Ramos vs Pepsi-Cola

Facts
1. On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.
of the P.I.and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a
consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido
Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA.
2. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son
and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by
its driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
3. After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961,
finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily,
were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00
moral

damages;

P2,000.00

as

exemplary

damages;

and,

P1,000.00attorney's fees, with costs.

Issue
1. WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
Ruling
1. Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of
defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired as
a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was
hired as a driver, 'we had sized him by looking into his background, asking
him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and
later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination,
consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving
examination, all of which he had undergone, and that the defendant company
was a member of the Safety Council.

In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver. In the case of Campo vs. Camarote, GR No. L-9147 (1956),
53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to
put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be
considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession
of a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined
the

applicant

for

employment

as

to

his

qualifications,

his

experiences and record of service."

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia: The owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be relieved from liability

Vinluan vs CA
Facts
1. The bus owned by Francisca Viluan, and driven by Hermenigildo Aquino
raced with the overtaking bus driven by Gregorio Hufana and owned by
Patricio Hufana.
2. Aquino lost control of the bus, hitting a post and crashing into a tree, after
which it burst into flames wherein seven persons were killed and thirteen
others were injured.
3. In the complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages filed by
the heirs of those who perished in the incident and Carolina Sabado, an
injured passenger, Vilaun and Aquino filed third party complaints against
Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio Hufana, contending that the
incident was their fault.
4. The lower court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both the two drivers
and their employers jointly and severally liable for damages.
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of concurrent negligence on the
part of the two buses but held that only Vilaun is liable because Aquino,
as driver, cannot be made jointly and severally liable in a contract of
carriage. It ruled that the Hufana cannot be made liable since the
plaintiffs did not amend their complaints in the main action so as to
assert a claim against them.
Issue
1. Whether Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should be made equally liable
although they were third-party defendants and not principal defendants
Ruling
1. The fact that the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but
were brought into the cases as third party defendants should not preclude
a finding of their liability.
2. Section 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, precluding a judgment in favor of
a plaintiff and against a third party defendant where the plaintiff has not

amended his complaint to assert a claim against a third party defendant,

applies only to cases where the third party defendant is brought in on an
allegation of liability to the defendants. It does not apply where a third
party defendant is impleaded on the ground of direct liability to the
plaintiffs, in which case no amendment of the plaintiffs complaint is
necessary.
3. In this case the third-party complaints filed by Viluan and Aquino charged
Gregorio and Patricio Hufana with direct liability to the plaintiffs.
Amendment of the complaint is not necessary and is merely a matter of
form since the liability of the Hufanas as third-party defendant was
already asserted in the third-party complaint.
4. Regardless whether the injury is quasi-delict or breach of contract of
carriage, in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another
vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly
and severally liable for damages.

Baliwang Transit vs CA
Facts
1. On 31 July 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her 5-year old son, Allan Garcia,
boarded Baliwag Transit Bus 2036 bound for Cabanatuan City driven by
Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the driver.
2. At about 7:30 p.m., in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus passengers
saw a cargo truck, owned by A & J Trading, parked at the shoulder of the
national highway. Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the
shoulder of the road was too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A
kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road obviously to serve as a
warning device. The truck driver, and his helper were then replacing a flat
tire.
3. Bus driver Santiago was driving at an inordinately fast speed and failed to
notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road.
Santiagos passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed.
Santiago even carried animated conversations with his co-employees
while driving. When the danger of collision became imminent, the bus
passengers shouted Babangga tayo!. Santiago stepped on the brake,
but it was too late. His bus rammed into the stalled cargo truck killing him
instantly and the trucks helper, and injury to several others among them
herein respondents.
4. Thus, a suit was filed against Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading and Julio
Recontique for damages in the RTC of Bulacan. After trial, it found Baliwag
Transit, Inc. liable for having failed to deliver Garcia and her son to their
point of destination safely in violation of Garcias and Baliwag Transits
contractual relation; and likewise found A & J and its truck driver liable for
failure to provide its cargo truck with an early warning device in violation
of the Motor Vehicle Law. All were ordered to pay solidarily the Garcia
spouses.
5. On appeal, the CA modified the trial courts Decision by absolving A & J
Trading from liability.
Issue

1. Whether or not Baliwag should be held solely liable for the injuries.

Ruling
1. Yes.
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed
to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and
sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the
common carrier was at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies
or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the court need not
even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of
the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers are
liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the
common carriers do not cease upon proof that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision
of their employees.
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code provides Lights
and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares
visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the corner of the

vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not
well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all times with built-in
reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted, painted or attached
at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one
hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements
mentioned in this subsection shall be registered.
x x x However, the evidence shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a
kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the
truck to serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The law clearly
allows the use not only of an early warning device of the triangular
reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or flares visible 100 meters
away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an
acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore,
may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV31246) with the modification reducing the actual damages for hospitalization
and medical fees to P5,017.74; without costs.

