You are on page 1of 31

GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION

Empowering Filipinos onshore and overseas


Change agent for effective governance
INTERIM REPORT
27 May 2010

FOREIGN OBSERVERS CHALLENGE ELECTION LEGITIMACY


[This is the Interim Report of a 2010 Election Observers Team of Global Filipino Nation (GFN), a non-partisan international organization of offshore and
onshore Filipinos in 30 countries committed to "Building the Global Filipino Nation for Good Governance." This report does not necessarily reflect the
views of the GFN Convenors. Questions about this Interim Report may be directed to globalfilipinos@gmail.com.]

1. THE ELECTION RESULTS TRANSMITTED FROM THE PRECINCTS DO NOT HAVE DIGITAL SIGNATURES OF THE BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS.

Based on industry standards, the digital signature on the precinct Election Return (ER) is a summary (hash value) of the ER encrypted
using the BEI’s secret key. The digital signature serves two purposes:

a. It identifies the BEI personnel and the precinct number from which the ER came; and
b. It ensures that the precinct ER is not modified in any way by dagdag-bawas (immutability of precinct data).

Because of the importance of digital signatures in maintaining data integrity and security, REPUBLIC ACT 9369 states in SEC. 19 A. In
the election of president, vice-president, senators and party-list system; and B. In the election of local officials and members of the
House of Representatives:

"Within one hour after the printing of the election returns, the chairman of the board of election inspectors or any official
authorized by the Commission shall, in the presence of watchers and representatives of the accredited citizens' arm, political
parties/candidates, if any, electronically transmit the precinct results to the respective levels of board of canvassers, to the
dominant majority and minority party, to the accredited citizen's arm, and to the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP).

1
"The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall be considered as official election results and shall be
used as the basis for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate."

Also in SEC. 25. "Authentication of Electronically Transmitted Election Results. - The manner of determining the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates shall conform with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 as may be supplement or modified
by the provision of this Act, where applicable, by appropriate authentication and certification procedures for electronic
signatures as provided in Republic Act No. 8792 [Electronic Commerce Act] as well as the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant thereto."

REPUBLIC ACT 8792, SEC. 5. Defines "e. “Electronic Signature” refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic
form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic
document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the
intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document."

SEC. 8 also stipulates. "Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the electronic document shall be
equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if that signature is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not
alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document, ..."

SEC. 9 provides. "Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. - In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be
presumed that:
a. The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and
b. The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic document
unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or
unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances.

FIRST ISSUE: Comelec Bid Bulletin No. 10 27 April 2009 Public Bidding / 2010 Elections Automation Project, dated 15 April 2009, states:
“The digital signature shall be assigned by the winning bidder to all members of the BEI and the BOC (whether city, municipal, provincial,
district). For the NBOCs, the digital signatures shall be assigned to all members of the Commission and to the Senate President and the
House Speaker. The digital signature shall be issued by a certificate authority nominated by the winning bidder and approved by the
Comelec.”

There were fears at that time that if Smartmatic gets a copy of the secret keys of the BEIs, it would theoretically have the power to
change the ERs. Smartmatic did not pinpoint a trusted third party, Digital Certificate Authority, up to the time of the SECOND ISSUE.

2
SECOND ISSUE: Comelec Resolution 8786, dated March 4, 2010, no longer required the use of digital signatures. The Resolution
stated:

"WHEREAS, there is a need to amend or revise portions of Resolution No. 8739 in order to fine tune the process and address
procedural gaps;

x x x x x x x x

SEC. 40. Counting of ballots and transmission of results

f) Thereafter, the PCOS shall automatically count the votes and immediately display a message ‘WOULD YOU LIKE
TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE TRANSMISSION FILES WlTH A BEI SIGNATURE KEY?’, with a ‘YES’ or 'NO’ option;

g) Press ‘NO’ option. The PCOS will display ‘ARE YOU SURE YOU DO NOT WANT TO APPLY A DIGlTAL SIGNATURE?’
with a ‘YES’ and ‘NO’ option;

h) Press ‘YES’ option.”

WHY WOULD COMELEC SUDDENLY REMOVE THIS VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE OF THE SYSTEM?

1. The Bid Bulletin Specifications required Digital Signatures to be available by 11 November 2009 to Comelec personnel,
from BEIs to the Board of Canvassers to the Operators of the Comelec Server, its back-up and to the Servers of the
dominant majority, minority, accredited citizens arm and KBP- for lab and field test, mock election test, testing and
sealing, and on election day.

2. The Technical Specifications in the same Bid Bulletin required:

" Component 1A- Election Management System (EMS)

2. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all users, such as, but not limited to,
usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels. (For customization)"

"Component 1B- Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)

3
7. The system shall require authorization and authentication of all operators, such as, but not limited to,
usernames and passwords, with multiple user access levels."

