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Behavior Modification
Volume 31 Number 2
March 2007 174-201
2007 Sage Publications
10.1177/0145445506297016
http://bmo.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
This study examined the interrelations among negative cognitive errors, anxiety
sensitivity, and anxiety control beliefs and explored their unique and specific
associations with anxiety symptoms in a community sample of youth. Existing
research has suggested that these constructs are related to childhood anxiety disorder symptoms; however, additional research is needed to test the interrelations
among negative cognitive errors, anxiety sensitivity, and anxiety control beliefs
and to determine if they show unique and specific associations with anxiety
symptoms. The results of this study indicated that negative cognitive errors, anxiety sensitivity, and anxiety control beliefs were associated with each other and
that they demonstrated unique concurrent associations with childhood anxiety
disorder symptoms. Moreover, certain cognitive biases showed specificity in
their association with anxiety symptoms versus depressive symptoms.
Keywords: anxiety; child and adolescents; cognition; anxiety sensitivity;
cognitive errors; control
175
Authors Note: This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Institute of
Mental Health (MH067572) awarded to Carl F. Weems. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carl F. Weems, Department of Psychology, University of New
Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148; e-mail: cweems@uno.edu.
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Interpretive Biases
As noted, interpretive bias involves being predisposed toward negative
or erroneous interpretations of neutral, ambiguous, or potentially threatening stimuli or situations. Negatively biased cognitions1 have long been
thought to be core processes in emotional problems such as anxiety disorders (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962). Research has shown that clinically anxious
youth presented with ambiguous vignettes and then asked to explain what
was happening in the story are more likely to provide interpretations indicating threat than are nonanxious controls (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan,
1996; Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996).
Negative cognitive errors are thought to be particularly salient to emotional problems in youth (Leitenberg, Leonard, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986)
and concern the interpretation of events and situations in ones life. For
example, catastrophizing involves expecting the worst possible outcome of
an event or situation, overgeneralizing involves believing that a single negative outcome is representative of all similar future events, personalizing
involves attributing control over the outcome of negative events to internal
causes, and selective abstraction involves selectively focusing on only the
negative aspects of an event or situation. The existing research on these
cognitive errors using the Childrens Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire
(CNCEQ; Leitenberg et al., 1986) suggests that they are associated with
177
symptoms of anxiety and depression and that certain errors, such as catastrophizing and overgeneralizing, may be more related to anxiety, whereas
selective abstraction may be more related to depression (Epkins, 1996;
Leitenberg et al., 1986; Leung & Wong, 1998; Weems, Berman, Silverman,
& Saavedra, 2001). However, as theoretically predicted by the cognitive content specificity hypothesis (Beck, 1976; Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson, &
Riskind, 1987; Laurent & Stark, 1993), greater specificity has been obtained
when the content of the cognitions are centered on depressive versus anxious content (Leung & Poon, 2001). Such findings suggest that it is not the
type of bias per se that is specific to anxiety but the content of the bias (see
also Laurent & Stark, 1993).
Catastrophic interpretations of anxiety-related sensations have been the
focus of the literature on anxiety sensitivity. The concept of anxiety sensitivity refers to beliefs that anxiety-related sensations have severe and negative consequences (Reiss, 1991). Defined in this way, anxiety sensitivity
provides specificity to the concept of catastrophizing by focusing on anxietyrelated events and situations. Research indicates that anxiety sensitivity predicts panic beyond that predicted by trait anxiety in adult samples (e.g.,
Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997, 1999), prospectively predicts the development of panic attacks in youth (Hayward, Killen, Kraemer, & Taylor,
2000; Weems, Hayward, Killen, & Taylor, 2002), and that anxiety sensitivity is concurrently and prospectively related to self-report of anxiety and
panic symptoms (Ginsberg & Drake, 2002; Lau, Calamari, & Waraczynski,
1996; Silverman, Fleisig, Rabian, & Peterson, 1991). Moreover, studies
have demonstrated that although anxiety sensitivity is related to depression,
it is more uniquely associated with anxiety symptoms in youth (see Dehon,
Weems, Stickle, Costa, & Berman, 2005; Joiner et al., 2002).
