Latin American Culture:

A Deconstruction of Stereotypes
Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn
Butler University

Abstract
This article addresses and deconstructs some of the most widely held beliefs on Latin America in the United States, and it is based on an analysis of
publications (in print and electronic), with emphasis on the past forty years,
coupled with statistics and personal observations. Specifically, the article examines the differences and similarities among Latin Americans in eight areas of the Latin American social worldurban-rural subcultures, work,
ethnicity, social class, religion, militarism, politics, and family and gender
relationsand it questions the widespread idea of a monolithic group as reflected in US popular culture and in the US media.
In politics and history, if one takes accepted statements at face value,
one will be sadly misled.
Jos Ortega y Gasset

atin America as represented in the popular culture of the United States

invokes poverty, a rural environment, shantytowns, exotic indigenous,
economic and technological backwardness, the Catholic religion's governance of every aspect of life, personality cult, dictatorship, authoritarianism, corruption and disorganization, machismo, violence in the streets,
drug trafficking, and revolutionary movements. I asked students in one class
about Latin America to write down their first thoughts on Latin America at
the beginning of the semester, and most of the thirty students in that class
mentioned one or several of these stereotypes. Politicians and many opinion
leaders in the United States express some of these views often, as reflected
in websites and blogs. Popular mass media (e.g., television, cinema, newspapers, magazines), as several studies have shown (e.g., Aguirre and Baker;
Cline; Esteinou Madrid; Eejes; Mndez-Mndez and Alverio), contribute a
great deal to creating and reproducing such images. A large number of so-

Studies in Latin American Popular Culture, Vo\. 32, 2014

2014 by the University of Texas Press
DOI: 10.7560/SLAPC320D

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cial sciences and humanities studies have also provided elements that have
contributed to reinforcing most of these stereotypes throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (see, e.g., Bryjak and Soroka; Cornbleth
and Gill; Gonzales, Lepper, and Miller; Harrison Underdevelopment:,
Huntington; Kolenzan and Heine; Kryzanek; Madsen; Pescatello; Rivera;
Rudolph; Tomasek). And in a recent study about the effects of US pubhc attitude toward immigrants from different regions of the world, Timberlake
and Williams (8, 9) found that Latin American stereotypes have the greatest impact on public perceptions and that Latin Americans were the most
negatively rated on several characteristics. The study demonstrates that reaction to "immigration is often filtered through attitudes toward the particular characteristics they believe immigrant groups hold" (8).
This article is based on the analysis of publications that attempt to characterize and define Latin Americans and Latin America, with an emphasis
on the past forty years, coupled with some statistics and personal observations. I am aware that I risk reproducing or producing some stereotypes of
my own. This risk is unavoidable when trying to define or explain coherently all the subtle cultural variations and complexities of social phenomena. I address some of the most widely held beliefs on Latin America that
I think need to be deconstructed for a better understanding of contemporary Latin America. Specifically, I address eight areas of the Latin American
social world: urban-rural subcultures, work, ethnicity, social class, religion,
militarism, politics, and family and gender relations. First, though, it is important to clarify the question of the differences and similarities among
Latin Americans.
Homogeneity versus Diversity
People in the United States tend to explain all of Latin America in terms of
the nationalities or countries that they know. For instance, most US citizens
in the Midwest and Southwest perceive Latin American culture through the
Mexicans they know; in the East, particularly in the New York and Boston
areas, people see Latin American culture through their limited interactions
with Dominicans and Puerto Ricans; in Miami, Cubans and Central Americans constitute the reference group for interpreting Latin America. This is
the case because of the large numbers of immigrants from Mexico, Puerto
Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba in those areas, respectively. A similar process occurs in many scholars' writings: a researcher studies a country or a small area of a country and often extrapolates the findings to larger
areas of Latin America, thus projecting an artificial image of homogeneity.
This idea of homogeneity is so extensive in US society that even important politicians tend to treat Latin America as a culturally unified region.

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Ex-president Ronald Reagan, after a tour of several Latin American countries, was surprised to find that the countries were different from one another (Goodwin 12).
Are these scholarly analyses and public perceptions totally wrong.> Indeed, some rather general aspects of these countries' history are similar, such
as having been conquered by Spain and Portugal, and the facts that most
countries of the region have adopted the Catholic religion and the large majority speak Spanish. Beyond that, they are rather different; in truth, diversity is the norm rather than the exception. For instance, the degree of
economic development or poverty varies considerably from one country to
another and from one cultural environment to another (e.g., rural versus urban). There is a remarkable difference in per capita income from country to
country. Chile and Argentina have per capita incomes almost eleven times
higher than that of Haiti and four times greater than that of the Dominican
Republic or Peru.
Overall, in comparing all of Latin America with the United States, perhaps one can find more widespread poverty and political corruption there
than here, but it is more a question of degree than a question of black-andwhite opposition. In other words, we also find poverty and corruption in
the United States and in other developed countries of the world. Therefore,
it is erroneous to classify a continent according to some of its characteristics
without considering their relative importance, and without considering the
vast differences that exist between countries and regions.
In summary, Latin America presents many widely varying ways of life
and differences in geography. I do not imply that there are not some cultural similarities and ways of life; these exist, but they are not so great as
most US citizens, many politicians, and numerous scholars tend to assume.

On Urban-Rural Subcultures
Contrary to the belief widely held in the United States that Latin America
is essentially rural, approximately 72 percent of the Latin American population live in cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. In reality,
there are more cities of greater than five hundred thousand inhabitants in
contemporary Latin America than in the United States. In 2008, only Belize, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, and Honduras had more than 50 percent of
the population living in rural areas (International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development 2). Therefore, if one wants to classify Latin America in
terms of urban or rural society (which I do not believe is appropriate), then
one must classify it as urban.
In the past twenty years, communications (e.g., roads, public transport,
movement of people, information) between urban centers and rural ar-

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eas have developed greatly, but substantial differences in lifestyles remain.

