Author in Chinese Supervisor Author's Information

2016
Abstract in Chinese ,
, 2001 8 21
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Abstract With the development of Chinese economy and capital market, the
number of listed companies in China has gradually increased. In order to in line
with international standards and improve Chinas capital market order, China
Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated an regulation, "Guidance on the
establishment of independent director system in the liseted company" on Auguse
21,2001. This is a milestone of implementing the independent director system in
China. Thereafter, the independent director system has been a hot topic in the
field of corporate governance gradually. So far, the politically connected
independent directors have been a significant component of independent
directors in China. However, less attentition has been paid to the issues on
politically connected independent directors in the academic field.In order to fill
this gap in the academic field, on a political connection perspective, this
dissertation aims to discuss two related issues. First, the impact of political
connection on the employing of independent directors in Chinese private-owned
listed firms. To this issue, this dissertation empirically examines the impact of
non-independent directorspolitical connection on a firms probability of
employing politically connected independent directors. Also, this dissertation
examines the impact of year variation, area variation and industry variation on
that probability. The second issue in this dissertation is the impact of
independent directorspolitical connection on the firm performance of privateowned listed firms in China. In doing so, this dissertation builds an analytical
framework to examine the impact of independent directorspolitical connection
on firm performance, from the perspectives of principal-agent theory and
informal institution.Based on the analytical framework, this dissertation
empirically examines four questions. First, is independent directors political
connection helpful to improve the corporate governance performance of privateowned listed firm in China? Second, can independent directors political

connection bring firm more valuable policy rescources, and in turn have positive
impact on the economic performance of private-owned listed firm in China?
Third, does the impact of independent directors political connection on firm
performance differ by the types of political connection? Finally, does regional
institututional environment have impact on the relations between independent
directors political connection and firm performance of private-owned listed firm
in China?Based on the literature review, analytical framework building and
empirical study, this dissertation has four main findings. First, on the
independent director employing issue, the empirical results suggest that
compared to the private-owned listed firm without politically connected nonindependent directors, the private-owned listed firm with politically connected
non-independent directors is more available to employ politically connected
independent director in China. Moreover, the factors like year variation, area
variation and industry variation are all influencial on the probability of employing
politically connected independent directors in China.Second, on a principal-agent
theory perspective, to some extent, the independent directors political
connection can improve the corporate governance performance of private-owned
listed firms in China. It has positive impact on restricting the scale of related part
transaction of private-owned listed firms in China, while does not have significant
impact on improving the information disclosure quality of these firms.Third, on
an informal institution perspective, the independent directors political
connection can bring firm more government subsidies, and in turn has positive
impact on the economic performance of private-owned firm in China. However,
the regression results also show that the positive impact of government
subsidies on economic performance of firm has a character of time-lag. To date,
the impact of independent directors political connection on firms government
subsidies gain differs by the types of political connection. That is, whether a
private-owned listed firm in China has an independent director who is (or was) a
government official, matters to the government subsidies gain of firm. While, it is
not the same to the independent director as a memner of the National Peoples
Congress or Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference. Moreover, the
empirical results also indicate that the private-owned listed firms with
independent directors political connections to a higher level of governments can
gain more government subsidies.Finally, in the process of Chinas economic
transition, the variation of institututional environment among regions is
influencial to the relation between independent directors political connection
and firm performance. Specificly, after considering the varication of institutional
environment among regions, the impact of independent directors political
connection on restricting the related part transaction size of firm significantly
increases. However, this does not work on the improving of information
transparency of private-owned listed firms in China. Besides, compared to the
private-owned listed firms in a better institutional environment, the positive
impact of government subsidies on firms economic performace is lower to the
private-owned listed firms in a worse institutional environment. Generally, these
empirical results improve the understanding on the impact of independent
directors political connection on firm performance in the field of corporave
governance. In addition, the results also releal the impact of politics and

institutions on firm behavior and firm performance in the process of Chinas

economic transformation to some extent.This dissertation has four main
innovative points. First, this dissertation expands the studies about the
employing of independent director and the impact of independent directors
political connection on firm performance in the corporate governance field with a
perspective of political connection. Second, based on the principal-agent theory
and the informal institution perspective, this dissertation builds an analytical
frameword to examine the impact of independent direcotrs political connection
on firm performance. Third, according to the political and administrative systems
in China, this dissertation divides politically connected independent directors into
two types:the independent directors with political connections as a government
official, and the independent directors with political connections as a member of
the National Peoples Congress or Chinese Peoples Political Consultative
Conference. This is additional to the classification and measure of political
connection. Finally, this dissertation introduces a moderate variable, the
variation of institutional environment among regions. In doing so, this
dissertation can releal the impact of institional environment on the relation
between independent directors political connection and firm performance in the
process of Chinas economic transition. To date, there remain some shortcomings
in this dissertation. Based on the remaining shortcomings, this dissertation
argues some suggestions for further studies in the last section of the
dissertation. Back

Keywords in Chinese
Key words Corporate Governance Independent Director Political
Connection Institutional Environment Private-owned Firms
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