LEGISLATIVE POWER IN GENERAL, WHEN LODGED

Prof. Randolf S. David vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
FACTS:
These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of
national emergency) and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. While the cases are pending, President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that
the state of national emergency has ceased to exist, thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to
enact laws and decrees
* If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
HELD:
Take-Care Power
This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed,
based on Sec. 17, Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in
existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to
the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws.
In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers
attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
including the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction.
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the
foregoing provision. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former
President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same
category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in

the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a
state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees.
But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It
follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to
laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Gonzales v Hechanova
G.R. No. L-21897 October 22 1963 [Executive Agreements]
FACTS:
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice to be purchased
from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said implementation
because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency."
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to be authorized by
the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any
other government agency from importing rice and corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that
only private parties may import rice under its provisions. They contended that the
government has already constitute valid executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma, that in case of conflict between RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and
the conflict be resolved under the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive
agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming that said contracts may
properly considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null

and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the
provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous
legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH
G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of
Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial
appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to
sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of
having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two
(2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally
envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a representative of the

National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with
the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on
July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were made
aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral
one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of
Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of providing
balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely
provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the
right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2)
of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform
the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be
clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the
singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no
room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in
which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each

word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases
and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing
principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion
whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit
in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into
the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members
only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be
divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the
sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the
Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the
records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still
differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no
liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is
required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of
the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with
one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote
or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in
recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides

of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people
who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC,
all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the
doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.
Imbong v. Ochoa
Facts:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in
various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by sociopolitical activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the clash
between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to
life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute,
they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the

"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and
to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall
offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July
17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the
sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
Issues:
1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy;
2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
HELD:
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.
Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such
as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services,
prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are
already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible,
the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that
the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be
present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation
of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of
survival and maturation under normal conditions.
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would
allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban
all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized
that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established
evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.
Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance,
and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception
are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical
authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of
conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being complete
with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution.
While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the
Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural
laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in
the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was
explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether
it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man
where no law is applicable.
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life.
It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making nonabortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.
Sanidad v COMELEC
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct
1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of
22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its
whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the
interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,

which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October

16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking
to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos.
991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no
grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the
question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate
the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by
the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that
period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly
(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments
and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people
in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are
assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the
new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.