These differences within the same country are such that a person from Buenos Aires, on the coast of Argentina, is likely to have a lifestyle more like a
person from Santiago, on the coast of Chile, than like that of a rural resident of Patagonia. Similarly, a teenager who lives in Mexico City or Buenos
Aires probably has more cultural similarities with a teenage resident of Chicago, Madrid, or Rotne than with a teenager from the state of Chiapas in
Mexico or from any rural area in Argentina. In other words, the globalization of culture has produced new segmentations and divisions. It has produced cultural similarities among people who live in faraway countries but
who inhabit similar sociocultural contexts (e.g., urban professionals, urban
teenagers). At the same time, large differences exist within a single country
between areas that are not within the same communication network. This
new global arrangement shows empirically that we can no longer define cultures in terms of physical zones; we must define them in terms of communication areas. The collective imaginary is clearly overcoming frontiers and
languages.

On Work
Latin Americans are often pictured as not strongly inclined to work hard.
Some Latin Americans themselves promoted this idea in the first half of the
twentieth century (e.g., Arguedas; Bunge; da Cunha; Encina). These authors overlooked the factors that historically prevented the increase of productivity in most Latin American countries; those factors have more to do
with particular natural conditions and socioeconomic conditions resulting
from the world economic system (e.g., Stavenhagen; Wellenstein) than with
Latin Americans' inclination to work. Close to 80 percent of Latin America is in the tropics; numerous tropical diseases affected the population in
those areas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore,
farming in the tropics is difficult because of the heat and the encroaching
vegetation. In addition, a large proportion of the land requires great investments in irrigation systems so that it can become productive by world standards. Besides, physical activity is arduous in certain areas of Latin America,
such as in the altiplano, which perhaps has contributed to a slower pace of
life among the inhabitants ofthat Andean region and has given a false impression to outsiders.
In comparing Latin America with the United States, some scholars have
emphasized a dualism between contemplation and action, according to
which Latin Americans are more inclined to the contemplation of aesthetics
and life forms, and US citizens are more inclined to action (Harrison, Who
Prospers? 83; Plaza 23). This kind of general proposition is relatively popular

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among US citizens who have some basic knowledge of Latin America, but
it has little value for explaining differences between Latin America and
the United States, and it certainly has no validity for understanding Latin
Americans. The difference that one can observe concerns the role of work
in people's minds. In the United States, it seems that more people perceive
their lives according to their work and their occupational position than in
Latin America. In Latin America, more people tend to perceive work simply
as a way of making a living. The stigma of being without a job is stronger
in the United States than in Latin America; one's job plays a more central
role in everyday life in the United States. Even in the context of parties and
other informal gatherings, work themes are omnipresent in conversations
among US residents in a way that is not as evident among Latin Americans.
Furthermore, Latin Americans tend to be more skeptical than US citizens
about the myth of becoming rich by working hard.
However, many Latin Americans actually work as many, if not more,
hours than hardworking US citizens. No good statistics are available on
this subject (beyond the official number of per capita working hours in each
country, which is generally about forty hours a week), but there is some serious research that demonstrates that Latin Americans actually work more
hours on average than Anglo-Americans (Medalia and Jacobs 147; Spector
et al. 129, 130). Furthermore, I can provide some information based on my
own observations and experience. Because salaries are generally low in comparison with the cost of living and the desired standard of living, because
of overall economic conditions, a large proportion of Latin Americans work
long days to increase their income. In most countries of Latin America, employers expect almost full-time availability from their middle- and upperlevel employees. For example, a person who works for the government or in
a private company in a middle-management position or above cannot expect
to follow the offlcially established schedule (often eight hours a day). It is
expected that this person will be available at any time, including weekends.
The same is true of university professors. A full-time position in most
Latin American universities usually involves teaching four to five classes
(two and a half hours each) a week, but because salaries are so low, most
professors teach in a second or third university, conduct research as consultants, or own a small business. That is, most university professors teach on
average about eight classes a week, with all the hours of class preparation,
grading examinations, and so on that the work implies. The same amount
of time is spent at work by those professors who also have a business or do
consulting work.
Members of the Latin American working class must work the minimum
of forty hours, as in most countries around the world, and often are eager
to work extra hours to increase their wages. Other, rather large segments of
the population, such as small-scale artisans and people in the sector generally characterized as the "informal economy," customarily work far more

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than the official forty hours per week in order to survive. In short, to what
extent could we explain underdevelopment as due to the work attitudes of
some people in the population? I do not think we have enough data to examine this question beyond mere stereotypes.
Specific to most countries of Latin America is a high rate of unemployment and subemploymentpeople who work part-time or only occasionally
because they are unable to find a full-time job. Also, by US standards, Latin
American businesses often appear more disorganized than United States or
Japanese businesses, and it is often stated that Latin Americans do not invest in their countries. But according to recent studies, it seems that the key
issue is not that the region's citizens work or invest less; rather, it is a question of productivity related to "producing more effectively, training, changing, reallocating, and using work, capital, and land with greater efficiency"
(Lora and Pages 19)activities that are more specific to the Latin American
elite than to the population at large.
People in the United States too often view Latin America through a simplistic and incorrect interpretation of Weberian analysis, whereby Catholics, in contrast to Protestants, are not inclined to work hard (even though
nearly a quarter of the US population is Catholic). Therefore, every detail
that could confirm that theory is overemphasized.

On Ethnicity
Latin Americans are often pictured as living in the past (e.g., Cornbleth and
Gill; Gonzalez et al.; Rivera; Rudolph). This seems to be another vague and
unfounded supposition based on the fact that a few myths and rituals of indigenous origin remain alive in some areas of Central America and Mexico.
The desire to return to a pre-Columbian past is more present in intellectuals' writings and in the speeches of politicians trying to gain support among
the indigenous than in the beliefs, perceptions, and feelings of the larger
society.
The following anecdote, with which Eriedlander ended her work, typifies most Latin Americans' approach to the past: "An Indian woman named
Zeferina, who usually lived in the countryside, went to Mexico City, where
she met a manthe proud owner of a Mexican hairless dog." Eriedlander
continues:
Never having seen one before. Doa Zeferina told the gentleman that
she thought the dog was very ugly. . . . The owner was quite surprised
by Doa Zeferina's reaction and told her that this was a real Aztec
dog, domesticated by her ancestors; she should be proud of it. Doa
Zeferina replied that first of all she was not Aztec and secondly the
dog was still ugly! (184)

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Jn other words, people's understanding of their ethnic background is

linked not so much to a distant pre-Columbian past as to their present experiences and social position. This point implies social class, as Eriedlander
(190) suggests, as well as cultural recognition within the larger society.
Furthermore, in the United States one can find many publications on indigenous culture and rural culture, but very few on the other aspects of
Latin American culture (e.g., urban culture). This is due to anthropologists'
traditional emphasis on native-population cultures, and also, perhaps, because social scientists in general have a particular interest in the exotic. Jn
any case, the result is a distorted image of Latin America. In reality. Native
Americans constitute only about 8 percent of the total population of Latin
America. More than 95 percent of those live in seven countries: Bolivia,
Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In those
places their influence can be observed in verbal expressions, art, and religion, as well as some form of communal ownership of land, such as the ejido
in Mexico and the ayllu in Peru.
Victor Alba (21), overemphasizing the extent of indigenous influence on
Latin American society, suggests that the psychology of the Latin American has its roots in the indigenous's adaptation to a new and hostile society.
However, given that Latin America received millions of European immigrants in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, this assertion
cannot be considered valid for Latin America in general. It can apply only
to a certain extent to the indigenous who subsist in Latin America today,
and perhaps to some people in the mestizo population. Furthermore, this
view omits the African influence, which is present in most countries of Latin
America, and is especially prevalent in Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and most of the other Caribbean countries. The African influence can be easily perceived in these countries in the
music, the religious expressions, and some culinary habits, but also, as many
studies reveal (Andrews; Gates; Gudmundson and Wolfe; Vinson), the Africans and their descendants contributed to shape the political, economic,
cultural, and military realms of these societies.
Jn brief, culturally, the Latin America of the twenty-first century is an intermingling of diverse indigenous, African, European, and (recently) United
States elementsthe US influence is particularly strong in the small countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Latin America is not a mosaic in which particular subcultures exist side by side without interacting.
With the exception of a few very isolated areas (e.g., in the Amazon), Latin
American countries present various combinations of the already-mentioned
cultural influences. These cultures are intermingled as a result of a long,
complex, and perhaps contradictory process that began with the conquest
of the American continent by the Spaniards, Portuguese, and other Europeans. None of these cultures has survived on its own in its pure and original

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State. The natives and the Africans became somewhat more like the Europeans, and the Europeans became more like the natives and the Africans.

On Social Classes
Most writers tend to refer to the social-class system in Latin America as
dominated by an oligarchy, made up of a few families that control most
aspects of the economy and the politics in their country (e.g., Deblij;
Goodwin; Osterling). Also, it is believed that the oligarchy, often composed
of landowners, keeps alive traditional values and attitudes.
However, the social stratification system in Latin America is not very different in general terms from the predominant one in the United States. The
existence of powerful families or economic groups is peculiar to any country with a capitalist system. In Latin America, as in the United States and
European countries, a few names in each country immediately evoke those
who are economically important and influential. Perhaps, in some of the
smaller countries, the few powerful families are more visible than in a larger
country such as the United States or Brazil, and they may have more relative power, but in general, if we analyze the socioeconomic structure of any
country with a capitalist system, we will find that most resources are controlled by a very tiny minority, whether newcomers to the millionaires' club
or old families who control corporations.
Furthermore, most Latin American countries no longer contain a class of
rural-based landowners, distinct from an urban-based industrial or financial
bourgeoisie. Most landowners also have large investments in other areas of
the economy, and only a few live in the countryside. In other words, today
there is not an exclusive group of landowners who constitute a power with
traditional values, opposed to a more liberal and more progressive bourgeoisie. A complex, intermingled web of interests exists among different sectors
of the economy and individual investors, thus making this conception of
opposition according to sectors simplistic and unrealistic. In addition, the
international ownership of land and productive agriculture in the fruit, vegetable, coffee, and wine industries offers another example of the decHning
importance of rural-based landowners in Latin American countries.
In the works previously cited one sees a tendency to characterize the economic elite groups as tied to the colonial past. In reality, however, very few
families have survived from colonial times. The majority of people in the
Latin American economic and political elite today are descendants of immigrants from all over the world (particularly from Spain, Italy, Portugal,
Germany, China, Japan, and several North African and Middle Eastern
countries) who went to Latin America during the nineteenth century and
the first half of the twentieth century.

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Numerous writings also focus on the existence of a significant cultural

gap between upper and lower classes in Latin America (e.g., Osterling;
Stavrianos and Blanksten). No one can deny that such a gap exists, but this
is not peculiar to Latin America. The same can be said of the social-class
system in the United States and other postindustrial countries, in regard
to ways of living, tastes, and social conventions. However, when comparing
Latin America with the United States, the differences in social classes contrast the most in the economic sphere. Economic inequality between the
lower 20 percent and the upper 20 percent of the population is greater in
most Latin American countries than in the United States.
The living conditions of the upper class in Latin America are comparable
to those of the upper class in the United States. Members of this class typically drive Mercedes, Volvos, BMWs, Audis, and Cadillacs; live in extremely
sumptuous houses; have several servants; and travel often to Europe and the
United States. Upper-class people tend to be politically conservative.
The middle stratum in Latin America is not as large as in the United
States, but it is not as small as is often assumed. If we define this class in
the context of Latin Americaand not through the prism of the US middle classit includes 30 to 70 percent of the population, depending on the
country. This social class contains so much variation that it is difficult to
establish a common elernent among its members, except that they are not
part of the economic elite. Many people, such as high school teachers and
university professors, journalists, bank employees, artisans, and middle-level
government employees, are part of the professional and educated class, together with engineers, army officers, and owners of small businesses. They
see themselves as part of the middle class. In the 1960s, Argentina had a
very large middle class, close to 70 percent of the population, but the economic difficulties and neoliberal policies of the 1980s severely reduced the
size of that group. The Latin American middle class lives with many more
limitations than the middle class in the United States. Its members, however, are able to possess most of the material goods that, in developed countries, are the external signs of middle-class status, such as cars, television
sets, refrigerators, and so on. They own older cars instead of newer cars,
smaller houses or apartments, and smaller televisions and refrigerators than
the middle class in the United States, but in general they have similar lifestyles. This social class is mixed ethnically, with a majority of mestizos in
countries such as Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru; a majority of mulattoes in
countries such as Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela;
and mostly whites in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
Petty merchants, farmworkers, sharecroppers, and manual skilled and unskilled workers constitute most of the lower social class. This social class embodies some of the stereotypes about Latin America that are often presented
by the US mass media, such as high infant mortality, extreme poverty, and
so on. People from this social class live in much greater poverty than those

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in the United States, and few of them own a car, or what can be considered
even a modest house. They have less access than their US counterparts to
entertainment outside the home and to education. Most of them, however,
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, own refrigerators, DVD players, CD players, television sets, and cell phones.
There is no question that the living conditions in most Latin American
countries are very harsh. Even so, most of these countries (including some
that are very poor by UN standards, such as the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Peru) are able to maintain a relatively large educated middle class
that US scholars and visitors often overlook.
In brief, Latin America is a region with large underdeveloped areas. Much
of the population live in very poor conditions, with vast differences between
classes, countries, and regions. Alba's description from twenty-seven years
ago is still largely valid today:
Alongside skyscrapers we find huts; alongside automobiles of the latest model, carts drawn by animals; by the side of hospitals with all the
newest equipment, village medicine men; next to residential areas with
every convenience, slums without paving, sewers, electricity, or running water; alongside superhighways, vast areas without communication of any kind. (174)
The extent of these contrasts varies by country, and the differences are
enormous even within Latin America. For instance, the contrasts are stronger in Central America and the Caribbean (with the exception of Costa Rica
and Cuba) than in Argentina or Chile (see Collier et al.).

On Religion
Viewed from the United States, all Latin Americans are devout Catholics.
Religion is presented as influencing every aspect of daily life; and it is often
suggested that this influence contributes to socioeconomic backwardness
(e.g., Deblij; Harrison Who Prospers?:, Rudolph). This interpretation is based
mostly on superficial observations of religious rituals taking place in small
villages, or other festivities of Catholic origin that are celebrated throughout Latin America, coupled with a mechanistic, simplistic, ethnocentric application of Weberian views to the Latin American context. A caricatured
example of this perspective is found in Who Prospers? (Harrison 12).
Catholicism indeed is the most widespread religion in Latin America, but
it is not as omnipresent as is often represented in US literature and culture.
Recent researcb on religious affiliation (Holland 2) shows that in most countries of Central America, Protestants constitute between 20 percent and
44 percent of the population, and between 7 percent and 25 percent classify

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themselves as nonreligious. In South America (even without the Malvinas

and Guyana) the proportion of Protestants varies between 6 percent and
22 percent and a considerable proportion are classified as other or nonreligious (some countries have a relatively high proportion of nonreligious,
such as Uruguay, at 40.6 percent). The same tendency can be seen in the
Spanish-speaking Caribbean, such as Cuba, the Dominican Repubhc, and
Puerto Rico. In short, according to the research previously mentioned, only
Mexico, Colombia, and Paraguay show a proportion of Catholics greater
than 80 percent. Moreover, many Latin Americans are only nominally Catholic, and most people limit their practice of Catholicism to attending church
occasionally; in most countries only a minority attend church every Sunday, as the World Values Survey shows (NationMaster.com 3; Hollinger and
Haller 285; Rossi and Rossi 309), particularly in urban areas. Latin American Protestants tend to go to church more regularly (Hollinger and Haller
288). Eor most Latin Americans the practice of religion is limited to traditional ceremonies such as baptism, first communion, marriage, last rites,
and festivities of religious origin. The Catholic Church has even experienced
problems in recruiting priests among Latin Americans.
The power of the church in Latin America today is more or less interwoven with that of other institutions, which varies by country. Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay have separation of church and state. In the other countries, Catholicism is the official religion. However, the differences in the
actual influence of the church are due not to these constitutional provisions
but to the complex historical interaction of civil society, the state, and the
church. The most obvious arrangement concerning church influence on society is the difference between support in rural and urban areas. The church
tends to have more influence in rural areas, as it does in most postindustrial countries of Europe and North America. In the countryside, priests
constitute the authority, together with the mayor, the police, the judge, the
teacher, and the leaders of the different political parties.
However, this is not very different from the situation in the United
States. If a comparison must be made, religion clearly plays as important a
role in politics and everyday life in the United States as in Latin America, if
not more so. Eor instance, church attendance at least once a week is higher
in the United States than in most countries of Latin America, with the exception of Mexico and the Dominican Republic, which are comparable (Institute for Social Research), and the use of religious symbols is probably
more common in the United States. Consider, for example, the frequent references to God by elected officials in the United Statesno speech is ended
without the traditional "God bless you"and note the religious influence
on several political debates, including health care (e.g., religious positions
concerning proposals by President Clinton and more recently by President
Obama), contraception, abortion, and so on.

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In Latin America, as in most countries around the world, the church historically has supported the status quo, often backing dictatorships. Yet in
recent years a large number of priests, as well as some bishops and archbisbops, sympathizing with the ideas of social justice, have taken positions on
the side of the poor, and it seems that the present pope is also espousing
that approach: they ask for land reform, advocate salary increases for workers, and support greater respect for human rights. Often they confront other
members of the church, including having done so with popes in the past.'
Furthermore, the idea that economic backwardness is tied to the predominance of the Catholic Church is merely an ideological and ethnocentric interpretation. There is enough evidence in history and in today's world
to prove that no particular religion makes some people prosper more than
others.
Another stereotype related to religion, often found in US literature and
in conversations with US citizens, is the view that Latin Americans are fatalists because of the predominance of the Catholic Church (fatalism is defined as the belief that certain events are unavoidable). For example, Madsen
and Meyer (205) and William Madsen (96), in studies of Mexicans living in
the United States, suggest that Mexicans, because of their worldviewsinfluenced by Catbolic religion and their history of feudalism from Spainare
not really interested in progress and a better life through science and technology. In this interpretation, because Mexicans believe tbat God controls
events, the mastery of the physical environment has no meaning for them. If
this were true, how would these authors explain the large numbers of Mexicans studying sciences and engineering in the United States and elsewhere,
as well as the investment in modern technology made by the Mexican government, among others, in the extraction of petroleum, which constitutes
one of the most important areas of the Mexican economy.>
These assumptions are further cases of extrapolation based on superficial analysis of expressions tbat people tend to use in certain areas of Latin
America, sucb as "que sea lo que Dios quiera" (it will be what God decides), or in observations of behavior in small villages, in which people
tend to reject certain tendencies of modernity. Jn reality, twentieth-century
Latin America has been characterized by strikes, revolts, revolutions, and
other such events, as a result of people's struggles for a better future. This is
hardly a sign of fatalism.

On Militarism
The military plays a powerful role in Latin American politics. Military dictatorships, military support of a civil dictatorship, and military execution of
coups d'tat have been part of Latin American political traditions since independence. In fact, in the early days of independence the populist caudillos

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were often military; any civilian had to have their support in order to be in
power.2 -pjjg tradition of the military as one of the pillars of the nation survives today.
Originally, the military could be liberal or conservative. By the midtwentieth century, however, it had become primarily a force in the service of the most conservative sectors of the dominant classes, and (with the
exception of Peru and Panama in the 1970s, and Venezuela in the early
twenty-first century) it worked to prevent any real social change. The dominant classes have employed the army to protect the social system that favored them. This protection, as has been largely documented (Agee; Alba;
Horowitz; Langley; Musicant), was reinforced by the United States' support
of the military, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly: numerous
Latin American militaries that have supported dictatorships or have been
responsible for human rights abuses were trained at US military academies
(see Gill 12; Harper's 3; Livingstone 24; Waller 34).
However, the fact that militaries traditionally have played a prominent
role in Latin American politics does not reflect an ideology of militarism
in the Latin American population. Quite the contrary; probably because of
military participation in government and in repression, most Latin Americans tend to dislike militaries. Militaries and police officers are generally
perceived as ignorant and uneducated people whom one must accept because of their brute force and the violent power they possess in the society.
They are not genuinely respected. Often, Latin American soldiers or police
officers explain, almost with embarrassment, that they became military men
or police officers because they had no better professional alternative.
In this sense, the United States is a more militaristic society; the US military forces are looked upon with pride by a large part of the population,
which also takes pride in having family members in the service. Furthermore, an important sector of the US economy depends on the militaryindustrial complex.

On Politics
Populist movements have dominated Latin American politics for most of
the twentieth century and up to the present. The Cambridge Dictionary defines populism as "political ideas and activities that are intended to represent ordinary people's needs and wishes," and, as Smith (41) suggests, it can
also be understood as any political discourse that appeals to the population
at large, regardless of class distinctions and political partisanship, "a folksy
appeal to the 'average guy' or some allegedly general will." By these definitions we could apply the analysis to political parties in the United States and
many other countries in the world, as well as to Latin America.
Most political parties in Latin America seek to obtain the greatest possible support from the populationsometimes using a language that ap-

Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn

85

pears revolutionaryand claim to bring about change, because change

is desired by large segments of the rniddle and the lower classes. Some of
these political parties do not hesitate to use the term revolutionary in their
name, such as in the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, or Institutional Revolutionary Party) of Mexico, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
de Amrica (APRA, or American Revolutionary Popular Alliance) of Peru,
the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, or Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) of Bolivia, and the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
(PRD, or Dorninican Revolutionary Party) of the Dominican Republic, but
actually they are relatively conservative. These parties are either right of center or slightly left of center.
Populist parties tend to present themselves as truly Latin American and
try to adapt their programs to what they consider the Latin American reality. Because populist parties propose social reforms that potentially could affect the interests of some limited groups in the dominant class, they often
encounter opposition from these groups, which can obtain the support of
the military. The United States often has feared these populist movements,
and has even helped to overthrow some of them (as in 1963 in the Dominican Republic). Probably the populist discourse of social change was tinged
too strongly with Marxism for the dualistic form of thinking that too often dominated in Washington's decision-making process. In fact, populism in the electoral context has been the best recipe for avoiding real social
change in Latin America and for keeping more radical parties from gaining
power.
Atiother stereotype by which scholars tend to differentiate Latin American from US political behavior is that Latin Americans are accustomed to
thinking in terms of personalities and labels, not in terms of ideas or programs (Goodwin 19). Again, this interpretation does not refiect the reality.
The emphasis on the candidate's personality is extreme in the United States,
probably even more so than in Latin America. In fact, only a minority of the
population in Latin America or the United States addresses politics in terms
of ideas and programs.
Besides, not all of the political parties in Latin America are merely personal followers of popular leaders, as they are often presented in the \\Ttings on Latin America. Some of them have a life of their own. Although
some leaders play a very important role in the party, this fact does not automatically subordinate the parties to the leaders. The process is very similar
to that in the United States and elsewhere: some individuals dominate the
public expression of the political parties.
A major difference in political behavior between the United States and
Latin America is that in most Latin American countries, in addition to the
large populist parties, there are many other political parties (sometimes
small) that express specific ideologies in favor of particular sectors of the
population and that play a role in the political debate. Even in countries such
as Venezuela, where only two major parties had dominated the electoral

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Studies in Latin American Popular Culture

picture during the second half of the twentieth century, the small parties
contributed to creating opinion. In the United States, politics is dominated
totally by two very similar parties whose programs differ only very slightly.
Furthermore, in Latin America, the population participates in the political debate more openly than in the United States, especially in urban areas.
Also in need of clarification is the fact that regardless of the numerous
coups, the rule of law as a symbol still prevails among the Latin American populations. The rule of law is even used hypocritically by those who
perpetrate a coup d'tat. In their inaugural speeches they often present
themselves as defenders of law and order who felt forced to take over the
government because of the need to reestablish the rule of law. The following
excerpt from a speech that Lt. Gen. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla gave to the Colombian population after taking over the government is typical of military
pronouncements after a coup: "The armed forces will lead Colombia along
the paths of order. . . . Peace, law, liberty, and justice without discrimination
for all. . . . The armed forces will remain in power while they create the conditions in which we can hold free elections" (Samuel 171).
Symbolically, in Latin America as in the United States, such concepts
as institutionalization, basic human rights, accountability of officials to the
people, and individual freedom play an important role in political life. People evaluate their government according to those concepts. The problem is
the discrepancy between what is desirable to the general population and the
disregard for those precepts by the military and political elite.
This brings us to the traditional debate on democracy in Latin America.
Very often scholars expect to find some institutionalized characteristics of
democracy in Latin America that will allow them to conceptualize a given
country as democratic. Generally, in these perspectives, democratic is understood as certain structural arrangements that reproduce an electoral democracy and particular practices concerning human rights, such as respect
for minorities and rule of law. The most widely accepted contemporary definitions draw to some extent on the influential work of Robert Dahl, in
which democracy implies (1) meaningful and extensive competition among
individuals and political parties for all effective positions of government
power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; (2) a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies,
at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major social group
is excluded; and (3) a level of civil and political liberties"freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations
sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation"
(Diamond, Linz, and Lipset xvi). This definition reflects an analysis inspired
by established democracies around the world. In other words, the measures
of democratic institutions are the countries in which an electoral democratic
system has operated for a long time, such as the United States, France, and
England.

Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn

87

This perception of external democratic influence on Latin America is

such that the move toward independence from Spain and Portugal is often linked simplistically to a development of democratic beliefs inspired by
the US and French revolutions (see, e.g., Harrison, Who Prospers?). It is
not impossible that there have been influences from the United States and
France, but to believe that those influences actually produced independence
obscures the elitist and antidemocratic character of many of the independence movements. Indeed, the emerging elite often was more concerned
with controlling resources than with establishing a democracy. This also ignores the concrete situations that in Europe created the circumstances to
facilitate Latin American countries' independence, such as Napoleon's invasion of Spain and Portugal.
The tone of many writings celebrates the transformation of traditional
societies into modern ones, understanding by modern a replica of US society at the best and in the last instance some form of organization that reproduces the same characteristics of advanced capitalist societies, such as a large
middle class and private control of all the major resources of the country
(e.g., Kolenzan and Heine). If this does not happen as expected, then the
analysis focuses on the supposed essence of authoritarianism, corporatism,
elitism, and clientelism that pervades and dominates Latin American political culture (e.g., Malloy; Pike and Stritch; Wiarda).
By 2000, with the exception of Cuba, the countries of Latin America
were classified in the US academic literature and media as democratic. In
appearance those countries do have free elections, a so-called free press, separation of power, checks and balances, and so on. However, a close look will
reveal that things are not as they appear. Eor example. President Joaqun
Balaguer of the Dominican Republic has been officially elected seven times
since the late 1960s. In at least two instances proof of fraud has been presented (in 1990 and 1994), but because behind the scenes his party controlled the basic judicial institutions, and the army supported Balaguer,
nothing could be done by the opposition parties, unless they were ready
to venture a violent uprisingnot to mention the everyday human rights
abuses, which were perpetrated by the police, as well as the pervasive corruption in this country. El Salvador constitutes another, better-known case
of a country that during the 1980s appeared to be democratic, but its government was constantly violating basic human rights.
Formal and institutionalized aspects of democracy can be considered in
interpreting Latin American pohtics, but the apparent existence of formal
elements of democracy by themselves does not prevent human rights abuse.
For instance, could we say that the military government of Velasco Alvarado
in Peru in the 1970s had a worse human rights record than the so-called
democratic government of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic during the
same period? The answer depends on what we are looking at. If we look
at formal forms of democracy, the answer is that Balaguer's government

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Studies in Latin American Popular Culture

was more legitimately democratic, but if we look at other aspects, such as

people's treatment by police, or economic investment in the population at
large, or respect of minorities, it might be that Velasco Alvarado was closer
to respecting basic human rights.
In other words, an electoral democracy that seems to respond to all the
characteristics one finds in advanced capitalist societies does not always produce governments that consistently respect human rights. Examples of electoral democracies that have produced a despotic government are numerous
all over the world: Germany's election of Hitler is one of the most striking examples. But more recently, voters' support for fundamentalists in
Iran, a majority voting in favor of fundamentalists in the 1993 Algerian
elections (although the pro-Western military took over the government), a
strong show of force for fundamentalism in Turkey's 1995 national elections, and the electoral victory of Fujimoto in Peru (after having imposed a
semi-dictatorship)these all remind us that electoral democracy does not
necessarily prevent authoritarianism.
The fact is that universalizing modes of democratization has not been
hugely successful in Latin America. This is due not only to their encounter with economic underdevelopment or authoritarian forms of state power
but also to the tendency to understand democratization in terms of modernization, as conceived in advanced capitalist societies of the Western
Hemisphere.
The Latin American democratic process has been multifaceted and has
not followed a particular linear pattern. Recent history shows that there is
no final point at which equilibrium or a particular form of democracy with
Western characteristics can be established definitively; the political process
has been subject to constant questioning and to rearticulations.
The Latin American political situation for the past twenty years could
be characterized by disenchantment (Beverly and Oviedo 6; Brunner 35;
Hartlyn 255; Ydice 10). This disenchantment elicited the questioning of
the expectations of modernization and the rearticulation of Latin America's political cultural heterogeneity, thereby providing ways to further new
political alternatives and practices that no longer operate solely within the
framework of class or traditional political projects. New social movements,
with their emphasis on everyday local experiences, have obtained recognition and public support. These movements involve the struggles of different communities as well as the defense of some minimal human rights,
such as those of peasants, women, and ethnic groupsfor instance, mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, feminist movements, and grassroots
organizations. The actions of these movements suggest new ways of constructing democracy; they have weakened the rationality that undergirds
modernity and the view that a transition to a particular form of democracy
in the United States or other advanced capitalist societies style is unavoidable. In brief, a disenchantment with the traditional politics of both the

Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn

89

Left and the Right is widespread among large sectors of Latin Americans,
and people are relying more and more on small local organizations that seek
concrete solutions to specific everyday problems. The limited changes that
people like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and Luiz
Incio Lula da Silva in Brazil were able to implement have also contributed
to this disenchantment.
The key issue is no longer whether a formal democracy exists, but rather
how the different countries are addressing issues of human rights, economic
inequalities, and so on.

On Family and Gender Relations

The Latin American family is often described as a large, extended, tightly
closed circle of relatives and close friends (e.g., Athey 19; Gillin 32; Goodwin
3, 4). These kinship relations are said to play a very important role in Latin
American social structure and in everyday activities, such as finding a job,
negotiating for property, or running for office (e.g., Rivera 78).
This was perhaps the general tendency in the first part of the twentieth
century, but today, with two-thirds of the population living in urban areas
and extensive geographical mobility, the situation has changed. The predominant family since the 1990s is nuclear, and family ties are less strong
and less extended than in the past. The existence of compadres ^-id comadres
no longer reflects an extended family and a strong kinship system, but
merely the formal traditions of godparenthood. The compadrazgo system is
still relatively extended in certain countries such as Mexico, but it does not
play the same role as it did in the past.
With some exceptions, such as the great work of Marjorie Wall, Latin
American women are often depicted in the United States as passive in political and social life, but this impression is not supported by reality. Latin
American history presents striking examples of women participating actively
in numerous social movements (even z.s guerrilleras, as in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru), and in certain countries their presence in high-level political positions surpasses those in several postindustrial countries. In fact,
more women have held high political office in Latin America than in the
United States, as secretaries of state, senators, representatives, and even presidents (such as Lidia Gueiler in Bolivia, Isabel Pern and Cristina Fernndez
in Argentina, Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, Rosalia Arteaga in Ecuador,
Mireya Moscoso in Panama, Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Laura Chinchilla in
Costa Rica, and Duma Rousseff in Brazil).
Another rather amazing description by US scholars propounds that Latin
American women must have a chaperone when they go out with a boyfriend
or prospective boyfriend (e.g., Goodwin 5; Osterling 112). A simple observation of people interacting in any city of Latin America will show that

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Studies in Latin American Popular Culture

this does not apply to today's society. The custom of women being chaperoned ceased to be a common practice a long time ago. Perhaps one may find
some isolated cases in the rural areas, but it is very far from a common custom today.
In general, women's conditions in the urban centers of Latin America
are not as different from postindustrial countries as they are often depicted.
Women's participation in the job market has grown enormously in the past
fifty years or so, and their level of education and presence in higher education does not differ significantly from that of men in most Latin American
countries. In many countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay, female university students are in the majority. Not only did women
in Latin America enroll in large numbers ten years ago, but in many cases
they also performed better than their male counterparts, and graduated at
higher rates, as the data from UNESCO {Enrollment) and the World Bank
{World Development Indicators) show. These trends have continued until the present (World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011). Latin
American women, probably more than men, have adapted rapidly to new
ways of living, changing their attitudes toward sex, family, and other areas
of life.
A central theme in US scholars' characterization of Latin American gender relations is the predominance of machismo. Machismo is depicted as the
cult of male strength, which implies being fearless, self-confident, capable
of making decisions, and able to support one's family. It also imphes an acceptance of male dominance over women (includitig the valorization of Don
Juanism) and, in its extreme form, a defense of the traditional division of labor (women in the kitchen and taking care of the children, and men as providers). In the United States, Hollywood movies, along with some scholars
and others in general, tend to regard machismo as unique to Latin America. For instance, "Macho or [m]achismo is the cult of masculinity in Spanish America," write Bryjak and Soroka (124). Other authors suggest that in
virtually all aspects of life men dominate and women are subordinate (Hall
53; Mayo and Resnick 258; Stevens 59).
In reality, however, as with the other aspects of culture that I have addressed, the difference between the United States and, for example, Mexicowhich is generally depicted as a very macho countryis a question of
degree. According to Marvin Goldwert (vii) machismo is a "potent and historical force in Mexico." He adds: "The macho is admired for his sexual
prowess, action-orientation (both physical and verbal), and aggressiveness."
Is this very different from the concept of masculinity in the United States.'
Machismo is perhaps more widespread in Mexico than in the United States,
but one cannot rnake such a sharp distinction. Considerable machismo also
exists in the United States, although it is expressed differently than it is in
Latin America. Observation of everyday life in many US homes would reveal this reality.

Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn

91

Crude expressions of machismo in both Latin America and the United

States are most common in the lower classes. Indeed, gender relations differ
with social class: laborers and rural dwellers tend to be more traditional in
their sex roles than are the middle and upper classes.
Another aspect presented as characteristic of machismo is that Latin
American men require virginity of their future spouses. Although some
men may prefer to marry a virgin, this preference is not widespread in the
twenty-flrst century, and is more the case among peasants in rural areas than
among urban workers. In urban areas, the traditional idea that women must
be virgins before marriage is becoming less important. Non-virginity is no
longer taboo, as it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, in a study of attitudes that I conducted in 1986 (Menndez Alarcn 36)
among university students of different class origins in the Dominican Republic, only about 15.2 percent of the interviewees considered female virginity a basic requirement for marriage.
Furthermore, Latin American wives are not as submissive to their husbands as in the past (as is also the case in the United States). In 1975
Hawkes and Taylor (809), in a study of seventy-six Mexican families,
showed that power was shared equitably between husbands and wives in
62 percent of marriages, and in 20 percent of the marriages the wife was
semidominant.
However, because scholars have a strong tendency to depict a society
in broad cultural characteristics, they often overlook studies like this one,
failing to recognize significant differences not only between countries but
also, as Celia Falicov (231) has suggested, in family structures and dynamics. These differences reflect variations in social classes, urban-rural differences, regional identities, and other family living circumstances overlooked
by researchers id their efforts to provide a global and rational view of the
phenomenon. What is presented as a universal pattern may be unique to a
particular subgroup within a country or region of a country.
The fact is that one can no longer characterize Latin America as a maledominated subcontinentat least, no more so than are the postindustrial
countries of Europe and North America. Women have their voices, and their
participation in the labor force and in political activities calls into question
this characterization.

Conclusion
In this brief analysis of eight aspects of life by which Latin American societies have been depicted in the US literature on Latin America during
the past forty years, I have tried to show some of the complexities of Latin
American cuhure. The interpretation of Latin American societies cannot
be limited to short, isolated, standardized categories, as on the evening
news. An understanding of Latin America requires the ability to overcome

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traditional classifications and dual oppositions, such as traditional-modern

or Protestant-Catholic, and so on. The universality and particularity of
Latin American culture cannot be understood within a mechanistic framework. Several modes of hfe have been coexisting and developing at the same
time. Indigenous tribal cultures mix with traditional peasants and artisans, the poor of the shantytowns, the urban middle class, and a cosmopolitan eliteall of whom would be at home in any metropolitan area in the
postindustrial societies. All of them coexist with factories, computers, and
electronic equipment of all sorts. In Latin America the constitution of a cultural identity has always been more provisional, more in the process of becoming, and more heterogeneous than in the postindustrial countries of
Western Europe and the United States. Latin American cultural identity has
undergone a long process of appropriation and rupture. Mere imitations of
metropolitan advanced capitalist societies have been coupled with strong rejections of the cultural representations of those societies, at times embracing
indigenismo, at other times negrismo, and so on.^
The present international and national structure has produced new arrangements, as Latin American societies are faced with segmented and uneven participation in the globalization of social life. Several processes are
at work simultaneously; an emphasis on local traditions and expressions,
such as the noninstrumental practices of indigenous peoples, avant-garde
fiction, and other cultural works, rearticulate communities around what is
perceived as local or national culture. At the same time, a globalization of
culture and an ever-increasing colonization of the Latin American lifeworld
can be observed as a result of the cultural dominance disseminated by the
postindustrial societies, particularly the development and dissemination of
technology. Large areas of Latin American society are embracing new technology, particularly in the urban areas, and televisionthe most important
medium for disseminating cultural representations of present-day multinational capitalismreaches almost every area and sector of society.
Latin Americans live in an incomplete and mixed time of premodernity,
modernity, and postmodernity; therefore, Latin American cultural identities are ambiguous, multiple, incomplete, and mixed. Clearly, US relations
with Latin America will change for the better if people can perceive Latin
America in a different light, and if Latin Americans cease to be viewed as a
uniform mass of "volatile neighbors" (Trger 1).

Notes
1. As a result, several priests have been killed by the army on the service of dictators, or pseudodemocracies. The killing in Fl Salvador of several priests and two
nuns, and the assassination of Father scar Romero, are two of the best-known examples, but these are far from isolated cases.

Antonio V. Menndez Alarcn

93

2. Alba defines the caudillo in the early days of independence as "a man who issued from the people, distinguished himself in the army by his bravery and boldness, won high rank, and, when the fighting was over, used his popularity and the
troops under his command to try to express the wishes of the people and to impose
on them by force, when no other way was open" (25).
3. Latin American hterature has tapped metropolitan culture (Cortzar,
Fuentes), local indigenous culture (Alegra, Asturias, Icaza), and negrismo (Guillen).

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