1. Calala vs.

CA, 332 SCRA 356

Facts:
Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, a college freshman at the Siliman University, took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. Sunga was given by
the conductor an "extension seat," at the rear end of the vehicle. Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga
was injured and confinement in the hospital. Her attending physician certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against
Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against
Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case,
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, the same court held Salva and his
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed and
dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga. Hence this petition.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates the liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an
insurer of the safety of its passengers.
(2) Whether or not that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso
fortuito.
(3) Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is supported evidence.
Held:
(1) Finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety
of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers.

(2) This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was
improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. The jeepney was not properly parked, its
rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle and that
petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.

(3) In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's
admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to
a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that
petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.

2. FGU Corp. vs. CA, 287 SCRA 718

Facts:
Two-car collided at dawn. Both are Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising along Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic accident. The other owned by Lydia
F. Soriano was being driven by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent
FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee. The car owned
by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time DahlJensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license. FGU Insurance
Corporation, paid the latter by way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent
FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR
for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen he was no longer staying at his given
address; upon motion of petitioner, Jensen was dropped from the complaint. The trial court
dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court although only the fault or negligence of DahlJensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR, petitioner failed to
establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict. Petitioner insists that
respondents are liable on the strength being the registered owner of a vehicle and is liable
for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the damages suffered by a third party, may be an action based on quasidelict against a rent-a-car company
(2) Whether or not its insurer held liable for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving
the rented vehicle

Held:
(1) Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor
vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner
was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of
action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against
respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
(2) Petitioner failed to prove the existence of one of the requisites; the (b) fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by
virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the
acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by
respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances
mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being
engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As
such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not
being an employer of the latter. Therefore only Dahl-Jensen is held liable.

3. Air France vs. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722

FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of
the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class"
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would be taken over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his
"first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip BangkokRome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the
complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly,

the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but
that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer
the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another
passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper.

4. Singson vs. Bank of PI, 132 Phil. 597

Facts:
Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case filed before the CFI Manila. Judgment was
rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co. to pay
the sum of P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat appealed, while the
decision became final and executory as to Villa-Abrille. A writ of garnishment was issued to
BPI against the Villa-Abrilles account.
The clerk of BPI who received the writ saw the petitioners name and, without reading the
full text, wrote a letter for the signature of the bank President, informing Singson of the
garnishment. Subsequently, Singson issued two checks. The one issued in favor of B.M.
Glass Service was dishonoured, and so petitioners account with the latter was closed.
Singson wrote a letter to the bank, claiming that his account is not included in the writ of
garnishment. Having confirmed so, the bank President Santiago Friexas apologized to
Singson and rectified the mistake. Singson filed a claim for damages. The lower court ruled

that damages for quasi-delict cannot be sustained because the relationship between the
parties is contractual. Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.
Issue:
Whether damages based on torts can be awarded based on a contract
Held:
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the
one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. The act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.

5. Robles vs. Yap Wing, 41 SCRA 267

FACTS:
Ciriaco Robles, who received apparently serious head injuries when a piece of lumber fell on
his head while working on July 6, 1961 on a construction job of his employer, Yap Wing, filed
the damages suit below in the regular court of first instance, alleging that "defendant
(employer) negligently failed to provide safety measures within the construction premises"
and praying actual damages, moral damages, exemplary and nominal damages as
attorneys fees.
In his answer defendant alleged by way of affirmative defense that plaintiffs claim is one for
disability resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and
thus pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmens Compensation Commission.
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for damages with costs, holding that it had no
jurisdiction over the case, since all such claims for compensation fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Workmens Compensation Commission.
On appeal, appellant contends that his claim is not for compensation under the Workmen's
Corporation Law but one for damages under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the action of the injured employee restricted to seeking the limited
compensation provided under the Workmens Compensation Act, such that they cannot seek
higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the latter or of his
other employees.
2. Whether the appellant can claim moral damages.
HELD:
1. YES. Section 5 of the Act provides that "the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and, remedies accruing to an employee, his personal representation dependents
or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code or other laws, because of said
injury ..." Hence, where the employee's cause of action against his employer derives mainly
from an injury received in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, such
employee may not elect other forms of damages in place of and/or in addition to
compensation. He may not have recourse in the ordinary courts, for his remedies are
confined to lodging the proper claim with the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
2. The alleged negligence was not a quasi-delict inasmuch as there was a pre-existing
contractual relation of employer and employee between the parties (Art. 2176, Civil Code);

and in breaches of contract moral damages may be recovered only where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the
complaint here.

6. Ramos vs. CA, 321 SCRA 584

G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.
Ponente: Kapunan
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for
the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist botched the administration of the
anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched
operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of
Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for
damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in intubating Erlinda.
Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the
patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a good anesthesiologist and
for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for
not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to
petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose
condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.
RATIO:
Res ipsa loquitur a procedural or evidentiary rule which means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question
of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice
case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the attending
physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos
already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit.
Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damagedres ipsa loquitur!the
thing speaks for itself!
Negligence Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence
on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation
was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the
anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which
indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority
as the captain of the ship in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their consultants.
While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an
employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

7. Vda. De Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181

Facts:
Pass-midnight in September 1952, Juan Bataclan rode a bus owned by Mariano Medina from
Cavite to Pasay. While on its way, the driver of the bus was driving fast and when he applied
the brakes it cause the bus to be overturned. The driver, the conductor, and some
passengers were able to free themselves from the bus except Bataclan and 3 others. The
passengers called the help of the villagers and as it was dark, the villagers brought torch
with them. The driver and the conductor failed to warn the would-be helpers of the fact that
gasoline has spilled from the overturned bus so a huge fire ensued which engulfed the bus
thereby killing the 4 passengers trapped inside. It was also found later in trial that the tires
of the bus were old.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their burning
by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
HELD: No. The proximate cause was the overturning of the bus which was caused by the
negligence of the driver because he was speeding and also he was already advised by
Medina to change the tires yet he did not. Such negligence resulted to the overturning of the
bus. The torches carried by the would-be helpers are not to be blamed. It is just but natural
for the villagers to respond to the call for help from the passengers and since it is a rural
area which did not have flashlights, torches are the natural source of lighting. Further, the
smell of gas could have been all over the place yet the driver and the conductor failed to
provide warning about said fact to the villagers.

WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE?

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom.

8. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1

Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found
the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano
went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and
Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A
quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg
with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable
settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980,
Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm.
He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by
the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial
based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters
death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset
time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from
theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted
by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later
or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause."

9. Jarco Marketing Corp. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong,
Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda Aguilar are spouses and
the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing
her credit card slip when she heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her
daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying and shouting
for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6
years old.
Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization,
medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages wherein they sought
the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for
attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter
was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial

court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous

counter. The counter was defective, unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was
absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the reversal of this
decision.
Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence
(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private
respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises
Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to
the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening
without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in determining the existence of
negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no
accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence.
(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements
made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered
under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and
concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the
circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and
in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord
credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that
facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to
secure or make stable the counter's base.
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of
the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to
remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation
petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a
family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption
that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she
climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory
that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not
have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial
court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it
was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its

top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not
secured. CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially,
ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily
released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time
ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and
the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time and distance
were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would
want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital
that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.

10. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8
Facts:
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able
to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads
office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power
plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode
the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries
to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to
children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps
which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However,
the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as
he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is
from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and
the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer,
and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.