Jacinto Co vs. Rizal Militar. Et.

Al
Facts:
Petitioner Jacinto V. Co claims to be the owner of a parcel of land
measuring 396 square meters covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 81792. The land was formerly owned by Rolando Dalida, in whose
name it was registered under TCT No. 192224. Dalida mortgaged the
land to petitioner to secure payment of a loan. After Dalida defaulted in
the payment of his obligation, petitioner caused the foreclosure of the
mortgage. Subsequently, petitioner acquired the land at the foreclosure
sale held sometime in 1982. On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 75, against respondents Rizal Militar and Lilia
Sones, who were in possession of the land.Petitioner alleged that he is
the registered owner of the land; that as owner, he declared the same
for tax purposes and has been up to date in the payments of real
property taxes; and that respondents occupancy of the property was by
his mere tolerance but their continued stay became unlawful after he
demanded that they vacate the premises. In their answer, respondents
claimed that they are the owners of 198 square meters each of the
disputed land, having bought the same from Burgos L. Pangilinan and
Reynaldo Pangilinan who were the owners-developers of a residential
subdivision project called Immaculate Conception Village, and whose
ownership was covered by TCT No. 13774. Respondent Militar further
claimed that his occupancy of the property could not be by tolerance of
petitioner for the following reasons: one, he constructed his house way
back in June 1966, long before petitioner acquired title thereto on
October 10, 1983; two, he bought the one-half portion of the property,
consisting of 198 square meters, on April 20, 1966 from B.L. Pangilinan
& Sons, Inc. and paid for the same in full on October 3, 1973, or 10
years before petitioner claimed ownership of said property. He also
assailed the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, claiming that it
had no jurisdiction over the case as the proper action should have been
an accion reinvidicatoria filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent Sones, on the other hand, alleged that she bought the other
half of the property from the Spouses Burgos and Juanita Pangilinan on
April 6, 1966, and paid for the same in full on October 6, 1973. She also

argued that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action considering that the same is founded on a property
right. She also averred that petitioner registered the subject property in
bad faith inasmuch as he knew that she was in actual, peaceful,
exclusive, adverse and continuous possession of the same and was
exercising dominion and ownership over it when petitioner proceeded
with his registration.
ISSUE: Who between petitioner and respondents has a better right to
possess the subject property. JACINTO CO

RATIO
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership
for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between
the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it
is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents
merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support of their
claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens

System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding
upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the
power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.[
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents
argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was
guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in his name is a
collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not allowed. A
certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be
altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.

G.R. No. 159292

July 12, 2007

SPOUSES
RICHARD
B.
PASCUAL
and
CRISTINA
D.
PASCUAL, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES REYNALDO P. CORONEL and ASUNCION MALIG
CORONEL, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71323, dated April 30, 2003, and

Resolution2 dated July 29, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) which ordered the petitioners to vacate the disputed
property and surrender its possession to the respondents.
Respondents, spouses Reynaldo and Asuncion Coronel, are the
registered owners of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 68436,3 located in Barrios San Roque and San Rafael,
Tarlac, with a total area of 253 sq.m., and the house standing thereon.
They resided on the said property until sometime in 1969 when they
decided to transfer to a new residence close to their business
operations. The respondents then entrusted the property and the
owners copy of TCT No. 68436 to Asuncions parents, Emilio and Alberta
Malig, who moved into the property and resided therein. In 1981, Emilio
and Alberta moved to a house in San Vicente, Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac, and
entrusted the whole property to their son, Dr. Fermin Pascual, Jr. The
latter had a son, petitioner Richard Pascual, who subsequently occupied
the premises together with his wife, Cristina.
On April 27, 2001, the respondents formally demanded from the
petitioners the immediate surrender of the premises but the latter failed
and refused to vacate the same.4
On June 19, 2001, the respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Tarlac City a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages5 against the petitioners on the ground that the latter are
occupying the property without their consent. The respondents alleged
in the complaint that they need to retake possession of the property
because they will be using it as their permanent residence since their
current residence in Quezon City will be occupied by their daughter.
Earnest efforts were exerted to settle the matter amicably but the same
proved futile. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7821.
In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 the petitioners contended that the
respondents are no longer the lawful owners of the subject house and lot
because they already sold the same to Alberta as evidenced by the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate7 dated February 18, 1975 (1975
Deed). Alberta, in turn, sold the property to Dr. Melu-Jean Pascual,
petitioner Richards older sister, through the Deed of Absolute Sale of

Real Estate8 dated March 6, 1989 (1989 Deed). According to the

petitioners, after Alberta sold the property to Melu-Jean, she surrendered
the actual possession of the property to the latter; hence, Melu-Jean is
the lawful owner and possessor of the property. The petitioners claimed
that they are occupying the property on behalf and with the consent of
Melu-Jean, and therefore, she is the real party-in-interest and the
complaint should be filed against her. The petitioners concluded that the
complaint should then be dismissed since it was not filed against the
real party-in-interest and it involves a serious question of ownership.
Apparently, the respondents also filed a case for annulment of deed of
sale with the RTC of Tarlac City, docketed as Civil Case No. 9169. In the
complaint, the respondents admitted that respondent Asuncion
executed the 1975 Deed in favor of Alberta. They claimed, however, that
it was simulated because there was no actual consideration paid to
them by Alberta. Respondent Asuncion allegedly decided to execute the
simulated contract because, at that time, her marriage to respondent
Reynaldo was on the verge of breaking up. They averred that
respondent Asuncion never appeared before any notary public at the
time of the execution of the contract.9
After the petitioners filed their answer in the case for unlawful detainer
(Civil Case No. 7821), the respondents amended10 their complaint in the
case for annulment (Civil Case No. 9169) to include Melu-Jean as
defendant, and to pray for the nullification of the 1989 Deed in favor of
Melu-Jean. The respondents alleged that Albertas signature in the said
deed of sale is a forgery and that it was not signed by Emilio, who was
still very much alive then, contrary to what was written above his name
as "deceased."
On November 5, 2001, the MTCC dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer with costs against plaintiffs, herein respondents. 11 In upholding
the right of the petitioners to the possession of the property, the MTCC
gave credence to the two deeds of sale which it pronounced as valid
until annulled by the RTC in Civil Case No. 9169.
The respondents appealed to the RTC on the ground that the MTCC erred
in relying on the deed of sale transferring the property to Melu-Jean. On
March 26, 2002, the RTC reversed the MTCCs decision, thus:

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed is hereby reversed and

judgment is issued ordering the defendants and all other persons acting
under their command to:
i. Immediately vacate from the subject property and turn over
possession of the same unto the plaintiffs;
ii. To pay the plaintiffs the sum Php 20,000.00 as attorneys fees
plus Php 2,000.00 as appearance fee for every hearing;
iii. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.12
In so ruling, the RTC found that the petitioners possession was by the
tolerance of the respondents, thus, lawful until the latter sent the
petitioners a demand to vacate. According to the RTC, the lower court
failed to grasp the distinction between possession de jure or possession
arising from ownership, and possession de facto or physical possession.
It pointed out that the only issue in a case for unlawful detainer is
possession de facto, which, in this case, should be decided in favor of
the respondents. It ruled that the lower court erred in relying on the
deeds of sale in determining who has the better right to possess the
property as the same pertains to possession as an attribute of
ownership (possession de jure). Further, the RTC held that the deed of
sale executed by respondent Asuncion was simulated, thus, void from
the beginning, and the second deed of sale executed by Alberta seemed
falsified, and so, it cannot be the basis of a valid transfer of ownership.
On June 3, 2002, the RTC denied the petitioners
reconsideration of its decision for want of merit.13

motion

for

The petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. The petitioners argued, inter
alia, that they have a superior right because they are in actual physical
possession of the property by authority of the real owner, Melu-Jean,
who should have been impleaded as defendant. They contended that
the action for unlawful detainer is not proper since the issue of

ownership is raised; the proper action is to file an accion publiciana or

accion reinvindicatoria cognizable by the RTC.
On April 30, 2003, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. 14 The CA held
that the respondents have a superior right to the possession of the
subject property considering that they are its registered owners and a
certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of ownership. Melu-Jean was
not impleaded as defendant since she was not in actual possession of
the property, and in an unlawful detainer case, the issue is purely
physical possession. The CA pointed out, however, that, in an unlawful
detainer case, the court may provisionally make a finding on the issue of
ownership for the purpose of determining who has the right to possess
the property. Thus, the RTC did not err in finding that the sale to MeluJean was invalid since it did so only to determine the question of
possession, not ownership of the property. On the other hand, the
MTCCs ruling that the petitioners have a better right to the possession
based on the deeds of sale is erroneous because it refers to possession
de jure which is not the issue in an unlawful detainer case.
On July 29, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 15 As a result, they filed this petition for
review, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT ALTHOUGH THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS STILL REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF THE
RESPONDENTS, THEY, HOWEVER, WERE NO LONGER OR CEASED
TO BE THE RIGHTFUL AND LAWFUL OWNERS OF THE SAID
PROPERTY WHEN THEY EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
OF REAL ESTATE ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975 IN FAVOR OF ALBERTA
MALIG, RESPONDENT ASUNCION MALIG CORONELS MOTHER,
AND WHO IN TURN SOLD THE SAME PROPERTY TO DR. MELUJEAN PASCUAL, PETITIONER RICHARD PASCUALS OLDER SISTER,
AS EVIDENCED BY THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL
ESTATE EXECUTED ON MARCH 6, 1989.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN CONCLUDING THAT SINCE THE RESPONDENTS ARE STILL THE
REGISTERED OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY THEY ARE
ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION THEREOF.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS STAY ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS BY MERE TOLERANCE OF THE RESPONDENTS AND
NOT BY DR. MELU-JEAN PASCUAL AND THAT THERE IS UNLAWFUL
DETAINER.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE IS A
SIMULATED ONE AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID.
V.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN CONCLUDING THAT DR. MELU-JEAN PASCUAL IS GUILTY OF
LACHES.
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW WAS (sic) NULL
AND VOID FOR NONJOINDER OF AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
VII.
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT CAN REVIEW THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS
CASE.16
The petitioners contend that the respondents are no longer the owners
of the property; therefore, they are not entitled to its possession. Their

theory is that the 1975 Deed validly transferred ownership of the

property to Alberta, which the latter, in turn, transferred to Melu-Jean
through the 1989 Deed. The petitioners maintain that the 1975 Deed is
a notarized document that enjoys the presumption of validity; it is
considered valid unless declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The petitioners contend that the respondents self-serving
and unsubstantiated claim that the 1975 Deed is simulated cannot
prevail over such presumption. Further, the fact that the person who
notarized the same is not commissioned to be a notary public has no
bearing on the validity of the 1975 Deed. The petitioners aver that the
1975 Deed is binding not only upon the parties but upon their heirs,
assigns and successors-in-interest even if it was not registered; in any
case, registration is not necessary as it does not confer ownership. They
point out that the filing of the case for annulment of the deeds of sale is
an admission by the respondents that they are voidable, or valid until
annulled.
The petition has no merit.
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties. 17 However, where the issue of
ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in
order to determine who has the right to possess the property. 18 We
stress, however, that this adjudication is only an initial determination of
ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue
of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower courts
adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. 19 It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the
issue of ownership,20 which is the subject matter of a separate case for
annulment of deeds of sale filed by respondent.
In the present case, both the petitioners and the respondents raise the
issue of ownership.lawphi1 The petitioners aver that the real owner is
Melu-Jean based on the two deeds of sale and that it is by her tolerance
that they are occupying the property. On the other hand, the
respondents claim that they themselves are the owners of the property
as evidenced by the certificate of title in their names. The resolution of

this case will therefore boil down to which of the parties respective
documentary evidence deserves more weight.
At this juncture, it would be fitting to mention that under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised for the simple reason
that the Court is not a trier of facts.21 It is not duty-bound to analyze and
weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. 22 This is
especially true where the trial courts factual findings are adopted and
affirmed by the CA as in the present case. Factual findings of the trial
court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.23 Here, both the RTC and the CA gave more
credence to the respondents title and found that the petitioners
occupation of the subject property was by the mere tolerance of the
respondents. Accordingly, as far as this Court is concerned, these
findings are already final.
In any case, we sustain the appellate courts finding that the
respondents have the better right to possess the subject property. As
opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale, the certificate of title
certainly deserves more probative value. Indeed, a Torrens Certificate is
evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the person in whose
name appears thereinsuch holder is entitled to the possession of the
property until his title is nullified. 24
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve more
credence because they are valid contracts that legally transferred
ownership of the property to Melu-Jean. They argue that (a) the 1975
Deed, being a public document, is presumed to be valid and there was
no evidence sufficient to overturn such presumption or show that it was
simulated; (b) the fact that the person who notarized the said deed of
sale is not commissioned as a notary public has no bearing on its
validity; (c) registration of the deed of sale was not necessary to transfer
ownership; (d) Melu-Jean is not guilty of laches in asserting her
ownership over the property since she is actually in possession of the
property through the petitioners; and (e) the filing of the annulment
case is an admission that the two deeds of sale are merely voidable, or
valid until annulled.

However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the power of

the trial court to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, which
consequently includes the power to determine the validity of the deeds
of sale. As previously stated, such determination is not conclusive, and
the issue of ownership and the validity of the deeds of sale would
ultimately be resolved in the case for annulment of the deeds of sale.
Even if we sustain the petitioners arguments and rule that the deeds of
sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster the petitioners case. In
a number of cases, the Court had upheld the registered owners superior
right to possess the property. In Co v. Militar, 25 the Court was confronted
with a similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an
unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative weight in
resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess. There, the
Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on the transfer certificate
of title in the name of petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered deeds
of sale of the respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens
System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established
and recognized.26
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado,27 the Court declared
that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT
in the name of the decedent vis--vis the contested unregistered Deed
of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab,28 the Court held that the registered
owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful
detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title
over a land is entitled to possession thereof.29
Still the petitioners unrelentingly argue that the proceedings below were
null for failure to implead Melu-Jean, the alleged owner, as an
indispensable party-defendant. As previously mentioned, the sole issue
in an unlawful detainer case is who has the right to the physical
possession of the property. Consequently, in an action for unlawful
detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the person who
is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of
lease and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such
occupant is bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the

premises upon demand.30 As earlier pronounced in Domalsin v.

Valenciano,31 an action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained
only against one in possession at the commencement of the action, and
not against one who does not in fact hold the land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated April 30, 2003, and Resolution dated July
29, 2003, are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 166941

December 14, 2009

SPOUSES DENNIS BARIAS and DIVINA BARIAS, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF BARTOLOME BONEO, namely, JUANITA, LEOPOLDO,
ANTONIO, CARMELO, NIMFA, EDWIN, ELPIDIO, ANGELICA,
EMILIO, BARTOLOME, JR., and EPIFANIO, all surnamed BONEO,
represented by JUANITA VOLANTE BONEO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondents, Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, are registered owners of a
parcel of land (the property) identified as Lot No. 1086, Cad-483-D in
Sta. Teresa, Malilipot, Albay, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-

29864 which was issued on the basis of a free patent granted on

October 3, 1991.1
Respondents, alleging that the Spouses Dennis and Divina Barias
(petitioners) have been occupying a portion of the property for
residential purposes on their (respondents) mere tolerance, and that
despite verbal demands and a written demand by letter of August 18,
2001, petitioners refused to vacate the premises, filed a complaint 2for
unlawful detainer and damages.
In their Answer,3 petitioners charged respondents with forum shopping,
claiming that the portion of the property subject of the complaint was
also the subject of a case between petitioners and respondents
predecessor-in-interest Silvestra Bo Boneo (Silvestra) pending appeal
before the Court of Appeals. They also claimed that Carmen BendicioBelir, the mother of petitioner Divina Barias, bought a portion of the
property from Silvestra, respondents stepmother, by a Deed of Absolute
Sale4 dated August 8, 1994.
The
MCTC,
which
found
respondents
guilty
shopping,5 dismissed respondents complaint in this wise:

of

forum

x x x The defendant-spouses submitted to the court a Deed of Absolute

sale dated August 8, 1994 xxx which showed that Silvestra Bo Boneo,
the plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, had sold a portion of the lot in
question (Lot No. 1086) to the former consisting of 1,143 square meters.
This deed was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on
August 9, 1994. The sale of a portion of Lot No. 1086 by Silvestra Bo
Boneo to the defendants binds the plaintiffs in this case. The rule is
settled that plaintiffs as successor-in-interest over the lot, merely
stepped into the shoes of the original owner, Silvestra. They are deemed
to succeed only to such remaining interest of Silvestra over Lot No.
1086. This rule applies even if plaintiffs were able to secure a title xxx
only in the year 2000. Until such Deed of Sale executed in defendant[]s
favor has been declared null and void by final judgment, the court has
no recourse but to respect the same.6 (underscoring supplied)
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), respondents denied that
they are Silvestras successors-in-interest. They claimed that she was

the second wife of Crispin Boneo and stepmother of the late Bartolome
Boneo, their father and immediate predecessor-in-interest, hence, they
can not be considered as the legal heirs or even successors-in-interest of
Silvestra. They thus concluded that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
disputed portion of the property executed by Silvestra in favor of the
herein petitioners has no binding effect upon them.7
While the RTC did not find respondents guilty of forum shopping, it
nevertheless dismissed their appeal, holding that petitioners have a
superior right to possess the property. 8 Brushing aside respondents
argument that they are not Silvestras successors-in-interest, the RTC
held that when Silvestra died, respondents moved to substitute her in
the case between her and petitioners.9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision10 in this wise:
It was error for both the RTC and MTC to have sustained respondents[herein petitioners] claim which was based on a deed of sale, as against
the claim of petitioners[-herein respondents], which was based on a free
patent (OCT No. P-29864) issued by the Bureau of lands on October 3,
1991.
In Pitargue v. Sorilla,11 the plaintiff was considered as having a better
right to the possession of the public land which he applied for against
any other public land applicant, which right may be protected by the
possessory action of forcible entry or by another suitable remedy that
the rules provide, even while his application was still pending
consideration, and while title to the land was still with the government.
If in said case, a mere applicant was held to have acquired superior
possessory right over a portion of public land, with more reason,
therefore, that . . . petitioners[-herein respondents] right to the
possession of the subject property ought to be upheld. For here,
petitioners[-herein respondents] claim is predicated upon Free
PatentNo. 050509-91143P issued in the name of "Hrs. of BARTOLOME
BONEO Rep. by Juanita Boneo." This free patent has the force and effect
of a Torrens Title. And it is axiomatic that a Torrens Title cannot be
indirectly or collaterally attacked, as respondents apparently sought to
do in this case. On the other hand, respondents[-herein petitioners]

predecessor-in-interest, Silvestra Boneo, does not at all appear to be a

patentee or grantee of the disputed premises by any of the means
recognized by law as she is only the stepmother of Bartolome Boneo.
Neither was it shown that Silvestra Boneo was ever a prior applicant to
the contested lot.
It was also reversible error for the RTC to hold that petitioners merely
stepped into the shoes of Silvestra Boneo on the basis mainly of the
motion for substitution that they filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 62015.
For, the records showed that petitioners [herein respondents] sought to
substitute Silvestra Boneo not necessarily because they are her
successors-in-interest, but because, among other things, it was the heirs
of Bartolome Boneo, alleged collateral relations of Silvestra Boneo, who
bankrolled the expenses in the prosecution of this case. x x
x.12 (emphasis partly in the original, partly supplied; underscoring
supplied)

X X X IN NOT FINDING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF "FORUM SHOPPING"

WARRANTING OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THEIR PETITION.13
The petition is bereft of merit. The test in determining the presence of
forum shopping is whether in two or more cases pending, there is
identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of action, and (3) reliefs
sought.14
The case filed by Silvestra, which was pending when respondents filed
the complaint for unlawful detainer, was for annulment of the deed of
sale that she executed in favor of petitioner Divina Barias
mother.15 Thus, the causes of action of that case and respondents
complaint for unlawful detainer subject of the present petition are
different: the cause of action of the first is the alleged fraud in inducing
Silvestra to execute the deed of sale, while the cause of action of the
second is the alleged unlawful possession of petitioners of that portion
of the property which was allegedly sold by Silvestra. The reliefs sought
in both cases are likewise different.1avvphi1

Hence, petitioners present petition faulting the Court of Appeals

-IX X X IN HOLDING THAT: "IT WAS ERROR FOR BOTH THE RTC AND THE
MTC TO HAVE SUSTAINED RESPONDENTS CLAIM, WHICH WAS BASED ON
A DEED OF SALE, AS AGAINST THE CLAIM OF PETITIONERS WHICH WAS
BASED ON A FREE PATENT (OCT No. P-29864) ISSUED BY THE BUREAU
OF LANDS ON OCTOBER 3, 1991."
-IIX X X IN HOLDING THAT: "IT WAS ALSO REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE RTC
TO HOLD THAT PETITIONERS MERELY STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF
SILVESTRA BONEO ON THE BASIS MAINLY OF THE MOTION FOR
SUBSTITUTION THAT THEY FILED IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 62015."
-III-

In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or

material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties.16 Where the issue of ownership is
raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order
to determine who has the right to possess the property. 17 The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property.18As both parties raise the issue of ownership in the unlawful
detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of their respective
documentary evidence deserves more weight. 19
Respondents have a Torrens title over the property which was issued
in 1991. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over
a land is entitled to possession thereof. 20 The deed of sale which was
executed by Silvestra in 1994 and was the subject of a case for
annulment could not affect the herein respondents-registered owners
superior right to possess the property. 21 It bears emphasis that this
determination of ownership in an ejectment case is only initial and only
for the sole purpose of settling the issue of possession. 22 It does not
prejudice the case for annulment of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Carbonilla v Abiera (Right of Possession Arising from Title)
Facts
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents alleging
that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Maasin City. He also
alleged that he owns the building standing on said land by virtue of a
Deed of Extrajudicial settlement of Estate with Waiver and
Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos. He maintained
that the building was being occupied by respondents by mere tolerance
of the previous owners. Petitioner asserted that he sent a demand letter
to respondents asking them to leave the premises within 15 days from
receipt of the letter, but they failed and refused to do so. The MTCC
ruled that Carbonilla is the lawful owner of the subject land. However it
held that the defendants to have the better rights of (material)
possession to the assailed building and deemed as possessors in good
faith and are legally entitled to its possession and occupancy. The RTC
affirmed the decision of the MTCC with respect to the land, however it
ruled that petitioner, as owner of the land, would have every right to
evict respondents from the land. The CA reversed the RTC decision and
ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint for failure of the plaintiff
(herein respondent) to prove that the case at bar is for unlawful detainer
or forcible entry.
Issue: Won petitioner has sufficiently established his ownership of the
subject properties and has the right to recover possession thereof

were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right
over it. Ranged against respondents' proof of possession of the building
since 1977, petitioner's evidence pales in comparison and leaves the
court totally unconvinced. Without a doubt, the registered owner of real
property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply
wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the
property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial
remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper. In the
present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment cases-forcible entry and unlawful detainer-are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect
actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.
The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is:
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even
matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. For this reason,
an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who
has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed
must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven. The
statements in the complaint that respondents' possession of the building
was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Here, petitioners failed to prove that the possession
of
respondents was by mere tolerance. Petitioners must file either an
action reivindicatoria, a suit to recover ownership to property or file an
accion publiciana, a plenary action to recover based on the better right
to possess

Held
No. While petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as
there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a
Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to
substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the
building. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate(Residential
Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the
Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building
cannot be accepted by the court. There is no showing that the Garcianos

CANLAS v. TUBIL
GR 184285, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009
FACTS:

Iluminada Tubil filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo

Canlas, Victoria Canlas, Felicidad Canlas, and Sps. Pablo & Charito
Canlas (Canlas et al.) before the MTC. Canlas et al. filed a motion to
dismiss (MTD) alleging that the MTC is w/o jurisdiction over the subject
matter because Tubil s cause of action was for accion publiciana w/c is
beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The MTC denied the MTD. The MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer, & this was affirmed by the RTC. However the CA reversed the
RTC decision.
Canlas et. als contention: The RTC does not have original jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case. Thus, it cannot validly decide on the
merits.
ISSUE:
Which court, the MTC or the RTC, has jurisdiction over the subject
matter?
If it is an unlawful detainer case, the action was properly filed in the
MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion publiciana, original
jurisdiction is w/ the RTC, w/c is mandat ed not to dismiss the appeal but
to decide the case on the merits pursuant to Sec. 8 If the case was tried
on the merits by the lower court w/o jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdic tion
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance w/ the preceding
section, w/o prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice. of Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
The MTC has jurisdiction.
An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of
which lies in the proper MTC or MeTC. The action must be brought w/in 1
year from the date of last demand & the issue in said case is the right to

physical possession. A complaint suffi ciently alleges a cause of action

for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be br ought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than 1 year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
t he complaint, more than 1 year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become
illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but
an accion publiciana.
In the instant case, Tubils allegations in the complaint clearly make a
case for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC
over the subject matter. Tubil alleged that she was the owner of the land
as shown by the OCT issued by the RD of Pampanga; tha t the land had
been declared for taxation purposes & she had been paying the taxes
thereon; that Canlas et al.s entry & construction of their houses were
tolerated as they are relatives; & that she sent a letter demanding that
Canlas et al. vacate the pro perty but they failed & refused to do so. The
complaint for unlawful detainer was filed w/in 1 year from the time the
last demand to vacate was made.
Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over thecase, it thus
properly exercised its discretion i n dismissing the complaint for unlawful

detainer for failure of Tubil to prove tolerance by sufficient evidence.

Consquently, Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court w/c
ordains the RTC not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the MTC/Me
TC w/c tried the same albeit w/po jurisdiction, but to decide the said
case on the merits, finds no application here.

G.R. No. 164213

April 21, 2009

VALENTIN CABRERA, MANUEL CABRERA, and REBECCA LESLIE

CABRAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ELIZABETH GETARUELA, EULOGIO ABABON, LEONIDA LIGAN,
MARIETTO ABABON, GLORIA PANAL, LEONORA OCARIZA, SOTERO
ABABON, JR., and JOSEPH ABABON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 22 January 2004
Decision2 and 3 May 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80062.
The Antecedent Facts
Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y, located in Inayawan, Pardo, Cebu City
were covered by Tax Declaration Nos. GR2K-12-078-02409 and GR2K-12078-02431 in the name of Arcadio Jaca (Arcadio). The heirs of Arcadio
executed a notarized document known as "Kasabutan nga Hinigala"

dated 25 July 1951 which stipulated that all the inherited properties of
Arcadio, including Lot No. 3635, would go to Peregrina Jaca Cabrera
(Peregrina). However, in a Repartition Project approved on 21 November
1956 by Judge Jose M. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City, Branch 6 in Special Proceedings No. 211-V, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and
3635-Y were given to Urbana Jaca Ababon (Urbana), mother of Elizabeth
Getaruela, Eulogio Ababon, Leonida Ligan, Marietto Ababon, Gloria
Panal, Leonora Ocariza, Sotero Ababon, Jr., and Joseph Ababon
(respondents). Upon Urbanas death in 1997, respondents inherited the
lots.
Valentin Cabrera (Valentin), Manuel Cabrera (Manuel), and Rebecca
Leslie Cabras (Cabras), Peregrinas adopted daughter, occupied the lots
with the knowledge and consent of respondents.
Respondents alleged that Valentin, Manuel, and Cabras (collectively,
petitioners) were occupying portions of the lots without paying any
rentals, but with an agreement that they would vacate the premises and
demolish their houses at their expense should respondents need the
property. In 2001, respondents personally notified petitioners that they
would repossess the property. Respondents asked petitioners to vacate
the premises and remove the houses they built on the lots. However,
despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the premises.
The matter was referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Inayawan, Cebu for possible amicable settlement but petitioners still
refused to vacate the premises. Thus, respondents filed an action for
ejectment against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. R-45280.
Petitioners assailed the Project of Partition as incredible because its first
page was missing and it lacked the signatures of the parties who
executed it. Petitioners asserted the validity of the "Kasabutan nga
Hinigala." Cabras alleged that as owner of Lot No. 3635 upon Peregrinas
death, she could not be ejected from the premises. Valentin and Manuel
alleged that they could not be ejected because they built their houses
with Peregrinas knowledge and consent.
The Rulings of the MTCC and RTC

In its Decision4 dated 4 April 2002, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 7, Cebu City (MTCC) ruled in favor of respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, ordering the latter to vacate the premises in
question and to demolish whatever improvements introduced thereon
and surrender complete control and possession thereof to the plaintiffs,
and to jointly and severally pay the latter:

The dispositive portion of the RTCs Decision reads:

Wherefore, the judgment in the Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R45280, is REVERSED, and another one is entered DISMISSING the case
against defendants-appellants.

1) the amount of P15,000.00 for and as attorneys fees;

Plaintiffs-appellees are directed to compensate defendants-appellants

attorneys fees in the amount ofP15,000.00, and litigation expenses in
the amount of P5,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.

2) litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00; and cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.7

SO ORDERED.5
The MTCC ruled that the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala" was superseded by
the court-approved Repartition Project. The MTCC noted that in the
Repartition Project, Lot Nos. 3635-CC and 3635-Y were given to Urbana,
respondents predecessor-in-interest. The MTCC ruled that while the lots
were still in Urbanas name, respondents were not barred from judicially
ejecting petitioners from the premises.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 29 July 2003 Order,

the RTC partially granted respondents motion. The RTC ruled that it
erred in finding that Urbana sold her share to Asas. The RTC ruled that
the Project of Partition showed that it was Panfilo Jaca who sold his share
to Asas. The RTC modified its 19 May 2003 Decision as follows:
Wherefore, the judgment in the Decision dated April 4, 2002, of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. R45280, is MODIFIED, as follows:

Petitioners appealed from the MTCCs Decision.