Weems et al. (2001) examined the association between negative cognitive errors assessed with the CNCEQ and anxiety symptoms as well as anxiety sensitivity assessed with the Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index
(Silverman et al., 1991) in a sample of children and adolescents who were
clinic referred for anxiety disorders (N = 251, ages 6-16 years). Results
indicated that the types of errors, except selective abstraction, were significantly positively related to self-reported anxiety and anxiety sensitivity
even when controlling for levels of depression (correlations ranged from
.39 to .43). Results of regression analyses indicated that age moderated the
relation between the cognitive errors and anxiety. The pattern that emerged
was statistically significant but there were somewhat smaller correlations
between CNCEQ subscale scores and the anxiety measures in children
ages 6 to 11 (average r = ~.35) than adolescents ages 12 to 17 years
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(average r = ~.45). These results suggest that for younger children with
anxiety disorders, negative cognitive errors were less strongly related to
their anxious symptoms than for older youth with anxiety disorders.
Additional results indicated that selective abstraction was more uniquely
associated with depression and that catastrophizing and overgeneralizing
were more uniquely associated with anxiety symptoms. However, the
unique associations among anxiety, anxiety sensitivity, and CNCEQ scores
were not examined.
Judgment Biases
As noted, judgment bias involves negative and/or lowered estimates of the
individuals coping ability or style. Judgment biases in children can refer to
lowered expectations of their ability to handle threatening situations or
events. Common definitions of control involve a judgment as to ones ability
and have thus been the most common way that judgment biases have been
studied in youth. Barlows (2002) model of anxiety suggests that a perceived
lack of control over external threats (i.e., events, objects, or situations that are
fear producing for an individual) and/or control over negative internal emotional and bodily reactions are central to the experience of anxiety problems;
that is, beliefs that anxiety-related events and sensations are uncontrollable is
part of what makes anxiety a problem for individuals with anxiety disorders.
In other words, nonpathological anxiety in individuals who do not have anxiety disorders is differentiated from pathological anxiety by heightened levels
of anxiety in response to the experience of threatening situations but also by
the judgment that they cannot control these events.
Research on control and anxiety has produced an encouraging body of
knowledge. For example, studies suggest that there seems to be a fairly consistent relation between an external locus of control and self-reported anxiety in children (Nunn, 1988; Rawson, 1992). Similar findings also have
been evidenced using diverse methods of assessing control (e.g., Capps,
Sigman, Sena, Henker, & Whalen, 1996; Cortez & Bugental, 1995). However,
control is also strongly related to depression as well as anxiety (see Joiner
& Wagner, 1995).
Barlow and colleagues (Barlow, 2002; Rapee, Craske, Brown, & Barlow,
1996) model of control provides a more anxiety-specific conceptualization.
Drawing on Barlows (2002) model of control in anxiety disorders, Rapee
et al. (1996) developed a measure of control over anxiety, the Anxiety Control
Questionnaire (ACQ), for use with adults. Ones perception of control over
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anxiety-related events is assessed by the ACQ in terms of control over emotional reactions and frightening events. Specifically, in the ACQ, the internalexternal distinction refers to the stimuli to be controlled (i.e., internal anxiety
reactions such as heart palpitations or feelings of panic; external threats
such as a dog or social situations).
Weems, Silverman, Rapee, and Pina (2003) investigated the role of control beliefs in childhood anxiety disorders using a developmentally modified version of Rapee et al.s (1996) Anxiety Control Questionnaire (i.e., the
ACQ-C) in a sample of 117 youth ages 9 to17 years. Eighty-six participants
were clinic referred and met diagnostic criteria for an anxiety disorder, and
31 participants were nonreferred comparison participants. Findings indicated that perceived control over anxiety-related events was significantly
negatively correlated with youth self-reported anxiety symptoms and that
youth with anxiety disorders reported significantly lower perceived control
about anxiety than the nonreferred youth. Results of logistic regression
analysis indicated that the perceptions of control over anxiety predicted
anxiety disorder status even when controlling for anxiety levels using an
existing measure of anxiety as well as locus of control. Although this initial
research is encouraging, the specificity of anxiety control beliefs to anxiety
versus depression and its association to other forms of cognitive bias has
not been examined.