"Component 1C- Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS)

The consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) shall be secure, fast, accurate, reliable and auditable, and able to:

1.12 Allow the BOCs to digitally sign all electronic results and reports before transmission;"

3. Makati Rep. Teodoro Locsin said on 26 May that he was wrong in his position on the absence of the digital signatures of
the Boards of Election Inspectors on the election returns. Locsin, at the hearing of the House committee on suffrage and
electoral reforms, said the digital signatures of the precinct count optical scan machines were enough compliance with
the law. He had said earlier that the BEIs should have encoded their own signatures on the electronically transmitted
results. "I admit I was wrong. There is a real reason why a PCOS signature is a practical equivalent of a digital signature,"
he said.

RA 9369 AND RA 8792 RECOGNIZED PEOPLE, NOT MACHINES, AS AUTHENTICATORS THROUGH DIGITAL SIGNATURES.
COMELEC HAD THE SAME PRESCRIPTION IN ITS BID BULLETIN AND ITS PRONOUNCEMENTS until that issuance of
Comelec Resolution 8786.

4. Observers are at a loss as to the valid operational justification to remove the digital signatures of the BEIs.

The Comelec was quoted as saying "the move [not using the digital signatures] was aimed at removing one step in the
transmission process to minimize human intervention and protect the results of the balloting.

Will three keys to be entered prior to transmitting significantly delay the transmission process, given that the
transmission has been observed to take several minutes?

Was the intent to protect the results and provide comforting assurance? Indeed what happened in minds of objective
observers is the REVERSE. No assurance can be made that the transmitted results are the same as the actual votes.

5. The Philippine Computer Society (PCS) disclosed that Comelec considered the i-button key of the BEI Chairman and the
PINs of the two BEI members as sufficient equivalents for a digital signature.

4
The PCS members did not agree that the i-button and PIN features were sufficient to protect the authenticity, integrity,
confidentiality and veracity of the transmission of the ERs. It was their consensus that these features were not the
security features contemplated by RA 9369.

MAJOR IMPLICATIONS:

1. There was a significant divergence from the law, including non-compliance with the provisions of the Bid and the
Automation Contract.

2. There is now a dark cloud on the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the vote counts in the
ERs.

3. The process prejudices the entire electoral process. Several voting result irregularities, discrepancies in printouts vs.
transmitted results, malfunctioning of PCOS machines, slowdown in transmission, and worse, reports of unauthorized
vote shaving and changing for a fee, have come into light.

2. THE NUMBER OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS IS SUFFICIENT TO AFFECT GREATLY THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS.

Voters Lists were posted on the walls outside the clustered precincts (with a maximum of 1000 registered voters) only on voting day.

Although precinct assignments were mailed to individual voters by barangay captains, most received theirs late in the voting day or not
at all. Voters have great difficulty in locating and identifying their clustered precincts. Long queues developed with voters waiting
several (from one to six) hours before voting. As a result, many, especially women and the elderly, decided to forego voting.

Comelec's consultant on queue management estimates the number of disenfranchised voters to range from 2 million to 8 million.

This number can easily affect the results in the presidential, vice presidential and senatorial race especially the close ones.

3. THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) WAS IMPLEMENTED LIVE WITHOUT THE APPROPRIATE FIELD TESTING, AND
LAW-SPECIFIED TESTING IN ACTUAL ELECTIONS.

RA 9369 SEC. 6 states "for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act (in 2007),
the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao ..."

5
"In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide."

Furthermore, the Bid Specifications, Annex E, stated that "There shall be as many field tests as may be necessary until the requirements
for the tests have been satisfied provided that the tests shall not go beyond December 5, 2009. All systems shall be tested on site, i.e. in
selected locations nationwide covering different test voting centers, test consolidation sites, and test canvassing sites. The test shall also
include live transmission of precinct results. COMELEC personnel shall operate all systems in the test."

No such tests were conducted by December 5, 2009. In fact, a precinct test using 10 sample ballots were conducted in selected
precincts starting in February 2010. No field tests in an entire municipality, city and even province were conducted. This is further
aggravated by the fact that 4,690 polling centers have no cell phone signal from telecommunication firms affecting about 5 million
registered voters.

Worse, on May3, seven days before elections, Comelec and Smartmatic discovered malfunctioning of Compact Flash cards with
erroneous votes for local elections. They hurriedly imported new ones and reconfigured all 76,340 CF cards for use in May 10. This
reconfiguration action was not fully tested and certified, thereby resulting in documented irregularities where precinct transmissions
showed 10 votes (used during the testing) and other unexplained wrong data in many ERs.

4. THE SOURCE CODE REVIEW WAS NOT COMPLETED AND INITIAL FINDINGS WERE NOT ADDRESSED.

Comelec commissioned SysTest Lab of the USA to review the source code. SysTest Lab, after three months, submitted a report with
some 4,000 comments for action by Comelec. There was no official announcement by Comelec whether these SysTest comments were
addressed.

Comelec also opened up to political and other interested parties the review of the source codes in February 2010. No one agreed to it as
only a part of the source code was made available, and one month's time was given. To the parties, it would not be a real source code
review but only a walk-through.

The lack of transparency in this source code review, among others, led the Supreme Court to order Comelec to produce the relevant
documentation on these items.

The non-transparent action led to suspicions and worries by citizen watchdogs that insufficient testing and checking would happen—
leading to the use and non-recognition of a malicious code, the emergence of irregularities, and possible manipulation of the vote
results. Simple mistakes like registered voters reaching 153 million in the House server are indicators of such probable errors.

6
5. NO AUDIT WAS DONE ON THE AES PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. THERE WAS ONLY A MANDATED RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT
THAT, UP TO THIS WRITING, HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED.

RA 9369 Sec. 24 Random Manual Audit states "Where the AES is used, there shall be a random manual audit in one precinct per
congressional district randomly chosen by the Commission in each province and city. Any difference between the automated and
manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or
procedural error."

A Random Manual Audit (RMA) was conducted for 5 precincts for each congressional district or a total of 1,145 of the 76,340 precincts
nationwide.

The RMA precincts were raffled 12 noon of election day but the choice of the RMA precincts was made public only after the close of
voting. As observed in Pampanga, the RMA in one precinct in Telabastagan was started at 8pm election day and the results were not
disclosed to the observers.

The results of 30 RMA precincts were released and announced as of 15 May 2010. Last 20 May, Comelec announced results of about
300 RMA precincts were completed with few discrepancies.

PPCRV and Comelec announced some .07% discrepancies in about 400 ERs audited as of 21 May. No target completion was announced.

This should be compared to the Bid Bulletin Specifications "Component 1B- PCOS Machine -

10. The system shall count the voter’s vote as marked on the ballot with an accuracy rating of at least 99.995 %."

If in 400 ERs audited, .07% discrepancy is noted, how much more discrepancy can be expected for the rest of the 76,340 ERs?

6. SEVERAL VOTER AND SECURITY FEATURES WERE DISABLED PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.

5.1 RA 9369, SEC. 7. requires "Minimum System Capabilities ... (e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;" so the voter can
verify whether his votes were the same as those read and counted by the PCOS machine. The AES disabled this feature. The
voter was only notified that his vote was read through the word "CONGRATULATIONS" shown in the PCOS LCD.

5.2 The same section requires "(k) Data retention provision;"

7
A memory card and Compact Flash Card designed to maintain the copy of the vote data and precinct, candidates’ data per PCOS.

Comelec was reported to have started destroying the CFC cards 15 May.

5.3 The AES disabled the Ultra Violet scanning capability (to detect fake and unauthorized ballots) of the PCOS when Comelec
discovered that the ink used in printing the ballots were not sufficiently dense to be read by this UV scanner.

Instead, Comelec procured 76,340 UV handheld scanners to take the PCOS UV feature. However, during the elections, the UV
lamps were not used.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

There has been a noticeable improvement in the peace and order aspects of the elections compared to past national elections. There was initial
satisfaction with the early voting results. BUT later events put to question the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, veracity and accuracy of the
vote counts in the ERs. The dark cloud rose from disabling critical, legally specified security features, particularly relating to the digital
signatures. Thus, no one (both perceived winners and losers) can be sure whether the vote results are true and correct, and reflect the real will
of the Filipino people.

Accordingly, the Election Observers Team of Global Filipino Nation challenges the legitimacy of the election results.

To resolve this very critical issue, GFN recommends the following:

1. In the short-term, impound PCOS machines, the memory and CF cards, and perform forensics on these using the actual ballots.

2. Comelec would promptly comply with Supreme Court directing the Comelec to make public the documents requested by
Petitioner about Comelec's preparation and compliance with the requirements of the law.

3. An independent, non-partisan qualified party would conduct a full-blown audit of the Automated System (including
recommended improvements to include automated registration, purging of voters lists, precinct mapping, and Internet Voting)
as inputs to the Advisory Council. The audit should cover:
a. Compliance with RA9369 and other related legal issuances covering national and local elections;
b. Compliance with the Terms of Reference and Project Specifications of the Bid;
c. Reasonableness of Pricing and Expenses involved in the Project vs. Contract, and approved changes;
d. Evaluation of the Technology used;
8
e. Evaluation of Internal Controls of the System; and
f. Evaluation of Performance by Comelec and Smartmatic management and project staff.

4. With the lessons learned in the automation of 2010, the following projects should be pursued in time for the 2013
elections:

a. As a priority, complete the computerization of the Automated Fingerprint Information System (AFIS), started by Comelec
several years ago, to complete and purge the Registered Voters List.
b. Complete the computerization of the Voters Registration Information System (VRIS) and that of the Project of Precincts
(POP) in order to prevent disenfranchisement, "flying and ghost" voters, and "ghost" precincts.
c. Finalize the amendments and corresponding Implementation Rules and Regulations for RA 9369.

GLOBAL FILIPINO NATION is a non-partisan international organization of offshore and onshore Filipinos in 30 countries committed to "Building
the Global Filipino Nation for Good Governance." It has been active for more than eight years in major governance issues such as The Overseas
Absentee Voting Law, the Dual Citizenship Law, economic initiatives, and social issues and programs for migrant workers.

GFN 2010 ELECTIONS OBSERVERS TEAM

The GFN Team covered municipalities and cities in Pampanga, Quezon and Iloilo.

1. Victor S. Barrios is an international banker and economist. He has served as Sr. Adviser to initiatives of multilateral financial
institutions in over a dozen countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. He is a Convenor of Global Filipino Nation.

2. Jun S. Aguilar, an OFW entrepreneur, is an engineer by profession who has served various international companies in the Middle
East for 13 years. He is CEO-President FMW Group Holdings Inc., Chair of the Filipino Migrant Workers Group and Convenor of
Global Filipino Nation.

3. Theodore B. M. Aquino, a California Registered Civil Engineer and a Global Filipino Nation Convenor, is a strong advocate for
Filipino Dual Citizenship rights and good governance. He has his own consulting engineering practice in California and in several
occasions provided pro bono consulting services to the Republic of the Philippines through the UNDP TOKTEN (Transfer of
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals) Programme.

9
4. Elsa A. Bayani served as an RN from U.K. and U.S.; Arkansas State Chair of National Federation of Filipino American Association;
and TV host Fox Network Asian American Focus, Little Rock Arkansas. An advocate for children in prison, youth and the elderly,
she serves as Chairman of Our Barangay Inc. to connect 42,000 barangays to the Internet and a Convenor of Global Filipino
Nation.

5. Tim C. Bayani, a registered criminologist, served the Arkansas State Dept. of Correction and Phil. National Police Commission. He
was the Dean of Criminology Manila College. He is a member of the FBI-Law Enforcement Executive Dev. Association.

6. Robert Ceralvo’s company provides wifi products/services to projects in the US, notably Google. He has been in the IT industry
for almost thirty-years and founded several start-ups. He has been actively involved with IT organizations and a Global Filipino
Nation Convenor. His motto is: Technology to the People.

7. Romeo Z. Cayabyab is a Sydney-based audit consultant and university lecturer specializing in treasury operations, risk
management, systems and operations control. He is also the founder and publisher of the emanila.com group of websites
including TheFilipinoAustralian.com.

8. Hermenegildo R. Estrella, Jr. is a Management Systems Advisor for public and private consulting projects. He held senior
management positions in IBM Philippines, Ayala Investment and Development, and Citibank. He is currently a Board Member
and Officer of My Wellness City and SIETAR Philippines. He served as the IT/Election Specialist/Consultant of the Global Filipino
Nation Foreign/ Election Observers Group.

10
ANNEX 1. INTERIM DETAILED ASSESSMENT

This Interim Assessment of the 2010 national elections can be divided into two areas:

1. Performance of Comelec and its deputized agencies vis-a-vis their roles, and in comparison with their performances in the 2004
national and 2007 local elections.

2. Performance of Comelec's Automated Voting, Consolidating and Canvassing System (referred to as the Automated Election
System or AES) procured from Smartmatic-TIM compared to the actual live System implementation, provisions of RA9369
governing such automation, System contract between Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM, System Project Management, and the
System deliverables.

TABLE I. PERFORMANCE OF COMELEC AND ITS DEPUTIZED AGENCIES

CRITERIA ACTUAL 2010 2004 /2007 2010 ASSESSMENT


1. Comelec
1.1 Registration of Voters Regular procedures with Regular procedures with No significant improvement
automated registration using automated registration using vs. 2004/2007
Purging of Lists biometrics. biometrics.

Comelec claims purging of Comelec claims purging of a


some 70,000 of voters in similar number of voters in
current voter list that year's voter list
1.2 Voter Verification / Checking of Voters Lists were posted on Voters lists were posted on Voters have great difficulty in
Names in Comelec Lists and Precinct the walls outside the the walls outside of each locating and identifying their
Assignments clustered precincts (several established precinct (up to clustered precincts.
established precincts into 300 voters per precinct) prior
one clustered precinct for a to the voting day. Long queues developed with
maximum of 1000 registered voters waiting several hours
voters) only on voting day. before voting.

Precinct assignments were No mailing of precinct The estimated number of


mailed to individual voters by assignments. disenfranchised voters in the
barangay (but mostly election may range from 2
11
received during voting day million to 8 million, according
only) to Comelec's consultant on
queue management.
Comelec website provides
finder capability for precinct This number may have
assignment per voter. affected the results in the
presidential, vice presidential
and senatorial results.
1.3 Voting and Canvassing (please see
Table II)
1.4 Release of Results (time) 80% of precinct votes Voting results completed Faster results at precinct and
reported by 13 May after more than a month municipal/city level than
Several winning local officials 2004/2007
proclaimed starting 13 May
90% reported by 17 May
9 senators proclaimed 17
May.
1.5 Accuracy of Results Most of declared winners 2004 national results In suspense following
follow the general trend of questioned with announcement of Random
pre and post election investigations ending up with Manual Audits and resolution
surveys. "Hello Garci" investigations in of filed cases.
Contract specified 99.99% 2005 to 2006. (No resolution
accuracy. yet.) With the assessments in
Two days after elections, Table 2, and awaiting a full
several incidents of potential 2007 (12th position) blown audit, this criterion
fraud and irregularities were senatorial results questioned awaits resolution.
reported, documented and and pending resolution.
protests filed (starting 17
May)

2. Department of Education
2.1 Performance as Board of Election Performed their assigned Performed their assigned BEIs have shown their best
Inspectors jobs despite procedural jobs despite incidents of under pressure
difficulties and long voter violence and related electoral
12
queues to serve pressures

3. Philippine National Police


3.1 Maintenance of Peace and Order Very few incidents of Has a high level of reported More peaceful and orderly
reported electoral violence. of electoral related incidents, than 2004/2007
especially in Mindanao in the
2007 elections

4. Armed Forces of the Philippines


4.1 Maintenance of Peace and Order No reported incidents
4.2 Involvement in the elections No reported involvement in Claimed involvement in 2004 Better performance in 2010
election fraud. elections,

TABLE II. PERFORMANCE OF THE COMELEC AES

MAJOR CRITERIA REQUIREMENT COMELEC PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT


1. Republic Act 9369
1.1 Sec 3 and 5. IT-capable person Trained and certified by In the observed Pampanga
DOST; at least one member voting centers, only one IT
of the BEI, and to assist the person (no certification
BOC shown) covered one voting
center consisting of several
clustered precincts
1.2 Sec 6. Use of AES "for the regular national and There was no use of the AES This is dangerous as
local election, which shall be contracted in July 2009 in Comelec's non compliance
held immediately after two urbanized cities and two means an untested and
effectivity of this Act, the AES provinces each in Luzon, unaudited system will be
shall be used in at least two Visayas and Mindanao. The implemented LIVE. May lead
highly urbanized cities and AES was IMPLEMENTED LIVE to unforeseen difficulties and
two provinces each in Luzon, NATIONWIDE in the 2010 erroneous results.
Visayas and Mindanao ..." elections.

13
"In succeeding regular
national or local elections,
the AES shall be
implemented nationwide."
1.3 Sec 7. Minimum System (a) Adequate security against Passwords for the BEI were
Capabilities unauthorized access provided. No observed
passwords for the IT
personnel.

Digital signatures were This is leading to a Legal


required but within two standoff as to the
months before the elections, authenticity, reliability and
these were not used. accuracy of the vote results.

(b) Accuracy in recording and Use of encryption in


reading of votes as well as in transmission announced but
the tabulation, an incompletely secure
consolidation/canvassing, transmission scheme is made
electronic transmission, and available, but not utilized in
storage of results; the elections.

UV reading by PCOS earlier The UV lamps were not


provided but later was provided nor used in the
disabled when ink density of Pampanga precincts.
the ballot was found
inadequate. An external,
handheld UV lamp was
procured to check on the
authenticity of a ballot.

Tests using 10 sample ballots There were reports that


were made after the May 3 stated some ERs contain
erroneous Compact Flash votes of 10 voters, meaning
cards (CFC) field tests. Not all that the votes transmitted
14
tests in 76,340 precincts were the test votes.
where supposedly all CFC
were reconfigured and
replaced, were completed
and announced.

Transmission tests were not


conducted as stated by
Provincial Election
Supervisor, Regional Election
Officer and his Deputy.

(c) Error recovery in case of Back up PCOS machines are


non-catastrophic failure of used within a province.
device;

(d) System integrity which Only a UPS is provided to


ensures physical stability and ensure the PCOS will not lose
functioning of the vote power.
recording and counting
process ;

(e) Provision for voter Voter only notified in the


verified paper audit trail; PCOS screen that his vote is
read.

The announced capability for


the voter to verify that his
vote choices were recorded
by the PCOS was disabled.
Only the word
"CONGRATULATIONS" was
shown in the PCOS LCD.

15
NO VOTE RECEIPT WAS
PROVIDED FOR.

(f) System auditability which Only a printed Election 30 copies of the ER were
provides supporting Return tape was prepared printed for each precinct and
documentation for verifying after the counting. distributed to authorized
the correctness of reported parties.
election results;
A Random Manual Audit was The results of 30 RMA
conducted for 5 precincts for precincts were released and
each congressional district or announced as of 15 May
a total of 1,145 of the 76,340 2010.
precincts nationwide. Last 20 May, Comelec
announced results of about
300 RMA precincts were
completed with few
discrepancies.

(g) An election management An Election Management


system for preparing ballots System module was
and programs for use in the provided.
casting and counting of votes
and to consolidate, report No prior tests were made
and display election result in instead implemented LIVE
the shortest time possible; immediately.

(h) Accessibility to illiterates No specific tests were made.


and disabled voters;

(i) Vote tabulating program Election Return tapes were


for election, referendum or printed out (see item f
plebiscite; above)

(j) Accurate ballot counters; Tested under item b above.


16
(k) Data retention provision; A memory card and CFC card Comelec was reported to
designed to maintain the have started destroying the
copy of the vote data and CFC cards 15 May.
precinct, candidates’ data per
PCOS.

(l) Provide for the Comelec provided facilities


safekeeping, storing and for storing their copies of the
archiving of physical or paper paper tapes, and the used
resource used in the election ballots, unused ballots and
process; other paper paraphernalia.

(m) Utilize or generate Printed official ballots at the


official ballots as herein National Printing Office.
defined;

(n) Provide the voter a Same as item e above.


system of verification to find
out whether or not the
machine has registered his
choice; and

(o) Configure access control See item a above.


for sensitive system data and
function.

"In the procurement of this An evaluation system was


system, the Commission shall provided but not announced
develop and adopt an nor released.
evaluation system to
ascertain that the above
minimum system capabilities
are met. This evaluation
17
system shall be developed
with the assistance of an
advisory council."

1.4 Sec 8. Communication Channels all electronic transmissions 4,690 polling centers have no
for Electronic Transmissions by and among the EAS and its cell phone signal from
related components shall telecommunication firms
utilize secure communication affecting about 5 million
channels ... to ensure registered voters.
authentication and integrity
of transmission." 5,600 Broadband Global Area No announced results of
Network (BGAN) equipment testing these facilities.
and 680 Very Small Aperture Slowdown in transmission
Terminals have been was noticed three days after
assigned to these areas. elections.

See item 1.3 b above.

No specific authentication
and integrity check were
released and announced
regarding the public telecom
facilities and facilities
utilized.
As observed in Pampanga,
Only 40,000 modems were there was only one modem
contracted to allow used by several precincts in a
18
transmissions. voting center, thus delaying
transmission.
Transmission in observed
precincts in Pampanga took
about 30 minutes per ER.
1.5 Sec 9. Technical Evaluation The Committee shall certify, Comelec commissioned SysTest Lab submitted a
Committee through an established SysTest Lab of the USA to report with some 4,000
international certification review the source code. comments for action by
entity to be chosen by the Comelec. No official
Commission from the Comelec also opened up to announcement by Comelec
recommendations of the political and other interested whether these SysTest
Advisory Council, not later parties the review of the comments were addressed.
than three months before source codes.
the date of the electoral The lack of transparency by
exercises, categorically The source code copy was the Comelec led the Supreme
stating that the AES, put in escrow at the Central Court to order Comelec to
including its hardware and Bank. produce the relevant
software components, is documentation on these
operating properly, securely, items.
and accurately, in accordance
with the provisions of this Act This action of Comelec led to
based, among others, on the suspicions and worries by
following documented citizen watchdogs that
results: insufficient testing and
checking are happening, that
may lead to irregularities and
possibly manipulation of the
vote results.

1. The successful conduct of a Bid Specifications "Annex E" Tests were conducted only at
field testing process followed stated that "There shall be as precinct level.
by a mock election event in many field tests as may be
one or more necessary until the
cities/municipalities; requirements for the tests
19
have been satisfied provided
that the tests shall not go
beyond December 5, 2009.
All systems shall be tested on
site, i.e. in selected locations
nationwide covering different
test voting centers, test
consolidation sites, and test
canvassing sites. The test
shall also include live
transmission of precinct
results. COMELEC personnel
shall operate all systems in
the test.

2. The successful completion No certification issued.


of audit on the accuracy,
functionally and security
controls of the AES software;

3. The successful completion See above comment re


of a source code review; SysTest.

4. A certification that the Announcement made.


source code is kept in escrow
with the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas;

5. A certification that the No certification announced.


source code reviewed is one
and the same as that used by
the equipment; and

6. The development, No announcement.


20
provisioning, and
operationalization of a
continuity plan to cover risks
to the AES at all points in the
process such that a failure of
elections, whether at voting,
counting or consolidation,
may be avoided.

"If the Commission decides No announcement.


to proceed with the use of
the AES without the
Committee's certification, it
must submit its reason in
writing, to the Oversight
Committee , no less than
thirty (30) days prior to the
electoral exercise where the
AES will be used.

1.6 Sec 10. Procurement of With respect to the May 10, The PCOS machine was not
Equipment and Materials 2010 election and succeeding used in the ARMM and 2007
electoral exercises, the elections. In ARMM, two
system procured must have voting machines, the DRE and
demonstrated capability and CCOS were used by two
been successfully used in a different contractors.
prior electoral exercise here
or board. Participation in the
2007 pilot exercise shall not
be conclusive of the system's
fitness.
1.7 Sec 11. Continuity Plan Activation of such continuity Not done. Although a
and contingency measures Comelec Resolution was
shall be undertaken in the issued to cover these.
21
presence of representatives
of political parties and
citizen's arm of the
Commission who shall be
notified by the election
officer of such activation.
"All political parties and Not know whether these
party-lists shall be furnished were furnished.
copies of said continuity plan
at their official addresses as
submitted to the
Commission.