Metro Manila Transit Corp. vs CA

Facts
1. Nenita Custodio was a paying passenger of a public utility jeepney, then
driven by Calebag and owned by Lamayo, when it collided with a bus
driven by Leonardo and owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corp(MMTC).
2. The collision happened after failure of both vehicles to slow down or blow
their horns when they were simultaneously approaching the same
intersection in Taguig.
3. As a result of the collision, Custodio suffered physical injuries. Assisted by
her parents, since she was still a minor, she filed a complaint for damages
against the drivers of the automobiles and their respective employers.
4. At the trial court, MMTC presented its training officer and its transport
supervisor who respectively testified that:
a) it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening
applicants for job openings
b) but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees
i.

by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms

ii.

briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty

iii. that it checked its employees to determine WON they were

positive for alcohol and
iv. that they followed other rules and regulations of the Bureau of
Land Transportation and of the company.
5. TC found both drivers concurrently negligent. As joint tortfeasors, both
drivers, as well as Lamayo(owner of the jeepney) were held solidarily
liable for damages sustained by Custodio. MMTC was absolved on the
ground that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising its employees.
6. CA modified TCs decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other
defendants on the ground that the testimonies of the training officer and
transport supervisor were not enough to overcome the presumption of
negligence; they were not able to present any evidence that its driver has
complied with all the clearances and trainings, and evidence as to the
alleged written guidelines of the company.

Issue
1. WON MMTC exercised due diligence
2. WON MMTC should be held solidarily liable with the other defendants
Ruling
1. No
2. Conclusion of CA is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply
supported by evidence of record than that of TC.
3. It is procedurally required for each party in case to prove his own
affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. Such
party must present all available evidence at his disposal in the manner
that may be necessary to buttress his claim.
4. In the instant case, inasmuch as the witnesses (training supervisor and
transport supervisor) dwelt on mere generalities, they cannot be
considered as sufficiently persuasive proof that MMTC observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
5. MMTC should have presented other evidence, object or documentary, to
buttress an apparently biased testimony. Declarations are not enough.
6. Hence, MMTC fell short of the required evidentiary quantum as would
convincingly and undoubtedly prove its diligence

Calalas vs CA
Facts
1. At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, Sunga, then a college
freshman, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Calalas. As
the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of
the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan,
Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger.
2. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney, injuring Sunga
necessitating her confinement and to ambulate in crutches for 3 months
3. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of
the contract of carriage, to which Calalas in turn filed a third-party
complaint against Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck
4. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident, taking
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against
Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to
his jeepney
5. On appeal, the CA reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action
was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code, and dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga
Issue
1. Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one
hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue
in this case

2. Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the

contract of carriage
3. Whether moral damages should be awarded
Ruling
1. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case
No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No.
3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict
for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently,
in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability

to a person where there is no relation between him and another

party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where
there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law
is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
2. We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was
seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to
which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he
was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give
serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.
This requires that the following requirements be present:
a. the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will;
b. the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable;
c. the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner, and
d. the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.

3. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for

damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such
damages are recoverable:
a. in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code;
and
b. in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in
bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

Air France vs Carrascoso

Facts
1. Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air
France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket.
2. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the
manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because a "white
man" had a "better right" to it.
3. He refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after
being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat.
4. Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and
complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a
first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the
availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention.
Issue
1. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims ---- YES
2. WON Carrascoso is entitled to moral damages ----- YES
Ruling
1. Yes to both
2. To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the
indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received
the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed
the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping
with the ordinary course of business that the company should know
whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
3. Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the
Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present
its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant
did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior
reservation was made by the white man.

4. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist
class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not
established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
5. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right
to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy
and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
is

conduct,

injurious

language,

indignities

and

abuse

from

such

employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a

passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
6. Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits
into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

Barredo vs Garcia
Facts
1. On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate taxicab driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis.
The carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-year old boy,
Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died.
2. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The
court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve the civil action.
3. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed a
civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible
under culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
4. It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the
accident, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed,
and there was no showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredos
theory of defense is that Fontanillas negligence being punished by the
Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is only subsidiary, but
Fontanilla, was not sued for civil liability.
5. Hence, Barredo claims that he cannot be held liable.
Issue
1. WON Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of Fontanilla, his
employee.
Ruling
1. Yes, Barredo is liable for damages.
2. Article 2177 - Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code of the Philippines is entirely distinct and
independent from a delict or crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this
jurisdiction, the same negligent act causing damage may produce civil
liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines; or create an action for quasi-delicto or

culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
parties are free to choose which course to take.
3. And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2)
liabilities of Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of
Fontanilla arising from the latters criminal negligence under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct
responsibility arising from his presumed negligence as an employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
4. Since the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred
the second, which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and
effective method of relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just
been released or had no property. Barredo was held liable for damages.
5. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action
against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is
more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is
already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that
Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that
Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not
reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only
been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

Manalo vs Robles Transportation Co

Facts
1. On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant Robles
Transportation Company, Inc. (the Company) and driven by Hernandez its
driver, collided with a passenger truck. In the course of and a result of the
accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old,
causing him physical injuries which resulted in his death several days
later.
2. Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and
after trial was found guilty. He served out his sentence but failed to pay
the indemnity. 2 writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the
amount but both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff.
3. On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara
Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando filed the present
action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to
Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
4. It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless and until the
convicted driver Hernandez was included as a party defendant, the
Company considering him an indispensable party. The TC and CA both
correctly ruled that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant.
The Company is now before SC.
5. To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs
introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting
Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of
execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff
showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the
insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property
in his name. Over the objections of the Company, the trial court admitted
this evidence and based its decision in the present case on the same.
6. The Company contends that this kind of evidence is inadmissible. The
Company also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of
the writs of execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez, without
requiring said opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff.

Issue
1. WON Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by
the New Civil Code, promulgated in 1950, particularly, by the repealing
clause under which comes Article 2270 of the said code?
Ruling
1. Article 2177 of the New Civil Code expressly recognizes civil liabilities
arising from negligence under the Penal Code, only that it provides that
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of
the defendant.
"ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under
the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of
omission of the defendant."

Invoking prescription, appellant claims that the present action is barred by

the Statute of Limitations for the reason that it is an action either upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff, or upon a quasi delict, and that according
to Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, such action must be instituted within
four years. We agree with the appellee that the present action is based
upon a judgment, namely, that in the criminal case, finding Hernandez
guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentencing him to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000, and,
consequently may be instituted within ten years.

As regards the other errors assigned by appellant, we find it unnecessary to

discuss and rule upon them.

Finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law, the same
is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Virata vs Ochoa
Facts
1. Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking
along Taft Avenue by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo Borilla and
registered in the name of Victoria Ochoa.
2. An action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted
against Maximo Borilla in the CFI of Rizal.
3. Atty. Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a reservation to file
separately the civil action for damages against the driver for his
criminal liability, which he later on withdrew and presented evidence on
the damages.
4. The Heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action.
5. They commenced an action for damages based on quasi-delict against
the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the vehicle,
Victoria Ochoa.
6. Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is
another action pending for the same cause.
7. The CFI acquitted Borilla on the ground that he caused the injury by
accident. The motion to dismiss was granted.

Issue
1. WON the Heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages
based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver
and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio
Virata?

Ruling
1. YES. IT IS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.
2. In negligence cases, the aggrieved parties may choose between an
action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil
Code is to recover twice for the same negligent act.

3. In this case, the petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the
same negligent act. Before the Criminal Case was decided, they
manifested in the said case that they were filing a separate civil action
for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney
based on quasi-delict.
4. Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
5. The source of damages sought to be enforced in the Civil Case is quasidelict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under Art. 1157 of the
Civil Code, quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are
two different sources of obligation.
6. Moreover, for petitioners to prevail in the Civil Case, they have only to
establish their cause of action by preponderance of evidence.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs IAC
Facts
1. At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua,
Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales
and Zenaida Parejas boarded the jeepney owned by spouses Isidro
Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau,
Mabalacat,Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend
Christmas with their families for P 24.00.
2. Upon reaching barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel
of the jeepney detached causing it to run in an unbalanced position.
Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to make a Uturn, invading and eventually stopping on the opposite lane of the road
(the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its rear
faced the north (towards where it was going)).
3. The jeepney occupied and blocked the greater portion of the western
lane, which is the right of way of vehicles coming from the north.
4. Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the
sudden U-turn the bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep.
Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus stopped a few minutes
before hitting the jeepney.
5. Either way, as a result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney
(Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died while the
other jeepney passengers sustained physical injuries.
6. A criminal complaint was filed against the two drivers for Multiple
Homicide. The case against delos Reyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was

dismissed for insufficieny of evidence. Manalo (jeepney driver),however,

was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
7. 3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of
Pangasinan.
a) Spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina
Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan.
b) Spouses Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda
Meriales.
c) spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued as heirs of
Adelaida Estomo.
8. All three cases impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo
(jeepney owners),Rabbit and delos Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs
anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo
on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs
based their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, Inc. Was also impleaded as additional defendant
in the first case only.
9. The trial court ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, finding defendants
negligent and having breached the contract of carriage with their
passengers and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs
damages.
10. The IAC reversed the ruling of the trial court, applying primarily
a) the doctrine of last clear chance
b) the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle
guilty and the cause of the accident unless contradicted by other
evidence
c) the substantial factor test (which concluded that bus driver delos
Reyes, NOT jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent).
Issue
1. Who are liable for the death and injuries of the passenger? - Trial court
decision reinstated with modification. Only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma
Carreon and Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to
the victims or their heirs.
Ruling
1. The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between
the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations.

2. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney

and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.
3. The IAC erred in applying the presumption that the driver who bumps the
rear of another vehicle is guilty and the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence. This presumption is based on the
responsibility given to a rear vehicle of avoiding a collision with the front
vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is
in a position to observe the vehicle in front of it. Such presumption is
rebutted by the evidence that shows that the jeepney, which was then
traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of
approximately 35 meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle,
making a skid mark of approximately 15 meters from the eastern
shoulder to the point of impact. (Basically, the U-turn was sudden and
delos Reyes could not have reasonably anticipated it even though he was
the rear vehicle)
4. Likewise, the bus cannot be made liable under the substantial factor test
(that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have
foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does
not prevent him from being liable). Contrary to the findings of the
appellate court, the bus was travelling within the speed limit allowed in
highways. He also had only a few seconds to react to the situation. To
require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask too much from him.
Aside from the time element involved, there were no options available to
him to have avoided the collision. The proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of jeepney driver Manalo and spouses Mangune and
Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice..
5. In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733,
1755 and 1756of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. The negligence of Manalo was
proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua,
the police who arrived on the scene, his (Manalo's) conviction and the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra.
6. Spouses Mangune and Carreon alleged that their mechanic regularly
maintains the jeepney and on the day before the collision, the mechanic
actually checked the vehicle and even tightened the bolts, thus the
incident was caused by a caso fortuito.
7. The SC upheld the trial courts findings that "in an action for damages
against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger to his
destination, an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or

through the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would
avoid the carriers liability.
8. The SC modified the decision holding spouses Mangune and Carreon
jointly and severally liable with Manalo. The driver cannot be held jointly
and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of
carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if such breach be due to
the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can neither shift
his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his
driver's negligence is his. Secondly, that would make the carrier's liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled tor
recover only the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to
the explicit provision of Article2181 of the New Civil Code.

DOCTRINE
The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had
observed extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was
due to a fortuitous event.
The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case
of breach of the contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is
between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words, the carrier can
neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him, for
his driver's negligence is his. Secondly, that would make the carrier's liability
personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover
only the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to the explicit
provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.