Summary
There is evidence that negative cognitive errors, anxiety sensitivity, and
anxiety control beliefs are associated with anxiety in youth. However,
research is needed to examine the interrelations among negative cognitive
errors, anxiety sensitivity, and anxiety control beliefs and to examine if they
are each uniquely associated with anxiety. For example, anxiety sensitivitys
association with anxiety may be explained by the more general cognitive
bias of catastrophizing. Similarly, it could be argued that personalizing or
attributing control over the outcome of negative events to internal causes is
tapping the same cognitive process as control over anxiety. Moreover, the
judgment that anxiety sensations are uncontrollable might be tapping the
same beliefs that are central to anxiety sensitivity (i.e., they are not empirically unique). Theoretically, biases such as control over anxiety involve a
perceived lack of ability, competence, or skill and are thus centered on the
individual making the judgment, whereas interpretive biases involve disproportionately negative interpretations of stimuli or situations and are thus
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181
Method
Participants
Data were collected from a socioeconomic and ethnically diverse sample
of 145 youth (ages 6-17 years, M age = 11.36 years, SD = 3.5 years)2 and
their primary caregiver (mothers = 90%, fathers = 7%, grandparents = 3%).
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183
Measures
The CNCEQ (Leitenberg et al., 1986) was used to assess catastrophizing, overgeneralization, personalizing, and selective abstraction. This
24-item measure is designed to assess the four errors via four theoretically
derived subscales. Each subscale contains six questions. Each item on each
subscale presents the child with a hypothetical vignette and a negative interpretation of the vignette to which the child responds if he or she would
interpret the situation in a similar fashion. For example, one of the items
assessing selective abstraction has the hypothetical situation of playing basketball where it is indicated that during the game the child scored five baskets and missed two easy shots. After the game, the child thought, I played
poorly. Children are asked to rate on a 5-point scale how similar the
thought was to their own thoughts in a similar situation (e.g., 1 = not at all
like I would think, 5 = almost exactly like I would think). The CNCEQ has
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and
construct validity estimates (Leitenberg et al., 1986; Weems et al., 2001).
For example, in terms of convergent validity, Mazur, Wolchik, and Sandler
(1992) found that total distortion scores were significantly related to
childrens anxiety scores as measured by the Revised Childrens Manifest
Anxiety Scale (RCMAS) while controlling for gender using partial correlations (partial r = .28).
The CASI (Silverman et al., 1991) was used to assess anxiety sensitivity. The CASI is an 18-item measure designed to assess childrens fear of
different symptoms of anxiety. Children rate each question by selecting one
of three choices (none, some, or a lot). Each item is scored with a 1, 2, or
3. Example questions are, It scares me when I feel shaky and It scares
me when I feel nervous. The CASI has been shown to have satisfactory
reliability estimates (Silverman et al., 1991). For example, Cronbachs
alpha coefficient has been estimated at .87 and 2-week test-retest reliability
at .76. With regard to validity, the CASI has been shown to (a) concurrently
relate to panic symptoms, fears, and negative cognitive errors; (b) predict
anxiety-relevant responding to behavioral-stress challenge tasks; and (c) be
prospectively associated with panic symptoms (e.g., Ginsburg & Drake,
2002; Lau et al., 1996; Rabian et al., 1999; Silverman et al., 1991; Weems
et al., 2001).
The ACQ-C (Weems et al., 2003) was developed by adapting the method
used in Rapee et al. (1996). Questions were designed to measure perceived
lack of control over external threats (e.g., events, objects, or situations that
are fear producing for an individual) and control over negative, internal,
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185
Procedures
Informed consent was obtained from the parent and informed assent was
obtained from the child. Completion of the assessment took place in a quiet
room and the child completed the assessment in a separate room from the
parent. Both the youth and parent were greeted and given a general
overview of the assessment procedures. Standardized specific instructions
were then given to the parent and child separately. Youth completed the
measures and were assisted as necessary by trained research assistants (e.g.,
young participants were read the assessment battery by research assistants
who monitored the childs comprehension of the questions). At the conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed and given a small monetary
reward. Missing or incomplete data on one or more measures was handled
by pair- or analysis-wise (when more than two variables) deletion of missing cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Age groups4 (children, ages 6-11
years, and adolescents, ages 12-17) were formed on the basis of sample
size, predicted change in cognitive development (Piaget, 1950, 1983), and
for consistency with past research for dichotomous age analyses.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Means and standard deviations for each of the measures for the total
sample and by age and gender are presented in Table 1. Examination of the
cognitive and symptom scores ranges and skew indicated acceptable levels
for the planned analyses. Results of 2 (gender) 2 (age group) ANOVAs
are summarized in Table 1 and indicated that boys and girls differed on
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Cognitive and Symptom
Measures by Age and Gender
Measure
Full Sample
M (SD)
6-11 Years
M (SD)
12-17 Years
M (SD)
Boys
M (SD)
Girls
M (SD)
1. RCADS-(A)a,b
2. RCADS-(PA)
3. CASIa,b
4. ACQ-Cb
5. CNCEQ-CT
6. CNCEQ-OG
7. CNCEQ-PS
8. CNCEQ-SA
9. RCADS-(D)
10. RCADS-(PD)
64.15 (16.7)
51.55 (10.3)
29.31 (6.9)
71.03 (20.1)
12.09 (4.8)
12.45 (5.0)
13.22 (5.1)
12.38 (4.6)
16.71 (4.8)
13.41 (3.5)
68.90 (17.6)
52.48 (10.0)
31.25 (6.8)
70.51 (19.2)
12.01 (4.8)
12.90 (5.2)
13.98 (5.3)
12.59 (5.2)
17.39 (4.9)
13.22 (3.5)
58.83 (14.0)
50.33 (10.8)
27.19 (6.4)
71.60 (21.1)
12.17 (4.8)
11.95 (4.8)
12.38 (4.7)
12.15 (4.0)
15.93 (4.7)
13.60 (3.7)
59.83 (16.1)
51.51 (10.6)
26.89 (6.3)
76.82 (22.1)
12.17 (5.3)
11.92 (4.9)
13.39 (5.1)
12.00 (4.3)
15.98 (4.6)
13.48 (4.1)
67.79 (16.5)
51.58 (10.2)
31.30 (6.8)
66.02 (16.8)
12.01 (4.4)
12.90 (5.1)
13.06 (5.0)
12.71 (5.0)
17.31 (4.8)
13.34 (3.0)
Note: RCADS = The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales; A = Anxiety; D =
Depression; PA = Parent-Completed Anxiety; PD = Parent-Completed Depression; CASI =
Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ACQ-C = Anxiety Control Questionnaire for Children;
CNCEQ = Childrens Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire; CT = Catastrophizing; OG =
Overgeneralizing; PS = Personalizing; SA = Selective Abstraction.
a. Significant age group difference.
b. Significant gender difference.
RCADS anxiety scores, CASI scores, and ACQ-C scores and that the age
groups differed on RCADS anxiety and CASI scores. Because the sample
sizes for the other ethnicities were small, the role of ethnicity was considered separately and only the African American and Euro-American participants were used for the ethnic comparisons. Results of t tests indicated that
African American and Euro-American participants significantly differed on
CNCEQ catastrophizing (African American M = 13.16, SD = 5.5; EuroAmerican M = 11.01, SD = 4.0), t(120) = 2.46, p < .05; CNCEQ personalizing (African American M = 14.69, SD = 5.4; Euro-American M = 12.43,
SD = 4.4), t(120) = 2.44, p < .05; CASI (African American M = 31.77,
SD = 6.2; Euro-American M = 27.34, SD = 6.8), t(120) = 3.76, p < .001;
and RCADS anxiety (African American M = 69.72, SD =17.9; EuroAmerican M =59.39, SD =14.7), t(120) = 3.48, p < .01.
Pearsons correlations among the measures and internal consistency are
presented in Table 2 and indicated that child-reported RCADS anxiety
scores were significantly but modestly correlated with each of the cognitive
measures. RCADS anxiety was significantly and highly correlated with
187
.27**
.60**
.37**
.31**
.41**
.33**
.35**
.73**
.11
.93
.92
.93
.07
.12
.04
.01
.09
.10
.21*
.74**
.93
.91
.95
.23**
.24**
.27**
.32**
.25**
.43**
.06
.86
.83
.88
.10
.24**
.09
.21*
.29**
.08
.91
.89
.94
.67**
.66**
.66**
.35**
.03
.73
.71
.76
.61**
.64**
.39**
.00
.74
.73
.76
.64**
.31**
.09
.74
.71
.77
.40**
.07
.71
.73
.67
.19*
.71
.65
.77
.82
.83
.82
10
Note: RCADS = The Revised Child Anxiety and Depression Scales; A = Anxiety; D = Depression; PA = Parent-Completed Anxiety; PD = ParentCompleted Depression; CASI = Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ACQ-C = Anxiety Control Questionnaire for Children; CNCEQ = Childrens
Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire; CT = Catastrophizing; OG = Overgeneralizing; PS = Personalizing; SA = Selective Abstraction.
*p < .05. **p < .01, two-tailed.
1. RCADS-(A)
2. RCADS-(PA)
3. CASI
4. ACQ-C
5. CNCEQ-CT
6. CNCEQ-OG
7. CNCEQ-PS
8. CNCEQ-SA
9. RCADS-(D)
10. RCADS-(PD)
Coefficient alpha
Age 6-11 (n = 75)
Age 12-17 (n = 70)
Table 2
Internal Consistency and Correlations Among the Measures of Cognitive Bias, Anxiety, and Depression
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189
Table 3
Summary of Regression Analyses Predicting Child Anxiety
Step
R2
Change in R2
Semipartial r
VIF
.17
.07
.34
.19
.20
.24
.15
.09
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.2
.17
.08
.28
.19
.16
.22
.11
.15
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.2
.18
.18
.50
.32
2.8
1.1
5.5
3.1
3.1
3.9
2.4
2.8
.006
.272
.000
.003
.002
.000
.018
.005
.18
.08
.40
.20
.20
.25
.16
.10
.16
.16
.39
.23
2.5
1.1
4.1
2.7
2.4
3.2
1.6
2.2
.012
.264
.000
.007
.020
.002
.109
.033
.18
.08
.33
.20
.17
.23
.12
.16
Note: F for all steps and all full models is p < .01. VIF = Variance Inflation Factors; CASI =
Childhood Anxiety Sensitivity Index; ACQ-C = Anxiety Control Questionnaire for Children;
CNCEQ = Childrens Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire; CT = Catastrophizing; OG =
Overgeneralizing; PS = Personalizing; SA = Selective abstraction.
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191
associations between the cognitive measures and anxiety. Ethnicity moderated regression analyses similar to those conducted for age, and gender
indicated that ethnicity did not significantly moderate associations between
the cognitive measures and anxiety.
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Prospective Analyses
One-year test-retest correlations were calculated on the subsample of
youth (n = 52) who completed the Time 2 assessment for the cognitive variables and child-reported anxiety. The retest correlation for the CASI was r =
.48, for the ACQ-C was r = .59, for the CNCEQ was r = .70, and for the
RCADS was r = .49, all p values less than .01. Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to determine which of the cognitive biases predicted anxiety levels at Time 2. RCADS anxiety scores at Time 2 were used as the
criterion variable and each of the cognitive measures at Time 2 were entered
in as predictors. CASI scores ( = .30, p < .05) and CNCEQ scores ( = .32,
p < .05) were significant predictors but the ACQ-C was not ( = .09 p > .1).
Together, the variables accounted for 27% of the variance in anxiety levels at
Time 2. Supplemental regressions were run to examine the incremental variance predicted by the CASI and CNCEQ in Time 2 anxiety. Incrementally,
the CASI accounted for 10.4% of the variance beyond CNCEQ scores and
the CNCEQ accounted for 9.8% of the variance beyond CASI scores.
Discussion
This study adds to the existing research on interpretive and judgment
biases by adding to the empirical support for the conceptual distinctions
among the concepts. Consistent with conceptual distinctions, the measures
of interpretive and judgment biases showed incremental predictive validity.
