Civpro Cases r1-3

RULE 1 - 3
CIVIL PROCEDURE [Cases 2017]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE
DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for
petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private
respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration
of the resolution of the Second Division
of January 28,1987 and another motion to
refer the case to and to be heard in oral
argument by the Court En Banc filed by
petitioners, the motion to refer the case to
the Court en banc is granted but the
motion to set the case for oral argument is
denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention
that the filing fee must be assessed on the
basis of the amended complaint cite the
case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They
contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case
differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for

recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land with damages. 2While the
present case is an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with
prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the
complaint seeks not only the annulment of
title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of
possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks
for the payment of actual moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom
in the amounts specified therein. 4 However,
in the present case, the prayer is for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture
of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs
for the property in question, to attach such
property of defendants that maybe sufficient
to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the
subject property and annul defendants' illegal
forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and severally to pay
plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as
maybe proved during the trial as attorney's
fees and declaring the tender of payment of
the purchase price of plaintiff valid and
producing the effect of payment and to make
the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges
the total amount of over P78 Million as
damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was
an honest difference of opinion as to the
nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The
complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. The damages
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stated were treated as merely to the main

cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of
only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's
fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such
honest difference of opinion. As maybe
gleaned from the allegations of the
complaint as well as the designation
thereof, it is both an action for damages
and specific performance. The docket fee
paid upon filing of complaint in the
amount only of P410.00 by considering
the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved
is not capable of pecuniary estimation is
obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in
the prayer of the complaint yet it is
spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00
which should be the basis of assessment
of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the
filing fee in this case was brought to the
attention of this Court together with
similar other cases an investigation was
immediately ordered by the Court.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another
counsel with leave of court filed an
amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and
Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint.
The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained. After this Court issued an
order on October 15, 1985 ordering the
reassessment of the docket fee in the
present case and other cases that were
investigated, on November 12, 1985 the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for. It was
only then that plaintiffs specified the
amount of damages in the body of the

complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the
trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the
amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering
the damages alleged in the original complaint
as it did not consider the damages to be
merely an or incidental to the action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real
property. 8 An amended complaint was filed
by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and
reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00.
Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
In the Magaspi case, the action was
considered not only one for recovery of
ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for the damages should be the basis
of assessment. Although the payment of the
docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be
insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an
"honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court
"had acquired jurisdiction over the case and
the proceedings thereafter had were proper
and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended
complaint superseded the original complaint,
the allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference
of opinion was possible as the allegations of
the complaint, the designation and the prayer
show clearly that it is an action for damages
and specific performance. The docketing fee
should be assessed by considering the amount
of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
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As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule

is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed
only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in
court . 12 Thus, in the present case the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by the payment of only P410.00
as docket fee. Neither can the amendment
of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction
upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes
there is no such original complaint that
was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial
court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly
ruled in the present case that the basis of
assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without
making the observation that it frowns at
the practice of counsel who filed the
original complaint in this case of omitting
any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the
amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly
intended for no other purpose than to
evade the payment of the correct filing
fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in
the assessment of the filing fee. This
fraudulent practice was compounded
when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
investigation, petitioner through another
counsel filed an amended complaint,
deleting all mention of the amount of
damages being asked for in the body of
the complaint. It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed
that the amount of damages be specified in

the amended complaint, that petitioners'
counsel wrote the damages sought in the
much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in
the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment
of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take
drastic action upon a repetition of this
unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth
all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount
of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint
or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The
ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE,
the
motion
for
reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
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EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD.,
(SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc
& De los Angeles Law Offices for
petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco,
Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for
private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the
issue of whether or not a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case when the correct
and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity)
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the
consignation of a premium refund on a
fire insurance policy with a prayer for the
judicial declaration of its nullity against
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent as declared in default
for failure to file the required answer
within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984,
private respondent filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
the refund of premiums and the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment which

was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177,
initially against petitioner SIOL, and
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J.
Warby as additional defendants. The
complaint sought, among others, the payment
of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary
and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
Although the prayer in the complaint did not
quantify the amount of damages sought said
amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by
private respondent as docket fee which
prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by
respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was
then presiding over said case. Upon the order
of this Court, the records of said case together
with twenty-two other cases assigned to
different branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket
fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court
thereafter returned the said records to the trial
court with the directive that they be re-raffled
to the other judges in Quezon City, to the
exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala
which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en
banc issued a Resolution in Administrative
Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the
judges in said cases to reassess the docket
fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its
payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of reassessment of docket fees. All litigants were
likewise required to specify in their pleadings
the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
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44
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On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P.

Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan
order to the Clerk of Court instructing
him to issue a certificate of assessment of
the docket fee paid by private respondent
and, in case of deficiency, to include the
same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default,
a cautionary answer was filed by
petitioners. On August 30,1984, an
amended complaint was filed by private
respondent including the two additional
defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom
Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter
assigned, after his assumption into office
on January 16, 1986, issued a
Supplemental Order requiring the parties
in the case to comment on the Clerk of
Court's letter-report signifying her
difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15,
1985 since the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not indicate the exact
amount sought to be recovered. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed
a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended
Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not
less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In
the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent
alleges actual and compensatory damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of
about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion
issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein
that the same constituted proper
compliance with the Resolution of this
Court and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the
reassessment of the docket fees. The

reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on
private respondent's claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket
fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals questioning the
said order of Judie Asuncion dated January
24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a
supplemental
complaint
alleging
an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or
some seven months after filing the
supplemental
complaint,
the
private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision ruling, among others, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CAG.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the
complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary
attachment, but giving due course to the
portion thereof questioning the reassessment
of the docketing fee, and requiring the
Honorable respondent Court to reassess the
docketing fee to be paid by private
respondent on the basis of the amount of
P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
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44
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During the pendency of this petition and

