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Winter 2017
HOOVER D I G E ST
P O L IT IC S
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14
Visions of Democracy
Global democracy is in trouble, and Donald Trump can either
help it or harm it. Where will he lead? By Larry Diamond
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28
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 3
T HE ECO N OMY
36
40
44
53
57
L AB OR
61
R EG U LAT ION
65
Progressively Poorer
So-called progressives are hostile to free markets, capital, and
laborthe very things that would reduce the inequality they
claim to abhor. By Richard A. Epstein
72
F OR E IGN P OL ICY
77
80
Staying Power
Some of Americas founders would have liked Donald Trumps
America First foreign policy. After all, they were the original
foes of risky entanglements abroad. By Elizabeth Cobbs
T E R R OR ISM A ND DE FE NSE
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 5
92
98
Islamism Implacable
The terrorists are in some ways only Europes second-worst
enemy. Europes worst enemy is itself. By Charles Hill
R USS IA
103
108
EUROPE
120
IRA N
131
SY R IA
136
E DUCAT ION
146
150
IN T E RVIE WS
154
165
A Miracle or a Relic
Hoover fellow Terry Moe argues that the US Constitution
is an anachronism that needs fundamental change. By Peter
Robinson
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Past Is Prologue
Determined to shape the future, the new president needs to be
reminded of the past. Lets convene a council of historians.
By Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson
180
HOOV E R A R C HIVE S
184
A Bomb to Remember
The 1946 nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll were a shocking
introduction to the perils of the atomic age. Rare artifacts and
records tell the story. By Jean McElwee Cannon and
James Sam
POLI T I C S
Shaken and
Stirred
That tremor felt after Election Day was American
democracy in action. Donald Trumps allies and
foes alike can make sure American principles
stand firm.
By James W. Ceaser
racy exists in America do not seem to apply in this case. A bought election?
Hillary Clinton outspent her rival massively and enjoyed the support of many
more of the big donors. There are no Koch brothers to kick around this time.
Support from the big organized interests? Major unions, prestigious associations, and the denizens of the most powerful corporate board rooms were overwhelmingly in Clintons camp, just as Bernie Sanders had charged. Bias for one
side by the major media? No contest here; Clinton enjoyed a huge advantage.
Fabulists are sure to discover a few things to confirm their thesisinstances of
voter suppression, a right-wing conspiracy in the FBI and the bumblings of Director Clouseau, an electoral system that does not count the national popular vote.
But even the most ardent will be hard pressed to deny that the people spoke.
James W. Ceaser is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Harry F.
Byrd Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia and director of the Program
on Constitutionalism and Democracy.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 9
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 11
without a hashtag. This group saw the danger of a demagogic candidacy and
a threat to democratic norms. Opposed were a smaller number of intellectuals, who jumped in, at first tepidly, to defend Trump, admitting some of the
flaws but advising others that this was not a decision made in a vacuum but
a choice between two evils.
Vexed by what they thought
Trump followed the age-old strategy
was a lack of realism and a
surplus of moralism among
of divide and conquer, and his rivals
their adversaries, many
played their part to perfection.
reached their limit when
they observed the same criticism of Trump being parroted by the sultans
of sanctimony on the left, who pronounced daily on Trumps outrages while
referring to any limitations of the Clintons as minor mistakes or flaws.
During the last months of the campaign it was said that this split represented a fundamental cleavage within conservative thought. And as the argument
grew more acrimonious, as political arguments invariably do, it came to be
thought that fundamental and systematic differences in conservative thinking
were somehow the original cause of the division. More sober voices, however,
tried to remind everyone that this dispute did not cause the nomination of
Trump; on the contrary, it was the nomination of Trump that caused the
dispute. Few if any conservative intellectuals had Trump as their first option
or favored him as the partys nominee, and there is practically no correlation
to be found between the kind of conservative one is and the position one took
during this argument. This fact led to the hope that once Trump was defeated,
which most thought likely, the war would eventually end.
INSIST ON PRINCIPLES
Now that Trump has won, what happens? Can this difference be overcome
and is reconciliation possible? Restraint is a quality in short supply, especially
among intellectuals, and the temptation to settle scores is difficult to resist.
Those who thought themselves subject to being purged if Trump lost may be
inclined to seek purges now that he has won. What can be done?
The fate of the relations among conservative intellectuals is certainly not
among the top items of concern within the new circles of political power. But
its importance for the nation and for conservatism is real, even in the near
term. However much a campaign and election can be run, as we now know,
without much input from intellectuals, the nation cannot be governed, or
governed well, without their help. Facts have changed, and all are obliged to
work in the world we live in, not the one they thought we would live in.
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P O L I TI CS
Visions of
Democracy
Global democracy is in trouble, and Donald Trump
can either help it or harm it. Where will he lead?
By Larry Diamond
resident Trump faces a world with more authoritarian momentum and greater democratic instability than at any time in the
past several decades. How he responds will be one of the great
challenges of his presidency.
to have occurred in waves. The largest and most recent of these, the third
wave of global democratic expansion that began in the mid-1970s and crested in the 1990s, had already begun to subside as early as 2005. Since then,
declines in freedom and political participation have come incrementally. But
in the past year or two, several developments have intensified global anxieties about the health and future of democracy.
The first is a trend toward authoritarianism that has popped up in several
emerging democracies.
Turkey: It has been under a state of emergency since the failed military
coup last July. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has arrested some thirty-two
thousand alleged coup plotters and more than one hundred journalists, while
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a coordinator of
Hoovers Project on Democracy in Iran. He also is a senior fellow at the Freeman
Spogli Institute for International Studies and is the Peter E. Haas Faculty CoDirector of the Haas Center for Public Service at Stanford University.
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16
elites in London and Brussels, who had grown distant from common people
and unresponsive to their concerns. But for more upwardly mobile and cosmopolitan British people, as well as for the bulk of Europeans looking at the
vote from the continent, Brexit was a turn away from inclusion, integration,
and a liberal democratic Europe.
On November 8, voters in the United States delivered an even more stunning
upset by electing the populist Donald Trump to the presidency, in a turn of events
that Trump himself had correctly predicted would be Brexit, plus, plus, plus. In
fact, the core constituencies that delivered the
Brexit vote and the Trump The most ominous trend is the
increasingly manifest problems of
presidency were similar: working class white
democracy in the United States and
voters with limited skills
the advanced nations of Europe.
and education, who feel
culturally displaced and economically threatened by immigration, globalization,
and racial and cultural diversity. Both votes pitted culturally diverse cities against
predominantly white rural areas, small towns, and decaying post-industrial rust
belts. Both campaigns left their countries more polarized than before. And both
have deepened worries about the future of the liberal democratic order.
A PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD
Will the new Trump administration confront a gathering global crisis of
democracy? A new wave of breakdowns that could sweep away the democratic gains of recent decades? It depends. If Trump can bring the art of the
deal to Capitol Hill and fashion bipartisan agreements that address central
challenges such as economic stagnation, income inequality, and immigration,
the world may see that American democracy is working againeven if many
of Trumps policies draw opposition at home and abroad. Indeed, if the new
president pursues his little-noticed but progressive proposals on lobbying
reformwhich would make it much more difficult for former White House
and congressional officials to sell influence, especially to foreign governmentsthe quality of US democracy could improve in at least one respect
(though the prospective appointments of industry lobbyists to key government roles could largely vitiate that impact). And if Trumps pragmatic streak
in foreign policy leads him to recognize the value of supporting democratic
allies, his administration may be able to contain democratic backsliding.
There is reason to be skeptical: throughout his campaign, Trump made
it clear that his would be a foreign policy of realism, of pragmatism, and of
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 17
putting America firstnot of interventions to spread democracy. Authoritarian leaders such as Egyptian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi now probably
assume that under Trump, the Obama administrations pressure to democratize will vanish. Duterte, who offered warm post-election congratulations to
Trump, is visibly relieved to be getting rid of Obama, whom he called a son
of a whore after US officials expressed their concerns over extrajudicial killings. Silence from a Trump administration in the face of human rights abuses
by rulers such as these would exact a toll on democracys global prospects.
Yet previous US presidents, including Barack Obama, have made many compromises of this kind. And the world has changed since the days of Richard
Nixon, the last US president
to be a pure realist in foreign
Ronald Reagan understood that we
affairs. Today, there are many,
cant make America great again if we many more democracies
worldwide, and thus many
dont defend and advance our prinmore opportunities to pursue
ciples internationally.
common interests through
democracy. For instance, not enough attention has been given in policy circles
to existing but insecure and poorly institutionalized democracies such as those
in Indonesia, Peru, Tunisia, and most of postCold War Africa. Strengthening
the governing institutions and civil societies of these emerging democracies is
not inconsistent with Donald Trumps view of the world, which stresses friendship with countries that want to be friendly with the United States.
There is one further reason for hope. Part of what has made the United States
a great country has been its international standing as the worlds leading democracy. Ronald Reagan understood that we cannot make America great again if
we do not defend and advance our principles internationally. Whether Trump
understands that will be one of the most important tests of his foreign policy.
Reprinted by permission of Foreign Affairs (www.foreignaffairs.com).
2016 Council on Foreign Relations Inc. All rights reserved.
18
POLI T I C S
By David Brady
record number of
Americans perceive their
Key points
government as ineffective.
ago found that for the second consecutive year, dissatisfaction with government edged out the economy...as the
nations top problem. Last May, a poll
by the Associated PressNORC Center
for Public Affairs Research found that
just 4 percent [of Americans] say they
have a great deal of confidence in Congress, and only 15 percent say they
have a lot of confidence in the executive
branch.
20
able to respond decisively and quickly, which, of course, an American parliament could do. Its all very well to keep saying that we have the greatest
system in the history of the world, he writes in a follow-up post, but against
this background of dysfunction, it sounds a lot like thoughtless cheerleading. Similarly, in 2013, thenWashington Post columnist Ezra Klein claimed
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inter 2017 21
that our system of government is pretty unstable because both sides end
up having control over some levels of power...and incentives that point
in opposite directions. He went on: Our system is beginning to exhibit the
predictable, and terrifying, tensions of all presidential systems.
Taking a more urgent tone still is Matthew Yglesias in Vox. In 2015, he
wrote an article under the headline American Democracy Is Doomed.
Yglesias, sounding like the
early Christian apocalyptics,
The fond hope is that an empowered argued that someday there
US prime minister would swiftly
will be a collapse of the legal
and political order and its
enact effective policy.
replacement by something
else. If we are lucky, this would lead to a better, more relevant political system. He then cited the work of the late Spanish political scientist Juan Linz
to make the case that presidential systems simply cannot overcome gridlock.
In a parliamentary system, writes Yglesias, deadlocks get resolved. In
contrast, within a presidential system, gridlock leads to a constitutional
train wreck with no resolution. The conclusion was obvious: America needs
parliamentary government.
Writing in the Atlantic in 2015, Yoni Appelbaum was also dire. Noting first
that in parliamentary systems, governmental gridlock is relatively rare, he
delivers a harsh assessment of American democracy: Blind faith in the wisdom of the Constitution, and in its capacity to withstand the poor behavior of
its politicians, will ultimately destroy it.
Some American supporters of the Westminster system offer a more
thoughtful treatment of the question. The political scientists Thomas
Mann and Norman Ornstein claim that the problems for our presidential
democracy are now emerging in acute form because the Republican Party
is acting like a parliamentary-majority party without the mandate offered
by a parliamentary system. In their book, Its Even Worse Than It Looks:
How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of
Extremism (2012), they describe parliamentary parties as ideologically
polarized, internally unified, vehemently oppositional. In a system of
power-sharing and checks and balances, such unyielding organizations
cannot make anything happen.
The political system has become grievously hobbled at a time when the
country faces unusually serious problems and grave threats, Mann and
Ornstein write. The country is squandering its economic future and putting itself at risk because of an inability to govern itself effectively. In a
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 23
that demanded the type of decisive policies that are supposedly beyond the
abilities of our presidential democracy. If parliamentary institutions are
better at making and implementing policy, then one would think they would
have done better economically than the United States.
Using data from the International Monetary Fund allows us to compare
the US performance to that of the parliamentary democracies of the euro
area on real GDP growth, unemployment, and hourly earnings between 2013
and 2015 (with projections for 2016).
The United States was first in growth in 2013, 2014, and 2015, and was first
in projected growth for 2016. The United States also had the lowest rate of
unemployment from 2013
through 2015 and the lowest
David Camerons defeat in the
projections for 2016. Likewise, the United States led
Brexit plebiscite left many Britons
in employment growth in
demanding that the prime minister
those years and was proactually be weakened.
jected to lead in 2016.
In regard to hourly earnings, the United States led in 2013 and 2014, was
at parity with the euro area in 2015, and was the projected leader for 2016.
Finally, consumer price data show that in 2013 the euro area lost 1.4 percent
and had risen to a projected 1.1 percent in 2016, while the United States was
projected to have slightly higher consumer prices through 2016.
These data point undeniably to the fact that the United States had a
quicker, more robust post-recession recovery than the parliamentary democracies of Europe. This is not to say that our recovery was optimal; but, relative to others, the United States fared best. To be sure, Americas lead over
parliamentary systems here was not absolute. In Germany (and Canada and
Japan) unemployment was lower than in the United States during this time.
And Germany edged out the United States in productivity and hourly earnings. The United States did better than Germany, however, in GDP growth
and job creation.
OUT OF MANY, STABILITY
Surely, one might argue, this alone does not demonstrate that Americas
stronger recovery is the result of its presidential system. The objection is
fair, but when we consider the kind of action the United States took and why
European countries failed to do the same, the picture becomes clearer.
Critics of our presidential system, recall, claim that checks and balances
and veto points inhibit the swift implementation of bold, proactive policy.
24
Yet, thats not at all what we find in the case of the recession. The US
policy response was much more proactive [than the European response],
a group of Woodrow Wilson School researchers reported. Fiscal stimulus
was greater than in the eurozone in 20089....More important was the US
authorities active resolution of banking stress; eurozone banking problems
were allowed to fester. The researchers also found that US monetary policy
was much more aggressive [than in Europe]. American gridlock, it seems,
was not an issue.
Europes less decisive response to the recession was not accidental. In
fact, it gets to the heart of a deep structural problem with the Westminster
systema problem routinely ignored by its AmeriIts doubtful many Americans would
can enthusiasts. Because
tolerate a government that ignored
parliamentary governments
are more unified, they can
half the electorate.
be more completely manipulated. We live in a world where national governments are increasingly
buffeted by forcesnotably international financethat are very hard to
control, wrote the British political scientist David Runciman in the London
Review of Books. Decisive, single-party governments are not the way to resist
these forces, because their freedom of maneuver makes them easier to buy
off without anyone else being able to hold them to account.
That is precisely what happened during the recovery from the Great
Recession. International financial organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission,
leaned on parliamentary governments after the recession to enact budgetreduction reforms that resulted in a slowed recovery. In a single-party
government, its much harder for dissenters to influence policy, so the acquiescence was essentially total. Although not speaking about the recession per
se, Runcimans diagnosis is apt:
What national democracies need is not more autonomy but more
barriers in the way of any single political faction or grouping being
able to call the shots. The presence in government of multiple
parties representing multiple interests helps to give democracy
a measure of defense against the whirlwind of money that swirls
around it.
Thus, in the birthplace of the Westminster system, there are those who wish
for a more decentralized, less decisive government.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 25
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unhappy the present state of affairs might be, citizens may prefer muddling
through to being whipsawed by two elite minorities governing by their own
lights.
For all the popular calls for government to do something about a given
problem, its doubtful many Americans would tolerate a government that
ignored half the electorate with impunity.
And muddle through we do. In the United States, ongoing arguments are
the source not merely of gridlock but also of policy refinement and innovation. Whats more, Americans continue to believe that political arguments
can be won and consensus can shift. Indeed, our history shows this to be
true. The recent presidential election season showed clearly that our politics are not static. Taking the broadest view of American history, this is for
the good. It means, among other things, that a people dissatisfied with their
government will ultimately be heard.
In our presidential system, for all its frustrations, things do change and government does respond. If we have to argue about it first, so much the better.
Reprinted by permission of Commentary (www.commentarymagazine.
com). 2016 Commentary Magazine. All rights reserved.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 27
P O L I TI CS
The Infrastructure
Myth
Politicians always demand more infrastructure
and the spending that goes with it. Yet the United
States already spends vast sums on such things,
much of it wasted.
By Paul R. Gregory
andidate Hillary Clinton called for a big increase in infrastructure spending as a down payment on what she termed a national
emergency. She warned: We have bridges that are right now too
dangerous to drive on, although people take a deep breath and
drive across them. We have roads that are so riddled and pitted and potholed
that people driving them are having to pay hundreds of dollars to repair
the damage. We have airports that are stuck in the midtwentieth century
instead of the twenty-first century. We have water systems that are unsafe
for children to drink the water from.
She promised, if elected, to send a $275 billion infrastructure spending bill
to Congress in her first one hundred days. In campaign stops, she invited
voters to dream of the hundreds of thousands of jobs that her infrastructure spending would create. Her promised infrastructure boondoggle drew
Donald Trump into the bidding game with his unseemly pledge to double
Clintons program.
Paul R. Gregory is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the Cullen
Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of Houston and a research
professor at the German Institute for Economic Research in Berlin.
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 29
index. Will the 369 country specialists from the United States evaluate US
infrastructure by the same standards as the hundred experts from Egypt or
the thirty-nine from Haiti?
In its New Global Index of Infrastructure, the prominent Kiel Institute for
the World Economy has constructed an alternate infrastructure index based
on facts rather than expert opinions. The Kiel results are strongly correlated
with the WEFs, but the two differ on the US ranking. Kiel ranks it at fourth
behind Hong Kong, Singapore, and Germany. The first
two are city-states, which face lesser infrastructure
challenges. Among nation-states, therefore,
the United States comes in at number
two, just behind Germany.
If the Clinton campaigns
assertion that US
infrastructure is
30
crumbling and the Kiel Institutes numbers are correct, citizens of Switzerland, Canada, Luxembourg, Japan, Britain, France, South Korea, and Sweden
should worry out loud about their more decrepit and dangerous infrastructure. Strange that such voices are silent.
DO WE SPEND TOO LITTLE?
The second question: does the United States spend too little on
infrastructure?
The claimed US infrastructure crisis must be the result of too little spending relative to other countries. But thats not the case. According to OECD
statistics, the United States spent 3.2 percent of its GDP (200111) on public investment versus the European Unions 3 percent. With roughly equal
GDPs, the United States actually outspent the European Unionthe model
of infrastructure that our politicians frequently praise. Whats more, the
newly published McKinsey Global Institutes Bridging Global Infrastructure
Gaps confirms that US government investment (as a percent of GDP) has
outpaced those of Japan, Britain, and Europe since 2000.
The question, though, is how that money is spent. In both the
United States and Europe, public investment and procurement
are political processes characterized by waste and corruption. If
we get less bang per buck from our infrastructure dollar than
other nations, our problem is not too few dollars but too few
dollars efficiently spent.
We need fewer bridges to nowhere and less money
spent on propping up failing green businesses and public
employee pensions.
WHAT IS THE RIGHT NUMBER?
Finally, how much should we spend on
infrastructure?
The McKinsey report estimates that
the world needs to increase its 201530
infrastructure spending from its
current $2.5 trillion to $3.3
trillion per
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 31
year to achieve a GDP growth rate of 3.5 percent. In other words, the world
economies need to raise infrastructure spending by $800 billion per year for
the next fifteen years for a total of $12 trillion, or 15 percent of world GDP.
McKinsey, however, recommends that virtually all of the increased infrastructure spending go to those poor countries with alarming infrastructure
deficits. In fact, McKinsey
offers a list of countries
With roughly equal GDPs, the United whose current spending levStates actually outspent the Euroels are sufficient to produce
pean Union on infrastructure.
robust growth rates, among
them the United States. The
United States has a 30 percent surplus between current rates of infrastructure spending and infrastructure spending needs between now and 2030. In
other words, we do not need an infrastructure bank and a stimulus disguised
as infrastructure. We are already spending enough.
The American Society of Civil Engineers does not agree with McKinsey. These
civil engineers have decided that the United States must spend $3.4 trillion
between now and 2030 to correct our infrastructure deficit. If our civil engineers
had their way, the United States would gobble up 30 percent of the worlds extra
infrastructure spending that McKinsey says should go to the developing world.
Asking the civil engineers how much infrastructure spending we need is akin to
asking defense contractors how much we should spend to keep America safe.
A new president who is indeed a citizen of the world would direct our
infrastructure spending surplus to less-fortunate countries, not to campaign
contributors. Our builders, construction workers, and infrastructure lobbyists may not agree, but it would be the right thing to do.
Reprinted from Defining Ideas (www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas), a Hoover Institution journal. 2016 The Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
32
POLI T I C S
Return of the
Forgotten Man
American leaders like to invoke this character to
win elections. What can the new administration
do for him?
By David Davenport
Florida, for example, he said, We are going to massively cut taxes for the
middle class...who I call the forgotten people. These forgotten men and
women are the ones who built our country. He made similar references to
this key constituency at pre-election rallies in Raleigh, North Carolina, and
Grand Rapids, Michigan.
But this leads to an interesting question: who are Trumps forgotten man
and woman? Are they related to Franklin Roosevelts famous forgotten man
around whom he built his New Deal in the 1930s? And, going even further back
in history to seek a deeper understanding, where did the term originate?
What we find is a flexible expression that has varied widely in its meaning, a character whom Donald Trump resurrected and reinvented to fuel his
political victory.
David Davenport is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He and Gordon
Lloyd are co-authors of the new Hoover Institution Press book Rugged Individualism: Dead or Alive?
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 33
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War II and also winning white working class women at high levels, Trump
has reached down to the lower rungs of the economic pyramid, as Roosevelt
put it. Like many victims of the Great Depression of the 1930s, many of these
are unemployed or underemployed. But they are not impressed by what big
government has done for them. They seem to want more of the American
Dream rather than more government welfare.
The important question now is: what can Trump do for the forgotten men
and womenwhat will he do? He says he will cut their taxes. Of course he
alone cannot accomplish that, but with a
When the term was coined, it meant
Republican-dominated
the man who pays for someone elses
Congress, perhaps tax
reforms that, in turn, benefit yet
reform is possible. It
seems that the rest of his another person.
solutions are more like
Hoover than Roosevelt, more about building walls and rebuilding the economy, allowing them to create more jobs, rather than providing more government welfare or control.
So the forgotten man and woman rise again. Each president who embraces
them sees them a bit differently, but they have become a convenient political
appeal and a way to structure domestic policy.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 35
T H E ECONOMY
Putting Words
into Action
The new administrations economic policies range
from good to not so good. The time is short to
straighten them out.
By Lee E. Ohanian
resident Trumps economic vision for America is an unprecedented, unlikely combination of economic policies from both the far
left and the far right that he argues will right Americas economic
ship. Trump claims that his policies of trade restrictions, immi-
gration restrictions, tax cuts, and higher federal government spending will
create twenty-five million new jobs and nearly double the current economic
growth rate over the next decade.
These policies have given hope to a large group of voters who blame
globalization and government for the declining economic opportunities
and lower incomes many Americans have experienced. However, several
of these policies provide nothing more than a false sense of hope, particularly to workers who are the least skilled and the most vulnerable
to economic dislocations arising from globalization and technological
change.
Many see Trumps trade proposals as a critical policy tool to restore highpaying US jobs. The new president argues that existing trade policies have
Lee E. Ohanian, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a professor of economics and director of the Robert Ettinger Family Program in Macroeconomic
Research at the University of California, Los Angeles.
36
devastated the economic lives of many Americans and proposes to renegotiate trade deals and raise tariffs on China if the Chinese do not stop what
Trump calls unfair trade practices. These proposals have resonated with
a surging populist sentiment, but they are perhaps the most destructive of
Trumps policies.
DONT HURT TRADE
The United States benefits enormously from international trade. It not only
provides a much wider range of goods for Americans to purchase but also
benefits the average American household by about $10,000 per year in lower
prices. Moreover, US trade restrictions would not make our industries more
competitive.
