ART III BILL OF RIGHTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- is the study of the maintenance

of the proper balance between authority as represented
by the three inherent powers of the State and liberty as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
I. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
A. POLICE POWER
-power of the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare.
B. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
-enables the State to forcibly acquire private property,
upon payment of just compensation, for some intended
public use.
C. POWER OF TAXATION
-State is able to demand from the members of society
their proportionate share or contribution in the
maintenance of the government
AMONG THE SAFEGUARDS IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS ARE:
i. Right to Due Process
ii. Equal protection
iii. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures
iv. Impairment clause
v. Guarantees against injustice to the accused
ART III SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEE V. PHIL. BLOOMING
MILLS
DOCTRINE: HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IS
PREFERRED OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS
FACTS
1. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING
MILLS
EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION (PBMEO) decided to stage a
mass demonstration in front of Malacanang to
express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police
2. After
learning
about
such
planned
demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc
called the leaders of PBMEO
3. During the meeting, the planned demonstation
was confirmed by the union, and explained
that it was not a strike against the company
but an exercise of the laborers inalienable
constitutional right to freedom of expression,
of speech and to petition for redress of
grievances.
4. The company asked to cancel the demonstration
for it would interrupt normal course of their
business which may result to loss of revenue,
with a threat that such employees would lose
their jobs if they pushed through with the
demonstration.
5. In a 2nd meeting, the company appealed that
those from the 1st and regular shifts should not
be absent in their works, otherwise they would
be dismissed.
1
6. HOWEVER, it was too late to cancel the plan and
the rally took place and the officers of PBMEO
were eventually dismissed for violation of the
No strike ad No Lockout clause of their
Collective bargaining agreement.
7. Lower court ruled in favor of the company. MFR
was denied was denied by CIR for being filed 2
days late.
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

ISSUE: DOES THE STRIKE VIOLATE THE CBA?

HELD. NO. The demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm. Said
demonstration was purely and completely an exercise
of their freedom of expression in general and of their
right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig.
They exercised their civil and political rights for their
mutual aid and protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein
petitioner Union and its members from the harassment
of local police officers.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to
intercede for its employees with the local police. Was
it securing peace for itself at the expense of its
workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or
did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the
more weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis the
alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the
more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly
employees to further indignities.
-The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in
the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassed and persecuted as they believed they
were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit can never
be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his
dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution,
denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights
has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic
tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened
civilization becomes Our duty, if freedom and social
justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal
wound on the constitutional guarantees of free

expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.[19]

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the
working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty x x x to observe
regular working hours." The strained construction of
the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage a
mass demonstration against police abuses during
working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the
mind and life of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not
be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on
March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, for such an injunction would be trenching
upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if
it legally appears to be an illegal picketing or strike.
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was
not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted
in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted
act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for
all its employees to participate in the demonstration
and that they suggested to the Union that only the first
and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for
work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be
averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor
union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate the maximum
persuasive force that will gain for them not only public
sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediate action on the part of the corresponding
government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues
they raised against the local police. Circulation is one
of the aspects of freedom of expression. [21] If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that
much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the
purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of onethird of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which
will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the
company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses
it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers
for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees
who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969
which request the Union reiterated in their telegram
received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of
March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp.
42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding
or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request
of the Union for excuse from work for the day
2
shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part
of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

RULING.
I. HEIRARCHY OF RIGHTS
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and
principles which underlie the issues posed by the case
at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement
of the dignity and worth of the human personality is
the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith
of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as
an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel
of his person."[2]
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals
of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well
as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the
rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherish, or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect
the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen.[6] And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the
liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe
unless the liberties of all are protected.[7]
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and
petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not
merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the
appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.[8] Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter
their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only
"with narrow specificity."[9]
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If
human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of
the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such

priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the

sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights
is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the
law and its object or purpose that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would
suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights.On the other hand, a constitutional or
valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent.
II. LIABILITY OF THE COMPANY
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair
labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged
police abuses and the subsequent separation of the
eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4
(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees
the right "to engage in concerted activities for x x x
mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4 (a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the
fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm
did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present
evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for
failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or
that penalties were exacted from it by customers
whose orders could not be filled that day of the
demonstration; or that purchase orders, were
cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to
deliver the materials ordered; or that its own
equipment or materials or products were damaged due
to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the
form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel,
water and electric consumption that day. Such savings
could have amply compensated for unrealized profits
or damages it might have sustained by reason of the
absence of its workers for only one day.
III. DENIAL OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and assembly as well as the right to
3
petition
for redress of grievances of the employees,
the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and consequently
being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social
justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all of the people," which guarantee is
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of

Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
afford protection to labor x x x."

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or

good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim
that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police. It was more expedient for the firm to
conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and
security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police
officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism
and expediency resorted to by the respondent company
assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees.
It was pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
-Origin of the due process
Magna Carta
No man shall be taken or imprisoned or
disseized or outlawed , or in any manner destroyed;
nor shall we go upon him, nor send upon him, but by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land.
King Edward IIIs Statute 28
No man, of what state or condition whoever
he be, shall be put out of his lands, or tenements,
nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor indicted, nor put to
death without he be brought in answer by due
process of law.
-Evolution of Due Process
Darthmouth College Case, Daniel Webster was
to declare that the law of the land meant The
general law, a law which hears before it condemns
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial.
-Dual aspect of the due process
1. Substantive Due Process
-Requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
-Violation in the intrinsic validity of the law would result
in violation of due process and ultimately the
declaration of its unconstitutionality.
Rationale:
The inquiry in this regard is not whether or not the law is
being enforced in accordance with the prescribed
manner but whether or not, to begin with, it is a proper
exercise of legislative power. The law must have a valid
governmental objective; the interests of the general
public as distinguished from those of particular class
require the intervention of the State. It must be also
pursued in a lawful manner.
2. Procedural Due Process
-The essence of procedural due process is expressed in
the immortal cry of Themistocles to Eurybiades, Strike
but hear me first!
-Supreme Court has held that the twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
due process and neither of these elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional
guaranty.
A. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal

clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant and over the property
which is the subject matter of the proceeding.
a. In personam jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired by the court by his voluntary appearance
or through service of summons upon him.
b. In rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction of the court is
derived from the power it may exercise over the
property. Jurisdiction over the person is not
essential; provided the relief granted by the court is
limited to such as can be enforced against the
property itself.
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard.
-The right to appeal is not essential to the right to a
hearing. Except when granted by the Constitution,
appeal may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its
discretion. But as long as the law allows him to appeal,
denial of that remedy is denial of due process
As stated in Article VIII Sec. 5(2) of the
Constitution, to wit:
1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, international orexecutive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
2) All cases involving the legality of any tax,
impost assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed
in relation thereto.
3) All criminal cases which the penalty is
reclusion perpetua or higher
4) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue
5) All cases in which only an error or question
of law is involved
Exceptions
a) Nuisances
i. A nuisance per se is objectionable under
any and all circumstances because it
presents an immediate danger to the
welfare of the community. This kind of
nuisance may be abated summarily, that is,
without the necessity of judicial
authorization.
ii. A nuisance per accidens is objectionable
only under some but not all circumstances,
there being situations when it is perfectly
legitimate and acceptable.
b) Presumption
Would a statutory presumption deny the
right to a hearing insofar as the person affected
is precluded from introducing evidence to rebut
the presumption? The accepted view is that it
would not, provided that there is a rational or
natural connection between the fact proved
and the fact ultimately presumed from such
fact.
Atty. Gabriel: Presumption is allowed if it
is based on 1. Human experience 2.Causal
connection established 3. Fact presumed there
from
4.
Judgment
must be rendered upon lawful
4
hearing.
-Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution provides
that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.
JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS
EL BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO VS VICENTE PALANCA AND
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

ESTATES OF ENGRACIO PALANCA

DOCTRINES
-Enumerated the requirements for procedural due
process in Judicial proceedings:
(1)There must be an impartial court or tribunal
clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it;
(2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant over the property which is the
subject matter of the proceeding;
(3) The defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and
(4) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful
hearing.

FACTS
1. Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and
he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His
property is worth 75k more than what he owe.
2. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his
payments, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracios property.
3. Engracio however left for China and he never
returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non
resident, El Banco has to notify Engracio about
their intent to sue him by means of publication
using a newspaper.
4. The lower court further orderd the clerk of
court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd
be sent to Amoy, China.
5. The court eventually granted El Banco petition
to execute Engracios property.
6. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the
annulment of the ruling.
7. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the
summons.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of constitutional due
process?
HELD: No.
SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the
requisites for judicial due process had been met.

As applied to a judicial proceeding,

however, it may be laid down with certainty that
the requirement of due process is satisfied if the
following conditions are present, namely; (1) There
must be a court of tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
person of the defendant or over the property which
is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant
must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4)
judgment must rendered upon lawful hearing.
REGARDING THE MAILING OF NOTICE TO RESIDENTS
-statutes generally provide for publication, and
usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice
to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though
commonly called constructive, or substituted service,
such notification does not constitute a service of
process in any true sense. It is merely a means
provided by law whereby the owner may be
admonished by his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings and that it is uncumbent upon him to

take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In

speaking of notice of this character a distinguished
master of constitutional law has used the following
language:

" . . . if the owners are

named in the proceedings, and
personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness of their
interests, and in order to make sure
that the opportunity for a hearing
shall be lost to them, than from any
necessity that the case shall assume
that form." (Cooley on Taxation [2d.
ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green,
193 U.S., 79, 80.)
-It will be observed that this mode of notification
does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice.
The periodical containing the publication may never
in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he
should discover the notice may often be very slight.
Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of
his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent
upon the correctness of the address to which it is
forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security
of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore,
that the provision of our law relative to the mailing
of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of
notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in
the case where the defendant's residence is known.
In the light of all these facts, it is evident that the
actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind
is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely
necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in
recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification
which may fall short of actual notice is apparently
this: Property is always assumed to be in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent;
and he may be safely held, under certain
conditions, to be affected with knowledge that
proceedings have been instituted for its
condemnation and sale.
It is stated in the affidavit that the
defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y
Limquingco, died on January 29, 1910. The
mortgage under which the property was sold was
executed far back in 1906; and in the proceedings
in the foreclosure were closed by the order of the
court confirming the sale dated August 7, 1908. It
passes the rational bounds of human credulity to
suppose that a man who had placed a mortgage
upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then
gone away from the scene of his life activities to
end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should
have long remained in ignorance of the fact that
the mortgage had been foreclosed and the
5 property sold, even supposing that he had no
knowledge of those proceedings while they were
being conducted. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of things that he should have
acquired information as to what was transpiring in
his affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this
rational assumption we are authorized, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, to presume that
he did have, or soon acquired, information as to
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

the sale of his property.

RULING
-The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of
exercising judicial power, is used in several different,
though related, senses since it may have reference
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
particular kind of action or to administer a particular
kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, (2) over the property which is
the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a
court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its competency or
jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it
may entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by
the voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by
the coercive power of legal process exerted over
the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is
subject of litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the
law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein, under special provisions of
law, the power of the court over the property is
recognized and made effective. In the latter case
the property, though at all times within the
potential power of the court, may never be taken
into actual custody at all. An illustration of the
jurisdiction acquired by the actual seizure is found
in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some
subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide
the final event of the litigation. An illustration of
what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title of land
under our system for the registration of land. Here
the court, without taking actual physical control
over the property assumes, at the instance of some
person claiming to be owner, to exercise a
jurisdiction in rem over the property and to
adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the
action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the
idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is
substantially such. The expression, "action in rem'
is, in its narrow application, used only with
reference to certain proceedings in courts of
admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as
responsible for the claim or obligation upon which
the proceedings are based. The action quasi in
rem differs from the true action in rem in the
circumstance that in the former an individual is
named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or
other disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form

of remedy, are in general way thus designated. The

judgment entered in these proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties.
-.Jurisdiction over the person on the defendant, if
acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the
voluntary submission of the defendant or by the
personal service of process upon him within the
territory where the process is valid. If, however,
the defendant is non-resident and, remaining
beyond the range of the personal process of the
court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court
never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all.
-Here the property itself is in fact the sole thing
which is impleaded and is the responsible object
which is the subject of the exercise of judicial
power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in
such case is based exclusively on the power which,
under the law, it possesses over the property; and
any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant is entirely
apart from the case.
The jurisdiction of the court over the property,
considered as the exclusive object of such an
action, is evidently based upon the following
conditions and considerations, namely :
(1) that the property is located within the
district;
(2) that the purpose of the litigation is to
subject the property by sale to an
obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage;
and
(3) that the court at a proper stage of the
proceedings takes the property into its
custody, if necessary, and exposes it to sale
for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage
debt.
An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be
granted in this proceeding than such as can be
enforced against the property.

GALVEZ VS CA
DOCTRINE: DISMISSAL VS ACQUITTAL;
COMPLAINANT CHANGE INFORMATION

WHEN

CAN

FACTS
1. On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the
incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one
Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate
informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death
Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.
2. On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be
arraigned , respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte
Motion
to Withdraw Information in said cases, which
6
was granted.
3. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new
information against herein petitioners for murder, two
counts of frustrated murder, and violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession
of firearms
4. Petitoner-accused filed a motion of reconsideration of
the motion to withdraw original information which
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

Judge Pornillos granted

5. Petitioner-accused filed a motion to quash information
for lack of jurisdiction
CONTENTIONS FOR FILING MTQ
(1)it is argued that the new informations were
prematurely filed considering that the order
granting the withdrawal of the original
informations had not yet become final and
executory and that, as a matter of fact, the
same was subsequently reconsidered and the
case reinstated by Judge Villajuan. Therefore,
so petitioners postulate, Judge Pornillos could
not acquire jurisdiction over the same offense
involving the same incident and the same
accused.
(2)petitioners contend that the dismissal of the
original informations and the filing of new ones
which were raffled to another branch of the
court constituted forum shopping, Pursuant to
the doctrinal ruling that the court first
acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other
courts, it is theorized that the cognizance of
the case taken by Judge Villajuan barred Judge
Pornillos from assuming jurisdiction thereover.

ISSUE : The jurisdiction of Judge Pornillos to entertain

and act upon the new informations for murder,
frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms
r
It is a general rule that a nolle prosequi or
dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial
and before he is called on to plead is not equivalent to
an acquittal, and does not bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. It is not a final
disposition of the case. Rather, it partakes of the
nature of a nonsuit or discontinuance in a civil suit and
leaves the matter in the same condition in which it
was before the commencement of the prosecution.
A dismissal is different from an acquittal. An
order of dismissal which is actually an acquittal is
immediately
final
and
cannot
be
reconsidered. Furthermore, an acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is
acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but a
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or
that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissals terminate
the proceedings, either because the court is not a
court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does
not show that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and
substance. 37 For dismissal to be a bar under double
jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal.
All these go to show, therefore, that the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M93 did not amount to an acquittal of herein
petitioners. Consequently, the same did not
immediately become final, hence petitioners could
still file a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
Moreover, such dismissal does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38 Since jeopardy
had not yet attached, herein petitioners were not

prejudiced by the filing of the new informations even

though the order of dismissal in the prior case had not
yet become final. Neither did it affect the jurisdiction
of the court in the subsequent case. LexLib
In American legal practice, where a motion
for an order of nolle prosequi is made, the only power
to deny the motion would be based on failure of the
district attorney to judiciously exercise his
discretion. 39 In most cases, the motion will be readily
granted and should not be refused unless the court has
some knowledge that it is based on an improper reason
or a corrupt motive. But such a motion to dismiss will
not also be approved unless the court is satisfied that
the administration of justice requires that the
prosecution be ended, or if there appears to be a clear
violation of the law. Whatever may be the reason
therefor, a denial of the motion to withdraw should not
be construed as a denigration of the authority of the
special prosecutor to control and direct the
prosecution of the case , since the disposition of the
case already rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This brings us to the question as to whether
or not an order of dismissal may be subsequently set
aside and the information reinstated. Again, in
American jurisprudence, the authorities differ
somewhat as to whether a nolle prosequi may be set
aside and the cause reinstated. Some cases hold that
thenolle prosequi may be recalled and that the
accused may be tried on the same information , but
before it can be retraced, set aside, cancelled, or
struck off, the permission or assent of the court must
be had and obtained, and such cancellation or
retraction must be duly entered. According to other
authorities,
however,
the
entry
of
an
unconditional nolle prosequi, not on the ground that
the information is insufficient on its face, is an end to
the prosecution of that information, and such nolle
prosequi cannot afterward by vacated and further
proceedings had in that case.
Still in some cases, it has been held that
a nolle prosequi may be set aside by leave of court, so
as to reinstate proceedings on the information, or
unless it was entered by mistake. In our jurisdiction,
we follow the rule which allows an order of dismissal
to be set aside by leave of court. In one case, it was
held that in the absence of any statutory provision to
the contrary, the court may, in the interest of justice,
dismiss a criminal case provisionally, that is, without
prejudice to reinstating it before the order becomes
final or to the subsequent filing of a new information
for the offense.
The rule that in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction the court first acquiring jurisdiction will
retain it to the end to the exclusion of other tribunals,
is not to be given unyielding effect in all cases and it
does not apply where the jurisdiction of the first court
has come to an end in any legal way, such as by nolle
prosequi. The rule on exclusions is intended to prevent
confusion and conflicts in jurisdiction and to prevent a
person
from being twice tried for the same offense,
7
but no accused has a vested right to be tried in any
particular court of concurrent jurisdiction; and when
one court of concurrent jurisdiction voluntarily
relinquishes it by a nolle prosequi or dismissal of the
case, there can be no legal or logical reason for
preventing the other court from proceeding. With
much more reason will this rule apply where only
branches of the same court, and not different courts,
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

are involved in the jurisdictional conflict. LLpr

There was no forum shopping in the lower
court with respect to the case involved. While the
procedure adopted by the prosecution was somewhat
cumbersome, it was not in bad faith and, accordingly,
it did not affect the legality of the proceedings. There
is no showing, and petitioners failed to prove
otherwise, that the assignment by raffle of the new
informations to another branch of the same court was
intended to prejudice herein petitioners, or to place
them under less favorable circumstances, or to find a
court which would act favorably on the prosecution's
case.
STATE PROSECUTORS VS MURO
DOCTRINE: DISMISSAL SUA PONTE WITHOUT MOTION TO
QUASH
FILED
BY
ACCUSED
DEPRIVES
THE
COMPLAINANTS RIGHT TO BE ACCORDED THE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
FACTS
1. Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate,
Masbate, was appointed Presiding Judge of the
RTC of Manila, Br. 54, by then President
Corazon C. Aquino. - graduate of College of
Law-FEU, valedictorian of class 1995, Magna
Cum Laude and 6th in the Bar exams.
2. Now he is being charged with ignorance of the
law, grave misconduct and violation of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for dismissing motu proprio the eleven
(11) cased filed by the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restrictions after Pres. FVR had
announced, which was published in newspaper
reports, the lifting of all foreign exchange
restrictions
3. CA reversed the ruling of Judge Muro,
4. Prosecutors contend that he should be liable to
such dismissal for doing so in bad faith, since
he dismissed 11 charges insisting that "there
was no need to await publication of Circular
No. 1353 for the reason that the public
announcement made by the President in
several newspapers of general circulation
lifting foreign exchange controls is total,
absolute,
without
qualification,
and
immediately effective," and, second, for "
dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases
without even a motion to quash having been
filed by the accused, and without at least
giving the prosecution the basic opportunity
to be heard on the matter.
5. It is an elementary principle in procedural law
and statutory construction that the repeal of a
penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the
old law prior to its repeal. Thus, where the
crime no longer exists, prosecution of the
person charged under the old law cannot be
had and the action should be dismissed.
6. respondent judge asseverates that complainants
who are officers of the Department of Justice,
violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "proceedings against
judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential" when they caused to be published
in the newspapers the filing of the present
administrative case against him|||
ISSUE: Was there a violation in the judicial due process

requirement? Should Judge Muro be dismissed.

Held. Yes. The dismissal sua ponte by Judge Muro
deprives the prosecutors the right to be heard.
No. In order to hold judge Muro liable, bad faith must
be proved, and such has not been proved.

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom

and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative.

be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party.

A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct
of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent
with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously
and with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of
the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his actuation
highly dubious.

The principal guide in determining what facts may be

assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts
of general notoriety.

V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of

respondent judge could have seriously and
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had
the accused invoked the defense of double jeopardy,
considering that the dismissal was ordered after
arraignment and without the consent of said accused.
This could have spawned legal complications and
inevitable delay in the criminal proceedings, were it
not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day
for the People since in the absence of jurisdiction,
double jeopardy will not set in.

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion

and on the basis of a mere newspaper account which is
sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of
foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and
cannot be considered of common knowledge or of
general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an
administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence
dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a
statute before it becomes effective. The reason is
simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still
inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of
ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one
of the requirements before a court can take judicial
notice of a fact

Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required,

complainant-prosecutors in the instant case failed to
prove the absence of good faith on the part of
respondent judge. Consequently, the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed stands. In
sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that
the assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro
was inspired by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a
disservice and commit an atrocity, and thus his
dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no clear
indication from the records that the respondent's
assailed decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a
reprehensible purpose, and while there may be a
misjudgment, but not a deliberate twisting of facts to
justify the assailed order, dismissal of respondent
judge from the service is not proper

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and

it was definitely not proper for him, to have taken
cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same
was not yet in force at the time the improvident order
of dismissal was issued.

JUAN CARVAJAL VS CA
DOCTRINE:
Is there denial of due process if an applicant for land
registration is unable to testify?

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have

three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or

erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act of
respondent judge is altogether dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused,
and without at least giving the prosecution the basic
opportunity or on oral argument, is not only a
blatant denial or elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith
and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily
dispose of the cases as early as possible is no license
for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does
8
such
professed objective, even if true, justify a
deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a
violation of its right to due process of law.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he
should have the patience and circumspection to give
the opposing party a chance to present his evidence
even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

FACTS
1. Petitioner JUAN CARVAJAL is the applicant in a
land registration case involving a 96,470 square
meter lot denominated as Lots 6846-A, 6846-B,
6846-C and 6846-D.
2. Petitioner was ordered to refer to the Bureau of
Lands for corrections the discrepancy existing
in the directional bearing and area of Lot 6846D.
3. The technical descriptions as corrected by the
Bureau of Lands were submitted and the
application was set for hearing.
4. Solid Homes, Inc. filed its opposition stating that
a land registered in its name under the Torrens
System and covered by then TCT No. N-7873 is
almost identical to the property subject of the
application.
5. To avoid duplicity, the NLTDRA was directed to
make the plotting of the relative position of
the property embraced in TCT No. 7873 and to
submit its plotting to the court.
6. Meanwhile, as recommended by the Land
Registration Authority, the application for
registration of petitioner was dismissed by

respondent court.
7. Respondent judge required the parties and the
engineers
from
the
Land
Registration
Commission and the DENR to appear before the
Court. The engineer from the Land Registration
Commission was likewise directed to inform
the court whether the property applied for by
petitioner is indeed inside the titled property
of private respondent.
8. The Land Registration Authority submitted a
report showing that there was indeed an
overlapping of the four (4) parcels of land
applied for by petitioner and the properties of
Solid Homes under TCT 7873.
9. Hence, considering that the properties applied
for were within the titled property and could
not be the subject of an application for
registration. the motion for reconsideration,
was denied.
10. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of
the application for registration. Hence, this
appeal.
11. Petitioner further maintains that he was denied
due process when he, as an applicant in a land
registration case, was not able to take the
witness stand. According to petitioner, even his
counsel hardly participated in the proceeding
except to propound classificatory questions
during the examination of Engineer Silverio
Perez of the Land Registration Authority|||
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner was given (the)
chance and the opportunity to be heard or allowed to
fully introduce his evidence in the (proceeding) for
Land Registration and to rest (his) case?
HELD.
Petitioner claims that he was denied due process
because he was unable to take the witness stand. We
disagree. The essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is
repugnant to due process.
In this case, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to
present witnesses, and he did present three. However,
petitioner did not invoke his right to take the witness
stand even when the trial court ordered the submission
of the parties' memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced
to the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to
take the witness stand.
Likewise, we are not persuaded by his allegation that
his own counsel hardly participated in the proceedings.
The records show that said counsel did cross-examine
Engineer Silverio Perez by propounding clarificatory
questions to the latter. In any event, the client is
generally bound by the acts of his counsel. Petitioner
has not shown at all that his previous counsel had
acted in such grossly negligent manner as to deprive
him of effective representation, or of due process.
|
PEREZ
VS ESTRADA AM. No. OI-4-03-SC, june 29, 2001
9
(RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE
TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA||| )
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. MFR for the denial of petitioners' request for
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

permission to televise and broadcast live the

trial
of
former
President
Joseph
E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan was
filed by the Secretary of Justice HERNANDO
PEREZ, arguing that there is really no conflict
between the right of the people to public
information and the freedom of the press, on
one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial.
2. He further elaborated that if there is a clash
between these rights, it must be resolved in
favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of
sovereignty, are entitled to information, and
live media coverage is a safeguard against
attempts by any party to use the courts as
instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests.
3. On the other hand, former President Joseph
E. Estrada reiterated his objection to the live
TV and radio coverage of his trial on the
ground that its allowance will violate the sub
judice rule. ETHSAI
ISSUE: WILL RECORDING AND TELEVISING OF THE
PLUNDER CASE OF ERAP VIOLATE HIS RIGHT TO FAIR
TRIAL?
HELD
NO. UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS, SUCH TRIAL IS TO BE
RECORDED BUT ONLY TO BE SHOWN TO PUBLIC AFTER
THE RULING HAS BEEN DECREED.
There are several reasons for such televised recording,
TO WIT
i.

the hearings are of historic significance. They are

an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that
"the King is under no man, but he is under God
and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)

ii.

the Estrada cases involve matters of vital

concern to our people who have a fundamental
right to know how their government is
conducted. This right can be enhanced by audiovisual presentation.

iii. audio-visual presentation is essential for the

education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual
records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The
recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of
the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot
quite do because it cannot capture the sights and
sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the
proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan
is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial
can be checked by reference to the tapes.
HOWEVER, by delaying the release of the tapes for
broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the
proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will
thus be distracted from the proper performance of

their roles whether as counsel, witnesses, court

personnel, or judges will be allayed. The possibility
that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar
of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the
just determination of the cases can be minimized. The
possibility that judgment will be rendered by the
popular tribunal before the court of justice can render
its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and
fairness of the trial which, it may be assumed, is the
concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in
favor of, televised trials will be addressed since the
tapes will not be released for public showing until after
the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By
delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem
posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the
record of the trials can be served by audio-visual
recordings without impairing the right of the accused
to a fair trial.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
-The requisites of procedural due process
are the following(ANG TIBAY DOCTRINE/
CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS):
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right
to present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
3) The decision must have something to support
itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act
on its own independent consideration of the law and the
facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving to a decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
ANG TIBAY, represented by Teodoro Toribio VS CIR
DOCTRINE: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS; REQUSITES OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
FACTS
1.Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.
2.There was an alleged shortage of leather soles,
and it was necessary to temporarily lay off
members of the National Labor Union.
3.According to the Union however, this was merely
a scheme to systematically terminate the
employees from work, and was a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this
bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
10
the Philippine Army,| and that the shortage of
soles is unsupported by evidence.
4. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because
the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring
the National Workers Brotherhood, which was
allegedly sympathetic to the employer.
5.That the National Workers' Brotherhood of ANG
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

TIBAY is a company or employer union

dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal. |||
6.The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition
both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to
the motion for new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
7.We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no
substantial evidence to indicate that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to
their union affiliation or activity. The whole
transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of
opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion
drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that
these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.|||
ISSUE: IS THE CIR REQUIRED TO OBSERVE PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS EVEN IT IS TECHNICALLY NOT PART OF
THE JUDICIARY BUT MORE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BOARD?
HELD. YES.
RULING
The Court of Industrial Relations is a
special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between,
and/or affecting, employers and employees or
laborers, and landlords and tenants or farmlaborers, and regulate the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions
ofCommonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance for purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely
to cause a strike or lockout, arising from
differences
as
regards
wageshares
or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number
of employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or
agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
death with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before hearing
the dispute and in the course of such hearing,

endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them

to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by
the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate
and study all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determining the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share
of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or
lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it
may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the
settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur
to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order
to determine specific controversies between labor
and capital in industry and in agriculture. There is
in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid
doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial

Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out
that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable."
(Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall
not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for
the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing
further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially
regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into effect the avowed legislative
purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due
Process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
11language of Chief Justice Hughes, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play."
(2) the
tribunal must
consider the
evidence presented, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right
is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside

without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." This
principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional
government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited
power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.
(4) the evidence must be "substantial."
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
The statute provides that 'the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. But this
assurance
of
a
desirable
flexibility
in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to
justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet
the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to
see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of
facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be
appointed for the purpose of investigating
and determining the facts in any given case,
but their report and decision are only
advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any
industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or
any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations
may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not
affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its
powers (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts

of the controversy, and not simply accept the

views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It
may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally impossible for the titular heads of the
Court of Industrial Relations personally to decide
all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the
enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should,
in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the
Ang Tibay and the National Workers' Brotherhood
(appendix A), the record is barren and does not
satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of law.
||| -MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION V. PASCUAL
DOCTRINE
FACTS
1. In February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote
a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of
the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the
respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
2. On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to
the National Bureau of Investigation in order
that an investigation on the alleged illegal and
corrupt practices of the respondent may be
conducted.
3. A "discreet investigation" was proceeded in
Angat, Bulacan, where they looked for Ceferino
Tigas, the letter writer, who was learned to be
a fictitous person.
4. They proceeded to the residence of Candido
Cruz, an accused in respondent's sala, who
stated that the charge of Frustrated Murder
against him was only physical injuries and that
to have a favorable action, Cruz was to give to
give the judge P2,000.00. Added that the judge
is believed to be a drunkard.
5. An entrapment operation was conducted and the
judge was caught in flagrante delicto.
6. NBI report provides: Candido met with
respondent judge and opted to give the money
at Colegio de Santa Monica where he is
attending the graduation of his daughter, but
said he refused because there were plenty of
12
people.
At about 8:30 in the morning of (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge
PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan,
and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00
bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously
marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

RESPONDENT JUDGEs VERSION

1. An NBI Tandems assignment was merely to
conduct discreet investigation supposedly
regarding the letter sent by MR. TIGAS, but it
led to incriminatory machinations, planting
evidence, unlawful arrest, illegal search and
seizure, after learning that such is a fictitious
person.
2. They contacted Candido Cruz (an illiterate and
70 years old) who was mentioned in the letter,
and made him sign such affidavit. |||
3. At first, they went to his office but learned he
was at the graduation of his daughter so they
moved their operation to such school, but the
Judge refused to receive the money.
4. The next morning, such officers went to the
chambers of said judge and placed it on his
desk.
5. Cruz said it was the money he was asking for.
Judge erupted in anger and picked up the
envelope and placed it in the pocket of cruzs
polo.
Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive
Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint,
the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of
the bribery case of respondent judge at the
Sandiganbayan., RECOMMENDED THAT JUDGE IS
GUILTY|||
ISSUE: WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
AGAINST THE JUDGE, IN THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE?
HELD. YES
=We note that the only bases for the Report and
Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge
Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the
Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the
bribery case of respondent judge at the
Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not
afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent
can confront the witnesses against him and present
evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules,
even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the
respondent judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against
him should be competent and should be derived from
direct knowledge.
The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it
should be only after due investigation and after
presentation of competent evidence, especially since
the charge is penal in character. 7 The above-quoted
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge
had fallen short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable
inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness,
Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on
several material points.
||| The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful
prosecution and planting of evidence amounting to
persecution. It is reprehensible to say the least that
NBI agents should entrap the respondent judge by
illegal means, besmirch his reputation by the planting
of evidence against him and make public the foregoing

charges of bribery against him in the face of the

unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations
perpetrated by the NBI agents in connivance with
Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual
blameless of the charge of bribery against him.
||| We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v.
Castaeda, Jr., that:
"The ground for the removal of a
judicial officer should be established
beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the
rule where the charges on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc. The general rules
in regard to admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials apply."
Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt after a
thorough investigation of the whole evidence. 16 The
principle of reasonable doubt being applicable in the
instant case, therefore, we find that the alleged act of
bribery committed by respondent has not been
sufficiently and convincingly proven to warrant the
imposition of any penalty against respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
judge is hereby exonerated and the administrative case
against him is DISMISSED.

Arsenio LUMIQUED V. EXEVEA

DOCTRINE: RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
FACTS
1. Petition for certiorari for the reversal of the
Investigating Committee's report
recommending the dismissal or removal from
office of Former Regional Director, DAR-CAR
Arsenio Lumiqued (deceased), without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against him.
2. Records reveal that three complaints were filed
against Arsenio Lumiqued charging him of
malversation through falsification of official
documents, violation of Commission on Audit
rules and regulations, and for oppression and
harassment.
3. After the investigation, the Committee
rendered a report finding him liable for all the
charges. Thereafter, acting on the report and
recommendation, President Fidel Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 52 finding Lumiqued
administratively liable for dishonesty and
dismissing him from the service with forfeiture
of his retirement and other benefits.
4. Lumiqued filed a petition for appeal in the
Office of the President, but said appeal was
subsequently denied. A second motion for
reconsideration was filed, but the same was
likewise denied. It was during the pendency of
this motion that Arsenio Lumiqued died.
5. On appeal before the Court, petitioners, as heirs
of the late Arsenio Lumiqued, fault the
investigating committee for its failure to
inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during
the hearing.
6. They maintained that his right to counsel could
not be waived unless the waiver was in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
ISSUE: IS THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL A REQUIREMENT FOR
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?
HELD. NO

13

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners' arguments

are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel is a
right afforded to a suspect or accused during custodial
investigation. In the case at bar, Lumiqued was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The
investigation was conducted for the purpose of
determining if he could be held administratively liable
for the complaints filed against him. Also, such right is
not absolute and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. Moreover, Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260 (Civil Service Act) and Section
39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 explicitly provide that in an administrative
proceeding such as the one in case at bar, a respondent
has the option of engaging the services of counsel or
not. Accordingly, the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus is dismissed and the

challenged administrative order is affirmed.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED;
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS A RIGHT AFFORDED TO AN
ACCUSED DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, BUT NOT
IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY; CASE AT BAR. The
right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a
right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus,
be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and,
with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the
case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an
accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued,
however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the
committee created by Department Order No. 145 was
for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him.
2. ID.; ID.; A PARTY IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE INQUIRY MAY
OR MAY NOT BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL, IRRESPECTIVE
OF THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AND OF THE
RESPONDENT'S CAPACITY TO REPRESENT HIMSELF, AND
NO DUTY RESTS ON SUCH BODY TO FURNISH THE
PERSON BEING INVESTIGATED WITH COUNSEL. While
investigations conducted by an administrative body
may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. In an administrative
proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a
respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear
from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII
of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil
Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on
Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987).
3. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS NOT
INDISPENSABLE TO DUE PROCESS UNLESS REQUIRED
BY THE CONSTITUTION OR THE LAW. The right to
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless
required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v.
Auditor General, the Court said: ". . . There is nothing
in the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by
counsel and that, without such representation, he shall
not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The
legal profession was not engrafted in the due process
clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.
The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot
validly
act at all except only with a lawyer at his side."
14
4. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; RESOLUTION No. 94-0521 OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON RESPONDENT'S
RIGHT TO COUNSEL, APPLICABLE ONLY TO CASES
BROUGHT BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
Petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the
Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in
the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

a respondent in an administrative complaint must be

"informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of
his choice," is inappropriate. In the first place, this
resolution is applicable only to cases brought before
the Civil Service Commission. Secondly, said resolution,
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen
days following its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation, much later than the July 1992 hearings of
the investigating committee created by Department
Order No. 145.
5. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS, AS LONG AS A
PARTY WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIS
INTERESTS IN DUE COURSE, HE CANNOT BE SAID TO
HAVE BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. The
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much
more creditably as it is more practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long
as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be
heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions
for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the
committee.
FABELLA VS. CA
DOCTRINE:DUE
PROCESS
IN
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
FACTS
1. On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary
Isidro Cario issued a return to work order to
all public school teachers who had participated
in walkouts and strikes.
2. Secretary Cario filed administrative charges
against the striking teachers, and placed the
teachers under preventive suspension.
3. The teachers filed an injunctive suit charging
the committee appointed by Secretary Cario
with fraud and deceit. RTC QC denied to issue
a restraining order.
4. The DECS Secretary through the Solicitor
General, contended that in accordance with
the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court
should not interfere in the administrative
proceedings.
5. DECS investigating committee rendered a
decision finding the striking teachers guilty as
charged and ordered their dismissal.
6. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court which issued a
resolution en banc declaring void the trial
court's order of dismissal and reinstating the
action, and ordered the teachers'
reinstatement pending decision of their case.
7. The trial court rendered its decision declaring

the dismissal of the teachers null and void. The

trial court held that Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers," is the primary law that
governs the conduct of investigation in
administrative cases filed against public school
teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its
supplemental law.
8. As a result, the committee tasked to investigate
the charges filed against the teachers was
illegally constituted and all acts done by said
body possess no legal color whatsoever.
9. From this adverse decision of the trial court,
former DECS Secretary Cario filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
holding in the main that private respondents
were denied due process in the administrative
proceedings instituted against them. Hence,
this petition for review.
10. The Supreme Court ruled that the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges did not include a
representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher's
organization as required by Section 9 of RA
4670.
11. Accordingly, said committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction and all
proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure
an impartial tribunal and gives substance and
meaning to the fundamental right to be heard.
Because the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no amount of
delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to
private respondents. The Court ordered the
DECS to reinstate the private respondents and
award all monetary benefits that may have
accrued to them during the period of their
unjustified suspension or dismissal.