in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid
the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on
April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the
Court of Appeals erred in not finding that
the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177
on the ground of nonpayment of the
correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners
allege that while it may be true that
private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee as hereinabove related, and considering that the
total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should
be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having
paid the same, petitioners contend that the
complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the
Court
in Manchester
Development
4
Corporation vs. CA, as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the
amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent
with this pronouncement is overturned
and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent
claims
that
the
ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively
to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time
said civil case was filed in court there was
no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further,

private respondent avers that what is
applicable is the ruling of this Court in
Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5wherein this Court
held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense and to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this
Court held that the payment of the full
amount of the docket fee is an indispensable
step for the perfection of an appeal. In a
forcible entry and detainer case before the
justice of the peace court of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment
dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice
of appeal with said court but he deposited
only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of
P16.00 as required, within the reglementary
period of appeal of five (5) days after
receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff
deposited the additional P8.00 to complete
the amount of the docket fee only fourteen
(14) days later. On the basis of these facts,
this court held that the Court of First Instance
did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and
determine the appeal as the appeal was not
thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a
verified declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor
General in 1953 but the required filing fee
was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for
citizenship. This Court ruled that the
declaration was not filed in accordance with
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the legal requirement that such

declaration should be filed at least one
year before the filing of the petition for
citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court
concluded that the filing of petitioner's
declaration of intention on October 23,
1953 produced no legal effect until the
required filing fee was paid on May 23,
1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same
principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee
were applied. It was an original petition
for quo warranto contesting the right to
office of proclaimed candidates which
was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the
Court of First Instance, within the oneweek period after the proclamation as
provided therefor by law. 10 However, the
required docket fees were paid only after
the
expiration
of
said
period.
Consequently, this Court held that the
date of such payment must be deemed to
be the real date of filing of aforesaid
petition and not the date when it was
mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court
reiterated the rule that the docket fee must
be paid before a court will act on a
petition or complaint. However, we also
held that said rule is not applicable when
petitioner seeks the probate of several
wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each
will but instead he may have other wills
probated in the same special proceeding
then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated
the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case
is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of
its filing in court. Said case involved a
complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with
damages filed in the Court of First Instance of

Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the
docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R11882. The prayer of the complaint sought
that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
the name of the defendant be declared as null
and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be
declared as owner thereof to whom the proper
title should be issued, and that defendant be
made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00
from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property
is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and
exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel
the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the
docket fee to which an opposition was filed
by the plaintiff alleging that the action was
for the recovery of a parcel of land so the
docket fee must be based on its assessed
value and that the amount of P60.00 was the
correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered
the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the
amended complaint to include the Republic
as the defendant. In the prayer of the
amended complaint the exemplary damages
earlier sought was eliminated. The amended
prayer merely sought moral damages as the
court may determine, attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The
defendant filed an opposition to the amended
complaint. The opposition notwithstanding,
the amended complaint was admitted by the
trial court. The trial court reiterated its order
for the payment of the additional docket fee
which plaintiff assailed and then challenged
before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he
paid the total docket fee in the amount of
P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional
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fee it must be based on the amended

complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was
whether or not the plaintiff may be
considered to have filed the case even if
the docketing fee paid was not sufficient.
In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the
case was deemed filed only upon the
payment of the correct amount for the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of
the filing of the complaint; that there was
an honest difference of opinion as to the
correct amount to be paid as docket fee in
that as the action appears to be one for the
recovery of property the docket fee of
P60.00 was correct; and that as the action
is also one, for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee
based on the damages alleged in the
amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was
based on the damages alleged in the
original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manc
hester involves an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, etc. The prayer in said
case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during
the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the
sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs
for the property in question, the
attachment of such property of defendants
that may be sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered, and, after
hearing, the issuance of an order requiring
defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property
and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of
the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed
that the defendants be made to pay the
plaintiff jointly and severally, actual,

compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as 25% of said amounts as may be
proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The
plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare
the tender of payment of the purchase price of
plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of
payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is
not specified in the prayer although the body
of the complaint alleges the total amount of
over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by
plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff
paid the amount of only P410.00 for the
docket fee based on the nature of the action
for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. However, it was obvious from the
allegations of the complaint as well as its
designation that the action was one for
damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the
correct docket fee computed against the
amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the
prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel,
with leave of court, filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 by the
inclusion of another co-plaintiff and
eliminating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The
prayer in the original complaint was
maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the
re-assessment of the docket fee in the said
case and other cases that were investigated.
On November 12, 1985, the trial court
directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they
were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the
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44
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amount of damages alleged was reduced

to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that
"the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of filing in court," this
Court held that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by
payment of only P410.00 for the docket
fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes there was
no such original complaint duly filed
which could be amended. Consequently,
the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court were
declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is
among the several cases of underassessment of docket fee which were
investigated by this Court together
with Manchester.
The
facts
and
circumstances of this case are similar
to Manchester. In the body of the original
complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In
the prayer, the amount of damages asked
for was not stated. The action was for the
refund of the premium and the issuance of
the writ of preliminary attachment with
damages. The amount of only P210.00
was paid for the docket fee. On January
23, 1986, private respondent filed an
amended complaint wherein in the prayer
it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary
damages but in the body of the complaint
the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said
amended complaint was admitted and the
private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on

his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in
damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a
supplemental
complaint
alleging
an
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
damages so that his total claim is
approximately P64,601,620.70. On October
16, 1986, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the
respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein
private respondent was ordered to be
reassessed for additional docket fee, and
during the pendency of this petition, and after
the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28,
1988, private respondent paid an additional
docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private
respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee
considering the total amount of his claim in
the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting
to
about
P64,601,620.70,
petitioner insists that private respondent must
pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well
be applied in the present case. The pattern
and the intent to defraud the government of
the docket fee due it is obvious not only in
the filing of the original complaint but also in
the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not
pay any additional docket fee until] the case
was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.
Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud
committed on the government, this Court
held that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the
amended complaint could not have been
admitted inasmuch as the original complaint
was null and void.
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44
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In the present case, a more liberal

interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had
that sobering influence on private
respondent who thus paid the additional
docket fee as ordered by the respondent
court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such
additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the
docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount
of the claim. This is a matter which the
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his
duly authorized docket clerk or clerk incharge should determine and, thereafter, if
any amount is found due, he must require
the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
a reasonable time but also in no case beyond

its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the
court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess
and determine the additional filing fee that
should be paid by private respondent
considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned
from the allegations and the prayer thereof
and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
2. The same rule applies to permissive

counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing
fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may also allow payment of said fee within
Page 10 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 29115, promulgated on November 10,
1993, which affirmed with modification the
decision of the trial court, as well as its
resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466
for the grant of an easement of right of way
was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino
Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C.
Santos before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as
synthesized by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the
original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during
the pendency of this case and was substituted
by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116100
1996
February 9,
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA

CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and
MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF
PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH
181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This
petition
on certiorari assails
for
review
the decision of
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a

two-door apartment erected thereon situated
at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas,
Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able
to acquire said property through a contract of
sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and
Teodora Quintero as vendors last September
1981. Said property may be described to be
surrounded by other immovables pertaining
to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street
as the point of reference, on the left side,
going to plaintiff's property, the row of
houses will be as follows: That of defendants
Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of
Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that
of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that
of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a
Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P.
Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there
are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide
Page 11 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from

Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the
previously mentioned row of houses. The
second passageway is about 3 meters in
width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's
residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about
26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6
meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by
Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
remises and who were acknowledged by
plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said
tenants vacated the apartment and when
plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe
fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along
the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even
extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit
"1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for
plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1E") And it was then that the remaining
tenants of said apartment vacated the
area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos
testified that she constructed said fence
because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in
said apartment along the first passageway.
She also mentioned some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of
her house a pathway such as when some
of the tenants were drunk and would bang
their doors and windows. Some of their
footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis
in original text; corrections in parentheses
supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was

rendered by the trial court, with this
dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access
ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants
Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for
the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective
litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff
represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals
raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier
stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court with modification, the decretal portion
of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein
grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The
Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to
pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty
Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual
Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos
as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand
(P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The
rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all
respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's
motion
for
6
reconsideration. Petitioners then took the
Page 12 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
present recourse to us, raising two issues,

namely, whether or not the grant of right
of way to herein private respondents is
proper, and whether or not the award of
damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein
petitioners are already barred from raising
the same. Petitioners did not appeal from
the decision of the court a quo granting
private respondents the right of way,
hence they are presumed to be satisfied
with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court
as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of
the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the
trial court to the Court of Appeals,
petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the
decision of the trial court. That decision
of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be
reviewed, much less reversed, by this
Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil
case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other
than what was granted in the decision of
the lower court. The appellee can only
advance any argument that he may deem
necessary to defeat the appellant's claim
or to uphold the decision that is being
disputed, and he can assign errors in his
brief if such is required to strengthen the
views expressed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to
maintain the appealed decision on other
grounds, but not for the purpose of
reversing or modifying the judgment in
the appellee's favor and giving him other
affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we

agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor
of private respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading of
the decision of the Court of Appeals will
show that the award of damages was based
solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form
of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated
the leased premises by reason of the closure
of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,
and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely
part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it.10 The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that
an individual was injured in contemplation of
Page 13 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
law. Thus, there must first be the breach

of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to
state that there should be tort liability
merely because the plaintiff suffered some
pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries
are inflicted by acts or omissions which
cause damage or loss to another but which
violate no legal duty to such other person,
and consequently create no cause of
action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will
give redress for an act causing damage,
that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et
injuria.13 If, as may happen in many
cases, a person sustains actual damage,
that is, harm or loss to his person or
property, without sustaining any legal
injury, that is, an act or omission which
the law does not deem an injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque
injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was
damage, there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said
to have violated the principle of abuse of
right. In order that the principle of abuse
of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that
the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy; (2) The acts should be
willful; and (3) There was damage or injury

to the plaintiff.15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence
within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.16 It is within
the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose
and fence their property. Article 430 of the
Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence,
the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in
favor of private respondents, either by law or
by contract. The fact that private respondents
had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision
of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to
use the said passageway after payment of the
compensation and imposed a corresponding
duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had
an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an
act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have
been sustained by private respondents by
reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and
enjoyment of his own property, according to
Page 14 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
his pleasure, for all the purposes to which

such property is usually applied. As a
general rule, therefore, there is no cause
of action for acts done by one person
upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts
incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such
damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria. 18 When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and
ordinary manner in which the property is
used, such as fencing or enclosing the
same as in this case, nobody can complain
of having been injured, because the
incovenience arising from said use can be
considered as a mere consequence of
community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right
cannot constitute a legal wrong for which
an action will lie, 20 although the act may
result in damage to another, for no legal
right has been invaded. 21 One may use
any lawful means to accomplish a lawful
purpose and though the means adopted
may cause damage to another, no cause of
action arises in the latter's favor. An injury
or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
absque injuria. The courts can give no
redress for hardship to an individual
resulting
from
action
reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of
the foregoing premises, the appealed
decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the judgment of the trial court is
correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS INC.,
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA
CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC.,
DONEDCO PLANTERS ASSOCIATION
INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE
ROJAS, ALFREDO MONTELIBANO,
JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO,
Page 15 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH

MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA,
JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO
ALONSO, MIGUEL GATUSLAO,
PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San
Agustin Law Offices for private
respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, in this special action for
certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeks to annul the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court dated
December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order
of the then Court of First Instance of
Bacolod City which denied petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel
filed by private respondents (Civil Case
No. 15812), and the Resolution dated
March 10, 1983 which denied its Motion
for Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private
respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental
claiming to have 8,500 members and
several individual sugar planters, filed
Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf
and/or as a class suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against petitioner and
two
of
petitioners'
non-resident
correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning
and Barry Came. The complaint alleged
that petitioner and the other defendants
committed libel against them by the
publication of the article "An Island of
Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of
petitioner's
weekly
news
magazine Newsweek.
The
article
supposedly portrayed the island province of