Take sugar production, for example. The United States has protected
domestic sugar producers since 1789. After two hundred years of protection,
our sugar industry is nowhere close to being competitive, and it will never
be competitive. Todays sugar protection raises domestic sugar prices about
60 percent above the world price. The Commerce Department estimates
that three jobs are lost in the candy industry alone for every sugar job that is
saved by protection.
Moreover, raising US tariffs would raise the cost of the raw and intermediate imported goods that make up our complex international supply chain.
There is wide agreement among economists that increasing trade protection
could benefit a handful of workers but would significantly reduce economic
opportunities and incomes for everyone else.
Some of Trumps proposals for tax reform are more sensible. While lacking
in detail, Trump proposes to eliminate many tax credits and subsidies and
reduce marginal tax rates. This view of tax policy is consistent with the recommendations of every bipartisan tax reform commission since the 1990s.
Unfortunately, these recommendations have never been followed. Todays
US tax code is more
than seven hundred
thousand pages long. Future Congresses and presidents may
The corporate tax
inherit a very large fiscal problem.
code is the poster
child for tax complexity and inefficiency. The 35 percent statutory corporate tax rate is among the highest in the world, yet corporate tax revenue
accounts for only 10 percent of federal tax revenue. In 2002, the IRS declared
that corporate tax rules were so complicated that it was nearly impossible to
summarize them. They are even more complicated today.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 37
38
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 39
T H E ECONOMY
By Michael Spence
ince the end of World War II, the hierarchy of economic priorities
has been relatively clear. At the top was creating an open, innovative, and dynamic market-driven global economy, in which all
countries can (in principle) thrive and grow. Coming in second
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 41
42
technologies may need to be paced so that the economys structural adjustment can keep up.
The new emphasis on national interests clearly has costs and risks. But
it may also bring important benefits. A global economic order sitting atop a
crumbling foundation
in terms of democratic
Expect the United States to be more
support and national
reluctant to absorb a disproportionpolitical and social cohesionis not stable. As
ate share of the cost of providing
long as peoples identities global public goods.
are mainly organized, as
they are now, around citizenship in nation-states, a country-first approach
may be the most effective. Like it or not, we are about to find out.
Reprinted by permission of Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.
org). 2016 Project Syndicate Inc. All rights reserved.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 43
T H E ECONOMY
A Thousand
Things Going
Wrong
Hoover fellow John H. Cochrane surveys the
effects of economic reality on economic theory.
By Cloud Yip
Cloud Yip, EconReporter: Do you think a new general theory has been emerging since the Great Recession? Where do you think macroeconomics is heading?
John H. Cochrane: Eighty years ago, Keyness General Theory of Employment,
Interest, and Money inaugurated a very simple view of recession. There is
only one element: lack of demand. It doesnt really matter where the lack of
demand comes from. When theres not enough water in the pool, you fill it up
with more demand. There is just a single thing wrong with the economynot
enough demandand there is just a single dimension of cureto stimulate
demand. You can interchange monetary and fiscal stimulus. Thats a beautiful, simple view of the world, very easy to understand. All the complexity of
the economy stays away.
Medicine in the eighteenth century had its theory of four humors. It was
very simple: everything wrong in the human body came down to imbalances
of the four things. Similarly, in the view of Keynesian economics, everything
John H. Cochrane is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Cloud Yip is a
reporter for EconReporter (Hong Kong).
44
comes down to this one thing: demand or lack of demand. That is an unbelievably simplified view of how the economy works.
In modern medicine you would no longer say things like Aha! You need more
zinc in your diet and that will cure all your diseases! We now understand that
there are thousands of diseases, each with its own treatment or cure.
Whats wrong with the economy now is that there are a thousand things
going wrong. Every market is screwed up in its own way. There is no single
thing wrong so that you can come in and say, Aha! We will have a stimulus
program and solve it all! You have to cure it the way you cure diseases.
I think the difference between microeconomics, macroeconomics, and
growth theory will disappear. Its as if were trying to help an addict living in
a house crammed with junk, and old-fashioned demand-side macroeconomics says: Just forget that the house is a mess. All you need is a magic ten-day
cure, then everything will be fine. No, Im sorry. Youve got to diet, got to eat
right, got to clean up the house.
By the way, Keynesianism was a really useful idea for its time. The economy was in crisis, and dont forget how widespread communist and fascist
ideas were back thenthe notion that the government needs to take over
the economy and run it. By telling a story that demand management alone,
generic fiscal stimulus, could heal the economy, Keynesian ideas allowed the
core of a market economy to survive. But just because the story was useful
once doesnt mean we should cling to it forever. And just because a story was
useful doesnt mean it was right!
Yip: Do you agree that the major macroeconomics trends that emerged after
the Great Recession are mostly reboots of old ideas?
Cochrane: I think you have the observation quite right. A lot of economists,
both in finance and macroeconomics, said the financial crisis and the Great
Recession just proved they were right all along.
This is actually a good approach. If economics is a discipline in which
every data point requires a brand new theory, its not much of a discipline.
When physicists see something new in the sky, they tend not to say, Einstein
was wrong! We have to start from scratch. The first thing you do is try to
fit the new phenomenon in with the theory you already have, what Thomas
Kuhn called normal science. I dont think most of what we have seenfor
example, the financial crisis and slow growthare facts that demand a particularly new theory, as we have so many theories already.
The events we have seen are quite similar to events in the past. Weve had
financial crises on and off since 1700. At its core, this financial crisis was a
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 45
run, just like many other financial crises. I think that is the most productive
way to approach it. Similarly, were having a period of very slow growth, so
lets blame overregulation and an economy that has too much
sand in its gears. Just apply what we get off the shelf and it
seems to fit pretty well.
Yip: Lets go back to your medicine analogy. I
would say macroeconomics doesnt have its
germ theory yet. I think we dont really
have a consensus view of what
caused the financial crisis.
Cochrane: Why
was there a
sharp
46
recession after the financial crisis? I dont think this is a difficult problem.
Lack of aggregate demand, though vastly oversimplified, does explain why
we have a sharp recession after the financial crisis. The puzzle is why we
didnt grow quickly afterward.
Almost all economists, Keynesian or monetarist, and all the official forecasts said in 2008 that after the recession we will have a very quick bounce
back, just as we did in the early 1980s. Once the banks were settled in March
2009, everybody thought, Good, well bounce back up to where we were.
The puzzle is why we never bounced back.
I think this is illuminating. The traditional Keynesian theory really bites
the dust here. It makes explicit predictions that failed pretty dramatically in
the past eight yearsa deflation spiral.
Yip: You have mentioned the puzzle of slow growth. I think this is a good
entry point for our discussion of the Neo-Fisherian view of inflation.
One of the issues suggested by the Neo-Fisherian is that the Fed
should not keep the interest rate this low, am I right?
Cochrane: Well, lets separate the question of how
does the economy work? from what should the
Fed do?
When you think about it, zero percent
interest and deflation is actually perfect
monetary policy. This is an idea of Milton
Friedmans from a long time ago. If the
interest rate is zero, you get your rate
of return from the slight deflation.
That is just about perfect. The
only objection is it cant last,
but the past eight yearsand
Japans twentyprove that
wrong.
Since it doesnt show
up much in popular
discussion,
let me
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 47
remind you why zero interest rates are ideal: normally, the interest rate is
higher, and you have to spend a lot of time making sure you dont have cash
lying around; as much as possible is in your bank account, earning interest
all the time. If somebody owes you money, you have to make sure that you
collect that bill quickly before you lose interest on it.
At a zero percent interest rate, who cares? Cash lying around is just fine.
Furthermore, the United States and most other countries charge taxes on
interest, which is a bad idea. It is an important tax distortion, ensuring that
people put in a lot of effort to try to avoid the tax. If we are not paying interest, then there are no taxes on interest. Thats wonderful too.
So, your question presumes that there is something bad about low rates
and that the central bank should raise the interest rate and raise inflation. Im
not so sure that is right. Im happy where things are.
Now, lets leave aside what they should do, and just ask the cause and effect
questionhow does the steering wheel work? We take it for granted that if
the central bank raises the interest rate, that lowers inflation. But look at what
happened over the past few
years. Central banks set
Were having a period of very slow
interest rates to zero, and
growth, so lets blame overregulation what happens to inflation? It
slowly declines, back down
and an economy that has too much
toward where the interest
sand in its gears.
rates are. Doesnt it look a
lot like if the central bank lowers the interest rate, that lowers inflation? In fact,
thats always been the long run view; the question has been about the short run.
The standard view is that the central bank is controlling the interest rate
the way you would balance a broom on its head. Its unstable, so you always
have to move the interest rate around to keep the inflation rate in check. If
you move the bottom of the broom one way, the top of the broom falls off the
other way. If you cant move the bottom of the broom, it topples over.
Thats why old-style Keynesians, and monetarists, predicted a deflation
spiral once interest rates hit zero. They are exactly right to predict that, as
thats what their model says. Once central banks started enormous quantitative easing operations, monetarists say we are going to have hyperinflation.
Again, they were exactly right to predict that, as thats what their model said.
But nothing happened. The interest rate is zero and inflation is just very
quietly doing nothing.
I call this the Michelson-Morley moment. This refers to a very famous
experiment in physics that proved there was no aether.
48
The fact that nothing happened and the standard economic models used
in policy circles predicted an explosion is very revealing, I think. It suggests
that if the central bank holds the interest rate steady, inflation will eventually
settle down to where the interest rates are, not the other way around. Thats
the core of the Neo-Fisherian idea.
Yip: So the Neo-Fisherian view suggests that if the central bank pegs the
interest rate, the inflation rate will be stabilized?
Cochrane: Yes, but with a big asterisk. If you look at the past eight years of
the United States and Europe, and twenty years in Japan, it certainly looks
that way. The interest
rate is zero, inflaIf economics is a discipline in which
tion is very stable.
every data point requires a new theory,
We have had a more
stable inflation rate
its not much of a discipline.
over the past eight
years than pretty much ever before. That certainly suggests inflation can be
stable at zero interest rates, but it does not mean that inflation must be and is
always stable at zero interest rates.
Many interest rate pegs fell apart in the past. The traditional view came
from hard experiences of interest rate pegs that collapse, just like exchange
rate pegs collapse.
Thats where the Neo-Fisherian and fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL)
come together. When we look at those episodes in which interest rate or
exchange rate pegs fell apart, those were all episodes where the governments
were in fiscal distress. They were borrowing a lot of money and spending too
much, and didnt have enough tax revenue. They were using monetary policy
to try to cover things up. In order for lowering the interest rate to lower inflation, you need people to trust the governments fiscal policy. If people dont
trust the governments fiscal policy, then its not going to work, and theres
little a central bank can do about inflation.
Yip: Are there any other historical episodes that suggest the Neo-Fisherian
view is right?
Cochrane: In the postWorld War II era, the United States pegged the interest rate. Starting in the 1940s the US central bank simply said, The interest
rate on long-term government debt is going to be 2 percent, period. That
lasted from the 1940s to the mid-1950s. Interestingly, it fell apart on the fiscal
pressure of the Korean War. So one way to read that episode is a successful
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 49
peg that then fell apart when fiscal policy wasnt enough to take care of it.
When you read Milton Friedmans famous 1968 address that proclaims an
interest rate peg must fall apart, you see the influence of this episode, as well
as similar postwar European countries.
Another important episode in monetary economics is the end of hyperinflation. For example, Tom Sargent wrote the classic paper The Ends of Four
Big Inflations on this. Germany after World War I had huge hyperinflation.
The reason is that it had to pay reparations under the Treaty of Versailles and
wasnt able to do it, so it was basically printing money to pay the governments
bills. Printing up money to pay the fiscal deficitthat causes huge inflation.
So what stopped the inflation? Not the central bank monkeying around
with the interest rate, or even the money supply. What stopped the inflation
was that Germans reached
an agreement that solved
The traditional Keynesian theory
the fiscal problem, and
really bites the dust here. It makes
which enabled the governexplicit predictions that failed pretty ment to pay its bills. Then
inflation essentially stopped
dramatically in the past eight years.
overnight, interest rates fell
immediately, and the money supply grew because people were more willing
to hold German marks and the central bank was able to print lots more. So
think about this: if you look at the data, what you see is that inflation stops,
interest rates go down uniformly, theres no period of high interest rates to
remove the inflation, and the money supply grows. That looks really strange
from standard monetary views that said you need to shrink the money supply or raise the interest rate to get rid of inflation. But exactly the opposite
happened. So thats a nice example either for FTPL or the Neo-Fisherian
view.
Yip: Do you think this is the best time for FTPL?
Cochrane: I think this is the moment for FTPL. People are naturally intellectually conservative. They should be: each issue of each journal has about ten
new theories, and 9.99 of them are destined to be forgotten. But I think the
moment has come when people realize that the standard thinking just cant
work anymore. More deeply, I think we are all realizing that the view that the
central bank is tremendously powerful is no longer tenable. People used to
think central banks can just set the rate of inflation. Well, central banks have
been desperately trying to set the rate of inflation for eight years now and
have gotten nowhere.
50
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 51
finish up the model and explain where the inflation comes from. But people
choose to throw away this equation. Instead, we assume that central bankers
can threaten to blow up
the world if all but one
thing happens. So just
I think we are all realizing that this view
put the FTPL equathat the central bank is tremendously
tion back in, get rid of
powerful is no longer tenable.
this assumption that
the Fed will blow up the world if we dont do what theyd like us to do. That
changes the properties of the model quite a bit, that one little assumption.
I also need to point out strenuously that the policy world does not use newKeynesian models. They write very old-Keynesian executive summaries and
introductions, use old-Keynesian verbal analysis throughout actual policy
making, and then plaster some new-Keynesian equations in the back. The
actual models are enormously different.
Yip: So New Keynesian model plus FTPL would be perfect?
Cochrane: Who knows if it would be perfect? But I think that its the most theoretically coherent structure to start exploring the worldreally its the only theoretically coherent structure we have right nowand see how things work. Then
we let the data tell us whether it is really true. Also, like any theory, 99 percent of
the work is in the elaboration and application, not just in the basic ingredients.
Excerpted and edited by permission of EconReporter (www.econreporter.
com). 2016. All rights reserved.
52
T H E ECON OM Y
Non-explanation
for Non-recovery
The sharp downturn, as history suggests, should
have been followed by a sharp rebound. Why has
the economy sagged instead? Look to the feds.
By Robert J. Barro
ome economists argue that the recovery since the Great Recession ended in 2009 has been unusually weak because of the recessions severity and the fact that it was accompanied by a major
financial crisis. Yet in a recent study of economic downturns in
the United States and elsewhere since 1870, economist Tao Jin and I found
that historically the opposite has been true. Empirically, the growth rate
during a recovery relates positively to the magnitude of decline during the
downturn.
In our paper, Rare Events and Long-Run Risks, we examined macroeconomic disasters in forty-two countries, featuring one hundred and eighty-five
contractions in GDP per capita of 10 percent or more. These contractions are
dominated by wartime devastation such as World War I (191418) and World
War II (193945), and financial crises such as the Great Depression of the
1930s. Many are global events, some are for individual or a few countries.
On average, during a recovery an economy recoups about half the
GDP lost during the downturn. The recovery is typically quick, with an
Robert J. Barro is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 53
54
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inte r 2017 55
to hold the Feds added obligations despite the negative real interest rates
paid. In this scenario, the key factor is the flight to quality stimulated by the
heightened perceived risk in private investment.
Given the need for productivity-enhancing policies, it is sad that recent
policy suggestions by the presidential candidates emphasized restrictions on
trade and immigration and higher minimum wages. The former policies are
equivalent to constraining technological progress. Expanded trade in
The post-2009 period is not a jobless
goods and people is like
recovery, it is a job-filled non-recovery.
better technologyboth
raise the total real value of goods and services that can be produced for given
inputs. Mandating a higher minimum wage amounts to inefficient regulation
of the labor market by pricing young and less-productive workers out of the
job market.
At this point, it is hard to imagine US policy makers participating in serious policy discussions aimed at promoting economic growth. But maybe I am
too pessimisticafter all, the report on the US fiscal situation in 2010 by the
Simpson-Bowles Commission was very good. Its unfortunate that the Obama
administration ignored it.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. 2016 Dow Jones &
Co. All rights reserved.
56
T H E ECON OM Y
By Charles Blahous
Key points
58
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 59
among young adult men. We lack a single, agreed-upon explanation for this
persistent decline.
We need to correct these various causes of labor participation decline if
the United States is to resume the economic growth rates that made it the
leading economic power in
the world. We simply can
We cant afford to keep letting federal no longer afford to let our
programs shift productive people out largest federal retirement,
health care, and income
of the workplace.
security programs deprive
the workplace of people who, based on their health, age, skills, and general
inclination, would otherwise be working. Lawmakers will have no choice but
to confront these realities at some point, and would do well to do so sooner
rather than later.
Its important to understand that corrections would generally tend to
benefit individuals. This is because, while the current designs of programs
from the ACA to Social Security often induce workforce withdrawal, the
temporary inducement often comes at the cost of the individuals long-term
interest. For example, retiring on Social Security at age sixty-two reduces
ones annual benefits and increases the risk of outliving ones savings and
experiencing poverty in old age. Similarly, those who forgo employment to
receive substantial subsidies like those in the ACA often do so at the cost of
skill development that would otherwise result in higher wages later.
Only if we surmount our labor force participation challenge will we be able
to address other economic policy desires such as higher living standards,
lower poverty, and sound federal government finances. For these and other
reasons, reorienting federal policies to keep people in the workforce is likely
to remain the pre-eminent economic policy challenge of our time.
Reprinted by permission of e21. 2016 Economic Policies for the 21st Century. All rights reserved.
60
LA BOR
The Latest
German Model
Germany knows how to get young people into good
jobs without a college degree: vocational training.
America should follow its example.
he presidential candidates maintained that foreign competition and unfair trade practices hurt the United States. Yet the
problems of many American workers come not from the global
market but from poor training. The success of Germany, which
faces competition from developing countries, shows that well-trained workers can thrive amid pressure from abroad.
Only about one-third of American adults twenty-five and older have
completed a bachelors degree, according to our analysis of the Current
Population Survey. Most workers entering the labor force rely on skills they
acquired in high school. Meanwhile, about 75 percent of Germanys privateeconomy workforce has taken part in the countrys system of vocational
training with apprenticeships.
This system prepares millions of Germans for careers as machine operators, medical assistants, bank clerks, and countless other occupations. The
Edward Paul Lazear is the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at
the Hoover Institution, co-chair of Hoovers Conte Initiative on Immigration Reform,
and the Jack Steele Parker Professor of Human Resources Management and Economics at Stanford Universitys Graduate School of Business. Simon Janssen is a
research fellow at the Institute for Employment Research in Nuremberg, Germany.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 61
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inter 2017 63
Lost manufacturing jobs tend to draw the most attention from free-trade
critics. Foreign competition affects these jobs directly, because countries
tend to trade manufactured goods and not services. Yet the wage figures in
manufacturing are virtually identical to those for the economy as a whole:
American high school graduates in manufacturing earn 45 percent of their
college-educated counterparts, while Germans with vocational apprenticeships earn two-thirds of their counterparts. The relatively high wages of
Germans imply high productivity among those with vocational training.
Germanys model has its shortcomings. It places students onto separate
educational tracks as early as age ten and sometimes creates rigidity in a
technologically changing world. But misclassified students can, and often
do, switch academic tracks. Employer associations and trade unions steadily
update the training curricula to keep pace with shifting demand for skills.
A recent University of Zurich study found that training changes fluidly with
technology to accommodate the market.
While Germans with vocational training do well relative to university graduates, neither group has experienced much wage growth in the 2000s. But this
has little to do with trade: earnings outside manufacturing have fared even
worse than those in manufacturing, even though trade affects the latter more.
The different outcomes that American and German workers experience
provide an important lesson: cutting the United States off from the global
economy isnt an effective way to fight income inequality. Policy makers
can enhance the skills of the majority of Americans who do not get college
degrees by providing them with knowledge more suitable to working life.
Political candidates may rile up their base with anti-trade speeches, but
moving Americans toward practical job-market training could actually make
a difference.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. 2016 Dow Jones &
Co. All rights reserved.
64
R EG ULAT I ON
Progressively
Poorer
So-called progressives are hostile to free markets,
capital, and laborthe very things that would
reduce the inequality they claim to abhor.
By Richard A. Epstein
than fifteen million private-sector jobs were created under President Obama,
she said; many more people are now on health insurance; and the automobile
industry is booming. Her argument seemed to be that the Obama administrations progressive policies led to this economic growth. But a closer look
reveals a less rosy picture.
The day after her speech, the Commerce Department reported that
the slowest economic recovery since 1949 was getting slower still. Gross
domestic product (GDP) growth for the second quarter of 2016 was
down to 1.2 percent. The cumulative growth rate during the years of
the Obama administration was down to 2.1 percent. Consumer spending
Richard A. Epstein is the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution and a member of the steering committee for Hoovers Working Group
on Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Prosperity. He is also the Laurence A.
Tisch Professor of Law at New York University Law School and a senior lecturer
at the University of Chicago.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 65
held up for the short run, but capital investmenta more reliable predictor of future economic growthhad fallen. So how can these disappointing figures be reconciled with interventionist progressive policies
of the past eight years?
The standard Democratic response is that the decline of the middle
class is the source of our social and economic problems. But given the
high levels of consumer
demand, it is hard to
Theres no reason why capitalism (in
argue that rising levels
of inequality are to
contrast with crony capitalism) should
blame for our sluggish
tend toward inequality of wealth.
economy. Nonetheless,
given their populist aversion to free markets, the Democrats propose to
double down on existing policies: they want to move to a national $15-perhour minimum wage, add paid family leave, increase the strength of public
and private unions, and raise taxes on the richand then, presto, we shall
reverse the steady decline in median household income, which has fallen
from about $57,000 in 2008 to about $53,660 in 2016. The median household income reached its highest level of $58,000 in 2000 at the end of the
Bill Clinton era. Household income also fell, but less precipitously, when
George W. Bush was president.
THE MARKET WORKS BEST
Political campaigns are notable for their lack of reasoned argument, and
those of both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump were no exception. Thus it
is useful to turn to the circle of advisers and the intellectual elites that back
both parties.
There was, for instance, a largely misguided economic critique offered, in
the Wall Street Journal no less, by Ruy Teixeira of the Center for American
Progress. It was chock full of fatal errors of economic reasoning. His intellectual case was summarized in four propositions derived from Thomas
Pikettys well-known but highly flawed book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Teixeiras expos of the perils of unvarnished capitalism offered a causal
explanation filled with missing links:
First, the basic dynamic of the system tends toward higher
inequality. Second, this tendency makes economic growth less
effective at raising living standards. Third, faster overall economic
growth, even if unequally distributed, could potentially solve the
66
problem. Except that, fourth, rising inequality slows down economic growth, rather than speeds it up.
There is no reason why capitalism (in contrast with crony capitalism)
ought to tend toward inequality of wealth. Piketty starts with the basic
assumption that the rate of capital growth is always greater than the overall growth in GDP, at which
point the long-term domiNo iron law guarantees that initial
nance of capital becomes
success in the market leads to safety. a mathematical necessity.
The only way to stay ahead of the
One glaring weakness is his
failure to note that much
curve is to keep on innovating.
capital investment is in
depreciable assets, so that capital accounts can move downward as easily
as they can move upward. Under his view, labor should be virtually wiped
out today, which ignores the simple point that huge portions of the upper
1 percent derive their income from delivering high-skilled labor services
doctors, lawyers, bankers, developersto the public at large. In addition,
the huge fortunes acquired by present-day mogulsBill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezosmay be represented in corporate shares, but much of
that wealth derives from their early labor in some small garage or office.
Teixeira also failed to take into account the role of entry and exit into
labor and capital markets. The first entrant with a new technology can
reap billions. Those gains come in part from undermining older and less
efficient technologies, and thus act as a brake on any abnormally high
returns garnered by current entrepreneurs and investors. Yet in the next
phase of the cycle, new inventors and entrepreneurs will target those soft
areas in the formerly new generation of incumbents and garner their own
abnormally high rates of return. The only way to stay ahead of the curve is
to keep on innovating. There is no iron law whereby initial success guarantees safety over the long term. Individuals and firms rightly exit markets
when they can no longer compete. Inherited wealth tends to divide and
shrink, not multiply and increase.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the innovations that generate high
rates of return are less effective in raising the overall standard of living.