For example, anxiety sensitivitys association with anxiety does not appear
193
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195
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Such results are at odds with Ginsburg, Lambert, and Drake (2004), who found
that general external attributions of control (using the Multidimensional
Measure of Childrens Perceptions of Control [MMCPC]) and control in
anxiety-specific situations (a measure similar to the ACQ-C) were positively, concurrently associated with panic symptoms but only attributions of
control in anxiety-specific situations (i.e., not the scales from the MMCPC)
were predictive of panic symptoms 6 months later in a community sample of
African American adolescents (N = 109; M age = 15.75 years). Replication
in larger samples may be necessary. In addition, aspects of control may not
always assume a direct etiological role in the development of anxiety disorders but may nonetheless influence the maintenance, trajectory, or
expression of anxiety symptoms. In some of our most recent work in this
area, we (Taylor, Costa, & Weems, 2005) have found that anxiety control
beliefs were stable over time and that they interacted with initial anxiety
levels in a manner consistent with control beliefs serving as a maintainer of
stable elevated anxiety levels during a 1-year period in a community sample of youth. An important challenge that therefore lies ahead is to disentangle the thorny relations among control and other risk factors in our
efforts to improve understanding about the development and prediction of
pathological anxiety.
One potential problem in moving the area of cognitive models of childhood anxiety forward may be in the lack of a comprehensive framework
and set of common definitions delineating the various biases. Following
previous work, we see the cognitive biases as broadly falling into one of
four categories, namely, biased interpretation, biased judgment, biased
memory, and selective attention (see, e.g., Vasey & MacLeod, 2001).
Although additional work is needed, the findings in this article suggest that
judgment biases (control beliefs) and interpretation biases (anxiety sensitivity, catastrophizing) do demonstrate incremental validity. However, it is
not entirely clear, for example, that personalizing or attributing control over
the outcome of negative events to internal causes (i.e., blaming yourself for
a negative thing) is not better considered a judgment bias or that control
over anxiety is not better considered an interpretive bias. For the purpose of
conceptual clarity, we suggest the following distinctions in categorizing the
concepts, specifically, that judgment biases involve a perceived lack of
ability, competence, or skill and are thus centered on the individual making
the judgment, whereas interpretation biases involve disproportionately negative interpretations of stimuli or situations and are thus centered on a context or event. For example, in placing personalizing with the interpretation
biases, we are thus focusing on the interpretation of the external event
197
Notes
1. We will use the term interpretive or judgment biases to distinguish these two classes
and cognitive biases to refer more generally to both classes. The term cognitive errors is
used to refer to the interpretive biases assessed with the Childrens Negative Cognitive Error
Questionnaire (CNCEQ) consistent with past usage.
2. Because of the wide age range, a number of steps were taken to ensure developmental
appropriateness of the assessment and measures. These steps included establishing estimates
of internal consistency for both older and younger participants (see Table 2) and testing the
influence of age on the main findings and results (e.g., controlling for age in the analyses).
Convergent validity estimates were conducted by age group and produced similar estimates in
both younger and older youth. Detailed results are available from the authors.
3. Data collection for this study took place in several waves (of approximately 30 participants per wave). The follow-up sample in this study represents roughly the first two waves of
participants. The plan was to reassess the entire sample but Time 2 data collection was halted
by the Hurricane Katrina disaster.
4. The terms children and adolescents are used for convenience.
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5. Ethnicity is considered in a separate section and was not included in these regression
analyses because of the small number of ethnicities other than African American and EuroAmerican. Moreover, ethnicity was not a significant covariate in the context of the other predictors.
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Carl F. Weems, PhD, is an associate professor of psychology at the University of New Orleans
and director of the Child and Family Anxiety, Stress, and Phobia Lab. His research focuses on
the developmental psychopathology of anxiety and depression. In particular, his research integrates developmental, cognitive, biological, and behavioral theories in attempting to understand the etiology and course of internalizing disorders in childhood.
Natalie M. Costa is a doctoral candidate at the University of New Orleans and her research
focuses on parent factors in the development of childhood anxiety.
Sarah E. Watts is a doctoral student at the University of New Orleans with an interest in the
role of attention, memory, and interpretation biases in the development and maintenance of
anxiety problems.
Leslie K. Taylor is a doctoral student at the University of New Orleans whose research has
focused on the definition and role of traumatic stress in childhood anxiety problems.
Melinda F. Cannon is a doctoral student at the University of New Orleans with interests in
the comorbidity between anxiety and depression.