Negros Occidental as a place dominated by
big landowners or sugarcane planters who not
only exploited the impoverished and
underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but
also brutalized and killed them with
imprunity. Complainants therein alleged that
said article, taken as a whole, showed a
deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation
of facts intended to put them (sugarcane
planters) in bad light, expose them to public
ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the
Philippines and abroad, and make them
objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of
their agricultural workers and of the public in
general. They prayed that defendants be
ordered to pay them PlM as actual and
compensatory damages, and such amounts for
moral, exemplary and corrective damages as
the court may determine, plus expenses of
litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A
photo copy of the article was attached to the
complaint.
On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the
printed article sued upon is not actionable in
fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is
bereft of allegations that state, much less
support a cause of action. It pointed out the
non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. Private respondents
filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss
and petitioner filed a reply.
On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on
which the motion to dismiss are predicated
are not indubitable as the complaint on its
face states a valid cause of action; and the
question as to whether the printed article sued
upon its actionable or not is a matter of
evidence.
Petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.
Page 16 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a

petition for certiorari with respondent
Court (CA-G. R. No. 14406) seeking the
annulment of the aforecited trial court's
Orders for having been issued with such a
grave abuse of discretion as amounting to
lack of jurisdiction and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action.
As earlier stated, respondent Court
affirmed the trial court's Orders in a
Decision dated December 17, 1982 and
ordered the case to be tried on the merits
on the grounds that -(1) the complaint
contains allegations of fact which called
for the presentation of evidence; and (2)
certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be made
to substitute for an appeal where an
appeal would lie at a proper time.
Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the
respondent Court denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision, hence this petition.
The proper remedy which petitioner
should have taken from the decision of
respondent Court is an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and not the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of said Rules. However, since the petition
was filed on time within fifteen days from
notice of the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, we shall treat
the same as a petition for review on
certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the
petition are: (1) whether or not the private
respondents' complaint failed to state a
cause of action; and (2) whether or not the
petition for certiorari and prohibition is
proper to question the denial of a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action.
First, petitioner argues that private

respondents' complaint failed to state a cause
of action because the complaint made no
allegation that anything contained in the
article complained of regarding sugarcane
planters referred specifically to any one of the
private respondents; that libel can be
committed only against individual reputation;
and that in cases where libel is claimed to
have been directed at a group, there is
actionable defamation only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to
do damage to a specific, individual group
member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16
SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to
maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L16772, November 30, 1962), although it is
not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R.
116)." In an earlier case, this Court declared
that" ... defamatory matter which does not
reveal the Identity of the person upon whom
the imputation is cast, affords no ground of
action unless it be shown that the readers of
the libel could have Identified the personality
of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs.
Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil.
760).
This principle has been recognized to be of
vital importance, especially where a group or
class of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to
have been defamed, for it is evident that the
larger the collectivity, the more difficult it is
for the individual member to prove that the
defamatory remarks apply to him. (Cf. 70
ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32
Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Page 17 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or

group of persons in general language
only, are not actionable by individuals
composing the class or group unless the
statements are sweeping; and it is very
probable that even then no action would
lie where the body is composed of so
large a number of persons that common
sense would tell those to whom the
publication was made that there was room
for persons connected with the body to
pursue an upright and law abiding course
and that it would be unreasonable and
absurd to condemn all because of the
actions of a part. (supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that
where the defamation is alleged to have
been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so
sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each
individual in the class or group can prove
that the defamatory statement specifically
pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a
"class suit" in representation of all the
8,500 sugarcane planters of Negros
Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and
argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by
the filing of a class suit on behalf of the
aforesaid sugar planters.
We
find
meritorious.
petitioner's
contention
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not

a case where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559)
or where the representation of class
interest affected by the judgment or
decree is indispensable to make each member

of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case
where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and
distinct reputation in the community. They do
not have a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which
refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed
to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola
as a sugar planter. The news report merely
stated that the victim had been arrested by
members of a special police unit brought into
the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it
does to an official act performed by an
elective public official, is within the realm of
privilege and protected by the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and press.
The article further stated that Sola and the
commander of the special police unit were
arrested. The Court takes judicial notice of
this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is
whether or not the special civil action of
certiorari or prohibition is available to
petitioner whose motion to dismiss the
complaint and subsequent motion for
reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion
to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or
order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The
ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same
rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer
a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a
judgment of acquittal.
Page 18 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
This general rule is subject to certain

exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the
defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment. In
such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal
cannot be plain and adequate. The
following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554),
upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss
the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616),
upon the denial of a motion to quash
based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674),
based on improper venue, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss
the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80),
based on bar by prior judgment, this Court

granted the petition for certiorari and directed
the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668),
upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based
on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and dismissed the
amended complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this
Court granted the petition for certiorari after
the motion to quash based on double jeopardy
was denied by respondent judge and ordered
him to desist from further action in the
criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order
denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and
the criminal case was dismissed by this
Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general
rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that
none of the exceptions is present in the case
at bar and that the case appears complex and
complicated, necessitating a full-blown trial
to get to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of
action against it by pointing out the nonlibelous nature of the article sued upon. There
is no need of a trial in view of the conclusion
of this Court that the article in question is not
libelous. The specific allegation in the
complaint, to the effect that the article
attributed to the sugarcane planters the deaths
and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not
borne out by a perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the
favorable working conditions of the
agricultural workers in the sugar industry and
the various foundations and programs
Page 19 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
supported by planters' associations for the

benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the
statements in the article in question are
sweeping
and
exaggerated;
but,
paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco
case above quoted, it would be
unreasonable and absurd to condemn the
majority of the sugarcane planters, who
have at heart the welfare of their workers,
because of the actions of a part.
Nonetheless, articles such as the one in
question may also serve to prick the
consciences of those who have but are not
doing anything or enough for those who
do not have.
On the other hand, petitioner would do
well to heed the admonition of the
President to media that they should check
the sources of their information to ensure
the publication of the truth. Freedom of
the press, like all freedoms, should be
exercised with responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed
and the complaint in Civil Case No.
15812 of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap,
Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras,
JJ., concur.
N BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and

JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES,
GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and
DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and
MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,
minors and represented by their parents
GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN
ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by
his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL
and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II
and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE,
all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA
SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA.,
all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented
by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
Page 20 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
MARIETTE, all surnamed

CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN
and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI
QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL,
minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources,
and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO
U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears
upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital

life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case
No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now
the principal petitioners, are all minors duly
represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper
motion
by
the
petitioners. 1 The
2
complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about
the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to
Page 21 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
(1) Cancel all existing timber license

agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other
reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general
averments that the Philippine archipelago
of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and
unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest
cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural,
residential,
industrial,
commercial and other uses; the distortion
and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages
resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer,"
as well as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) salinization of the water table as a
result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential
loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded
estimated
at
one
billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and
varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and
dislocation
of
cultural
communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as
is presently experienced by the entire country,
(h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation
and the generation of electric power, and (k)
the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to
perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation
are
so
capable
of
unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed
their intention to present expert witnesses as
well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically
allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
Page 22 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the

foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the
Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal
that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary
growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the
defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate
area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12.
At
the
present
rate
of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares
per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will
be bereft of forest resources after the end
of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences,
serious
injury
and
irreparable damage of this continued trend
of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's
generation and to generations yet unborn
are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages

enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already
being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great
damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique
natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1,
1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
Page 23 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
indigenous cultures which the Philippines

had been abundantly blessed with.
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article

II, id.)
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the

aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the
policy of the State
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the

highest law of humankind the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to selfpreservation and perpetuation.
(a) to create, develop, maintain and

improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conductive
to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued
refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's
is
contradictory
to
the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth."
(Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and
22. There is no other plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant,
Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their
12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the
action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an
order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it
raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on
the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
Page 24 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
abused his discretion in dismissing the

action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffsminors not only represent their children,
but have also joined the latter in this
case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due
course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment
in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint
clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine
Environmental
Policy),
Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man's inalienable right to selfpreservation
and
self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's
right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the
respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent
Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that

the same does not apply in this case because
TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that
the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
"protection by the state in its capacity
as parens
patriae."
Such
allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the
TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised
nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other
forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.
Page 25 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
Before going any further, We must first

focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90777 as a class suit. The original defendant
and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of
the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently,
since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a
valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the
instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and
novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature."
Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious
disposition,
utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other

natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to
come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having
thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to
the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in
question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for
having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The pertinent portions of the said order reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of
the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging,
with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect,
or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
Page 26 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
action in its Complaint against the herein

defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes
that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter
of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3)
co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving,
accepting,
processing,
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the
complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health

which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is to be found under the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such
a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are
now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange
transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Page 27 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo

Azcuna who sponsored the section in
question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to
provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to
healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not
impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment
of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental
balance
would
be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to
a balanced and healthful ecology and the
right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987
E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency
responsible
for
the
conservation,
management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those
in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the

licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of
the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the
following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and
other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the
development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well.
It is also the policy of the state to recognize
and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially restated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The
State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources,
consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and
the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different
Page 28 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
segments of the present as well as future

generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and
apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the
necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing
the
quality
of
the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title,
on the other hand, specifically speaks of
the mandate of the DENR; however, it
makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and
higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control
and
supervise
the
exploration,
development,
utilization,
and
conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases
for policy formulation, and have defined
the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even
before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid
special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and

P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions
under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the
attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the
"responsibilities of each generation as trustee
and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said
policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty under its mandate and by virtue of its
powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and
the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect
and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be
renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of
the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
Page 29 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a

motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the
court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of
falsity of the said allegations is beside the
point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting
such alleged facts to be true, may the
court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante
vs.
21
Edrosolano, this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing
upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest,
by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the
law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on
the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights. On the basis
thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly
or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party
defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90777 be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the
executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights
which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his
book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of
this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights
as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments
of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the
Page 30 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
legislature and to declare their acts invalid

for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz,
now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court
in dismissing the complaint is the nonimpairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared
that:
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving,
accepting,
processing,
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the
contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked,
by such a sweeping pronouncement. In
the first place, the respondent Secretary
did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in

his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have
acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly
respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest
so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form
of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not
a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person
to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested
Page 31 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).

Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs.
Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests
so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee)
and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts,
the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation
of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.

Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations
or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of
government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth
in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
Page 32 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
In short, the non-impairment clause must

yield to the police power of the state. 31
FELICIANO, J., concurring
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the
trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the
prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber
licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in
the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with
merit, the instant Petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took
no part.
Separate Opinions
I join in the result reached by my

distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one
of the most important cases decided by this
Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management
of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I
have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners
have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here
involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who
may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be
seen
therefore
to
be
recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities
operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of
action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act,
in the first instance, on the part of the
Page 33 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
governmental agency concerned must be

shown
("prior
exhaustion
of
administrative
remedies"),
is
not
discussed in the decision and presumably
is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the
complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that,
accordingly,
it
has
been
"constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in
fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after
strip-mining
or
open-pit
mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral
reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide
and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The
other statements pointed out by the Court:
Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated
10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV

of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D.
No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to
be formulations of policy, as general and
abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977,
entitled "The Philippine Environment Code,"
is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
conservation embracing:
and
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface
and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this
connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the
Court has identified the particular provision
or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Page 34 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
Environment Code which give rise to a

specific legal right which petitioners are
seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies
with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of
guidelines and programs dealing with
each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned
above. The
Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other
words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding
petitioners' cause of action as anchored on
a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15
(and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners
must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should
be understood as simply saying that such
a more specific legal right or
rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles
found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment

Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so
to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right
which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather
than
a
constitutional
or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words,
there are due process dimensions to this
matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration
where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
involving rights
which are legally
determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the
right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it
is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into
Page 35 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
the uncharted ocean of social and

economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical
competence
and
experience
and
professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly
insists that the timber companies, whose
concession
agreements
or
TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that,
if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The
answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal
right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights
and the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under
all the circumstances which exist.
I
vote
to
grant
the
Petition
for Certiorari because the protection of
the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines
set out in the Court's decision issued today

should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my
distinguished brother in the Court, Davide,
Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one
of the most important cases decided by this
Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction
and course of the protection and management
of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I
have therefore sought to clarify, basically to
myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners
have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners' claim that their suit is
properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal
interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here
involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who
may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be
seen
therefore
to
be
recognizing
a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly
Page 36 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
concerned and the private persons or

entities operating in the field or sector of
activity
involved.
Whether
such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or
whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown ("prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies"),
is not discussed in the decision and
presumably
is
left
for
future
determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the
complaint has alleged and focused upon
"one specific fundamental legal right
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that,
accordingly,
it
has
been
"constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with
very great respect, that it cannot be
characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in
fact very difficult to fashion language
more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and
control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles;
of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil
rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after
strip-mining
or
open-pit
mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral
reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and

other chemicals; contamination of ground
water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section
3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No.
1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and
abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology")
and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977,
entitled "The Philippine Environment Code,"
is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide
range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management
conservation embracing:
and
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface
and ground water
Page 37 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this
connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor
the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the
Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which
petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment
Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged
with the formulation and implementation
of guidelines and programs dealing with
each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned
above. The
Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other
words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding
petitioners' cause of action as anchored on
a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15
(and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their
present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future
cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners
must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated
by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be

understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general
policy principles found in the Constitution
and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court
should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of
aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right
which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather
than
a
constitutional
or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to
have been violated or disregarded is given
specification in operational terms, defendants
may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words,
there are due process dimensions to this
matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration
where a specific violation of law or
applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
involving rights
which are legally
determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 38 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
When substantive standards as general as

"the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology" and "the right to health" are
combined with remedial standards as
broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is
respectfully submitted, to propel courts
into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in
respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts
have no claim to special technical
competence
and
experience
and
professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and
executive departments must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion
and promulgate those norms and
standards, and to implement them before
the courts should intervene.
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all

the circumstances which exist.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly

insists that the timber companies, whose
concession
agreements
or
TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents
should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that,
if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of
breach by the timber companies of one or
more of the specific terms and conditions
of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will
those companies litigate about? The
answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal
right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights
and the claimed wrongful acts or failures
to act of public respondent administrative
agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or
The Court deliberated on the letter-request of

Atty. Pablito M. Rojas dated January 5, 1988,
the comments thereon of Quezon City
Executive Judge B.D. Chingcuangco and of
counsel for Sulpicio Lines et al, and the reply
to said comments.
I
vote
to
grant
the
Petition
for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of
our territory, is of extreme importance for the
country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 88-1-646-0 March 3, 1988
RE: REQUEST OF THE PLAINTIFFS,
HEIRS OF THE PASSENGERS OF THE
DOA PAZ TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER
DATED JANUARY 4, 1988 OF JUDGE
B.D. CHINGCUANGCO.
It appears that on January 4, 1988 a

complaint for damages amounting to more
than one and a half billion pesos was filed in
the name and behalf of the relatives or heirs
of the victims of "the worst sea disaster in
history:" the sinking of the vessel Doa Paz
caused by its collision with another vessel.
The complaint characterized the action
thereby instituted as a "lass suit",prosecuted
by the twenty-seven (27) named plaintiffs in
their behalf and in presentation of the
approximately 4,000 persons . . . (who also)
are all close relatives and legal heirs of the
passengers of the Doa Paz" (par. 5). The
action's character as a class suit results, it is
Page 39 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
claimed, from "the subject matter . . .

(thereof being) of general or common
interest to 4,000 persons, more or less, all
of whom are residing variously in Samar,
Leyte and Metro Manila;" and its
institution is proper because the Identified
plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous and
representative to fully protect the interests
of all" (par. 3). The complaint prayed that
... judgment be rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and all other persons embraced
in this class suit, and against the
defendants, ordering them to pay to the
former, jointly and severally, as follows:
a) From P200,000.00 to P400,000.00 per
victim or passenger who perished in the
sinking of the vessel DOA PAZ, by way
of actual or compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, or the total amount
of
from
P800,000,000.00
to
Pl,200,000,000.00
(should
be
P1,600,000,000.00) for all of the 4,000
passengers on board said vessel;
b) an amount which this Honorable Court
may deem just and reasonable as and by
way of attorney's fees and, under the
circumstances
of
this
case,
P10,000,000.00 would be reasonable;
"national concern as shown by the public

outcry and sustained publicity that it has
evoked,' the Court "may be justified in ...
(allowing them) to file the instant suit as
pauper litigants or, in the alternative, (ruling)
that the legal fees incident to the filing of this
case may constitute a lien on whatever
judgment may be recovered by the plaintiffs
therein." On the same day, their counsel
submitted a certification of the City Assessor
of Quezon City of even date to the effect
"that according to the assessment records x x
there is no property whether land or
improvements registered for taxation
purposes in the . . names of' seven (7) of the
named plaintiffs.
By Order dated January 4, 1988, the motion
was granted by Judge Chingcuangco in his
capacity as Executive Judge only in so far as
said seven (7) plaintiffs were concerned, but
not as regards the case.
It is this order that the plaintiffs, in their
counsel's aforementioned letter of January 5,
1988, request this Court to set aside. They ask
that they all instead be allowed to prosecute
the case as pauper litigants and they be
exempt from paying filing fees which they
say have "been assessed in the amount of
P6,060,252.50 based on the total maximum
claim of P1,200,000,000.00 as per the
complaint."
xxx xxx xxx