The list shall be published in No copy published.


at least two newspaper of
national of circulation and
shall be posted at the
website of the Commission at
least fifteen (15) days prior to
the electoral activity
concerned."
1.8 Sec 12. "Examination and Testing The Commission shall allow
of Equipment or Device of the AES and the political parties and
Opening of the Source Code for candidates or their
Review" representatives, citizens'
arm or their representatives
to examine and test.
"The equipment or device to No test by the parties were
be used in the voting and made prior to the voting on
counting on the day of the election day. The only test
electoral exercise, before made was after the
voting start. Test ballots and reconfiguration of the CFCs
test forms shall be provided using 10 sample ballots.
by the Commission.
22
"Immediately after the
examination and testing of
the equipment or device,
parties and candidates or
their representatives,
citizen's arms or their
representatives, may submit
a written comment to the
election officer who shall
immediately transmit it to
the Commission for
appropriate action.
"The election officer shall No such minutes were made.
keep minutes of the testing,
a copy of which shall be
submitted to the Commission
together with the minute of
voting."
"Once an AES technology is
selected for implementation,
the Commission shall
promptly make the source
code of that technology
available and open to any
interested political party or
groups which may conduct
their own review thereof."

1.9 Sec 13. Official Ballot The Commission shall Comelec first made the list of
23
prescribe the format of the candidates on a vertical list
electronic display and/or the format but later shifted to a
size and form of the official horizontal list per position.
ballot, which shall contain
the titles of the position to be
filled and/or the proposition
to be voted upon in an
initiative, referendum or
plebiscite.
1.10 Sec 17. Notice of Designation of The election officer shall post No such lists were posted in
Counting Centers prominently in his/her office, the city/municipal halls, nor
in the bulletin boards at the provided the political parties.
city/municipal hall and in
three other conspicuous
places in the
city/municipality, the notice
on the designated counting
center(s) for at least three
weeks prior to election day.
The notice shall specify the
precincts covered by each
counting center and the
number of registered voters
in each of said precincts . The
election officer shall also
furnish a copy of the notice
to the headquarters or
official address of the
political parties or
independent candidates
within the same period. The Such lists were not also
election officer shall post in posted in the Comelec
the Commission website website nor published in the
concerned the said notice local newspapers.
24
and publish the notice in the
local newspaper. Where the
polling place or voting center
is also the designated
counting center, such
information shall be
contained in the notice.
1.11 Sec 18 and 19 Election returns The Commission shall Comelec provided these in Some protestors have shown
prescribe the manner and the BEI General Instructions; ERs with "Citibank
procedure of counting the and printed 30 copies of the Mastercard" marks and had
votes under the automated ERs. prior dates to elections, and
system: Provided, that apart several post dates marked.
from the electronically stored
result, thirty (30) copies of
the election return are
printed."
A. Distribution of ER copies (as above) (as above)
B. Electronic Transmission "Within one hour after the The BEI, in the observed
printing of the election voting centers of Pampanga,
returns, the chairman of the transmitted the vote results
board of election inspectors to the Comelec server, the
or any official authorized by PPCRV and KBP.
the Commission shall, in the
presence of watchers and
representatives of the
accredited citizens' arm,
political parties/candidates, if
any, electronically transmit
the precinct results to the
respective levels of board of
canvassers, to the dominant
majority and minority party,
to the accredited citizen's
arm, and to the Kapisanan ng
25
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas
(KBP).
"The election results at the The canvassed election This transmission step of
city/municipality canvassing results were transmitted to precinct to Comelec Server
centers shall be transmitted the Comelec server. was not provided for by RA
in the same manner by the 9369. The problem would be
election officer or any official that anyone in control of the
authorized by the Comelec Server would
commission to the district or already know the trend of the
provincial canvassing centers. voting prior to the precinct
results going to the
municipal/city as mandated.
"The election returns
transmitted electronically This is now the legal subject
and digitally signed shall be in the National Canvassing as
considered as official election digital signatures as required
results and shall be used as by RA 9369 were not
the basis for the canvassing purposely utilized upon
of votes and the orders of the Comelec.
proclamation of a candidate."
1.12 Sec. 20 Canvassing by Provincial, "Within one hour after the The canvassed election In the first hours of
City, District and Municipal Boards of canvassing, the Chairman of results were transmitted first canvassing in the City of San
Canvassers the district or provincial to the Comelec server, then Fernando, what was shown in
Board of Canvassers or the to the various canvassing the projected canvass, after
city board of canvassers of centers. the election, were only the
those cities which comprise number of precincts
one or more legislative reporting without vote
districts shall electronically results.
transmit the certificate of
canvass to the commission
sitting as the national board
of canvassers for senators
and party-list representatives
and to the Congress as the
26
National Board of Canvassers
for the president and vice
president, directed to the
President of the Senate.
"The Commission shall adopt
adequate and effective No such measures were
measures to preserve the released nor announced.
integrity of the certificates of
canvass transmitted Comelec Resolution 8786
electronically and the results instructed the BEIs not to
in the storage devices at the indicate their digital
various levels of the boards signatures for the
of canvassers. transmission.
"The certificates of canvass
transmitted electronically
and digitally signed shall be See 1.11 B above assessment.
considered as official election
results and shall be used as
the basis for the
proclamation of a winning
candidate."
1.13 Sec. 24 Random Manual Audit Where the AES is used, there Same as item 1.3 f above. Same as item 1.3 f above.
shall be a random manual
audit in one precinct per The RMA precincts were PPCRV and Comelec
congressional district raffled 12 noon of election announced some .07%
randomly chosen by the day. As observed in discrepancies in about 400
Commission in each province Pampanga, the RMA in one ERs audited as of 21 May. No
and city. Any difference precinct in Telabastagan was target completion was
between the automated and started at 8pm election day. announced.
manual count will result in
the determination of root
cause and initiate a manual
count for those precincts
affected by the computer or
27
procedural error."
1.14 Sec. 26 Stakeholder education The Commission shall, not Comelec initiated the
and training later than six months before stakeholder education and
the actual automated training program together
election exercise, undertake with concerned peoples'
a widespread stakeholder groups and organizations
education and training through print, radio and TV
program, through newspaper media.
of general circulation, radio,
television and other media
forms, as well as through
seminars, symposia, fora and
other nontraditional means,
to educate the public and
fully inform the electorate
about the AES and inculcate
values on honest, peaceful,
orderly and informed
elections.
1.15 Sec. 30 Rules and Regulations The Commission shall No implementing rules and
promulgate rules and regulations were provided for
regulation for the the implementation and
implementation and enforcement of this Act.
enforcement of this Act.

2. Contract Between Comelec and


Smartmatic-TIM
2.1 Compliance to RA9369 provisions Contract indicated provisions As stated in the various items
and attachments that comply in this column, there were
with RA 9369, the Terms of many required specifications
Reference and Project that were disregarded,
Specifications of the Bid. disabled and not provided for
in the actual implementation.
2.2 Reasonableness of Pricing Total Smartmatic Contract is Comelec agreed to all these Although this pricing is below
28
P7,191.4 million pricing provisions. the P11,230 million budget,
there are certain items that
are way above industry price
levels.

10%: Project Initialization, This will be difficult to justify


Set up Project Management considering it is only
Team and Project Systems initialization and set-up, and
including all SW licenses and considering the main
firmware- P719 million software is only P42 million.

5%: Delivery of Development The cost of 20 PCOS units is


Set (20 PCOS units)- P359 about P1.0 million. The
million balance of P358 million
would be difficult to justify.

5%: Report on Transmission The actual services and


and Logistics- P359 million equipment for transmission is
only P199.9 million, logistics
5%: Delivery of Functional is P916 m, so it would again
System and Software- P359 be difficult to justify such as
million report.

Project Management- P99.9 The Project is for a year, and


million certainly this amount is
extravagant as no such
Project team would justify
such an amount for their
services.

82,200 PCOS machines One PCOS is leased for


(lease) – P3,346 million P45,419, which is almost the
purchase price of one
available in the market,
29
further should be lower as a
big volume is ordered.
Total software – P42 million

Electronic Transmission –
P199.9 m

Logistics – P916 million

2.3 Compliance to contract provisions See items 3 and 4 below. See items 3 and 4 below. See items 3 and 4 below.
3. Project Management
3.1 Project Manager Requirement for the Project No Project Manager of Questions arising from the IT
Manager: Smartmatic has been community have been raised
• Minimum fifteen (15) identified, shown nor quoted whether the Smartmatic and
years relevant IT during the entire election Comelec Project Managers
experience; period, up to the present. are really qualified and
• At least ten (10) years experienced to perform the
experience in managing required work, as shown by
large-scale multi-site IT project delays and non-
development and compliance to key and critical
implementation projects aspects of the automation.
involving relational
databases and wide area
networks;
• With actual experience in
assisting in the bid
processes of any
government agency
following RA 9184 –
Philippine government
procurement rules,
regulations and processes

3.2 Completion of planned activities A time schedule was posted There had been delays in the These delays led to
30
in the Comelec website. deliveries of the PCOS insufficient testing, to note
machines and completion of particularly the one that led
activities. to the Monday May 3
episode that rushed the Final
Light penalties were charged Testing and Sealing of the
to Smartmatic. PCOS machines and
reconfigured CF cards.

Such delays are now being


considered as critical to the
resolution of protests
regarding irregularities found
out in the voting results.
4. Deliverables
4.1 Compliance to quality of project Several certifications were Only the certification by Lack of transparency by
specifications required and specified. SysTest was announced but Comelec and Smartmatic on
not published. these requirements puts to
doubt the test quality and
implementation results of the
whole system.
4.2 Adherence to timetables See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above See item 3.2 above
Canvass and proclamation of As provided for in the Project Canvass about 90% by 17
winners Timetable: Finish by May
05.13.10 Proclamation of 9 of 12
senators made 17 May.

31

You might also like