Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54904 January 29, 1988
HEIRS OF TITO RILLORTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO N. FIRME, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance
of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union; and ANDREW
COSTALES, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the heirs of the
offended party? Of course. May the criminal aspect of the decision be
modified as a basis for the increase in the civil award? Certainly not. Is
the case at bar covered by the rule on double jeopardy or by the
exception? We shall come to that.
Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of
less serious physical injuries and sentenced to twenty days of arresto
menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00.
The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide
because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The
certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously induced
by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. In
short, the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not
affect any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross
incompetence. 1
The heirs of the deceased, herein petitioners, did not agree. Through
their counsel acting "under the direct control and supervision of the
provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
notified to them on January 23, 1980. 2 This motion was sent by
registered mail on February 2, 1980. 3 Heard on February 26, it was
denied on February 28, 1980, in an order that was communicated to the
private prosecutor on March 18, 1980. 4 On March 20, 1980, a notice of
appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the
justify the increase in the civil indemnity. This rule is applicable in the
present case.
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of
the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v.
United States, 12 where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of
the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal
of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of
increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in
double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this
jurisdiction.
The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500.00
be increased because the accused should not have been found guilty of
only less serious physical injuries but of homicide. They are not confining
themselves to the civil aspect of the challenged decision. In their own
words, their appeal involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil
liabilities in the criminal cases." 10 This is not permitted under the rule on
double jeopardy. 11
It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much
less then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned
only with the civil indemnity.
The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information." 13 There is
no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the
accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense
of homicide.
But the petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because
the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This
argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by
the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of
error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no
matter how obvious the error may be.
In People v. City Court of Silay, 14 the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to dimiss a charge for falsification after the prosecution had
rested, holding that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court disagreed. Nevertheless, it held through
Justice Munoz-Palma that "however erroneous the order of the
respondent court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from
said order, such error cannot now be lighted because of the timely plea of
double jeopardy."
We have made similar rulings in several other cases, among them People
v. Hernando, 108 SCRA 121, People v. Francisco, 128 SCRA 110, and
People v. Villarin, 11 SCRA 550.
The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all
involve not errors of judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss
or lack of jurisdiction. 15 The prosecution in each of these cases was
allowed to appeal because it had not been given its day in court. In the
present case, a full trial was held and both the prosecution and the
defense were accorded the right to be heard before the judgment was
reached. There is no doubt at all that the trial court had the requisite
jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence. Even assuming it was
incorrect, it was certainly not invalid.
It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award
corresponding only to the offense found against the accused, to wit, less
serious physical injuries. The award cannot be related to the victim's
death, of which the defendant has been absolved by the trial court. The
problem then is whether or not the sum of P500.00 was sufficient
indemnification for the wound which, the trial court has held, was not the
proximate cause of the victim's death.
The determination of this question should normally be made by the
appellate court after examining the factual issues as originally resolved
by the trial court. This would require elevation of the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the usual procedure and an
exchange again of pleadings and arguments between the parties that will
further prolong this case. But we do not believe that such delay is
necessary. We can decide the appeal ourselves to expedite decision of
this case. We have carefully studied the pros and cons of this problem
and can rule on it directly on the basis of the record before us and in the
interest of speedy justice.
Accordingly, we hold that the sum awarded by the trial court to the
petitioners, for the less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim
and not for his death is sufficient recompense. Therefore, the
increase sought is denied.
While the Court sympathizes with the petitioners for their tragic loss, it is
unable to accord them a more satisfactory material settlement because it
is limited by the findings of the trial court and inhibitions of double
jeopardy. If an error has been committed somewhere and on this it is
not necessary for us to rule that error will nonetheless not relax the
application of the salutary rule on double jeopardy. It must be, as it is
here, upheld.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court dated April 14, 1980,
and May 20, 1980, are SET ASIDE. However, the appeal sought shall no
longer be necessary because the questioned civil award in the amount of
P500.00 is hereby directly AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Constitution prohibits it. Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto. This
is the defense raised by accused-private respondents after respondent
Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, ordered without notice and
hearing the dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 both for
frustrated murder, which thereafter were reinstated upon initiative of the
Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as Crim: Cases Nos. 8572 and
8573.
It appears that on 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller
of Puerto Princesa City filed Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 for
frustrated murder against accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde,
Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for
allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting
complainants, the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones
at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on
the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crim.