Together with the complaint, the plaintiffs
filed a "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
CASE AS PAUPER LITIGANT." They
alleged that "a big majority ... (of them)
are poor and have no sufficient means to
finance the filing of this case especially
because, considering the gargantuan
amount of damages involved, the amount
of filing fee alone will run to several
thousands of pesos," that in view thereof
and the fact that the case was one of
In the comment (dated January 22, 1988)

submitted by him in response to this Court's
direction, Judge Chingcuangco declared that
he had opted to leave the matter of the
propriety of the class suit "to the sound
judgment of the branch to which this case
may be raffled," although he personally
"would have freely allowed all plaintiffs to
litigate as pauper litigants and close ... (his)
eyes to the fact that one of them is the present
Clerk of this Court and another regional trial
court judge;"and that he had 'suggested to the
Page 40 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
plaintiffs' counsel to seek the assistance of

the highest tribunal of the land with the
fond hope that it may once again exercise
its highly-regarded judicial activism by
allowing that which this Executive Judge
cannot do, that is, allow, in the highest
interest of public service, all plaintiffs to
litigate as pauper litigants, and consider
the case as a class suit."
The defendants, Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et
al., in their own comment, point out that
there were only 1,493 passengers on
board the Doa Paz at the time of the
tragedy, not 4,000; they have not been
remiss in attending to the immediate
needs and claims of the the legal basis for
the claim and the amount of damages
recoverable;"' it is doubtful whether 27
plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous and
representative to fully protect the interests
of all the suit preempts the other
claimants' cause of action as to the
amount of recovery and as to the venue of
the suit; there are in truth only seven
plaintiffs qualified to sue as pauper
litigants; and the claimants not authorized
to sue as paupers may continue with the
action.
In the first place, it is not the rule
governing class suits under Section 12,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court that in truth
is involved in the proceedings at bar, but
that concerning permissive joinder of
parties in Section 6 of the same Rule
3. 1 It is perhaps not inappropriate for the
Court to avail of the opportunity that the
proceeding at bar presents to point out the
distinctions between the two rules, as
these appear to have been missed by the
petitioners and even by the Court a quo.
The first cited provision reads as follows:
SEC. 12. Class Suit. When the subject

matter of his controversy is one of csurvivors
and next of kin of the victims; each claimant
is a class unto himself in terms of ommon or
general interest to many persons, and the
parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. But in such case the court shall
make sure that the parties actually before it
are sufficiently numerous and representative
so that all interests concerned are fully
protected. Any party in interest shall have a
right to intervene in protection of his
individual interest.
What is contemplated, as will be noted, is that
(a) the subject matter in controversy is of
common or general interest to many persons,
and (b) those persons are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court. Illustrative of the rule is a so-called
derivative suit brought in behalf of numerous
stockholders of a corporation to perpetually
enjoin or nullify what is claimed to be a
breach of trust or an ultra vires act of the
company's board of directors. 2 In such a suit,
there is one, single right of action pertaining
to numerous stockholders, not multiple rights
belonging separately to several, distinct
persons.
On the other hand, if there are many persons
who have distinct, separate rights against the
same party or group of parties, but those
rights arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions and there are common
questions of fact or law resulting therefrom,
the former may join as plaintiffs in one action
against the same defendant. This is authorized
by
the
above
mentioned joinder-ofparties rule in Section 6 of Rule 3.
SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All
persons in whom or against whom any right
to relief in respect to or arising out of the
Page 41 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
same transaction or series of transaction is

alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action;
but the court may make such orders as
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put
texpense in connection with any
proceedings in which he may have no
interests.
or law are at issue. What makes the situation

a proper case for a class suit is the
circumstance that there is only one right or
cause of action pertaining or belonging in
common to many persons, not separately or
severally to distinct individuals.
For instance, it has been held that

employees dismissed by their employer
on the same occasion for substantially the
same reasons, allegedly without cause or
justification, may join as plaintiff in a
single action to obtain relief from their
employer. 3 In such a case, the plaintiff
each have a material interest only in the
damages properly due to him, not in those
that may be payable to the others,
although their rights thereto arise from the
same transaction. In other words, there are
as many rights of action as there are
plaintiffs joined in the action. Similarly,
the owner of a tract of land whose
property has been illegally occupied by
many persons claiming different portions
thereof, may bring a single action against
all illegal occupants thereof, in
accordance with this rule of permissive
joinder of parties. 4 The right of action is
not unal but plural, there being as many
rights asserted in the action as there are
defendants, each defendant having an
interest only in the portion of the land
occupied by him.
A "true class actions" distinguished from

the so-called hybrid and the spurious class
action in U.S. Federal Practice-involves
principles of compulsory joinder, since . .
(were it not) for the numerosity of the class
members all should ... (be) before the court.
Included within the true class suit ... (are)
the shareholders' derivative suit and a class
action by or against an unincorporated
association. ... A judgment in a class suit,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class,
is
binding
under res
judicata principles upon all the members of
the class, whether or not they were before
the court. It is the non-divisible nature of
the right sued on which determines both the
membership of the class and the
res judicata effect of the final determination
of the right. 6
It is true that in both juridical situations,

similar essential factors exist i.e., the
same transaction or series of transactions
is involved; and common questions of fact
An action instituted by several hundred

members of a voluntary association against
their officers to compel them to wind up the
association's affairs and render an accounting
The "true" class action, which is the invention

of equity, is one which involves the
enforcement of a right which is joint,
common, or secondary or derivative. ... (It) is
a suit wherein, but for the class action device,
the joinder of all interested parties would be
essential. 5
The object of the suit is to obtain relief for or

against numerous persons as a group or as an
integral entity, and not as separate, distinct
individuals whose rights or liabilities are
separate from and independent of those
affecting the others. 7
Page 42 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
of the money and property in their

possession has been held to be a class
suit. 8 In that case there was in truth only
one single right of action sought to be
enforced by the numerous plaintiff, not
separate, individual, distinct rights
pertaining independently to them. 9
On the other hand unlike an action by
numerous stockholders (which is properly
a class suit) to restrain an unauthorized
act of a corporation's board of directors,
e.g., to extend or shorten the corporate life
or increase capital stock of incur bonded
indebtedness without the specified
majority vote prescribed by the
Corporation Law, in which the right
sought to be vindicated is single, common
and general, not multiple and separate and
distinct from each other's 10 an action
by shareholders of a banking corporation,
for example, to enforce their right to
subscribe to stock left unsubscribed by
other stockholders who failed to exercise
their own right to do so on or before a
stipulated date, was held not to be a class
suit since each one of them 'had
determinable interest; each one had a
right, if any, only to his respective portion
of the stocks (or a definite number of
shares) ... and (no one) of them had any
right to, or any interest in, the stock to
which another was entitled." 11So, too, an
action for libel flied in behalf of 8,500
sugarcane planters has been held not to be
a class suit since 'each of the plaintiffs has
a separate and distinct reputation in the
community ... (and) do not have a
common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy. 12 But in all
these instances, and prescinding from
pragmatic considerations, a permissive
joinder of parties would have been
perfectly proper in accordance with the
aforecited Section 6 of Rule 3 . 13
The other factor that serves to distinguish the

rule on class suits from that of permissive
joinder of parties is, of course, the
numerousness of parties involved in the
former. The rule is that for a class suit to be
allowed, it is needful inter alia that the
parties be so numerous that it would be
impracticable to bring them all before the
court.
The case at bar not being a proper one for a
class suit, it follows that the action may not
be maintained by a representative few in
behalf of all the others. Be all this as it may,
as regards the computation of the amount
involved in the action for purposes of
determining the original jurisdiction over it,
and the correlative matter of the amount of
filing fees to be paid, it is immaterial whether
the rule applied be that on class suits
or permissive joinder of parties. For in either
case, it is the totality of the amounts claimed
by or against the parties that determines
jurisdiction, exclusive only of interest and
costs. 14
The second question-whether or not the
numerous claimants, should they join as
parties plaintiff, may be allowed to sue as
pauper litigants, not because they are shown
to be without means to maintain their suits,
but on the ground of the alleged "national
importance" of the subject matter, or upon an
unverified averment that most of them are
impecunious-yields another negative answer.
The rule on the matter is clear. A party may
be allowed to litigate in forma pauper is only.
. upon a proper showing that he has no means
to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the
corresponding provincial, city or municipal
treasurer, or otherwise. 15
Thus, every would be litigant who seeks
exemption from the payment of the fees
prescribed for maintaining an action must
Page 43 of
44
RULE 1 - 3
establish, not simply allege, his lack of

means Where there is a multiplicity of
such parties, each must show such lack,
in propria persona as it were. And that the
particular circumstances or possible
consequences
of
an
actual
or
contemplated suit are such as to transcend
the narrow personal interests of the
immediate parties thereto and to so
impinge upon the wider interests of the
people at large as to assume an aspect of
"national importance," does not under any
existing law or rule justify excusing such
parties from paying the requisite judicial
fees or costs.
WHEREFORE, the order complained of

being in accordance with law, the solicitation
to set aside the same, and to be exempted
from observance of the rule on paupers
litigant, is DENIED. The authority to litigate
in the form of a class action is likewise
DENIED.
It should moreover be quite obvious that

the denial of the privilege to prosecute as
paupers litigant to those who do not
qualify as such cannot in any sense be
deemed a denial of free access to the
courts by reason of poverty, 16 as counsel
for the plaintiffs suggests.
Everyone and the members of the
Court are no exception deplores that
tragedy
that
claimed
so
many
unsuspecting victims in what has been
described, to repeat, as 'the worst single
-disaster' in maritime history. Everyone
condoles and symphatizes with those
whom the victims, both known and
unknown, left behind, many of whom
were denied even the small consolation of
being able to bury their dead. Everyone
undoubtedly hopes and wishes that these
survivors may quickly obtain adequate
recompense for the untimely loss of their
loved ones. But sympathy and
commiseration however-well-deserved,
are not considerations that would
justifiably argue for bending or dispensing
with the observance of the rules which
prescribe now such vindication may be
obtained in the courts of law.
Page 44 of
44

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RULE 1 - 3

CIVIL PROCEDURE [Cases 2017]

1. The Magaspi case was an action for

stated were treated as merely to the main

amount of damages in the body of the

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule

that the amount of damages be specified in

of a writ of preliminary attachment which

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P.

reassessment of the docket fees. The

During the pendency of this petition and

no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further,

the legal requirement that such

damages filed in the Court of First Instance of

fee it must be based on the amended

plaintiff jointly and severally, actual,

amount of damages alleged was reduced

additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on

In the present case, a more liberal

a reasonable time but also in no case beyond

2. The same rule applies to permissive

respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a

and is about 20 meters distan(t) from

On February 27, 1990, a decision was

present recourse to us, raising two issues,

However, with respect to the second issue, we

law. Thus, there must first be the breach

willful; and (3) There was damage or injury

his pleasure, for all the purposes to which

VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH

supposedly portrayed the island province of

On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a

First, petitioner argues that private

Defamatory remarks directed at a class or

The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not

decree is indispensable to make each member

This general rule is subject to certain

based on bar by prior judgment, this Court

supported by planters' associations for the

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and

MARIETTE, all surnamed

unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital

(1) Cancel all existing timber license

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the

matter of fact, the environmental damages

indigenous cultures which the Philippines

harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the

(a) to create, develop, maintain and

22. There is no other plain, speedy and

abused his discretion in dismissing the

impairment clause, petitioners maintain that

Before going any further, We must first

fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other

action in its Complaint against the herein

This right unites with the right to health

Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo

lands of the public domain, as well as the

segments of the present as well as future

1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and