As a theoretical matter, the typical innovator captures about 10 percent of
the wealth that he or she creates, which means that the rest of that wealth
is distributed through market transactions to employees, suppliers, and,
most important, the customers, who receive a panoply of new products and
68
services at prices far below their reservation pricesthat is, the maximum
amount they are prepared to pay.
It follows that it is very difficult for any single group in a market economy
to preserve its outsize returns against the competition of others. It is therefore false to insist that rising inequality operates as a barrier against further
economic growth. It is always worth remembering that the period of most
rapid growth in the United Statesbetween 1870 and 1940was achieved
under a legal order that had a relatively strong commitment to laissez-faire
economics and classical liberal political theory.
The best evidence of the wide distribution of these gains is found in the
enormous increase in life expectancy over that period, which spread to all
segments of the population regardless of
Most of the wealth generated by innovageography, race, or
tion is distributed through market transsex. There is no way,
for example, that the actions to employees, suppliers, and,
overall increase in
most important, the customers.
life expectancy from
forty-seven to fifty-four in the twenty years between 1900 and 1920 could
be concentrated in the top 1 percent of the population. It had to be widely
dispersed, and that could have happened only by a combination of felicitous
events: the improvement of public health and infrastructure, whose benefits
extended to the whole population even if its costs were largely borne by the
relatively rich; the increase of superior products for consumption; and vastly
safer working conditions on the joball fueled by technological advances in
every area of life.
Nor did Teixeira offer any sensible explanation for how rising inequality
could ever slow down the economic growth achieved by voluntary market
transactions. The great virtue of a market transaction is that it leaves both
sides better off, even if the two gain in unequal measures. The higher the
rate of overall transactions, the greater the improvement in wealth and the
greater improvement in utility for all individuals, who can take advantage
of the plethora of choices made available to them in an open environment.
Ordinary transactions in goods and services are positive sum for the parties
to them, and generate greater opportunities for third persons everywhere.
KILLED BY KINDNESS
It is now possible to see how the progressive agenda thwarts the engine for
growth in ways that private ingenuity finds it difficult to overcome.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 69
The initial observation is that virtually every progressive reform undermines free markets and tends to establish monopolies in labor, agriculture,
and other industries. These rules frustrate the free entry into new markets.
It is therefore inexcusable that the first impulse of the determined progressive is to impose restraints on voluntary exchange. These new taxes and
regulations are always described benevolently as restrictions on the bad
partieson landlords, employers, insurers, health care providers. But in
practice they always operate as devastating constraint on both sides of the
market.
The labor law regime of collective bargaining that protects some employees also snuffs out opportunities for their nonunion competitors. Yet the
Obama administration tried strenuously to place new obstacles to workforce
access by marginal and teenage workers. It sought to force franchisors like
McDonalds to be subject to liability for the alleged unfair labor practices of
their franchisees; the Department of Labor works incessantly to subject ever
larger segments of the economy, including the gig economy, to more serious
regulations. These added regulations drive down employment opportunities
and net wages, which keeps the next generation out of the middle class.
When government raises the price of labor relative to capital, firms can
diversify in ways that workers cannot. Hence the greatest blows are landed
on the intended beneficiaries of this misguided legislation.
The recent figures
all point to a decline
The great virtue of a market transaction is
in business investment: capital, we
that it leaves both sides better off, even if
are told, is on strike.
the two gain in unequal measures.
And well it should
be. The rise of economic populism sparks an increase in tax rates for both
ordinary income and capital gains. The legal uncertainties over our vast
regulatory apparatus also exert a downward force. The hyperenforcement
of the securities laws makes potential entrepreneurs and investors factor
into their calculations the prospect of civil fines and criminal sanctions. The
widespread hostility toward free trade warns future investors that they will
face added difficulties in acquiring factors of production from abroad. The
massive subsidies for wind and solar energy impose higher taxes on more
productive elements of society.
Those burdens will be further compounded by the insatiable drive for
revenue to fund expansion in free tuition, Social Security, and other transfer
payments. The whole redistributive scheme bears little or no relationship to
70
the classical liberal theory of taxation, which uses taxes chiefly to fund public
goods for the benefit of all. The prospect of diminished returns thus explains
diminished investment, sans any of Pikettys intellectual diversions.
There is no single big story here. It is the accumulated distortions from
multiple levels of misguided regulation and taxation, each of which is celebrated with scant regard to the negative synergistic effects of the entire
package.
Reprinted from Defining Ideas (www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas), a Hoover Institution online journal. 2016 The Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 71
R EGUL ATI ON
By Henry I. Miller
thats only part of a trend that is having corrosive effects on the nation.
Former Office of Management and Budget director and former governor of Indiana Mitch Daniels put it this way in recent congressional
testimony:
A near-decade of anemic growth and the weakest post-recession
recovery on record has eroded Americans economic optimism.
A 2015 Rasmussen survey found that nearly half (48 percent) of
likely voters think Americas best days are in the past. As this
new pessimism has deepened, it has turned into an ugliness, a
meanness, a new cynicism in our national life, with a search for
scapegoats on the left and the right.
Henry I. Miller, MD, is the Robert Wesson Fellow in Scientific Philosophy and
Public Policy at the Hoover Institution.
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 73
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 75
76
F OR E I G N POLI CY
By Michael A. McFaul
round the world, our allies are worried. In South Korea, Donald
Trumps unexpected presidential victory fueled a deep sense of
uncertainty about the future of American leadership in Asia and
the world. Government officials and foreign policy experts have
been scrutinizing every Trump utterance about South Korea, trade, and security made during the campaign, and they dont like what they find. As I was
asked repeatedly during my recent visit to South Korea, does he really believe
that the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement kills American jobs, that South
Korea does not contribute substantially to the costs of basing our soldiers
here, or that South Korea and Japan should defend themselves against the
maniac of North Korea, including by acquiring their own nuclear weapons?
A similar frightened discussion about the credibility of the United States commitments has occurred in Japan, Australia, and most countries in the NATO alliance. In conversations, e-mails, and public statements I get from foreign policy
officials from Estonia to Canada, the question is always the same: does Trump
really believe all the crazy things he said on the campaign trail about our allies?
Michael A. McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
at Stanford University, and a professor of political science at Stanford. He recently
served as US ambassador to Russia.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 77
78
economic declines triggered by a trade war between the two largest economies in the world. Trump needs to back away from these extreme ideas,
which are gross violations of our own World Trade Organization obligations,
and instead take a more pragmatic, evolutionary, and cooperative approach.
Trump also could reassure allies in Europe and Asia by continuing, not
stopping, negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with our European partners and agreeing to explore amendmentnot complete abandonmentof the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
in Asia. Prematurely walking away from the TPP would be particularly
insulting and destabilizing to our Asian partners who have already signed
the agreement. President Trump must understand that our retreat from the
TPP would create a vacuum for China to fill with its own Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Talk about values. President Trump could utter the words democracy,
freedom, or liberty when describing what makes our alliances special. As one
senior Korean official told me, Trump only talks about money, and never
about values. It might be too much to hope that Trump might commit to
promoting democracy abroad, but at least he could pledge to defend democracy abroad.
Unlike some other foreign policy rethinks, signaling support for our
alliances would not alienate Trumps core electoral constituencies. On the
contrary, public opinion polls show deep support for our alliances among
the American people. And a reset with our allies would be cheap, requiring
mostly rhetorical statements, confirming existing commitments and adding
very few new resources. So, for an easy and early win in his new administration, President Trump should focus first on resetting relations with our
allies. Russia can wait.
Reprinted by permission of the Washington Post. 2016 Washington Post
Co. All rights reserved.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 79
F O R EI GN POLICY
Staying Power
Some of Americas founders would have liked
Donald Trumps America First foreign policy.
After all, they were the original foes of risky
entanglements abroad.
By Elizabeth Cobbs
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 81
THE GREAT RULE: John Quincy Adams appears in his official White House
portrait (left) by George P. A. Healy (181394). Adams reiterated George
Washingtons advice, telling Congress in 1821 that the nation goes not
abroad, in search of monsters to destroy....She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. [White House Historical Association]
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 83
T ERRORI S M AND DE F E N SE
General Mattis
Advances on
Washington
President Trumps choice for secretary of defense
made his name as both scholar and strategist, as a
master of both details and the big picture. Now he
brings his wisdom to the Pentagon.
By James Mattis
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 85
ideology, and adapting its methods, ISIS morphed into a much more robust
threat. Combining Al-Qaedas significant fighting capabilities with a stronger
focus on the administrative capabilities that might permit it to hold ground,
ISIS copied the latter from Hezbollahs model.
Basically, ISIS is a combined Al-Qaeda and Lebanese Hezbollah on steroidsdestabilizing the region, dissolving borders and changing the political geography in the Mideast, and hardening political positions that make
Mideast peace-building more remote by the day.
Gaining strength as they draw to their banner the most hardened and disaffected violent Sunni radicals, todays ISIS holds ground in a continuation
and significant maturation
of the modern violent jihadSaying that these maniacs are on
ist terror war that began
against us in 1983. In 1984
the wrong side of history will not
stop them. History is written by good thenSecretary of State
George Shultz noted that
people and bad.
the violence was no longer
random, and he rejected any moral confusion when it came to Americas
special responsibility to firm resistance against terrorism. Today ISIS
represents a threat to governance across the Middle East and a threat that
extends far beyond that tumultuous region. Having dealt with the mutating
threat of terrorism since 1979, I believe that, left unfettered, its only a matter
of time before ISIS launches transnational operations. We should approach
their threat in this manner and determine how to take away their initiative.
FRIENDS MATTER
The enemy is not waiting. I understand and appreciate the desire to pull us
out of the poorly explained Mideast fights weve engaged in. But as we say in
the military, the enemy gets a vote. In light of what weve seen...we must
now change what weve been doing, challenging or validating our assumptions about this threat, determining our political objectives, and building a
fully resourced strategy in concert with allies. Potential allies exist in the
region and around the globe, but nothing can replace American leadership in
bringing the interested parties together.
Friends matter in todays globalized worldjust as they have always
mattered. Alliances and coalitions are high priorities when we confront
todays challenge: we need to embrace those who reject terrorism, working
with allies even when they are not perfect because our friends stood by us
when we fell short of perfection. When the United Arab Emirates stands tall
86
condemning ISIS and its atrocities [and how it] aims to kill, terrorize, and
displace civilians, we hear our own thoughts in their blunt words.
So long as we demonstrate firm reliability, there are many allies hoping
for our leadership, both in the region and around the world....This will be
a long-term effort involving fighting alongside our partners; it will not be
solved with humanitarian airdrops to the surviving victims of ISIS barbarism. Additionally, forecasting the amount of time we will commit to this
effort is unwise, giving hope
to our foes that they can
ISIS represents a threat to goveroutlast us. Saying that these
nance across the Middle East and a
maniacs are on the wrong
side of history also will not
threat that extends far beyond that
stop them, for history is
tumultuous region.
written by good people and
bad. If history teaches us anything and we want to leave a better world for
the next generation, we learn that we must stand with those who share our
security interests. Throughout history it has been nations with allies that
defeated those without.
Today in ISIS we see again those who thinklike those on 9/11that they
can scare us by hurting us. While we didnt ask for this fight, we must again
show that we dont scare and we wont abandon our friends. By their very
barbarity ISIS has created a strong motivation for a wide range of countries
to move against themif America will lead. The barbarism of ISIS is a vulnerability worth exploiting to the maximum degree possible.
The strategy we choose must no longer deal with each emerging Mideast threat as a one-offthere is no single vexing threat to be dealt
with as an immediate, stand-alone problem. Nowhere is the impression of
American withdrawal more pronounced than in the Mideast. To counter
that impression and take necessary steps before our enemies grow stronger, we need an integrated regional strategy that avoids unintended consequences that come from dealing with individual problems without regard
for their regional context. In league with our allies (those who find their
purpose in moderate policies and being responsive to the needs of their
people), we must build a politically unambiguous, guiding vision. That
starts with a policy that provides clarity: objectively and persuasively laying out to the American people and the global audience what we stand for,
but also what we will not tolerate toward innocent people, either our own
or others. Recognizing that in the Mideast today vacuums are not filled by
tolerant elements, we must stand with those opposed to terrorism.
88
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 89
ISIS, for example, portend different endgames that demand different levels
of effortand thus different strategies.
Whichever strategy we choose, we should be reticent in telling our adversaries in advance any timeline that governs us, or which of our capabilities
we will not employ. Specifically, if this threat to our nation is as significant as
I believe it is, we may not wish to reassure our enemies in advance that they
will not see American boots on the ground. If a brigade of our paratroopers or a battalion landing team of our Marines could strengthen our allies at
a key juncture and create havoc or humiliation for our adversaries, then we
should do what is necessary with forces that exist for that very purpose. The
US military is not war-weary; our military draws strength from confronting
our enemies when clear policy objectives are set and we are fully resourced
for the fight.
Properly used, a mix of our troops can help set the conditions for the
regional forces that can carry the bulk of the fighting on the ground.
Half-hearted or tentative efforts, or airstrikes alone, can backfire on us
and actually strengthen our foes credibility, reinforcing his recruiting
efforts, which are already strong. I do not necessarily advocate American
ground forces at this point, but we should never reassure our enemy that
our commander-in-chief would not commit them at the time and place of
his choosing. When we act, it should be unequivocal, designed to end the
fight as swiftly as possible. No one is more reluctant to see us again in
combat than those of us who have signed letters to the next of kin of our
fallen. But if something is worth fighting for, we must bring full strength
to bear.
When one side resorts to barbarity against our fellow Americans and tears
up the rulebook about protection of the innocent, then the moral choice is
obvious. The only questions
lie in our wise choice of a
The international order promoting
coalition strategy and full
peace and prosperity is not self-susresourcing by America if we
want the same commitment
taining. We must choose sides.
by our allies. As British
Prime Minister David Cameron has said, true security will only be achieved
if we use all our resources.
Without firm action this poison will spread. The geography of the globalized world does not permit us to look away as if this is not our problem.
Geopolitical realities must be confronted, and the enemy of our enemy may
still remain our enemy, so the construction of an integrated Mideast strategy
90
to include confronting ISIS will not be simple. But that is now our duty to
ourselves and to the world that our children will inherit.
Without exaggerating the ISIS threat, we must bring objective purpose
and strong heart to this
fight to determine which
When we act, it should be unequivvalues will govern our
ocal, designed to end the fight as
future. With both the
swiftly as possible.
power to inspire as well
as to intimidate, America
should now bring both to bear with firm leadership and robust resources.
Vacillation or tentative American moves absent an integrated regional
strategy will not work to sustain the civilized international order in the face
of barbarians. Delay can only cost us as the enemy grows stronger. Failure to
act multidimensionally, decisively, and in concert with allies can only leave us
vulnerable to future enemy attacks.
These remarks were delivered September 18, 2014, before the House Intelligence Committee.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 91
T ERRORI S M AND DE F E N SE
The Other
Forever War
Its been two long years since we launched a war
against the Islamic State, yet the American people
have never had a chance to debate itor consent to
the sacrifices it entails.
e have now marked the fifteenth anniversary of the beginning of the longest armed conflict in American history.
But another significant anniversary in the forever war
has also come and gone: as of September 10, two years had
for the conflict against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and associates since a few
days after the 9/11 attacks. Obama said he welcomed congressional support
for this effort in that address while making clear that he did not require it.
One month later, the Pentagon named the campaign Operation Inherent
Resolve.
The inclusion of Operation Inherent Resolve under the AUMF rubric was
controversial and not entirely persuasive, since the Islamic State was not at
that time (and has not since then been) a force associated with Al-Qaeda. Yet
for more than two years now Congresss long-ago approval for war against
the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks has been the legal foundation for war
against the Islamic State as wella war that, many Obama administration
military officials said, will last at least decades.
We do not fault Obama for enhancing US military efforts against the obvious threat posed by the Islamic State. But his decision to expand the war
unilaterally on the basis of the 2001 AUMF rather than return to Congress
and the American people and insist on a new authorization for this new war
was a fateful one.
The claim of authority under the 2001 AUMF to fight the Islamic State
took away every political incentive that the responsibility-shy Congress
might have had to debate and authorize the war. And that in turn has stunted
robust and extended debate about the nature of the threat the Islamic State
poses and the sacrifices the nation needs to make to defeat it.
LIGHT FOOTPRINT, HEAVY IMPACT
Nor have events in the world necessitated such debate. The war against the
Islamic State was the epitome of former president Obamas light footprint
warfare characterized by heavy reliance on airpower (especially drones), special operations forces, and cyber-operations. Light-footprint warfare takes
place largely in secret, largely from a distance, and largely without threat to
US personnel. By design, it does not attract nearly the same level of congressional and especially public scrutiny as do more conventional military means.
Congress and the American people of course know about the war against
the Islamic State, and Congress has gone along with the stealth war via what
are in effect stealth appropriations, even while declining to approve the presidential actions explicitly. But Congress as an institution has refused to weigh
in explicitly on the military efforts against the Islamic State. Deadlock over a
new AUMF for the Islamic State is unlikely to be broken soon. Among other
reasons, the White Houses legal needs are served by a stretched 2001 AUMF,
and many members of Congress see possible political downside but little
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 93
NO FINISH LINE: A boy joins civilians returning to their village near Mosul,
Iraq, after it was recaptured from Islamic State militants. Over two years
of fighting in Operation Inherent Resolve, a light footprint campaign, the
United States conducted 11,442 strikes in Iraq and Syria and three US soldiers
were killed. [Thaier al-SudaniReuters]
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 95
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H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 97
Islamism
Implacable
The terrorists are in some ways only Europes
second-worst enemy. Europes worst enemy is
itself.
By Charles Hill
specter is haunting Europeagain. Now, as in Marxs proclamation, an idea generated in Europe has had consequences
elsewhere that threaten modern civilization.
Modernitys world-spanning influence has been accurately
Over the past four centuries this became the framework of what was called
modern and generally accepted around the world as the only system that
made room for wide cultural diversity through a simple set of procedures
founded on the improbable but imperative juridical doctrine of the equality
of states, creating historys first-ever liberal world order.
Looking back with fresh eyes we can see that every major modern war
Napoleonic, the first and second world wars, the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions, and the Cold Warwas launched by a neoimperial or radical ideology bent on destroying and replacing the modern state system. This
countercurrent has been carried, forcibly and subversively, into the twentyfirst century by the revolution that produced the Islamic Republic of Iran, by
Saudi-supported Wahhabi Salafism, and most recently by the Islamic State
(also known as ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh).
As the Modern Age has been Eurocentric, the main battle for modernitys
survival is taking place in Europe. Here is the fulcrum on which historys next
phase has begun to turn because Europe in the late Cold War years decided
to urgently redefine itself against its own history and the international state
system it had created in order to carry the concept of modernity as secular,
scientific, administrative, and ethical to a perfected degree.
RELENTLESS SECULARIZATION
This was propelled by the German Historikerstreit (the historians dispute), a
late 1980s controversy about the causes and justifications of guilt in the past.
This aroused an intellectual-moral reaction of Enough! That was then; this
is now. Europe would pride itself by accelerating the European Union into
a new form of transnational entity that would eschew war, abolish sovereign
borders, exalt diplomacy,
and supersede the WestphaThe European Union made itself the
lian system by offering the
epitome of the Modern Age by relentworld a compelling model of
how to dismantle the state
less secularization. Islamism made
by devolving some of its
itself the implacable adversary of
powers downward according that modernity.
to the concept of subsidiarity while pulling other powers up into a pan-European bureaucracy in Brussels which, however defined, would not be a state. There would be a new flag
bearing no hint of national identity and a new currency depicting unidentifiable architecture of no discernable origin. While some worried that subsidiarity originated with Saint Thomas Aquinas and that the flag recalled the
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 99
Blessed Virgin Marys iconography, the EU assured all that it was entirely
unreligious and noted the care with which the text of its voluminous constitutionunratifiedavoided any reference to Europes Christian heritage.
Put simply, the European Union made itself the epitome of the Modern Age
by relentless secularization. Islamism, emerging from the postWorld War
I collapse of the Ottoman empire and caliphate, made itself the vanguard of
jihadist religions rise to become the implacable adversary of modernity. If
Europe is where the siege is to take place, the drawbridge already is up:
Islamism abhors the state; the EU has emasculated it.
100
Islamism recognizes only one border: between itself and regions yet to
become Muslim; Europe has opened its borders to the point of abolishing the
concept altogether.
Islamism regards democracy as un-Islamic because it enacts laws other
than sharia; the European Union from its inception has acted assiduously to
prevent people from governing themselves democratically.
Islamists, like Machiavelli, know that armed prophets are victorious and
unarmed prophets are destroyed; the European Union has deliberately diminished its capacities to defend itself or to back its diplomacy with strength.
And while Islamists declare religion to be the answer, the EU has seen
religion as the problem. As Pierre Manent has pointed out, had Europeans
maintained their identity as sovereign states with a Christian heritage, the
assimilation of Muslims could have been possible on the basis of comity,
whereas now it lacks an answer to assimilation to what?
Americans need to understand that the Modern Age with its pluralistic
structures, societies, and beliefs is under assault and that the enemies of
modernity are uniate, unwilling to accept others on an equal basis. In this
context Americas involvement in the Middle East must take the side of pluralistic states and parties compatible with the international system.
HANDS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC
Only Europeans can rectify the flaws in the European Unions design to
enable Europe to act on the world stage as a bordered state incorporating its
historic nation-states in confederation. And only Europeans can attend to the
needs of the European soul.
But however the relationship between Britain and Europe comes out, the
United States must regard its relations with both as special. Transatlantic
unity has been the keystone of the defense and extension of freedom in wartime for a hundred years and must remain so.
It is not the European Union but NATO that has been the key to transatlantic solidarity. Strengthening NATO as a military alliance with political
consequences in support of a reformed European Union must be at the core
of American policy. NATOs role out of area will be vital along with continued efforts to integrate like-minded partners to the extent possible: Russia,
Israel, the gulf Arab states. The Modern Age itself is at stake.
Subscribe to The Caravan, the online Hoover Institution journal that
explores the contemporary dilemmas of the greater Middle East (www.
hoover.org/publications/caravan). 2016 The Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved.
102
R USSI A
Can Trump
Handle Putin?
Forewarned is forearmed. Lets arm our new
president with the facts about Russia.
By Paul R. Gregory
The new president should be able to restore growth and economic confidence with the ready remedies of deregulation, tax reform, and the end of
zero interest rates. He will be able to reverse the Obama administrations
legacy items passed by executive order. He can replace ObamaCare at
the height of its unpopularity as rate increases kick in and doctors opt out.
Conservatives can embrace
much of a Trump economic
As someone who prides himself on
program of tax cuts, dereguhis negotiating ability, Trump will
lation, and the freeing of the
energy sector.
readily grasp the first rule: you must
Globalists will have to
understand the party on the other
wait
and see how the Trump
side of the table.
administration renegotiates
trade deals. If Trump wants them re-examined for special-interest wheeling and dealing and lack of compliance, they could indeed end up improved.
Trump would be prevented by checks and balances from using arbitrary
penalties to dissuade companies from moving abroad. Most important, his
tax policy would remove tax advantages as a reason for relocating to other
countries.
Progressives will lament the decline in political correctness. Trumps own
manner of speaking is bereft of political correctness, and his concern about
the vulgarity of the pop culture that influences our children is widely shared.
I believe a wide swath of the American public is tired of safe spaces, transgender bathrooms, and multiple gender identifications. Trumps campaign
message is that we have more important things to consider, like jobs. Americas main street seems to agree.
Environmentalists will lament the loss of an anti-carbon president. Under
Trump, we will see declining support for green energy and UN climate
deals, and an actual discussion of the science of climate change. Americas
main street will respond to environmentalist outrage with the question:
how many jobs and how much economic growth has the green economy
produced?
THE THREAT OF MISCALCULATION
The major threat to a successful Trump presidency lies in the area of foreign
policy, namely, in his relationship with Russian president Putin.
Trump admittedly knows little about world affairs and is acquainted with
few world leaders. His views of the world are still being shaped. Let us hope
that he will surround himself with the right people and be a quick study.
104
As a new president, Trump should indeed sit down with Putin to probe for
areas of common interest. As someone who prides himself on his negotiating ability, Trump will readily grasp the first rule: you must understand the
party on the other side of the table. Putin would be no exception.
Despite widespread angst, I consider that the few loose remarks Trump
made about Russia, Putin, and NATO during the presidential campaign do
not define a Russian policy. The exchange of compliments and expressions of
willingness to re-engage follow standard diplomatic protocol and have little
meaning. Trump, however, should prepare his Russian policy with an understanding of the facts, all of which the Kremlin narrative disputes.
First, it is a fact that Putin has declared the United States enemy
number one since his February 2007 speech in Munich. In Putins world,
the United States and its NATO allies are intent on surrounding and dismembering Russia. Any aggressive actions of Russiasin Georgia, Crimea,
Ukraineare therefore purely defensive in nature. Putins entire domestic
repression policiesremoval of potential opponents, state control of media,
arrests of protestersis justified by the American threat. His regime could
not survive as is without this purported threat. How can Trump get along
very well with a negotiating partner whose regimes very existence requires
that the United States be Russias major enemy?
Second, it is a fact that Putin ordered the Crimean annexation and
the hybrid war against Ukraine. That conflict has killed more than nine
thousand people and wounded nearly twenty-one thousand. Combatants and
civilians are still being killed daily despite a so-called truce brokered by Russia and European leaders at Minsk. Oddly, in this peace negotiation, Russia,
the aggressor and string-puller, sits at the table as a peacemaker. Trump
would understand the idiocy of such an arrangement.
Third, it is a fact that Putin lies publicly on matters of fact and great
diplomatic importance. In an April 2015 press conference he stated that
there are no Russian troops in Ukraine. (He backtracked at his December
press conference.) Putin lied that the March 2014 annexation of Crimea
was a spontaneous act of the Crimean people. Only later did Putin publicly
admit that he had ordered work on returning Crimea well before the
Crimean takeover. Despite overwhelming official evidence, the Putin regime
still blames Ukraine for the shooting down of a Malaysian airliner. How can
Trump enter into a deal with a leader whose word has no value?
Fourth, it is a fact that Putin is not a natural ally against Islamic
terrorism. Russian forces are in the Middle East to prop up a client and
to strengthen Russias ally, Iran. Putin can cite large numbers of Muslims
in Russia, but he has used past terrorist incidents (the Chechen wars, the
Beslan massacre, the Ost-West Theater fiasco) for political advantage. He is
confident his police state can infiltrate Islamic groups. To show how Putin
distorts his war on terror, dissident politician Alexei Navalny faces the
bizarre charge of cooperation with ISIS as an agent for the CIA. Jehovahs
Witnesses have been declared a terrorist organization. In other words, a
terrorist is anyone whom the
Kremlin does not like.
Trump should prepare his Russian
World leaders must negotiate
with unsavory leaders,
policy with the facts, all of which the
but Putins crimes and misKremlin narrative disputes.
deeds place him near the top
of the list. Putin is, at best, an accomplice to murder of politicians, investigative journalists, and opposition figures. Trump should read the convincing
evidence that Putin deliberately blew up apartment buildings in three Russian cities, killing more than three hundred, to pave the way for the second
Chechen war. Before the bombings, Putin had a minuscule favorability rating
and stood little chance of being elected president. Under Putin there have
been eight political assassinations of national importance, not counting the
murders of numerous regional and local politicians and investigative reporters. Only low-level assassins take the fall.
With his armies of secret police, FSB agents, and informants, Putin does
not want these cases solved and is hence himself complicit in a cover-up.
President Trump should examine the finding of a British high court that
the Russian government
and Putin were most likely
Putin has declared the United States responsible for the polonium
murder of a former FSB
enemy number one.
agent who had become an
English citizen. Trump should be wary of a leader who resorts to the ultimate domestic violence to stay in power.
Fifth, it is a fact that Putin and his inner circle have stolen a large
portion of Russias wealth. Putin runs Russia as a criminal enterprise in
which the right to property is entirely conditional upon the property owners
loyalty. Putins own wealth will never be known. I doubt that President
Trump would welcome the praise of national thieves with names such as
Marcos, Mobutu, or Duvalier. Trump is proud of how he made his fortune.
He did not steal it, as did Putin. For proof, Trump might wish to consult his
treasury officials who follow Russian illegal money flows.
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We Americans must hope that what Trump thinks is right is actually right.
If he understands what makes Putin tick, we, NATO, Ukraine, and other
regions threatened by Russia will be all right. He must resist the advice of the
many experts in the West who peddle the Russian line that we are to blame
for everything that is wrong in our relations. The dread that Trump will
be Putins puppet will prove as wrong as the election-eve pollsotherwise,
Trump will lose the right to call himself a master of the art of the deal.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
R U SS I A
A Different
Special
Relationship
Whether allies or rivals, the United States and
Russia have deep ties. Its time for both nations
to again pursue mutual benefit in a complex,
dangerous world.
By Katya Drozdova
periods of major geopolitical strife marked by common threats. Their successful resolution has been consistently promulgated through mutually beneficial US-Russian efforts. Even as rivals, the two nations have found reasons
to work together since the era of the United States founding, and they can
again return to being rational partners. We are overdue for a renewed phase
of such reciprocal cooperation.
period. The Frank A. Golder Papers in the Hoover Institution Archives shed
light on these developments as well as on Russias aid to the North during the
American Civil War.
During the critical stages of the American Civil War, when the danger of
direct British and French intervention was threatening to swing the tide in
favor of the Confederacy, President Lincolns government appealed to Russia
for assistance. And Russia responded. At the beckoning of the US government, Russian warships docked in New York and San Francisco. The official,
though secret, mission they fulfilled was to disrupt enemy commerce and
provide strategic military deterrent against any hostilities launched by European or other powers. The Russian fleet received a very warm welcome from
common US citizens and dignitaries alike. The gratitude of San Franciscans
was especially heartfelt: Russian officers and sailors played a prominent role
in helping extinguish a major firean act for which they were cheered by
San Franciscans and officially commended by city leaders.
Two years after the Union victory, Mark Twain, on a trip to Russia detailed
in Innocents Abroad, wrote a note of gratitude on behalf of the nation to Czar
Alexander II, proclaiming that America owes much to Russia: is indebted
to her in many ways; and chiefly for her unwavering friendship in the season
of her greatest need. Twain avowed Americas reciprocal response toward
Russia in that 1867 address, which he personally presented to the czar during
an audience in Yalta, Crimea, wishing that the same friendship may be hers
in time to come.
One of the most progressive and reform-minded czars in history, Alexander had freed the serfs in Russia before slavery was abolished in the United
States and was about to convert the empire into a parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, he was assassinated by a terrorist just as these reforms
were about to be put in place and any further attempts at liberalization then
floundered.
In some of the other historical episodes involving the United States and
Russia, the self-interests of all sides have not been well balanced. These too
112
offer important strategic lessons for President Trumpparticularly applicable to contemporary global developments.
In one of its first acts of international leadership, the United States reciprocated earlier Russian support by helping it negotiate ostensibly favorable
terms of a peace treaty ending the Russo-Japanese War (19045). Spearheaded by President Theodore Roosevelt, the Treaty of Portsmouth did stop the
bloodshed, but it also left both warring sides unsatisfied and relatively weakenedthus serving Americas tactical geopolitical interests at the expense of
its potential rivals. At the time, it was considered a masterstroke of international diplomacy. Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role.
Strategically, however, this treaty proved to be a Pandoras Box of interand intranational conflict. In Russia, some viewed it as a betrayal of those
lost in an ultimately winnable war, and soin an early example of stab in
the back rhetorichelped fan the flames of the 1905 Russian Revolution.
(Although the revolt was put down, it ushered in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution that led to the creation of the Soviet Union.) At the same time, imperial
Japan felt slighted by what it saw as a forced acceptance of a one-sided deal.
Later, some in Japan would view the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor as avenging,
in part, these alleged injustices.
The Second World War that followed saw the United States and Soviet
Russia become close allies against their mutual enemies, the Axis powers.
The United States provided the USSR with massive materiel assistance and
eventually opened a second front in Europe. The Soviet Union reciprocated
by acquiescing to President
Franklin Roosevelts request
Constructive US-Russian relations
to help the United States
extend deep into history, to the very
against imperial Japan in
Asia. Russias enormous sacbeginnings of the United States.
rifice in defeating the Nazis
on the Eastern Front paved the way for Allied victory and the survival of the
Free World led by the postwar United States. Even during the height of the
subsequent Cold War, the rival superpowers cooperated on nuclear deterrence, disarmament, and nonproliferation.
TODAYS MUTUAL ENEMIES
Today, US-Russian collaboration must be brought to bear on Islamist
extremism, which endangers the interests of both countries. As terrorists
are learning to turn each nations capabilities against itself, the need for a
joint response is becoming ever more urgent.
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Amid the tensions of what some call a new Cold War, US and Russian
counterterrorism forces have failed to prevent jihadi extremists from
metastasizing into a worldwide threat. Weapons and resources shared with
regional allies frequently end up in extremist hands, while elite counterterrorism operatives betray their oaths and training to join ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and
other militant organizations.
A case in point is the reported new ISIS minister of war, Gulmurod
Khalimov. He is alleged to have replaced Abu Umar al-Shishani, reportedly
killed by US forces. Shishanithe nom de guerre of Tarkhan Batirashvili, a
jihadi of Chechen origin
from post-Soviet Georgiawas formerly a
During the Civil War, Lincoln
sergeant in the Georgian
appealed to Russia for assistance.
military trained as a
And Russia responded.
commando by NATO.
But ISISs new military chief has an even more distinguished pedigree. A former colonel and special forces commander, Tajikistans former lead security
officer, and a member of the elite Presidential Guard, Khalimov is a defector
to ISIS who possesses not only counterterrorism expertise but also links
to the worlds top defense and policy establishment. Remarkably, Khalimov
was able to clear rigorous security vetting and then receive elite training in
counterterrorism and special operations from both US and Russian military
programsbefore turning his back on his privileges and wealth to fight for
the jihadi cause.
In a sleek ISIS propaganda video posted online, Khalimov had challenged
Russian, American, and allied security personnel by asking: Are you ready
to die...for this democracy?
One would be prudent to avoid dismissing Khalimovs question as mere
rhetoric. Indeed, such cases represent a troubling trend of counterterrorism brain drain to the enemy. Individuals come and go, but the little-noticed
phenomenon of terrorist turncoats reveals a largely unaddressed systemic
problem: that the enemy is learning, through compromised human networks,
the covert measures used to hunt terrorists. A highly capable defector can
teach the hunters thinking to his prey. This brain drain empowers terrorist
organizations and helps them marshal other talent more effectively.
According to a World Bank study, ISIS recruits come from around the
globe, including from democracies with market economies. They tend to be
just as educated as their compatriots and often more so. At least a quarter
of them are university educated, nearly half have secondary schooling, and
fewer than 2 percent are illiterate. The proportion of those willing to become
suicide bombers actually increases with education. ISIS has attracted skilled
professionals to help build its caliphate, people with experience in management, the professions, and the military.
ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other radical jihadi groups assimilate these capabilities and benefits of Western-style education to fight the very world that
produced them. Prominent among those abilities are cyber skills, which ISIS
uses for sophisticated online propaganda, social networks, and a hacking
division featuring groups such as the United Cyber Caliphate. Well-placed,
professionally trained adherents can cause even more damage. Competent
suicide bombers may infiltrate organizations and attack hardened targetsa
threat very difficult to detect and counter. Other adept jihadists may compromise critical infrastructure, thanks to their education, skills, and credentials.
The United States and Russia share a leading role in counteracting these
threatsand the terrorists treat both nations as equally historic foes. This
was recently underscored when Abu Mohammed al-Golani, leader of Jabhat
Fateh al-Shamformerly Jabhat al-Nusra, the official Al-Qaeda branch in
Syria, and engaged in violent infighting with ISIScalled upon fellow mujahideen to fight their common enemies, singling out both America and Russia.
Despite many ideological and even violent conflicts among the extremist
jihadists, they tend to agree on combating the United States and Russia.
The two nations should respond in kind. Divided, they have failed to eradicate extremist ideology and stop attacks. Their discord has run the gamut
from interfering in civil
wars, reshaping alliances,
The troubled treaty that ended the
and manipulating markets
at one anothers expense
Russo-Japanese War struck some as
to disagreeing over sorting
betrayal.
out terrorists from freedom fighters. There is much cautionary history, for instance, in the modern
wars in Afghanistan, as shown in the Soviet Politburo files in the Fond 89
Collection of the Hoover Archives. US support for friendly or moderate
mujahideen groups against the Soviet invasion was an effective Cold War tacticyet some see it in retrospect as perilous and strategically shortsighted.
Several of those groups have since become dangerous threats, facilitating the
9/11 attacks on the US homeland and continuing to fight the United States
and its allies in what has become Americas longest warin Afghanistan and
beyond. Al-Qaeda, having emerged from the Soviet Afghan war, spawned
ISIS and Al-Nusra, among other common threats. Yet the Afghan playbook
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conflict. Energy relations are among such vital issues, especially regarding
the resources located in the Gulf and the broader Middle East.
All energy players, but particularly major ones like the United States and
Russia, need relative long-term stability and security to plan and develop
their projects. Gulf countries have been seeking to diversify their economies
away from oil to survive. One emerging issue is the struggle over control and
export of natural gasthe most momentous being whether Iran or Qatar
will dominate supplies to Europe from the largest-in-the-world Pars gas field
they share. Qatar owns about two-thirds of the reservoir known as North
Dome; the rest, South Pars,
belongs to Iran. Freed from
international sanctions by
Energy security is perhaps the most
its nuclear deal with the
vital shared interest in the broader
United States, Iran has been
Middle East.
advancing a pipeline project
spanning Iran, Iraq, and Syria; it is looking to supplant earlier Qatari plans
for a Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria-Turkey pipeline. It is no coincidence
that the intersection of these two pipelines has come to define the respective
stances of these two countries and their allies over the Syrian conflict.
Several other regional pipelines and liquefied natural gas export schemes
are in the works. The success or failure of each project critically depends on
the results of the eventual political settlement of the war in Syriawhere
Russia is currently the dominant outside military and political force; and
on the progress of the war against ISIS in Iraqwhere the United States
is in a similar position. At the same time, all major energy infrastructure
and supply players are involved, tangled up in alliances or covert interactions with multiple warring sides, some including jihadists. Deep sectarian,
religious, ethnic, and political animosities further supercharge this economic
competition.
In this context, the United States and Russia need each other to untangle
and direct these relationships toward a stable, mutually beneficial outcome.
They are the dominant players on the overlapping battlefields, and only by
working together will they be able to muster the diplomatic forces to effect
a multilateral solution. Some of the critical political and economic players
tend to align more with Russia (for example, Iran and Syrias government);
others with the United States (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraqalthough
notable Shia elements within Iraqs government and anti-ISIS militias align
closely with Iran, and US-Saudi relations have recently been strained). Yet
others are tilting in new directionssuch as Americas traditional allies
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Egypt and Turkey, which have recently renewed stronger ties with Russia
or, like Qatar, have pursued independent agendas. One should also beware of
oversimplifying regional relations. Understanding and balancing their many
intricacies requires serious concerted efforts by both sides.
THE PROFIT OF SUCCESS
Against the backdrop of history, emerging geopolitical challenges represent
an even more complex chessboard with fewer rules, more players, and more
powerful weaponsfrom cyber, nuclear, and conventional to economic,
low-tech, and hybridwhich pose great danger to both the United States
and Russia. A major power for nearly a thousand years, Russia has more
experience than the United States at succeeding in such long geostrategic
struggles. It also knows the price of failure and the rewards of success. A
lack of constructive engagement eventually risks irrelevance on the world
stagesomething the United States must take into account when short-term
political goals emerge. Informed by historical insights, President Trump and
the entire country could profit from finding lasting solutions through rational
engagement with Russia in the service of US national interests.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
EU ROPE
he Western powers have frequently ignored the explosive potential of the Balkans at their peril. This happened at the turn of
the twentieth century, when the Balkan Wars (191213) exploded
unexpectedly on the European scene, causing enormous suffer-
ing and death. The great powers were also shocked when, on July 28, 1914,
the assassination of the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by
Bosnian Serb terrorists plunged the world into a long and disastrous conflict.
When war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide erupted in former Yugoslavia in
the 1990s, the international community was aghast at what Warren Christopher called a problem from hell. There was an almost complete lack of
comprehension in the West of a region that was essential to European and
NATO security interests.
Norman M. Naimark is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is also the Robert and Florence
McDonnell Professor of East European Studies at Stanford University, where he is
the Fisher Family Director of the Global Studies Division. Aleksandr Matovski
was the Bittson National Fellow at the Hoover Institution for 201516 and is a
postdoctoral fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.
120
The price was steep. To stabilize the Balkans in the 1990s, the United
States and its allies were eventually compelled to engage in the largest peaceand nation-building exercise since the Second World War. Just in Bosnia,
the international community invested about $300 per person per year in
reconstruction aid
from 1996 to 2007.
Western involvement now could help
Afghanistan, by
comparison, has
prevent costly intervention once again.
received $65 per
resident per year since 2002. The Balkans have been the largest and one of
the most expensive peace-, nation-, and democracy-building laboratories
in the world. Trying to bring order and progress to a chronically unstable
region, and among ethnically and religiously divided societies, is a task of
major consequence. There is little hope that the Western allies can stabilize
other conflict regions like the Middle East if they still cannot get things right
in the Balkans and learn from this experience.
But today, the Balkans have again fallen off the screen of Western observers even though the severe problems of the area may well erupt into conflicts
that eventually demand the attention of the United States, the European
Union, and NATO. This essay provides an overview of the problems of the
region and suggests that Western involvement now could help prevent costly
intervention once again.
The focus here is on the countries of the Western BalkansAlbania and the
former republics of Yugoslavia: Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. With the exception of Serbia (7.1 million
people), these lands are tiny. The smallest is Montenegro, with 630,000 people.
The others have 2 million to 4 million people. The populations are decreasing, as there are generally low birthrates (with the exception of the Albanian
populations in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia) and a net outflow of labor, both
legal and illegal, to the countries of the EU. Europes biggest sources of illegal
migrants, even during the Syrian crisis, have been Kosovo and Albania.
The countries of the region are extremely poor, with the exception of Croatia, which has a GNP per capita of over $10,000 per year. Kosovo is the poorest by far, with a GNP per capita of approximately $2,000 per year. The others
range between approximately $4,000 and $6,000 per year. The economies of
the region depend heavily on remittances from immigrant labor in Europe.
This is especially the case for Kosovo, where remittances account for over 11
percent of GNP, and Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they are close
to 10 percent. Unemployment rates across the region are at Great Depression
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foreign direct investment, which they hope will produce employment for
their workers in European-built factories and workshops. They envy the
programs of infrastructure
development that have
The Balkans have been among the
helped propel the economies
largest and most expensive laboraof countries like Poland
and Bulgaria and will soon
tories in history.
have an impact on Croatia.
They seek the advantages of a single labor market and of price and currency
stabilization.
Croatia joined the EU as the twenty-eighth member state in 2013, while
the other countries of the region look longingly in the same direction. Even
Serbia, which maintains a kind of schizophrenic stance towards Europe
and Russiaone day praising Vladimir Putin, the next talking about
Serbia as part of the Westis agitating for EU entrance. But these countries path to EU membership is blocked not just by their own domestic
problems but also by disputes with their neighbors and the multiple crises
in the EU, which make Brussels all the more reluctant to take on new
members. Serbias road to the EU had been blocked in the spring of 2015
by Croatia, which had objected to Serbias treatment of its Croat minority. Croatia then stepped out of the way, allowing Serbia to open accession
talks in 2016. But future roadblocks remain a distinct possibility.
Even more complicated is Kosovos potential road to the EU. Kosovo split
from Serbia after the NATO-led bombing campaign in 1999, and its independence is still not recognized by many countries, including several EU
member states. It is likely that the Serbian government, once in the EU,
would attempt to block Kosovos accession. Lack of progress in Kosovo carries a high risk for a
violent implosion. Like
Youth unemployment in all of the Balkan its neighbors, though
more so, Kosovo is rent
countries is a devastating 60 percent.
by corruption (even
its president, former KLA fighter Hachim Thaci, has been accused of ties to
organized crime and trafficking circles, including organ trafficking), extraordinarily high unemployment, low productivity, and political ineptitude. Ethnic tensions remain high, as the small Serbian minority (less than 5 percent)
continues to disrupt the process of consolidating Kosovos statehood, while
ethnic Albanian nationalists mobilize angry outbursts against the Kosovar
Serbs, the international community, and their own government.
124
Most worrying, Kosovo has gradually transformed from the most proAmerican Muslim country in the world to a hotbed of radical Islam. Spurred
by dashed hopes and a complete lack of economic opportunities, young
Kosovars have been increasingly drawn in recent years to radical preachers
and ideologies imported from Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states. As a
result, Kosovo has become the highest per capita contributor of foreign fighters to ISIS among European nations.
Neighboring Montenegro appears to be in much better shape. Given
heavy Russian historical connections and influence, investment, and even
physical presence in Montenegro (including a sizable expat community),
it is surprising how determined the Montenegrin government has been
to join the Western community. Despite Russian grumbling, Montenegro
sought an invitation to join NATO, which was granted on December 2,
2015. With Albania and Croatia already members, Montenegro would
solidify NATOs hold on the Adriatic Sea and its entry point at the Gulf of
Taranto.
ON GUARD: Soccer players walk past security police in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Divided historical memory compounds the already severe difficulties of dealing with the administrative chaos left by the Dayton Agreement,
which ended the war in Bosnia in 1995. [Fehim DemirEPA]
In the proud tradition of Putins Russia, Gruevski blamed the demonstrations on George Soros and his democracy-promoting Open Society organizationa desperate attempt to lay responsibility on a foreign conspiracy. His
power base comes from hard-core nationalists and the thousands of supporters of his party employed in the public sector, as well as their families.
BOSNIAN SADNESS
On July 11, 2016, the annual ritual of burying Bosnian Muslim victims of the
Srebrenica massacre concluded with the interment of 127 newly found bodies, in addition to the six thousand already in the Potocari memorial cemetery. While Bosniaks mourned their victims, Milorad Dodik, president of
the Bosnian Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina, denied that genocide took
place at Srebrenica and discounted the generally accepted number of eight
thousand massacred. At the same time, a Serb counter-demonstration took
place in nearby Bratunac to commemorate Serb losses.
The Dayton Agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
November 1995, left the country split not only administratively between
the autonomous Serb Republic and the Bosniak-Croat federation, but also
between a largely unrepentant Serb minority and a resentful and angry
Bosniak population.
Divided historical memory compounds the already severe difficulties of
dealing with the pure administrative chaos left by Dayton. To make matters worse, a European high representative is still the highest authority in
the land. Despite its good intentions, the Office of the High Representative,
currently led by Valentin Inzko from Austria, is itself tied into knots. On the
one hand, the office typically does not like to intervene in the domestic affairs
of the country, because that
tends to infantilize the leadThe Balkans are still going through a
ers of all the nationalities
triple transition: from communist to
and to make it more difficult
democratic, from state-run economy for them to learn the art of
compromise in governance.
to capitalist, from wartime trauma
On the other hand, without a
and hatred to peace.
periodic show of determination by the high representative, it is almost impossible to reach any reasonable solution to even the most straightforward problems.
A good example of the kind of impasse that has held a stranglehold over
the country is the delay in releasing data from the Bosnia-Herzegovina census taken in the fall of 2013. Finally published in July 2016, the census results
128
130
I RA N
Pipe Dreams of a
Normal Iran
Permit the rise of Iran? That wouldnt just be
foolish. It would represent an abdication of the
Wests moral legitimacy.
By Thomas Donnelly
n June 2014, as the forces of the Islamic State swept toward Baghdad,
President Obama began to recommit American military forces to Iraq.
He also observed that Iran can play a constructive role, if it sends the
same message to the Iraqi government that were sending, which is
132
relation to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Scowcroft made an apt comparison, though one that undermines his argument for normalizing relations.
