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Unfortunately, the full scope of that threat to the election process is not well understood
by many decision-makers and their advisors. Contrary to the claims made during and
following the hearing, as citizen experts in election mechanics, we know that it is not at
all difficult to manipulate election results through cybersecurity intrusions.
We would be happy to brief you with the extensive research that has proven this fact.
Although there may be no evidence currently presented of manipulation of the 2016
election, we are confident in our view that no one has performed the required extensive
testing to provide such assurances. We write to implore you and the Committee to
increase the scope of your investigation to include such essential testing before drawing
conclusions. Both the Committee and the public deserve well-researched
documentation to confirm any conclusion of no manipulation of voter databases or
vote tallies.
The chronic vulnerabilities of the election system mechanics are misunderstood by
many government officials and media, some of whom have recently sought to calm
voters fears by inaccurately claiming that the voting machines and tabulators are
protected from cyberattacks because such machines are purportedly never connected
to the Internet. These claims, even repeated by EAC officials,3 are simply inaccurate.
An Internet connection is not necessary for malware to infect an entire countys
machinery, as was dramatically demonstrated by the Stuxnet virus. Additionally, many
components actually are connected to the Internet, sometimes in violation of state laws.
These and other inaccurate claims should be debunked in a Congressional investigation
of our election system cybersecurity risks, as we hope your Committee will undertake.
Former CIA Director James Woolsey recently commented on CNN about allegations of
Russian hacking: "Well, the degree to which they intervened in the process is something
we really need to get a handle on, but at this point, it doesn't look as if they were
interfering with the voting, and in so far as that's the case, it's a very different thing than
if they were hacking into the voting machines and by the way, they shouldn't be involved
period, but we have to make sure that two years from now and four years from
now we are protecting our voting machines and a lot of people and counties and
so forth have added essentially touch screens and you can't check up on hacking
with that. You gotta have some kind of a paper trail...." 4
We wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Woolseys views concerning the need for voting
system protection. Given the inherent risks, the 2016 election data must be promptly
studied by objective investigators and scientists under Congressional authority. We are
certain that alarming cybersecurity weaknesses will be exposed when the systems are
scrutinized by independent experts. In our view, a broad-based in-depth investigation
would demonstrate the urgent and compelling need for legislation providing both
resources and statutory requirements for enhanced election cybersecurity, whether
future threats emanate from foreign states or domestic criminals. We encourage you to
incorporate election system cybersecurity in the Committees investigation.
Signatories
(Affiliations for informational purposes only)
Duncan Buell
Professor
Computer Science and Engineering
NCR Chair in Computer Science and Engineering
University of South Carolina
buell@acm.org
803.777.7848
JoAnne Day
Julie Hussey
League of Women Voters of South Carolina
POB 8453
Columbia, SC 29202
jvday@yahoo.com
copresident.lwvsc@gmail.com
803-251-2726
J. Alex Halderman
Professor
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor MI
Eleanor Hare
Associate Professor Emerita of Computer Science
Clemson University
864.654.4417
eleanorhare@gmail.com
Frank Heindel
171 Hobcaw Drive
Mount Pleasant SC 29464
Candice Hoke
Co-Director, Center for Cybersecurity & Privacy Protection
Professor of Law
C|M Law, Cleveland State University
216.687.2313 office
216.798.4643 mobile
shoke@me.com
s.hoke@csuohio.edu
Joseph Kiniry
CEO and Chief Scientist, Free & Fair
Principal Investigator, Galois
kiniry@freeandfair.us
kiniry@galois.com
421 SW 6th Ave., Suite 300
Portland OR 97204-1622
Marilyn Marks
Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Foundation
Marilyn@AspenOffice.com
7035 Marching Duck Drive E504
Charlotte, NC 28210
704.552.1618
Neal McBurnett
Elections Integrity Consultant
Boulder CO
http://neal.mcburnett.org/
Stephanie Singer
Former Chair, Philadelphia County Board of Elections
Data Strategist
Portland, OR
sfsinger@campaignscientific.com
Jason Grant Smith
I Voted? Director/Producer
Jason@ivotedmovie.com
Philip B. Stark
Associate Dean, Mathematical and Physical Sciences
Professor, Department of Statistics
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-3860 | 510-394-5077
statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark |
@philipbstark
Dr. Daniel M. Zimmerman
Computer Scientist
Galois / Free & Fair
dmz@acm.org
503.808.7224
End notes:
1
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/817701436096126977
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/statement-ic-report-russian-hacking
ABC News: Nearly Every State Has Asked for Federal Help to Protect Voting
Systems From Hacks
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/state-asked-federal-protect-voting-systemshacks/story?id=43197682
Yahoo News: Russian Hackers Targeted Nearly Half of States' Voter Registration
Systems, Successfully Infiltrated 4
https://gma.yahoo.com/russian-hackers-targeted-nearly-half-states-voter-registration113205790--abc-news-topstories.html
6