ISSUE: WAS THERE A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS? HELD

YES.

||\SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
REQUIREMENTS. In administrative proceedings, due
process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
15
institution
of proceedings which may affect a
respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to
present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to
defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartially;and (4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

substantial evidence submitted for consideration

during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected. caHCSD
2. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW;
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING PUBLIC
SCHOOL TEACHERS; RA 4670 KNOWN AS THE MAGNA
CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS; SECTION 9
THEREOF; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. In
the present case, the various committees formed by
DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include "a representative of the
local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher's organization" as required by Section
9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all
proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial
tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard.
Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural
due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. Mere membership
of said teachers in their respective teachers'
organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers' organization possesses the right
to indicate its choice of representative to be included
by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right
to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that
none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever
designated or authorized by a teachers' organization as
its representative in said committee.
|||
SUMMARY DISMISSAL V/ TORCITA 330 SCRA 153
DOCTRINE
FACTS
1. The twelve administrative complaints were the
subject of administrative hearings before the
Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP.
2. The series of twelve complaints filed against
C/Insp. Torcita were solely based on the
incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at
about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, wherein
Torcita, who was off-duty and was in civilian
clothes, riding in his private vehicle with
members of his family, chased another vehicle
which overtook his car in a reckless manner
and in violation of the Traffic Code; the hot
pursuit ended at the Hacienda Aimee, where
he allegedly entered the place without lawful
warrant and while inside, belligerently shouted
invectives, challenging everyone to a fight,
pointed his gun at somebody and urinated in
full view of the persons therein.
3. At the pre-trial, counsels agreed that the twelve
cases shall be consolidated into one "major
complaint" for "conduct unbecoming of a police

officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II,

Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 pursuant
to RA 6975.
4. The Board did not find sufficient evidence to
establish any of the charges against him and
found that he was in the performance of his
official duties when the incident happened;
5. however, he committed a breach of internal
discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in
the performance of same.
6. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional
Appellate Board of the PNP, Region VI, Iloilo
City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
7. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition
for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it
found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the
performance of duty.
8. Public respondent appealed from the decision of
the RTC, by petition for review to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the same. The instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the definition of
the more serious offense is broad, and almost allencompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no
matter how light, for which one is not properly charged
and tried, cannot be countenanced without violating
the rudimentary requirements of due process. It is
glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the
twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp.
Torcita, that none of the charges or offenses
mentioned or made reference to the specific act of
being drunk while in the performance of official duty.
The Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that even if
he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty,
he could not have been found to have the odor or smell
of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he
was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of
liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed
and the petition was dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE; SUMMARY DISMISSAL PROCEEDINGS;
DEFINED AND CONSTRUED. The administrative
disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or
charges against any member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) is laid down in Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990." This law defines
the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and
Regional
Directors, among others in cases, "where the
16
respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police
officer." Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 prescribes
the "Rules and Regulations in the conduct of summary
dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and
defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under
Section 3 (c), Rule II, as follows: "Conduct unbecoming
of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a
PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

capacity which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing

himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his
character and standing as a gentleman in such a
manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of
moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior
of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity
which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally
as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a
PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy
to remain as a member of the organization." On the
other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in
the performance of duty" are defined in Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred,
among others, by a member of the PNP who shall,
among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of
alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess
alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post
or office."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTIFICATION OF THE CHARGES,
REQUIRED; OMISSION THEREOF, FATAL TO THE VALIDITY
OF THE JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. The omission is
fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty
of the offense for which he was not notified nor
charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed
by specific requirements of notification of the charges
together with copies of affidavits and other
attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing
of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is
true that consistent with its summary nature, the
duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of
conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
statements may take the place of oral testimonies of
witnesses, cross-examination is confined only to
material and relevant matters, and prolonged
arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be
entertained. However, notification of the charges
contemplates that respondent be informed of the
specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to
know that he was being charged with being drunk while
in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse
the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his
defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be
heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed
against him, the absence of specification of the
offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not
a proper observance of due process. There can be no
short-cut to the legal process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr.,
287 SCRA 245).
3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE
PROCESS; ABSENCE THEREOF RENDERS A JUDGMENT
VOID; CASE AT BAR. It is a requirement of due
process that the parties be informed of how the
litigation was decided with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of
the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp. vs. NLRC,
286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
specifically prescribes that the decision shall contain "a
brief statement of the material facts and the findings
of the summary dismissal authority as well as the
disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of
the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of
internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated
by factual findings referring to this particular offense.
As it turned out, the Dismissal Board believed his
allegation that he was not drunk and found that he was
in full command of his senses where he tried to
apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up.
Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot
of alcoholic drink at the party which he attended

before the incident, the records show that he was then

off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of
Victorias, which was outside of his area of police
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot pursuit
incident occurred while he was on his way home to
Cadiz City with the members of his family. As observed
by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was
motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as
Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land
Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and
regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads
and highways." The Court of Appeals correctly pointed
out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to
have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the
performance of duty because he was not on duty at the
time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private
trip fetching his wife. A decision is void for lack of due
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity of being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 SCRA
358). A void judgment never acquires finality (Heirs of
Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672; Fortich
vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 678).
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS CORONEL

Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint against

respondent for dishonest, alleging that
respondent falsified the cash invoice she
submitted for reimbursement by making it
appear that the luncheon bill was (P1,213.00)
when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected
in the photocopy of the original duplicate of
cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
viii. Graft Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Mindanao,
Davao City, rendered a decision, approved by the
then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto holding that
respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of
DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefit. She is disqualified from reemployment in the national and local
governments, as well as in any agency, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
ix. "[Respondent] filed her motion for
reconsideration dated February 2, 2001. On
March 7, 2001, Graft Investigation Officer I
Grace H. Morales issued an Order, the decretal
portion of which states

DOCTRINE:In administrative cases, a finding of guilt

must be supported by substantial evidence. In the
present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an
alleged receipt does not constitute substantial
evidence to show that respondent is guilty of
dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the
photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very
least, it has no probative value.|||

x.

FACTS

Second, he did not give any justification for his

disapproval of the investigating officer's ruling.

i.

Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting

Processor B with Salary Grade 10 of the Linamon
Water District, Lanao del Norte.

ii.

On September 26, 1997, the Board of Directors of

Linamon Water District, designated [respondent]
as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997
until a General Manager shall have been
appointed.

iii. "In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent]

called for a meeting and since it was nearing
lunchtime, the group opted to continue their
meeting at Marvilla's Store at Barangay Bunu-un,
Iligan City.
iv.

v.

The luncheon meeting, attended by more or less

ten (10) persons, was presided over by Advisor
Rhodora Gumban of the LWUA.
As the host of the said meeting, [respondent] paid
for the lunch in the amount of (P1,213.00), as
shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14,
1998.

vi.
17 Respondent claimed for reimbursement of her
expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23,
chargeable against the representation and
entertainment account of her office, and was
approved.
vii. Thereafter, Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed
General Manager of Linamon Water District. He
filed with the Office of the OmbudsmanSEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

Appellate court said that the OMB's

disapproval was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

First, petitioner ombudsman did not consider the

credible evidence presented by respondent in her
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS

IN
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST
CARMENCITA CORONEL?
HELD: YES. THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUBSTANTIAL.

We find the evidence presented by the complainant

insufficient to support his serious charge that she was
dishonest.
Although sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is a
question of fact and is not generally subject to review
by this Court, the instant case falls under the
recognized exceptions. The original Decision of the
ombudsman was not supported by the evidence, but
was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures. TaDAHE
The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of
the original Official Receipt (OR) No. 0736, and a
photocopy of the original duplicate of that receipt. The
first was a bill for P1,213; and the latter, for P213.
Both pieces of evidence refer to one and the same
Official Receipt; yet, they contain different amounts.
Obviously, one of them was falsified. Unfortunately,
Complainant Sausal, Jr., failed to prove that it was
indeed respondent's receipt that was falsified. As it
stands, we do not know for certain if the number "1"
was inserted in OR No. 0736 or was deleted from the
unauthenticated photocopy of the original duplicate.
The evidence is equivocal. Besides, given that there
were 8 to 10 attendees in the luncheon meeting, a bill
of P1,213 for meals was not entirely improbable, even

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

in 1998.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial
evidence; 43 that is, such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 44 In the instant case, the complainant did
not present evidence to support his theory that the
photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true
amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified.
That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden
of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to
the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.
The complainant's evidence to prove falsification
consisted of an unauthenticated 45 photocopy of the
original duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit
from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had
issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due
execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due
execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of
the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince
us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill
incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the
conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies,
it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity
or reliability as a condition for the admission of
documents. Absent any such proof of authenticity, the
photocopy of the original duplicate should be
considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative
value.
Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the
evidence against respondent, there is no need for her
to present additional evidence to vindicate herself.
The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed
the Administrative Complaint against her in the first
place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial
evidence.
|

DOCTRINE: RIGHT TO NOTICE AND HEARING DURING

EVALUATION STAGE OF EXTRADITION
FACTS
1. As a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Extradition
Treaty,
private
respondent
contended that he should be furnished a copy
of the US government request for his
extradition and its supporting documents even
while he is still under evaluation by petitioner
Secretary of Justice.
2. The Secretary of Justice, however, feared the
demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to
flee.
3. In permanently enjoining the RTC from further
conducting proceedings in Civil Case No. 9994684, the Supreme Court held: that private
respondent is not entitled to the right of notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process; that there is no provision
in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No.
1069 giving an extraditee such right; that a
court cannot alter, amend or add to a treaty
any clause, upon any motion of equity, or
general convenience, or substantial justice;
that the terms of the treaty should be
interpreted in the light of their intent; that
other countries with similar extradition
treaties with the Philippines have expressed
the same interpretation adopted by the
Philippine and US governments; and that an
extradition proceeding is sui generis, not a
criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; TREATIES;
RP-US EXTRADITION TREATY; POTENTIAL
EXTRADITEE IS BEREFT OF RIGHT TO NOTICE
AND HEARING DURING EVALUATION STAGE;
REASONS; CASE AT BAR.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private
respondent is entitled to the due process right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. We now hold that private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

18

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

First. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US

Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for
extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after
the filing of the petition for extradition in the
extradition court. There is no provision in the RP-US
Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner
Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request
from the US government and its supporting documents
and to comment thereon while the request is still
undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in
the treaty giving private respondent that right where
there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot
alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any
clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its

conditions and requirements or take away any

qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon
any motion of equity, or general convenience, or
substantial justice."
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of
their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose." . . . It cannot
be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines
forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of
international and transnational crimes like terrorism
and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the
assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not
be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty.
Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending
commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will
not be coddled by any signatory state. It ought to
follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an
interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the
escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and
expedite their trial. . . .
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is
the understanding of the parties themselves to the RPUS Extradition Treaty as well as the general
interpretation of the issue in question by other
countries with similar treaties with the Philippines.
The rule is recognized that while courts have the
power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by
the departments of government particularly charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded
great weight. The reason for the rule is laid down
in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al., where
we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive legislative
act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was adopted and given the force of law in the
country." . . .
Fourth. . . . An extradition proceeding is sui
generis. It is not a criminal proceedingwhich will call
into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with,
the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot
be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. . . .
Private respondent's plea for due process . . . collides
with important state interests which cannot also be
ignored for they serve the interest of the greater
majority. . . . Petitioner avers that the Court should
give more weight to our national commitment under
the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the
extradition
to the United States of persons charged
19
with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also
emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the
Executive on matters relating to foreign affairs in order
not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation
of powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition
proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

of the right being claimed by the private respondent is

nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly
suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the
interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice. . . .
2. THREAT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S LIBERTY IS
MERELY HYPOTHETICAL IN CASE AT BAR.
The supposed threat to private respondent's liberty
is perceived to come from several provisions of the RPUS Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow
provisional arrest and temporary detention. . . . Both
the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly
provide that private respondent may be provisionally
arrested only pending receipt of the request for
extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition
request from the United States and has turned it over
to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United
States has not requested for private respondent's
provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private
respondent's liberty has passed. It is more imagined
than real. Nor can the threat to private respondent's
liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069. . . . It is
evident from the above provision that a warrant of
arrest for the temporary detention of the accused
pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by
the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing
of the petition for extradition. As the extradition
process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent
documents and there is no certainty that a petition for
extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition
court, the threat to private respondent's liberty is
merely hypothetical.
GOVT OF USA VS PURUGANAN
DOCTRINE: RIGHTS OF AN EXTRADITEE; RIGHT TO BAIL,
NEED FOR A WARRANT BEFORE ARREST

FACTS:
1. Petitioner US government filed this Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the
procedure adopted by the trial court of first
hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez,
before issuing a warrant for his arrest under
Section 6 of PD No. 1069, contending that the
procedure gives Jimenez notice to escape
and to avoid extradition.
2. Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting
of Jimenez's prayer for bail, which allows him
to go on provisional liberty while extradition
proceedings are pending.
ISSUE: MUST A POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE BE HEARD
BEFORE A WARRANT BE ISSUED? CAN A POTENTIAL
EXTRADITEE BE RELEASED ON BAIL?
HELD. BOTH NO.
the Supreme Court held that the present extradition
case validates the premise that persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee. Prior acts of
respondent eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all costs.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC judge to set the hearing for the issuance of

the warrant of arrest when it was already evident from

the Petition for Extradition itself and its supporting
documents that a prima facie finding did exist and he
may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused; that there is no requirement to notify and
to hear the accused before the issuance of a warrant
of arrest under the Constitution which requires only
an examination under oath or affirmation of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce; and
that since accused were allowed to be heard and to
present evidence at this early stage, the procedure
could convert the determination of a prima facie case
into a full-blown trial, which is discordant with the
rationale for the entire system and anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
The Court also held that extraditee's immediate
detention prior to his being heard does not violate
the due process clause; that the right to bail applies
only in ordinary criminal proceedings; but that in
extradition proceedings, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested, bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW;
EXTRADITION TREATY; PERSONS TO BE
EXTRADITED ARE PRESUMED TO BE FLIGHT
RISKS; CASE AT BAR.
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be
flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to
the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would
not even begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country.
Prior acts of herein respondent (1) leaving the
requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the
requested state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as
well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost:
These circumstances point to an ever-present,
underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that
he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
2. NEITHER TREATY NOR THE EXTRADITION LAW
REQUIRE A HEARING BEFORE ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST OF PROBABLE
20
EXTRADITEE; REASONS; CASE AT BAR.
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD
1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
"immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties,
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving

them time to prepare and present such facts and
arguments.arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered "immediate." The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on
the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency
and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
In connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word "hearing" is notably absent from the
provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at
that stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature.
Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to
the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step
in the entire proceedings.
3.GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; SETTING FOR
HEARING A REQUEST FOR THE ARREST OF AN
EXTRADITEE AFTER HAVING ALREADY
DETERMINED FROM SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
THAT A PRIMA FACIE FINDINGS EXISTS, A CASE
OF; CASE AT BAR.
Respondent Judge could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
the extradition request was prima facie meritorious.
In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist.
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing
an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence,
after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie findingdid exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter
for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
4. RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED; NOTICE AND HEARING
NOT REQUIRED BEFORE ISSUANCE OF WARRANT
OF ARREST. Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution,which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine
probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only
the examination under oath or affirmation
of complainants and thewitnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and
hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
6. ID.; INTERNATIONAL LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY;
PROPER PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE JUDGE
UPON RECEIPT OF A PETITION FOR EXTRADITION.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it
wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of
a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as
soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a)
they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of

this study and examination, no prima facie finding is

possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the
presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the
arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of
the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in
extradition cases.
7. ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
RIGHT TO BAIL; APPLIES ONLY TO ORDINARY CRIMINAL
CASES AND NOT TO EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. As
suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies
only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts
do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows
that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
EXCEPTION. The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not
a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave
abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power
to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that
the right to due process is broad enough to include the
grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property"
of everyperson. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable
to every situation calling for its application."
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we
believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein.
9. RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS; SUFFICIENCY OF A
SUBSEQUENT OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ONCE
EXTRADITEE IS PLACED UNDER THE
EXTRADITION COURT'S CUSTODY, EXPLAINED;
CASE AT BAR. Contrary to the contention of
Jimenez, his detention prior to the
21
conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to
due process. We reiterate the familiar
doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time,
point out that the doctrine does not always call
for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances such as those present in an
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

extradition case call for it,

a subsequent opportunity to be heard is
enough. In the present case, respondent will
be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears
the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and
fundamental fairness. Contrary to his
contention, we find no arbitrariness, either, in
the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior
to his being heard.
That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is
sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets
the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judge's independent prima
facie determination that his arrest will best serve the
ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the
court's custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the
no-initial-bail rule.
GOVT OF HONGKONG VS OLALIA
DOCTRINE: EXTRADITEE
FACTS
1. |On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the
Philippines and the then British Crown Colony
of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997.
2. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the
People's Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
3. Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before
the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of accepting an advantage as an
agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized
by a common law of Hongkong. A warrant of
arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face
jail terms.
4. On September 23, 1999, He was arrested and
detained.
5. On November 22, 1999, Hongkong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for his extradition.
6. Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail,
which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.
7. Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a
petition to vacate such order, but it was denied
by the same judge.
8. petitioner alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private
respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a
potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
9. ISSUE: DOES THE POSSIBLE EXTRADITEE HAVE
THE RIGHT TO POSE FOR BAIL?
HELD.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the
family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the

responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of

every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection
to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a reexamination of this Court's ruling
in Purganan is in order. caADSE
First, we note that the exercise of the State's power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, 4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be
to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of
the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This
Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been
allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention
during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to
uphold human rights. HDAaIc
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot
be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or
guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply
for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light
of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption
lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the
object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or
22
government."
aSATHE
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of
a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

proceeding. 9 Even if the potential extraditee is a

criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature
criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even
though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It
is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty
obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a
trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil
action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. 13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a
person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure
his return to the state from which he fled, for the
purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b)the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No.
1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates
the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of
the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of
justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the
requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of
the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and
extradition of the accused if a request for extradition
is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced
to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the
length of time of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on
September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until
December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his
admission to bail. In other words, he had been
detained for over two (2) years without having been
convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an
extended period of detention is a serious deprivation
of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this
prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the
grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however,
should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings.
In the latter, the standard of due process is premised
on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major
premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of
admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the
foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a

flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that
in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditee's rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also
by international conventions, to which the Philippines
is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the
standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence"should be used in granting
bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. cITCAa

In this case, there is no showing that private

respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."
COMPARISON OF THE CASE GOVT OF US VS
PURG. AND THE CASE GOVT OF HK VS OLALIA
Q: What are the five postulates of extradition
proceedings as enumerated in the case of
Government of U.S. v. Puruganan?
A:1)Extradition is a major instrument for
suppression of crime
2)The requesting State will accord due
process to the accused
3)The proceedings are sui generis
4)Compliance shall be in good faith
5)There is underlying risk of flight
Q: Did the Supreme Court abandon the ruling in
23 case of Puruganan in the case of Govt. of
the
Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia?
A: No. as stated in both cases right to bail
does not apply to criminal proceedings.
Even in extradition also in deportation
because the penalty for the offense
charged and weight of guilt is irrelevant. In
both cases the right to bail under sec.13,
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

are not applicable.

The right to bail granted in the case of
Govt. of Hong Kong v. Hon. Olalia is not
grounded on Sec.13 but on Sec.1 of Art 3,
the
due
process
clause
and
the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Q: What is the required quantum of evidence?
A: Clear and convincing evidence
Q: What are factors that must be taken into
consideration whenever an application for bail is
filed before an extradition court?
A: 1)That once granted bail, the applicant
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community
2)There exist a humanitarian, special and
compelling circumstances including as a
matter of reciprocity those cited by the
highest court in requesting state when
grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
OCAMPO VS ABANDO
DOCTRINE: RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS
NOT A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS
FACTS.
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by
elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army
at Sitio Sapang
Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.
The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation
Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) of arounf 67 severly
deteriorated skeletal remains launched by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
12 undated letters were sent to the Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder.
In a Special Report IALAG came up with the names of
ten (10) possible victims after comparison and
examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the
alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them swore that
their relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen
again.
According to former members, four sub-groups were
formed to implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the
Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not
support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group
charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group
which would subject those arrested to questioning; and
(4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of those
confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would
not support the movement.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been
abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP pursuant to Operation
VD.
petitioner Ocampo filed for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero in
issuing the warrants of arrest and denial of bail.
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others (including petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis and Ladlad) was then pending

before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC

Makati). Putting forward the political offense
doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already
absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed
as a necessary means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.

ISSUE 1. Whether petitioners were denied due process

during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.

entry of appearance
counsels. 99

by

their

respective

Section 3 (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows

Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent
were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place
in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent
to delay the prosecution of offenses.

2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners

should be dismissed under the political offense
doctrine.
Petitioners
were
process
during
investigation
and
in
the warrants of arrest.

accorded
due
preliminary
the
issuance
of

A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public
trial. While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a
component of due process in the administration of
criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right
to due process of law entails the opportunity to be
heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondent's side with regard to
the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer
shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead
to a reasonable belief that a crime has been
committed, and that it was the respondent who
committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is
bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to
be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance
to present one's own side of the story cannot claim
denial of due process.
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did
not receive a copy of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Petitioner Ladlad claims that
he was not served a subpoena due to the false address
indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp.
Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor
Vivero. Furthermore, even though his counsels filed
their formal entry of appearance before the Office of
the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a
subpoena through his counsels' addresses. thus, they
were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Majority
of the respondents did not submit
24
their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address,
per return of the subpoenas. On the other
hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to
submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
"no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
finding the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested." Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under
oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not
necessary for the determination thereof.
In fact, the judge's personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor's report and supporting documents showing
the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and
require the submission of additional affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge
Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted
by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably
dismissed the charge against them. Additionally,
petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
point out facts and evidence in the record that were
used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue
a warrant of arrest.
The determination of probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to
the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial
judge.Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to
trial judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this
Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan 117 as

follows:
. . . . The trial court's exercise of its judicial
discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure
errors in the trial court's appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, the conclusion of facts it
reached based on the said findings, as well as the
conclusions of law. . . . .
Whether or not there is probable
cause for the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused is a
question of fact based on the
allegations in the Informations, the
Resolution of the Investigating
Prosecutor,
including
other
documents
and/or
evidence
appended to the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual
matters indicated in the affidavits of the complainants
and witnesses as bases for the contention that there
was no probable cause for petitioners' indictment for
multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for
their arrest. As stated above, the trial judge's
appreciation of the evidence and conclusion of facts
based thereon are not interfered with in the absence
of grave abuse of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently
complies with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the
documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof
forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of
the crime with which he is being charged."
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable
cause for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of
arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are
primarily questions of fact that are normally not within
the purview of a petition for certiorari, 120 such as
the petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners
prior
to
a
determination
by the trial court that the murders
were
committed
in
furtherance
of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently,
cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty."
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. 122 Thus, when a
killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
killing
is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing
25
assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its
mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished
as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are
obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple
rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes
the well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

that the institution of criminal charges, including

whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the public prosecutor.
SEN JINGGOY ESTRADA VS OMBUDSMAN
DOCTRINE: RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE IN PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a
preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine
the
witnesses
which
the
complainant
may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that the respondent shall only
have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to
examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine.||
NOTA BENE: SEN. JINGGOY INVOKED THE REYES
CASE, WHICH WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AND THE
CASE HEREIN IS A CRIMINAL CASE.|
FACTS
1. On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served
upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint filed
by the NBI and Atty. Baligod for Plunder
2. Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and
Other Filings (Request)
3. Sen. Estrada's request was made "[p]ursuant to
the right of a respondent 'to examine the
evidence
submitted
by
the
complainant which he may not have been
furnished'
4. Ombudsman denied the request. On 28 March
2014, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Resolution which found probable cause to
indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with
one count of plunder and 11 counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019.
5. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
and prayed for the issuance of a new resolution
dismissing the charges against him.
6. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Ombudsman's 27 March 2014 Order
denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the
present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
and sought to annul and set aside the 27 March
2014 Order.
7. Sen. Estrada argued in the certiorari that the
Office of the Ombudsman violated his
constitutional right to due process and that
under such circumstance he has no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, and filed a
motion to suspend proceedings because the
denial of his Request to be furnished copies
of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
deprived him of his right to procedural due
process, and he has filed the present Petition
before this Court.
8. The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada's motion to

suspend in an Order
ISSUE: WAS THE DENIAL TO FURNISH ACCUSE THE
REQUESTED AFFIDAVITS CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION
AGAINST SEN ESTRADAS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS ?
HELD. the denial did not violate Sen. Estrada's
constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada,
however, fails to specify a law or rule which states
that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in
a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of
his co-respondents. Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4
(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada's claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish
the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the
supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the
respondent. This is clear from Section 4 (b), Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of
the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured,
the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting
documents, directing the respondent to submit, within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counteraffidavits . . . ." At this point, there is still no counteraffidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4 (b) refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of
the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits
of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting
affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman
for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estrada's Request.
Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure
of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a
respondent "shall have access to the evidence on
record," this provision should be construed in relation
to Section 4 (a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4 (a)
states that "the investigating officer shall require the
complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The
"supporting witnesses" are the witnesses of the
complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second,
Section 4 (b) states that "the investigating
26
officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and all other supporting documents,
directing the respondent" to submit his counteraffidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4 (b) are
the affidavits mentioned in Section 4 (a). Clearly, the
affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting
witnesses. The provision in the immediately succeeding
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

Section 4 (c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall

have "access to the evidence on record" does not stand
alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions
of Section 4 (a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the
"affidavits and other supporting documents" submitted
by "the complainant or supporting witnesses." Thus, a
respondent's "access to evidence on record" in
Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Ombudsman's Rules of
Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting
documents of "the complainant or supporting
witnesses" in Section 4 (a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he respondent
shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A
respondent's right to examine refers only to "the
evidence submitted by the complainant."
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the
Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, there is no
requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed
by the co-respondents should be furnished to a
respondent.
Justice Velasco's dissent relies on the ruling in Office
of
the
Ombudsman
v.
Reyes (Reyes case), 15 an administrative case,
in
which a different set of rules of procedure and
standards apply. Sen. Estrada's Petition, in contrast,
involves the preliminary investigation stage in a
criminal
case.
Rule
III
on
the
Procedure
in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman applies
in
the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure
in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada's
Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a
suppletory character or by analogy. 16
In the Reyes case, the complainant Acero executed an
affidavit against Reyes and Pealoza, who were both
employees of the Land Transportation Office. Pealoza
submitted his counter-affidavit, as well as those of his
two witnesses. Reyes adopted his counter-affidavit in
another case before the Ombudsman as it involved the
same parties and the same incident. None of the
parties appeared during the preliminary conference.
Pealoza waived his right to a formal investigation and
was willing to submit the case for resolution based on
the evidence on record. Pealoza also submitted a
counter-affidavit of his third witness. The Ombudsman
found Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed
him from the service. On the other hand, Pealoza was
found guilty of simple misconduct and penalized with
suspension from office without pay for six months. This
Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' finding that
Reyes' right to due process was indeed violated. This
Court remanded the records of the case to the
Ombudsman, for two reasons: (1) Reyes should not
have been meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service when the evidence was not substantial, and (2)
there was disregard of Reyes' right to due process
because he was not furnished a copy of the counteraffidavits of Pealoza and of Pealoza's three
witnesses. In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy
of the counter-affidavits happened in the
administrative proceedings on the merits, which
resulted in Reyes' dismissal from the service . In Sen.

Estrada's Petition, the denial of his Request happened

during the preliminary investigation where the only
issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose
of determining whether an information should be filed,
and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a
copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents
during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
We should remember to consider the differences in
adjudicating cases, particularly an administrative
case and a criminal case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that
quanta of proof and adjective rules vary
depending on whether the cases to
which they are meant to apply are
criminal, civil or administrative in
character. In criminal actions, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required for
conviction;
in
civil
actions
and
proceedings,
preponderance
of
evidence, as support for a judgment; and
in administrative cases, substantial
evidence, as basis for adjudication. In
criminal and civil actions, application of
the Rules of Court is called for, with
more or less strictness. In administrative
proceedings, however, the technical
rules of pleading and procedure, and of
evidence, are not strictly adhered to;
they generally apply only suppletorily;
indeed, in agrarian disputes application
of the Rules of Court is actually
prohibited.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a
preliminary investigation is only for the determination
of probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights
of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.

27

A preliminary investigation is defined as an

inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of
determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The quantum
of evidence now required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence sufficient
to "engender a well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of a crime
and the respondent's probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord
with the state prosecutor's findings in the
case at bar that there exists prima
facie evidence of petitioner's involvement
in the commission of the crime, it being

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

sufficiently supported by the evidence

presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's
argument that the testimonies of Galarion
and Hanopol are inadmissible as to him
since he was not granted the opportunity
of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the
accused in a preliminary investigation
has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may
present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to
submit a counter-affidavit, to examine
all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing
to
propound
clarificatory
questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity
to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if
petitioner was not given the opportunity
to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at
the time they were presented to testify
during the separate trial of the case
against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot
assert any legal right to cross-examine
them at the preliminary investigation
precisely because such right was never
available to him. The admissibility or
inadmissibility of said testimonies should
be ventilated before the trial court during
the trial proper and not in the preliminary
investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on
evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If
by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the
accused, we
find
no
compelling
justification for a strict application of
the evidentiary rules. In addition,
considering that under Section 8, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, the record of the
preliminary investigation does not form
part of the record of the case in the
Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies
of Galarion and Hanopol may not be
admitted by the trial court if not
presented in evidence by the prosecuting
fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does
present such testimonies, petitioner can
always object thereto and the trial court
can rule on the admissibility thereof; or
the petitioner can, during the trial,
petition said court to compel the
presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for
purposes
of
crossexamination. 19 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice
Velasco's dissent overlooked a vital portion of the
Court of Appeals' reasoning. This Court quoted from
the Court of Appeals' decision: ". . . [A]dmissions made
by Pealoza in his sworn statement are binding only on
him. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,

declaration or omission of another." In OMB-C-C-130313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen.

Estrada's co-respondents can in no way prejudice
Sen. Estrada. Even granting Justice Velasco's argument
that the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-130313
and
OMB-C-C-13-0397 20mentioned
the
testimonies of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents like
Tuason and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely
corroborative of the testimonies of complainants'
witnesses Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suas
and were not mentioned in isolation from the
testimonies of complainants' witnesses.
We likewise take exception to Justice Brion's assertion
that "the due process standards that at the very least
should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation are those that this Court first
articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations [Ang Tibay]." 21 Simply put, the Ang
Tibayguidelines for administrative cases do not apply
to preliminary investigations in criminal cases. An
application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary
investigations will have absurd and disastrous
consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements
of due process, which Ang Tibay described as the
"fundamental and essential requirements of due
processin trials and investigations of an administrative
character." These requirements are "fundamental and
essential" because without these, there is no due
process as mandated by the Constitution. These
"fundamental and essential requirements" cannot be
taken away by legislation because they are part of
constitutional due process.
The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further
clarified in GSIS v. CA 24 (GSIS): "what Ang Tibay failed
to explicitly state was, prescinding from the general
principles governing due process, the requirement of
an impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates
that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as
judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review
his decision on appeal." 25 The GSIS clarification
affirms
the
non-applicability
of
the Ang
Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the
role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the
investigation
and
prosecution
of
government
personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required
in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the
Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary
investigation, after conducting its own fact-finding
investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing
an information, and not to make a final adjudication of
the rights and obligations of the parties under the law,
which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang
Tibay. The
investigating
officer
investigates,
determines probable cause, and prosecutes the
criminal case after filing the corresponding
information.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make
sure
28 that the courts are not clogged with weak cases
that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person
from the travails of a needless prosecution. 26 The
Ombudsman and the prosecution service under
the control and supervision of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder,
investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the
respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously,
this procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

amplified
in GSIS. However,
there
is
nothing
unconstitutional with this procedure because this is
merely an Executive function, a part of the law
enforcement process leading to trial in court where the
requirements mandated inAng Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To now rule
that Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should apply to
preliminary investigations will mean that all past and
present preliminary investigations are in gross violation
of constitutional due process.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as
Sen. Estrada is in the present case when he filed his
Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence
cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an
accused person:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar
v. United States, while probable cause demands
more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement
of guilt.
Considering the low quantum and quality of
evidence needed to support a finding of probable
cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the
NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The
decision to call witnesses for clarificatory
questions is addressed to the sound discretion of
the investigator and the investigator alone. If the
evidence on hand already yields a probable cause,
the investigator need not hold a clarificatory
hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely
implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary
investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in
a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the
DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough
evidence had been adduced to establish probable
cause
and
clarificatory
hearing
was
unnecessary. 27
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing for the Court,
emphatically declared in Lozada v. Hernandez, 28 that
the "rights conferred upon accused persons to
participate in preliminary investigations concerning
themselves depend upon the provisions of law by
which such rights are specifically secured, rather
than upon the phrase 'due process of law'." This
reiterates Justice Jose P. Laurel's oft-quoted
pronouncement in Hashim v. Boncan 29 that "the right
to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not
constitutional." In short, the rights of a respondent in
a preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights,
not constitutional due process rights. An investigation
to determine probable cause for the filing of an
information does not initiate a criminal action so as to
trigger into operation Section 14 (2), Article III of the

Constitution. 30 It is the filing of a complaint or

information in court that initiates a criminal action. 31
The rights to due process in administrative cases as
prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
granted by the Constitution; hence, these rights
cannot be taken away by mere legislation. On the
other hand, as repeatedly reiterated by this Court,
the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a
statutory right, 32 not part of the "fundamental and
essential requirements" of due process as prescribed
in Ang
Tibay and
amplified
in GSIS. Thus,
a
preliminary investigation can be taken away by
legislation. The constitutional right of an accused to
confront the witnesses against him does not apply in
preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a
preliminary investigation be an infringement of his
right to confront the witnesses against him. 33 A
preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of
an accused under the due process clause to a fair
trial. 34
The quantum of evidence needed in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the
evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to
establish probable cause, or to establish the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to
"substantial evidence," while the establishment of
probable cause needs "only more than 'bare
suspicion,' or 'less than evidence which would
justify . . . conviction'." In the United States, from
where we borrowed the concept of probable
cause, 35 the prevailing definition of probable
cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are
not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what
must be proved.
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable
cause "is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt." McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63,
69, quoted with approval in theCarroll opinion. 267
U. S. at 161. And this "means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation" or conviction, as
Marshall, C. J., said for the Court more than a
century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339,
348. Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come
to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause
exists where "the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is
being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 162.
29
These
long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They
also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in
the community's protection. Because many situations
which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be
allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of

probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical
conception
affording
the
best
compromise that has been found for accommodating
these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would
be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the
officers' whim or caprice.
To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the
quantum of evidence required in determining
probable cause from evidence of likelihood or
probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused and
the right to a preliminary investigation. To treat them
the same will lead to absurd and disastrous
consequences. All pending criminal cases in all
courts throughout the country will have to be
remanded to the preliminary investigation level
because none of these will satisfy Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations are
conducted by prosecutors, who are the same officials
who will determine probable cause and prosecute the
cases in court. The prosecutor is hardly the impartial
tribunal contemplated in Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS. A reinvestigation by an investigating officer
outside of the prosecution service will be necessary
if Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, were to be applied.
This will require a new legislation. In the meantime, all
pending criminal cases in all courts will have to be
remanded for reinvestigation, to proceed only when a
new law is in place. To require Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to apply to preliminary investigation will
necessarily change the concept of preliminary
investigation as we know it now. Applying the
constitutional due process in Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to preliminary investigation will necessarily
require the application of the rights of an accused in
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This
means that the respondent can demand an actual
hearing and the right to cross-examine the witnesses
against him, rights which are not afforded at present
to a respondent in a preliminary investigation.
The application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
not limited to those with pending preliminary
investigations but even to those convicted by final
judgment and already serving their sentences. The rule
is well-settled that a judicial decision applies
retroactively if it has a beneficial effect on a person
convicted by final judgment even if he is already
serving his sentence, provided that he is not a habitual
criminal. 39 This Court retains its control over a case
"until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably
with
established
legal
processes." 40 Applying Ang
Tibay, as
amplified
in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will result in
thousands of prisoners, convicted by final judgment,
being set free from prison.
SUMMARY
The right of the respondent is only "to examine the
evidence submitted
by
the
complainant," as
expressly stated in Section 3 (b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the 7 May
2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman went beyond legal
duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he

specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of

some of other co-respondents.
The constitutional due process requirements
mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not
applicable to preliminary investigations which are
creations of statutory law giving rise to mere
statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary
investigations without running afoul with the
constitutional requirements of due process as
prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The
present procedures for preliminary investigations do
not comply, and were never intended to comply,
with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary
investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and
obligations
of
parties,
while
administrative
investigations governed byAng Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, so
adjudicate. Ang
Tibay, as
amplified
in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision
against the respondent in the administrative case. In
preliminary
investigations,
only likelihood
or
probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required to establish
probable cause. The respondent in an administrative
case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has
the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations,
the respondent has no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must
be impartial and
cannot
be
the
fact-finder,
investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In
preliminary investigations, the same public officer may
be the investigator and hearing officer at the same
time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing
officer may be under the control and supervision of
the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains whyAng Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary
investigations. To now declare that the guidelines
in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and
essential requirements in preliminary investigations
will render all past and present preliminary
investigations invalid for violation of constitutional due
process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation
all criminal cases now pending in all courts
throughout the country. No preliminary investigation
can proceed until a new law designates a public
officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving
sentences by final judgment would have to be released
from prison because their conviction violated
constitutional due process.

C. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE

-minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the

demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
30

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the

nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if
desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against

them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by
the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.

GUZMAN VS NU

FACTS
1.Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo
and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent
National University, seek relief from what they
describe as their school's continued and
persistent refusal to allow them to enroll due
to their participation in a said peaceful mass
action within the premises of the university
2.that such refusal violated their basic
constitutional and human rights violates their
due process.
3. that "in effect, petitioners are subjected to the
extreme penalty of expulsion without cause or
without being informed of such cause and
without being afforded the opportunity to
defend themselves.
4.University and its President claim:
1) that "petitioners' failure to enroll is due to their own
fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights;
"2) that petitioner Urbiztondo, sought to re-enroll only
on July 5, 1986 "when the enrolment period was
already closed:
"3) that as regards petitioner Guzman, and Ramacula
his "academic showing" was "poor", "due to his
activities in leading boycotts of classes"; that when his
father was notified of this development sometime in
August, 1982, the latter had demanded that his son
"reform or else we will recall him to the province";
that Guzman was one of the petitioners in "Rockie San
Juan, et al. vs. National University, et al.," at the
hearing of which on November 23, 1983 this Court had
admonished "the students involved (to) take advantage
and make the most of the opportunity given to them to
study;" that Guzman "however continued to lead or
actively participate in activities within the university
premises, conducted without prior permit from school
authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein;" that moreover, Guzman "is facing criminal
charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila (Crim. Case No. 066446) in
connection with the destruction of properties of
respondent University on September 12, 1983", and "is
also one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 8320483 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled 'National
University, Inc. vs. Rockie San Juan et al', for damages
arising from destruction of university properties";
--- that petitioners have "failures in their records,

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

(and) are not of good scholastic standing."

discipline and the corresponding

sanctions therefor must be clearly
specified and defined in writing and
made known to the students and or
their parents or guardians. Schools
shall have the authority and
prerogative to promulgate such rules
and regulations as they may deem
necessary from time to time
effective as of the date of their
promulgation
unless
otherwise
specified." 12

Petitioners'
1) Urbiztondo averred that"while he
did try to enroll that day, he also
attempted to do so several times
before that date, all to no avail,
5. Immediately apparent from a reading of
respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact
that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort
to determine whether or not petitioners-students had
indeed led or participated "in activities within the
university premises, conducted without prior permit
from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted
classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism,
coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and
other acts showing disdain for and defiance of
University authority."
6. Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for
damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief
against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more,
furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or
debarment from re-enrollment.
7. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite
this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which
students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.

But, to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary

sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The
proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross-examination is not, contrary to
petitioners' view, an essential part thereof.
There are withal minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that
(6) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;

ISSUE: WAS THE REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE STUDENTS

VIOLATIVE OF THEIR DUE PROCESS?

(7) they shall have the right to answer the

charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;

HELD. YES.

(8)

Under the Education Act of 1982, 5 the petitioners, as

students, have the right among others "to freely choose
their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except
in case of academic deficiency, or violation of
disciplinary regulations." 6 Petitioners were being
denied this right, or being disciplined, without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools 7 that "(n)o penalty
shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as
defined in . . . (the) Manual and/or in the school rules
and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due
investigation shall have been conducted." 8 This Court
is therefore constrained, as in Beria v. Philippine
Maritime Institute, 9 to declare illegal this act of
respondents of imposing sanctions on students without
due investigation.
Educational institutions of course have the power to
"adopt and enforce such rules as may be deemed
expedient for . . . (its) government, . . . (this being)"
incident to the very object of incorporation, and
indispensable to the successful management of the
31
college."
10 The rules may include those governing
student discipline. Indeed, the maintenance of "good
school discipline" is a duty specifically enjoined on
"every private school" by the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools; 11 and in this connection, the Manual
further provides that
". . . The school rules governing
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

they shall be informed of the evidence

against them;

(9) they shall have the right to adduce evidence

in their own behalf; and
(10) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the
respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to reenroll
ARIEL NON VS. JUDGE DAMES
DOCTRINE: STUDENT DOES NOT SHED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE ENTERS SCHOOL
FACTS
1.Petitioners urge the Court en banc to review
and reverse the doctrine laid down
in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of
Business Administration, et al., to the
effect that a college student, once admitted
by the school, is considered enrolled only for
one semester and, hence, may be refused
readmission after the semester is over, as
the contract between the student and the
school is deemed terminated.
2. Petitioners, students in private respondent

Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines

Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the
school for the academic year 1988-1989 for
leading or participating in student mass
actions against the school in the preceding
semester. The subject of the protests is not,
however, made clear in the pleadings.
3.Petitioners filed a petition in the court a
quo seeking their readmission or reenrollment to the school, but the trial court
APPLIED THE RULING THAT THE ruling in the
Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at
issue in this case but affirming the authority
of the school regarding admission of
students, save as a matter of compassionate
equity when any of the petitioners would,
at the least, qualify for re-enrollment, this
petition is hereby DISMISSED.
4. Petitioners' claim of lack of due process
cannot prosper in view of their failure to
specifically deny respondent's affirmative
defenses that "they were given all the
chances to air their grievances which they
were represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak"
and that on the date of the resumption of
classes at Mabini College, petitioners
continued their rally picketing, even though
without any renewal permit, physically
coercing students not to attend their
classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled
classes and depriving a great majority of
students of their right to be present in their
classes.
5. It must be noted that the petitioners waivedtheir privilege to be admitted for reenrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its
enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89. Said form specifically
states that:
The Mabini College reserves the right to
deny admission of students whose scholarship and
attendance are unsatisfactory and to require
withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits
the institution and/or whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation
of the college. Students, therefore, are required
to behave in accord with the Mabini College code
of conduct and discipline.
6.Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition
for certiorari
7.At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine
encapsuled in the following excerpt
from Alcuaz:
It is beyond dispute that a student once
admitted
by the school is considered enrolled for
32
one semester. XXX " It is thus evident that after
the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no
longer has any existing contract either with the
students or with the intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due
process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle
that contracts are respected as the law between
the contracting parties . The contract having been
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

terminated, there is no more contract to speak

of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into
another contract with said students and teachers.
"
8. Thus, although respondent judge believed himself
bound by the ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8,
1988; Rollo, pp. 12-12-A], he actually viewed the
issue as a conflict between students' rights and the
school's power to discipline them, to wit:
Students should not be denied their
constitutional and statutory right to
education, and there is such denial when
students are expelled or barred from
enrollment for the exercise of their right
to free speech and peaceable assembly and
or subjected to disciplinary action without
abiding with the requirements of due
process. Also, it is understandable for
student leaders to let loose extremely
critical and, at times, vitriolic language
against school authorities during a student
rally.
But the right of students is no license
and not without limit . . .
RULING
1.The Student Does Not Shed His
Constitutionally Protected Rights at the
Schoolgate.
Central to the democratic tradition which
we cherish is the recognition and protection of the
rights
of
free
speech
and
assembly.
Thus, our Constitutionprovides:
Sec. 4.No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government
for redress of grievances. [Art.
III.]
That the protection to the cognate rights
of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution is similarly available to students is
well-settled in our jurisdiction. In the leading case
of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21,
1984, 129 SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in anen banc decision,
declared:
The Court found the penalty imposed on
the students too severe and reduced it to a oneweek suspension.
The rule laid down in Malabanan was
applied with equal force in three other en
banc decisions of the Court. cdphil
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135
SCRA 706, the Court reiterated that the exercise
of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis
for barring students from enrolling. It enjoined the

school and its officials from acts of surveillance,

blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll.
But the Court allowed the non-enrollment of
students who clearly incurred marked academic
deficiency, with the following caveat:
In Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137
SCRA 94, a case arising from almost the same facts
as those inMalabanan, the Court rejected "the
infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of
denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of
senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of
the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly, improper conduct could be attributed to
them." [At p. 98].
In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No.
68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent
school was directed to allow the petitioning
students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with
their respective courses, without prejudice to any
disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in
connection with their participation in the protests
that led to the stoppage of classes.

2.Permissible Limitations on Student

Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the
School.
While the highest regard must be afforded
the exercise of the rights to free speech and
assembly, this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are virtually powerless to
discipline students. This was made clear by the
Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, 393 US 503,
514: "But conduct by the student, in class or out of
it, which for any reason whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech."
But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process. Thus:
There are withal minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
33 (3) they shall be informed of the evidence

against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

designated by the school authorities to hear

and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].
Moreover, the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense committed. As
stated in Malabanan, "[i]f the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed
and sanction imposed is not followed, an element
of arbitrariness intrudes." [At p. 371].
3.The Nature of the Contract Between a
School and its Student.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision
on the "termination of contract" theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract
between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given
by the Constitution to education and the grant
to the State of supervisory and regulatory
powers over all educational institutions [See Art.
XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
Respondent school cannot justify its
actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides
that "[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling . . . for the entire
semester for collegiate courses," which the Court
in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that
his contract, which has a term of one semester,
has already expired.
However, these should not be taken to
mean that no disciplinary action could have been
taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if
the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's
ruling in Malabanan, petitioners could have been
subjected
to
disciplinary
proceedings
in
connection with the February 1988 mass actions.
But the penalty that could have been imposed
must be commensurate to the offense committed
and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed
only after the requirements of procedural due
process have been complied with. This is explicit
from the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, which provides inParagraph 145 that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except
for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the
schools rules and regulations duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings
and the imposition of administrative sanctions
have become moot and academic. Petitioners,
who have been refused readmission or reenrollment and who have been effectively
excluded from respondent school for four (4)
semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline
they might have committed when they led and
participated in the mass actions that, according to
respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes.
To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings
would serve no useful purpose and would only
further aggravate the strained relations between
petitioners and the officials of respondent school
which necessarily resulted from the heated legal

battle here, in the Court of Appeals and before

the trial court.

adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present

is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Ang

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988
and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED.
Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit
and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners, if
they are still so minded, without prejudice to its
taking the appropriate action as to petitioners
Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon
and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records
(Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the
school's prescribed academic standards.
SO ORDERED.
|||
ADMU VS CAPULONG
FACTS
1. Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of
Petitioner University, died of serious physical
injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido
Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol
Medical Center for acute renal failure
occasioned by the serious physical injuries
inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
2. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to
investigate and submit a report within 72 hours
on the circumstances surrounding the death of
Lennie Villa.
3. Said notice also required respondent students to
submit their written statements within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to filea reply.
4. The Investigating Committee, after receiving
the written statements and hearing the
testimonies of several witness, found a prima
facie case against respondent students for
violation of Rule 3 of the Law
School Catalogue entitled "Discipline.
5. " Respondent students were then required
to file their written answers to the formal
charge.
6. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to
hear the charges against respondent students.
The Board found respondent students guilty of
violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits
participation in hazing activities
7. Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on
all respondent students.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since
they are currently enrolled. This was granted
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the
respondent
students.
34

Held: There was no denial of due process, more

particularly procedural due process. Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the
incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.
The nature and cause of the accusation were
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

tibay

case

bs

Guzman

Case

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process

is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case 25 and not
the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar.
Though both cases essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals
specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied
in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence
in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide
the case.26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above
requirements were not met. When, in view of the
death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo,
as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written
statement on the incident, 27 the records show that
instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of
the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991
notice duly submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an
extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their
statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation
were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices
dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted
that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule
No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed
individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20
clearly show that respondent students were given
ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf
and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when,
from the very start of the investigations before the
Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the
law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates
put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students

Issue: Whether or not the students can still be re

admitted. Their right to due process were violated
because they were not allowed to cross examine the
resource persons.
Q: cross examination essential?
A: the right to confrontation is not part of due process
in school administrative proceedings. Right may be
invoked only is to demand for the presentation of the

evidence held against them. Right to rebut but not

cross examine.
Requirements of due process in school administrative
proceedings
1. Right to answer the charges against them with
the assistance of a counsel Q: With the
assistance of counsel? A: If so desired. Optional
not mandatory. Not unlike in custodial
investigation when a presence of a counsel is
indispensable. 2. Students must be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against
them. (must be informed in writing) 3. Right to
adduce evidence. 4. Evidence must be duly
considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case. 5. Informed of the
evidence.
UP VS LIGOT-TELAN
FACTS: THE UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the
penalties of suspension for one year, non-issuance of
any certificate of good moral character during the
suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed
the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest
per annum and non issuance of his transcript of records
until he has settled his financial obligations with the
university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally
rendering a guilty verdict on Nadals alleged willfull
withholding of the following information in his
application for scholarship tantamount to acts of
dishonesty, viz: (1) that he has and maintains a car and
(2) the income of his mother in the USA in support of
the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he
was not afforded due process when, after the Board
Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in
a decision of NOT GUILTY in his favor, the Chairman
of the UP Board of Regents, without notice to the
petitioner, called another meeting the following day to
deliberate
on
the
Chairmans
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision
of GUILTY. Upon petition, Nadal was granted his
action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Nadal was denied due process.
HELD: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the
instant case with the sending of notice of the March
29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require
the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose
cases are included as items on the agenda of the
Board. At no time did respondent complain of lack of
notice given to him to attend any of the regular and
special BOR meetings where his case was up for
deliberation. Let it not be forgotten that respondent
aspires to join the ranks of professionals who would
uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail.
Nadal has sufficiently proven to have violated his
undertaking to divulge all information needed when he
applied for the benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal
cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as
basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasijudiciall proceedings, only substantial evidence is
required,
that which means a reasonable mind might
35
accept a relevant evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion.
CASE OF NON VS DAMES VS CASE AT BAR
Attention is drawn to the disparate factual
environments obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the
instant case. In the former case, the students were
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

refused admission for having led or participated in

student mass actions against the school, thereby posing
a collision between constitutionally cherished rights
freedom of expression and academic freedom. In the
case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having breached
the University's disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the
Court ruled that the students were not afforded due
process for even the refusal to re-enroll them
appeared to have been a mere afterthought on part of
the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not
dispute the fact that his right to due process was held
inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on March 29,
1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.
D. DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
LAO GI VS CA

Facts:
2. Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue
of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However,
this was revoked when his fathers citizenship was
cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation.
3. Manuel Chias case of falsification of
public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen.
He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real
property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that
Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be
contravened by Opinion 147.
4. After the acquittal in the falsification, they were
charged with deportation for refusal to register as
aliens, as ordered by the Commissioner of
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
ISSUE. CAN COMMISSIONER OF CID ORDER CHIAS
TO REGISTER AS ALIENS WITHOUT A HEARING?
HELD. NO.

The petitioners question the Order of Acting

Commissioner Nituda that they register as aliens as
required by the Immigration Act. While it is not
disputed that it is also within the power and authority
of the Commissioner to require an alien to so register,
such a requirement must be predicated on a positive
finding that the person who is so required is an alien.
In this case where the very citizenship of the
petitioners is in issue there should be a previous
determination by the CID that they are aliens before
the petitioners may be directed and required to
register as aliens.
The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It
is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. 1It is a police measure against undesirable aliens
whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to
the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. 2
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake
of the nature of a criminal action, however,
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such
person to due process should not be denied. Thus,
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to
deportation proceedings.
Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 as amended, it is provided:
c No alien shall be deported without being informed of
the specific grounds for deportation nor without being
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be

prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the
acts or omissions complained of which must be
stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a
person of common understanding to know on what
ground he is intended to be deported and enable the
CID to pronounce a proper judgment. 3
Before any charge should be filed in the CID a
preliminary investigation must be conducted to
determine if there is a sufficient cause to charge the
respondent for deportation. 4 The issuance of warrants
of arrest, arrests without warrant and service of warrants
should be in accordance likewise with Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; 5search warrants
issued by the CID shall be governed by Rule 126 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; 6 and so the matter of
bail, motion to quash, and trial, 7 among others. Fealty to
the prescribed rules of procedure in deportation cases
shall insure a speedy, fair and just dispensation of
justice.
The Court takes note of the fact that a private
prosecutor is assisting in the prosecution of the case
by the special prosecutor of the CID. The Court sees
no reason why a private prosecutor should be
allowed to participate in a deportation case. Under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
Section 16, Rule 110 thereof, an offended party may
intervene in a criminal prosecution when there is civil
liability arising from the criminal action claimed by
said party. In such case he may intervene by counsel.
In deportation cases, the Court cannot conceive of
any justification for a private party to have any right to
intervene. Even if such party can establish any
damages due him arising from the deportation charge
against the alien, such relief cannot be afforded him
in the deportation proceeding. His recourse if at all is
in the ordinary courts. Thus the Court rules that the
intervention of a private prosecutor should not be
allowed in deportation cases. The possibility of
oppression, harrassment and persecution cannot be
discounted. The deportation of an alien is the sole
concern of the State. This is the reason why there are
special prosecutors and fiscals tasked to prosecute
such cases.
DOMINGO VS SCHEER
FACTS
1. Respondent Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a native
of Ochsenfurt, Germany, was a frequent visitor
of the Philippines.
2. On July 18, 1986, his application for permanent
resident status was granted. [4] The Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued in
favor of the respondent Alien Certificate of
Registration and Immigration Certificate of
Residence
3. The Commissioner stated that the granting of
the petition would redound to the benefit of
36
the Filipino people.
4. During his sojourn in the Philippines, the
respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes
with whom he had two daughters. They had a
son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away on
November 13, 1995.
5. They resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan,
where the respondent established and
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

managed the Bavaria Restaurant.

6. On May 21, 1991, he was appointed Confidential
Agent by then NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim
7. BOC ISSUED A SUMMARY ORDER OF DEPORTATION
AGAINST
SCHEER
ON
ACCOUNT
OF
INFORMATION FROM THE GERMAN EMBASSY
THAT SCHEER IS WANTED IN GERMANY AND IS
WANTED BY THE GERMAN POLICE
8. BID ALLOWED MR SCHEER TO STAY IN THE PHIL,
AND SECURE NEEDED PAPERS
9. SCHEER filed a motion for reconideration on the
Deportation Order, but was not resolved
10. When Commission Domingo was appointed in
CID, she asked the German Embassy regarding
such, and found that Scheer was not really
wanted by the German Police, (April 2002)
11. Around midnight of June 2002, Scheer was
arrested and was detained while waiting for
deportation.
RULING
On the Solicitor Generals fourth and fifth
arguments, we are convinced that the BOC committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in issuing its Summary Deportation Order
and Omnibus Resolution, and that the petitioner
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in causing the arrest and
detention of the private respondent.
The settled rule is that the entry or stay of
aliens in the Philippines is merely a privilege and a
matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute nor
permanent and may be revoked. However, aliens
may be expelled or deported from the Philippines
only on grounds and in the manner provided for by
the Constitution, the Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant
thereto. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,[66] we held,
thus:
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law a part of the law of Nation. And in a
resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at
its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to
life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was
there resolved that All human beings are born free and
equal in degree and rights (Art. 1); that Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or
other status (Art. 2); that Every one has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
(Art. 9); etc.
In this case, the BOC ordered the private
respondents deportation on September 27, 1995
without even conducting summary deportation
proceedings. The BOC merely relied on the June 29,
1995 Letter of the German Vice Consul and of the
German Embassys Note Verbale No. 369/95 dated July
26, 1995. It issued the Summary Deportation Order on
September 27, 1995 allegedly under paragraph 3 of
Office Memorandum Order No. 34 dated August 21,

1989 which reads:

3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the
alien or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the
alien loses the privilege to remain in the country,
under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann vs. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461, 30
May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates
deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of
Commissioners may issue summary judgment of
deportation which shall be immediately executory.
However, as gleaned from the Summary
Deportation Order, the respondent was ordered
deported not only because his passport had already
expired; the BOC speculated that the respondent
committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in the
Philippines and would not, thus, be issued a new
passport. This, in turn, caused the BOC to conclude
that the respondent was an undesirable alien. Section
37(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
provides that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of
the specific grounds for deportation or without being
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Under paragraphs 4 and 5 of Office Memorandum
Order No. 34, an alien cannot be deported unless he is
given a chance to be heard in a full deportation
hearing, with the right to adduce evidence in his
behalf, thus:
4. All other cases shall be tried in full deportation
hearing, with due observance of the pertinent
provisions of Law Instruction No. 39.
5. In all cases, the right of the alien to be informed of
the charges against him, to be notified of the time and
place of hearing, when necessary, to examine the
evidence against him, and to present evidence in his
own behalf, where appropriate, shall be observed.
The respondent was not afforded any hearing at
all. The BOC simply concluded that the respondent
committed insurance fraud and illegal activities in
Palawan without any evidence. The respondent was not
afforded a chance to refute the charges. He cannot,
thus, be arrested and deported without due process of
law as required by the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution.In Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals,[67] we held
that:
Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of
the nature of a criminal action, however, considering
that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative
proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a
person, the constitutional right of such person to due
process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of
the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on
criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.
37
It must be noted that the respondent was a
permanent resident before his passport expired on July
2, 1995. In Chew v. Colding,[68] the United States
Federal Supreme Court ruled:
It is well established that if an alien is a lawful
permanent resident of the United States and remains
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

physically present there, he is a person within the

protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be
deprived of his life, liberty or property without due
process of law. Although it later may be established, as
respondents contend, that petitioner can be expelled
and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled
to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at
least before an executive or administrative tribunal.
Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his
expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may
expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be
heard.
As Mr. Justice Murphy said in his concurring
opinion in Bridges v. Wixon:[69]
The Bill of Rights belongs to them as well as to all
citizens. It protects them as long as they reside within
the boundaries of our land. It protects them in the
exercise of the great individual rights necessary to a
sound political and economic democracy.
According to Vattal,[70] an alien who is a
permanent resident in a country is a member of the
new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is
a kind of citizen of inferior order from the native
citizens; but is, nevertheless, limited and subject to
the society, without participating in all its advantages.
Sir Robert Philconse called them de facto, though
not de jure citizens of the country of their domicile.[71]
Such permanent resident[72] may be classified as
a denizen, a kind of middle state between alien and a
natural-born subject and partakes of both.
Paraphrasing Justice Brewer in his dissenting opinion
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,[73] when the right to
liberty and residence is involved, some other
protection than the mere discretion of the petitioner
or the BOC is required. We recall the warning of the
United States Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States:
[74]

Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their

first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed. A close and
literal construction deprives them of half their
efficacy, and leads to a gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in
substance. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto
should be obsta principiis.
In sum, the arrest and detention of the
respondent and his deportation under the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC for insurance fraud and
illegal activities in Palawan violated his constitutional
and statutory rights to due process.

E. FIXING OF RATES AND REGULATION OF

PROFESSIONS
PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ
FACTS
1. Herein petitioner, Philippine Comunication
Satellite Corp (PHILCOMSAT) is engaged in
providing
for
services
involving

2.

3.
4.

5.

telecommunications, granted with a franchise

by RA 5514
Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent
Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which
granted the NTC the power to fix rates.
Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.
PHILCOMSAT argues that (a) the questioned
order violates procedural due process for
having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes
is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus
constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.|||
Petitioner argues that the function involved in
the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory
and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi-legislative;
thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the
absence thereof results in a violation of due
process.|||
Issue: Whether
or
Not
E.O.
546
is
unconstitutional for violating the due process
of
the
petitioner?
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the
application of a policy like the fixing of rates
as exercised by administrative bodies is quasijudicial rather than quasi-legislative. But
respondents contention that notice and
hearing are not required since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and temporary in nature is
erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service
Act, providing for the proceedings of the
Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates
that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon
proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject
to the exceptions, limitations or saving
provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing,
respondent has no authority to make such
order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent,
and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or
upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case.

4. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND

HEARING NECESSARY EVEN IF THE ORDER IS
TEMPORARY IN NATURE. While respondents
may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner,
such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may
be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing,
as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it
may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an
38
order as temporary in nature does not perforce
entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be
applied to any other order on the same matter
unless otherwise provided by the applicable
law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory
provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service
Act which provides: "Section 16. Proceedings of
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

the Commission, upon notice and hearing.

The Commission shall have power, upon proper
notice and hearing in accordance with the rules
and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and
determine individual or joint rates, . . . which
shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service; . . . ."|
RATE-FIXING POWER; STANDARDS REQUIRED; MAY BE
IMPLIED. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power,
the only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of
an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. The inherent power and
authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to
regulate the rates charged by public utilities should be
subject always to the requirement that the rates so
fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no
power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to
regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of
reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not
be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be
oppressive. What is a just and reasonable rate is not a
question of formula but of sound business judgment
based upon the evidence; it is a question of fact calling
for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair,
enlightened and independent judgment. In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to
consider the given situation, requirements and
opportunities of the utility. A method often employed
in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon
the value of the property to the public utility.
Competition is also a very important factor in
determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier
is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet
competition. (Mla. Railroad Co. vs. A.L. Ammon Trans.
Co. Inc. 218 Phil. 900 (1920)|||
RADIOCOM VS NTC AND PLDT
FACTS
1.On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT
filed
an
application
with
respondent
Commission for the Approval of Rates for
Digital Transmission Service Facilities
2.

On January 25, 1984, the respondent

Commission provisionally approved and set the
case for hearing within the prescribed 30-day
period allowed by law.

3. the respondent Commission issued a notice of

hearing, setting private respondent PLDT's
application for hearing on February 22, 1984 at
9:30 o'clock in the morning
4. In the aforementioned notice of hearing, herein
petitioners except Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation were not included in
the list of affected parties
5. petitioner PT & T Co., along with other
petitioners alleged that neither respondent
Commission nor private respondent PLDT
informed them of the existence of this
provisional authority
6.Petitioners

raised

that

THE

RESPONDENT

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND
HEARING WHEN ITS APPLICATION IS NOT FOR
RATE APPROVAL BUT FOR AUTHORITY TO
ENGAGE
IN
SERVICES
OUTSIDE
ITS
FRANCHISES.
7. Petitioners further claimed that PLDT is limited
by its legislative franchise to render only
"radiotelephonic
services,"
exclusive
of
"radiotelegraphic
or
record
services."
Therefore, the issuance of the provisional
authority by the respondent Commission
without notice and hearing constitutes grave
abuse of discretion
8. respondent PLDT maintains that the act of the
respondent Commission in having issued its
order of January 25, 1984 is a valid exercise of
its jurisdiction considering that the franchise of
PLDT authorizes it to operate not only
telephone system, domestic and international,
but also transmission service facilities. In fact,
PLDT pointed out that petitioners themselves
with the exception of CLAVECILLA had been
actual users of PLDT lines or channels for data
transmission.

ISSUE: DID RESPONDENT VIOLATE PETITIONERS RIGHT

TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT DID NOT GIVE THEM PROPER
NOTICE OF THE HEARING?
1. PUBLIC SERVICE ACT (C.A. No. 161); PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION; EMPOWERED TO APPROVE PROVISIONALLY,
RATES OF UTILITIES WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF
PUBLIC HEARING. Section 16(c) of the Public Service
Act (CA No. 146) provides for the fixing of rates, by the
Commission, which shall be imposed and observed by
any public service. The Public Service Commission
found that the application involved in the present
petition is actually an application for approval of rates
for digital transmission service facilities which it may
approve provisionally and without the necessity of any
notice and hearing as provided in the above-quoted
provision of law. Well-settled is the rule that the Public
Service Commission now is empowered to approve
provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of
a prior hearing (Republic v. Medina, 41 SCRA 643
[1971]). Under the Public Service Act, as amended (CA
No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the
NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's
investment to be effective immediately, without
hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, CA 146, as amended;
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC, 131
SCRA 260 [1984]). Further, the Public Service Act makes
no distinction between initial or revised rates. These
rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the
Commission approves them (Republic v. Medina, supra).
39
Moreover,
the Commission can hear and approve
revised rates without published notices or hearing. The
reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional
rates are by their nature temporary and subject to
adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates
approved after final hearing (Republic v. Medina,
supra; Cordero v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. No.
83931, November 3, 1988, En Banc, Minute Resolution)
and it was so stated in the case at bar, in the National
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

Telecommunications Commission's order of January 25,

1984.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC UTILITY, ENTITLED TO JUST
COMPENSATION AND FAIR RETURN UPON THE VALUE OF
ITS PROPERTY. The Commission did not grant the
PLDT any authority to engage in any new
communication service, but merely approved
provisionally PLDT's proposed revision of its then
authorized schedule of rates for the lease on availment
by end-users of the digital full period leased lines or
channels for data transmission which said company
acquired, installed, and presently maintain in
serviceable condition, a relief well within its power to
grant. Undoubtedly, a public utility is entitled to a just
compensation and a fair return upon the value of its
property while it is being used in public service (Phil.
Shipowners' Ass'n. v. Public Utility Commissioner, 43
Phil. 328).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF NOTICE TO PARTIES
AFFECTED; DEEMED CURED IN CASE AT BAR. As to
the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent
Commission to give personal notice to all parties
affected, not all of them being known to it. More than
that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was
published and as admitted by petitioners, one of them
received the notice which in turn informed the others.
In fact, the petitioners have timely opposed the
petition in question, so that lack of notice was deemed
cured. Under the circumstances, the Commission may
be deemed to have substantially complied with the
requirements (Matienzo v. Abellera, 162 SCRA 1
[1987]).
4. ID.; ID.; REGULATES MAXIMUM RATE FIXED IN A
FRANCHISE; RATIONALE. The maximum rate fixed in
a franchise which its holder is authorized to collect, is
always subject to a revision and regulation by the
Public Service Commission (now NTC). For if such
maximum rate is not subject to alteration, the power
of the Commission to review would be rendered
nugatory, as it cannot be said that the power to revise
may be exercised only where the franchise does not
impose a limitation (Manila Gas Corporation v. De Vera,
et al., 70 Phil. 321 [1940]). Therefore, the authority of
the Commission to issue ex parte a provisional permit
to operate proposed public service is not absolute but
is based on the superior and imperative necessity of
meeting an urgent public need (Veneracion v. Congson
Ice Plant & Cold Storage, Inc., 52 SCRA 119 [1973]). It
is the duty of the PSC, (now NTC) to see to the needs
and interest of the public (Dizon v. PSC, 50 SCRA 500
[1973]).
GLOBE TELECOM VS NTC
FACTS
1. Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc
(Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to
effect the interconnection of their SMS or
texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom,
Inc.
2. (Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects
in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the
case. It also pointed out that another network,
Islacom, was allowed to provide such service
without prior NTC approval.
3. The National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were
equally blameworthy and issued an Order
penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS
under Value Added Services (VAS) without

prior approval from the NTC. The Court of

Appeals sustained the NTC Order.
NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the
definition of "value-added service" or "enhancedservice" given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95
(MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS
interconnection is mandatory pursuant to Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 59. 23
The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have
been providing SMS without authority from it, in
violation of Section 420(f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which
requires PTEs intending to provide value-added
services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC
through an administrative process.
ISSUE: IS THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?
HELD. YES
The initial controversy may have involved a different
subject matter, interconnection, which is no longer
contested. It cannot be denied though that the findings
and penalty now assailed before us was premised on
the same exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, it is not
relevant to this case that the process for obtaining
prior approval under the PTA and its Implementing
Rules is administrative in nature. While this may be so,
the assailed NTC's determination and corresponding
penalty were rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions. Therefore, all the requirements of due
process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial
power apply to the present case. Among them are the
seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable cases
before administrative tribunals, as enumerated in Ang
Tibay v. CIR. 73 They are synthesized in a subsequent
case, as follows:

40

There are cardinal primary rights

which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The
first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. Not only
must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision.
Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. The decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. 74

NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe

in the promulgation of the assailed Order.
First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the

reasons for the decision rendered.
Our earlier discussion pertained to the lack of clear
legal basis for classifying SMS as VAS, owing to the
failure of the NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations
to that effect. Muddled as the legal milieu governing
SMS already is, NTC's attempt to apply its confusing
standards in the case of Globe and Smart is even more
disconcerting. The very rationale adopted by the NTC
in its Order holding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy.
Astoundingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
rationale bereft of intelligent inquiry, much less
comment. Stated in full, the relevant portion of the
NTC Order reads:
. . . Getting down [to] the nittygritty, Globe's SMS involves the
transmission of data over its CMTS
which is Globe's basic service. SMS is
not ordinarily provided by a CMTS
operator like Globe, and since SMS
enhances Globe's CMTS, SMS fits in to
a nicety [sic] with the definition of
"value-added-service" or "enhancedservice" under NTC Memorandum
Circular [8]-9-95 (Rule 001, Item
[15]). 75
The Court usually accords great respect to the
technical findings of administrative agencies in the
fields of their expertise, even if they are infelicitously
worded. However, the above-quoted "finding" is
nothing more than bare assertions, unsupported by
substantial evidence. 76 The Order reveals that no
deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what
its provisioning entails. In fact, the Court is unable to
find how exactly does SMS "fits into a nicety" with
NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95, which defines "enhanced
services" as analogous to "format, media conversion,
encryption, enhanced security features, computer
processing, and the like." 77 The NTC merely notes
that SMS involves the "transmission of data over [the]
CMTS," a phraseology that evinces no causal relation to
the definition in M.C. No. 8-9-95. Neither did the NTC
endeavor to explain why the "transmission of data"
necessarily classifies SMS as a VAS.
In fact, if "the transmission of data over [the] CMTS" is
to be reckoned as the determinative characteristic of
SMS, it would seem that this is already sufficiently
covered by Globe and Smart's respective legislative
franchises. 78 Smart is authorized under its legislative
franchise to establish and operate integrated
telecommunications/computer/electronic services for
public domestic and international
communications, 79 while Globe is empowered to
establish and operate domestic telecommunications,
and stations for transmission and reception of
messages by means of electricity, electromagnetic
waves or any kind of energy, force, variations or
impulses, whether conveyed by wires, radiated through
space or transmitted through other media and for the
handling of any and all types of telecommunications
services. 80
The question of the proper legal classification of VAS is
uniquely technical, tied as at is to the scientific and
technological application of the service or feature.
Owing to the dearth of substantive technical findings
and data from the NTC on which a judicial review may
reasonably be premised, it is not opportunely proper

for the Court to make its own technical evaluation of

VAS, especially in relation to SMS. Judicial fact-finding
of the de novo kind is generally abhorred and the shift
of decisional responsibility to the judiciary is not
favored as against the substantiated and specialized
determination of administrative agencies. 81 With
greater reason should this be the standard for the
exercise of judicial review when the administrative
agency concerned has not in the first place come out
with a technical finding based on evidence, as in this
case.
Yet at the same time, this absence of substantial
evidence in support of the finding that SMS is VAS
already renders reversible that portion of the
NTC Order.
Moreover, the Order does not explain why the NTC was
according the VAS offerings of Globe and Smart a
different regulatory treatment from that of Islacom.
Indeed, to this day, NTC has not offered any sensible
explanation why Islacom was accorded to a less
onerous regulatory requirement, nor have they
compelled Islacom to suffer the same burdens as Globe
and Smart.
While stability in the law, particularly in the business
field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC
slavishly follow precedent. 82 However, we think it
essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual
honesty, that if an administrative agency decides
inconsistently with previous action, that it explain
thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if
need be, why the previous standards should no longer
apply or should be overturned. 83 Such explanation is
warranted in order to sufficiently establish a decision
as having rational basis. 84 Any inconsistent decision
lacking thorough, ratiocination in support may be
struck down as being arbitrary. And any decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. 85
Second. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to
present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of
VAS and the prior approval.
Another disturbing circumstance attending this petition
is that until the promulgation of the
assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed
of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior
authority was at all an issue for consideration. As a
result, neither Globe or Smart was afforded an
opportunity to present evidence in their behalf on that
point.
NTC asserts that since Globe and Smart were required
to submit their respective Certificates of Public
Convenience and Necessity and franchises, the parties
were sufficiently notified that the authority to operate
such service was a matter which NTC could look into.
This is wrong-headed considering the governing law
and regulations. It is clear that before NTC could
penalize Globe and Smart for unauthorized provision of
SMS, it must first establish that SMS is VAS. Since there
41
was
no express rule or regulation on that question,
Globe and Smart would be well within reason if they
submitted evidence to establish that SMS was not VAS.
Unfortunately, no such opportunity arose and no such
arguments were raised simply because Globe and
Smart were not aware that the question of their
authority to provide SMS was an issue at all. Neither
could it be said that the requisite of prior authority
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

was indubitable under the existing rules and

regulations. Considering the prior treatment towards
Islacom, Globe (and Smart, had it chosen to do so) had
every right to rely on NTC's disposal of Islacom's
initiative and to believe that prior approval was not
necessary.

Neither was the matter ever raised during the hearings

conducted by NTC on Smart's petition. This claim has
been repeatedly invoked by Globe. It is borne out by
the records or the absence thereof. NTC could have
easily rebuffed this claim by pointing to a definitive
record. Yet strikingly, NTC has not asserted that the
matter of Globe's authority was raised in any pleading
or proceeding. In fact, Globe in its Consolidated
Reply before this Court challenged NTC to produce the
transcripts of the hearings it conducted to prove that
the issue of Globe's authority to provide SMS was put in
issue. The Court similarly ordered the NTC to produce
such transcripts. 86NTC failed to produce any. 87
The opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the
administrative process, as decisions must be rendered
on the evidence presented, either in the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. 88 The requirement that agencies
hold hearings in which parties affected by the agency's
action can be represented by counsel may be viewed as
an effort to regularize this struggle for advantage
within a legislative adversary framework. 89 It
necessarily follows that if no evidence is procured
pertinent to a particular issue, any eventual resolution
of that issue on substantive grounds despite the
absence of evidence is flawed. Moreover, if the parties
did have evidence to counter the ruling but were
wrongfully denied the opportunity to offer the
evidence, the result would be embarrassing on the
adjudicator.
Thus, the comical, though expected, result of a
definitive order which is totally unsupported by
evidence. To this blatant violation of due process, this
Court stands athwart.
Third. The imposition of fine is void for violation of
due process.
The matter of whether NTC could have imposed the
fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily
related to due process considerations. Since this
question would also call to fore the relevant provisions
of the Public Service Act, it deserves its own extensive
discussion.
Globe claims that the issue of its authority to operate
SMS services was never raised as an issue in
the Complaint filed against it by Smart. Nor did NTC
ever require Globe to justify its authority to operate
SMS services before the issuance of the Order imposing
the fine.
CORONA BS UHPAP
SYNOPSIS
1. July 15, 1992, PPA General Manager Rogelio A.
Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the
term of Appointment of harbor pilots to one (1)
year subject to renewal or cancellation by the

authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of

the appointee's performance.
2. Respondents, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas,
questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and
Communication, but they were informed by the
Department Secretary that the matter of
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's
administrative issuances lies exclusively with
its Board of Directors as its governing body.
3. Respondents appealed to the Office of the
President which ordered the PPA to hold in
abeyance the implementation of the
administrative order. However, the Office of
the President through then Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona
dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the
restraining order issued earlier.
4. The trial court ruled that herein petitioners
have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
PPA AO No. 04-92 including its implementing
memoranda.
5. The trial court also declared the administrative
order null and void and permanently enjoined
its implementation. Hence, herein petitioners
elevated the case to the Court on certiorari.
ISSUE: IS THE ORDER UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
VIOLATING DUE PROCESS?
HELD. YES.
The Supreme Court ruled that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was
issued in utter disregard of respondent's right against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
The Court held that the provision limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots unduly restricts the right
of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their
retirement. Renewal of the license is now dependent
on a rigid evaluation of performance which is
conducted only after the license has been canceled.
Hence, the use of the term "renewal." It is the "preevaluation" cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO
No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In
a real sense, it is deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Petition denied.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PPA-AO NO.
04-92; DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THE PREEVALUATION CANCELLATION OF THE HARBOR PILOTS'
LICENSES IS WHAT PRIMARILY MAKES THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER UNREASONABLE AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM; IT CONSTITUTES
42
DEPRIVATION
OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 0492 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In
the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing
that after passing five examinations and undergoing
years of on-the-job training, they would have a license
which they could use until their retirement, unless
sooner revoked by the PPA for mental or physical
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to

contend with an annual cancellation of their license
which can be temporary or permanent depending on
the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran
pilots and neophytes alike are suddenly confronted
with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end
of that period. Renewal of their license is now
dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance"
which is conducted only after the license has already
been canceled. Hence, the use of the term "renewal."
It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily
makes PPA-AO No. 04-92 unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
2. ID.; ID.; AN UNNECESSARY ENACTMENT; SINCE THE
LAW ADDS NOTHING NEW OR SUBSTANTIAL IT MUST BE
STRUCK DOWN. The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 0492 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPAAO No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents
are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a
"surplusage" and, therefore an unnecessary enactment.
PPA-AO 03-85 is a comprehensive order setting forth
the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services,
the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and
removal of harbor pilots matters which are
duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or
substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.

RULING
After carefully examining the records and deliberating
on the arguments of the parties, the Court is convinced
that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents' right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. Consequently, the instant
petition must be denied.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known
as the "due process clause" of the Constitution, viz.:
"SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, . . ."
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two
conditions must concur, namely, that there is a
deprivation and that such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks of
due process of law, however, a distinction must be
made between matters of procedure and matters of
substance. In essence, procedural due process "refers
to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced," while substantive due process "requires that
the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the
law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and
just." 14 PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be examined in light
of this distinction. prLL
Respondents argue that due process was not observed
in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because
no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant
government agencies" and the pilots themselves could
ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to
the procedural aspect of the enactment. Fortunately,
the Court has maintained a clear position in this

regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case

of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, 15 where it declared that
"(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of."
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No.
04-92 no less than four times 16 before the matter was
finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on
this score, however, fail to persuade. While
respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast
Guard, "which issues the licenses of pilots after
administering the pilots' examinations," was not
consulted, 17 the facts show that the MARINA, which
took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast
Guard, was duly represented in the Board of Directors
of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that,
there being no matters of naval defense involved in the
issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine
Coast Guard need not be consulted. 18
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were
not consulted in any way taint the validity of the
administrative order. As a general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirements of
procedural due process, are essential only when an
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply
with the requirements of notice and hearing. 19
Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole
and exclusive right to the exercise of harbor pilotage
by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said
right has become vested and can only be "withdrawn or
shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of
due process of law. Their argument has thus shifted
from the procedural to one of substance. It is here
where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set
by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has
taken on the nature of a property right. Even
petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his
March 17, 1993, decision that "(t)he exercise of one's
profession falls within the constitutional guarantee
against wrongful deprivation of, or interference with,
property rights without due process." 20 He merely
expressed the opinion that "(i)n the limited context of
this case PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful
interference with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of,
the property rights of those affected thereby, and that
"PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates,
the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession." As
will be presently demonstrated, such supposition is
gravely erroneous and tends to perpetuate an
administrative order which is not only unreasonable
but
43 also superfluous.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced
only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "the
granting of license especially to practice a profession."
It is also "the system of granting licenses (as for
professional practice) in accordance with established
standards." 21 A license is a right or permission granted
by some competent authority to carry on a business or
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

do an act which, without such license, would be

illegal. 22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice
their profession, they literally have to pass through the
proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one
but fiveexaminations, each followed by actual training
and practice. Thus, the court a quo observed:
"Petitioners (herein respondents)
contend, and the respondents (herein
petitioners) do not deny, that here
(sic) in this jurisdiction, before a
person can be a harbor pilot, he must
pass five (5) government professional
examinations, namely, (1) For Third
Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice on board a vessel
for at least a year; (2) For Second
Mate and after which he must work,
train and practice for at least a year;
(3) For chief Mate and after which he
must work, train and practice for at
least a year; (4) For a Master Mariner
and after which he must work as
Captain of vessels for at least two (2)
years to qualify for an examination
to be a pilot; and finally, of course,
that given for pilots."
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment
which allows them to engage in pilotage until they
retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under
the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, "(a)ll existing regular
appointments which have been previously issued by the
Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to
31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from
date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation
by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of
performance."
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly
restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the
past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that
after passing five examinations and undergoing years of
on-the-job training, they would have a license which
they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness.
Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an
annual cancellation of their license which can be
temporary or permanent depending on the outcome of
their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and
neophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-year
terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that
period. Renewal of their license is now dependent on a
"rigid evaluation of performance" which is conducted
only after the license has already been cancelled.
Hence, the use of the term "renewal " It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO
No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In
a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.

The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No.
08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO No. 03-85, which
is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing

out that PPA-AO No. 04-92 is a "surplusage" 23 and,

therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is
a comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct
of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." It
provides, inter alia, for the qualification,
appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and
removal of harbor pilots matters which are
duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memorandum order. Since it adds nothing new or
substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Finally, respondents' insinuation that then PPA General
Manager Dayan was responsible for the issuance of the
questioned administrative order may have some factual
basis; after all, power and authority were vested in his
office to propose rules and regulations. The trial
court's finding of animosity between him and private
respondents might likewise have a grain of truth. Yet
the number of cases filed in court between private
respondents and Dayan, including cases which have
reached this Court cannot certainly be considered the
primordial reason for the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, Dayan should
be presumed to have acted in accordance with law and
the best of professional motives. In any event, his
actions are certainly always subject to scrutiny by
higher administrative authorities.

F. DISMISSALS, SUSPENSIONS, REINSTATEMENTS

ETC
-following requisites should be complied with:
a) the employee concerned should be informed of
his unsatisfactory performance for a
semester;
b) such notice shall be in writing;
c) the same must be made within thirty (30) days
from the end of the semester when the
first unsatisfactory rating was given;
d) the notice should contain a warning that a
succeeding unsatisfactory performance
shall warrant his separation from the
service; and
e) the notice shall contain sufficient information to
enable the employee to prepare an
explanation.

NPC VS ZOZOBRADO
DOCTRINE: IN DISMISSALS DUE TO UNSATISFACTORY
SERVICE, NOTICE OF SUCH MUST BE GIVEN.
44 1. On 28 August 1998, respondent Agustin

A. Zozobrado, a permanent employee of

petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC 4 )
assigned as Pilot in the aviation group,
received a letter dated 18 August 1998 from
NPC President Frederico C. Puno, informing
him that that he was being dropped from the
rolls.

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

2. respondent Zozobrado filed an appeal before the

CSC questioning NPC's implementation of
dropping him from the rolls.
3. the CSC dismissed the appeal. CA reversed
finding that the respondent's separation "was
made with utter lack of due process,
4. Petitioner submits the following allegations in its
discussion:
1. actual and constructive notice
had been served upon
respondent; and
2. the ratings given to respondent
resulting to his dropping from
the rolls, were official and
regular acts by NPC based on
his performance during the
rating periods and by no
means a premeditated design
to drop respondent from the
rolls.
5. Respondent had been dropped by petitioner from
the rolls based on, unsatisfactory performance,
6. Respondent alleged that Dropping from the rolls
means separation from the service. Such separation
is made summarily, without any case, investigation or
due process. For this reason we submit that the rule
should be strictly construed in order that it may not
be used as a tool for harassment, vindictiveness or
removal of any employee who happens to fall out of
grace of his supervisor or superior officers.
Thus, before the dropping from the rolls, it is
imperative that the following requisites should
be complied with:
a) the employee concerned should be informed of his
unsatisfactory performance for a semester;
b) such notice shall be in writing;
c) the same must be made within thirty (30) days
from the end of the semester when the first
unsatisfactory rating was given;
d) the notice should contain a warning that a
succeeding unsatisfactory performance shall
warrant his separation from the service; and
e) the notice shall contain sufficient information to
enable the employee to prepare an
explanation.
In the instant case, the notice required by law was not
given to the petitioner. He was not given notice after
the rating of unsatisfactory during the first semester of
1997 within thirty (30) days therefrom. The alleged
verbal notice, to our mind, is not sufficient for the
reason that it is easily concocted. And when there are
conflicting allegations as to the alleged verbal notice,
such that there is a clash between the word of a
superior officer and that of a subordinate, the latter is
usually at a disadvantage. Hence, a verbal notice
cannot be considered as substantial compliance with

the Civil Service Rules.

Moreover, the notice should contain sufficient
information to enable the employee to prepare an
explanation. This is the opportunity given the
employee to explain why his efficiency had fallen if
such were the fact and explain circumstances why
his performance has deteriorated, so to speak, which
might be considered by the rater. In any case, he is
given the opportunity to improve, which is why the
notice is given within thirty (30) days from the end of
the rating period, so that he has sufficient time to do
better, make amends, and enhance his performance at
the succeeding period.
This was not done in the case at bar.
On the contrary, the first
unsatisfactory rating was obviously
withheld from the petitioner.
According to the respondent, the
written notice was made on January
29, 1998, which is way beyond the
30-day period required by the
rules. AECacS
Moreover, we observe that the petitioner had
been getting "very satisfactory ratings for 8
1/2 years before the controversial ratings
were made solely by Gen. Lagera. All previous
performance ratings appear to have complete
evaluation on all factors, and signed in
acknowledgement by the ratee himself.
It also appears that when the petitioner
brought to the Grievance Committee the
matter of his unsatisfactory ratings, the said
committee recommended a review thereof to
take into account the dimension of the
quantity in the performance standard.
However, Gen. Lagera blocked such review,
claiming that it was not necessary because he
had already considered the
same, albeit minimally. This is an indication
that Gen. Lagera really wanted to take it upon
himself to solely give the rating to the
petitioner, in violation of the approved PAS of
NAPOCOR. Thus, the Grievance Committee had
no recourse but to elevate it to the President
[of NPC] for review. However, the latter,
instead of making a fair and impartial review,
just adopted the recommendation of Gen.
Lagera.
All these are indications that there was a
pattern to dislodge the petitioner from
NAPOCOR's rolls. This started when he
exposed certain anomalous transactions in
the purchase of helicopter parts and
materials. There are allegedly charges and
counter charges between the petitioner and
other pilots, which the respondent never
categorically denied. Likewise not denied was
the alleged efforts exerted by Gen. Lagera for
45 petitioner to withdraw his charges. Thus,
the
at a time when he was supposed to testify in
court at the hearing of a case against the other
pilots, Gen. Lagera suddenly sent him to fly the
NAPOCOR President albeit another pilot was
assigned to such mission. Although his failure
to fly on such flight was fully explained to Gen.
Lagera, this was obviously made the basis of
the unsatisfactory rating given to the
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

petitioner. These circumstances which were

fully narrated by the petitioner had never been
refuted by the respondent. CSTDIE
It is also worthy to note that when the
petitioner was transferred to the Engineering
and Maintenance Division, after the two
unsatisfactory ratings in 1997, he was again
given a Very Satisfactory rating for January to
June 1998. Hence, at the time he was notified
of his being dropped from the rolls, on August
28, 1998, his immediate past rating was "very
satisfactory" and not "unsatisfactory".
The dropping of respondent from
the rolls is a violation of procedural
due process.
Petitioner claims that, contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeals, its compliance with Memorandum
Circular No. 12 is full and not merely substantial.
However, the evidence submitted by petitioner to
prove this allegation, namely the affidavit of Gen.
Lagera, only confirms the findings of the Court of
Appeals that if there really was a notice to respondent,
it had been oral. 10 This is in clear contravention of
the requirement in Memorandum Circular No. 12. As
held by the Court of Appeals, dropping from the rolls is
made summarily, making it imperative to strictly
observe the circular to prevent its being used for
harassment or vindictiveness.
Not even one of the requisites mentioned by the Court
of Appeals had been complied with. It is an
uncontested fact that respondent was never notified in
writing of his Unsatisfactory rating within 30 days from
the end of the semester when the Unsatisfactory rating
was given. It is likewise uncontested that respondent
was never warned in writing that a succeeding
Unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his
separation from the service. Even the allegation of the
oral notice itself (that petitioner claims and
respondent categorically denies) is clearly an
afterthought, having been utilized for the first time in
the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Court of
Appeals decision and was never used as an argument in
the administrative proceedings. The proof of such
notice, a self-serving affidavit of the very individual
who unilaterally gave the apparently groundless rating,
deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner also refutes the finding that respondent was
denied due process by claiming that the action to drop
an employee from the rolls is not disciplinary in
character. Petitioner claims that such dropping from
the rolls does not carry with it forfeiture of Civil
Service eligibility and other benefits arising from
employment, nor does it involve a disqualification from
holding a public office or re-entry in the service. This
Court is appalled by such an argument. One's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a property
right, the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. 11 Taking this away without due
process is a violation of a constitutional human right,
and the consolation of not being disqualified for later
employment does not erase nor mitigate such
infraction.
The dropping of respondent from
the rolls is a violation of substantive