1) Dismissing the complaint as regards Lot 3655-Y; and
In its 19 May 2003 Decision, 6 the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 7 (RTC) reversed the MTCCs Decision. The RTC ruled that the
Project of Partition showed that Lot No. 3635-Y was co-owned by Urbana
(251 sq. m.), Peregrina (863 sq. m.), and Andres Jaca (251 sq. m.). The
RTC ruled that as Peregrinas heir, Cabras became a co-owner of Lot No.
3635-Y and she could not be ejected from the property. The RTC ruled
that Valentin and Manuel could not likewise be ejected from the property
as they were allowed by Cabras to occupy the lot.

2) Ordering defendants-appellants to vacate Lot No. 3655-CC,

demolish whatever improvements they may have introduced
thereon and surrender complete control and possession thereof
to plaintiffs-appellees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.8

The RTC ruled that the Project of Partition also showed that Urbanas
total share of 1,499 sq. m., covering 1,248 sq. m. of Lot No. 3635-CC
and 251 sq. m. of Lot No. 3635-Y, was sold to one Josefina Asas (Asas).
As such, respondents had no cause of action against petitioners.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the RTCs 29 July 2003 Order,

assailing the Project of Partition. In its 3 September 2003 Order, 9 the RTC
denied petitioners motion. The RTC ruled that petitioners failed to
present any evidence supporting the purported falsity of the Project of

Partition. The RTC upheld the jurisdiction of the MTCC and further ruled
that respondents action was an ejectment case.
Petitioners filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

by petitioners which they failed to present before the MTCC. The Court
of Appeals stressed that the MTCCs finding on the issue of ownership
was merely provisional. Thus, petitioners were not legally barred from
filing the proper action to settle the question of title.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

In its 22 January 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 29 July
2003 and 3 September 2003 Orders of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Orders
dated July 29, 2003 and September 3, 2003 of the court a quo are
hereby both AFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint. The Court of Appeals held that a
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful. The Court
of Appeals ruled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in
actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. The Court of
Appeals further ruled that occupation of the premises must be tolerated
by the owners right from the start of the possession of the property
sought to be recovered.
The Court of Appeals found that in this case, petitioners were occupying
the lots without rentals upon agreement with respondents that they
would relinquish possession once respondents need the property.
However, petitioners refused to vacate the premises despite demands
by respondents. The Court of Appeals ruled that the allegations were
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the MTCC where the ejectment suit
was instituted and tried.
The Court of Appeals noted that petitioners challenged respondents
claim of ownership of the property. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
only issue involved in an ejectment case is possession de facto.
However, when the issue of possession could not be resolved without
resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive evidence upon
the question of title to the property but solely for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Hence, the MTCC acted correctly
when it received evidence on the issue of ownership. The Court of
Appeals further noted that the RTC upheld the MTCCs finding that the
Project of Partition superseded the"Kasabutan nga Hinigala." The Court
of Appeals sustained the RTC in refusing to admit documents submitted

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 3 May 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that a complaint for unlawful detainer must
be filed within one year from demand and not from the start of
possession as claimed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals reiterated
that in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the issue is pure
physical or de facto possession and pronouncements made on the
question of ownership are provisional in nature. The Court of Appeals
further ruled that all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall
be filed before the proper Municipal Trial Court, there being no
jurisdictional amount involved, even with respect to damages or unpaid
rentals sought.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues in their Memorandum:11
1. Whether the MTCC had jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment
case considering the absence of a contract, written or oral,

entered into by respondents and petitioners as lessors and

lessees, respectively;
2. Whether tolerance as a ground for ejectment is tenable in this
case; and
3. Whether the Project of Partition superseded the "Kasabutan
nga Hinigala."
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners insist that the MTCC had no jurisdiction to entertain
respondents complaint because there was no contract, oral or written,
between the parties. Petitioners allege that the proper action should
have been one for recovery of possession and not for unlawful detainer.
We do not agree.
It is settled that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 12
In this case, the complaint alleged that petitioners were occupying the
property, with agreement that should respondents need the property,

petitioners would relinquish possession of the lots and demolish their

houses at their expense. Respondents personally notified petitioners to
vacate the premises and to demolish their houses but petitioners
refused to vacate the lots. The complaint established that petitioners
possession was by tolerance of respondents, and their possession
became illegal when they refused to vacate the premises upon demand
by respondents. Here, the possession became illegal not from the time
petitioners started occupying the property but from the time demand
was made for them to vacate the premises. In short, the complaint
sufficiently established a case for unlawful detainer.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the issue in this case is not the
ownership of the lots. It should be stressed that the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of
the action and the court with jurisdiction over it. 13 The defenses set up in
an answer are not determinative of jurisdiction. 14 The jurisdiction of the
court cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the
case by one of the parties.15 Thus:
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of
ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership in
order to determine who has the right to possess the property. We stress,
however, that this adjudication is only an initial determination of
ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue
of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower courts
adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the
issue of ownership x x x.16
The MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all held that the Repartition
Project superseded the "Kasabutan nga Hinigala." We sustain their
factual finding as this Court gives substantial weight to the factual
finding of the trial court, particularly if this factual finding is sustained by
appellate courts. However, we also reiterate that this resolution on the
issue of ownership is only provisional for the purpose of settling the
issue of possession.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 22 January 2004

Decision and 3 May 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80062.

Bishop of Cebu v. Mangabon (1906)

- He had a right to re-enter; time for prescription has not yet expired
since he was ejected
Trial Court Ruling:
Ruled in favor of Bishop of Cebu and ordered Mangabons to vacate the
land

Facts:
1. Mariano Mangabons parents and brothers had been in possessionof a
tract of land in the district of Ermita until about the year 1877
(possession of at least 20 years).
2. In 1878, they vacated the land by virtue of an order from the
municipality which declared that the land was included within the zone
of materiales Fuertes (fire zone) and the houses in which they lived upon
were of light materials.
3. They vacated said land without objection.
4. After the land was vacated, Parish Priests of Ermita Church fenced the
land and cleaned the same without any objection on the part of anyone.
5. In 1898, Mangabons entered upon the land in question and built
thereon a nipa house and continued to live thereon without the consent
of the parish priest of Ermita Church or the Bishop of Cebu.
6. Roman Catholic Church, represented by the Bishop of Cebu filed an
action to recover possession of said land; amended complaint for said
land to be declared property of the Catholic Church and that it be
restored to the latter. They interposed the following:
- Property had belonged to the Catholic Church from time immemorial
- Mangabons occupied
Catholic Church

- He was the legal owner when he was unlawfully ejected by the Bishop
ofCebu in 1879

apart thereof by the mere tolerance of the

7. On the other hand, the Mangabons interposed the following defense:

- Claims to be the owner of the land by inheritance

- Occupation of the land by Mangabon in the year 1898 was illegal

- If he thought he had a right to the land, he should have filed an action
with the court to recover possession and not proceed to occupy the
property
- If the Church acceded and voluntarily returned possession and
acknowledged that the property belonged to him, there would be no
necessity to file an action; but in this case, Church has objected to the
occupation which necessitates a filing of a proper action.
- The possession held by Mangabon in 1898 cannot be added to the
former possession which was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the
municipality.
Art. 466 CC: a person who recovers possession according to law, which
is improperly lost, is considered as having enjoyed it without interruption
for all the purposes which may redound to his benefit. It cannot be
ascertained that the possession enjoyed by Mangabon was improperly
lost. It has been lost by virtue of an order from the municipality and no
proof to the contrary was presented. Impossible to say what was the
nature of possession prior to the year 1877whether it was held by
right or by the mere tolerance of the Church. Acts of violence or secrecy
or mere tolerance cannot affect the right of possession. Mangabon could
not have lawfully done what he didto re-enter upon the land from
which he had been ejected by the city of Manila If the order of the
municipality was illegal, and that the possession was improperly lost,
Mangabon SHOULD HAVE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE OF COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES to recover it in PLENARY ACTION.

8. Mangabon filed petition. SC resolved a relevant question of law in

deciding whether to affirm the decision of the Trial Court on availability
of accion publiciana
Issue:
Whether after the promulgation of the CC, accion publiciana, which had
for its object the recovery of possession in a plenary action before an
action for the recovery of title could be instituted, still existed (YES)
RATIO:
Available actions:
o Accion interdictal recovery of physical possession within 1 yearfrom
the time of dispossession
o Accion publiciana better right to such possession brought after lapse
of 1 year
o Recovery of ownership action for title
- If Mangabon instituted the accion interdictal within 1 year from
dispossession, he would have been restored to the possession. 1 year
period has already elapsed so such summary action for possession could
not be maintained. But even after the lapse of 1 year, he still could have
brought an accion publiciana. This involved the right to possess; based
upon the fact the he having been in possession for 20 years, could not
lose the same until he had been given opportunity to be heard and had
been defeated in an action in court by another with a better right.

DOUBT ARISES whether accion publiciana is still available from Art. 460
CC. Possessor may lose possession:(1) Abandonment(2) Transfer to
another for a good or valuable consideration(3) Destruction or total loss
of the thing or by the thing becoming unkmarketable (4) By the
possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if
the new possession has lasted more than one year

Questions: Which is lost, possession de facto or also possession de jure?