Ahmadinejad yelled more, but Iran under Rouhani has done more: encouraging the US withdrawal from Iraq and the region, slowly transforming the
Baghdad government into an Iranian proxy, rescuing and resuscitating the
Assad regime in Damascus, even cobbling together a weird but working
partnership with Putin.
Slowly but surely, Iran is establishing hegemony over not only the Persian
Gulf but also the northern Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, the domestic dissatisfaction that erupted in the protests of 2009 appears to have been quelled,
or at least successfully repressed.
In fact, it appears more likely that the nuclear deal will end in a lose-lose
proposition for the United States and its allies. In the near term it has given
the green light to Iranian expansionismwhich has, if anything, become
more Shia-sectarian rather than less sowhile guaranteeing and legitimating its right to a nuclear deterrent once it wins the current regional war. It is
already clear that even if a future American president wished to reverse the
Iranian tide across the
region, it would be tough:
The Iran deal springs from a wouldour traditional Arab and
Israeli allies have lost
be realist faith that ignores the charmuch confidence, and the acter of regimes.
retreat of US forces from
the region and the US military capacity and capabilities lost over the past
decade cannot quickly be restored. This sort of sharing of the region would
give Iran a huge slice of the power pie, and perhaps create a quiet-of-thegraveyard sort of stability.
But the nuclear deal does more than acknowledge and materially aid Irans
bid for hegemonyit legitimates Iranian dominance. This is a serious threat
to the liberal international orderthe American-led orderin two ways.
To begin with, this contravenes the fundamental principle of American
strategy and statecraft since the early twentieth century: that critical
theaters of the Eurasian landmass should not be in the hands of a hostile
hegemon. In Europe, this meant opposing the rise of Wilhelmine and Nazi
Germany; in East Asia, of imperial Japan. During the Cold War, this meant
containing the Soviet Union not just in Europe but globally. In the Middle
East, it has meant battling not just Soviet intrusions from outside revolutionary Iran, but Saddam Hussein and the proliferation of revolutionary Sunni
Salafist movements in the region.
134
syria
What Syrians
Want
A survey of Syrian refugees shows just where their
allegiances lie.
By Daniel Corstange
Key points
Daniel Corstange is the Bittson National Fellow at the Hoover Institution and
an assistant professor in the department of political science and the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.
136
say what people actually want. Thanks to decades of dictatorship and five
years of war, Syrian public opinion has been terra incognita.
Journalists and scholars now have unprecedented access to Syrian views
on politics, but there is a major caveat. Whether due to physical security
concerns, personal sympathies, or simple accessibility, many interviewers
have gravitated toward the mainstream oppositionand often its most
articulate members. As a result, observers have much better coverage of
the latters views than they do of Syrians who support the government or
one of the militant jihadi factions.
Talking with only one part of the Syrian body politic, no matter how
agreeable to ones views, gets no one closer to understanding that body as
a whole. Gathering systematic data on Syrian public opinion is, of course,
hardif it were not, it would already be done. A recent survey of two
thousand Syrian refugees in Lebanon is meant to fill a small part of this
immense gap. Although they cannot speak for all Syrians, they can illuminate some blind spots.
AN ELUSIVE SAMPLE
The findings substantiate some of the basic stories we tell ourselves about
the Syrian civil war, but they also suggest that we need to revise things we
thought we knew. They show that the majority of the refugees support the
rebels, but that a substantial minority sympathize with the government.
Poverty and religion both factor into who supports whom, but religion is
not nearly as divisive as the rhetoric of the militant groups would suggest.
And the opposition is indeed split between nationalists and Islamists, but
foreign fighters are no ones first choice. Far from the stereotype of young
firebrands bent on imposing Islamic law, the support base for the latter
concentrates among old men who are politically disengaged and no more
religious than their peers.
The Syrian civil war has caused massive population displacement
since fighting began in 2011. Fatality estimates range from a quarter to
a half a million peoplethe United Nations stopped counting deaths
in 2014and over half of the country has been displaced at home and
abroad. The staggering humanitarian disaster makes it impossible to
gather a truly representative sample of the entire Syrian population.
Consequently, the focus here is on a more modest target: the 1.5 million
displaced Syrians in neighboring Lebanon, which hosts more Syrians
per capita than any other country in the world, and where one in four
residents is a refugee.
138
educated, but, surprisingly, are otherwise not much different from the
other participants.
Finally, by building on UNHCR data, we almost certainly underrepresent
people at the wealth extremes. The most destitute Syrians are hard to locate,
and the wealthiest Syrians neither need UNHCR benefits nor live in the lowincome areas where refugees concentrate.
WHO SUPPORTS WHOM?
So whom do the refugees support in the civil war? There isnt an easy
answer. We can probably agree on what we mean when we say the government. But when we say the oppositionwell, who is that? Is ISIS
part of the opposition or not? Where do the Kurds fit in? Asking people
to line up behind the government or the opposition is too ambiguous in a
conflict that is no longer a two-sided civil war, but neither is it illuminating to get a babel of answers about the ever-changing rebel factions and
battalions.
To strike a balance between too much information and too little, we
asked people to rank their top three choices among the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), Syrian Islamist groups, foreign Islamist groups, the Syrian government, Kurdish groups, and Hezbollah. Not all those surveyed used all of
their choices, but declining to offer support when given the option to do so
is itself informative. The rank-order format helps us capture not only the
core government-opposition cleavage but also some of the nuance in peoples
choices, especially among opposition supporters.
A little under 10 percent of refugees offered no preferences at all; unsurprisingly, people who were uninterested in politics also had little to say about
the factions. Second, about 40 percent expressed sympathies for the governmentperhaps a bigger number than many in the West would like to believe,
but a smaller one than the regime or its foreign backers would like to claim.
The rest of the samplea little over 50 percentpicked an oppoReligion is not nearly as divisive as
sition faction. People
the militants rhetoric suggests.
almost invariably cited
the FSA as their first choice to express generic support for the rebels, and
then used their second and third choices to express sympathies for domestic
and foreign Islamist factions. A little under half of those in the opposition
supported the FSA but not the Islamists. We call these people nationalists
in the absence of a better label. Meanwhile, virtually all Islamist supporters
cited Syrian groups as their second choice, and only sometimes cited the
foreign factions as their final choice.
Taken together, the survey data suggest that a little over 50 percent of
the refugees support the opposition, and a little under 40 percent sympathize with the government.
But who supports whom?
Observers have come up
Opposition is ambiguous in what
with a number of stories:
is no longer a two-sided civil war.
minorities and secularists
line up with the government, and poor people and the religiously devout support the opposition. There is some truth to these stories, but also a lot that
needs updating.
One of the most common tropes of the civil war is that there is a minoritydominated dictatorship pitted against a demographic supermajority of Sunni
Arabs. This narrative is accurate to a point, but it is also misleading. Precise
figures on Syrias sectarian and ethnic composition do not exist, but mainstream estimates place the Sunni Arab population at roughly 70 percent of
the total, with the remainder comprising the Kurds, Muslim minorities such
as the Alawis and Druze, and a variety of Christian denominations.
Displaced Syrians in Lebanon come disproportionately from the majority
community: a little under 90 percent of the sample is Sunni Arab. Meanwhile,
virtually all of the minorities that side with anyone pick the government.
Only one minority in the samplenot 1 percent, one personsided with the
opposition. This breakdown does lend credence to sectarian narratives of the
war. Still, it is worth retaining a sense of perspective.
Government sympathizers amount to 40 percent of the sample, but minorities add up to little more than 10 percent. The difference between these
figures? Sunni Arab loyalists. It is true that Sunni Arabs break two to one
in favor of the opposition. Yet it is also true that they nonetheless comprise
75 percent of the governments support base. So is the civil war a sectarian
one? The data are ambivalent, with two yeses and a no. Most of the refugees are Sunni Arabs, most of the minorities line up with the government,
but the majority community is itself split between the government and the
opposition.
DAMPENING RELIGIOUS FERVOR
Another interpretation of the conflict focuses on the religious claims of the
warring parties. In this version, religious zealotssome imported, some
homegrownare trying to impose a puritanical form of religious law on
140
society. Pitted against them are the beleaguered forces of the mainstream
opposition as well as those of the government that, although by no means
respectful of civil rights, at least hold the line against religious extremism.
There is at least a grain of truth to this narrative, but this version of events
is also deceptive. Like their peers in other Arab societies, Syrian refugees
express a great deal of personal religious devotion. More than three-quarters
claim to pray daily, and half say they read the Quran or the Bible at least
weekly. Yet demands that religion play a role in public life are not correspondingly high. Only about one-third of the refugees agreed that religion is
even somewhat important in either economic or political affairs.
That said, there are important differences between opposition and government supporters. About 60 percent of the former, but only about 40 percent
of the latter, are personally pious on the Quran/Bible metric. More starkly,
opposition supporters are twice as likely as their government counterparts
about 50 versus 25 percentto see an important role for religion in politics.
Nor is this a sectarian difference masquerading in government-versus-opposition terms. Minorities are, indeed, less religious; yet Sunni Arab loyalists
are far more similar to their minority allies than to their co-religionists in the
opposition.
What, though, of differences within the opposition? Surely the Islamists
are more religious than the nationalists, and supporters of the foreign
Islamist groups the most religious of all? In a word: no. There is no noticeable difference between
the opposition facDisplaced Syrians in Lebanon come
tionsbarely anything
disproportionately from the majority
on personal piety and
only a modest distinction
community: a little under 90 percent
between the domestic
of our sample are Sunni Arab.
Islamists and the rest. In
other words, nationalist supporters are no more secular than their Islamist
counterparts. The latter, in turn, are far less insistent on an Islamized public
sphere than the rhetoric of the militant factions would have us believe.
WELL-BEING AND EDUCATION
Poverty and corruption were two of the original grievances of the Syrian
uprising, but they have largely fallen out of the narratives that reach Western
audiences. Material deprivation takes many forms, including obvious ones
such as drops in household income and knock-on effects like deteriorating
health and nutrition. In this setting, questions about income are unlikely to
ON WHOSE SIDE? A Syrian refugee boy brandishes a toy gun in the Delhemiyeh camp in Lebanon. Surveys indicate that foreign fighters in Syria are
backed not by the firebrand young but by old men. Younger people are more
drawn to Syrias nationalist opposition. [Jamal SaidReuters]
tell us much since many people no longer have regular incomes. Instead, we
can examine crowding in family dwelling spaces: the number of household
members per bedroom.
A comparison of the typical households crowding rate from prewar Syria
and the current residences in Lebanon shows that living standards have
dropped sharply across the board. Three-quarters of the refugees have
poorer housing now than before the war, with accommodations that are some
50 percent more crowded for the median household. Second, it shows that
opposition supporters are much poorer than government sympathizers. The
typical pro-government household deteriorated to two people per bedroom
from a prewar norm of one and a half, whereas the median opposition household now crams three people into a bedroom compared to two before the war.
Distinctions in material well-being show up in peoples stocks of human
capital as well. Over half the sample has no more than a primary education,
142
and just one in five refugees has completed secondary school. Based on
data from the Arab Barometer project, these educational attainment rates
are on par with Morocco and Yemen, the regions laggards, but are broadly
consistent with the low levels of education that prevailed in Syria before the
uprising. Yet there are sharp
governmentopposition differences in the sample that
Opposition supporters are twice as
mirror the crowding rates,
likely as their government-backing
with the former nearly
counterparts to see an important role
twice as likely as the latter
for religion in politics.
to have a secondary school
education.
In short, opposition supporters are significantly poorer, and more
poorly educated, than government sympathizers. That is consistent with
what we already knew, so no surprises here. But the data do dispense
with some wishful thinking about the opposition. One of our long-standing
claims about terrorism is that it is born out of poverty and ignorance.
Finer distinctions notwithstanding, many of the foreign fighters flowing
into Syria certainly fit the bill of terrorists, but their sympathizers do
not match up to our expectations. As with religiosity, there is virtually no
difference between the opposition factions in either material well-being
or education. Foreign Islamist supporters may be poor and uneducated,
but they are no worse off, and no less educated, than their nationalist
counterparts.
ACTIVISM, SURVIVAL, AND THE FUTURE
In broad brushstrokes, the survey data confirm some of what we thought
we knew about the factional breakdown of the civil war: minorities and the
relatively secular lean toward the government, whereas the poor and less
educated side with the opposition. Yet some of the core distinctions we might
expect to see between the different opposition factions fail to materialize:
the nationalists are no less religious than the Islamists, and the base for the
foreign fighters is not poorer or less educated than anyone else. Yet there
are differences in the opposition support basessome banal, but some quite
interesting.
The first distinction is demographic. Generational and sex structures differ between the factions. Notwithstanding early images of young men and
women protesting together against dictatorship, government support is basically constant across the age cohorts and the same among men and women.
Although the same pattern holds for the domestic Islamists, it diverges
among the nationalists and foreign Islamists, who are mirror images of each
other. Nationalist support concentrates among the young, while older Syrians
tend toward the Islamists. And, although men support the two factions at virtually identical rates, women split in intuitive directions: leaning toward the
nationalists and away from
the foreign Islamists, whose
The support base for foreign Islamist views on womens rights are
fighters is no poorer or less educated by far the most regressive.
More important than the
than anyone else.
raw demographic differences, however, are differences in political engagementdo people care about
public affairs, or do they not? There are several ways to measure engagement, including interest in, understanding of, and knowledge about politics.
Each account tells the same basic story: nationalist supporters are far and
away the most politically engaged of the refugeessome 50 percent more
so than their government-aligned peers and four times as engaged as the
foreign Islamist sympathizers, who bring up the rear.
This surveya snapshot in time, and one that only includes Syrians in Lebanonshows more popular support for the government than the opposition
would like to believe, but more support for the opposition than the government would like to admit. The precise figures are less important than the
core takeaway, however: Syrians are split in their loyalties, and those splits
are comprehensible.
There is some truth in many of the existing narratives about the conflict,
but they are inevitably oversimplifications. Minorities and people who prefer
a more private role for
religion tend to sympathize
Support for the government does not with the government, whose
efforts to portray the opposiimply support for its human rights
tion as dangerous religious
abuses or its dictatorship.
fanatics may have paid off
in shoring up a support base. Nonetheless, support for the government does
not imply support for its massive human rights abuses or its dictatorship;
as others have suggested, it may be more accurate to describe much of this
constituency as anti-revolution rather than pro-government.
Opposition supporters conform to some of the conventional wisdoms, but
not others. They are poorer and more religious than their government counterparts, but they do not appear to be demanding a religious state. Indeed,
144
ED U CATI ON
The Schools We
Deserve
Old-style local control of public schools is fading
except, that is, in charter schools.
Chester E. Finn Jr. is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, former chair
of Hoovers Koret Task Force on K12 Education, and president emeritus of the
Thomas B. Fordham Institute. Bruno V. Manno is a trustee emeritusof the Fordham Institute and the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation. Brandon L. Wright is
the managing editor and a policy associate at the Fordham Institute. They are the
authors of Charter Schools at the Crossroads: Predicaments, Paradoxes,
Possibilities (Harvard Education Press, 2016).
146
and small-town society in which people spent their entire lives in one place,
towns paid for their own schools, and those schools met most of the workforce needs of the local community.
This arrangement does not perform nearly so well in a country of
mobile and cosmopolitan citizens, where states make most education
rules and furnish most
of the money, where
Charter schools attract to their
government intrudes in
boards selfless citizens and commyriad ways, and where
discontent with educamunity leaders who see a chance to
tion outcomes is rampromote change.
pant. It doesnt meet
the requirements of people who change neighborhoods and cities as well
as jobs and careers, and its ill-suited for an era of fervent agitation about
equalizingand compensating forthe treatment of children from different backgrounds, locales, and needs.
Nor does local control mean what it once did. Some ninety school
districts today struggle to educate more than fifty thousand students
each in systems sprawling over many miles and run by massive bureaucracies. The Houston Independent School District is responsible for
two hundred and fifteen thousand pupils, Chicago for four hundred
thousand, Los Angeles for seven hundred thousand, and New York City
for more than a million. The governance of these systems doesnt work
well when elected boards have evolved from panels of public-spirited
civic leaders into gaggles of aspiring politicians and teacher-union
surrogates.
The feebleness of traditionally governed public schools explains the
burgeoning alternatives. Yet far from undermining local democratic
control, these new schools are reinventing itdown to small communities
of families that now run their own schools, each with six or seven board
members.
Because these boards function more like nonprofit organizations than
political bodies or public agencies, their members need not stand for election. Being generally union-free, they dont have the headaches of collective bargaining. And with freedom to engage and deploy principals and
teachers, and to adjust budget, curriculum, and instruction to do their
students the most good, charter schools are attracting to their boards
selfless citizens and community leaders who see a plausible chance to
promote change.
148
battles around it are about more than market share, test scores, and discipline codes. Theyre proxies for whats really in dispute: power and control
over a K12 education behemoth that spends more than $600 billion a year
and employs some six million adults.
Local control as weve known it is growing obsolete. Lets hail the kind of
local control that charter schools embody.
Reprinted by permission of the Wall Street Journal. 2016 Dow Jones &
Co. All rights reserved.
ED U CATI ON
Grading on an
Invisible Curve
Evidence, not habit, should guide how we develop
the best schools. Why is evidence so scarce?
By Michael J. Petrilli
can people to decide what to do. The better their information, the
wiser will be their decisions.
So wrote my colleague Chester Finn in his introduction to a compendium
of research findings about teaching and learning.
The book was called What Works, and it was published in March.
March of 1986.
In the thirty years since, America has gone through several waves of
reform, but were still talking about establishing research-based practices in
our schools. Figuring out how to do this better is another way that reformers and funders might improve our education system without overhauling
laws and regulations. (I have identified other tactics, besides policy change,
for reforming our schools, namely building a new system via charters or
Michael J. Petrilli is a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, executive editor
of Education Next, and president of the Thomas B. Fordham Institute.
150
education savings accounts; spurring disruptive innovations that target students, parents, or teachers directly; and investing in leadership.)
No, its not easy. Policy makers can exhort educators to adopt evidence-based
practices, as Congress did in both No Child Left Behind and the Every Student
Succeeds Act. Philanthropists and advocates of every ideological stripe can
do the same, and they frequently do. Think tanks and scholars and evaluation
shops and the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) can pump out studies and
practitioner guides. Structures can be put in place to give education leaders the
incentive to seek evidence about what worksresults-based accountability
systems, for instance, or the competition that comes with school choice. Insights
from research can be embedded into academic standards like the Common
Core. Yet it seems to me that all of these efforts have gotten limited traction.
Education remains a field in which habit, intuition, and incumbency continue to play at least as large a role as research and data analysis.
The question is why, and what might be done about it. Many people much
smarter than I have thought hard and long about these questions, among
them Vivian Tseng at the W. T. Grant Foundation, Tom Kane at Harvards
Center for Education Policy Research, and Michael Barber at Pearson. Here
are some of the key problems they identify.
Limited supply. Theres undoubtedly more research findings to guide
practice today than there were a generation ago; its no longer fair to call the
What Works Clearinghouse the Nothing Works Clearinghouse. As Institute
of Education Sciences (IES) founding director Russ Whitehurst told me, the
Clearinghouse has identified one hundred and eleven effective educational
interventions in the past twelve years. Rigorous studies have made a big
impact on teacher evaluations (for better or worse) and helped make the case
for high-quality charter schools. Ruth Neild, acting director of the IES, points
to yet more examples. Still, we could all name dozens of practical questions
for which education research still hasnt provided definitive guidance.
Too much supplyof the wrong kind. Education is awash in a deluge of
reports, journal articles, e-mails, tweets, and news stories, all making claims
about what the research shows. Its too much for anyone to sift through,
and much of it is bogus to start with, so some educators understandably
shun it all and keep doing what theyve always done.
Poor dissemination. A recent study from the National Center for
Research in Policy and Practice found that fewer than one in five district
administrators checks the What Works Clearinghouse often or all the time
for research findings. Instead they look to books, turn to peers in professional associations, pick up ideas at conferences, and rely on state education
departments and the news media. Maybe if the WWC and similar outlets did
a better job pushing out their findings, theyd have a better uptake rate. (A
new and improved WWC website and social media strategy was rolled out
last fall.)
Weak incentives. Maybe test-based accountability and competition
from school choice arent enough to entice leaders to seek out evidencebased interventions. Maybe whats needed is an FDA for education, an entity
with explicit regulatory authority to keep districts from purchasing dubious products and services. (Then again, if you thought Common Core was
controversial...)
Ideology. Its those education school professors! Theyre fundamentally
opposed to the reform agenda, measuring schools via student outcomes, and
hard-nosed quantitative analyses. Our teachers and principals get trained to love
the warm-and-fuzzy while in college or grad school, and they never recover.
Habits of practice in schools and districts. Maybe the problem is that
educators arent particularly open to new research in the first place. Perhaps
theyre weary of the reform of the month. Maybe educators distrust the
external validity of national studies and put faith only in findings from studies about their own students and contexts.
Theres surely some truth in all those explanations, which means we should stay
open to a variety of solutions for addressing the problem. Some options include:
Book it! If education leaders often turn to books for ideas and evidence,
lets develop evidence-based books that might have an impact. Doug Lemovs
best-selling Teach Like a
Champion demonstrated a
market demand for specific,
Education is still a field in which
practical advice for teachhabit, intuition, and incumbency
ers. Id personally love to
play a large role.
work on evidence-based
elementary schools, which could share practices that boost achievement
especially for disadvantaged kidsincluding teaching a broad, content-rich
curriculum. It would help if universities rewarded junior scholars for publishing well-read books when making tenure decisions.
Get together! Professional associations and personal networks are key
sources of information and ideas, so reformers and researchers should do a
better job partnering with the key education groups that already exist, like the
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD); AASA,
the School Superintendents Association; and the National Council of Teachers
of English (NCTE). Another option, naturally, would be to create ones. Tony
152
I N TERVI EW
By Peter Robinson
history lesson: who are the Scots-Irish, when did they come to this country,
what makes them distinctive?
Vance: Scots-Irish is a bit of a misnomer because its basically rural people
who came from the broad UK. They tended to settle in the United States in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to cluster along the Appalachian Mountains in what we now know as West Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, southern Ohio. I dont have a fantastic argument for why they clustered in those regions.
Some people have argued
that they were drawn to
the mountains of Appalachia in the same way that
they were drawn to the
mountains back in the
highlands. But they were
a very distinctive subculture and what is relatively interesting, if you look at the ethnography of these
areas, they still are very heavily overrepresented in these parts of the country. There is still a disproportionate share of the Scots-Irish in Appalachia.
Robinson: They come to this country in the early- to mid-eighteenth century,
when the borderlands of England and Scotland and Ireland are still very
rough, violent places, and they take a certain level of violence for granted. Its
part of their lives in those regions, as opposed to southern England, which is
much more settled and becomes wealthier, and frankly I suppose the term is
more civilized, much earlier. And in those regions, much more is based on
clan. Family has a different weight among these people. Is that correct?
Vance: I think thats right. Whatever the causes, theres a lot of evidence
that suggests the Scots-Irish valued honor and family loyalty in a very, very
personal and deep way. And because of it, they werent afraid to enforce
that family honor code in a way that sometimes led to violence. And again,
the cause is something that I dont have great insight into, but its just there.
Not just violence against others, but also violence inside the home, which is
something I write about.
Robinson: One more characteristic of the Scots-Irish before we move on.
The point Id like to stress and that is implicit in your book: they are a long
way from the media centers of the East Coast and the West Coast. So were
talking about a distinctive culture of people who have been here for a couple
of centuries that the rest of the country, the media and the culture tend to
overlook. Is that fair?
Vance: I dont really think that is fair. Though there is definitely a regional distinction and a sort of cloistering of the Scots-Irish in a part of the country that is
very cut off from the media
centers, I think its fair to say
Theres a lot of evidence that sugthat Scots-Irish culture has
gests the Scots-Irish valued honor
been very, very influential
on what we call American
and family loyalty in a very, very perculture more broadly.
sonal and deep way.
Theres an interesting book
by Jeff Biggers, The United States of Appalachia, that chronicles the ways in which
Appalachian culture influences mainstream American culture. So there is a sense
in which a lot of the things that we think of as American are at least somewhat
related to and influenced by Scots-Irish culture.