Case No. 8572 (G.R. No. 101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and
stones and hacking her with a bolo which would have caused her death in
Crim. Case No. 8573 (G.R. No. 101558).
On 3 June 1988, accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr.,
Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all
pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, accused Jojeta Panaguiton was
also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty."
On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the
Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for
the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by
the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which
Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.
On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to
the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to
the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the
Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the
dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed
that petitioner-spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real
aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense.
what private respondents gave. What they did was merely to move for
reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with
express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower
court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there
was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for
the dismissal of the original Informations.
The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of
double jeopardy since one of the requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that
there be a valid termination of the first jeopardy, is unavailing. He further
argues that the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should
not have been entertained, much less granted, since there was no notice
of hearing, nor was it actually set for hearing.
We do not agree.
While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a
notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases
present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates
the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who
after instituting Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that
". . . the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused
Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the
attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and
unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case."
Besides, who should invoke "lack of notice" but the party deprived of due
notice or due process. And when the Provincial Prosecutor moved to
dismiss on the ground that the complaining witnesses were instead the
aggressors and the accused simply acted in self-defense, would the
accused have opposed the motion as to require that he be first notified
before the cases against him be dismissed?
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal." It must
be remembered that as public prosecutor he is the
It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the
court, it acquires jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent
discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor retains full control over the
prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. Hence,
what petitioners should have done was to appeal the dismissal of the
cases on the ground that the said motion failed to include a notice of
hearing, and should not have waited for the dismissal of the subsequent
cases on the ground of double jeopardy, and thereafter question the first
dismissal, which by then had already become final, erroneous though it
may be.
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of
a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity
in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction
over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of
the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to
have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court
which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and
not certiorari.
It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the
case, the failure to give notice of a subsequent step in the proceedings
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury results
from failure of notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the
court may be held to be erroneous and will be corrected in the proper
proceeding, but it is not an act without or in excess of jurisdiction and is
not void. There is a great difference in the results which follow the failure
to give the notice, which is necessary to confer on the court jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter of the action, and that which
follows a failure to give notice of a step taken after the court has
obtained such jurisdiction and is proceeding with the action.
Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of double
jeopardy must prevail.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, committed by
public respondent, and, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null and void
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated
October 27, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 051672 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Segundina Rosario y Sembrano," the issues raised are (1)
whether or not double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of
acquittal of the accused without a trial on the merits; and (2) whether or
not the complainant or private offended party in a criminal case can file a
special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said judgment
of acquittal without the intervention of the Solicitor General.
On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772 was filed by
the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city
fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y
Sembrano, which reads, among others, as follows:
That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for
sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the
evidence is usually made stating its nature and purpose had it been
admitted.
Assuming that such proffer of evidence, as directed by the respondent
judge, may be made at the pre-trial in a criminal case, the prosecution
should be given the opportunity to object to the admissibility. In this case,
the prosecution filed its opposition to the proffer of its exhibits stating
that it is not authorized under section 1 and 2 of Rule 118 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure; that the documentary evidence were not
presented for marking at the pre-trial; and that the manifestation
submitting the case for the resolution with the proffer of exhibits has no
legal basis. In it position paper, U.P. also pointed out that the alleged title
of the accused covers property in Marikina and not in U.P. Campus,
Quezon City wherein the accused built her structure. The trial court did
not even rule on the admissibility of the exhibits of the accused.
The respondent judge despite the conflicting positions of the parties and
the objection of the U.P. to the resolution of the case without a trial on the
merits, nevertheless rendered a decision acquitting the accused by
making the following disquisition:
With all the documents of the prosecution and the defense
on record, it may now be asked: MAY THE ACCUSED BE
CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER 772?
Prosecution of the accused is anchored on the postulate that
accused built a structure over land belonging to the
University of the Philippines and titled in the name of the
latter. Documents presented by the defense established that
accused has a title over the land on which she built the
structure; that she has a building permit for the structure;
that she paid the corresponding fees for the building permit;
that she has a relocation plan with supporting data of field
notes and lot data computation (Exhs. "1", "2", "2-A", "3",
"4", "5", "5-A," "6-B", "5-B-1", "5-B-2", and "5-B-3").
Actually, there is now a collision between the claim of the
prosecution and the defense on rights of ownership to the
land in question. It may be noted that both land titles are
torrens titles.
court that the accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a
title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis.
Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision as
to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates
that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution
to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for
want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to
present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused.