In the first three, both may be lost, so it would be strange if the fourth
merely referred to possession de jure. However, ownership cannot be
lost under the fourth; owner may recover ownership, and is only barred
by statute of limitations.
Evidence that accion publiciana still exists:
- Possession constitutes a right, a right in rem, whenever it is exercised
over real property or property rights
- Where there is a right, there is a cause of action
- It is sufficient that the right existing, there should be an action to
protect it. No necessity of any special declaration in CC
- It is impossible to conceive that a person has a right which need not be
respected by others, and such respect cannot be exacted unless the law
provides a remedy for its enforcement
- If a person has a right over any kind of property, such right wouldnot
be complete unles sit could be enforced as against the whole world
- The action is a recognition of the right; it is a weapon for its protection
- The right does not arise from the action; but vice versao
- Accion publiciana
exists, nor for the sake of equity, but because it
must necessarily exist or can exist as provided in Art. 445- Action
brought by Catholic Church to recover the possession which was
unlawfully deprived by the defendant can be properly maintained.

Gilchrist v Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga

Feb. 18, 1915
Trent, J.

Cuddy was the owner of a copy of the movie Zigomar in Manila. He

agreed into an agreement with Gilchrist to lease the latter the film for a
week, for P125. However, just before the agreed time that the lease was
to begin, he breached his contract, sent back the money Gilchrist had
forwarded, and did not deliver the film. It turned out that he leased the
film to rival theater-owners in Iloilo. The CFI Iloilo issued an injunction
ordering Cuddy to deliver the film to Gilchrist and preventing Espejo and
Zaldiarraga (E and Z) from exhibiting the film. The latter two challenged
the issuance of the injunction. The Court held that E and Z were liable to
Gilchrist for inducing Cuddy to breach his contract. This interference was
in the form of a tort, and so the fact that they did not know Gilchrists
identity as the third person to whom they caused damage was
immaterial. The Court then justified the issuance of the injunction
because Zigomar, as Gilchrists theaters feature film for the week of
May 26, was to be the main draw for his theater. If the film was shown
after it had already been shown in another theater, the attendance
would be much lower than if he was the first one to show it. Thus, the
issuance of the injunction prevented incalculable damages upon
Gilchrists theater, andwas thus proper.

theater Zigomar until further orders of the court. Cuddy, Espejo and
Zaldiarraga appealed the order of the court on the ground that there
was insufficient evidence to justify the decision, and thus that the
injunction against them was wrongfully issued.

Facts:

Ratio

This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI-Iloilo dismissing Espejo and

Zaldiarragas cross-complaint for damages against Gilchrist for wrongful
issuance of a mandatory and preliminary injunction. E.A. Cuddy was the
owner of a copy of the film Zigomar.

1. Espejo knew Cuddy was the owner of the film, and had received the
letter from his agents in Manila telling him that he could not get the film
for about six weeks, including and extending beyond the week of May
26. The inevitable conclusion is that the appellants did knowingly induce
Cuddy to violate his contract. However, it is assumed that they did not
know Gilchrist wasthe one who had contracted for the film.

1He had entered

into
with C.S.
Gilchrist,
operator
of an
a agreement
cinematograph
theater in Iloilo, to rent the
copy to Gilchrist for the week beginning May 26th, 1912 for P125. The
trial court, through a deposition of Cuddys testimony, found that such a
contract indeed existed between Cuddy and Gilchrist.Gilchrist promptly
forwarded the money to Manila. A few days before May 26th, Cuddy sent
the money back to Gilchrist, saying that he had made other
arrangements with the film. The other arrangement was the rental of
the film to Jose Fernandez Espejo and Mariano Zaldarriaga for P350.
They were also movie theater owners in Iloilo. It appears that Cuddy
willfully violated his contract with Gilchrist because they offered him
more money for the same period.
Espejo said that he tried to get the film through his agents Pathe
Brothers in Manila, but the latter advised him not to contend for the
rental of the film because the rent was prohibitive, and that he would
not be able to get the film for about 6 weeks.The court then issued a
mandatory injunction directing Cuddy to send to Gilchrist Zigomar in
compliance with their contract, and a preliminary injunction was issued
restraining Espejo and Zaldarriaga from receiving and exhibiting in their

Issue:
1. WON Espejo and Zaldiarraga knew they were inducing Cuddy to
violate his contract with a third party when they induced him to accept
the P350? (Yes.)
2. WON Espejo and Zaldiarraga were liable for damages for interfering
with the Gilchrist-Cuddy contract? (Yes)
a. Even if they did not know the identity of one of the parties?
(Yes)
3. WON the injunction was properly issued (Yes.)

2. There is no doubt that Cuddy is liable for breach of contract with

Cuddy. However, Espejo and Zaldiarraga (E&Z for brevity) claim that
there was no valid contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, and so, in
exercising their right to compete, they had a justifiable reason for
interfering therein. Thus, their view was the ground on which liability of
a third party for interfering with a contract between others rests on the
fact that the interference was malicious.The Court disagreed. Citing the
US case of Angle v Railway Co., the fact that there was no malicein
behind the interference with the contract and causing its breach does
not excuse the interferers from legal liability. It is clear, therefore, that
they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts.
a. That is, unless they are relieved from liability by reason of the fact
that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee

Gilchrist. The liability of E & Z arises from unlawful acts, and not from
contractual obligations, as they had no such obligation to induce Cuddy
to violate his contract with Gilchrist. Thus, an action for damages would
arise from good old Art. 1902 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in that
article that requires knowledge of the person to whom he causes
damage. In fact, the other provisions in that chapter make it clear that
no such knowledge is required so that the injured party may recover.
3. Injunction as a remedy is covered by Section 164 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It is a special remedy borrowed from American practice and
rooted in English legal procedure, issued to cases where there is no
plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, which will not be granted
while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in
extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done,
which cannot be compensated in damages, and which will not, as a rule,
be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put
it into that of another whose title has not been established by law. There
is nothing in Section 164 that requires that the wrongful interference to
a contract be carried out by strangers with knowledge of the identities of
both parties. As a rule, injunctions are not issued in favor of those who
have an adequate remedy at law. Moreover, if the injury is irreparable,
the ordinary process, and not extraordinary processes like injunction, are
sufficient. Here, the court took on the novel issue of (brace yourselves) a
cinematograph or motion-picture theater. This is a quite modern form of
the play house, where, by means of a magical apparatus known as a
cinematograph, the functions of which Im assuming every reasonably
well-read person in 2012 understands. The attendance at movie
theaters depend, in no small degree, upon the quality of the moving
pictures exhibited, especially those attractive films which the proprietors
of these theaters designate as feature films. The feature films are
depended upon to secure a larger attendance for the theater. If the
theater fails to exhibit the feature film, it would reduce receipts of the
theater.Zigomar was relied upon by Gilchrist as his feature film for the
week beginning May 26. Thus, if he was not able to show it, his business
would suffer. Neither could he profit by showing the film after it had
already been shown in another theater, as interest in the film would
have substantially died down. Thus, the injunction issued saved him
from the incalculable harm and damages caused by the unwarranted
interference of the defendants. It was thus justifiably issued

So Ping Bun v. CA
Facts:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor
Dee C. Chuan and Sons, Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo,
which the former used to store textiles. The agreements were for one (1)
year, with provisions for month-to-month rental should the lessee
continue to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua
Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former members formed Tek Hua
Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of
the defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson,
occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter
Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to
petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the premises. Petitioner
refused, and on March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of lease
with DCCSI. The contracts were executed. Private respondents moved
for the nullification of the contract and claimed damages. The petition
was granted by the trial court, and eventually by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
(1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract
(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees
Held:
(1) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and

enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges
with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion,
and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The
elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract;
and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or
excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease
contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent
corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly
viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference
above-mentioned are present in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the
defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of another exists where the
actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist
where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some
authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest
outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an
individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not
merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are
negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover justification for
protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a
comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of
others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Where there was no
malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his
conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon
DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property

of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record

imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues
that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the
trial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were
not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he
ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic
interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others,
however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the
absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain
to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however,
precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability
for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The
respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction
and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's
interference.
(2) Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided
for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have
consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have
clear factual and legal bases. In connection with attorney's fees, the
award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been
derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of
the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate review such
that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. This ruling applies
with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a long line of cases
we said, "It is not sound policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate.
To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his
successful opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to
the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue
proportions."

Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract, at the

time when the cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month
basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the reduced
amount of attorney's fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still
exorbitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence. Consequently, the
amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent
appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor
of private respondent corporation.

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (Third
Division)[3] promulgated on January 31, 1992 and October 14, 1992,
respectively, in CA-G.R. No. 10926 entitled "People of the Philippines Vs.
Remman Enterprises, Inc."
The challenged Decision affirmed in toto the orders[4] of the Regional
Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 12,[5] promulgated on June 15, 1990, and
November 21, 1990, in Civil Case No. 2760 which found Rremman
Enterprises, Inc. guilty of "indirect contempt for having continuously
ignored and defied the Decision of this Court dated August 29, 1984, x x
x." The October 14, 1992 Resolution denied herein petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
The Facts:

[G.R. No. 107671. February 26, 1997]

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this case, the Court distinguishes civil contempt from
criminal contempt. It also holds that petitioner may be held liable for
indirect contempt on the basis of a single hearing and an ocular
inspection report rendered ex parte to the trial court by the clerk of
court who was duly commissioned for the purpose.

The antecedent of the instant petition is a complaint filed in 1983 by the

spouses Paulino and Purification Ochoa before the Regional Trial Court of
Lipa City against Remman Enterprises, Inc. (herein petitioner) for
abatement of nuisance and damages. After trial on the merits, said court
rendered judgment[6] in favor of spouses Ochoa and against petitioner,
ordering the latter to "stop and desist from draining their waste matter,
solid and liquid, to the estate of the plaintiffs x x x." The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, and the petition to this Court
was denied. Subsequently, a writ of execution[7] of the decision was
issued by the trial court.
However, on March 26, 1990, the spouses Ochoa filed another
complaint[8] before the same trial court against Remman Enterprises,
this time for indirect contempt. They alleged that a portion of their
estate was still being flooded with wastes coming from petitioner's hog
farm, in defiance of the final and executory order of the court directing it
to stop and desist from draining its waste matter into the Ochoa estate.
A hearing was held on may 18, 1990, wherein petitioner denied the
allegations of the complaint. In view of the conflicting claims of the
parties, the trial court ordered an ocular inspection on the properties of
the parties. The branch clerk of court was authorized by the court to
conduct the ocular inspection and was directed to submit a report
immediately upon termination thereof. The ocular inspection was

conducted on the same day in the presence of both parties and their
respective counsel.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present

recourse.

Thereafter, said clerk of court reported his findings[9] to the trial court,
on the basis of which the court issued its order dated June 15, 1990. The
dispositive portion thereof states:

Issues

"WHEREFORE, this Court finds defendant Remman Enterprises, Inc.,

guilty of indirect contempt for having continuously ignored and defied
the Decision of this Court dated August 29, 1984, and hereby orders
defendant Remman Enterprises, Inc.,:

Petitioner imputes the following errors[12] against the trial and appellate
courts:
(a) declaring petitioner guilty of contempt without any evidence
adduced by the prosecution/Ochoas; and

a) To pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P 1,000.00); and

(b) declaring petitioner guilty of contempt on the sole basis of the

commissioner's report, copy of which was never furnished petitioner and
which was never set for hearing.

b) To pay plaintiffs the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P 1,000.00)

monthly as damages occasioned by the continuous draining of the
waste matters into plaintiff's property until defendant does something
effective to prevent the same."[10]

The principal issue is whether petitioner may be held liable for indirect
contempt after a single hearing and on the basis of an ocular inspection
report which was not furnished the parties nor set for hearing.

Finding merit in the omnibus motion for reconsideration of plaintiffs, the

trial court, on November 21, 1990, modified/amended its previous order
to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds defendant Remman Enterprises, Inc.,
guilty of indirect contempt for having continuously ignored and defied
the Decision of this Court dated August 29, 1984, and hereby orders
defendant Remman Enterprises, Inc.
a) To pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P 1,000.00); and
b) To construct or put up structure/device in its premises which would
prevent the draining of waste matter to plaintiffs' estate within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this order. Failure on the part of the defendant
to do so will authorize the plaintiff to construct or put up structure or
device in their estate at the expense of defendant."[11]

As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's

orders, finding them to be "in accordance with law and evidence."

Petitioner impugns the trial court's reliance on the report of the branch
clerk of court, alleging that no evidence was presented by the spouses
Ochoa in the presence of, or with notice to, petitioner. It claims that
"(w)here no hearing was held, as required by law, the Court acquires no
jurisdiction to declare a person guilty of indirect or constructive
contempt."
Petitioner thus insists that it was denied due process, specifically its
right to be heard. Citing Sections 10[13] and 11,[14] Rule 33 of the Rules
of Court and relevant jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner indignantly
argues that it was not given opportunity to be heard or any chance to
file its objections or comment to the commissioner's report, or present
evidence in contravention thereof.
Petitioner likewise assails the conclusion made by the trial and appellate
courts in adopting the findings of the commissioner that the waste
matter coming from its property flowing into the Ochoa estate was
"stinking and foul-smelling," practically declaring it to be polluted.
Petitioner maintains that the power to determine the existence of
pollution is vested in the National Pollution Control Commission, now the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), under P.D. No. 984.
Contrarily, petitioner flaunts a "Permit to Operate" issued by said

agency. It further claims that, without the determination by the EMB of

the existence of pollution as defined by law, no court action may be
initiated on the matter.

due process. The requirements of due process are satisfied even if the
court failed to set the commissioner's report for hearing, as long as the
parties were given an opportunity to be heard.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of public respondents, asserts that

petitioner was not deprived of its right to be heard since a hearing was
held on May 8, 1990,[15] where both parties appeared before the court
through their respective counsel, and petitioner (defendant therein)
denied the allegations of the complaint. In addition, during the ocular
inspection conducted pursuant to the order of the court in view of the
conflicting claims of the parties, the counsel[16] and vice-president[17]
of petitioner were present and participated actively.[18]

xxxxxxxxx

As regards petitioner's contention that a finding of the existence of

pollution can only be made by the EMB, the Solicitor General avers that
this case is specifically exempt from the coverage of P.D. No. 984 since
the original action in this case was for abatement of nuisance and
damages.
Petitioner substantially raises the same issues adduced before the Court
of Appeals. In disposing of its arguments, the appellate court said:
"The accused-appellant was given more than ample opportunity to be
heard. The procedural requisites for indirect contempt proceedings are:
(a) a complaint in writing or motion of a party, or an order of the court
requiring a person to appear and explain and (b) an opportunity for the
person charged to appear and explain his conduct (Montalban vs.
Canonoy, Adm. Case No. 179-J, 38 SCRA 1). All these requirements have
been complied with in the case at bar.
It is to be stressed that a contempt proceeding is of a criminal nature
and of (sic) summary in character which the court exercises but limited
jurisdiction (In re Mison, Jr. vs. Subido, 33 SCRA 30; The Insurance
Commissioner vs. Globe Assurance Company, Inc., 111 SCRA 202). Due
process does not always require a trial-type proceeding.
xxxxxxxxx
Contempt proceeding, being summary in nature the mere failure to
furnish the parties of the commissioner's report described in Section 10
of Rule 33, of the Rules of Court does not constitute an infringement on

Moreover, it is clear from the records that accused-appellant

consistently failed to raise before the trial court the matter that it was
not furnished with a copy of the commissioner's report. If it really
believed that it was deprived of due process by the omission, it should
have, in the very least, brought out that fact in a motion for
reconsideration and asked the court for a copy of the commissioner's
report and for sufficient time within which to file an objection thereto. It
did not. Not only this, accused-appellant should have raised the matter
of not having been furnished a copy of the commissioner's report in its
Opposition to plaintiff's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration filed on
April 12, 1990 and its rejoinder to plaintiff's reply dated October 12,
1990. It is now late in the day for accused-appellant to bring up the
question in this appeal."[19]
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Main Issue: No Denial of Due Process
There is no question that disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or
judge constitute indirect contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. What is put in issue here is the validity of the
proceedings that found petitioner liable for such misconduct.
The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be
determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is
primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily
compensatory or remedial.[20]

In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in

accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in
so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of
contempt proceedings. Strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions
apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; the accused is to be
afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed.
However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular
form so long as the substantial rights of the accused are preserved.[21]

Civil contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are generally held to be

remedial and civil in nature; that is, for the enforcement of some duty,
and essentially a remedy resorted to, to preserve and enforce the rights
of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a judgment
or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. The rules of
procedure governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal
prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.
[22]
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the
procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an opportunity given
to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel. All that the law
requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an
opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel.[23] What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be
granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard
in his defense.[24]
The Court of Appeals has sufficiently disposed of the issue. As correctly
excerpted in the assailed Decision, we have held in Mutuc vs. Court of
Appeals,[25] which was likewise a contempt proceeding, that:
"There is no question that the 'essence of due process is a hearing
before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested tribunal'
(Rollo, p. 173) but due process as a constitutional precept does not,
always and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding (Zaldivar vs.
Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 [1988] citing the ruling in Torres vs. Gonzales,

152 SCRA 272 [1987]). The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438
[1981] and Richards vs. Asoy, 152 SCRA 45 [1987]). To be heard does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process (Juanita Yap Sy vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73451, March 28, 1988.
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.
(Tajonera vs. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438 [1981])"
In the instant case, a written charge of indirect contempt was duly filed
by the spouses Ochoa before the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. This is
not contested by petitioner. Acting on the complaint, the trial court
issued an order[26] requiring the defendant (herein petitioner) to "show
cause/explain why a judgment of contempt should not be rendered
against it." A hearing for the purpose was originally scheduled on May
11, 1990 which, upon motion of herein petitioner, was reset to May 18,
1990. On the latter date, as petitioner admits in its petition, it
"vehemently denied the accusations in the motion for contempt"[27]
(underscoring supplied). We can draw no other conclusion than that a
hearing was conducted and petitioner was heard in its defenses in court.
Moreover, its vice-president and counsel were likewise present during
the ocular inspection where they actively participated, as reported by
the clerk of the trial court.[28] The effect of this was discussed in
Apurillo vs. Graciano,[29] which the appellate court correctly cited, thus:
"Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that the proceeding was
tainted with irregularity because he was not given an opportunity to
object to the findings of the Commissioner. Otherwise stated, petitioner
stated that there was non-observance of the procedure prescribed by
sections 10 and 11 of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, that is, notice to the
parties of the filing of the report of the Commissioner and the setting of
such report for hearing. In one case, this court dismissed such claim in
this wise:

'x x x In Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil.
539, it was held:
When the Court of Industrial Relations refers the case to a commissioner
for investigation, report and recommendation, and at such investigation
the parties are duly represented by counsel, heard or at least given an
opportunity to be heard, the requirements of due process has been
satisfied, even if the Court failed to set the report for hearing, and a
decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the case,
is a decision which meets the requirements of a fair and open hearing.'
While the foregoing ruling was made in a case elevated to this Court
from the Court of Industrial Relations, in the proceedings of which the
Rules of Court have suppletory application, We find no legal bar to the
application of the principle evolved in said ruling to cases similarly
situated before the ordinary courts of justice."
Further, after the trial court promulgated its final order on June 15, 1990,
and the spouses Ochoa filed an omnibus motion for its reconsideration,
petitioner did not raise the question of not having been furnished a copy
of the commissioner's report. No mention thereof was made in its
opposition to the omnibus motion. neither did it do so in its rejoinder to
movants reply. It is only an afterthought of petitioner to raise on appeal
the alleged, though unsubstantiated, procedural defect.
Anent the contention of petitioner that the plaintiffs below did not
present evidence to support its complaint, we find sufficient the findings
of the clerk of the trial court, which was likewise adopted by the
appellate court, to support the allegations in the complaint and the trial
court's decision. The clerk of court made the following detailed
observations:
"The first to be inspected was the property of defendant. It was devoted
to a piggery business. A concreted waterway was found wherein
hogwastes are being made to pass leading to a laggoon (sic) where they
are finally disposed and converted to gas with the aid of methane gas
tank situated just above the laggoon (sic).
Thereafter, the property of the plaintiffs was inspected. The land was
primarily devoted to a poultry farm. At the back potion of the property

were fruit trees and various kinds of plants. On this area can be found a
big foul-smelling swamp about five (5) meters in length, one and a half
(1 1/2) meter wide and about two (2) feet deep. The swamp has
developed near the boundary of the properties of both parties. From that
point, we can see the methane gas tank of defendant. This is so because
the property of defendant is higher in elevation than that of the
plaintiffs. And just below the gas tank is the supposed laggoon (sic).
There has been no rainfall on the place for quite some time for
understandably, it is still a (sic) dry season.
The representative and counsel of defendant corporation deny that the
swamp on plaintiffs' property was caused by the hogwastes as they
insist that there is a laggoon (sic) in its property to corner the liquid
wastes coming from its piggery business.
It is our observation that the foul-smelling and stinky swamp that has
developed on plaintiffs' property is still being caused by the continuous
flow of liquid matter mixed with fine solid refuse (known as hogwastes)
coming from the improvised canal situated at the estate of the
defendant. No conclusion can be reached other than this considering
that there is no rainfall yet and the smell of the swamp approximates
that of the smell of hogwastes.
Defendant corporation was already enjoined by a final decision of this
Court not to dispose its waste materials coming from its piggery
business to the property of plaintiffs but it seems that defendant has not
done anything concrete to remedy the problem."[30]

Well-entrenched and settled is the rule that points of law, theories,

issues and arguments not brought to the intention of the trial court
adequately and on time need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal."[31] In petitions for review or appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the appellate tribunal is limited to the determination
of whether the lower court committed reversible error. In the case at
bench, we find none.

Secondary Issue: P.D. No. 984 Not Applicable

We uphold the contention of the Solicitor General that petitioner
miscomprehended the law in applying P.D. No. 984 to this case. The
original complaint antecedent to the case at bar was for abatement of
nuisance and damages. As we have indeed ruled in Mead vs. Argel,[32]
the last paragraph of Section 8[33] of said decree "delineates the
authority to be exercised by the (National Pollution Control) Commission
and by the ordinary courts in respect of preventing or remedying the
pollution of the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The
provision excludes from the authority of the Commission only the
determination of and the filing of court actions involving violations of the
New Civil Code on nuissance." Hence, this case does not fall within the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction of said Commission, which has been
reorganized into the Environmental Management Bureau.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

request was denied because his carabao is found to be fit for agricultural
work. Even so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the purpose of human
consumption. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit
from the municipal treasurer of the municipality, in violation of Sections
30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding,
and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large
cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.
The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No. 1147
do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a
permit of the municipal treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle
happened outside the municipal slaughterhouse. They said that the
prohibition and penalty is limited only to the large cattle slaughtered at
the municipal slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in section 30
and the penalty imposed in section 33 stated only the phrase at the
municipal slaughterhouse.
They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for
public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without
providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147
is limited only to the slaughter of large cattle at the municipal
slaughterhouse.
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police
power.

U.S. vs. Luis Toribio

HELD:

Facts:

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more

constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend
to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the
object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be

Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of Bohol,

Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His

rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the

statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by
its enactment. The court is of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33
of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be
slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without
the permit provided for in section 30.
Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the
meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of
the property as would be inconsistent with the rights of the publics. All
property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.

G.R. No. L-9480

November 13, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BALBINO VILLAREAL,

Defendant-Appellant.
G.E. Jose for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Corpus for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant
of the offense of carrying a concealed deadly weapon as defined and
penalized in section 26 of Act No. 1780. The weapon was a sort of
dagger or sharp-pointed knife with a blade about 8 inches long. It was
carried in a leather sheath, attached to a belt which was strapped round
the body, and hung down on the left hip of the accused concealed from
public view inside his trousers.
The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate
comment is the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of
concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms
without a license, is a violation of the provisions of section 5 of the
Philippine Bill of Rights.

Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States
Constitution against the infringement of the right of the people of the
United States to keep and bear arms (U.S. Constitution, amendment 2),
which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing
to point out that in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any
bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly
extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been
uniformly held that both this and similar provisions in State constitutions
apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc.,
853, note 18); and further, because even in those jurisdictions wherein
the constitutional guaranty of the right to keep and bear arms is in force,
while it is beyond the power of a legislature or municipal body to
prohibit entirely the keeping and use of military arms, it may, in the
exercise ad lawlessness, lawfully regulate the use of such weapons by
providing that they shall not be carried in a concealed manner, or that
they shall not be pointed at another, or fired within the limits of a city.
(See many case cited in 40 Cyc., p. 853.)
Counsel's contention seems to be based on those provisions of the
Philippine Bill of Rights which prohibits the enactment of a law depriving
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. He insists that
restrictions placed on the carrying of delay weapons have the effect of
depriving the owner of the free use and enjoyment of his property, and
that the granting of licenses to some persons to carry firearms and the
denial of that right to others is a denial to the latter of the equal
protection of the laws.
Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of
Rights with which it is claimed it is in conflict were enacted under
American sovereignty, and both are to be construed more especially in
the light of American authority and precedent. The earliest English
statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the bearing of arms, enacted in
the year 1328 A.D., was but an affirmation of the common law offense of
going around with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the
people. Many statutes have been enacted since that time in English and
the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of weapons, and
these have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially when
the prohibitions have been directed to the wearing or carrying of deadly

weapons in a concealed manner. (See 48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and

many cases there cited.)chanrobles virtual law library
There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to
regulate the use of deadly weapons for the purpose of suppressing or
restraining crime and lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly
weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like which every citizens
has a right to own and to use in the various activities of human life. But
the right to own and to use such weapons does not carry with it the right
to use them to the injury of his neighbor or so as to enganger the peace
and welfare of the community. "It is a settled principle, growing out of
the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under his
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community." (Com. vs. Alger, 7 Cush (Mass.), 53, 84.) Provided the
means adopted are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
end in view, not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest
of the public generally rather than of a particular class, the legislature
may adopt such regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and
regulating the use of private property in the exercise of its police power.
(U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)
We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a
statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons as a
police measure well calculated to restrict the two frequent resort to such
weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the
strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend to increase the
security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any
community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons
prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the individual
owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature
is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe the conditions
under which they may be kept and used by their owners rest upon
substantially similar grounds. The general provisions touching the
licensing of the use of such arms are mere police regulations, intended
to limit such use so that firearms will not fall into the hands of persons

whose safety and security of individuals. While it may be true that those
charged with the issuing of such licenses willfully or mistakenly decline
to issue or approve licenses in some cases in which the applicants are
equally entitled with others to receive them, nevertheless the
regulations themselves are of general application and in no wise deny
the equal protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such cases
is not with the law, but with whose charged with its administration.
We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the
accused. The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur in the result\
[G.R. No. 125758. January 20, 2004]
HEIRS OF SUSANA DE GUZMAN TUAZON, represented by CIRILO
TUAZON, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MA. LUISA VICTORIO, ALBERTO GUANIO, JAIME B.
VICTORIO,
INES
MOLINA,
ERLINDA
V.
GREGORIO,
VISITACION
V.
GERVACIO,
and
FROILAN
C.
GERVACIO,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the March 12, 1996 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals, as well as its July 19, 1996 Resolution [2] denying the petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the petition at bench stemmed from the
following factual backdrop
On August 17, 1994, Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, issued an Order[3] in LRC Case No. 93-1310 granting the

petitioners prayer for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4331 of the Registry of Deeds of
Rizal, in lieu of the lost copy.

On October 24, 1995, Branch 74 issued an Order denying the

petitioners prayer to dismiss the case as well as the private respondents
motion to transfer case, to wit:

On June 19, 1995, the private respondents filed with Branch 74 of

the same court an action for Quieting of Title and Nullification and
Cancellation of Title, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-3577,
praying in the main that an order be issued directing the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to cancel the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 4331 it
has issued pursuant to the order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC Case No. 93-1310 thereof. [4] In their Answer filed
on August 14, 1995, the petitioners averred inter alia that the private
respondents had no cause of action against them; that Branch 74 had
no jurisdiction to annul and/or reverse an order of a co-equal court; and
that OCT No. 4331, on file with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, is
subsisting, otherwise, Branch 71 would not have ordered the issuance of
a new duplicate OCT in lieu of that which was irretrievably lost. [5]

For resolution is the Motion to Transfer Case dated September 25, 1995
filed by the petitioners thru counsel as well as the opposition thereto
dated October 12, 1995 filed by the respondents, thru counsel and it
appearing that the Order dated August 17, 1994 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, granting the petition for the
issuance of new owners duplicate copy of OCT NO. 4331 had long
become final and executory and considering that the present case
involves an action for the cancellation and nullification of the title which
is entirely different from the said petition, which is founded on a
different cause of action and further considering the reasons stated
therein to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby denied.

On September 25, 1995, the private respondents filed a Motion to

Transfer Case to Branch 71 in order to avoid any conflict of decision
between two separate branches of this court which are co-equal to each
other.[6] On October 11, 1995, the petitioners opposed the motion on the
following grounds: (1) Under the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference which bars Branch 74 from entertaining the case, the
remedy is not to transfer the case to Branch 71, as prayed for by the
private respondents, but to dismiss the case outright; (2) The Order
promulgated by Branch 71 on August 17, 1994, declaring the lost
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 4331 null and void and directing the
Register of Deeds of Pasig to issue a new one to the petitioners, had
long attained finality and can no longer be amended, modified nor set
aside; and (3) Neither Branch 74 nor Branch 71 has the jurisdiction to
annul the said order since the jurisdiction to annul the same is
exclusively lodged with the Court of Appeals, as provided in Section 9 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.[7] The petitioners, therefore, prayed that the
private respondents motion to transfer case be denied and an order be
issued dismissing outright the petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

Assailing the above-quoted order to have been issued with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
petitioners on December 4, 1995 filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul the order. On March 12, 1996, the respondent Court rendered its
herein assailed decision dismissing the petitioners petition for certiorari.
[9]
The petitioners motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision
was, likewise, denied by the respondent Court in an Order dated July 19,
1996.[10]

Defendants prayer for dismissal of this case is likewise denied. [8]

Hence, the present petition. The petitioners allege the following

grounds therefor:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 95-3577 IN BRANCH 74 OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, IS FOR QUIETING OF
TITLE AND CANCELLATION OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 4331.

