RULE 111

1.
[G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002]

LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.
REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995 and its Resolution
dated December 1, 1995. The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in
substance the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.
[1]

[2]

The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner
when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not
reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil
action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
[3]

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994
acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial
court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.
[4]

On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.

On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil

aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the
motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
stating:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the
accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office
of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion
for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Courts decision dated January 17,
1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for
Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit.
[5]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 18, 1994. The
trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:

Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22
April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.

[6]

Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked
the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration
of the decision dated February 7, 1994.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and
dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:

Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:

SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full

statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by
registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing
and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case
at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was
considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did.
[7]

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the
subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:

xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for reconsideration
dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn
the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the
order dated May 6, 1994, this is already academic. The decision dated January 7,
1994 had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on
03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no
more legal competence to promulgate the same.
[8]

[9]

Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the
civil aspect of the case, to wit:

x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation
nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to
the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly
instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the law
on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by
respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in

Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a
civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising
from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[10]

In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED.
[11]

In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration.
[12]

Hence, this petition.

The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER JUDGMENT ON
THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.[13]

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his
motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the
prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private

counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This
includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located
in another province.
Absence of Proof of Service
The first issue is whether petitioners motion for reconsideration dated February 7,
1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of
service. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts
finding that the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioners motion
for reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the
trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner
relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date
of mailing of both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the
motion was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return card which
shows actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the
motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on
January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the
decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner,
by filing a motion for reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of
paper and not a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner
to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial courts
decision final and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is
concerned. The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections
4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to
comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such
motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the
reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.
[14]

Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:

SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon by
the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
[15]

From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of
service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no
judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:

SEC. 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be
made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphasis supplied)
[16]

If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion.
Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a
copy of the trial courts decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the
reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail,
a motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and
the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of
service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding
him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt.
This raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be
served with petitioners motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the
accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who
may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the
public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect

of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has
generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as
far as he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party
and the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a
decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the
offended party appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served
a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended
party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present
Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion
for reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth
if the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his
pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private
counsel. This is in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of
record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion
for reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel
in the trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are
silent on the matter, it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of
this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the
offended party.
Trial courts jurisdiction over the civil aspect.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts
that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is
outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction.
In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held:

Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[17]

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the courts
territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the
criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can
acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In
the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily
submitted to the courts authority.
[18]

Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to
resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that
civil liability x x x includes restitution.
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action
unless reserved by the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not
reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.
Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded
on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court
had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if
the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
[19]

[20]

Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of

Appeals as to proof of service and the trial courts jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we
remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within
which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this
case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

2.

FIRST DIVISION
PROTON
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

- versus -

PILIPINAS

G.R. No. 165027

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES, represented by
the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
October 12, 2006
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals
Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 77684 entitled, Proton Pilipinas Corporation v.
Hon.Juan C. Nabong, dated 29 April 2004 and its Resolution[2] dated 2 August
2004, which respectively dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner

and denied its Motion for Reconsideration, thereby affirming the Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated 24 January 2003 [3] and 15 April
2003.[4]
The controversy arose from the following facts:
Herein petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) is a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws and duly registered [5] with the Board
of Investments (BOI). It is engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing,
and selling vehicles.
Sometime in 1997, Devmark Textile Industries, Inc. (Devmark), a corporation duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and with the BOI,
and engaged in the business of spinning, knitting, weaving, dyeing, and finishing
all types of textile, yarns, and fabrics, together with Texasia, Inc. (Texasia),
expressed the intention to purchase the various vehicles distributed and marketed
by petitioner. In payment thereof, the above named companies offered petitioner
their Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) worth P30,817,191.00. The companies,
through their officers, guaranteed petitioner that the TCCs were valid, genuine, and
subsisting. They further assured petitioner that said TCCs were a safe and a valid
mode of payment for import duties and taxes as they were issued by the
Department of Finance (DOF) and duly honored and accepted by the Bureau of
Customs (BOC).
Persuaded by the representations and assurances made by the two companies
as to the legality of the transaction, Paul Y. Rodriguez, in his capacity as Executive
Vice-President of Proton, signed a Deed of Assignment [6] with Eulogio L. Reyes,
General Manager of Devmark. The terms and conditions of the Deed of
Assignment are as follows:
1.

That the acceptance by the ASSIGNEE of the above

duty/taxes credit certificate being assigned by ASSIGNOR shall
be subject to condition that the [DOF] approves the proposed
assignment.

2.

For the purpose of this assignment, the above duty/taxes

certificates being assigned hereby to ASSIGNEE shall not be
credited as payment of ASSIGNORs account unless and until
ASSIGNEE has in turn utilized/applied the same with the [BOC]
or Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] for payment of each duty/tax
obligations.

3.

ASSIGNEE undertakes to issue to ASSIGNOR the Tax

Credit corresponding credit notes, as when the above duty/taxes
credit certificates was (sic) use[d]/applied, either partially or fully
by the ASSIGNEE, in payment of ASSIGNEEs duty/taxes
obligation with the [BOC] or [BIR], respectively.

4.

Withstanding the above-stated arrangement, such Tax

Credit assigned and transferred by the ASSIGNOR to ASSIGNEE
shall be subject to post-audit by the Government and shall be
credited to the ASSIGNOR only upon actual availment thereof by
ASSIGNEE.

5.

If the whole or any portion of the Tax Credit assigned

and transferred by ASSIGNOR to the ASSIGNEE is disallowed
by the Government upon post-audit or cannot be utilized for any
cause or reason not attributable to the fault negligence of the
ASSIGNEE, the whole amount corresponding such Tax Credit or
such portion thereof as is disallowed by the Government or cannot
be utilized by ASSIGNEE shall be paid in cash to ASSIGNEE by
the ASSIGNOR immediately upon receipt of written notice of
such event.[7]

Consequently, the TCCs, as well as their transfers to petitioner, were submitted to

the DOF for evaluation and approval. Thereafter, the DOF, through its
Undersecretary Antonio P. Belicena, cleared said TCCs for transaction and
approved them for transfer.For that reason, petitioner delivered 13 vehicles with a
total value of P10,778,500.00 and post-dated checks worth P10,592,618.00, in
exchange for the said TCCs, to Devmark and Texasia in accordance with their
agreement. In turn, petitioner used the TCCs for payment of its customs duties and
taxes to the BOC.

In the interim, the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)

under Hon. AnianoDesierto began conducting an investigation on the alleged P60
Billion DOF Tax Credit Scam in July 1998. On 30 March 1999, Silverio T.
Manuel, Jr., as Graft Investigator II, was given the assignment to look into the
alleged irregular issuances of four TCCs to Devmark and its subsequent transfer to
and utilization by petitioner. Based on the Fact-Finding Report[8] dated 29 October
1999 of the Fact Finding and Investigation Bureau, Ombudsman, the TCCs were
found to be irregularly and fraudulently issued by several officers of the DOF,
including its Department Undersecretary Belicena, to Devmark. As revealed in the
said Report, all the pertinent documents submitted by Devmark in support of its
application for the TCCs were fake and spurious. As a consequence thereof, the
transfers of the subject TCCs to petitioner and their subsequent use of the same
was declared invalid and illegal. The Report recommended among other things,
that the directors of the petitioner and Devmark, along with several DOF officers,
be criminally charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No.
3019,[9] otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On the weight of the Fact-Finding Report, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71[10] charging DOF Undersecretary
Belicena together with Reyes, General Manager of Devmark, Peter
Y. Rodriguez andPaul Y. Rodriguez, in their capacity as Director and Executive
Vice-President/Chief Operating Officer of the petitioner, respectively, for violation
of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic Act No. 3019.
In turn, petitioner filed a criminal case for Estafa against the officers of Devmark
with the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, docketed as I.S. No. 00-42921-K,
entitled, Proton Pilipinas, Inc. v. Robert Liang. The BOC on the other hand, filed
Civil Case No. 02-102650[11] against petitioner before the RTC for the collection of
taxes and customs duties, which remain unpaid because the subject TCCs had been
cancelled brought about by petitioners use of fraudulent TCCs in paying its
obligations.

Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss[12] the aforesaid civil case filed against it
by BOC on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prematurity of action, and litis
pendentia.The said Motion, however, was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated 24 January 2003. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above-mentioned
Order, but the same was likewise denied in another Order dated 15 April 2003.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
annul the Orders of the trial court.
On 29 April 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dismissing the
Petition for lack of merit and affirming the RTC Orders. On 7 June 2004, petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Court of Appeals
Resolution dated 2 August 2004.
Hence, this Petition.
In the petitioners Memorandum,[13] it ascribes the following errors committed by
the Court of Appeals:
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Orders and,
consequently, in not dismissing the Civil Case because, per Section 4,
RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
1. Per Section 4, RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Civil Case to the exclusion of
the RTC.
a. The expanded jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under RA 8249
covers the subject matter of the Civil Case.
i. Before, the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over civil actions was limited only to
civil liability arising from the offense charged per

[Presidential Decree] PD 1861 and RA 7975. But

now under RA 8249, Sandiganbayan has the
exclusive expanded jurisdiction over all civil actions
for recovery of civil liability regardless of whether or
not they arise from the offense charged.
ii. In fact, the language of the law is clear and extant
that this expanded jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
supersedes any provision of law or the rules of court.
iii. The subject matter of the Civil Case, being the
civil aspect of the Criminal Cases, is deemed
simultaneously instituted in the latter.
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the litis
pendentia rule is inapplicable and that the civil case is not premature.
1. The requisites of litis pendentia are present in the Criminal Cases and
the Civil Case.
a. There is identity of parties or at least such as representing
the same interest in both actionsb. There is identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same factsc. The identity in the two (2) cases is such that the
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the otherd. Even assuming that not all the requisites of litis
pendentia under the Rules of Court are present, the
pendency of the Criminal Cases constitute some form
of litis pendentia by express provision of Section 4, RA
8249.
2. In any event, the Civil Case is premature since the validity or
invalidity of the TCCs is a prejudicial issue that has yet to be resolved
with finality by the Sandiganbayan in the Criminal Cases.

Given the foregoing, this Court restates the issues for resolution in the Petition at
bar, as follows:

I.

Whether or not the jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 02102650, involving collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes
of petitioner, belongs to the Sandiganbayan and not to the RTC, as
it can be considered the civil aspect of the Criminal Cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan, hence, deemed instituted in the latter.

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, the

rule on litis pendentia is inapplicable in the present case.

III.

Whether or not the institution of the aforesaid Civil Case is

premature as the determination of the validity or invalidity of the
TCCs is a prejudicial issue that must first be resolved with finality
in the Criminal Cases filed before the Sandiganbayan.

The Petition is bereft of merit.

In the instant case, petitioner argues that since the filing of the criminal cases was
anchored on the alleged conspiracy among accused public officials, including the
corporate officers, regarding the anomalous and illegal transfer of four TCCs from
Devmark to petitioner and the latters subsequent use of three TCCs in paying their
customs duties and taxes to the detriment of the government, the civil case
regarding collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes was deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, being the civil aspect
of the criminal cases.To buttress its assertion, petitioner quoted the last paragraph
of Section 4, Republic Act No. 8249, which states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of
civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action
shall be recognized: x x x.

It is a truism beyond doubt that the jurisdiction of the court over a subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law.[14] In addition, it is settled that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[15]
Accordingly, as can be gleaned from the Complaint for Collection of Money with
Damages[16] filed by the Government against petitioner, what the former seeks is
the payment of customs duties and taxes due from petitioner, which remain unpaid
by reason of the cancellation of the subject TCCs for being fake and spurious. Said
Complaint has nothing to do with the criminal liability of the accused, which the
Government wants to enforce in the criminal cases filed before the
Sandiganbayan.This can be clearly inferred from the fact that only petitioner was
impleaded in the said Complaint.
While it is true that according to the aforesaid Section 4, of Republic Act No. 8249,
the institution of the criminal action automatically carries with it the institution of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability, however, in the case at bar, the
civil case for the collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes cannot be
simultaneously instituted and determined in the same proceedings as the criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan, as it cannot be made the civil aspect of the
criminal cases filed before it. It should be borne in mind that the tax and the
obligation to pay the same are all created by statute; so are its collection and
payment governed by statute.[17] The payment of taxes is a duty which the law
requires to be paid. Said obligation is not a consequence of the felonious acts
charged in the criminal proceeding nor is it a mere civil liability arising from crime
that could be wiped out by the judicial declaration of non-existence of the criminal
acts charged.[18] Hence, the payment and collection of customs duties and taxes in
itself creates civil liability on the part of the taxpayer. Such civil liability to pay
taxes arises from the fact, for instance, that one has engaged himself in business,
and not because of any criminal act committed by him.[19]
Undoubtedly, Republic Act No. 3019 is a special law but since it is silent as to the
definition of civil liability, hence, it is only proper to make use of the Revised
Penal Code provisions relating to civil liability as a supplement. This is in

accordance with the provision of Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, which
make the said Code supplementary to special laws unless the latter should
especially provide the contrary.[20] Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerates the matters covered by the civil liability arising from crimes, to wit:
Article 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability
established in articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1.

Restitution;[21]

2.

Reparation of the damage caused;[22]

3.

Indemnification for consequential damages. [23]

With the above provision of the Revised Penal Code, it is far-fetched that the civil
case for the collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes can be simultaneously
instituted with the criminal cases for violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of Republic
Act No. 3019 filed before the Sandiganbayan nor can it be made the civil aspect of
such criminal cases. All the matters covered by the civil liability in the aforesaid
article have something to do with the crimes committed by the wrongdoer. Clearly,
the civil liability for violation of any criminal statute, like Republic Act No. 3019,
exists because of the criminal act done by the offender. In other words, the civil
obligation flows from and is created by the criminal liability,[24] thus, the civil
liability arising from crimes is different from the civil liability contemplated in the
case of taxation.
Since the present case took place at the time when Republic Act No. 1125,
[25]
otherwise known as, An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, was still in
effect and when the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction yet over tax
collection cases, this case therefore, still falls under the general jurisdiction of
the RTC. Section 19(6) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides that:
Section 19. Jurisdictional in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; x x x.

Consequently, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 02-102650. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is only with respect, among
other things, to the criminal cases for violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
particularly in this case, Section 3(e) and (j) thereof, but it has no authority to take
cognizance of the civil case to collect the unpaid customs duties and taxes of the
petitioner.
On the second and third issues. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in
not applying the rule on litis pendentia despite the fact that all its requisites are
present in both criminal and civil cases. Petitioner also avows that the institution of
the civil case for collection of unpaid customs duties and taxes was premature
since the validity or invalidity of the TCCs was a prejudicial issue that has yet to be
resolved with finality by the Sandiganbayan in the Criminal Cases before
it. Conversely, the Government claims that in Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71 filed
before the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner was not the party accused, but its
corporate officers, whereas in Civil Case No. 02-102650 the party sued is not the
corporate officers, but the corporation.Accordingly, there can be no litis
pendentia as the requisite of identity of parties was absent.
Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means a pending suit. Litis
pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation
wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis
pendentia to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary:
(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other.[26]

In the case at bar, in Criminal Cases No. 26168 to 71 only the responsible officers
of the petitioner are charged in the Information, while in Civil Case No. 02102650, it is only the corporation that is impleaded, holding it liable for the unpaid
customs duties and taxes as a corporate taxpayer. Taxes being personal to the
taxpayer, it can only be enforced against herein petitioner because the payment of
unpaid customs duties and taxes are the personal obligation of the petitioner as a
corporate taxpayer, thus, it cannot be imposed on its corporate officers, much so on
its individual stockholders, for this will violate the principle that a corporation has
personality separate and distinct from the persons constituting it.[27] Having said
that, the parties in the two actions are entirely different, hence, petitioner failed to
establish the first requisite of litis pendentia as to identity of parties.
Going to the second requisite of litis pendentia, this Court finds that the causes of
action, as well as the reliefs prayed for in the criminal and civil actions are
considerably different. In the criminal cases, the cause of action of the
Government, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision, was founded on
the fact that it was defrauded as a result of the alleged conspiracy among the
corporate officers of the petitioner and some public officials in the procurement
and use of the spurious TCCs, amounting to violation of Section 3(e) and (j) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Therefore, the primordial relief sought by the Government
is the conviction of the accused for their fraudulent acts. On the contrary, the cause
of action in the civil case was established on the basis that since the TCCs were not
honored, the customs duties and taxes remain unpaid so the civil action was filed in
order to collect the unpaid taxes due to petitioner. The relief sought by the
Government in the civil case is the collection of unpaid customs duties and
taxes. Thus, the conviction of the accused in the criminal cases and the collection
of unpaid taxes in the civil case are totally unrelated causes of action that will not
justify the application of the rule on litis pendentia.

As regards the third requisite of litis pendentia, again, the petitioner failed to meet
the same. This Court deems it necessary to quote the very wordings of the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated 29 April 2004, as follows:
Moreover, a judgment in the criminal cases, to our mind, will not be
determinative of the civil case upon which the principle of res judicata will
operate. A judgment in the criminal cases will only lead to either conviction or
acquittal of the accused officers of the petitioner as the crime only attaches to
them but will not in anyway affect the liability of the petitioner as it is a distinct
and separate juridical person. Nor do we believe that a finding on the efficacy of
the TCCs will change the dire situation in which the Government finds itself in as
the tax and the customs duties remain unpaid.The fate of the TCCs for whatever
its worth is already fait accompli. It is not disputed by the parties concerned that
the subject TCCs have already been cancelled by the [DOF] for which reason the
twin suits have been brought. It is on this basis too, that petitioner filed a
[C]omplaint for [E]stafa against Devmarks officers before the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City. Hence, it is absurd for the petitioner to anchor its complaint
on the alleged worthlessness of the TCCs only to argue in the present action that
the same must await final determination in the criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan.[28]

Attention must be given to the fact that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation through
which the government agencies continue to operate and with which the State
effects its functions for the welfare of its constituents. [29] It is also settled that taxes
are the lifeblood of the government and their prompt and certain availability is an
imperious need.[30] So then, the determination of the validity or invalidity of the
TCCs cannot be regarded as a prejudicial issue that must first be resolved with
finality in the Criminal Cases filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Government
should not and must not await the result of the criminal proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan before it can collect the outstanding customs duties and taxes of the
petitioner for such will unduly restrain the Government in doing its functions. The
machineries of the Government will not be able to function well if the collection of
taxes will be delayed so much so if its collection will depend on the outcome of
any criminal proceedings on the guise that the issue of collection of taxes is a
prejudicial issue that need to be first resolved before enforcing its collection.

Therefore, it is the obligation of the petitioner to make good its obligation by

paying the customs duties and taxes, which remain unpaid by reason of the
cancellation of the subject TCCs for having been found as fake and spurious. It
should not make the Government suffer for its own misfortune.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision as
well as the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77684 dated 29
April 2004 and 2 August 2004, respectively, affirming the Orders of the RTC are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

3. [G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted

out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of
the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of
asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability.Both the primary civil liability of
the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are
carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 29, 2000 and the March 27, 2001 Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.
[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[5]

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay
damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for his death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his
unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum
of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity
for her death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned
income for three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum
of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
her death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum
of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years
at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral
damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses,
doctors fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for
the [n]eurologist, an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to
cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in
the amount of P1,000,000.00;

e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00

as loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical
expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral
damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical
expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages and her loss earnings
of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital
expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines
and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical
expenses, P87.00 for medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital
bills, P500.00 for medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for
loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace
Van, the amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the
totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount
of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused,
shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against
accused had become final and executory.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed
the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its
brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing
[respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss. (Citations omitted)
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the
criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accusedemployee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the
notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers
subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.

[7]

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its
accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the
accused.
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.
[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item
A.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC
Decision, petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the
accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In
effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accusedemployee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case,
but the government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be
placed in double jeopardy. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on
the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.
On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the
judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to
appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
[9]

[10]

[11]

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if
the accused jumps bail.The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in
court when they abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts
jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial relief.
[13]

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail
during the appeal, but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his
appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule
124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x
[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they

voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested
within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. While at large, they
cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.
[15]

[16]

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section
7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty
is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to
surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become final and
executory.
[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No
liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according
to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for

felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in

the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.
[18]

[19]

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving

independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
[20]

[23]

[21]

[22]

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need
not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed
included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action
arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such
action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than
once for the same act or omission.
[24]

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability

arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even
if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the
remaining civil interest therein.
[25]

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code,

which states that [e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
[26]

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the

criminal
case
and
is
conclusively
bound
by
the
outcome
thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the
case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to
the criminal case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its
employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not
interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which
[27]

the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is

not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly
declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they
have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their
subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
[28]

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved
of his criminal responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These
intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief filed with the CA and from its
Petition before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is
not supported by competent evidence.
[29]

[30]

[31]

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case
open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable
to the appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused decides to
appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate courts have the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or
reduce the penalty it imposed.
[32]

[33]

[34]

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accusedemployee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than
that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to
him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy,
since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.

We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused

effectively waived his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that
petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing
criminal procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the court below final. Having been a
fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his
right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court
in People v. Ang Gioc ruled:
[35]

[36]

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted
to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from
the judgment rendered against him. x x x.
[37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the

court and placed himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a
reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped
to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable
and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
[38]

[39]

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who

refuses to surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.
[40]

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the
criminal case against the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has
waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case against
him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability

Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now
accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the
present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in
these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
[41]

[42]

[43]

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary

liability, petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that
an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the
cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of
the employer.
[44]

[45]

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the

offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
[46]

[47]

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case

would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
[48]

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and

conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability,

but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be
separated from that of the employee.
[49]

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must

be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been
satisfied due to insolvency.
[50]

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil

action. But the determination must be based on the evidence that the
offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing
set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
[51]

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its

accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature;
its liability remains subsidiary.Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary
liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has
attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso
facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the
finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one
criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to be
final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability
is dependent upon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the

pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary
liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we
reiterate that what is sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In other
words, the employer becomes ipso factosubsidiarily liable upon the conviction
of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers
subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.
[52]

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a
remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions
of law authorizing such exercise. Hence, the legal requirements must be
strictly complied with.
[53]

[54]

[55]

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal

as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded. Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed
by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of
those cases.
[56]

[57]

[58]

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the
winning party. If the proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of the case.
[59]

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it

participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the
employer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal,
but it was not denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to
appeal.
[60]

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that
there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged
in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26
August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus
owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x. Neither does
petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
[61]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

the

assailed

SO ORDERED.

4.

[G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005]

SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA

BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA
SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON.
NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by VIRGILIO Q.

RONDARIS, President/Chairman,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 1, 2002, petitioners

assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their
complaint to recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their
kin.
[1]

The following facts are matters of record.

In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace
Van, which claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers,
including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the
vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to
file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.
[2]

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against

Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a
separate civil action. They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
[3]

Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper

service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of
non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.
[4]

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that

the right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years
reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was
no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed
barely two (2) years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the
cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions
based on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be,
prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate
civil action, the complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
[5]

Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal

of the complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of
the legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction
in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment. The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was
filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident. As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the
complaint ought to be dismissed on this ground.
[6]

[7]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal. The appellate
court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if
the respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal
was available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was
brought within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu
of appeal.
[8]

[9]

In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of
an existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private respondents.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint
arose ex delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action
invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
had prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of
conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally
flawed, petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid
operation of the rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical injuries caused by private
respondents for which no civil liability had been adjudged by reason of their
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They
point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action
for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the
prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the
accident took place.
[10]

Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron
Transits contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil
aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file
a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of
Appeals viacertiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the
adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of
certification against forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true

copy of the assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full
names and addresses of petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply dated September 14, 2002, while private
respondents filed a Rejoinder dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of
their arguments.
[11]

[12]

We grant the petition.

Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from
the offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three
notable exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to
recover damages from the accused; second, when the offended party
reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate action in
order to take full control and direction of the prosecution of his cause;
and third, when the injured party actually exercises the right to maintain a
private suit against the offender by instituting a civil action prior to the filing of
the criminal case.
[13]

[14]

Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in

1988, which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111
thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint
or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate
civil action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan,
did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation
to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint,
they seek to recover private respondents civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the
trial court dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was
based on quasi delict and should have been brought within four (4) years from
the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are
consistent with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil
liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the

part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that
petitioners were pursuing a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering
that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended
party has the choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising from
crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the
Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery
under the Rules above-quoted.
[15]

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto.This is so because
the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter
action had been expressly reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a
similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The
plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action.
The driver was convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later,
plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delictwhich
was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was
[16]

instituted more than six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time
based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed
the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar
to the filing of the action to enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a
bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is
a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily
liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party
being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint
on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for
damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners
allegations in their complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss and motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
[17]

[18]

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a
separate civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this
rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of
the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for
damages based on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no
more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents
as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against double recovery for
obvious reasons.
[19]

Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed

the order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be
exempted from the strict application of the rules in order to promote their
fundamental objective of securing substantial justice. We are loathe to
[20]

deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a
final judgment of conviction based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to
prevent such an injustice.
[21]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the

resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9,
2002, respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated
February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

5.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12030

September 30, 1960

JOSE J. ROTEA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, defendant-appellee.
Marcos R. Rotea for appellant.
Jose A. Simpao for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On August 17, 1952, while Angel Bascon was driving a bus belonging to Fortunato F. Halili
along the national road of Makati, Rizal, it collided with a Rosado bus as a result of which
Jose Rotea, a passenger of the Halili bus, was injured. As a consequence, a criminal
complaint for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Makati against Bascon, and the offended party having reserved his right
to file a separate civil action, after trial, Bascon was found guilty of the lesser crime of

serious physical injuries thru simple imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of 3 months
and 10 days of arresto mayor.
Within the reglementary period Bascon appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
After trial, said court found him also guilty of the crime charged sentencing him to 4 months
and 1 day imprisonment. In addition, the court ordered him to indemnify the offended party
in the amount of P513.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency, to pay
P3,000.00 as liquidated damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary or corrective damages,
and the costs. From this decision Bascon took steps to appeal to the Court of Appeals, but
he later withdrew his appeal and served the sentence imposed upon him.
The decision having become final, a writ of execution was issued upon Rotea's request to
enforce the civil liability awarded in his favor, but the writ was returned unsatisifed because
Bascon was insolvent. Rotea made several demands upon Halili to make good his
subsidiary liability, he being the employer of Bascon, and having ignored said demands,
Rotea filed on March 19, 1955 against Halili the present action in the court of first instance
of Manila praying that Halili be declared subsidiarily liable for the indemnity awarded in his
favor in the criminal case consisting in the sum of P13,513.00 as liquidated and exemplary
damages, and that he be awarded P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. After trial,
the court found for plaintiff ordering defendant to pay an indemnity in the amount of
P3,513.00, with legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until its payment, to
pay P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. The court denied plaintiff's claim for
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. Plaintiff appealed directly to this court assigning
several errors.
After stating that this action was brought to enforce the indemnity fixed in the criminal case
taken against appellee's driver based upon the subsidiary liability of appellee under articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which indemnity amounts to P13,513.00 including
the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, appellant contends that the trial court erred
in modifying said indemnity by reducing it to P3,513.00 as actual and liquidated damages,
eliminating therefrom the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages. He contends that the
trial court cannot make such diminution for that would be tantamount to an amendment or
modification of the decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the indemnity is
concerned which has long become final and executory. Appellant avers that in the absence
of collusion between the offended party and the accused in the criminal case, or unless it is
claimed that the court had no jurisdiction to act on the matter, the employer is liable for the
whole amount of indemnity awarded to the offended party in a subsequent civil action filed
to enforce it.
We have no quarrel with the contention that when a civil action is based upon the subsidiary
liability of an employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code resulting from
the indemnity awarded to the offended party in a criminal action the court has no other
function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and

has no power to amend or modify if even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. For, as this court has aptly said: "To allow an employer to dispute the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by
a competent court" (Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil., 670; 52 Off.
Gaz. [11] 5145). But the situation differs when the court in the criminal case has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, in which case the decision should be ignored
because being null and void it never existed in contemplation of law. This is the situation
herein obtained. The decision rendered in the criminal case insofar as the indemnity is
concerned is null and void for having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction of
the court of first instance, and this is so because the offended party has made an express
reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action to recover the indemnity and the
amount awarded is far beyond the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court where the
case originated. The trial court, therefore, was justified in ignoring the decision in the
criminal case and in rendering judgment according to its discretion based upon the
evidence on hand.
1awphl.nt

On the other hand, the trial court was justified in not requiring appellee to pay exemplary
damages there being no evidence whatever that he had any participation in the wrongful act
committed by his employee. The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed primarily
upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts in the future. Such
punitive damages cannot be applied to his master or employer except only to the extent of
his participation or ratification of the act because they are penal in character. Moreover, in
this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be imposed when the crime is committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances (Article 2230, new 3m 3 Civil Code), and here
the crime being only qualified by negligence is not accompanied by an aggravating
circumstance.
According to the rule adopted by many courts, a principal or master can be held
liable for exemplary or punitive damages based upon the wrongful act of his agent or
servant only where he participated in the doing of such wrongful act or has
previously authorized or subsequently ratified it with full knowledge of the facts.
Reasons given for this rule are that since such damages are penal in character, the
motive authorizing their infliction will not be imputed by presumption to the principal
when the act is committed by an agent or servant, and that since they are awarded
not by way of compensation, but as a punishment to the offender and as a warning
to others, they can only be awarded against one who has participated in the offense,
and the principal therefore cannot be held liable for them merely by reason of
wanton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the agent. (15 Am. Jur., 730).
With regard to the claim that the trial court erred in awarding to appellant only the amount of
P500.00 as attorney's fees and not the amount of P2,000.00 as claimed by him considering
that appellee paid no heed to his repeated overtures for payment thus forcing him to
institute the present action, suffice it to say that this is a matter addressed to the discretion

of the trial court. Considering that the principal amount involved in small and appellee's
liability is merely subsidiary, we find no abuse of discretion committed by the trial court.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,
concur.
Paras, C.J., Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.

6.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182210, October 05, 2015
PAZ T. BERNARDO, SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS, MAPALAD G. BERNARDO, EMILIE B. KO,
MARILOU B. VALDEZ, EDWIN T. BERNARDO AND GERVY B. SANTOS, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo (Bernardo)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 2007 decision1 and
the March 14, 2008 resolution2 in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Paz T.
Bernardo." The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56,
Makati City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
The Factual Antecedents
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag
(Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 payable on or before its maturity on November 30, 1991.
That loan was evidenced by a promissory note3 Bernardo and her husband had executed, whereby the
couple solidarity bound themselves to pay the loan with corresponding interest at 12% per annum
payable upon default.4 As additional security, Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-1034) 151841.
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in
another transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) checks,5 posted on different dates in June 1992, covering the loan's
aggregate amount:
cralawlawlibrary

Check
FEBTC No.
FEBTC No.
FEBTC No.
FEBTC No.

No.
391033
391034
391035
391036

Amount
Php 100,000.00
Php 100,000.00
Php 100,000.00
Php 100,000.00

Date
June 1, 1992
June 8, 1992
June 15, 1992
June 22, 1992

FEBTC No. 391037

Php 60,000.00

June 29, 1992

In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these checks to Bernardo's account but they were
dishonored; the reason given was "Account Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice informing
her of the dishonor of the checks. The demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag to initiate a
criminal complaint against Bernardo with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for five (5) counts
of violation of B.P. 22.
After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found
probable cause to indict Bernardo for the offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty plea on
arraignment.
The prosecution rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only on May
9, 1996, to present her defense evidence.
In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the
questioned checks were presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the law. She also denied
having received any notice of dishonor, which she insisted was essential to prove the material element
of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
In any case, she maintained that the checks were never meant to be presented as she had always
paid her loans in cash, which she claimed to have done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00.
According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag returned to her the title to the property after payment,
Bumanglag never bothered to issue her receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks either.
Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to
September 4, 1996.6 That hearing, however, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the absence
of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the April 3, 1997
hearing, and in view of the numerous previous postponements the defense had asked for, the RTC
considered her right to present additional evidence waived.
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her ten
(10) days within which to submit her formal offer of evidence, which she failed to do. As a result, the
RTC declared that Bernardo had waived her right to submit her formal offer of evidence.
RTC Ruling
On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation of B.P.
22.7 The RTC held that Bernardo failed to substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC further ruled
that it is not the nonpayment of the obligation but the issuance of a worthless check that B.P. 22
punishes.
The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year imprisonment for each count of the offense charged and
ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest and 5% penalty
charges, from December 1, 1991, until full payment. 8
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in lieu
thereof, imposed a P460,000.00 fine.9 The CA also retained the civil indemnity of P460,000.00 that the
lower court imposed, plus 12% interest from the time of the institution of the criminal charges until
full payment.10
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
payment. The CA further held that the 90-day period within which to present a check under B.P. 22 is
not an element of the crime.
The CA also did not recognize any merit in Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due process, in
view of the RTC's order waiving her right to present additional evidence. 11 To the CA, Bernardo had

sufficient opportunity to present her defense but did not avail of these opportunities. Instead, she and
her counsel moved for postponement at least nine (9) times, not to mention their subsequent failure
to appear four (4) times despite due notice of the scheduled hearings. These developments led the
RTC to consider Bernardo's right to present additional evidence waived. 12
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion; 13 hence, the present petition.14
The Petition and Comment
Bernardo insists in her present petition15 that the CA erred in finding that she had been accorded due
process; she was denied the full opportunity to present her defense and was thus deprived of the
chance to prove her innocence of the crime charged.
She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming her criminal and civil liabilities because the
prosecution failed to prove her knowledge of insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo, there was
no violation of B.P. 22 because the checks were presented beyond the mandatory 90-day period.
Moreover, Bernardo claimed that these subject checks were issued without consideration as she had
already paid the loan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits in its Comment that Bernardo was given the
opportunity to present her defense evidence.16 Citing Wong v. CA,17 the OSG further points out that
the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense; 18 it is simply one of the
conditions to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds.19
The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to substantiate her claim that she had settled the
obligation.20 In any event, the OSG asserted B.P. 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a
worthless check, not the nonpayment of the obligation. 21
Subsequent Developments
On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3,
2011, and provided, as well, the names of her heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and children:
Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their address (26
Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In due course, in our March 7, 2012
Resolution,22 we required Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the deceased Bernardo in the
present petition for purposes of Bernardo's civil liability.
Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's
death extinguished her civil liability. In the alternative, they contended that any civil liability should be
settled in a separate civil case.
We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil liability
survived her death as it is based on contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming to dismiss the present case and require the Bumanglags to file a
separate civil action.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit. Preliminary Matters
Classes of Civil Liabilities
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the
part of the offender.23 If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto).24 This particular civil liability due the offended party
is rooted on facts that constitute a crime.25 Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense
charged.26 It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability based
on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by preponderance of

evidence, civil liability may be awarded.27 Moreover, the civil liability based on delict is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 28
The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on
other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts;
(c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts
under Articles 3229 and 3430 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil
Code.31 For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise grants
the offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of the criminal action under
Article-33 of the Civil Code.
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from civil ability directly arising from a violation of the
penal law and to still be liable civilly based on contract or by laws other than the criminal law.32 Such
civil actions may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
criminal action,33 subject however, to the caveat that the offended party cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission.34
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the present case despite her death.
As a general rule, the death of an accused pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability and the
corresponding civil liability based solely on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an acquittal of
the accused based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in her favor, which can
be overcome only by a finding of guilt - something that death prevents the court from making. 35 In a
sense, death absolves the accused from any earthly responsibility arising from the
offense a divine act that no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. 36 The
intervention of death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself so that no criminal
liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from the offense should be imposed on him. 37
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and an action for recovery therefore may
be generally pursued but only by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.38 This separate civil action may be enforced against the
estate of the accused.39
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil actions.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. 40 This rule was enacted to
help declog court dockets, which had been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as
collectors. As we observed in Hyatt v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:41
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Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the
trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected
to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored
checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It
should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the
civil action.
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As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a
worthless check are deemed instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did not
automatically extinguish the action. The independent civil liability based on contract, which was
deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the
present case. We thus rule on the present action to determine Bumanglag's civil liability.
Substantive Aspect
Bernardo was not denied due process.

We meticulously went over the entire record, and confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been
deprived of her day in court. She was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in her defense
but she did not give this case the serious attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the repeated
absences of Bernardo and her counsel - the trial court eventually considered her right to present
defense evidence waived.
To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence is a matter
that lies with the discretion of the trial court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised wisely,
considering the peculiar circumstances of each case and with a view to doing substantial justice. 42 In
the present case, the records show that the RTC took all the steps necessary to safeguard Bernardo's
rights and to accord her the opportunity to present whatever evidence she had in her defense.
In particular, the prosecution formally rested its case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through
counsel, thereupon moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence prompting the RTC to reset the
hearing for initial presentation of defense evidence to December 15 and 20, 1994. 43 Bernardo filed her
demurrer to evidence on November 10, 1994,44 after previously requesting the RTC for a 10-day
extension.
The pendency of the demurrer to evidence prompted several resettings until the RTC finally denied it
on March 30, 1995.45 The RTC then set the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 11, 18,
and 25, 1995,46 but these were reset to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995, 47 at the motion of Bernardo's
counsel who expressed his desire to seek relief from the CA for the denial of the demurrer.
Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's counsel failed to appear during the May 9, 1995
hearing as he was busy attending to the canvassing of votes in Quezon City.48 Eventually, the
initial presentation of defense evidence was reset to July 20, 1995, and August 3, 1995. 49
Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing, Bernardo's counsel again moved for another resetting as
he was not prepared to conduct a direct examination. 50 Despite this flimsy ground, the RTC
granted the request and allowed Bernardo to testify on August 3, 1995.
Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing despite
due notice, prompting the RTC to waive their right to present defense evidence. 51 Bernardo moved for
reconsideration and the RTC granted her motion in the interest of substantial justice. 52 Thus, the
hearing for the presentation of defense evidence was reset to November 28, 1995. 53
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Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing,
despite due notice, prompting the RTC again to consider that Bernardo had waived her right to
present defense evidence.54
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Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on the ground that it was the first time she and
her counsel were absent at the same time.55 Despite this hollow excuse, the RTC granted the
motion in the spirit of compassionate justice and gave Bernardo the final opportunity to present her
defense evidence.56 The parties mutually agreed to set the hearing for initial presentation of defense
evidence on April 18, 1996.57
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Bernardo again failed to appear during the scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although Bernardo
did not offer any excuse for this absence,59 RTC exercised compassion and permitted Bernardo to
testify, as she did in fact testify, on May 9, 1996,60 - one (1) year and eight (8) months after the
prosecution had rested its case. At the conclusion of the cross-examination, the parties mutually
agreed to adjourn the hearing for September 4, 1996, for redirect examination. 61
Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing,
prompting the RTC to consider her failure as a waiver on her part to present additional
evidence.62Bernardo moved for reconsideration; she claimed that her counsel had to attend another
hearing in a different sala. Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another engagement on the same day,
which was in conflict with the RTC's hearing dates, was never properly explained. Nonetheless, the
RTC granted the motion to give her the last chance to complete the presentation of
evidence on April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.63
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Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her counsel again failed to appear at the April
3,1997 hearing.64 Instead, they filed a motion to reset because Bernardo's counsel was to attend a
wedding in the United States of America.65 This time, the RTC, mindful that there should be a limit to
postponements, ordered the case submitted for decision sans the presentation of evidence from the
defense.66
Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, without
justifiable reason, to appear at the scheduled hearing dates. 67 The order considering Bernardo's right
to present evidence waived, followed as a necessary and unavoidable consequence. As we held
in People v. Angco:68
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His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated
postponements and warnings that failure to so appear would be deemed a waiver to present evidence
in his defense, and that the case would be deemed submitted for judgment upon the evidence
presented by the prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to proceed and render
judgment upon the evidence before it.
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The records show that the RTC leniently granted repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's rights
as an accused. But Bernardo obviously did not recognize the need for expeditious handling of her case
and was already trifling with judicial process.69
Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient
evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
liable.
Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the present action to purely an enforcement of the civil
liability incurred. In particular, the focal issue in the present petition is no longer Bernardo's
criminal liability for violation of B.P. 22 but her civil liability, which is principally based on
contract and the corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered due to Bernardo's failure to
pay. Under these circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that the checks were presented beyond
the 90-day period and that she never received a notice of dishonor) were no longer relevant.
Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads payment carries the burden of proving it. 70 Indeed, once
the existence of an indebtedness is established by evidence, the burden of showing with legal
certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment rests with the debtor.71 After the debtor
introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the
general burden of proof - again shifts to the creditor, who then labors under a duty to produce
evidence to show nonpayment.72
In the present case, the existence of the obligation to pay has sufficiently been established through
the promissory note73 and the checks74 submitted in evidence. Notably, Bernardo even confirmed due
execution of these instruments during her testimony. During the offer of Bernardo's testimony, her
counsel stated:
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ATTY. MIRAVITE:

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With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are presenting the witness for the following purposes: to x
x x show that she borrowed money from [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total obligation
reached Php460,000.000; x x x that all the checks issued by the accused were only as proof
of her obligation to the private complainant x x x.75 [emphasis supplied]
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In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even confirmed the issuance of the checks and promissory
note. In particular, she stated:
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ATTY. MIRAVITE:

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Q: I am showing to you this promissory note marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and Exhibit 2 for

the defense. There appears a signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the middle portion thereof,
do you know whose signature is that?
A: It is mine sir.
xxxx
Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you
tell us, Madame Witness, what is covered by this promissory note?
xxxx
A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, plus interest and penalties, sir.
Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of June
1991 and includes all other charges?
A: Yes, sir.
x xxx
Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you issued the checks subject of these cases?
A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.76

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Bernardo's principal defense rests on the supposition that she had settled the obligation, which
settlement led Bumanglag to return to her the title to the property.77 A meticulous review, of the
records, however, firmly dissuades us from believing Bernardo's bare allegation.
At the outset, the handwritten note78 evidencing that transaction, which was submitted by the
prosecution in evidence, states that:
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10/28/91
Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes to
pay Mrs. Carmencita Bumanglag
Sgd
Paz T. Bernardo
10/28/91
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The document evidencing this transaction strongly suggests that she asked for the title from
Bumanglag to obtain another loan whose proceeds she would use to pay Bumanglag. Notably, the
defense even admitted the genuineness of Bernardo's signature in this document. 79 When Bernardo
therefore failed to fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to request for checks to secure the
obligation, which checks were eventually dishonored upon presentment.
Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's claim of payment was nothing more than an
allegation unsupported by adequate proof. If indeed there had been payment, she should have
redeemed or taken back the checks and the promissory note, in the ordinary course of
business.80Instead, the checks and the promissory note remained in the possession of Bumanglag,
who had to demand the satisfaction of Bernardo's obligation when the checks became due and were
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of the promissory note,
coupled with the dishonored checks, strongly buttresses her claim that Bernardo's obligation had not
been extinguished.81
We thus find that the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position that Bernardo
has not yet settled her obligation.82
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.'
CR No. 28721 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The heirs of Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay
the amount of P460,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum from the time of the institution of
criminal charges in court.
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and
interest due, from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The fine in the amount of P460,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