The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a
criminal case.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in
this case. 7 There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid
complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which
defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted
or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express
consent. 8
In this case, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such
imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. 9 It was not a court of
competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of
acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the
mandate of the rules. 10 Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in this
case.
The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can
file this special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said
decision of the trial court should be answered in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended
party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be
undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal.
11
The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.
However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil
aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. 12
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other
jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by
the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil
action questioning the decision or action respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the
action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant. 13
In this case, the Solicitor General upheld the right of U.P. to file the
petition as an aggrieved party. Inasmuch as the prosecution was deprived
of due process, the questioned decision of the respondent judge
acquitting the accused is null and void as it was rendered in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of
the respondent judge dated October 27, 1987 is set aside and declared
null and void. The respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with
the trial on the merits of the case, and thereafter, to decide the same on
the basis of the evidence adduced, without pronouncement as to costs.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines
seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976
and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft
filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of
double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined
the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned
and operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been
installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1 owned by
the private respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in
the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease
the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the
said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent
investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he
had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or
decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed
before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel
Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City.
A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine
"ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or
imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the
discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6
(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S.
1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, and
penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather
under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is
for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or
prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior
offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of
the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of
Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series
of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having
"wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an
automobile "recklessly and without reasonable caution thereby
endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three
months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the
same Municipal Court, this time with serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act
No. 587) committed by driving and operating an automobile in a reckless
and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon an
unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon
the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge.
Meantime, another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case
No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent municipal
judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed the
respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from
continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought
the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the
decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate
Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given
rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses
under two different sections of the same statute or under different
statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense
under a national statute. If the second sentence of the double jeopardy
provision had not been written into the Constitution, conviction or
acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense
penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different from an
offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making
authorities though one be subordinate to the other and the plea of
double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935
Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted
precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be
covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed
to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a
national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining
the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused
as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and
space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or
a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be
appropriately characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to
penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments (a
municipal ordinance and a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo
City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the
same act or sets of acts that is, the operation of an automobile in a
reckless manner. The additional technical element of serious physical
jeopardy does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the
offense charged. In the present case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel
Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen electric
current through the installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections
or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of
Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power. However,
there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been
dismissed both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which
dismissals the Batangas City electric light system could not have appealed 17)
before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been
waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric
power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of
judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil
action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement as
to costs.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the
annulment of the resolution dated September 17, 1981 of the respondent
Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379,
4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387, for estafa under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's
motion to quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the
ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124,
and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
pending before the lower court. In both sets of criminal cases, petitioner
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court.
However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases,
petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not
guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by
respondent Judge ruling as follows:
The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied.
Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor
of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in
payment of oil products which the latter delivered to him
simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing
checks is not committed by mere issuance of a check. Under
Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 4885, the following are the elements of
estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA
568). Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the mere
issuance of a check without sufficient funds issued in
payment of a simultaneous obligation and the check was
dishonored upon presentation for that estafa is committed
under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court.
and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code
which states as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below . . .
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check.
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit
and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal
Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter
law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano,
132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences
between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had
issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by
petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense,
because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses
and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an
offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no
double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated
prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is
prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2)
sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy (People v.
Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).
In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held
in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309) that "when a motion to
quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to
court without prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the
motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered,
to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule
laid down in People v. Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot
appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still a
necessity for the trial on the merits wherein the parties may present
proofs in support of their contentions and not because the remedy of
appeal is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila
dated February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case
No. 1345-D entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide"
for violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of
Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed
in the said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand
pesos. The information against him reads:
light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be
secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private
respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to
review otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be
violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to
the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases
where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the
private respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more
pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117
which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without
the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;
xxx xxx xxx
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under
the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended
because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the
offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval
of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol
wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and
apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a
police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished
to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given
their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on
board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their
unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The
women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales,
provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo.
The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to
these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment
are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case.
Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to
work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the
Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and
friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an
application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was
made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to
Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application
will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient
facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were
illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by
certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and
Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the
petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk
of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible.