II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE OF OCT NO. 4331 FILED BY
PETITIONERS IN BRANCH 71 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, IS FOR RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, BRANCH 74, HAS JURISDICTION TO
ENTERTAIN THE PETITION FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 95-3577.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
[11]

The petition has no merit.

It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.
[12]
This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and specify
the relief sought.[13] The pertinent allegations made by the private
respondents in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-3577 are herein-below
reproduced, to wit:
2. Nazario de Guzman was the owner in fee simple of those parcels of
land situated at Barrio Dilang-Cainta, Rizal, embraced in and covered by
then Original Certificate of Title No. 4331 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, a photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex A and
made a part hereof and which parcels of land are more particularly
described as follows:

3. On October 13, 1931, the surviving spouse of Nazario de Guzman,

Maria Gonzaga, with the approval of the Court, sold the above-described
parcel of land to Alejandro Santos; a certified photocopy of which Sale in
Spanish is hereto attached as Annex B and made part hereof; and
Original Certificate of Title No. 4331 was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21839 was issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal in the name of Alejandro Santos; a certified photocopy of
which is hereto attached as Annex B-1 and made a part hereof;
4. On April 7, 1941 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, a certified
photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex C and made a part
hereof, Alejandro Santos sold the above-described parcel of land to the
spouses Jacinto de la Cruz and Andrea de Leon and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 21839 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 43164, a certified photocopy of which is hereto attached as
Annex C-1 and made part hereof, was issued in the names of the said
spouses;
5. On June 19, 1941, the spouses Jacinto de la Cruz and Andrea de Leon
sold to Gabriel de la Cruz the above-described parcels of land pursuant
to the Deed of Absolute Sale they executed on the same date, a certified
photocopy of which Deed of Absolute Sale is hereto attached as Annex D
and made a part hereof and as a consequence thereof, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 43164 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44790 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, a certified photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex D-1
and made a part hereof;
6. On June 9, 1943, Gabriel de la Cruz sold the above-described parcels
of land to Isidro Victorio, the predecessor of the petitioners, by virtue of
that Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by the former in favor of
the latter, a certified photocopy of which is hereto attached as Annex E
and made a part hereof. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44790 was
cancelled and in its place was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
44851 in the name of Isidro Victorio a certified photocopy of which is
hereto attached as Annex E-1 and made a part hereof;
7. Isidro Victorio had caused the parcels of land covered by the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44851 to be consolidated with the parcel of land

shown on Plan PSU-188478 as Lot 1 and 2 thereof, and subdivided in

accordance with consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) PCS-188478 into 4
lots and the corresponding titles for each resulting subdivision lots were
issued as per Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 304776, 304777, 304778
and 304779, photocopies of which are all hereto attached as Annexes F,
F-1, F-2, and F-3, respectively, and made part hereof;
8. Isidro Victorio in turn sold to petitioners by virtue of those Deeds of
Absolute Sale hereto attached as Annexes G, G-1, G-2, and G-3, the
parcels of land now covered by Annexes F to F-3 as follows:
9. On November 5, 1993, the respondents filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo Rizal, Branch 71, asking for the issuance
of a second owners duplicate copy of the Original Certificate of Title No.
4331 and which petition was docketed as LRC Case No. 93-1310 in said
Court;
10. On August 17, 1994, an order was issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, declaring the owners duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 4331 which was supposedly lost, as null
and void and directed the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to
issue a new owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
4331;
11. Such order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in
LRC Case No. 93-1310 is based on the perjured testimony of respondent
Cirilo Tuazon that the copy of the owners duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 4331 was lost while in the possession of his
mother, Susana de Guzman and they found this out after the death of
Susana de Guzman Tuazon;
12. Such order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in
LRC Case No. 93-1310 thereof should be annulled as the said Court was
made to believe the oral testimony of respondent Cirilo Tuazon, despite
the documentary evidences annexed hereto, which were deliberately
concealed by the respondents from the Court, which show that the
owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 4331 was
already cancelled;

13. The issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of Original Certificate

of Title No. 4331, having no factual and legal basis, casts a cloud on the
titles of the petitioners and should be ordered cancelled;
13.a. That by reason of the unlawful and illegal acts of respondents heirs
of Susana de Guzman Tuazon in causing the issuance of a fake second
owners duplicate copy, the petitioners were forced to hire the services of
counsel and to pay the latter the amount of P200,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
13.b. That likewise as a result of respondents action, respondents should
be made liable to pay herein petitioners litigation expenses as may be
incurred in the prosecution of this case and such amount of exemplary
damages as may be fixed by this court;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that an order be issued directing
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the owners duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title No. 4331 it has issued pursuant to the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in LRC Case No.
93-1310 thereof.[14]
A cursory examination of the foregoing averments readily shows
that the private respondents petition is indeed, as captioned, one for
quieting of title and nullification and cancellation of title. Thus, the
private respondents assert therein that the issuance to petitioners of a
new owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 4331, which was procured by
fraudulent representation, casts a cloud on the titles of the private
respondents and, therefore, should be ordered cancelled. In Baricuatro,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[15] we held that:
[Q]uieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to
that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of
hostile claim. In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one

who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other,
but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see
every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best (citation
omitted). Such remedy may be availed of under the circumstances
enumerated in the Civil Code:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is
in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein.
Verily, the private respondents complaint before Branch 74 seeks
the removal of a cloud from and an affirmation of their ownership over
the disputed properties covered by the titles issued subsequent to the
cancellation of OCT No. 4331. Penultimate to the primary relief sought is
the private respondents prayer for the cancellation of the new owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 4331 issued to the petitioners by virtue of the
August 17, 1994 Order of Branch 71 in LRC Case No. 93-1310. Hence,
contrary to the petitioners asseveration, the private respondents
petition before Branch 74 makes out a case for quieting of title, and
nullification and cancellation of title, and not a mere annulment of a final
order of the RTC as viewed under par. (2), Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129. [16] Under
the circumstances, the case before Branch 74 was actually a real action,
affecting as it does title to or possession of real property, [17] jurisdiction
over which is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court as provided in
par. (2), Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129. [18] Thus, even the petitioners allusion to
paragraph 12 of the private respondents petition above, in support of
their claim that the main, if not the real, thrust of the private
respondents petition is for nullification of the order of Branch 71 on the
ground of fraud, cannot be given serious consideration. We have
declared that under our system of pleading it is the duty of the courts to
grant the relief to which the parties are shown to be entitled by the

allegations in their pleadings and the facts proved at the trial, and the
mere fact that they themselves misconstrued the legal effect of the
facts thus alleged and proved will not prevent the court from placing the
just construction thereon and adjudicating the issue accordingly. [19]
The petitioners, likewise, asseverate that their petition in LRC Case
No. 93-1310 involved the issuance, in lieu of the lost one, of the owners
copy of OCT No. 4331 which is governed by Section 109 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise, known as the Property Registration Decree.
[20]
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it found that LRC Case No.
93-1310 was a petition for reconstitution which can be validly made only
in case it is the original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of
Deeds which is lost or destroyed, and the cause of action of which is
based on Republic Act No. 26.[21] The argument, however, is non
sequitur. Regardless of whether petitioners cause of action in LRC Case
No. 93-1310 is based on Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 or under Rep. Act
No. 26, the same has no bearing on the petitioners cause in this
case. Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of
P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a
restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is
merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the
same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does
not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title.[22] It bears stressing at this point that ownership should
not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence
of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.
[23]
Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be
threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private
respondents did when they filed Civil Case No. 95-3577 before Branch
74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties
will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the
subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. Branch
74, therefore, committed no reversible error when it denied the
petitioners motion to dismiss the private respondents petition in Civil
Case No. 95-3577.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is

DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 12, 1996 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39167 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno,
JJ., concur.

(Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Austria-Martinez and Tinga,

Rabino (Dianita) executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and

adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took
possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio
and two others, on the claim that they are surviving heirs of Iluminardo
and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Roberto Moico (Moico). Moico began evicting the Mananquils tenants.
Thus, the Mananquils filed a case for quieting of title.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Mananquils. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC.
The Mananquils argue that since they are the legal heirs of Iluminardo
Mananquil, then they possess the requisite legal or equitable title or
interest in Lots 18 and 19, which thus permits them to file an action to
quiet title; and whatever rights Iluminardo had over the lots were
transmitted to them from the moment of his death, per Article 777 of
the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 180076 : November 20, 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to quiet title should prosper?

DIONISIO MANANQUIL, LAUDENCIA MANANQUIL-VILLAMOR, ESTANISLAO

MANANQUIL, and DIANITA MANANQUIL-RABINO, represented by OTILLO
RABINO, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO MOICO, Respondent.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

CIVIL LAW: quieting of title

FACTS:

An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy

grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the
benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of
doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear
introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse
the property as he deems best. But for an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or

Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land

previously expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Lots
18 and 19 were awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil
under a Conditional Contract to Sell.
After the death of the spouses in 1991, it turned out that Prescilla had a
child by a previous marriage namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio).
Iluminardos supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) his brothers and sisters
and herein petitioners Dionisio and Estanislao Mananquil (Estanislao),
Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and Dianita Mananquil-

proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be

in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.

and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries

under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project, taking over Iluminardos
rights after his death.

From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have
failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his
rights under the NHA program/project. They failed to present any title,
award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo and Prescilla
have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18

Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the courts that

under the NHA program project governing the grant of Lots 18 and 19,
they are entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Iluminardo in
his rights upon his death.
DENIED.