Macalinao vs Ong
Facts
1. Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver,
respectively, at the Genetron International Marketing (Genetron), a
single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian. On April 25,
1992, Sebastian instructed Mavalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to
deliver a heavy piece of machinery a reactor/motor for mixing
chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan.
2. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by
Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf Truck with plate noo. PMP-106 hit and
bumped the front portion of private jeepney along Caypombo,
Sta.Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning.
3. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained
physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred
the most serious injuries among the passengers of the truck.
4. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid
treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was
transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Center at the instance of
Sebastian.
5. He was again moved to Capitol Medical Center by his parents, for
medical reasons then to PGH for financial consideration.
6. Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down
as a result of the accident and per doctors advice, his foot was
amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection.
7. His immedicable condition, coupled with the doctors recommendation,
led his family to bring him home where he died on Nov. 07, 1992.
8. Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages
against both Ong and Sebastian before the RTC of QC. After his death
Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action.
9. Trial Court ruled that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck
in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing the same to hit
the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that
Ong was driving cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no
evidence was presented to substantiate the claim.
10.CA reversed the findings of trial court. Evidence presented by
petitioners is insufficient to support verdict of negligence against Ong.

Issue

WON sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of negligence

against Ong

Ruling
1. The evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur sufficiently establishes Ongs negligence.
2. Application of Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur:
a. The photographs of the accident deserve substantial cogitation
b. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of
truth which ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
c. In this case, while there is dearth of testimonial evidence to
enlighten us about what actually happened, photographs
depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately
after the accident took place do exist. It is well established that
photographs, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic
evidence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the
time in question, are in the discretion of the trial court,
admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an understanding
of the evidence, the situation or condition of objects or
premises or the circumstances of an accident.
d. Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of
negligence against Ong is the police report of the incident. The
report states that the Isuzu truck was the one which hit the left
portion of the private jeepney. It must still be remembered that
although police blotters are of little probative value, they are
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries
in police records made by a police officer in the performance of
the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of
the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either
substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.
e. While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the
foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa
loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or
transaction speaks for itself.
3. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur recognizes that parties may
establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it
allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of
negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof
of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of

negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of

proving that there was no negligence on his part.
4. The doctrine can be invoked only when under the
circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. This is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it
while the plaintiff has no knowledge, and is therefore compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and rely upon the proof of the
happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.

5. Requisites of application of res ipsa loquitur:

a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someones negligence;
b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant or defendants;
c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated
6. The court held that all the above requisites are present in the case at
bar. In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of
the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while substituting their son
as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were
not present at the crucial moment.
7. The driver of the jeepney who could have shed light on the
circumstances is likewise dead. The only ones left with knowledge
about the cause of the mishap are the two truck helpers who survived,
both employees of Sebastian, and Ong, who is not only Sebastians
previous employee but his co-respondent in the case as well.

Santos vs Pizardo
Facts
1. Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle
collision between Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van
Ace. MTC penalized Sibayan with imprisonment for two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
2. However the municipal circuit trial court made no pronouncement as to
the civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages to the
respondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action
citing Sibayans judgment conviction. Viron moved to dismiss the case
alleging that the grounds for the cause of action had already
prescribed (quasi-delict prescribes in 4 years from accrual of cause of
action).
3. The petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending that the
right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As
there was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint
which was filed barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the
prescriptive period.
4. TC dismissed case the case. Again the petitioners filed a
reconsideration that the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on
the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes
ten (10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners was denied by the trial court based
on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was
filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities therefore it
already prescribed.
5. On the petition for certiorari with CA, it was dismissed the same error
in the choice or mode of appeal. It also denies the petitioners motion
for reconsideration since the petitioners failed to allege that the
petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the
allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.
6. Petitioners insist that it should been forced in the complaint that arose
in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on
the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action
accrued fromt he finality of the judgment of conviction.
7. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the
complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176
and 2180of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years
should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
8. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in

sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code the civil aspect of the case were
instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil
case was made.
9. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed
the adverse order of the trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the
private respondents also filled a rejoinder both in reiteration of their
arguments.
10.Hence this petition.
Issues
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa
aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer?
Ruling
1. No, the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to
the subsidiary liability of the employer.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may
consist of restitution, reparation of the damage caused and
indemnification of consequential damages. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the offense is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three
notable exceptions:
first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to
recover damages from the accused;
second, when the offended party reserves his right to
have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of
his cause; and
third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to
maintain a private suit against the offender by instituting
a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a
separate civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan.
On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its
decision convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to
the latter's civil liability.
Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice
between an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under

the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e.,
1. civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
2. independent civil liabilities, such as those
a.

not arising from an act or omission complained of as a

felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from
law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or

b.

where the injured party is granted a right to file an

action independent and distinct from the criminal action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject

to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against
double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
Dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar
to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer.
Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the
employer becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of
the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after
the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.