It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were
in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order
announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of
the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial
governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court
sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents
technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to
the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought
to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their
returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their
representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with
their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao
who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that
fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both
counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit
memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force
of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto
Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of
the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the
replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting
the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do
so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and
seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by
which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was
shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the
case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was
shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it
must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate
court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and
then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of
the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to
meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose
behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed,
were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a
tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is
found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of
that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in
a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as
effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the
liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty
which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his
right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would
mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could
forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his
official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was
under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums
of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna
Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its
many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the
petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will
have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and
securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus
acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause
for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of
the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature
may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on
the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition that the statutory provisions are
confined to the case of imprisonment within the state seems to
me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our
jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ
from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to
compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of
procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon,
not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former
except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does
not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court
relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint.
The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he
fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of
compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode
of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are
only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement
is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within
reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be
compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress
is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the
state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important
question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware
of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich.,
416.)
the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their
detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had
purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the
service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his
control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis
had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a
writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and
insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis
being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be
committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court
afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of
the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail
in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term.
(United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926.
See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd
ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the
defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the
granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with
the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus,
and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be
punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton
Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons
named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was
dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to
return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of
having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in
none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day
named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional
courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney
waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.)
They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ
was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they
did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those
interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that
the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have
since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least
sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be
found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing
by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have
been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt
of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their
excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient.
The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend
to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled.
For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an
earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought
about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get
the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the
purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in
the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an
absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did
not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by
the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the
spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and
because it desired to give the respondents another chance to
demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to
strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents.
So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be
permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual
liberty from illegal encroachment.
Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our
relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become
arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still
avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why
the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be
lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to
the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The
temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,1[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld
from the one entitled thereto.2[2] Slx
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50);
Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States,
he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The
children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft,
an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Antipolo City a petition10[10] for guardianship over the person and
property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondents11[11] refused petitioners demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo
City.
"SO ORDERED."12[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention,13[13] or by which the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 14[14] It
is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.15[15] Jksm
12
13
10
14
11
15
September 7, 2010
order, production order and for the return of the specified personal
belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence
that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture
of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of
this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the
Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all
forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the
grant of these reliefs.3
We begin with the petitioners allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United
States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with
the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central
Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYANTarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future
medical mission.7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet
with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera
with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines. 9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions,
Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to
rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat,
Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon,
however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the
loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding
that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door,
barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the
ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with
the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their
faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men
ganged up on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw
the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded
and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to
shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and knees. 16
Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was
able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van
then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. 18 Petitioner, Carabeo
and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19 After she was informed that she is
being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from
her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail
cell from the sound of its metal doors. 20 From there, she could hear the
sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some
construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military
camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in
blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her
blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. 27 There
were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to
peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn
the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her
as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who
tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle." 30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her
uncles house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return
of the Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture
as "stage managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public
respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained
in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report,
Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and
her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the
house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct
possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody
else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were
at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the
public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it
must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the
petitioner and her companions themselves. 48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner,
as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture
for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner
alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate
only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. 50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very
authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any
military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a
charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light,
and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group
that she represents.51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine,
the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas
Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in
general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition,
public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major
General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in
motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any
personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the
petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an
Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance,
the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and thereby
cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and
torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration
to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then
subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted
the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of
her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter
was telling the truth.80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the
public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage
managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only
the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time
they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the
Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a
true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter
claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when
she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat
against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of
"RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This
threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by
the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators
who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the
public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture. 95
Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of
Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. 96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture
was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and
airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her
two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient
evidence to prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of
command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and
military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo
petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement
holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as
well as liable for the return of her belongings. 99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper
legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition. 100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the
doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in
the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict." 103 In this sense, command
and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she
heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors
were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular
case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove
that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar
as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as
substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the
potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer
of Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors
whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these
cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the
greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners
abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been
realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches
remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any
military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not
proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay
was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took
to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she
heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights
which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly
excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that
her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally,
with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence
at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in
turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction
and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence
of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents,
therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
personal belongings.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of
Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of
the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance
would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position 123 espoused by the
petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for
evidence.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the
petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public
respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. 117 We agree with
the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason
used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner
for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether
there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the
abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can
only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo
proceeding.118
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong
enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort
Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An
inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return
of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without
prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make
on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations
submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be
undertaken, as follows
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the
lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under
the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take
the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in
the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as
well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his
successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation
of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with
the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a
copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of
the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt
of this decision.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDODECASTRO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice