SEC.

4
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
Adiong VS COMELEC
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEALTH SECRETARY
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988
Ledesma Vs Ca
Soriano VS Laguardia
Nelson Navarro, Petitioner vs. Mayor Antonio Villegas, respondent.
Phil. Blooming Mills
Sec. 5
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA.
Estrada vs. Escritor
Sec. 8
ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES
CHAVEZ VS PCGG

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated
that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the
printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner
Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme
Court.
Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom
of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to
offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit
itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653; 5 MAR 1992]
Facts: Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national
and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their
right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by
petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising
freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a
particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public
information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the
freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in
the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.
Issue: Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held: Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech,
freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be
seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our
own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given
constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The
essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information enterprises
during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media
operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX
(C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does
not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy
events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11
(b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as
such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not
paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly
repressive or unreasonable.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH

SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law
seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to
the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to
diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed
of the advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The
Milk Code, assailing that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No. 20060012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the
respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR. Customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or
customary international law means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of
international law refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states. The Milk
Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In
this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may
constitute soft law or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have
not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in
fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the
WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also failed to explain and prove
by competent evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the
regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the
objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the
basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the
act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila
and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on
November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of
Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate
and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political
parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement
and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and
present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked
upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its
enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether
for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine
Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to
give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible
restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The
first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive
evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency
rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be
advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency
and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to
satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author
Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive
evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election
campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.
The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. Vs Capulong, 160 SCRA 861, G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988
FACTS: Respondent Sen. Enrile files a case against private petitioners for the production and filming of the projected
motion picture The Four Day Revolution, which relates to the non-bloody change of government that took place at
EDSA, for its unlawful intrusion upon the formers right to privacy.
Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and the
subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of
respondent senator.
ISSUE: WON the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
HELD: Yes. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public interest. Private
respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the culmination of the change of government. The right of
privacy of the a public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.

G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997

RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents
Facts: Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M.
Ledesma, petitioner herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed
her counter-affidavit to the complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office
filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104. A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the
Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The Department of Justice gave due course
to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further proceedings and to elevate the
entire records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992 was filed by
Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or approval
of the trial prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992
and to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial
Issue : WON the letter is libelous
Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of
proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in
the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of
proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in
the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a private communication made in the performance of a
moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant, but to present
her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no
malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself
failed to allege the existence of malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July
27, 1992 or one year after June 27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge
to give Complainant Torres a leverage against petitioner's administrative action against him.

Nelson Navarro, Petitioner vs. Mayor Antonio Villegas, respondent.

FACTS:
On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to
the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 411pm. On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that, the have temporarily
adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the used of Plaza Miranda for rallies or demonstration during
weekdays due to the events that happened from the past week.
On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its rally,
and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayors action on the
ground that it violates the petitioners right to peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances
(ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioners right to the equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates the petitioners Right to peaceable
assembly and right to the equal protection of the law.
Held:
The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police power of the state.
The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for it may be
regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of community and
society, This power may be exercised under the police power of the state, which is the power of the state, which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, and good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication may be regulated in
the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied.

PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

Facts: Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their schedule for a mass demonstration in protest for the
alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their CBA agreement
however petitioners contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable assembly to seek redress of their grievances
against the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer. Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the
court sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to peaceable assembly of the petitioners.
Held: The court held that the primacy of human rights such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such
common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart from violating the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF ABRA, Respondent.
It is easily understandable why Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr. on behalf of the Iglesia ni Cristo would take umbrage on the portion of
the opinion of respondent Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella in the course of acquitting the defendants accused of Triple Rape. Thus: "it
will also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on July 27, 1979, yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979, to
August 21 to denounce to the proper authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda Ola. Merlinda Ola, however, is a
member of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Her husband Florencio Ola and her in-laws were still in the process of being convinced to become
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers of the Iglesia ni
Cristo as it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of this action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of
the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing to the
community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of
his/her problem." 1 There was absolutely no need for the last sentence therein being included. Respondent judge was charged with
ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench. While the offending portion of such opinion is not
impressed with such gravity, disciplinary action nonetheless is warranted.
As noted in the report of Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova, adopting the memorandum of Deputy Court Administrator Romeo
D. Mendoza: "Respondent judge, in his comment dated January 20, 1981, alleged that the charges made against him by herein
complainant are unfair and unfounded as the decision rendered by him in Criminal Case No. 2003, acquitting the three cranad(3)
accused of Triple Rape, was prepared by him in the honest conviction that the evidence adduced at the trial of said case was not
sufficiently clear to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent judge further contended that the
statements complained of are his honest appraisal and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the statement of
the complainant witness cranad(Merlinda Ola), in addition to the fact that she had always been accompanied in court during the
trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous members of the sect." 2 There was a reply on the part of complainant,
Teofilo Ramos, Sr. who, according to the report, "claimed that the statement made by the herein respondent judge that the
complaining witness had always been accompanied in court during the trial by Ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo and numerous
members of said sect, was uncalled for and intended to further malign the Iglesia ni Cristo, thereby seriously putting under doubt
respondent judge's competency and integrity as a magistrate of the law. He also claimed that the inconsistencies in the testimony of
the rape victim in the said criminal case were minor matters that did not disprove the commission of the crime of rape by the
members of the police authorities as well as their identities. Complainant proferred as an excuse for said inconsistencies the fact
that the victim is a simple and unlearned housewife and no malicious motive or evil intent had been shown at the trial which had
impelled said victim to point an accusing finger against the three cranad(3) accused in the subject criminal case." 3 In the state of
the record, it was submitted in such report that "on the basis of the pleadings and other documents of record, respondent judge's
liability or lack of it can already be determined without need of further investigation. Accordingly, the undersigned finds it
unnecessary to refer this case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation. This Court, in the case of Sta. Maria. v. Ubay,
held that 'cumbersome, time-consuming procedure of investigation need not be resorted to if the allegations in the complaint, the
comments thereon, and the documents presented provide ample basis for a resolution of the complainant's charges.'" 4
This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the word "gimmick" could offend the sensibilities of the
members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It
may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be
acceptable. While it would be going too far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have that effect. The Latin maxim,
Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to mind. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a
"gimmick" to gain converts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion 5 implies respect for every creed. No one,
much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost
sight of either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right to a
public trial is safeguarded by the fundamental law. 6 No adverse implication can arise from such an occurrence. It goes without
saying that if their presence would create disorder, it lies within the power of a trial judge to maintain the proper decorum.
The Court, however, takes into consideration the fact that the right of a court to give expression to its views is equally deserving of
protection. At any rate, it is not an affront to rationality if note be taken that not all members of the bench are possessed of such an
extensive vocabulary in the English language that the misuse of a word is to be followed automatically by reprisal of a severe
character. While under the circumstances, some members of the Court are of the opinion that censure is warranted, it is the view of
the majority that an admonition would suffice.
WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more careful in the use of language likely to offend
an individual or religious sect.

Estrada vs. Escritor

AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant,
wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation
of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a
son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and
is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed
to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of
living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the
congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since
1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely
executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be
penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation
of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard
of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious
freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish
her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious
freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is
ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to
override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its
interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.

ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES

496 SCRA 282(2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict.
FACTS: Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate Estate of
Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in
whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of
Roberto.
For a period of time, the counsel of Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true
copies thereof. However, one of Hilados counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes
ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the
case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed before the Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to
compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access, examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the
record of the Hilados case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely access.
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of mandamus is proper
RULING: The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of the
courts. It comprises the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued
and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took place during the trial and which are
in the possession, custody, or control of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions. It has
also been described to include any paper, letter, map, book, other document, tape, photograph, film, audio or video
recording, court reporter's notes, transcript, data compilation, or other materials, whether in physical or electronic form,
made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the transaction of any official business by the court, and
includes all evidence it has received in a case.
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized
expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with
knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be
against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in
Lantaco Sr. et al. v. Judge Llamas, this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
furnish Lantaco et al. a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private
complainants, the decision being "already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize."

CHAVEZ VS PCGG
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FACTS
Chavez
ISSUE:
HELD:
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes on their properties, such law will
definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in
favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation
shall be uniform and equitable."
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue