation was made? A: Only the
confidential agent approached. Q: But my question is: Was there
any police officer who went with him when he approached the
suspect? A: None.13 9 Ibid. 10 Development Bank of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 515. 11 People v. Doria, G.R.
No. 125299, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 668, 698. 12 Id. at 699. 13
TSN, April 21, 2005, pp. 4-5. Decision 6 G.R. No. 206906 In
convicting Ramos, the trial court said that although the name of the
poseur-buyer was not disclosed, the police officers who were there
saw the confidential-informant deliver the pre-marked P100.00 bill
to Ramos, who then handed over one (1) plastic sachet of shabu. We
have previously ruled that failure to present the poseur-buyer is
fatal to the prosecutions case under the following circumstances:
(1) if there is no person other than the poseur-buyer who witnessed
the drug transaction;14 (2) if there is no explanation for the nonappearance of the poseur-buyer and reliable eyewitnesses who
could testify in his place;15 (3) if the witnesses other than the
poseur-buyer did not hear the conversation between the pusher and
poseur-buyer;16 and (4) if the accused vehemently denies selling
any prohibited drugs coupled with the inconsistent testimonies of
the arresting officers or coupled with the possibility that there exist
reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify
falsely against the appellant.17 The common circumstance in the
foregoing cases is that the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of the fact that an illegal drug transaction transpired. In
this case, none of the police operatives were actually present while
the poseur-buyer was transacting with Ramos. To be sure, the police
officers had personal knowledge of what was going on because they
saw everything while inside a tinted car ten (10) meters away, and
that prior to the buy-bust operation, they had already planned what
was going to happen.18 The prosecution, therefore, was still able to
prove all the elements of the illegal sale even though the

poseurbuyer did not testify on how he transacted with Ramos.

However, contrary to the findings of the lower courts, we find that
the prosecution failed to properly prove the existence of the corpus
delicti or the actual drugs confiscated from Ramos. After reviewing
the records of the case, we find that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized drugs were not preserved as the evidence on
record manifests serious doubts in the handling of the confiscated
items. It is not uncommon to reverse a conviction simply because
there are gaps in the chain of custody over the confiscated items.
The presence of these gaps qualifies as reasonable doubt involving
the most important element in drug-related cases the existence of
the dangerous drug itself. 14 People v. Fider, G.R. No. 105285, June
3, 1993, 223 SCRA 117. 15 People v. Orteza, G.R. No. 173051, July
31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750, 759-762. 16 Samson, G.R. No. 101333,
March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 364. 17 People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 84656,
January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 1; People v. Sillo, G.R. No. 91001,
September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 74. 18 See Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R.
No. 182601, November 10, 2014, sc.judiciary.gov.ph, where we
explained when a police officer may arrest the accused without a
warrant based on the officers own determination of probable cause
from his appreciation of the facts and circumstances. Decision 7
G.R. No. 206906 The procedure laid down in Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165 was crafted by Congress as a safety precaution to
address potential police abuses by narrowing the window of
opportunity for tampering with evidence.19 Out of all the
requirements laid down, the most important is the immediate
marking and the physical inventory of the seized drugs, to wit: (1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and an elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a coy thereof [.]20 To comply with this
provision and to establish the first link in the chain of custody, what
is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the
accused and upon immediate confiscation.21 Considering that
immediate confiscation has no exact definition, we have held that
marking upon immediate confiscation contemplates even marking at

the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.22

After re-examining the records, we find that there is no evidence,
testimonial or otherwise, on the exact details before the marking of
the seized drugs. The evidence on record only show that the plastic
sachet of shabu the confidential informant bought from Ramos and
the other ten (10) plastic sachets inside the Vicks Vaporub jar
recovered from her were surrendered to one SPO1 Roland Navales.
The records of this case lack any evidence showing how the
allegedly seized drugs were preserved by the confidential informant
and by the arresting officers before the turnover at the police
station. Furthermore, we note that the police operatives conducted
not only one buy-bust operation that day. The testimony of one of
the arresting officers reveals that they saw the confidential
informant negotiate two (2) transactions that day one was with
Ramos and the other was with Porponio. Thus, considering that the
confiscated items were only marked at the police station and absent
any evidence on how the confidential informant possessed the
drugs before turning them over, we cannot be absolutely sure that
what was marked as evidence against Ramos was not the plastic
sachet the confidential informant also bought from Porponio. As for
the other ten (10) plastic sachets of shabu found inside the Vicks
Vaporub jar recovered after Ramos arrest, the trial court erred in
relying on the presumption of regularity. Contrary to the trial
courts findings, we find that there were allegations and evidence
that should have 19 People v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 197371, June 13,
2012, sc.judiciary.gov.ph, citing People v. Umpang, G.R. No. 190321,
April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 324. 20 RA No. 9165, Article II, Section 21.
21 People v. Ressureccion, G.R. No. 186380, October 12, 2009, 603
SCRA 510. 22 Ibid. Decision 8 G.R. No. 206906 led it to be careful in
relying on this presumption. In fact, it was the trial court that
solicited that Ramos was living with her live-in partner and his
father before they were arrested. From this fact, it would not be
implausible for the police officers to have the motive to implicate
her in drug transactions. While it is laudable that police officers
exert earnest efforts in catching drug pushers, they must always be
advised to do this within the bounds of the law. More importantly,
the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence and cannot, by itself, constitute proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 23 The presumption of regularity is
just a presumption disputable by contrary proof; when challenged

by evidence, it cannot serve as binding proof.24 Without the

presumption of regularity, the testimonies of the police witnesses
must stand on their own merits and the defense cannot be
burdened with having to dispute these testimonies.25 Here, the
absence of any testimony or other evidence surrounding the
handling of the ten (10) plastic sachets of shabu before they were
turned over becomes fatal for the prosecution because we cannot
be certain - without presuming regularity - that the drugs had not
been tampered with by Ramos' s arresting officers. In sum, the gaps
in the prosecution's evidence proving the identity and evidentiary
value of the prohibited items allegedly seized do not establish proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the drugs identified in court were the
same items confiscated from Ramos. WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the February 2, 2011 and the July 5, 2012 resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 00983. Accusedappellant Flordilina L. Ramos @ "Dinay" is hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She is ordered to be IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention
unless she is otherwise legally confined for another cause. Let a
copy of this Decision be sent to the Superintendent, Correctional
Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate
implementation. The Superintendent of the Correctional Institution
for Women is directed to report the action she has taken to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. 23 24 25 SO
ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 214450
-versusPresent: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, PERALTA, PEREZ,
REYES, and CAGUIOA,* JJ MANUEL PRADO Y MARASIGAN, AccusedAppellant. Promulgated: August 10, 2016
x----------------------------------------------------------------~--~ DECISION
PEREZ, J.: This is an appeal assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05566 dated 9 September 2013
which dismissed the appeal of appellant Manuel Prado y Marasigan
and affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the City of Calamba, Branch 36, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 6898-1999-C and 6899-1999- C, which found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Appellant,
together with three (3) other co-accused, was charged before the
RTC, with murder and frustrated murder as follows: * I CRIMIN AL

CASE No. 6898-99-C Additional Member per Raffle dated 8 August

2016. Rollo, pp. I A- IO; Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo with. Associate ~ Justices Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and
Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles concurring. f Records (Crim. Case No.
6898-99-C), pp. 89-10 I; Presided by Presiding Judge Medel Arnaldo
B. Belen. I , ' Decision 2 G.R. No. 214450 That on or about April 15,
1999 at Ind\.lstrial Site, Brgy. Canlubang, Municipality of Calamba,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another while conveniently
armed with superior weapon, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one POI
WEDDY ARATO by shooting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious/mortal gunshot wounds which
directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
victim's surviving heirs. That in the commission of the crime, the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery
were in attendant (sic). 3 CRIMINAL CASE No. 6899-99-C That on or
about April 15, 1999 at Industrial Site, Brgy. Canlubang,
Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
treachery and evident premeditation with intent to kill conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniosly (sic) attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon one POI PELAGIO SALUDES by then and
there shooting the latter with long and short firearms on his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious/mortal gunshot, thus accused
performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce
it by reason of some causes other than his spontaneous desistance,
that is the timely and able medical assistance redered (sic) to the
said victim which prevented his death. 4 During arraignment,
appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. The other
accused remained at large. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented Senior Police Officer 1 Pelagio Saludes
(SPO 1 Saludes ), Panfilo Arato (Panfilo) and Dr. Roy Camarillo as
witnesses. The prosecution established that on 15 April 1999, SPO 1
Saludes and other policemen, including the deceased Police Officer
1 Weddy Arato (PO 1 Arato), received information about an illegal

gambling operation at Ciba-Geigy, Canlubang, Laguna. There were

many people at the site when the team reached the place. As the
team was about to ask questions, four ( 4) men equipped with short
and long fireanns suddenly appeared and fired upon them, instantly
killing POI Arato and hitting SPOI Saludes. SPOI Records (Crim. Case
No. 6898-99-C), p. 13. Records (Crim. Case No. 6899-99-C), p. 14. %
Decision 3 G.R. No. 214450 Saludes identified appellant in open
court as one of the four ( 4) men; appellant had been outfitted with
a short firearm that fateful day. 5 The testimony of Panfilo, the
deceased victim's father, was dispensed with after the defense.
stipulated, among others, on the medical and funeral . expenses the
Arato family had incurred and the deceased officer's annual salary
at the time of his death. 6 Appellant interposed the defenses of
denial and alibi. He asserted that this is a case of mistaken identity
and that he had been in Leyte in 2008 at the time of his arrest. 7 His
sister, Teresa Sartiso, sought to support appellant's defenses but
had no documentary prooftherefor.8 After trial, the R TC on 7
February 2012 rendered the assailed decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the [ c ]ourt finds Accused MANUEL PRADO y
Marasigan: a) in Criminal Case No. 6898-1999-C GUILTY of MURDER
and imposed upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and for
him to pay the heirs of WED DY ARA TO the following sums of
money: P 112,000.00 for and as actual damages; P75,000.00 for and
as civil indemnity for death; PS0,000.00 for and as moral damages;
and PS0,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and (b) in Criminal
Case No. 6899-1999-C Accused MANUEL PRADO y Marasigan GUILTY
of ATTEMPTED MURDER and imposed upon him the penalty of
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and ten
(10) days of PRIS/ON CORRECCIONAL medium as minimum, to eight
(8) years to two (2) months and twenty (20) days of PRIS/ON MAYOR
medium, as maximum and for him to pay SPO 1 Pelagio Saludes the
following sums of money: PS0,000.00 for and as moral damages;
and P30,000.00 for and as exemplary damages. Until this [c]ourt
acquires jurisdiction over the accused Rodante Prado, Rodelio Prado
and "John Doe'', who all remains at-large, the criminal complaints
agai.nst them in these cases are "ARCHIVED."9 The Court of Appeals
found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its
ruling but with modification on the amount of damages awarded.
The appellate court found the eyewitness account of SPO 1 Saludes
credible, straightforward and reliable and upheld the latter's

positive 6 9 TSN, 19 August 2008, pp. 4-13. TSN, 2 September 2008,

pp. 2-8. TSN, 5 February 2009, pp. 2-5. TSN, 19 February 2009, pp.
3-7. Records (Crim. Case No. 6898-99-C), p. I 0 I. I c Decision 4 G.R.
No. 214450 identification of appellant as one of the perpetrators.
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court's findings of
conspiracy among the assailants and the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in the killing and wounding of the police
officers. The Court of Appeals thus disposed: WHEREFORE, in light of
all the foregoing, the February 7, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba City, Laguna, Branch 36, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: I. In Criminal Case No. 6898-99-C (for
Murder), the award of exemplary damages is REDUCED from
PS0,000.00 to P30,000.00. II. In Criminal Case No. 6899-99-C (for
Attempted Murder), the award of moral damages is REDUCED from
PS0,000.00 to P40,000.00. Moreover, accused-appellant is ORDERED
to pay the additional awards of civil indemnity in the amount of
P25,000.00 and temperate damages, also in the amount of
P25,000.00. III. In all other respects, the assailed Decision is
AFFIRMED. 10(Emphasis in the original) Now before the Court for
final review, we affirm appellant's conviction. Well-settled in our
jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in
the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has
the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note
his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. 11
Absent any showing that the trial court's findings of facts were
tainted with arbitrariness or that it overlooked or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of significance and value, or its calibration of
credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its
assessment. In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements
must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was
killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing
was attended by treachery; and ( 4) that the killing is not infanticide
or parricide. 12 10 II 12 Rollo, p. I 0. People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856,
873 (2003) cited in People v. Sevillano, G.R. 200800 9 February
2015. People v. Sevillano, G.R. 200800, 9 February 20 I 5 citing
People v. Sameniano, 596 Phil. 916, 928 (2009). Decision 5 G.R. No.
214450 Our review of the records convinces us that these elements
were clearly met. We uphold appellant's conviction in Criminal Case

No. 6898- 99-C for Murder and likewise his conviction in Criminal
Case No. 6899-99- C for Attempted Murder. The prosecution
eyewitness SPO 1 Saludes positively identified appellant as one of
the persons responsible for firing at their team, killing PO 1 Arato
and gravely wounding him. The Court finds no reason to disbelieve
this credible and straightforward testimony. Evidently; all the four
(4) men, including appellant, were armed, had a common intent and
purpose and performed conspiratorial acts to fire at the police
officers to finish them off. We are not persuaded by the appellant's
defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitness'
positive identification of him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence is negative and self-serving evidence d . f . h . I 13 un
eservmg o we1g t m aw. The prosecution ably established the
presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
The shooting of the unsuspecting victims was sudden and
unexpected which effectively deprived them of the chance to defend
themselves or to repel the aggression, insuring the commission of
the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation
on the part of the victim. In fine, the Court finds no error in the
conviction of appellant. In Criminal Case No. 6898-1999-C, we affirm
the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon appellant. Under
Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, the crime of murder qualified
by treachery is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. The
lower courts were correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in the absence of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime. The Court
likewise affirms the award of actual damages but the award of the
other damages should be modified, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, as follows: In5,000.00 as civil indemnity, 1!75,000.00
as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. 14 In
Criminal Case No. 6899-99-C, Article 51 of the RPC states that the
corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be two degrees
lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article
248, that is, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLA W), the
minimum penalty should be taken from any of the periods of prision
correccional and the maximum IJ 14 Malana, et al. v. People, 573
Phil. 39, 53 (2008). People v. Jugueta, G.R.No. 202124, 5 April
2016. .. \ f ... Decision 6 G.R. No. 214450 penalty should be taken
from prision mayor in its medium period. 15 Section 1 of the ISLA W

provides: [T]he court shall sentence the accused to an

indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. Thus, appellant
should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium
period, as maximum. The Court increases the award of temperate
damages to PS0,000.00 pursuant to jurisprudence. 16 The award of
the other damages should be modified, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, as follows: P25,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. 17 Further, all the amount of damages awarded should
earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid. 18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 09
September 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CAG.R. CR -H.C. No. 05566, finding appellant Manuel Prado y
Marasigan guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 6898-99-C and of
attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 6899-99-C is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 6898-99-C, appellant is
ORDERED to pay the private offended party as follows: P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 6899-99-C, appellant shall
SUFFER the indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum,
to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and
pay the offended party as follows: P25,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. 15 16 17 18 People v.
Gutierrez, 625 Phil. 471, 483 (20 I 0). People v. Jugueta, supra note
14. Id. People v. Vitera, GR. No. 175327, 3 April 2013, 695 SCRA 54,
69. ~ Decision 7 G.R. No. 214450 He is FURTHER ordered to pay
interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent
( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF BABAI GUIAMBANGAN, namely, KALIPA B.

GUIA.."1\1.BANGAN, SAYA GUIAMBANGAN DARUS, NENENG P.
GUIAMBANGAN, AND EDGAR P. GUIAMBANGAN,1 Petitioners,
-versusMUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG, SULTANKUDARAT,
represented by its MAYOR ROLANDO P. GARCIA, MEMBERS of its
SANGGUl'HANG BAY AN, and its MUNICIPAL TREASURER,2
Respondents. G.R. No. 204899 Present: CARPIO, Chairperson,
BRION, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA, and LEONEN,JJ. Promulgated: 2 7
JUl 201 x--------------------------------------------------~ DECISION DEL
CASTILLO, J.: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 are
the June 14, 2011 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 04239 which dismissed the herein petitioners' Petition
for Certiorari,5 and its September 10, 2012 Resolution6 which
denied their Motion for Reconsideration7 in said case. Factual
Antecedents ~ Datu Eishmael Summagumbra (Eishmael), heir of the
late Babai Guiambangan (Babai) and ascendant and predecessorin~int~rest of herein petitioners, Kalipa B. Guiambangan, Saya
Guiambangan Darus, Neneng P ~~ See rollo, pp. 13, 89, 506. 2 Id. at
14. 3 Id. at 12-27. 4 Id. at 38; issued by Associate Justices Rodrigo F.
Lim, Jr., Pamela Ann A. Maxino and Zenaida GalapateLaguilles. 5 Id.
at 141-176. 6 Id. at 33-37; penned by Associate Justice Marilyn B.
Lagura-Yap and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo A.
Camello and Renato C. Francisco. 7 Id.atl77-186. Decision 2 G.R. No.
204899 Guiambangan, and Edgar P. Guiambangan, instituted before
the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat (RTC Branch 19)
Civil Case No. 989 against herein respondents Municipality of
Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat, its Mayor, Members of its Sangguniang
Bayan, and its Municipal Treasurer. The case was for recovery of
possession of real property, rentals, damages, and attorney's fees,
with an additional prayer for injunctive relief, in connection with a
422,129-square meter parcel of land situated in Port Lebak,
Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat which Eishmael claimed was registered
in Babais name as Original Certificate of Title No. 995-A (OCT 995A). On March 4, 2002, a Judgment8 was rendered in Civil Case No.
989, which decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) ordering the
defendant, Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat, and those
acting for and in its behalf to vacate the portions used as market
site in Lot 1534-A, Psd-12-031263 and the portion in Lot 1534-B,
Psd-12-031263 where the ice plant structure is constructed, and

surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff, Datu Eishmael

Summagumbra, and for the latter to appropriate the improvements
built by the defendant on the said lot in question, without paying
indemnity; (b) ordering the defendant to pay back monthly rents
to plaintiff for the use of the portion of Lot 1534-A, Psd-12-031263,
as market place from January 1997, until the finality of this
judgment, at a reasonable amount of P5,000.00; (c) ordering the
defendants to pay to the plaintiff: 1 - moral damages in the
reasonable amount of P30,000.00; 2 - exemplary damages in the
reasonable amount of P20,000.00; 3 - P20,000.00, as reasonable
amount of attorney's fees; and (d) ordering the defendant to pay
the costs of suit. For lack of merit, the counterclaim for damages
interposed by the defendant should be, as it is hereby dismissed. IT
IS SO ORDERED.9 The above March 4, 2002 Judgment became final
and executory, and in a 8 Records, pp. 1-24; penned by Judge
German M. Malcampo. 9 Id. at 23-24. Decision 3 G.R. No. 204899
May 2, 2002 Order,10 the trial court directed the issuance of a writ
of execution. On June 13, 2002, Sheriff Edwin Cabug11 (Cabug)
issued a Sheriffs Notice12 to vacate the premises. On March 26,
2007, Cabug issued a Sheriffs Partial Return of Service,13
indicating that the writ of execution was not enforced. On August 4,
2008, fire gutted the Hall of Justice where the files of Civil Case No.
989 was kept; however, the record thereof was not reconstituted.
On September 17, 2010, Cabug issued another Sheriffs Partial
Return of Service14 and a Notice of Garnishment15 which he sent to
the Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines Lebak, Sultan
Kudarat Branch, in an apparent attempt to execute the March 4,
2002 Judgment in Civil Case No. 989. Respondents filed an Urgent
Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff Prohibiting Him from
Executing an Alleged Judgment in the Above-Entitled Case16
(Urgent Motion), seeking to restrain Cabug from enforcing the
decision in Civil Case No. 989 on the ground that since the record
thereof was not reconstituted, then there is no judgment in said
case to be enforced; and that for failure to reconstitute the record,
petitioners have no other recourse but to file the case anew, as Act
No. 311017 requires. Petitioners filed their Omnibus Comment18 to
the motion, and to this respondents submitted their
Comments/Reply.19 On December 16, 2010, the trial court issued an
Order20 granting respondents Urgent Motion, stating as follows: As
shown by the available records of the case, only machine copies of

the judgment dated March 4, 2002 (containing twenty three (23)

pages), Sheriffs 10 Rollo, p. 66. 11 Also spelled as Cabog in some
parts of the records. 12 Rollo, p. 67. 13 Id. at 73. 14 Id. at 74. 15 Id.
at 75. 16 Id. at 76-80. 17 AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE
PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE RECORDS OF
PENDING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AND BOOKS, DOCUMENTS, AND
FILES OF THE OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, DESTROYED BY
FIRE OR OTHER PUBLIC CALAMITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
approved on March 19, 1923, provides: Sec. 29. In case the parties
interested in a destroyed record fail to petition for the
reconstitution thereof within the six months next following the date
on which they were given notice in accordance with section two
hereof, they shall be understood to have waived the reconstitution
and may file their respective actions anew without being entitled to
claim the benefits of section thirty-one hereof. 18 Rollo, pp. 81-88.
19 Id. at 89-91. 20 Id. at 93-102; penned by Acting Presiding Judge
Roberto L. Ayco. Decision 4 G.R. No. 204899 Partial Return of
Service dated July 16, 2002, Sheriffs Notice dated June 13, 2002,
Order dated May 2, 2002, Order dated October 14, 2002,
Certification issued by Atty. Heathcliff H. Leal, dated August 12,
1999, Entry of Judgment dated August 23, 2002 were submitted
when the subject motions were filed as the whole records of the
case were burned together with the other records of cases of the
court on August 4, 2008 when the Hall of Justice housing it and the
Offices of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the Public Attorneys Office
was razed to the ground by a fire. Clearly, after that Sheriffs Notice
dated June 13, 2002 and Sheriffs Partial Return of Service dated
July 16, 2002 no other proceedings nor incident was taken by the
court regarding the case. x x x x x x x Then suddenly another
Sheriffs Partial Return of Service dated September 17, 2010 was
issued by Edwin Galor Cabug, Sheriff IV of the court, its content is
also quoted as follows: RESPECTFULLY RETURNED to ERLINDA P.
LELIM, OIC-Clerk of Court, of this Court, the herein Writ of Execution
issued in the above-entitled case that the same have [sic] already
been enforced and implemented and that the Kalamansig Public
Market was already turned over to DARUS BASMAN who is the
representative of the Plaintiff per Special Power of Attorney. FOR
YOUR INFORMATION AND READY REFERENCE. Aside from the said
Sheriffs Partial Return of Service dated September 17, 2010, Edwin
Galor Cabug, Sheriff IV of the Court also issued a Notice of

Garnishment dated September 17, 2010 addressed to the Manager,

Land Bank of the Philippines, Lebak Branch, Lebak, Sultan Kudarat.
x x x x x x x The above-mentioned Sheriffs Partial Return of Service
and the Notice of Garnishment all dated September 17, 2010 were
issued by x x x Cabug x x x without the court knowing it. The court
had not issued any Order directing the issuance of any alias writ of
execution. This will only show that the writ of execution referred to
by him in his Sheriffs Partial Return of Service was that writ of
execution directed by the court to be issued through its Order dated
May 2, 2002 and the Notice of Garnishment should have been based
upon it likewise. This being so, can it still be legally and lawfully
done considering the period of time that had elapsed? Why was
there a need for Edwin Galor Cabug to issue another Sheriffs Partial
Return of Service when he had issued a similar return on July 16,
2002? This Acting Presiding Judge having assumed as such just
lately, other than the documents forming parts of the carpeta of the
case furnished him, he does not personally know the reasons, why
this case was handled this way and in this manner. Decision 5 G.R.
No. 204899 Based however, upon said available documents, it is
clear that after the Sheriffs Partial Return of Service was issued on
July 16, 2002 no other move was ever adopted nor availed of by the
Plaintiff in order to enforce and satisfy the Judgment of the Court
dated March 4, 2002. x x x x x x x The next that was done thereafter
was only the issuance of another Sheriffs Partial Return of Service
dated September 17, 2010 and the issuance of a Notice of
Garnishment, also on said day, September 17, 2010. The Sheriffs
Partial Return of Service dated July 16, 2002, only served a copy of
the writ of execution and Sheriffs Notice upon Hon. Mayor and Hon.
Vice Mayor at the Session Hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat. It had never enforced
nor satisfy [sic] the subject Judgment of the court. It would then
only show that the judgment of the court in this case was never
enforced nor satisfied even partially. There was only service of the
copy of the writ of execution and Sheriffs Notice. The records of the
case including the original copy of the judgment of the court dated
March 4, 2002 and that of the other records of the cases of the
court were burned on August 4, 2008 and nothing was salvaged by
the court. There was no attempt nor effort from either of the parties
to have the records of the case reconstituted in accordance with
Section 3 of Act No. 3110 despite the Notice of Loss of Judicial

Records published in the Official Gazette on September 30, 2008

and in the newspapers both local and national. The period of time
provided by said law for the reconstitution of the records of this
case had long prescribed and may no longer be availed of. The
parties in this case then are considered to have waived their rights
to avail of said reconstitution. It is therefore mandatory on the part
of the court to declare the records of this case to have been
destroyed by fire and may no longer be reconstituted in view of the
apparent waiver of the parties. Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure directs the manner on how a final and
executory judgment or order may be executed. It provides, as
follows: Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a) This
court believes that its judgment dated March 4, 2002 was never
executed nor satisfied even partially within the period provided by
the pertinent rule above-quoted. Execution contemplates the usual
situation where a judgment is susceptible of enforcement the
moment it acquires the character of finality x x x and a judgment
becomes final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial
Decision 6 G.R. No. 204899 declaration x x x. Execution is fittingly
called the fruit and end of law, and aptly called the life of law x x x.
Execution is the process of the court for carrying its decree into
effect. In an action to recover possession of lands, as in this case, if
the judgment is for the Plaintiff, the writ of execution will be an
order to deliver the possession to the Plaintiff. The judgment of the
court in this case was never carried out nor enforced. The service of
a copy of the writ of execution and Sheriffs Notice to the Mayor and
Vice Mayor x x x did not in any manner satisfy the said judgment.
None of the matters decreed by the court in its judgment was ever
enforced. As shown by the Certification issued by Atty. Heathcliff H.
Leal, the Clerk of Court then, the said judgment became final and
executory on August 23, 2002. The five (5) years period provided by
Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure above-quoted
had lapsed without the subject judgment being enforced even
partially. WHEREFORE, the court finds, as follows: (a) - the Sheriffs

Partial Return of Service and the Notice of Garnishment issued by

Edwin Galor Cabug, Sheriff IV of the court were issued without
apparent basis, hence, the same are hereby declared null and void
and of no effect at all; (b) - the judgment of the court dated March
4, 2002 was never enforced nor complied, even partially and had
become stale and can no longer be enforced by a mere motion
unless the same is revived in accordance with the rules; and (c) the records of the case were among the records of cases of the
court burned and razed by fire on August 4, 2008, nothing was
salvaged by the court, it were [sic] not reconstituted and the period
for its reconstitution had long lapsed. SO ORDERED.21 Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 arguing that the court had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the Urgent Motion, invalidate Cabugs
actions, and declare stale its March 4, 2002 Judgment for failure to
reconstitute the records and failure to execute the decision within
the 5-year period provided for under Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (1997 Rules); that when the March 4, 2002 Judgment
became final and executory, the trial court lost its jurisdiction to
entertain respondents Urgent Motion, as it may no longer decide
or pass upon any issue that may thereafter be raised by the
parties, including the issue of validity or enforceability of the
judgment; that as shown by Cabugs March 26, 2007 Sheriffs
Partial Return of Service, the failure to execute the March 4, 2002
Judgment is attributable to respondents act of delaying satisfaction
by requesting 21 Id. at 94-102. 22 Id. at 103-131. Decision 7 G.R.
No. 204899 additional time to consult their lawyer and the members
of the Sangguniang Bayan and other municipal officials; that
respondents delay did not therefore result in the expiration of the
5-year period allowed for the execution of the March 4, 2002
Judgment by mere motion, but instead interrupted it, because a
judgment debtors delay will extend the time within which the writ
of execution may be enforced, and the time during which execution
is stayed or delayed by him should be excluded from the
computation of the 5-year period allowed for execution by mere
motion;23 that Act No. 3110 on reconstitution of court records
applies only to pending cases, and not to Civil Case No. 989 where
the March 4, 2002 Judgment is already final and executory; that
assuming arguendo that Act No. 3110 applied to Civil Case No. 989,
then the assailed December 16, 2010 Order of the trial court in said
case is null and void because it could not have acted on a case

whose record has not been properly reconstituted; that they and
their counsel did not receive any notice of loss of the record of Civil
Case No. 989, which notice is required to be sent under Act No.
3110, thus, they may not be blamed for failure to cause
reconstitution of the record; and that the enforcement of the writ of
execution did not require the courts permission, as well as the
issuance of an alias writ of execution, since under the 1997 Rules,24
alias writs of execution were done away with; the lifetime of a writ
of execution is no longer 60 days, but the whole 5-year period
during which a judgment may be enforced by motion, and all that
the sheriff must do is to make a monthly report/return to the court
on the proceedings taken, and such report shall be filed with the
court and copies thereof furnished the parties. However, in a May 3,
2011 Order,25 the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Petitioners filed an original Petition
for Certiorari26 before the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 04239. In a June 14, 2011 Resolution, however, the CA resolved
to dismiss the Petition, thus: The Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the
instant Petition for Certiorari 23 Citing Yau v. Silverio, Sr., 567 Phil.
493 (2008), and Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium,
Sixth Revised Edition, Volume I, pp. 417-418. 24 Rule 39, on
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS, states: Sec.
14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be
returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment
has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be
satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ,
the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor.
Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the
judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a
report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken
thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of
the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies
thereof promptly furnished the parties. 25 Rollo, pp. 138-140. 26 Id.
at 141-175. Decision 8 G.R. No. 204899 for failing to strictly comply
with Rule 65 and other related provisions of the Rules of Court,
particularly for: (a) Failure to implead Public Respondent RTC Br. 19,
Sultan Kudarat in the caption of the case; (b) Lack of appropriate
service of the petition on adverse parties Municipality of
Kalamansig represented by Mayor Rolando P. Garcia, the

Sangguniang Bayan Members and the Municipal Treasurer of the

said Municipality as required by Rule 46, Section 3; (c) Being
defective in substance as the verification and certification of nonforum shopping is signed by Saya Guiambangan without any proof
that she has been duly authorized by the other heirs of Babai
Guiambangan to file the petition on their behalf.27 Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration,28 which the CA denied in its
September 10, 2012 Resolution. The appellate court held:
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. They explain that it was only
petitioner Saya Guiambangan Summagumbra who signed the
verification and certification against forum shopping, because she is
the only substituted heir to the late Datu Eishmael
Summagumbra. They claim that this is evident in the affidavit of
Renato Consebit (Consebit), the previous counsel for the plaintiff in
the case a quo. The relevant portion of the affidavit reads: 3. That I
will confirm and affirm the fact that when I accepted the position as
one of the Prosecutors in the Office of the National Prosecution
Service, sometime in May 3, 2005, I did not formally and officially
filed [sic] my withdrawal as counsel for the Heirs of the late Babai
Guiambangan, but I am quite sure that sometime on October 9,
2003, I filed a Motion to Substitute Datu Eishmael Summagumbra as
representative of defendant Heirs of Babai Guiambangan
Summagumbra NAMING THEREIN SAYA GUIAMBANGAN DARUS AS
THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS OF BABAI
GUIAMBANGAN. x x x Petitioners also alleged that although, they
were not able to serve copies of the petition to private respondents,
they were able to serve it to private respondents alleged counsel in
the case a quo. They insists [sic] that when a party is represented
by a counsel of record, the service of orders and notices must be
made upon such counsel. Lastly, they claimed that their failure to
implead public respondent was only a typographical error. The
motion is bereft of merit. 27 Id. at 38. 28 Id. at 177-186. Decision 9
G.R. No. 204899 A petition involving two or more petitioners must
be accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping
accomplished by all petitioners, or by one who is authorized to
represent them; otherwise, the petition shall be considered as
defective and may be dismissed, under the terms of Section 3, Rule
46, in relation [sic] Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In the
title of their petition, petitioners referred [sic] themselves as the
Heirs of Babai Guiambangan, represented by Saya Guiambangan

Summagumbra. The records show that it was only petitioner Saya

Guiambangan Summagumbra who signed the certification of nonforum shopping. However, she failed to provide proof that she had
authority to sign for the other heirs of Babai Guiambangan
(Guiambangan). This makes the petition defective. Admittedly, the
infirmity is only formal. In appropriate cases, it has been waived to
give the parties a chance to argue their causes and defenses on the
merits. But to justify the relaxation of the rules, a satisfactory
explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirememnts
have always been required. However, instead of securing the
consent of the other heirs of Guiambangan, petitioner Saya
Guiambangan Summagumbra merely referred Us to the affidavit of
Consebit. This did not help their case. Firstly, petitioner Saya
Guiambangan Summagumbra failed to establish that she and Saya
Guiambangan Darus, the person named in such affidavit, is [sic] the
same person. Secondly, the affidavit cannot certainly be the source
of petitioner Saya Guiambangan Summagumbras authority to
represent the other heirs of Guiambangan because it merely
narrated that Consebit filed a motion in the case a quo. As it is,
there is on record, no proof that petitioner Saya Guiambangan
Summagumbra is authorized to represent the other petitioners in
this case. This makes the case dismissible. With the foregoing
disquisition, We find it unnecessary to discuss the other matters
raised. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. SO
ORDERED.29 Hence, the present Petition. In a June 9, 2014
Resolution,30 the Court resolved to give due course to the instant
Petition. Issues In essence, petitioners raise the issue of whether
their Petition for Certiorari before the CA was properly dismissed
due to mere procedural technicalities, when 29 Id. at 34-37. 30 Id.
at 429-430. Decision 10 G.R. No. 204899 these defects should have
been overlooked given the circumstances and merit of their case.
Petitioners Arguments In praying that the assailed CA dispositions
be set aside and that the trial courts December 16, 2010 and May 3,
2011 Orders be invalidated, petitioners contend, in their Petition
and Reply,31 that the CA should not have dismissed their Petition
for Certiorari on the ground of technicality, and should have treated
their case with more leniency and liberality; that while it was only
petitioner Saya Guiambangan Darus who executed the verification
in the CA Petition, she did the same in her personal capacity and as
representative of the other petitioners who are her co-heirs and co-

owners; that even if the other heirs did not sign the CA Petition and
are not made party to the CA case as a result, still any judgment
obtained will be to their benefit as well, considering that they share
a common interest in the action, as co-heirs to Babai and Eishmael,
and as co-owners of the subject property; that even though the
signatory to the CA Petition was designated only as Saya
Guiambangan, it refers to petitioner herein, Saya Guiambangan
Darus, who actually signed the said petition, thus, Saya
Guiambangan and Saya Guiambangan Darus refer to one and the
same individual; that in any case, they attached a Special Power of
Attorney32 to the instant Petition in order to comply with the
procedural requirement; and that if the CA looked beyond the
procedural aspect of the case, it would have realized the merit in
their cause. Respondents Arguments Respondents, on the other
hand, essentially argue in their Comment33 that the CA committed
no error; that a party availing of the remedy of certiorari must
strictly observe the procedural requirements under the 1997 Rules,
failing which his petition should be dismissed or rejected; and that
since petitioners CA Petition contained errors in violation of the
1997 Rules and circulars of the Court requiring proper verification,
impleading of parties, and service of pleadings, then the appellate
court was correct in exercising its discretion to dismiss the same.
Thus, they pray for denial. In their Memorandum,34 respondents
add that petitioners claim of ownership is based on OCT 995-A,
which on its face is patently fake as found by the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) itself; that OCT 995-A is based on a Land
Registration Commission record which actually pertains to a piece of
property located in Manila; that petitioners were able to secure the
title through defective 31 Id. at 418-426. 32 Id. at 39-40. 33 Id. at
393-406. 34 Id. at 452-467. Decision 11 G.R. No. 204899
reconstitution proceedings, in that the trial court hastily allowed
reconstitution even without awaiting the LRAs report on the title;
and that as a result, the government filed Civil Case No. 1024
against petitioners for the annulment/cancellation of petitioners
title and reversion of the subject property, which case is pending
before the same court (Branch 19) handling Civil Case No. 989.35
Our Ruling The Court grants the Petition. The CA dismissed
petitioners Certiorari Petition on three grounds: first, for failure to
implead the trial court as required by Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules,36 which states as follows: Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in

certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or

omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf
and in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by
the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in
favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only,
and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents. Unless otherwise specifically directed
by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents
shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or
any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by
either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by
the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein. This, however, is not fatal. In Abdulrahman v. The Office of
the Ombudsman, 37 this Court held that neither the misjoinder nor
the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action,38 particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; the
CA should simply order that a party be impleaded in the case. The
Court made the following pronouncement in said case: 35 Id. at 490496; Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 1024. 36 On Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus. 37 G.R. No. 175977, August 19, 2013,
38 Citing Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules, on Parties to Civil
Actions, which state: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 204899 The acceptance of a petition for
certiorari, and necessarily the grant of due course thereto, is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the court may
reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari (1) when there is no
showing of grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or
branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors,

such as violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court circulars.

In this case, the CA dismissed petitioners special civil action for
certiorari because of procedural errors, namely: (1) failure to
implead private respondent; (2) failure to attach copies of the
pleadings and documents relevant to the petition; (3) failure to file
a motion for reconsideration of the Order of Implementation; and,
consequently, (4) failure to allege material dates in the petition.
Petitioner argues that the rules of procedure should be liberally
construed when substantial issues need to be resolved. Indeed, the
rules of procedure need not always be applied in a strict, technical
sense, since they were adopted to help secure and not override
substantial justice. In clearly meritorious cases, the higher
demands of substantial justice must transcend rigid observance of
procedural rules. Thus, we have given due course to a petition
because it was meritorious, even though we recognized that the CA
was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari in the light of
the failure of petitioner to submit material documents. We have
affirmed the CA when it granted a petition for certiorari despite the
litigants failure to file a motion for reconsideration beforehand. We
have also had occasion to excuse the failure to comply with the rule
on the statement of material dates in the petition, since the dates
were evident from the records.39 Next, the CA dismissed the
Petition for lack of appropriate service of the Petition for Certiorari
on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules,40 although the record indicates that a copy thereof was
served upon 39 Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman, supra
note 37. 40 On Original Cases, which states: Sec. 3. Contents and
filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The
petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the
petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for. In actions filed under Rule 65, the
petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof
was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any,
was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received. It
shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof
of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended
for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true

copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof,

such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and
other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification
shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court,
tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized
representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition
shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all
documents attached to the original. The petitioner shall also submit
together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action
or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. Decision
13 G.R. No. 204899 their counsel of record. While this is not
sanctioned by the 1997 Rules, this Court has excused it in the past,
thus: True it is that Rule 46, Section 3 mandates that a copy of the
petition should be served on the other party; and that proof of such
service should be filed with the petition in court. However, the rule
was substantially complied with when service was made to
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Dennis Ancheta. Without the
benefit of a proper notice of petitioners substitution of counsel,
respondent had no recourse but to serve the copy of its petition to
whom it knew and perceived as being petitioners counsel of record.
In faithful compliance and with no intention of delay, service was
made on Atty. Ancheta.41 Finally, while only one of the heirs, Saya
Guiambangan Darus, verified the CA Petition for Certiorari, without
proof of authority to file the same obtained from the other heirs,
this is not fatal. As heirs, they all share a common interest; indeed,
even if the other heirs were not impleaded, the Petition may be
heard, as any judgment should inure to their benefit just the same.
Or, quite simply, the CA could have ordered their inclusion, as
earlier stated above. x x x As such co-owners, each of the heirs may
properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer,
or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject

properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without

joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.42 This ponente
reiterated this principle in Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v. Soliman, 43
and later, in Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr. 44 Indeed, the CA should not have
forgotten the guidelines laid down by the Court regarding
verifications and certifications against forum shopping: For the
guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form
the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission
of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
certification against forum shopping. The petitioner shall pay the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and
deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of
the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition. (n) 41 Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation, 595 Phil. 732, 747 (2008). 42 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Judge
Ponferrada, 536 Phil. 705, 722 (2006). 43 708 Phil. 428 (2013). 44
G.R. No. 191906, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 343. Decision 14 G.R. No.
204899 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to
certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground of substantial compliance or
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. 5) The
certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign

will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or

justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding respondents argument that petitioners title is spurious
and for this reason Civil Case No. 1024 for annulment of title and
reversion of the subject property was instituted, this cannot justify
the dismissal of petitioners Certiorari Petition before the CA; it is
irrelevant to these proceedings. As far as the trial court and parties
are concerned, there is admittedly a Judgment dated March 4, 2002
rendered in favor of petitioners in Civil Case No. 989; indeed, the
trial court even cited the dispositive portion of said Judgment in its
December 16, 2010 Order, and respondents did the same in their
Memorandum before this Court;46 that said judgment became final
and executory; and that the trial court directed the issuance of a
writ of execution. All these facts need not be further proved, and
reconstitution of the record is irrelevant and unnecessary on this
score given the admission of all concerned. The March 4, 2002
Judgment and May 2, 2002 Order of the trial court directing issuance
of a writ of execution are deemed reconstituted. It must be
remembered that under Act No. 3110, the judicial record shall be
reconstituted to the extent that the parties agree; thereafter, the
court shall intervene and determine what proper action to take. It
can reconstitute only that part of the record which can stand on its
own, and then continue proceedings upon 45 Altres v. Empleo, 594
Phil. 246, 261-262 (2008); cited in Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr., supra note
44 at 355-357. 46 Rollo, pp. 98, 453-454. ... ' Decision 15 G.R. No.
204899 such record so reconstituted.47 In the present case, it can
be said that the Judgment in Civil Case No. 989 and record of
subsequent actions taken are deemed reconstituted by agreement
of the parties and with the approval of the trial court. WHEREFORE,
the Petition is GRANTED. The June 14, 2011 and September 10, 2012
Resolutions in CA-G.R SP No. 04239 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE

and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further

proceedings. SO ORDERED.
FILOMENA CABLING, G.R. No. 187696 ~l Petitioner, Present: versus - SERENO, CJ, Chairperson, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, PERLAS-BERNABE and CAGUIOA,JJ RODRIGO
DANGCALAN, Respondent. Promulgated: JUN 1 5 2016
x-----------------------------------------r--------x DECISION SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 declaring void for lack jurisdiction
the Decision2 issued by the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Malitbog-Tomas Oppus, Southern Leyte, as well as the Decision3
rendered by Branch 25, Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMaasin City,
Southern Leyte. ANTECEDENT FACTS This case stemmed from the
Complaint for recovery of possession and damages filed by Filomena
Cabling (petitioner) against Rodrigo Dangcalan (respondent) over
respondent's alleged encroachment on petitioner's property. In her
Complaint,4 petitioner alleged that she owned a 125-squaremeter
parcel of land located at San Vicente, Malitbog, Southern Leyte. It
was denominated as Lot No. 5056 and had an assessed value of P2,
100. Adjoining her property was a parcel of land that respondent
had bought from 1 Rollo, pp. 19-30; dated 24 January 2008, penned
by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta with Associate Justices
Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier concurring. 2 Id. at
79-85; dated 2 June 2004, penned by Judge Sulpicio D. Cunanan. 3
Id. at 109-120; dated 17 January 2005, penned by Judge Romeo M.
Gomez 4 Id. at 52-60. ~' ( Decision 2 G.R. No. 187696 her brother,
Gerardo Montajes. Despite knowing the boundaries of their
respective properties, however, respondent constructed a perimeter
fence that encroached on petitioner's land. After several unheeded
demands for respondent to remove the encroachment and a failed
conference before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, petitioner filed the
Complaint before the MCTC in May 20,01. 5 Respondent denied any
encroachment on petitioner's property and raised prescription as an
affirmative defense.6 He claimed that he had constructed the
perimeter fence together with his house way back in 1987, and that
petitioner knew about it. She had actually observed some phases of
the construction to ensure that it would not exceed their property
boundaries. Yet, petitioner filed her Complaint only in 2001, which
was beyond the 10- year period for acquisitive prescription under

Article 1134 of the New Civil Code. 7 RULINGS OF THE MCTC AND
THE RTC :After trial, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. Relying on the sketch plan and the testimony of the
court-appointed commissioner, it ruled that respondent's perimeter
fence had indeed encroached on some 13 square meters of
petitioner's property. The court further ruled that respondent was a
builder in bad faith, because he did not verify the actual boundaries
of the lot that he had purchased from petitioner's brother.
Respondent had the lot titled under his name in 1988, but it was
surveyed only in August 2001. 8 5 Id. The dispositive portion of the
MCTC Decision reads: WHEFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, ordering the defendant of the following to wit: I.
Surrendering the defendant's possession of the portion of land in
question to plaintiff, the true owner of the portion of land, and as
defendant is a builder in bad faith loses what was built on said
portion without right to indemnity. (Art. 448, Civil Code of the
Philippines); 2. To pay the plaintiff of the monthly rental at P50.00
per month for the possession of said portion in question starting
from the time the defendant demanded by the plaintiff to vacate up
to the time the former actually vacate; and 3. To pay the plaintiff for
moral damages in the amount of P20,000, exemplary damages in
the amount of Pl 0,000 and actual damages in the amount of
P2,000.00 and 6 Id. at 75. 7 Id. at 74-76. 8 Supra note 2. ( Decision 3
G.R. No. 187696 4. To pay the costs of suit. 9 Upon appeal by
respondent, however, the RTC ruled differently. Unlike the MCTC, it
did not give credence to the commissioner's sketch plan. The RTC
noted that the sketch plan had no accompanying Commissioner's
Report, and that the basis of the survey was not clear. It also ruled
that the MCTC should have first ruled on the issue of prescription
because respondent had raised it in a timely manner, albeit via an
Amended Answer. 10 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the
decision of the lower court declaring: 1. That the action has already
prescribed and/or that plaintiff was already in laches when this
action was filed in 1990, and defendant has already acquired the
portion in litigation by z' prescription; 2. That when defendant built
the concrete perimeter fence on the lot in litigation in August 1987,
he was a builder in good faith; 3. No pronouncement as to damages
and costs. 11 CA RULING Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review

under Rule 42 before the CA, 12 raising the following issues: I

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
OF THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
AND EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION. II WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONER IS
BARRED BY LACHES. III WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS A BUILDER IN GOOD F AITH.
13 On 24 January 2008, the CA denied the Petition and annulled
both the RTC and MCTC Decisions for lack of jurisdiction. 14 Instead
of ruling on the issues presented by petitioner, the appellate court
held that the threshold 9 Id. at 84-85. 10 Supra note 3. 11 Id. at
119-120. 12 Id. at 37-56. 13 Id. at 42. 14 Supra note I. ( Decision 4
G.R. No. 187696 question was whether the MCTC had jurisdiction
over petitioner's complaint. After examining the averments therein,
the CA ruled that the MCTC had no jurisdiction because the
Complaint was clearly an accion publiciana. As such, it was a
plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which
properly fell under the RTC's jurisdiction. Accordingly, all
proceedings in petitioner's Complaint, including her appeal : before
the RTC, were invalid and the decisions rendered thereon could be k
d . 15 struc own at any time. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malitbog-Tomas
Oppus, Southern Leyte dated June 2, 2004 and the January 17, 2005
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, 8111 Judicial Region, Branch 25,
Maasin City reversing the Decision of the MCTC are BOTH declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction, and the instant Complaint for
recovery of possession with damages is DISMISSED without
prejudice. 16 On 1 April 2009, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. 17 Hence, this Petition. ISSUE The only legal issue
We shall resolve is whether the CA erred in nullifying the RTC and
the MCTC Decisions on the ground that the MCTC had no jurisdiction
over petitioner's Complaint for accion publiciana. COURT RULING We
GRANT the petition. It is no longer good law that all cases for
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie with the RTC,
regardless of the value of the property. 18 As early as 2001, this
Court had already declared that all cases involving title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than
P20,000, if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction
of the municipal trial court. 19 This pronouncement was based on

Republic Act No. 7 691, 20 which was approved by Congress on 25

March 1994. Jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property or interest therein, as set forth in
Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of 15 Id. at 29. 16 Id. at 30. 17 Id. at 167170. 18 Penta Pac[fic Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and
Development Corpration, G.R. No. 161589. 24 November 2014, 741
SCRA 426, 438; Spouses Cruz v. 5'pouses Cruz, 616 Phil. 519, 526
(2009), citing Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, 557 Phil. 650, 657
(2007). 19 Aliabo v. Carampatan, 407 Phil. 31, 36 (200 I). 20 An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending
for the Purpose Batas Pamhansa Big. 129, Otherwise Known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." ( Decision 5 G.R. No. !'87696
Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Big.) 129,21 as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, is as follows: SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xx
xx (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds (t]wenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.- Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise: xx xx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed [t]wenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (PS0,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. In
Lares ma v. A be Ilana, 22 We clarified that the actions envisaged in
the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana and
reivindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real

property subject of the complaint. The Court explained further in

Penta Pacific Realty Corporation v. Ley Construction and
Development Corporation23 that its jurisdiction would now be
determined by the assessed value of the disputed land, or of the
adjacent lots if it is not declared for taxation purposes. If the
assessed~value is not alleged in the complaint, the action should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The reason behind this rule is that
the trial court is not afforded the means of determining from the
allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another 21 Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. 22 424 Phil. 766, 782 (2004). 23 Supra
note 18, at 439. ( Decision 6 G.R. No. 187696 court. After all, courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value oflands.
24 Clearly, the CA erred in nullifying both the RTC and the MCTC
decisions. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, as well
as by the character of the reliefs sought. Once it is vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction remains vested in the trial
court irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 25 As the
CA has correctly held, the allegations in the Complaint filed by
petitioner sufficiently made out a case for recovery of possession or
accion publiciana. The same cannot be said, however, of the
ultimate outcome of her appeal from the RTC Decision. The MCTC
correctly exercised its exclusive and original jurisdiction in finding
for petitioner as the plaintiff. On the other hand, the appeal of
respondent, as the defendant, properly fell under the appellate
jurisdiction of the RTC, under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 as
amended. Hence, neither decision can be struck down for being a
total nullity. Petitioner now argues that the CA's dismissal of her
Complaint without prejudice to the filing of another case before the
RTC, would only force her to re-litigate the same issues that the
MCTC has already thoroughly considered. Additionally, she
contends that the RTC Decision was not in accord with the
applicable provisions of the New Civil Code. She claims that
respondent cannot be deemed a builder in good faith, because he
failed to verify the actual boundaries of his property prior to the
construction of his perimeter fence. Further, neither prescription nor
!aches applies, because petitioner filed her Complaint in 2001,
which was well within the 30-year prescriptive period set forth in

Article 1141 of the New Civil Code for real actions over
immovables.26 For these reasons, she urges us to reinstate the
MCTC Decision. 27 Respondent, on the other hand, has not filed any
comment despite Our repeated directives to his counsel on record.
28 Suffice it to say that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the RTC
Decision are factual issues that properly belong to the jurisdiction
of the CA. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If so, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a . ff: 29 quest10n o act. 24 Hilario v. Salvador, 497
Phil. 327, 336 (2005), citing Ouano v. PGTT International Investment
Corporation, 434 Phil. 28-37 (2002). 25 De Vera v. Spouses Santiago,
G.R. No. 179457, 22 June 2015; Hilario v. Salvador, supra. 26 Supra
note I, at 9-13. 27 Id. at 14. 28 Id. at 177. In a Resolution dated 5
September 2011, we deemed as waived the filing of respondent's
Comment on the Petition. 29 Crisostomo v. Garcia.Jr .. 516 Phil. 743,
749 (2006). ( Decision 7 G.R. No. 187696 Good faith is a question of
fact that must be proved. 30 Similarly, the question of prescription
of an action involves the ascertainment of factual matters, such as
the date when the period to bring the action commenced to 31 run.
We resolve only questions of law; We do not try facts or examine
testimonial or documentary evidence on record. 32 We may have at
times opted for the relaxation of the application of procedural rules,
but we. have resorted to this option only under exceptional
circumstances, such as when: (a) the findings are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) in making its
findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (g)the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (h) the findings are conclusions without a citation of the
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in
the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are
not disputed by the respondent; U) the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (k) the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 33 None of the

above circumstances, however, are extant in this case. The simple

reason is that the CA opted to gloss over the factual issues raised
by petitioner on the wrong premise that the decisions of the trial
courts were void. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated 24 January 2008 and Resolution dated 1 April 2009 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88408 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED
to the Court of Appeals for the prompt resolution of the case on the
merits. SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and
A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National Treasurer and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A.
GONZALES, Chairman of the Committee on Finance of the Philippine
Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive
of the Philippine Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their
own behalf and in representation of Senators HEHERSON ALVAREZ,
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F. OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M.
TOLENTINO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAADA and
FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the
Senate and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM FROM DEBT

COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON.
CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the
Senate and as taxpayers, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON.
CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer, and
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S.
Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty (Lamp).

QUIASON, J.:
Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims
of authority between the Legislative and the Executive in the clash
of the powers of the purse and the sword. Providing the focus for
the contest between the President and the Congress over control of
the national budget are the four cases at bench. Judicial
intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on
the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly
exceeded their respective authorities, and by several Senators on

the claim that the President has committed grave abuse of

discretion or acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto
power.
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of
1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed
budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized
members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating
budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to
the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and
declared the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled
"AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the
vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel
B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of
prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on
the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I
entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and
Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion
allocated for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and

(b) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of

Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate
President Edgardo J. Angara, Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco,
sought the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners
question: (1) the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto
Taada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No. 113174), together with the
Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation,
sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA.
Petitioners Taada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine
Senate and taxpayers, while petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition
sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of the
Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for
debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance
of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same
respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest
the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added
to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH);
and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the
DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders

to enjoin respondents Secretary of Budget and Management,
National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned
provisions of the GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said
provisional reliefs on the time- honored principle of according the
presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of
regularity to official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in
the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit their
respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2)
a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded
at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on
Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of
petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he claimed that the remedy of the
Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the
vetoes) in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal
standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized
in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23
Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House of
Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section
55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing of the suit was authorized by
Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which
reads as follows:

Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the

Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the
Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of
the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions,
particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
(H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to
sue has been recognized (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The
Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators,
including the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee
on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling
resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the
three cases becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can
inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions
for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of
Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item
in an appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess
of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the
issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain
of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing
To Challenge Executive Action, 122 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307
[1973]).

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress

causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F.
Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can
have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or
individual Senators as such having a substantial interest in the
question at issue. It could likewise be said that there was the
requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to
raise any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain
appertaining to the Senate is to be resisted. Similarly, if the
situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that could
allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the
corresponding action. What cannot be denied is that a Senator has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office (Memorandum, p.
14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding
a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only
when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In
the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the
dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development
Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be used for infrastructure, purchase
of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Said Article
provides:

COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND

For Fund requirements of countrywide
development projects P 2,977,000,000

New Appropriations, by Purpose

Current Operating Expenditures
A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000
P2,977,000,000
TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall
be used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials
concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives,
P12,500,000 each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; Vice-President,
P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the said credit facilities shall be
constituted as a revolving fund to be administered by a government
financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations.
Prior years releases to local government units and national
government agencies for this purpose shall be turned over to the
government financial institution which shall be the sole
administrator of credit facilities released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice
of Allotments and Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned

implementing agency not later than five (5) days after the beginning
of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects and activities
by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and
Management shall submit within thirty (30) days after the end of
each quarter a report to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from this
Fund. The report shall include the listing of the projects, locations,
implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p.
1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress
to propose and identify the projects and activities to be funded by
the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the
Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp. 78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James
Madison as "the power of the purse," belongs to Congress, subject
only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose
the budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is
lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can
be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used
"for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the
purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund
involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.

The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose

and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine
whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall
within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set
up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line
with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the
President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress
of particular projects or activities under Article XLI of the GAA of
1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its
interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities and
politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven
allocation of appropriations for the constituents of the members of
Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership
or who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less
favored colleagues. The members of Congress also had to reckon
with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power
to cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a
Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the
unequal. It is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their
respective constituents and the priority to be given each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is
P472,000,000.00 of which P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for
current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for the
House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which

P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for current operating

expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870

Total Salaries and Wages 160,217

=======
Other Compensation

Step Increments 1,073

Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173

Total Other Compensation 103,815

01 Total Personal Services 264,032

=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02
03
04
05
06
07

Traveling Expenses 32,841

Communication Services 7,666
Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
Transportation Services 128
Supplies and Materials 20,189

08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415

Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447

=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives
are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643

Total Salaries and Wages 405,200

=======
Other Compensation
Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable
Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281
Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance 21,150

Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53

Others 106,140

Total Other Compensation 202,863

01 Total Personal Services 608,063

=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234

Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297

=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines
provides:
4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of
Congress may realign his allocation for operational expenses to any
other expenses category provide the total of said allocation is not
exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).

The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is

further divided into expenditures for salaries, personal services,
other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other
operating expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted
for his own operating expenditure a proportionate share of the
appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not
spend for one items of expense, the provision in question allows
him to transfer his allocation in said item to another item of
expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of
Congress to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any
other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this
practice is prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution. Said section provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations:
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives the
power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their appropriations,
whenever there is a law authorizing such augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of
members of Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General
Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the
Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the
expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation
laws unless in cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized
under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p.
1273).

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, but not the individual members of
Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as
appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the
Philippines, the members of Congress only determine the necessity
of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their
operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because
they are the ones who know whether there are savings available in
some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of
their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before
giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to
it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in
the items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting
the items of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to
be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service
(Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994), it appropriated only
P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and
Sports. Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service
the highest priority in the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because
under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the
highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which
provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to
education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its
rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.

This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221
(1991), where this Court held that Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the highest
budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction
and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for
education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the
public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General
Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance
with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority
to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not
without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the
credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress
appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling

The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII

(Appropriations for Debt Service) of the GAA of 1994 which
provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be
used for payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of
the Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund
be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the
Department of Finance shall submit a quarterly report of actual
foreign and domestic debt service payments to the House
Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee within
one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt service in said Article.
According to the President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of
Congress to reduce the debt burden by decreasing the
appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of the Special
Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt
reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.
This must be addressed by revising our debt policy by way of
innovative and comprehensive debt reduction programs
conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign
Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under
Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative

Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the constitutionality of such

automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the
Supreme Court in the case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N. Carague, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No. 94571, dated
April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the
reason that the GAA is not the appropriate legislative measure to
amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No. 1177
and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used
for payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of
the Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund
be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators (GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special
Provision on the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the
entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No.
113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor
General counterposed that the Special Provision did not relate to
the item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be
the subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo,
G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales
v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452 (1990). In that case, the issue was
stated by the Court, thus:
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the
President of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and
without effect.

The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any
misunderstanding about it, thus:
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President
exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or
differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of
an Appropriations Bill?
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those
invoked in the present case, are stated as follows:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds:
(1) the President's line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and
Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President
objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise
the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the itemveto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution,
has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also
vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise
of that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the
President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill
not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true
sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in
its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even
assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond the executive

power to veto, and Section 55

(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the
budgetary sense of the term, they are "inappropriate provisions"
that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's
veto power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said
that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in separate
legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted
by it must be treated as "item", which can be vetoed by the
President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the
appropriation for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in excess
of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
provision referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section
31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the
constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will presume the
constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P.
1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53 A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process (Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI on the
Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive
Department in the Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts
on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire
bill, not merely parts thereof (1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]).

The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general
appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art. VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose
content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of
the Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the
Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress on August 29, 1916. The
concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions,
including conditions, restrictions and limitations, to items in
appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the
following sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935
Constitution:
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more
items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without
at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it
relates . . . .
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered
to veto separately not only items in an appropriations bill but also
"provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned
sentence added to Section 11(2) of Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, it included the following provision:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art.
VI, Sec. 25[2]).

In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of

Section 16(2) of the 1935 Constitution in the 1987 Constitution
should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power of
the President to veto a "provision".
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can
include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision
which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an
item. Also to be included in the category of "inappropriate
provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws
have no place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general
legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that
Congress cannot by law establish conditions for and regulate the
exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for
that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive
prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated
in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp
constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the
legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers
conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including
in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
separate legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto
bills of general legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful
placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby
forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable
substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential
to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location
of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent
the Governor's veto power over substantive legislation by artfully
drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true

conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the

legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power
to infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to
encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to
avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such
provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of the
Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to
encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof "logrolling
measures", special interest provisions which could not succeed if
separately enacted, or "riders", substantive pieces of legislation
incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the
Special Provision on the ceiling for debt payment is valid, the
President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt payment
without complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation
under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as amended by P.D. No. 81
and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the
Administrative Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No.
113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully
execute the laws. The writ of prohibition will not issue on the fear
that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service, including the provisions that
the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment
of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness"
and that "in no case shall this fund be used to pay for the liabilities
of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are

germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt

service. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346
So., 2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions,
cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the item veto of said provisions
is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are
sustaining the veto of the Special Provision of the item on debt
service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any
payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be
subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with the
concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of
income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the following:
(H. 7) West Visayas State University
Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to
Section 13 of the special provisions applicable to all State
Universities and Colleges shall be equally shared by the University
and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
xxx xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human
Resources Development Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State
College derived from the operation of its LSC House and HRDC shall
be constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an
authorized government depository bank for the operational

expenses of these projects/services. The net income of the

Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall be remitted to the
National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The
implementing guidelines shall be issued by the Department of
Budget and Management (GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the
following:
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and
Colleges are authorized to use their income from their extension
services. Subject to the approval of the Board of Regents and the
approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter 5, Book VI
of E.O.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty
development, instructional materials and work study program (GAA
of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State
Universities and Colleges derived from tuition fees and other
sources as may be imposed by governing boards other than those
accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and 1026
and those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts pursuant to
Section 40, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited
with the National Treasury and recorded as a Special Account in the
General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D. No. 1437 for the
use of the institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of
E.O. No. 292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special
Account shall not exceed the amount actually earned and
deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash advance on such
income may be allowed State half of income actually realized during
the preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged against
income actually earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED,
FINALLY, That in no case shall such funds be used to create
positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or allowances, except
as may be specifically approved by the Department of Budge and
Management for income-producing activities, or to purchase

equipment or books, without the prior approval of the President of

the Philippines pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees,
charges and receipts intended for private recipient units, including
private foundations affiliated with these institutions shall be duly
acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as a trust receipt
before said income shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines, Section 44, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987
and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, all income earned by
all Government offices and agencies shall accrue to the General
Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund Policy enunciated
by Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution. Likewise, the creation and establishment of revolving
funds shall be authorized by substantive law pursuant to Section 66
of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section 45,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution
and existing law, I have noted the proliferation of special provisions
authorizing the use of agency income as well as the creation,
operation and maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already
considered as integral part of the revenue and financing sources of
the National Expenditure Program which I previously submitted to
Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions authorizing
the use of agency income and the establishment of revolving funds
over and above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act
shall effectively reduce the financing sources of the 1994 GAA and,
at the same time, increase the level of expenditures of some
agencies beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized levels for such
agencies. This corresponding increases the overall deficit of the
National Government (Veto Message, p. 3).

Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of

discretion when he disallowed by his veto the "use of income" and
the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State
University and Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other
government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to use their income
for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to
use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it
is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before
by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the "one-fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the
National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange
Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Management's Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the President vetoed the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The
said paragraph reads as follows:
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for
the maintenance and repair of roads which are provided in this Act
for the Department of Public Works and Highways shall be released
to the respective Engineering District, subject to such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the Department of Budget and
Management. Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be
exempt from budgetary reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national
roads and bridges, a maximum of thirty percent (30%) shall be
contracted out in accordance with guidelines to be issued by the
Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance shall be
used for maintenance by force account.

Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated

herein to be applied across the board to the allocation of each
region shall be set aside for the maintenance of roads which may be
converted to or taken over as national roads during the current year
and the same shall be released to the central office of the said
department for eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That
any balance of the said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the
regions on a pro-rata basis for the maintenance of existing national
roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall
be made, except as authorized by law or upon direction of the
President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:
While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to
impose certain restrictions contained in some special provisions, I
am equally aware that many programs, projects and activities of
agencies would require some degree of flexibility to ensure their
successful implementation and therefore risk their completion.
Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail
and impede program implementation but they may also result in a
breach of contractual obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that
for practical intent and purposes, maintenance by contract could be
undertaken to an optimum of seventy percent (70%) and the
remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover, the
policy of maximizing implementation through contract maintenance
is a covenant of the Road and Road Transport Program Loan from
the Asian Development Bank (ADB Loan No. 1047-PHI-1990) and
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-C17-199).
The same is a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the
Highway Management Project (IBRD Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the
government to encourage and maximize private sector participation

in the regular repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, I

am directly vetoing the underlined second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(Veto Message, p. 11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the
divergence in policy of Congress and the President. While Congress
expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total
appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted out, the
President, on the basis of a comprehensive study, believed that
contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70%
would be more efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specified how the said item shall be expended 70% by
administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot
be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this
special provision. He merely argued that the provision is a complete
turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government to
maximize contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86).
That is not a ground to veto a provision separate from the item to
which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the
item for the DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
the President vetoed the special provision on the purchase by the
AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A.
No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:

12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed

Forces of the Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of
the Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the
purchase of medicines to a standard formulary, "it is believed more
prudent to provide for a transition period for its adoption and
smooth implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines"
(Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines
by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in
the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
"appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the
fact that there is an existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that
requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a
rational system of procurement and distribution." The President
believes that it is more prudent to provide for a transition period for
the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11
(Education Drive) of the law itself. This belief, however, cannot
justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the
AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation
item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision
cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said
item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
[1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President
vetoed the underlined proviso of Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use
of Fund," which requires the prior approval of Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the
entire Special Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":

2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall

be given for the acquisition of AFP assets necessary for protecting
marine, mineral, forest and other resources within Philippine
territorial borders and its economic zone, detection, prevention or
deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to support diplomatic
moves aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and
patrimony: PROVIDED, That the said modernization fund shall not
be released until a Table of Organization and Equipment for FY
1994-2000 is submitted to and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be
used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers (GAA of
1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition
and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of nonimpairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to
cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the
Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund"
and Special Provision No. 3 are conditions or limitations related to
the item on the AFP modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for
the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all
purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of
definition, a congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature
can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It
is a form of legislative control in the implementation of particular
executive actions. The form may be either negative, that is
requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative,
requiring approval of the executive action. This device represents a
significant attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the
executive to shared administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto
and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).

A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the

principle of separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the
issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special
Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed
of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action
in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive
acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill.
Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos.
2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum
as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress cannot do directly by law it
cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to the exercise of that
power (of the President as Commander-in-Chief) through provisions
in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the
Modernization Funds for payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws
that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so,
contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension
funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the
President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The
vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in
the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension fund
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA

of 1994,
p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use
savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and
Gratuity Fund is a condition or limitation which is so intertwined
with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings
to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, and under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid
out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
While Section 25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of
savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the
President pursuant to a specific law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the
payment of separation benefits but it added the following Special
Provision:
1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation
authorized herein shall be used for the compensation of CAFGU's
including the payment of their separation benefit not exceeding one
(1) year subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will be
deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies

and procedures for the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994,

p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation
of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject
to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A..
No. 6758. He gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:
I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in
proposing the amendment of Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU.
However, it is premature at this point in time of our peace process
to earmark and declare through special provision the actual number
of CAFGU members to be deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that
the number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result or
degree of success of the on-going peace initiatives which are not
yet precisely determinable today. I have desisted, therefore, to
directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss of
the entire special provision to the prejudice of its beneficient
provisions. I therefore declare that the actual implementation of
this special provision shall be subject to prior Presidential approval
pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of
the CAFGU's when it appropriated the money for payment of the
separation pay of the members of thereof. The President, however,
directed that the deactivation should be done in accordance to his
timetable, taking into consideration the peace and order situation in
the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was
tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will
to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President
cannot impair or withhold expenditures authorized and
appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor
other legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 15-16).

The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who
should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer
needed (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the
President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment refers to a
refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard
Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that
once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an
appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the
President to implement the project and to spend the money
appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on the
matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully
execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation
item, the President in effect exercises a veto power that is not
expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the
Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source of
the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal
sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority
to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress.
Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as
Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which
ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires
that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so
would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through
efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings
are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to
spend the entire amount budgeted in the law (Notes: Presidential
Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61

Georgetown Law Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the

Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 Yale Law
Journal 1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny
to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much
less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But
even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper
vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation
of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in an
appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597
and R.A. No. 6758.
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA,
and CHR, the Congress added the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any
savings in the appropriations for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
augment any item of the Court's appropriations for (a) printing of
decisions and publication of "Philippine Reports"; (b) Commutable
terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme
Court and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired Justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating
expenses of the courts' libraries, including purchase of books and
periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing
equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the employment of
temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for

judicial administration; (f) maintenance and improvement of the

Court's Electronic Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice,
attendance in international conferences and conduct of training
programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation
allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court
Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in
accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation
of attorney-de-officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489
any increase in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual
procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128;
Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is
hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, to use savings for the payment of fringe
benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of
the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to
appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations to
augment items of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman
from savings in other items of appropriation actually released, for:
(a) printing and/or publication of decisions, resolutions, training and
information materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of
OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c) purchase of books,
journals, periodicals and equipment;

(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation

allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their
positions are entitled thereto and fringe benefits as may be
authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB
pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e) for
other official purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1174; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to augment any item
of appropriation in the office of the CHR from savings in other items
of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training materials and
educational publications; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement
of Commission's central and regional facilities; (c) purchase of
books, journals, periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of
commutable representation and transportation allowances of
officials and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled
thereto and fringe benefits, as may be authorized by law for officials
and personnel of CHR, subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations (GAA of 1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the
conditions included in the GAA of 1994. He noted that:
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which
states that "no elective or appointive public officer or employee
shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore, confident that the
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and
faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation
standardization (Veto Message, p. 10).

Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President

violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme
Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were
placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto
Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that
additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to
law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with
law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the
condition that the implementation of the budget of the COA be
subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived
from sources authorized by the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not exceeding Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund which shall
be used for maintenance, operating and other incidental expenses
to enhance audit services and audit-related activities. The fund shall
be deposited in an authorized government depository ban, and
withdrawals therefrom shall be made in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and implementing rules and
regulations: PROVIDED, That any interests earned on such deposit
shall be remitted at the end of each quarter to the national Treasury
and shall accrue to the General Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the
Commission on Audit shall submit to the Department of Budget and
Management a quarterly report of income and expenditures of said
revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the
implementation, applicability and operation of use of income and
revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:

. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special
provisions authorizing the use of income and the creation of
revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations should be
discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations have
legal/statutory basis aside from being already a vested right to the
agencies concerned which should not be jeopardized through the
Veto Message. There is, however, imperative need to rationalize
their implementation, applicability and operation. Thus, in order to
substantiate the purpose and intention of said provisions, I hereby
declare that the operationalization of the following provisions
during budget implementation shall be subject to the guidelines to
be issued by the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book
VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation
to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act (Veto
Message, p. 6; Emphasis Supplied.)
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the
condition that in the implementation of DPWH projects, the
administrative and engineering overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be
subject to the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated
by the Executive pursuant to existing laws." The condition was
imposed because the provision "needs further study" according to
the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:
9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five
percent (5%) of the amount for infrastructure project released by
the Department of Budget and Management shall be deducted by
DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed engineering and
construction supervision, testing and quality control, and the like,
thus insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the released
fund is available for direct implementation of the
project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings, health
centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the deductible
amount shall not exceed three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject the
government official or employee concerned to administrative, civil

and/or criminal sanction under Sections 43 and 80, Book VI of E.O.

No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA),
the President imposed the condition that allocations for specific
projects shall be released and disbursed "in accordance with the
housing program of the government, subject to prior Executive
approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for
the specified projects shall be set aside for corollary works and used
exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation and construction of
buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems,
facilities and amenities in the area: PROVIDED, That any road to be
constructed or rehabilitated shall conform with the specifications
and standards set by the Department of Public Works and Highways
for such kind of road: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That savings that may
be available in the future shall be used for road repair,
rehabilitation and construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less than P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) Not less than P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) Not less than
P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the
implementation of various projects in resettlement areas, Seven
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,500,000) shall be
allocated to the Dasmarias Bagong Bayan resettlement area,
Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation
Center Area (Gen. Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and Services, all of which will be
for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000) shall be set aside for the asphalting of seven (7)

kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the
"operationalization" of the special provision on revolving funds of
the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the President
pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in
relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act"
(Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special
Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the mandatory retention of 5% and
3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the
necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the
Executive pursuant to existing law" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10,
14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can
be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the
government subject to prior Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No.
113888, pp. 10-11;
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that
the implementation of the items on which the said conditions were
imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws,
regulations or policies. They did not add anything to what was
already in place at the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines
on the use of public funds authorized by Congress is simply an
exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17;
Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper
steps" to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional
Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.

IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those
remedies can be used only when respondents have acted "without
or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of discretion,"
(Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing
the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt payment when
he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say that
Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger
sum for debt payment than the amount appropriated for education,
when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall from a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the
date of its enactment since the court's interpretation merely
establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270
[1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority
as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141
[1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make
bad laws and should be reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior
acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the
annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service
specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No.
113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a)
the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of
appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the

purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA

of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in
so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez
v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not effect the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case
within the scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I
do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the
constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and
a provision veto has been traditionally recognized in constitutional
litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon
v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general

provisions of law which happens to be put into an appropriation

bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the President to
veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act, it does
not
confer in fact, it excludes the power to veto any particular
provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA 549, this
court referred to its duty to construe the Constitution, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative would want it
construed, but in accordance with what it says and provides. When
the Constitution states that the President has the power to veto any
particular item or items in the appropriation act, this must be taken
as a component of that delicate balance of power between the
executive and legislative, so that, for this Court to construe Sec.
27(2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President to veto
any particular provision or provisions in the appropriations act, is to
load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of that
delicate balance of power.
I therefore disagree with the majority's pronouncements which
would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in the
appropriations act based on the contention that such are
"inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
"inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still
a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore,
outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most respected
colleague, Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a
bit, however, that part of the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide
Development Fund or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous
"pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation
act the activities and the projects that are desirable and may thus

be funded. Once, however, such identification and the

corresponding appropriation therefore is done, the legislative act is
completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved,
with exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the
legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law,
the Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither
may delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the
powers of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the
individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision that can bind
it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional
authority. Even assuming that overseeing the laws it enacts
continues to be a legislative process, one that I find difficult to
accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its members, that must
exercise that function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than
the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the
needs of their own respective cosntituents. I see no legal obstacle,
however, in their making, just like anyone else, the proper
recommendations to albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the
President for the purpose. Neother would it be objectionable for
Congrss, by law, to appropriate funds for specific projects as it may
be minded; to give that authoriy, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionality impermissible.

# Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in
so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez
v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not effect the item or items to which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case
within the scope of Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I
do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the
constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and
a provision veto has been traditionally recognized in constitutional
litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon
v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which
in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general
provisions of law which happens to be put into an appropriation
bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the President to
veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act, it does
not
confer in fact, it excludes the power to veto any particular
provision or provisions in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA 549, this
court referred to its duty to construe the Constitution, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative would want it
construed, but in accordance with what it says and provides. When
the Constitution states that the President has the power to veto any
particular item or items in the appropriation act, this must be taken
as a component of that delicate balance of power between the
executive and legislative, so that, for this Court to construe Sec.
27(2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President to veto
any particular provision or provisions in the appropriations act, is to
load the scale in favor of the executive, at the expense of that
delicate balance of power.
I therefore disagree with the majority's pronouncements which
would validate the veto by the President of specific provisions in the

appropriations act based on the contention that such are

"inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that a provision in the appropriations act is
"inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still
a provision, not an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore,
outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most respected
colleague, Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason. I should like to highlight a
bit, however, that part of the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide
Development Fund or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous
"pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation
act the activities and the projects that are desirable and may thus
be funded. Once, however, such identification and the
corresponding appropriation therefore is done, the legislative act is
completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the Executive is behooved,
with exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the
legislative will is properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another
theory invoked by some quarters that, in so implementing the law,
the Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither
may delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the
powers of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the
individuals that comprise it, in any action or decision that can bind
it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional
authority. Even assuming that overseeing the laws it enacts
continues to be a legislative process, one that I find difficult to
accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its members, that must
exercise that function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than
the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the
needs of their own respective constituents. I see no legal obstacle,
however, in their making, just like anyone else, the proper
recommendations to, albeit not necessarily conclusive on, the
President for the purpose. Neither would it be objectionable for

Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as

it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be
constitutionally impermissible.
G.R. No. L-55273-83 December 19, 1981
GAUDENCIO RAYO, BIENVINIDO PASCUAL, TOMAS MANUEL, MARIANO
CRUZ, PEDRO BARTOLOME, BERNARDINO CRUZ JOSE PALAD , LUCIO
FAJARDO, FRANCISCO RAYOS, ANGEL TORRES, NORBERTO TORRES,
RODELIO JOAQUIN, PEDRO AQUINO, APOLINARIO BARTOLOME,
MAMERTO BERNARDO, CIRIACO CASTILLO, GREGORIO CRUZ, SIMEON
ESTRELLA, EPIFANIO MARCELO, HERMOGENES SAN PEDRO, JUAN
SANTOS, ELIZABETH ABAN, MARCELINA BERNABE, BUENAVENTURA
CRUZ, ANTONIO MENESES, ROMAN SAN PEDRO, LOPEZ ESPINOSA,
GODOFREDO PUNZAL, JULIANA GARCIA, LEBERATO SARMIENTO,
INOCENCIO DE LEON, CARLOS CORREA, REYNALDO CASIMIRO,
ANTONIO GENER, GAUDENCIO CASTILLO, MATIAS PEREZ,
CRISPINIANO TORRES, CRESENCIO CRUZ, PROTACIO BERNABE,
MARIANO ANDRES, CRISOSTOMO CRUZ, MARCOS EUSTAQUIO, PABLO
LEGASPI, VICENTE PASCUAL, ALEJANDRA SISON, EUFRACIO TORRES,
ROGELIO BARTOLOME, RODOLFO BERNARDO, APOLONIO CASTILLO,
MARCELINO DALMACIO, EUTIQUIO LEGASPI, LORENZO LUCIANO and
GREGORIO PALAD, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH V, STA. MARIA,
and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The relevant antecedents of this case are narrated in the petition
and have not been controverted, namely:
3. At about midnight on October 26, 1978, during the height of that
infamous typhoon "KADING" the respondent corporation, acting
through its plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or
caused to be opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the
Angat Dam. And as a direct and immediate result of the sudden,
precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several

towns in Bulacan were inundated. Hardest-hit was Norzagaray.

About a hundred of its residents died or were reported to have died
and properties worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away.
This flood was unprecedented in Norzagaray.
4. Petitioners, who were among the many unfortunate victims of
that man-caused flood, filed with the respondent Court eleven
complaints for damages against the respondent corporation and the
plant superintendent of Angat Dam, Benjamin Chavez, docketed as
Civil Cases Nos. SM-950 951, 953, 958, 959, 964, 965, 966, 981, 982
and 983. These complaints though separately filed have a
common/similar cause of action. ...
5. Respondent corporation filed separate answers to each of these
eleven complaints. Apart from traversing the material averments in
the complaints and setting forth counterclaims for damages
respondent corporation invoked in each answer a special and
affirmative defense that "in the operation of the Angat Dam," it is
"performing a purely governmental function", hence it "can not be
sued without the express consent of the State." ...
6. On motion of the respondent corporation a preliminary hearing
was held on its affirmative defense as though a motion to dismiss
were filed. Petitioners opposed the prayer for dismissal and
contended that respondent corporation is performing not
governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its
own organic act, Section 3 (d) of Republic Act No. 6395, it can sue
and be sued in any court. ...
7. On July 29, 1980 petitioners received a copy of the questioned
order of the respondent Court dated December 21, 1979 dismissing
all their complaints as against the respondent corporation thereby
leaving the superintendent of the Angat Dam, Benjamin Chavez, as
the sole party-defendant. ...
8. On August 7, 1980 petitioners filed with the respondent Court a
motion for reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. ...
9. The respondent Court denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in its order dated October 3, 1980. ... Hence, the

present petition for review on certiorari under Republic Act No.

5440. (Rollo, pp. 3-6.)
The Order of dismissal dated December 12, 1979, reads as follows:
Under consideration is a motion to dismiss embodied as a special
affirmative defense in the answer filed by defendant NPC on the
grounds that said defendant performs a purely governmental
function in the operation of the Angat Dam and cannot therefore be
sued for damages in the instant cases in connection therewith.
Plaintiffs' opposition to said motion to discuss, relying on Sec. 3 (d)
of Republic Act 6396 which imposes on the NPC the power and
liability to sue and be sued in any court, is not tenable since the
same refer to such matters only as are within the scope of the other
corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the
instant cases. It being an agency performing a purely governmental
function in the operation of the Angat Dam, said defendant was not
given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said
defendant for tort may require the express consent of the State.
WHEREFORE, the cases against defendant NPC are hereby
dismissed. (Rollo, p. 60.)
The Order dated October 3, 1980, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs is pro forma; the motion was
simply denied for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 74.)
The petition to review the two orders of the public respondent was
filed on October 16, 1980, and on October 27, 1980, We required the
respondents to comment. It was only on April 13, 1981, after a
number of extensions, that the Solicitor General filed the required
comment. (Rollo, pp. 107-114.)
On May 27, 1980, We required the parties to file simultaneous
memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice. (Rollo, p. 115.)
Petitioners filed their memorandum on July 22, 1981. (Rollo, pp.
118-125.) The Solicitor General filed a number of motions for
extension of time to file his memorandum. We granted the seventh
extension with a warning that there would be no further extension.
Despite the warning the Solicitor General moved for an eighth

extension which We denied on November 9, 1981. A motion for a

ninth extension was similarly denied on November 18, 1981. The
decision in this case is therefore, without the memorandum of the
Solicitor General.
The parties are agreed that the Order dated December 21, 1979,
raises the following issues:
1. Whether respondent National Power Corporation performs a
governmental function with respect to the management and
operation of the Angat Dam; and
2. Whether the power of respondent National Power Corporation to
sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be
sued for tort.
The petition is highly impressed with merit.
It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or
not the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the
management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say
that the government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under
its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and
Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.)
Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued
in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and
accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by
the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the Orders of the
respondent court dated December 12, 1979 and October 3, 1980,
are set aside; and said court is ordered to reinstate the complaints
of the petitioners. Costs against the NPC.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154705

June 26, 2003

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR

SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI
KASIM, Petitioners,
vs.
JAMES VINZON, doing business under the name and style of VINZON
TRADE AND SERVICES, Respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J:
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2002 and its Resolution dated
August 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66894 entitled "The Republic of
Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counselor Azhari Kasim v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 145, Makati City, and James Vinzon, doing business
under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and Services."
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti
Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995
with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall,
for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy
Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the
official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The
equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that
the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will
renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving
thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry. 1
Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of
the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed
respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the
discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February
2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of
Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found
respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in

compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.

Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a
letter dated August 31, 2000.2 Petitioners claim, moreover, that they
had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to
terminate the agreement.
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent cites various
circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners alleged
dissatisfaction over respondents services: (a) in July 2000, Minister
Counsellor Kasim still requested respondent to assign to the
embassy an additional full-time worker to assist one of his other
workers; (b) in August 2000, Minister Counsellor Kasim asked
respondent to donate a prize, which the latter did, on the occasion
of the Indonesian Independence Day golf tournament; and (c) in a
letter dated August 22, 2000, petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin
thanked respondent for sponsoring a prize and expressed his hope
that the cordial relations happily existing between them will
continue to prosper and be strengthened in the coming years.
Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a complaint 3 against
petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 18203 in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 145. On February 20, 2001,
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity
from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the
Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador
Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as
defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and
therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.4 In turn, respondent filed on
March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the
Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit.
He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance
Agreement:
"Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be
settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper
court of Makati City, Philippines."

Respondents Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador

Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held
liable in their private capacities for tortious acts done with malice
and bad faith.5
On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners Motion to
Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration
subsequently filed.
The trial courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss was brought up to
the Court of Appeals by herein petitioners in a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. Said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66894,
alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that the Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and
voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and jurisdiction of Philippine
courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
On May 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
decision denying the petition for lack of merit.6 On August 16, 2002,
it denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration.7
Hence, this petition.
In the case at bar, petitioners raise the sole issue of whether or not
the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision
that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as
its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance
Agreement.
The petition is impressed with merit.
International law is founded largely upon the principles of
reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which
were adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution.8 The rule that a State may not be sued
without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States.9 As enunciated in Sanders v.
Veridiano II,10 the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of

foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of the

sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in
parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.11 A contrary attitude
would "unduly vex the peace of nations."12
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor
impervious to change. The increasing need of sovereign States to
enter into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the
discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new
concept of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory,
holds that the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but not with regard to
private acts or acts jure gestionis.13
In United States v. Ruiz,14 for instance, we held that the conduct of
public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval
Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as
an act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center
catering to American servicemen and the general public at the John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City,15 as well as the bidding for the
operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City. 16
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a
foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure
gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign
State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign
State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity,
and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If
the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii.17
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that
any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of
the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity
from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily
inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such

provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party

elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by
any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be
deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the
principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court
may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to
dismiss it.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and
unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication.
We find no such waiver in this case.
Respondent concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic
mission is a sovereign function.1wphi1 On the other hand, he
argues that the actual physical maintenance of the premises of the
diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and
equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State.18
We disagree. There is no dispute that the establishment of a
diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not
merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance
and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private
entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is
therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning
units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water
motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence
of the Indonesian ambassador.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, "the
Maintenance Agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. In such a
case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit."
As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent,
the Solicitor General states that it "was not a waiver of their
immunity from suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do
waive their immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of

any legal action arising out of the agreement and the proper court
in Makati City shall be the agreed venue thereof.19
On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin
and Minister Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private
capacities, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations provides:
xxx
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity
from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in
the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of
the sending State for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private
person and not on behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions.
xxx
The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim in terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not
covered by the exceptions provided in the abovementioned
provision.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under
subparagraph (c) thereof,20 but said provision clearly applies only to
a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any professional
or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the
case herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 66894 are

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the complaint in Civil Case No. 18203
against petitioners is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.