Robinson: They break through at the national level with Andrew Jackson.
Vance: Thats right.
Robinson: And well come back to politics in a moment. But first, your
family...the move from Jackson, Kentucky, which is Appalachia proper, to
Middletown, Ohio. Why?
Vance: Well, for very stark economic reasons. This is the 1940s; this is before
especially generous social welfare programs. And if my grandparents hadnt
moved from Jackson, Kentucky, they would have faced a choice: poverty,
potential starvation, maybe scraping by with a relatively successful life. But
if they moved to the industrial powerhouses that were developing in the Rust
Belt (what we now call the Rust Belt, but back then was the land of opportunity), they had an opportunity at the steel mill or at the paper mill to earn
a decent, middle class, livable wage. Thats what brought not just them but
millions of others into those Midwestern factories.
Robinson: And yet you observe in Hillbilly Elegy, that when they moved to
middle class Ohio they did not behave like middle class Ohioans. They did not
become suburban.
Vance: Thats right. It took a while to adapt to the cultural norms of Midwestern middle class life. One of the takeaways from the book is that culture
is really sticky in a certain way. You dont suddenly acquire material comfort
156
and then all the habits, all the attitudes you grew up with, are completely
cast off. Its something I learned myself as an adult.
Robinson: Let me quote from Hillbilly Elegy: Our homes are a chaotic mess. We
scream and yell at each other. At least one member of the family uses drugs. We
dont study as children and we dont make our kids study when were parents.
And that was your way of life until you were thirteen or fourteen years old or so.
Vance: More or less, yes.
Robinson: When you were about fifteen, you stopped moving from home to
home to home with your mother and moved in with your grandmother, Mamaw.
Vance: Sure.
Robinson: The same woman who doused your grandfather with lighter fluid
and tossed a match on him.
Vance: Sure.
Robinson: Once again from Hillbilly Elegy, Those three years with Mamaw,
uninterrupted and alone, saved me. She was uneducated, she swore like a
sailor, and she could be dangerous. How did she save you?
Vance: Well, the part of my grandma that would potentially set somebody
on fire if they crossed her had a good side too. Or at least a partially good
side. I was like a lot of kids who grew up in this environment. I was not doing
especially well in school; I was starting to experiment with drugs and alcohol;
I was starting to hang out with the proverbial wrong crowd.
I started hanging out
with this kid who was
One of the takeaways from the book
sort of known to be a little
is that culture is really sticky.
druggie. My grandma
found out and she leaned
in and said, J. D., I want to tell you something. If you dont stop hanging out with
that kid, I am going to run him over with my car and no one is ever going to find
out. Now do I think in hindsight that Mamaw would have actually run over a
thirteen-year-old kid? Absolutely not.
Robinson: Im not so sure...
Vance: Mamaw was always very protective of kids, and I think in her own
way, she probably felt bad for him. But what she did believe, and what I
believed, is that she would enforce that rule. So when she made that promise,
unlike a lot of kids who grew up in those circumstances whod say, aw screw
it, Im gonna hang out with the bad kid in secret or maybe just ignore what my
parents say, I believed her. So I completely cut off all contact with that kid.
Robinson: She expected you to do your homework, to behave, and if you
didnt she was going to come after you.
Vance: Thats right. She was very hard on me in a way that I needed. She
demanded that I get a job, that I work hard on the job, that I pay my own
way. She demanded that I go to school and that I get good grades. By the
time I lived with Mamaw, I was probably the poorest I ever was growing up.
I had very, very little money. I remember that she went and bought a TI-89
graphing calculator, because I was in the advanced math class at school . . .
Robinson: That was the hot calculator at the time.
Vance: ...and Mamaw said, Look, you lazy bastard, if I can pay for this
calculator with as little money as I have, then you are going to work hard in
school. You are going to do well. That meant a lot. So I did. And in a lot of
different ways, she had this influence on me that set me on the right path.
Robinson: Heres the feeling I get, and correct me if Im wrongthe feeling I get
is that when you moved from Middletown, Ohio, into the United States Marine
Corps, you were not moving from one world into a completely foreign world.
The Marine Corps had enough continuity with the best of the tradition in which
you grew up. These people are patriots, they understand the importance of hard
work, but the Marine Corps gave you the standards. It forced you to perform,
but it didnt seem as I read Hillbilly Elegy a really foreign world to you.
Vance: Thats right.
Robinson: But when you moved to Yale, you were on another planet.
Vance: Thats absolutely fair. The Marine Corps is very racially diverse in
terms of experiences and in terms of income classesits primarily middle
income, working class kids. Its not kids who were especially poor or especially wealthy. That was not true at Yale Law School.
Robinson: Do you feel any sense of dislocation, that youve left good people
behind?
Vance: Well, let me say first, I do think Im a hillbilly, and if you think that Im
so different from hillbillies, then my sense is that you ought to give them just
a little bit more credit, if I may say that.
158
SPEAKING UP: The people in this book are obviously struggling profoundly
and its not just an economic struggle. Its not just material deprivation, its
also partially a feeling that the coastal elitesthe people who have financial
and political powerlook down on people like you. [Hoover Institution]
to a community and to feel like you should be doing a little bit more. Maybe it
comes along with some feelings of survivors guilt, but I dont think thats an
especially heavy burden to bear.
Robinson: Back to the people you left behind: alone among all American
ethnic and demographic groups, working class whites in recent years have
seen their lifespans get shorter. Every other kind of American is living longer
and your people are dying sooner.
Vance: Sure.
Robinson: They are also the most pessimistic people in America. Im quoting Hillbilly Elegy: Well over half of blacks, Latinos, and college-educated
whites expect that their children will fare better economically than they
have. Among working-class
whites, only 44 percent
These attitudes can simultaneously share that expectation. You
provide a very disheartening
be right and self-destructive.
survey.
Vance: I think the combination of the economic pressure placed on these
families and the fact that, for the first time in many generations, they found
themselves outside the extended network of kin, created a lot of family pressures that produced some of the things that I write about in the book.
My guess is there is a certain measure of hopelessness and a consequent
lack of agency that sets in. In the 1970s, if you are a working class white person, you have a lot of confidenceand that confidence is well-placedthat
even if you only get a high school diploma, youre going to be able to earn a
middle class wage.
That supposition and that confidence have been pulled out from beneath
you. A lot of people who assumed they were going to be able to have those
jobs created alternative explanations for why they dont have them.
Robinson: Its not as if this is a lazy or shiftless culture. Those people worked
hard to survive on that land for a couple of centuries before they started
moving out to mine coal, for example, which is hard physical labor. So you
contend that at least a large part of whats taking place now is not that a
culture of laziness is taking over, its that there is no work to do.
Vance: Thats important, but in the face of the absence of work, people have
to deal with that psychologically. One of the ways they deal with it is to sort
of give upto say that no matter how hard they work, no matter how much
160
they do to try to get ahead, its not going to lead to good consequences. Now
that is partially true, of course, in an economy where there arent as many
good middle class jobs. But its also very self-destructive. So one of the things
I try to hit upon in the book is that these attitudes can simultaneously be
right and self-destructive.
Robinson: But two hundred years ago they had the gumption, the courage,
to get up and leave the Scottish Highlands or Northern Ireland and come to
this country. They know how to get out and start over again. Theyve done
it again and again across the generations. And now suddenly theyre stuck?
What explains that stuckness?
Vance: Its very complicated. Part of it is a lack of jobs, and part of it is the
despair, the hopelessness, that sets in because of the lack of jobs. But another
part of it is that the government antipoverty programs we have are designed
for a different time and different purposes. The purpose of the Great Society,
whether you think its good or bad, is fundamentally to provide assistance so
people dont starve to
death, so the basic needs
I definitely feel that I owe people
dont go unmet. I think
thats a valuable purpose
back home a lot more than Im curand a valuable thing
rently giving.
the government can be
doing. But we have to recognize that when the government does that it can
also provide disincentives and reasons not to work. It can make it harder to
become self-sufficient.
My sense is not that the government has caused this problem and therefore we should pull a lot of these programs away. My sense is that we should
recognize the government has a role in these programs and we should be
thinking about how to create a safety net geared more toward work and
participating in some of these institutions in society. If we dont do that, were
going to continue on the same path weve followed for the past fifty years,
and its just not working.
Robinson: OK, this brings us to you. You are conservative, politically conservative. And yet, through this whole conversation, youve been extremely
moderate and balanced and theres some of this and theres some of that.
Im looking for the firebrand. Dont you feel encouraged to take some
lighter fluid and squirt it over some of these welfare programs and toss on
a torch?
Vance: Sometimes I feel the urge, but I think that the best part of conservatism is maybe its moderation. I dont think moderation and conservatism are
at war. Im a conservative for a couple of reasons. One, I recognized growing
up and I continue to recognize that for these people I really care about and
I want to have better opportunities, a lot of things the government has done
either have not been super helpful or have even been counterproductive. We
have to think about the social safety net with much different goals in mind.
Second, people on the left have a certain discomfort with talking about
actors other than the state
and other than the individuNever be like those kids who think
al. If you read my book, the
the deck is stacked against them.
theme that runs throughout
it is that family is an important actor; the community is an actor; neighborhoods and churches are important actors. So thats a long way of saying that
culture matters in a way distinct from the way that individuals act, and in the
way that the state acts. And conservatives seem to be much more comfortable
in recognizing that and dealing with it as they approach global policy. I say in
the book, look, government policy can help, but at the end of the day we have
to have a role in fixing some of these problems.
But things did happen to these communities. A lot of good economics
papers have come out in the past few years that show, for example, that areas
of the country most exposed to free trade are the very areas where you have
rising mortality rates, rising heroin rates.
Robinson: Particularly trade from China.
Vance: Particularly trade from China. Theres a sense in which globalization
may have been net good but its been very, very hard on these communities.
Robinson: All right, were recording this not quite two weeks before the election. All the polls show that Donald Trump is losing in every ethnic group. I
think that is literally the case: Asians, Latinos, African Americans, college
educated whites...but hes winning in one: the Scots-Irish, your people.
Vance: Sure.
Robinson: Your people, who are poor and having a hard time and located in
Appalachia and the upper Midwest and the upper South, have fallen in love
with a billionaire from New York City. Would you explain that, please?
Vance: [Laughter] Ill try my best. There are two things happening here with
Trump. One is the tone and the way he conducts himself in politics. People
162
are just sick of hearing candidates who are so unfamiliar and unrelatable.
The way they talk about politics, how filtered and clean their accents are
theres something about Trumps offensiveness, something about his brashness, that appeals to the
people I write about in
We have to think about the social
the book and who grew
up like I did. Im not even safety net with much different goals
a Trump supporter, but I in mind.
feel a certain attachment
and I get a little bit cheery when he says certain things on the campaign trail
and criticizes the elites in such strong language. Its refreshing, even if you
disagree with the substance.
Look at the substance of what hes going after. The people in this book are
obviously struggling profoundly and its not just an economic struggle. Its the
addiction, its the family breakdown.
Robinson: I couldnt help feeling while reading Hillbilly Elegy that part of the
sort of subterranean anger or discontent is that they feel left out; overlooked
and left out.
Vance: Thats absolutely true, and that was actually going to be the other
part of the Trump answer. Its not just material deprivation, its also partially
a feeling that the coastal elitesthe people who have financial and political powerlook down on people like you. And for the past thirty years, the
Republican Party has basically run the same candidate. You think about the
debate stage, where there were seventeen people and sixteen of them were
fundamentally running a campaign not dissimilar to the one that George
W. Bush, John McCain, and Mitt Romney ran. And every single one of them
lost to the guy who was saying, look, were going to blow the whole thing up.
Everything that the elites have been telling you is wrong, this is why your
life sucks, were going to go in a new direction politically, substantively. And
thats appealing, I think, to people who feel left out and left behind.
Robinson: Do the elites look down on them, or is this just a self-indulgent,
self-pitying attitude?
Vance: I think theyre partially right. People I know who are very well
educated typically have sophisticated attitudes about politics, and will talk
as if Donald Trump is the dumb, redneck candidate that these dumb, racist rednecks deserved all along and who they wanted. There is a complete
failure to recognize that folks are complicated and that they can be driven
to vote for someone beyond just racism. It proves in a lot of ways the very
worst supposition that my people have about the elites, which is that they
dont really care about us. They dont try to think and understand us, they
just judge us. And as much as I disagree with so many folks back home about
Trump in particular, I think the reaction of a lot of the elites to Trumpism or
the Trump voter feeds into the very worst scenarios of how elites feel about
the rest of the country.
Robinson: I am going to ask you to talk to somebody. Lets suppose that some
place in Jackson, Kentucky, or Middletown, Ohio, theres a boy watching this
interview; his father left when he was little, his mother was in and out of
rehab, and so hes sitting in front of a computer screen with his grandmother
down the hall in the kitchen making dinner. What does J. D. Vance want to
say to that boy?
Vance: Well, I would say the same thing my Mamaw said to me, which is that
life is unfair for you. You are going to face barriers that other kids in similar
situations dont have to face, but you still have control over your life. Never
be like those kids who think the deck is stacked against them. Your job is to
recognize the unfairness, to overcome it, and then to give back once youve
overcome it. I think thats something kids like me really like to hear. Even
though the deck may be slightly stacked against you, you still have to believe
in your own agency or you will never make it out alive.
164
I N T E RVI E W
A Miracle or a
Relic
Hoover fellow Terry Moe argues that the US
Constitution is an anachronism that needs
fundamental change.
By Peter Robinson
Peter Robinson, Uncommon Knowledge: Hold fast, my friends, to the Constitution. Miracles do not cluster and what has happened once in six thousand years may not happen again. The Constitution of the United States as
a miraclein speaking those words, nineteenth-century statesman Daniel
Webster was giving voice to a view that is still common today. Our guest sees
the document not as a miracle but as a hindrance.
Terry Moe, the William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science
at Stanford, is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. Dr. Moe has
written extensively on education reform and the presidency, and with his
co-author, William Howell of the University of Chicago, Dr. Moe has published Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why
We Need a More Powerful Presidency. Terry Moe, welcome.
Terry Moe: Great to be with you.
Peter Robinson is the editor of the Hoover Digest, the host of Uncommon
Knowledge, and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Terry Moe is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the William Bennett Munro Professor of
Political Science at Stanford University.
FATAL FLAW?
Robinson: First, lets start with a kind of summary statement. Im quoting
from Relic: It is folly to think that what may have worked quite well in that
world [the eighteenth-century world of the founders] will also work well in
ours. We live with all kinds of premodern institutions; democratic assemblies date back twenty-five hundred years; English common law remains the
foundation of a great deal of American law. Why is it folly to suppose that an
eighteenth-century document will work in the twenty-first century?
Moe: Well, look at it. The founders designed the government for a tiny agrarian society in 1789. There were four million people in that society; seven
hundred thousand of them were slaves. Of the free people, 95 percent were
farmers. It was a very simple society. The government wasnt expected to do
much, and they designed a government that couldnt do much: government
separation of powers with a very parochial Congress at its lawmaking center.
And that kind of government may have been fine for the late 1700s, but as
society became much more modern, industrialized, and urbanizedand
generated a whole range of very serious problems such as monopoly, child
labor, pollution, disease, and other issues that people thought government
needed to do something aboutgovernment was simply incapable of acting.
The founders had created a government for their times, but the kind and
structure of government they created was simply ill-suited to take effective
action in modern times. Thats the real problem. Now, we cant blame the
founders for that. I mean, how could they have foreseen any of this? They
knew they couldnt, and Jefferson and others fully expected that the Constitution represented an experiment in government, and that future generations would adapt it
to suit the needs of a
changing society. But
that didnt happen, so,
basically, were stuck
with this structure
that they gave us two
hundred and twentyfive years ago.
Robinson: Let me see if I can sum up your argument to about a century ago.
Eighteenth century: you get a document that I get the feeling you wouldnt
have written it that way even to start with, but government was so small and
166
so little was expected of it that it worked, it was OK. Then you get an adjustment from the Progressive movement: it takes place within the existing
structure of the Constitution, but you get Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson saying, within this structure, we need to rebalance power and we
need a more vigorous
and assertive presidency.
The government wasnt expected to
With Wilson, as I recall,
do much, and they designed a govtheres civil service
reform; hes the first
ernment that couldnt do much.
president to give State of
the Union addresses in person; he is more assertive in every way in sending
up legislation and attempting to direct Congress. And you argue that was a
fix or workaround for that time as well: the Progressive movement achieved
a great deal of what needed to be done at that time?
Moe: Yes, I think they found themselves prisoners of the past and they
needed a government that could be more effective. They had a government
that was totally ineffective, and so they needed to do what they could. They
created a civil servicebased bureaucracy that could actually do things
carry out policyand a more powerful presidency. From that point on, weve
had what some people call a presidentially led bureaucratic government.
Thats basically the nature of modern American government. The problem is
that it didnt do away with the fundamental problem. We still have the same
basic structure of government. Presidents dont make the laws; Congress
makes the laws.
Robinson: Under the Constitution, Congress is granted the authority to
make the laws, and the fact that it makes them badlyand indeed, is wired
to make them badlyfatally undermines the ability of American government to meet the challenges of modern society. Bring out that part of the
argument.
Moe: Well, its simple but profound. It goes back to the Constitutions design
of Congress, which ensures that members are elected from districts and
from states, and theyre going to be responsive to the constituencies and special interests of those districts and states, and theyre going to be concerned
about getting re-elected. That makes them parochial, and it makes it almost
impossible for them, as a two-house collective institution, to really do whats
right for the national interest. Theyre acting in hundreds of different special
interests. Congress is just not capable of effectively pursuing the national
interest, and that is the heart of the problem. It goes back to the Constitution. Its still there, and nothing has changed that.
Robinson: Its one thing to say that each individual member of the House
will be, above all, sensitive to the interests of his own district, but its another
thing to say that the counterbalancingthe deal-making and compromises
necessary to produce any
legislation at allmakes
Weve had what some people call a
Congress, as a whole,
presidentially led bureaucratic govincapable of pursuing the
ernment. Thats basically the nature
national interest. The founders idea is wrong in prinof modern American government.
ciple? The founders set it up
so that the only way to get legislation through would be a protracted process
of compromise, and your argument is that even that doesnt work. Congress
as a whole cant function.
Moe: No, the first argument is that they were operating in 1789 and they
never thought Congress would be doing the kinds of things that its doing
today, that this vast array of problemspoverty, inequality, immigration,
infrastructure, terrorism, disruptive technology, globalizationwould be
dumped on Congress and people would say, do something. And there Congress is. Its just pathetic. Its incapable of taking effective action. They didnt
see that back in 1789. How could they? Theyre living in a completely different
world. Its up to us to do something. They expected that we would. We didnt.
So were left with an ancient Constitution that never anticipated any of this.
THE FIX
Robinson: Now, lets take your proposal. From Relic: The most promising
way to move our governmental system in the right direction is by amplifying the powers of the presidency. Presidents should be granted enhanced
agenda-setting powers to propose bills to Congress, which Congress should
then be required to vote on without amendment, on a strictly majoritarian
basis, within a fixed period of time. This is the way fast track authority currently works in the realm of international trade. Lets go through all that.
First of all, explain fast-track authority.
Moe: It was adopted in 1974 under Richard Nixon, and it was a recognition by
Congress that if they didnt do something like allow for fast track, we would
really never have trade agreementsthey would never work. Imagine if the
168
president were out trying to negotiate trade agreements with Europe or any
other nations, and when he brought an agreement back to Congress, Congress just picked it apart and said, Oh were going to do this, but were not
going to do that, and were not going to do that. Go back. And then the president, as the bargainer, would lose all credibility with these other countries,
and he would have no bargaining authority. So that doesnt work. Congress
decided that the only way were ever going to get anywhere in international
trade is by letting the president negotiate these things. He comes up with the
package, and then he presents the proposal to Congress, and Congress has
to accept the whole thing without changing it. They can vote no or yesno
amendments, no special-interest provisions. Plus they cant delay, cant sandbag the thing. They have to vote on it within x number of days. Thats the key
to the whole thing. Its a very simple mechanism that gives both the president
and Congress a role, and it ensures that if anything is going to become law,
both the House and the Senate must vote yes.
Robinson: You write that Congress would have to vote on a strictly majoritarian basis. Explain that one.
Moe: No filibusters.
Robinson: The point is that it takes sixty votes in the Senate to shut down a
filibuster, so it requires a supermajority. Thats what youre opposed to there.
Moe: Right.
Robinson: One of your criticsmaybe one of your severest criticsis Richard Epstein, our colleague here at the Hoover Institution. Richard takes the
example of ObamaCare, which passed Congress without a single Republican
vote in either the House
or Senate. It was literally
Youre going to get much more
as partisan as a vote can
getall the Democrats
coherent and better-justified attacks
and no Republicans in
on social problems than Congress
both houses. Richard
would come up with.
argues that if a president had been responsible for drafting the legislationthat is, if Terry Moes
reform had been in placethen the Democrats could have enacted legislation
that was even more partisan. Or, if the Republicans had a majority, they could
have voted it down outright. I quote Richard Epstein: This new proposed
system will thus lead to one of two equilibrium positions. Either a partisan
170
Ronald Reagan, and he wants to pare back the welfare stateand hed been
voted in on that basiscan he do that? And the answer is no, he cant do that.
Why? Because we have a separation-of-powers system, and Congress is right
there at the center, and they were not going to go along with itand they
didnt.
Robinson: I can remember Ed Meese describing to me his shock when he
came back from Capitol Hill after talking to the leadership for the first time.
Meese was then counselor
to the president, and the
Amending the Constitution is hard.
first thing leadership said
was, You guys are not
Why? Well, the founders made it
eliminating the Department
hard. Thats another thing where
of Education. Boom! That
were prisoners of the past.
was the first week after
Reagan was inaugurated.
A few last questions, Terry. The Constitution provides for two mechanisms
for amendments: either Congress calls for an amendment, which the states
then ratify; or the states call for a constitutional convention, which, if there
are enough votes, Congress must put in place. So youve got two mechanisms. How are you going to get your amendment enacted?
Moe: William Howell and I see our first job as being one of trying to understand the nature of the problem. I think the biggest problem facing this country is not who will win the election. Every four years, the people get wrapped
up in that like its the number one question. The most important question is:
how will this country be governed? And the fact isand has always been
that this country is governed very ineffectively. Presidents come into office
and they cant actually take effective action. That is the problem. What are
we going to do about that? The number one problem is to connect ineffective
government to the Constitution and show why Congress is at the center of
that.
Now, its helpful to move on from that and say, OK. Is there anything we
can do? I personally consider that a second-order issue. Maybe Im just a
dyed-in-the-wool academic, but I think people need to understand that this
is a problem, and that it goes back to the Constitution, and that rather than
just worshiping the Constitution and the founders, we should actually think
objectively about the Constitution.
What effects does it actually have on our governance today? Well, it has
some very negative effects. What can we do about that? It turns out that its
172
174
HISTORY A N D C ULT UR E
Past Is Prologue
Determined to shape the future, the new president
needs to be reminded of the past. Lets convene a
council of historians.
ship from Truman to Obama, the American diplomat Dennis Ross recently
noted that almost no administrations leading figures know the history of
what we have done in the Middle East. Neither do they know the history of
the region itself. In 2003, to take one example, when President George W.
Bush chose to topple Saddam Hussein, he did not appear to fully appreciate
either the difference between Sunni and Shiite Muslims or the significance
of the fact that Saddams regime was led by a Sunni minority that had suppressed the Shiite majority. He failed to heed warnings that the predictable
consequence of his actions would be a Shiite-dominated Baghdad beholden to
the Shiite champion in the Middle East: Iran.
The problem is by no means limited to the Middle East or to Bush. Former
president Barack Obamas inattention to the deep historical relationship between
Russia and Ukraine led him to underestimate the risks of closer ties between
Graham Allison is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. Niall Ferguson is a senior fellow at the
Hoover Institution and a member of the Hoovers Working Group on the Role of
Military History in Contemporary Conflict. They are co-directors of the Harvard
Kennedy Schools Applied History Project.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 175
Ukraine and Europe. I dont really even need George Kennan right now, Obama
told the New Yorker for a January 2014 article, referring to the great Cold War
era diplomat and historian. By March, Russia had annexed Crimea.
To address this deficit, it is not enough for a president to invite friendly
historians to dinner, as Obama was known to do. Nor is it enough to appoint a
court historian, as John F. Kennedy did with Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. We urge
the new president to establish a White House Council of Historical Advisers.
Historians made similar recommendations to Presidents Carter and Reagan
during their administrations, but nothing ever came of these proposals. Operationally, the Council of Historical Advisers would mirror the Council of Economic Advisers, established after World War II. A chair and two additional members would be appointed by the president to full time positions, and respond to
assignments from the president. They would be supported by a small professional staff and would be part of the Executive Office of the President.
HISTORY AT WORK
For too long, history has been disparaged as a soft subject by social scientists offering spurious certainty. We believe it is time for a new and rigorous
applied historyan attempt to illuminate current challenges and choices
by analyzing precedents and historical analogues. We not only want to see
applied history incorporated into the Executive Office of the President,
alongside economic expertise; we also want to see it developed as a discipline in its own right at American universities, beginning at our own. When
people refer to applied
history today, they are
I dont really even need George Ken- typically referring to trainnan right now, President Obama
ing for archivists, museum
curators, and the like. We
said in an interview. Two months
have in mind a different sort
later, Russia annexed Crimea.
of applied history, one that
follows in the tradition of the modern historian Ernest May and the political
scientist Richard Neustadt. Their 1986 book, Thinking in Time, provides the
foundation on which we intend to build.
Mainstream historians take an event, phenomenon, or era and try to
explain what happened. They sometimes say they study the past for its
own sake. Applied historians would take a current predicament and try
to identify analogues in the past. Their ultimate goal would be to find clues
about what is likely to happen, then suggest possible policy interventions
and assess probable consequences. You might say that applied history is to
176
PAY ANY PRICE? A display at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and
Museum in Boston shows Kennedy addressing an anxious nation during the
1962 Cuban missile crisis. The nuclear faceoff is among historical examples
that could be used to inform current presidential decision making. [Brian SnyderReuters]
178
deliberations have significant parallels with John F. Kennedys decision during the Cuban missile crisis to strike a deal with Nikita Khrushchev, rather
than invading Cuba or learning to live with Soviet missiles off Floridas coast.
THE KNOW N UNKNOWNS
A president might also ask the council what if? questions. What if some
action had not been taken, or a different action had been taken? (These
questions are too seldom asked after a policy failure.) In this spirit, the next
president could ask the council to replay 2013. What if Obama had enforced
his red line against the Assad regime, rather than working with Russia to
remove Syrian chemical weapons? Was this decision, as critics maintain, the
biggest error of his presidency? Or was it, as he insists, one of his best calls?
Finally, the council might consider grand strategic questions, including
perhaps the biggest one of all: is the United States in decline? Can it surmount the challenges facing it, or will American power steadily erode in the
decades ahead?
During the recent presidential campaign, both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump offered answers to these questions. Indeed, Trump proposed to
make America great again, implying that decline has already occurred, and
to put America first, reviving a slogan with, to put it mildly, a problematic
history. The presidential campaign gave us little confidence that Americas
history deficit was about to be closed.
We suggest that the charter for the future Council of Historical Advisers begin with Thucydidess observation that the events of future history...will be of the same natureor nearly soas the history of the past, so
long as men are men. Although applied historians will never be clairvoyants
with an unclouded crystal ball, we agree with Winston Churchill: The longer
you can look back, the farther you can look forward.
Reprinted by permission of the Atlantic. 2016 Atlantic Monthly Group.
All rights reserved.
Change for a
Dollar?
Even his former enemy King George III called
George Washington the greatest man in the
world. Tell that to the activist trying to rename a
San Francisco school.
By Bill Whalen
ts not just the clever minds under the state Capitol dome that
make America wonder sometimes if California has taken leave of its
senses.
The Golden State is also blessed by the likes of Matt Haney, presi-
dent of the San Francisco Unified School District Board of Education, who
recently posted this on his Twitter account (since set to private):
We should rename Washington High School after San Francisco
native, poet and author Maya Angelou. No schools named after
slave owners.
By George, Haney didnt get the memo about first in the hearts of his
countrymen. Or maybe Haney has it in for quarters, one-dollar bills, and
Purple Heart medals.
But its not strictly anti-Washington. In San Francisco, Jefferson Elementary and Francis Scott Key Elementary (The Star Spangled Banner author
also owned slaves) could be subject to renaming.
Bill Whalen is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
180
This might be the reality of a republic whose founding days are long past:
the early shapers are subject to sanitation, if not eradicationwell, unless
theyre playing on Broadway (without a bagful of Tony Awards, would Alexander Hamilton still be
on the $10 bill?).
Some very bright kids attending elite
Ill cop to a bias both
Southern and premodWestern universities know next to
ern: Im a graduate of
nothing about their nation.
Washington & Lee University, a double offender in the world of politically correct crusading. And I
grew up in Virginia, which has struggled with its heritage for decades.
With GW under siege in SF, I have two concerns.
First, if we unleash the PC dragon on the presidency, where do we stop?
The National Park Service will have to take a jackhammer to Mount Rushmore. Thomas Jefferson? Slave owner. Abraham Lincoln? Waged war,
revoked civil liberties. Theodore Roosevelt? An imperialist who slaughtered
wildlife.
Good luck finding clean icons in the past century. Woodrow Wilson is on
the hot seat at his alma mater, Princeton, for his segregationist ways. Franklin Roosevelt turned away Jewish refugees before World War II and didnt
bomb Nazi death camps during it. John F. Kennedy consumed women like an
Olive Garden never-ending pasta bowl. Ronald Reagan? Slow to react to the
AIDS health crisis.
My second concern: as we erase reminders of the era of slavery, how do we
ensure that younger generations still get an education in the root causes of
the American experiment?
Years ago, when I worked in the governors office in Sacramento, Id give
my summer interns a history quiz. Sadly, some very bright kids attending
elite Western universities knew little about their nation predating 1850 and
California statehood.
If Californias school
districts want to swap
Washington was the rare foundout slaveholding figures
ing father who actually freed his
for names more palatslaves
able in the present day,
the trade-off should be an increased classroom focus on at least three
aspects of the earliest chapters of American history: religious freedom in
the New World, the economic causes behind the uprising, and the drafting
of the nations Constitution.
But if San Francisco and other California cities give Washington and his
contemporaries a reprieve, I have another request: please show the kids
what makes these figures historically significant.
Washington High, for
example, has a mural depictThe founders are often victims of
ing the future president in
historical amnesiaunless theyre
the company of slaves.
piling up Tony Awards on Broadway. Where does that slice
of colonial life rank in
Washingtons biography? Well behind his assuming the presidency
and then voluntarily stepping down, multiple Revolutionary War
campaigns (Yorktown, Valley Forge, crossing the Delaware
River), or surveying the frontier.
As for slavery, why not a mural noting that Washington
was the rare slave-holding founding father who freed
his slaves in his will?
Such wrinkles are what make Washington,
like Jefferson and other giants of their
time, such complex figures. They
182
sought a better society; they wrestled with their consciences over what
defined libertya struggle that continues to this day.
Erase Washington? Like the quarter bearing his image, its a two-bit suggestion.
Reprinted by permission of the Sacramento Bee. 2016 Sacramento Bee.
All rights reserved.
H O OVER ARCHIVE S
A Bomb to
Remember
The 1946 nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll were a
shocking introduction to the perils of the atomic
age. Rare artifacts and records tell the story.
during the tests, and carried ammunition, vehicles, and equipmentas well
as mice, guinea pigs, and rats that would be tested for radiation levels after
the detonations. Forty-two thousand people, including military personnel,
scientists, technicians, and independent contractors, assembled to witness
the blasts.
The military detonated a first bomb, Able, from the air, and a second,
Baker, underwater. In both cases, the destructive fallout of the twentythree-kiloton devices exceeded the expectations of the military. Able sank
five ships, contaminated the remaining ships, and supplied lethal doses of
radiation to the animals on board. The Baker bomb, however, proved even
more destructive, causing a base surge and tsunami that sank nine ships,
and emitting nuclear fallout that contaminated nearly every ship of the
fleet. Working under unprecedented contamination levels, many of the servicemen involved with the tests were exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. A third planned test, Charlie, was abandoned in light of the results of
Able and Baker.
Seventy years after the initial tests on Bikini Atoll, the island remains a
symbol of the dangers and consequences of nuclear testing. The military
carried out other nuclear tests in the atoll until 1958. The geologic and
environmental damages caused by the Bikini Atoll nuclear tests render the
area uninhabitable to this day. The 167 residents of Bikini Atoll who agreed
to relocate for the good of all mankind in 1946 have never returned to their
homes. Servicemen who worked on the ships at Bikini Atoll have suffered
sickness and early death due to radiation exposure.
The sound recordings of 1946, however, broadcast an air of excitement in
publicizing Americas new weapon in an era of postwar victory: the nuclear
tests are presented as a spectacle set on an international stage. The giddy
coverage raises questions in the listeners mind. Were US scientists entirely
ignorant of the long-term effects of radiation? Were the Bikini Atoll tests part
of a strategy of intimidation against the Soviets? Was the attitude surrounding Bikini Atoll a mask for the anxiety of entering the nuclear age?
A RIVALRY BETWEEN AIR AND SEA
Immediately after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945,
the American public and in particular the press questioned whether mass
atomic attack against civilians rendered World War II a pyrrhic victory; an
editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, for example, stated that dropping
the atomic bomb was not only the most important single event in the course
of the war, it is an announcement more fateful for human history than the
UNCERTAINTY AND FEAR: The Bikini Atoll tests of 1946 were meant to
answer questions about warfare after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the end,
simple answers were few. The Bikini tests began to bring into sharper focus
the tactical challenges and humanitarian dangers of the nuclear era. [Hoover
Institution ArchivesDavid Monroe Shoup Collection]
whole war itself. The prescient Edward Murrow stated, Seldom if ever
has a war ended leaving the victors with such a sense of uncertainty and
fear, with such realization that the future is obscure and that survival is not
assured.
While the press focused on the humanitarian consequences of the bomb,
members of the military entertained tactical concerns: would atomic warfare put an end to traditional strategies of combat? The efficacy of the bomb
caused deep consternation particularly in American naval circles, who
feared it would establish the supremacy of the air service and make the naval
branch obsolete. In 1946, the air service was still under the auspices of the
Army. The Army argued that firebombing raids in Europe and Japan and the
new dominance of the atomic bomb were largely responsible for Americas
186
victory in World War II, establishing the Army as the countrys most important branch of military power. Representatives of the US Navy, meanwhile,
reminded the public of the dangerous hardships of seamen who served in the
Pacific theaterand that the pilots who fought in such battles as Midway and
Guadalcanal were able to do so because of aircraft carriers, supported by
battleships. In the end an independent US Air Force would be established on
September 18, 1947, as part of the National Security Actlargely in response
to the rivalry between the Army and the Navy that emerged in the wake of
the war, and which would be dramatized during the tests at Bikini Atoll.
Before the National Security Act was passed, however, Navy officers
were keen to prove that ships were not excessively vulnerable to atomic
attack and were just as useful and valuable as aircraft for transporting
atomic weapons. The officers pointed out that nuclear torpedoes would be
just as effective as aerial bombs, if not more so, given that the bombs would
be harder to detect under the sea rather than in the air. Eager not to allow
the Army to gain mastery over the United States most important new
weapon, the Navy proposed an atomic test to be conducted underwater.
The chief of naval operations approved the project that would take the form
of a bomb named Baker.
Thus, mere months after the peace agreements that officially ended the
Second World War, US military commanders had begun to lobby Congress
for permission to test and study the new weapon that had forced the surrender of Japan. In late December 1945, President Trumans Joint Chiefs of
Staff formed a plan for a series of three nuclear detonations (both aerial and
underwater) that would allow military and civilian scientists and engineers
to assess the strategic, tactical, and biological effects of atomic power on
naval and military forces. To guarantee a balanced, unbiased evaluation of
the experiments, the Joint Chiefs created a joint task force including members from the Army, the Navy, the Manhattan Project, and civilians. The
atomic tests were publicly announced on December 10, 1945, at which point
the New York Times reported on the squabbling between Navy and Army
officials, with the Army in particular working aggressively to get a leading
role in the experiment to make sure it will not be an all-Navy affair. On January 10, 1946, President Truman approved the plan, bringing Joint Task Force
One, the organizing unit for the tests, into existence. The operation was given
a budget of $1.3 billion, making it one of the biggest military operations of its
time.
The Joint Chiefs chose Vice Admiral William Henry Purnell Spike
Blandy to command the task force. Tagged by the press the Buck Rogers
of the Navy, Blandy was known as a resourceful, energetic combat leader
who had commanded significant World War II ships such as the destroyer
Simpson and the battleship Utah, and was probably best known as the
organizer of the campaigns at Iwo Jima and Okinawa. At the wars end, he
had been promoted to deputy chief of naval operations for special weapons,
where his job was to assess the costs and benefits of guided missiles and
nuclear bombs.
Interviews with Blandy recently released by the Hoover Archives reveal
that he held no illusions about the impact of his research. When asked to
name the forthcoming tests in early 1946 he chose the name Operation
SHOCK AND AWE: Many of the reporters and witnesses gathered at Bikini
Atoll were awed and intimidated by the explosion. After the blast, as smoke
and flames filled the sky, an eerie silence replaced the giddy, nervous chatter
that had characterized early morning conversations. Afterward, radioactive
rain began to fall. [Library of CongressCurtis E. LeMay Papers]
190
ground equipment, as well as our tacticians, strategists, and medical officers, would be groping their way along a dark road which
might lead us to another and worse Pearl Harbor.
In addition to its value for defensive strategy, Blandy argued, the operation
would give military and civilian researchers the chance to test a nuclear
attacks effects on airplanes, tanks, animals, radio and radar equipment,
ammunition, food,
clothing, and medicine.
After the first atomic bombs fell on
Scientific goals included
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one newsdiagnosing and measurpaper called the news an announceing radiation sickness,
and studying oceanic,
ment more fateful for human history
seismographic, and
than the whole war itself.
meteorological changes
wrought by the bomb.
Military officials insisted that because the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been dropped on enemy territory during wartime, scientists had
not been able to study the effects of gamma radiation. Under a controlled
environment, scientists could measure the pressure, impulse, and shockwave
velocity of nuclear energyand predict radiations effect on humans and
animals.
Detractors immediately branded the tests a demonstration of power aimed
at the Soviet Union. Many journalists also argued that nuclear testing was
a pompous show of wealth. Even the size of the castoff fleet to be bombed
nearly a hundred ships, some of them enemy vessels captured during wartimeunderscored the image of a wealthy, powerful nation with resources
to waste. Joint Task Force One press releases noted that the ships to be sunk
(they would come to be known as the Guinea Pig Fleet) represented the
worlds fourth- or fifth-largest navy, despite decrepitude. Equally significant,
three of the Guinea Pig ships were vessels captured from the once-feared
Imperial Japanese Navy, a symbolic sign of victory over Americas premier
enemy. Reversing the memory of Pearl Harbor, the servicemen at the tests
put the three Japanese revenants in the fatal zone, where they were all but
sure to be destroyed by a bomb.
Navy officials were especially keen to include the Nagato, the flagship of
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto when he commanded the attack on Pearl Harbor.
At wars end the Nagatonicknamed the Nasty Naggie by sailorswas the
last Japanese battleship left afloat. By 1946 the Nagato was heavily damaged
SAVE THE DATE: A pinup calendar highlights the month of July 1946, when
tests Able and Baker were carried out. (Charlie, the projected third test, was a
no-show, the military having decided it was unneeded.) Of some forty thousand witnesses to the tests in the Pacific, only thirty-seven were women.
The bomb used in the Able test was named Gilda, after a character played
by the actress Rita Hayworth, and the Baker warhead was dubbed Helen of
Bikinipresumably for its ability to launch ships skyward. [Hoover Institution
ArchivesBeth Flippen Scheel Papers]
and covered with debris. The seamen assigned the precarious task of sailing
the leaky Nagato to its imminent demise in the Marshall Islands discovered
a macabre reminder aboard: nearly a hundred corpses of Japanese servicemen, found locked in a compartment below decks. Victims of Americas last
bombing raids against Japan, the bodies served as ghostly reminders of the
death and destruction of the recent past.
WHERE TO DROP THE BOMB?
One of the biggest decisions the Operation Crossroads task force faced in
early 1946 was finding an area suitable for nuclear experiments. Officials
unfolded world maps in search of sites; in the early stages of planning, they
considered the Caribbean Islands and even
Military officials argued that because
the outer banks of North
the bombs at Hiroshima and NagasaCarolina. Finally, they
ki had been dropped during wartime,
settled on the Marshall
scientists had not been able to study
Islands, a cluster of coral
islands and atolls halfway the effects of gamma radiation.
between Hawaii and Australia. Known for white sand, coconuts, reefs, turtles, sharks, crabs, and clear
blue water, the Marshall Islands touted several sheltered lagoons deemed
ideal for underwater explosions, a mild climate that would facilitate testing
preparations, and a location far away from established shipping routes.
The Marshall Islandsin particular Kwajalein Atoll, where troops would
be stationedheld symbolic military significance as well. Japan had seized
the Marshall Islands from Germany during World War I and made them into
a military base; during World War II, the Japanese turned Kwajalein Atoll
into a fearsome prisoner of war camp known as Execution Island. The late
Louis Zamperini, subject of the recent book and film Unbroken, spent fortytwo days on the island, where he was interrogated and tortured before being
removed to a camp on the Japanese mainland. In a gruesome battle in 1944,
the United States had captured Kwajalein Atoll from Japan and turned it into
a base of operations for its own military maneuvers.
Besides being remote, the Marshall Islands held a further advantage: a
small population. As Admiral Blandy put it after the tests, It was important
that the local population be small and cooperative so they could be moved to
a new location with a minimum of trouble. After a survey of the Marshalls,
military officials targeted Bikini Atoll, which had a deep, sheltered lagoon
and only one hundred and sixty-seven inhabitants. In a meeting staged and
filmed by the military, Commodore Ben Wyatt met with the native Bikinians
after their weekly church service and asked, Would you be willing to sacrifice your island for the welfare of all men? Using biblical imagery that compared the Bikinians to the children of Israel, Wyatt implored the Bikinians to
yield their home island to
the service of an experiment
In American naval circles, there were
that would be for the good
fears that the bomb would establish
of humanity. After a days
discussion, the Bikinians
the supremacy of the air service and
leader, King Juda, reported
make the Navy obsolete.
to military authorities that
members of the native tribe on Bikini were willing to abandon their homes.
Within a month, the Bikinians were transported to nearby Rongerik Atoll.
With the native population removed, US soldiers and sailors mobilized
to prepare for the first test. The military had to assemble their test crews
quickly, since the majority of the scientists needed to be back on American
college campuses for the fall semester. The large-scale operation required a
wide variety of personnel: not just scientists but engineers, divers, veterinarians, bomb disposal experts, photographers, oceanographers, meteorologists,
and naval captains.
Working during postwar demobilization also proved tricky. In April 1946,
desperate to finalize operations, the task force issued a memorandum
imploring men in reserve to volunteer for Operation Crossroads, promising
that no serviceman would be kept on duty after January 1947. A second and
more heavy-handed measure included rerouting ships ferrying troops home
from the Pacific, and ordering these troops to assist with bomb site preparation before returning to the United States for demobilization. Finally, the task
force assembled a group of thirty-seven thousand sent from all corners of
the globe. They were joined by five thousand civilians, mostly scientists from
leading American universities and members of the press from around the
world.
Of the total force assembled, only thirty-seven of the witnesses to the
tests were women. One of them, a Red Cross volunteer named Beth Flippen
Scheel, amassed a collection of memorabilia from the event that is now held
HAVING A BLAST: One of multiple temporary news products created by the
Crossroads personnel, the Atomic Blast reported not just on the bomb tests
but on the media circus. Journalists had their own floating press headquarters,
the USS Appalachia. [Hoover Institution ArchivesBeth Flippen Scheel Papers]
SOON HOMELESS: Before the bomb tests, Commodore Ben Wyatt, military
governor of the Marshall Islands, had asked the Bikini islanders, Would you
be willing to sacrifice your island for the welfare of all men? The Bikinians
leader responded that they would, believing that everything is in the hands
of God. Islanders such as the children in this photo left their home, never
allowed to return. Their descendants today are scattered among several
islands, largely dependent on US support. [Hoover Institution ArchivesBeth Flippen
Scheel Papers]
196
trough. Convivially coupling the Bikini Atoll test with mythical beasts, the
spoof certificate emerges as a haunting testament to the carnival atmosphere
that attended the bomb sites in the days before the detonations.
CARNIVAL AND CONTROVERSY
Operation Crossroads was not only one of the most expensive military operations of the twentieth century but also perhaps the best documented. More
than one hundred and thirty newspaper, magazine, and radio correspondents
from the United States, Australia, Canada, France, the Republic of China, the
Soviet Union, and Britain came to the Marshalls to witness the tests. They
were given their own floating press headquarters, the USS Appalachia. In
addition, four newspapers for military and civilian personnel were printed
on Kwajalein; rare copies of one of the newspapers, the Atomic Blast, are
found in Hoovers Beth Flippen Scheel Collection. Radio Bikini was established for daily broadcasts and interviews with soldiers, sailors, officers, and
volunteers. The military estimated that over fifty thousand photographs and
two hundred and eighty-four miles of film were taken at the Bikini testing site
and its surroundings.
Between January and July 1946, Navy construction battalions built six
basketball courts, sixteen volleyball courts, and several lifeguard platforms
on the beaches of their base island, Kwajalein. Despite the grueling work
required to prepare for the tests, Kwajalein, once a hellish camp for American pilots taken prisoner, was converted into a billet with the distinct air of
an adult summer camp.
Footage from the days
The decrepit ships to be sunk (they
before the detonation
would be known as the Guinea
shows sailors playing
games, drinking sodas on Pig Fleet) represented the worlds
the beach, fishing, flirting fourth- or fifth-largest navy.
with the few women on
the island, swimming, and eating ice cream. The military reported that their
personnel required seventy thousand candy bars per day. Every afternoon,
thousands of officers, sailors, and scientists swarmed ashore to buy cold, tencent beer at the makeshift officers club known as the Up and Atom. The
walls of the club were decorated with life preservers stripped from the ships
of the Guinea Pig Fleet.
Sailors even became playful with the subject of the actual bombs to
be detonated: the Able bomb was nicknamed Gilda after the newly
released Rita Hayworth movie in which Hayworth played a beautiful,
destructive heroine. A print of Gilda had been flown from the United
States to Bikini Island in early spring 1946 and played nightly; nearly
every serviceman in the preparation crew had seen it. Sailors stenciled a
likeness of the voluptuous Hayworth on the nose of the plane that would
drop her namesake bomb. The Baker bomb, meanwhile, was christened
Helen of Bikini.
198
The sense of spectacle surrounding the Bikini tests was not limited to the
Marshall Islands; it was communicated throughout the international press
and in popular culture. Early in 1946 Life magazine began to refer to Hollywood starlets as anatomic bombs and later the hit pop song Atom Bomb
Baby secured the metaphorical association of the bomb and the erotic in
pop culture. Perhaps no
cultural product secured
In 1946, Life magazine started referthe sexual imagery of the
ring to Hollywood starlets as anabomb so well, however, as
the bikini itselfa new,
tomic bombs. A hit song, Atom
scant, and scandalous item
Bomb Baby, also linked the bomb
of swimwear introduced
and the erotic. And then came that
by French designer Louis
notorious two-piece swimsuit.
Rard just four days after
the detonation of the Able bomb. Not surprisingly, Rita Hayworth was one
of the first of Hollywoods glamour girls to be photographed poolside in the
explosive two-piece.
As media coverage of the tests spread, however, voices of opposition were
raised as well. The most outspoken critics of the bomb tests were led by Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois, who criticized the tests as a grandiose display
of atomic destruction. Admiral Blandy, called the Atomic Playboy by his
detractors, was summoned to testify before the Senates Naval Affairs Committee, who were concerned over the destruction of a fleet of American ships
that collectively had originally cost $450 million to build. Blandy argued that
the damaged ships in 1946 could only be sold for the value of scrap metal, and
sacrificing them to the grand nuclear experiment was a better value.
Protests concerning the ships also flooded in from veteran seamen
who had served on vessels slated for destruction. The state of New York,
lobbied by ex-servicemen and sensitive to regional pride, requested that
its namesake battleship be returned to its home state as a war memorial rather than being bombed at Bikini. Denying the request, Joint
Task Force One responded, this gallant battleship could perform no
more valuable or distinguished service for our postwar Navy than it will
render in the historic tests. Eventually, because of considerable public
feeling that valuable vessels were going to be destroyed, Congress limited the number of American combat vessels to be sacrificed during the
tests to thirty-three; the Navy, however, bolstered the Guinea Pig Fleet
by adding what it referred to as merchant type shipstransport and
landing craft.
The target ships that sailed for Bikini included two aircraft carriers, twelve
destroyers, eight submarines, nineteen attack transports, forty-one landing
craft, two oilers, and an advance-repair dry dock. The majority of damaged
combat vessels in the fleet were victims of Pearl Harbor or late-war kamikaze attack.
A NOAHS ARK OF THE DOOMED
By far the most vocal opposition to the tests came from civilians outraged
by the announcement that the military would place animals on the decks
to study the effects of radiation on living creatures. A month before the
tests the Navy deployed the USS Burleson, nicknamed Noahs Ark, to
Bikini, carrying animals as well as the veterinarians and seamen assigned
to care for them and test them for radiation after the blasts. The military
shipped five thousand rats, two hundred and four goats, two hundred
mice, and sixty guinea pigs to Bikini Atoll. The pigs were selected because
their skin and short hair was similar to humans. The goats were included
because their weight and volume of body fluid were close to that of an
average adult man.
Early in 1946, Blandy denied that animals would be tested at Bikini, but as
news of the plans circulated, he stated that a minimal number of animals
will be used. We regret that some of these animals will be sacrificed, but we
are more concerned about the men and women of the next generation than
we are about the animals of this one. Dogs were originally part of the animal
test group, but dog lovers protested so loudly that dogs were removed from
the roster. The Burleson was one of the few areas of the Bikini and Kwajalein
Atoll community strictly off-limits to the press.
Before Able was detonated, sailors placed animals on twenty-two ships of
the Guinea Pig Fleet, at duty stations that humans would typically occupy
during battle: decks and
bridges, gun turrets, engine
rooms. Goats were shaved
Were US scientists entirely ignorant
of the long-term effects of radiation? to imitate military haircuts;
some of the animals were
covered in sunblock to test whether it screened flesh from the nuclear flash.
A few pigs were dressed in Navy uniforms, both as dark humor and as a way
to test radiations effect on uniform fabric. An Operation Crossroads press
release reported, It is not the intention to kill a large portion of the animals,
since dead animals are of less value for study. We want radiation-sick animals, not radiation-dead animals.
200
BATTERED BUT UNBOWED: Sailors inspect the damage to the port side of the
light aircraft carrier Independence after the Able air burst. The carrier was 560
yards from ground zero. Commissioned in 1943, the Independence fought at
Tarawa and was damaged by torpedo planes at Rabaul; after repairs, the ship
returned to combat and served out the war. It was among ninety-five vessels
exposed to the Operation Crossroads tests. [National Archives]
Almost immediately, military personnel in planes and ships began taking Geiger counter readings of the fallouta haste that the Army and Navy
would later regret. By early afternoon radiological monitors sounded the all
clear in the lagoon. Support vessels came steaming back into Bikini Atoll to
inspect the Guinea Pig Fleet, and boarding teams raced ship to ship to rescue
surviving animals. One archival photograph from the nuclear tests shows
laughing sailors, some of them bare-armed or bare-chested, swabbing down
decks full of radioactive fallout.
Even though most of the target fleet was damaged, the press at Bikini
Atoll was quick to point out that the destruction of the blast failed to live up
to its hype: a New York Times article published just after Able, for example,
202
THE LAST GUINEA PIG: The ravaged Independence rests at anchor in San
Francisco Bay. After the 1946 atomic tests at Bikini Atoll the carrier was taken
to San Francisco, where the Navy studied it to learn about radiation and blast
exposure. Eventually the ship was towed out to sea and, after being used as
a naval gunnery target, was scuttled in January 1951 off the Farallon Islands,
where it rests upright in 2,600 feet of water. A robot submarine explored the
wreckage in 2015 and scientists proclaimed it amazingly intact. [San Francisco Maritime National Historical Park]
bemoaned that the bomb sank only a few ships, and interpreted this as
evidence of the weapons failure. Before the explosion, radio broadcaster
Don Bell reported the expected death cloud to reach sixty thousand feet.
Foreign observersparticularly Russian onlookerswere quick to publicize
the seemingly unimpressive results of the test. Wags in the American service
began referring to Bikini as No Atoll Atoll or Nothing Atoll.
While some nuclear scientists warned that the medias unmet lust for
cataclysmic destruction masked the alarming radiation levels of the explosion, their measured view received little to no publicity. Also largely ignored
204
FUTURE SHOCKS: The bomb tests at Bikini Atoll proved that nuclear weapons could toss ships around like toys. What they did not do was settle the
Army-Navy rivalry that had largely set the experiments in motion. Bomb tests
would continue in the atoll until 1958, and elsewhere in the Pacific Proving
Grounds until 1962. Signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 brought an
end to atmospheric and underwater nuclear testing. [Hoover Institution Archives
Bonner Frank Fellers Collection]
despite calling it a lagoon of death, within twenty-four hours Don Bell was
aboard a ship in the southeastern part of the lagoon, safe and within four
miles of the target array, and recalling the details of how and when individual vessels sank for his radio audience.
At first, the Navy believed that the target ships could be decontaminated
by washing. When multiple washings of the exteriors failed to bring down
radiation levels significantly, the Navy decided to sandblast the ships to
bare metal, and bathe the
ships brass and copper in
In the end, military documents connitric acid. After the initial
cluded that during a nuclear attack
controversy surrounding
ships would be virtually dead in the the expense of the Bikini
water...their crews dead or dying
experiment and the sacrifice
of storied ships, the Navy
from radiation. Those documents
wanted to make sure that
remained classified for nearly two
the remains of the target
decades.
fleet could be sold for scrap
metal, offsetting some of the costs of the bomb testing. Sailors boarded the
ships and removed all exposed organic material, such as ropes, canvas, and
wood, and removed all paint that had been exposed during the blasts. All the
sailors scrubbings, however, did not significantly reduce the radiation levels,
and many of the most contaminated ships were purposefully sunk.
Plagued by contamination on an unprecedented scale, inadequate equipment, inexperienced personnel, and difficult working conditions, attempts
to understand the impact of the Able and Baker tests faltered. Worse still,
the contamination spread at an alarming rate throughout Bikini Atoll,
moving quickly from the target fleet to the support fleet, and infecting the
water supply. By early August, radiation levels had reached such alarming
rates that Admiral Blandy was implored by nervous colleagues to abandon
the atoll. The remaining ships in the support fleet were so contaminated
that sailors were forced to pass Geiger counters over the salt water in the
ships toilets before using them. Blandy ordered mandatory withdrawal
from Bikini on August 10, 1946. On September 7, President Truman canceled the last planned test of Operation Crossroads, citing the difficulty of
keeping support crews on remote islands during demobilization, and the
need for nongovernment scientists to return to their home universities and
colleges.
At the same time, classified documents written by members of the Manhattan Project stated the reasons for halting the tests more bluntly: The
206
Navy considers this contamination business the toughest part of test Baker.
They had no idea it would be such a problem and they are breaking their
necks to find a solution.
The Navys temporary solution was to move the ships to Kwajalein and
continue cleaningyet this proved futile. In a confidential memo dated September 4, 1946, Blandy was granted permission to sink the remaining target
vessels that were badly damaged or severely contaminated. Only nine of the
original fleet of ninety-five were saved; these were shipped to Pearl Harbor
and San Francisco for further testing. After thorough investigation, the
remaining ships were sold to civilians as scrap.
Ironically, the inconclusive results at Bikini failed to settle the Army-Navy
rivalry that had largely set the experiment in motion. The Army Air Forces
pointed out that only nine ships survived the destruction and contamination,
taking this as proof of the Navys ineffectiveness in the atomic age. The Navy
countered that the results of Able and Baker were qualified; if the ships had
been manned, even by sailors exposed to radiation, crews could have countered the fires and damage caused by the initial explosions. The armed services faced the same speculative stalemate as after Nagasaki and Hiroshima.
The Navy moved forward by arguing that the gross contamination caused
by Baker was proof that the US military should invest in the production of
nuclear torpedoes. Slowly, public and political pressure to merge the Navy
with the Army receded.
Admiral Blandy and members of Joint Task Force One celebrated the
end of Operation Crossroads in Washington in November 1946, marking
the moment with an enormous angel food cake in the shape of a mushroom
cloud. At the same time the native Bikinians removed from their homes were
suffering severe food shortages on Rongerik Atoll, which lacked the resources of their former home. In 1947 the United Nations intervened on behalf of
the Bikinians, announcing that the Marshall Islands and Micronesia would be
a Strategic Trust Territory to be adminisAll the sailors scrubbing couldnt sigtered by the United
nificantly reduce the radiation levels.
States. It was the only
such trust ever established by the United Nations. The Bikinians, still exiled
today, continue to subsist in the Marshalls through heavy subsidies paid by
the US government.
Despite the high-level fallout of Baker, the US government reinstated the
nuclear testing program on Bikini Atoll in 1948. In 1954 the fusion bomb
Castle Bravoa thousand times as powerful as the bomb dropped on
208
H OOVE R A R C H I VE S
Historical Harvest
Witold Sworakowski, diplomat and scholar,
numbered among those who gathered historical
documents in Europe for the Hoover Institutions
collections. As he built, the secret police watched.
By Maciej Siekierski
ing Polish, Romanian, German, French, Russian, and slightly accented English, Witold Sworakowski (190379) read a dozen more languages, making
him perhaps the most linguistically adept Hoover staff member in the history
of the institution. His historical and legal knowledge, as well as his archival
collecting and management skills, were complemented by a rich personal
experience acquired through several decades of life on the frontier of Western civilization, in East Central Europe.
He was one of the great builders and promoters of the Hoover Library &
Archives. Because his many contributions are not chronicled as well as those
of his predecessorsEphraim Adams, Frank Golder, and Ralph Lutzit is
worth reviewing his biography and Hoover career, and furthermore, taking a
look at some newly discovered and declassified documentation about Sworakowski compiled half a century ago by Communist Polands security police,
the infamous Suba Bezpieczestwa (SB).
Maciej Siekierski is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and senior curator of Hoovers East European Collections.
H O O V ER D I G E ST W inter 2017 209
210
fifty were seated in the San Francisco Conference. The place of Poland was
vacant, although it had been the original victim of the war that began in 1939
and, along with France and the United Kingdom, one of the three original
Allies. At the end of the war Free Polish forces made up the fourth-largest
Allied army in Europe, after the Soviet, American, and British. Unfortunately
for Poland, the first country to resist Hitler, one that lost nearly six million of
its citizens during the war, it was not represented at the conference because
one of Hitlers former allies, Stalins Russia, did not approve of its presence.
Adding even more intrigue to the event, Sworakowski had learned from
a Polish intelligence colonel who was also observing the conference that
its general secretary, Alger Hiss, was a Soviet agent. This was three years
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inte r 2017 211
before the Whittaker Chambers revelations about Hiss before the House
Un-American Activities Committee and five years before Hiss went to prison
for perjury. Sworakowski did not then know that a close associate of Hiss, C.
Easton Rothwell, would be his boss at the Hoover Institution during 195259.
UNFASHIONABLY ANTI-SOVIET
Sworakowski arrived at Hoover in 1947 on a Rockefeller Fellowship, which
after several months turned into a permanent appointment. The Hoover
Library needed a qualified archivist who could handle the mass of Central
and East European documentation brought in after the war by its curators
and acquisition agents. The most famous of these agents was the legendary
Polish Home Army courier Jan Karski, who during the war first brought the
evidence of the Holocaust to the Allies. Karski was engaged by former president Herbert Hoover to travel to Europe during 194546 to collect fugitive
archives of exile governments and politicians, and Sworakowski was hired a
little later as curator of the Polish collections, to manage these remarkable
archives and to build on Karskis success.
Despite outstanding qualifications, Sworakowskis own path to professional
success was not assured. The political tone of the Hoover Institution under
the directorship of Harold Fisher and his successor, Rothwell, was decidedly
progressive, and very much in tune with the prevailing atmosphere of the
Stanford academic community. Sworakowski was the odd member of the
staff, conservative and decidedly anti-Soviet and anticommunist in his views.
Very early in his Hoover career, Fisher unjustly scolded him over his supposed statement that there were several communist sympathizers on the
staff. Such suspicions were
not unfounded, but Sworakowski was savvy enough
Sworakowski was perhaps the
not to express them publicly.
most linguistically adept Hoover
Later, Rothwell was offended
staff member in the history of the
by Sworakowskis passing
institution.
critical comment, completely justified, about Rothwells former State Department associate Alger
Hiss. As the only conservative fellow on the staff, Sworakowski was a natural
ally to the institutions founder, former president Hoover. The meddlesome
reactionary, as Hoover was dubbed by some Stanford faculty, was engaged
in a protracted struggle with Fisher and Rothwell to bring balance to the
research program, and with Stanford over the autonomy of the institution
bearing his name and financed largely by the money donated or raised by
212
WELCOME: Cardinal Karol Jzef Wojtya, the future Pope John Paul II, talks
with Witold Sworakowski and others during a 1976 visit to the Polish American Congress of the Bay Area. Sworakowki, who was retired from Hoover but
active in the Polish-American community, gave Wojtya a tour of San Francisco sights and treated him to lunch. When the new pope was chosen two years
later, Sworakowski said, I was completely caught by surprise. [Hoover Institution Library & Archives]
him. The conflict played out against the background of the publicity of the
Hiss case, the fall of Republic of China leader Chiang Kai-shek, the McCarthy
hearings, and the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution.
Sworakowski was in telephone contact with the Chief and visited him in
Suite 31A of the Waldorf Towers in New York before each of his annual collecting trips. Sworakowski reported the latest news of Stanford and Hoover
provided instructions and useful information on whom to contact in Europe.
In 1956, Hoover succeeded in persuading the institutions advisory board to
order that the librarys publications should be documentary and not interpretive in character, and prevailed on Easton Rothwell to appoint Sworakowski
assistant director of research and publications.
The new program included three major projects: one on the 1917 Provisional Government of Russia, co-edited by the former prime minister of the
Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky; a second on France under
H O O V ER D I G E S T W inte r 2017 213
214
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code name Zy (The Evil One in Polish) and it calls for surveillance and
information gathering on Sworakowski, the associate director of the Hoover
Institute, who is engaged in activities against our state system.
One document contains a plan to organize every detail of Sworakowskis
planned visit to Poland, to use eavesdropping and wiretapping, and to assign
agents with code names Awa, Astoria, Rudzki, and Sac, presumably
former visitors to Hoover and people he might have known from his diplomatic work before and during the war, to seek contact with Sworakowski
during the visit and to report on his conversations, plans, and professional
interests.
Two reports summarize Sworakowskis visit to various institutions and
people in Poland, along with topics of discussion and significant quotes. The
case officer suggests that the security organs interview several of the people
involved. An end note, written in mid-1973, declares that operation Zy should
be terminated because of the subjects hostility toward us; there was no possibility of starting an effort to recruit him, and because the subject is of an
advanced age and retired from Hoover.
A SCHOLAR AND A TEACHER
Sworakowskis most important contribution to the Hoover Institution was
in acquisition of library and archival materials. During his thirty years of
association with the institution the number of volumes in the Hoover Library
doubled, with much of the archival and library documentation picked up
personally by Sworakowski during his acquisition trips. He was instrumental in acquiring scores of
important collections and
Hoover needed a qualified archivist
archives; a good example
is the crowning glory of
who could handle the mass of CenHoovers Russian collectral and East European documents
tions, the Boris Nicolaevsky
brought in after the war by curators
trove of twenty thousand
and acquisition agents.
rare books and pamphlets.
He also acquired several hundred archival units on Russian revolutionary
figures.
Sworakowski doubled Hoovers extensive Polish archival holdings, with
virtually complete World War II records of the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Information and Documentation, which were
stored securely in Dublin until 1959. Sworakowski used his extensive wartime contacts in Paris, London, New York, and Chicago to gather important
216
H O O V ER D I GE S T W inter 2017
217
Captive Nations Committee for Northern California. Together with his wife,
Helena, a historian who was a part-time specialist in the Hoover Archives, he
taped a weekly Polish cultural-historical program, which aired for years on
Sunday evenings on radio station KQED-FM, until he succumbed to cancer in
1979.
Witold Sworakowski was an outstanding individual with great experience,
knowledge, and wisdom. It was an honor and pleasure to know him and to
participate in a small way in some of his endeavors.
Special to the Hoover Digest.
OUTREACH: Sworakowski, shown in this photo with Hoover archivist Marina Tinkoff, pursued
many public-education efforts, including a KQED-TV documentary, The Red Myth: Communism
from Marx to Khrushchev, which ran on educational and commercial stations during 196063.
The production earned him recognition and acclaim in the outside world, along with lingering
scorn and resentment from campus radicals. [Hoover Institution Library & Archives]
218
On the Cover
ne of Mexicos best defenders of democracy is a young, tousleheaded artist named Antonio Arias Bernal, Life magazine
reported in early 1942. At the time, Arias Bernal (19131960) had
never visited the United States, but he had many American
traits, Life assured its readers, including a liking for baseball, cigarettes, and
playing loud music on the radio. Born in Aguascalientes, he was the son of a
funeral-home owner and as a boy had a job making and painting coffins. As a
budding artist, the young man once won a gold medal. When he tried to pawn
it, it was revealed to be brass.
After moving to Mexico City he trained briefly and quickly found work. His
splashy colors, his impish irreverence, and his excellent drawing won more
and more followers, Life reported. He devoured tens of magazines and newspapers a day for ideas. The images that poured from his pen ranged from
barbed commentary about national politics to humorous takes on ordinary
life. Nor did he ignore that elefante in the room: Mexicos fraught relationship
with the United States.
In that respect, Arias Bernal was part of the established flow of Mexican
visual arts, which had a long, enthusiastic tradition of caricature, especially
the political kind. Much of the population couldnt read, and Mexico had seen
violent and confusing events: wars, revolution, elected authoritarianism after
the revolution, and invaders. Arias Bernal grew famous for his ability to crystallize Mexican fears, hopes, and resentments and serve them up with wit.
After joining the countrys largest newsmagazine, Hoy (today), Arias
Bernal found a calling beyond his borders. His fierce anti-Nazi covers and
cartoons, the product of what one writer called a personal and professional
crusade against demagogy, drew the attention of both Axis sympathizers in
his homelandwho threatened him at firstand the US government, which
decided to put his talents on a larger stage.
Teddy Roosevelts Big Stick policy toward Latin America had given
way to Franklin Roosevelts Good Neighbor policy, but suspicion about US
power and motives was still strong. Enter the Office of the Coordinator of
S ubject H eader
H O O V ER D I GE S T W inter 2017
221
counter the effective Italian and German propaganda, which tried to keep
Latin America neutral and open for business. In 1942, the CIAA hired Arias
Bernal to create posters such as this one.
Arias Bernal earned a nom de guerre among his fellow artists: the Brigadier. His Uncle Sam is rangy and well-armed, with a protective eye for his
Latin compadres. Hitler, Mussolini, and other fascist figures are strutting
buffoons in outlandish uniforms, liable to end up impaled on the thorns of a
Mexican cactus. Mexicans, bristling with pistols and bandoliers, easily best
the hapless Nazi invaders. In the poster from the Hoover Institution Archives
shown here, with its motto Como un Solo Hombre (as one man), the artist
makes a more solemn statement about the peoples, north and south, rising
up to face the totalitarian menace together.
After World War II, the nature of the menace changed, and so did Arias
Bernals targets. Now the Cold War was on, and the cartoonist cast a critical
eye on its players, not sparing his erstwhile ally. He saw warmongering and
cynical deal-making on all sides. He was willing to take Uncle Sam to task,
not just for belligerence but for mistreating Mexican migrant workers. Thus
he returned to an established theme, the awkwardness and risk of living in
the same neighborhood as the United States.
His anticommunist views never wavered. Stalin he caricatured as a canny
plotter with a huge mustache, wreathed in pipe smoke, and often protruding
from a tank. Once he drew the Soviet leader as a thick-armed siren luring
Europe to its doom on the rocks. Khrushchev was also lampoonedbut so,
on occasion, were President Eisenhower and his vice president, Richard
Nixon. He drew Eisenhower and Nixon carrying shotguns, la Elmer Fudd,
and hunting the dove of peace.
In 1956, Arias Bernal criticized Mexican university students who were
about to launch a massive strike as dangerous puppets of the Communist
Party, manipulated by manos extraas, or foreign hands. In 1958, he was
celebrated as a famous son of Aguascalientes. Two years later he was dead of
cancer, at age 47.
If he were alive today, Gustavo Vzquez Lozano wrote in a commemorative
book, surely the Brigadier would be ready, with a smile on his lips and the
radio turned all the way up, sketching a new cover....He always knew who
needed his voice, who should be made to tremble, who would heave a sigh of
relief, and who would return the wink.
Charles Lindsey and Aryeh Roberts
222
HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION AND PEACE
Board of Overseers
Chair
Joel C. Peterson
Vice Chairs
Paul Lewis Lew Davies III
Mary Myers Kauppila
Members
Neil Anderson
Barbara Barrett
John F. Barrett
Robert G. Barrett
Donald R. Beall
Peter B. Bedford
Bruce Benson
Peter S. Bing
Walter E. Blessey Jr.
Joanne Whittier Blokker
William K. Blount
James J. Bochnowski
Jerome V. Jerry Bruni
James J. Carroll III
Robert H. Castellini
Rodney A. Cooper
James W. Davidson
Steven A. Denning*
Herbert M. Dwight
Jeffrey A. Farber
Henry A. Fernandez
Carly Fiorina
James E. Forrest
Stephen B. Gaddis
Samuel L. Ginn
224
Michael W. Gleba
Cynthia Fry Gunn
Paul G. Haaga Jr.
Arthur E. Hall
Everett J. Hauck
W. Kurt Hauser
Warner W. Henry
Sarah P. Sally Herrick
Heather R. Higgins
Allan Hoover III
Margaret Hoover
Preston B. Hotchkis
Philip Hudner
Gail A. Jaquish
Charles B. Johnson
Franklin P. Johnson Jr.
Mark Chapin Johnson
John Jordan
Steve Kahng
Richard Kovacevich
Carl V. Larson Jr.
Allen J. Lauer
Howard H. Leach
Walter Loewenstern Jr.
Hamid Mani
Frank B. Mapel
James D. Marver
Craig O. McCaw
David McDonald
Harold Terry McGraw III
Burton J. McMurtry
Mary G. Meeker
Roger S. Mertz
H O O V ER D I GE S T W inter 2017
Marc Tessier-Lavigne*
Thomas J. Tierney
David T. Traitel
Victor S. Trione
Don Tykeson
Paul H. Wick
Richard G. Wolford
Marcia R. Wythes
*Ex officio members of the Board
Distinguished Overseers
Martin Anderson
Stephen D. Bechtel Jr.
Wendy H. Borcherdt
William C. Edwards
Peyton M. Lake
Robert H. Malott
Shirley Cox Matteson
Bowen H. McCoy
Overseers Emeritus
Frederick L. Allen
Susanne Fitger Donnelly
Joseph W. Donner
Bill Laughlin
John R. Stahr
Robert J. Swain
Dody Waugh
225
HOOVER DIGEST
WINTER 2017 NO. 1
Politics
The Economy
Labor
Regulation
Foreign Policy
Terrorism and Defense
Russia
Europe
Iran
Syria
Education
Interview: J. D. Vance
Interview: Terry Moe
History and Culture
Hoover Archives