due process.
Petitioner claims that, contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeals, the ratings given to respondent
resulting to his dropping from the rolls were official
and regular acts by the NPC based on his performance
during the rating periods and by no means a
premeditated design to drop respondent from the rolls.
According to petitioner, respondent failed to prove ill
motive on the part of Gen. Lagera as to the
"unsatisfactory" rating given to him. 12
Evidence, however, shows otherwise. Petitioner never
denied that respondent's unsatisfactory rating was due
to respondent's testimony in court concerning the graft
charges against NPC employees. On the day respondent
was supposed to testify in court under pain of
contempt, Gen. Lagera suddenly sent him to fly the
NPC President despite the fact that another pilot was
assigned to such mission. Instead of denying the
deliberate attempt to thwart respondent's testimony,
petitioner, in its memorandum to this Court, arrogantly
insisted that respondent's failure to perform his duty
for the highest officer of the corporation does not
deserve the "Fair" or "Unsatisfactory" rating but
outright dismissal from service. 13
Gen. Lagera's ill motive is further proved by the fact
that respondent was kept in the dark as to the status
of his employment even though the same had already
been terminated two months earlier. It appears that
the sad news was relayed to respondent only on his
natal day affair. We can see no reason for the two
months delay other than the devastation Gen. Lagera
expected to cause by imparting the shocking news on
respondent's birth anniversary, during a celebration and
in front of other people. IAcDET
Petitioner claims that it was non-sequitur for the Court
of Appeals to conclude that, just because respondent
received a "Very Satisfactory" rating for 8 1/2 years, he
could not possibly receive a lower rating
thereafter. 14 The Court of Appeals never said that.
The Court of Appeals was revealing petitioner's illdisguised attempt to illegally dismiss respondent by
means of unsatisfactory ratings. As observed by the
Court of Appeals, the "Very Satisfactory" performance
ratings for those 8 1/2 years have complete evaluation
on all factors, and signed in acknowledgement by all
three raters. This is as opposed to the "Unsatisfactory"
ratings made solely by Gen. Lagera, who is only one of
the raters. The ratings, furthermore, had been made
on a per semester basis (January to June and July to
December) for all those 8 1/2 years, while the last
"Unsatisfactory" rating was made for a four-month
period (July to October, 1997), an innovation applied
only to respondent among the hundreds of employees
of petitioner. As a matter of fact, respondent was again
rated "Very Satisfactory" and on a per semester basis
(January to June 1998) after he was transferred to
another unit.
On this note, petitioner claims that the "Very
46
Satisfactory"
ratings by the Engineering and Training
Division (ETD) should not have been considered in
doubting the ratings given by Gen.
Lagera. 15 According to petitioner, the job respondent
handled at the ETD is different from the job of a pilot,
and that "respondent was dropped from the rolls
because of unsatisfactory performance as a pilot and
not for being a researcher or ordinary employee in
ETD." 16 Petitioner mockingly claims that respondent
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

may have a talent for research but not for flying. 17

We disagree. Even if we disregard respondent's
believable claim that his ETD activities require the skill
and technical know-how of a pilot, the "Very
Satisfactory" rating in the ETD shows the credibility of
respondent in all aspects of the work he rendered, and
that the only reason for the "Unsatisfactory" ratings is
respondent's reporting of the alleged anomalies in the
NPC. It is uncontested that, sometime in May 1997,
respondent brought to the attention of the Chairman
and the President of the NPC several alleged anomalies
in the Aviation Group. In November 1997, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer reported the alleged
anomalous purchases in a three-part series of an
investigative Special Report. Complaints had been filed
by respondent, and complaints had been filed against
him. The ratings for the second half of 1996 (where
respondent was rated 76% which translates to "Fair")
were released in the second half of 1997, followed by
the ratings for January to June 1997 and July to
October 1997. Needing two consecutive
"Unsatisfactory" ratings to dismiss respondent, and
seeing that the second "Unsatisfactory" rating was
made for a period of July to October 1997, petitioner
argued that the "Fair" rating is equivalent to
"Unsatisfactory." This is a wild supposition which does
not deserve merit at all.
As further found by the Court of Appeals, when
respondent brought to the Grievance Committee the
matter of his unsatisfactory ratings, the Grievance
Committee recommended a review thereof to take into
account respondent's quantity of flying hours. Pilots
have traditionally been rated by the number of flying
hours spent in their career, and respondent had more
than double the flying hours of the two other pilots of
the Aviation Group combined. However, Gen. Lagera
blocked such review, claiming that he had already
considered the same, albeit minimally. This is a clear
indication that Gen. Lagera really wanted to take it
upon himself to solely give the "Unsatisfactory" ratings
to respondent, in violation of the approved
Performance Appraisal System (PAS) of the NPC.
|\
SALAW VS NLRC
FACTS
1. petitioner, Espero Santos Salaw, was employed
by the private respondents as a credit
investigator-appraiser.
2. (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted
from the petitioner without the assistance of
counsel a Sworn Statement which made it
appear that the petitioner, in cahoots with a
co-employee, Reynaldo Madrigal, a supervisor
in charge of the acquired assets of respondent
Associated Bank, sold twenty sewing machines
and electric generators which had been
foreclosed by the respondent bank from
Worldwide Garment and L.P. Money Garment,
3. petitioner was requested by private respondent
Rollie Tuazon, the bank manager, to appear
before the bank's Personnel Discipline and
Investigation Committee (PDIC) in connection
with the Worldwide case.

4. the petitioner was terminated from his

employment effective March 27, 1985, for
alleged serious misconduct or willful
disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the
trust reposed on him by the private
respondents.

clearly show, complainant was denied that

constitutional right when he subsequent request to
refute the allegations against him was granted and a
hearing was set "without counsel or representative."
(See respondent Tuazon's letter to respondent dated
February 25, 1985). 10

5. Subsequently, the petitioner filed with the NLRC

a complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent Bank Jose R. Tengco, and Rollie
Tuazon.

The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent

Bank's investigating committee violated his
constitutional right to due process, in as much as he
was not given a chance to defend himself, as provided
in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal
of employees. Section 5 of the said Rule requires that
"the employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so
desires." 11 (Emphasis supplied.) Here petitioner was
perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel during
the investigation to be conducted by the PDIC. No
reasons were proferred which vitiated the denial with
irregularity and unfairness. Cdpr

6. Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal illegal and

ordered his reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to pay him his backwages
and benefits due an employee of respondent
Bank from the time of illegal dismissal until
actual reinstatement.
7. The private respondents appealed the labor
arbiter's decision to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed
the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed
the case for lack of merit.
8. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the NLRC decision, but this was denied
ISSUE:WAS
THE
PETITIONERS
TERMINATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING HIS DUE PROCESS?
HELD: YES.

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements

for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his
employer are two-fold: the substantive and the
procedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a valid
or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279,
281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary
requirements of due process notice and hearing
must also be observed before an employee may be
dismissed. One does not suffice; without their
concurrence, the termination would, in the eyes of the
law, be illegal. 8
The inviolability of notice and hearing for a valid
dismissal of an employee can not be over-emphasized.
Those twin requirements constitute essential elements
of due process in cases of employee dismissal. The
requirement of notice is intended to inform the
employee concerned of the employer's intent to
dismiss him and the reason for the proposed dismissal;
on the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords
the employee the opportunity to answer his employer's
charges against him and accordingly to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither one of
these two requirements can be dispensed with without
running afoul of the due process requirement of the
Constitution. 9
We agree with the labor arbiter that the petitioner was
terminated without the benefit of due process of law.
His
47 dismissal was, therefore, illegal. Thus,
Respondents' initial act in convening their Personnel
Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC) to
investigate complainant (after the CIS experience)
would have complied with the demands of due process
had complainant been given the opportunity to present
his own defense and confront the witnesses, if any, and
examine the evidence against him. But as the records
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies

are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in
the adjudication of cases. However, the right to
counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due
process, has to be observed. Indeed, the rights to
counsel and to due process of law are two of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution to any person under investigation, be the
proceeding administrative, civil, or criminal.
Thus, Section 12(1), Article III thereof specifically
provides: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to . . .
have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel." 12 To underscore the inviolability of this
provision, the third paragraph of the same section
explicitly states that, "any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." 13
As aptly observed by the labor arbiter, the respondents
premised their action in dismissing the complainant on
his supposed admission of the offense imputed to him
by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in its
interrogation in November, 1984. The said admission
was carried in a three-page Sworn Statement signed by
the complainant. Aside from this Statement, no other
evidence was presented by the respondents to
establish the culpability of the complainant in the
fraudulent sale of the respondents' foreclosed
properties. Even the minutes of the proceeding taken
during the investigation conducted by the respondents
were not presented . . . This is a glaring denial of due
process. We find it worth reiterating the cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of an administrative character as
enunciated by this Court in the classic landmark
decision of Justice Laurel in Ang Tibay, 14 to wit:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of

fair play."
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law.
ed. 1288). In the language of this Court in Edwards
vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right
is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to
whom the evidence is presented thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity." (Edward vs. McCoy, supra.) . . .
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November
29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but the evidence must
be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia & Maryland
Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301
U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed.
965.) "Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power
v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d
985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13,15 BallstonStillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . .

which was affirmed by the public respondent NLRC; has

no more leg to stand on. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity. LLpr
Significantly, the dismissal of the petitioner from his
employment was characterized by undue haste. The
law is clear that even in the disposition of labor cases,
due process must not be subordinated to expediency or
dispatch. Otherwise, the dismissal of the employee will
be tainted with illegality. On this point, we have ruled
consistently. 15
We reiterate the rule laid down in Santos v.
NLRC 16 that "the normal consequences of a finding
that an employee has been illegally dismissed are,
firstly, that the employee becomes entitled to
reinstatement to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and, secondly, the payment of
backwages corresponding to the period from his illegal
dismissal up to actual reinstatement." The petitioner is
entitled to no less.
CASTILLO-CO VS BARBERS
FACTS
1. Congressman Junie Cua, in the course of the
congressional
investigation,
discovered
irregularities in the purchase of heavy
equipment by petitioner and the Provincial
Engineer constituting overpricing, purchase of
reconditioned and not brand new equipments,
absence of public bidding and inspection, and
advance payment prior to delivery.
2. He filed a complaint against the two before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of
Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence

presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N.R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431) . . .

3. Petitioner was placed under preventive

suspension for 6 months a week after the
filing of the complaint, under the order was
approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations (now the

National Labor Relations Commission) or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision . . .

4. Their motions for reconsideration having been

denied, petitioner filed the present recourse
contesting the authority of the Deputy
Ombudsman to sign the order of preventive
suspension, the period of suspension was
excessive, and denial of due process.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations (now NLRC)

should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
48

xxx xxx xxx

Considering further that the admission by the

petitioner, which was extracted from him by the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary (National Capital Region) without the
assistance of counsel and which was made as the sole
basis for his dismissal, can not be admitted in evidence
against him, then, the finding of guilt of the PDIC,
SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

The Supreme Court held that R.A. 7975 (An Act to

Strengthen the Functional and Standard Organization
of the Sandiganbayan, as amended) does not suggest
that only the Ombudsman and not his deputy may
order the preventive suspension of officials occupying
positions classified as grade 27 or above; that the
Ombudsman and his deputy may order preventive
suspension pursuant to the provisions of Section 24
of R.A. 6770 and Section 9, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman; that
preventive suspension, being merely a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation, may be decreed
even before the charges are heard; and that the sixmonth suspension of petitioner is within the limits
prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770.

These conditions are:

Petitioner next questions the manner by which the
suspension order was issued. She claims that she was
denied due process because she was not afforded the
opportunity to controvert the evidence against her
before the order of preventive suspension was
issued. 12 A preventive suspension, however, can be
decreed on an official under investigation after charges
are brought and even before the charges are heard
since the same is not in the nature of a penalty, 13 but
merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.|||
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW;
PUBLIC
OFFICERS;
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; A PUBLIC OFFICER WITH A
SALARY GRADE OF 27 OR ABOVE MAY BE SUSPENDED
BY THE OMBUDSMAN OR HIS DEPUTY. Under the
provisions of Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 6770 and
Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
office of the Ombudsman, there cannot be any doubt
that the Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend an officer or employee, where appropriate, as
indicated by the word "or" between the "Ombudsman"
and "his Deputy." The word "or" is a disjunctive term
signifying disassociation and independence of one thing
from each of the other things enumerated. The law
does not require that only the Ombudsman himself may
sign the order of suspension. aDSHIC
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IN THE NATURE OF PENALTY,
HENCE, CAN BE DECREED EVEN BEFORE THE CHARGES
ARE HEARD. A preventive suspension, however, can
be decreed on an official under investigation after
charges are brought and even before the charges are
heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty,
but merely a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE THEREOF DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The
fact that the said order was issued seven days after the
complaint was filed did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. The immediate issuance of such order is
required in order to prevent the subject of the
suspension from committing further irregularities. Such
prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section
15 of R.A. 6770.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; PUBLIC
OFFICIALS ENJOY THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
OF PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES. We do not give much
credence to petitioner's suggestions of a malicious
conspiracy between the Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero
and Congressman Cua, reputedly petitioner's political
adversary, to harass her. The Deputy Ombudsman and
the Congressman, being public officials, enjoy the
presumption of regularity of performance of duties.
Such presumption can be overcome only by strong and
convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in this
case.
49

5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; PREVENTIVE

SUSPENSION; CONDITIONS; MET IN CASE AT BAR.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the conditions
required to sustain her preventive suspension have
been met in this case.

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

(1) That the evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) That any of the following circumstances are
present:
(a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct
or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or
(c) the respondent's continued stay in office
may prejudice the case filed against him.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION WHETHER THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG RESTS UPON THE
DETERMINATION OF THE OMBUDSMAN. The first
requisite rests upon the determination of the
disciplining authority, the Office of the Ombudsman in
this case: As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however,
whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into
account the evidence before him. A preliminary
hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital
offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this
Court said in that case: The import of
the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is
given the discretion to decide when the evidence of
guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24
of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such
determination of guilt to the 'judgment' of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative
complaint . . . We find no reason to disturb such
determination in this case.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE NEED NOT BE ADDUCED TO
PROVE THAT PETITIONER MAY INFLUENCE POSSIBLE
WITNESSES OR MAY TAMPER WITH PUBLIC RECORDS.
Petitioner's high position likewise gives her access to
public records and the clout to influence possible
witnesses. Her continued stay in office may thus
prejudice the prosecution of the case filed against her.
It is immaterial that, as petitioner contends, no
evidence has been adduced to prove that petitioner
may influence possible witnesses or may tamper with
the public records. It is sufficient that there exists such
a possibility.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUSPENSION FOR SIX (6) MONTHS,
WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED LIMITS. Finally, the duration
of petitioner's suspension is not excessive. Petitioner's
suspension for six (6) months is within the limits
prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770. The length of
the period of suspension within such limits, like the
evaluation of the strength of the evidence, lies in the
discretion of the Ombudsman.

G. CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS/ PRIVILEGES

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION VS OP
Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by GTEB of dollar
salting and mis-declaration of importations. As a result,
its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB rendered
its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to
due process of law was violated and that GTEB decision
was not supported by substantial evidence. The Court

then issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct

further proceedings. However, on July 25, 1984,
Glorious filed a manifestation of its intention to
withdraw the petition. The Court granted the motion
for withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to
dismiss with prejudice which the Court duly noted.
After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for
restitution of its export quota allocation and requested
for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April
27, 1984. Glorious once again alleged that the charges
against them were not supported by evidence.
Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling
its export quota was rendered as a result of duress,
threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by
former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer
Glorious export quotas to Marcos crony-owned
corporations. Glorious further alleged that it was
coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition
in G.R. No. 67180 and to enter into joint venture
agreements paving the way for the creation of De
Soleil Apparel and AIFC.
On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious.
An appeal was then taken on Oct. 5, 1987 to the Office
of the President. AIFC filed its opposition to Glorious
appeal claiming that the GTEB decision dated April 27,
1984 has long been final. The Office of the President
ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to
GTEB for further proceedings. The motion for
reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation
to the 1984 GTEB decision. NO
HELD. NO

50

SEC 1 SET A|PILOTIN

The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of

the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured
the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under
the constitutional provision of due process enunciated
in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of
Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635 [1940]) and other
subsequent cases. (See Provincial Chapter of Laguna,
Nacionalista Party v. Comelec, 122 SCRA 423 [1983];
Mangubat v. De Castro, 163 SCRA 608 [1988]). The
petitioner's posture is to say the least misleading. At
issue in this petition is the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB. This resolution was the sole reason for stripping
off Glorious Sun's export quotas and awarding the
export quotas to two newly and hastily created
corporations, the petitioner herein and De Soleil. The
petitioner can not use as an excuse the subsequent
disclosure of the evidence used by the GTEB to
Glorious Sun in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB
resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious Sun was
denied due process when the GTEB failed to disclose
evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against
Glorious Sun. Moreover, as pointed out by Deputy
Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, the documents
disclosed to Glorious Sun by GTEB in 1987 enhanced
the change that Glorious Sun was denied due process.
The record clearly manifests that in cancelling the
export quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated
the private respondent's constitutional right to due
process. Before the cancellation in 1984, the private
respondent had been enjoying export quotas granted to
it since 1977. In effect the private respondent's export
quota allocation which initially was a privilege evolved
into some form of property right which should not be
removed from it arbitrarily and without due process
only to hurriedly confer it on another.