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7.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179814, December 07, 2015
WILFRED N.CHIOK, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND RUFINA CHUA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180021
RUFINA CHUA, Petitioner, v. WILFRED N. CHIOK, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (AS
AN UNWILLING CO-PARTY PETITIONER), Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals (CA) July 19, 2007
Decision2and October 3, 2007 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23309. The CA reversed and set aside the
December 3, 1998 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig-Branch 165, and acquitted
petitioner Wilfred Chiok (Chiok) of the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 109927, but ordered him
to pay civil liability to Rufina Chua in the total amount of P9,500,000.00, plus interests:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED DECEMBER 3, 1998 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and
accused WILFRED N. CHIOK is ACQUITTED for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, but he is ORDERED to pay complainant RUFINA CHUA the principal amount of
[P]9,500,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the tiling of this case, which rate
shall increase to 12% per annum from the finality of judgment.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis in original)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in an Information that reads:
That sometime in June, 1995 in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received in trust from Rufina Chua the
amount of P9,563,900.00 for him to buy complainant shares of stocks, under the express obligation

on the part of the accused to deliver the documents thereon or to return the whole amount if the
purchase did not materialize, but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from
complying will his obligation as aforesaid, with intent to defraud the complainant, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert lo his own personal use and
benefit the said amount of P9,563,900.00, and despite repeated demands failed and relused and still
fails and refuses to return the said amount or to account for the same, to the damage and prejudice of
the complainant Rufina Chua in the aforementioned amount of P9,563,900.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Chiok pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with both parties presenting
their evidence in support of their respective claims and defenses.
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According to the Prosecution, petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he
offered to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok's representations and the fact that he is
Chinese, Chua made an initial investment of P200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares.
She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on until 1994. For each of their
transactions, Chua claimed she was not given any document evidencing every stock transaction and
that she only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his proposal to buy shares
in bulk in the amount of P9,563,900.00. Chua alleged that she deposited P7,100,000.00 to Chiok's Far
East Bank, Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him P2,463,900.00 in cash later that
same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis, Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip
dated June 9, 1995 of Chiok's Far Bast Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or memorandum
for the cash delivery.7
Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided her calls and when he failed to
show any document of the sale. He reassured her by giving her two interbank checks, Check No.
02030693 dated July 11, 1995 for P7,963,900.00 and Check No. 02030694 dated August 15, 1995 in
the amount of P1,600,000.00 (interbank checks). The interbank checks were given with the request to
deposit the first check only after 60-75 days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a
property in I long Kong. Both interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon presentment for
payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of funds. Despite Chua's pleas, Chiok did not return her
money. Hence, she referred the matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated October 25,
1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply dated November 16, 1995 stating that the money was Chua's
investment in their unregistered partnership, and was duly invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end,
Chua decided to file her complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor's Office. 8
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock market, or offered her the
prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991
and until 1995, he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995 when both of
them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He admitted that the P7,963,900.00 she gave him
before she left for the United States was her investment in this unregistered partnership. Chua
allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best judgment and asked him to issue a check in
her name for her peace of mind. Chiok denied having received the P2,463,900.00 in cash from her.9
On cross-examination, however, Chiok admitted receiving "P7.9" million in June 1995 and "P1.6"
million earlier.10 He testified that exercising his best judgment, he invested P8,000,000.00 with Yu Que
Ngo, a businesswoman engaged in the manufacture of machine bolts and screws under the name and
style of Capri Manufacturing Company.11 Chiok narrated that Chua only panicked when she learned
that he was swindled by one Gonzalo Nuguid, who supplied him with dollars. 12 It was then that she
immediately demanded the return of her investment. To reassure Chua, Chiok informed her that lie
had invested the money with Yu Que Ngo and offered to give Yu Que Ngo's checks to replace his
previously issued interbank checks.13 Chua agreed, but instead of returning his checks, she retained
them along with the checks of Yu Que Ngo. Chua rejected Yu Que Ngo's offer to settle her obligation
with land and machineries, insisting on recovering the "whole amount plus interest, litigation expenses
plus attorney's fees."14 After the case was filed, Chiok and Yu Que Ngo met with Chua, accompanied
by their lawyers, in an effort to amicably settle Chua's demand for the return of her funds. Chua
demanded more than P30,000,000.00, but Chiok and Yu Que Ngo requested for a lower amount
because the original claim was only P9,500,000.00. Chua did not grant their request. 15

In a Decision16 dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the crime of estafa (RTC
conviction). Its dispositive portion reads:
In View Of All The Foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Wilfred N. Chiok guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer
imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest at
the legal rate to be computed from the date of demand - October 25, 1995 until fully paid.
For want of evidence, the Court cannot award the alleged actual damages.
SO ORDERED.17
The prosecution filed a Motion for Cancellation of Bail18 pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure on February 1, 1999, the same day the judgment was promulgated. 19On
February 15, 1999, Chiok filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 of the RTC conviction.
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The RTC, in an omnibus order21 dated May 28, 1999 (omnibus order), denied Chiok's motion for
reconsideration, and also cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the circumstances of the accused indicated the probability of
flight if released on bail and/or that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, he
may commit another crime. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the bail of the accused is cancelled. The accused is given five (5) days from receipt of
this order within which to surrender before this Court otherwise, his arrest will be ordered.
SO ORDERED.22
On June 18, 1999, Chiok filed a Notice of Appeal23 on the RTC conviction and omnibus order, docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 23309 (the appeal case) and rallied to the CA Fifteenth Division. On June 19, 1999,
Chiok also filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Injunction against the omnibus order,24 which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 53340
(bail case) and raffled to the CA Thirteenth Division.
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Meanwhile, the RTC issued an order of arrest 25 on June 25, 1999 (order of arrest) pursuant to the
omnibus order. The order of arrest was returned to the trial court by the Makati Police Station on July
25, 1999 on the ground that Chiok could not be located at his last given address. 26
The Bail Case
On July 27, 1999, the CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until further
orders.27 On September 20, 1999, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction 28 enjoining the arrest
of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not be deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal
because the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the probability of
flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. 29 The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and Chua filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
November 16, 1999.
On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate
petitions for certiorari before us seeking review of the CA Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and
November 16, 1999.30 We granted the OSG's and Chua's petitions and reversed the CA's injunction on
the arrest of Chiok.31 Our decisions (SC bail decisions) became final on December 6, 2006 and June
20, 2007, respectively.
The Appeal Case
On September 21, 1999, the CA Thirteenth Division dismissed the appeal of Chiok finding him to have
jumped bail when the order of arrest was returned unserved. 32 The CA considered his appeal
abandoned, dismissing it pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

However, on February 29, 2000, the CA reinstated Chiok's appeal when it learned of the issuance of
the TRO and injunction in the bail case on September 20, 1999 or a day prior to the appeal's
dismissal.33
Proceedings before the CA ensued. Chiok filed his Appellant's Brief 34 dated August 28, 2003 while the
OSG filed its Appellee's Brief35 dated December 23, 2003. Chiok submitted his Reply Brief 36 dated April
14, 2004 while the OSG and Chua replied through their Rejoinder Briefs 37 dated October 6, 2004.
On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former-Fourth Division) rendered a Decision
reversing and setting aside the Decision dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted
Chiok for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (CA acquittal).
The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact on the prosecution's evidence but
merely recited the evidence of the prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate
facts constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, the trial
court relied on the weakness of the defense. It found that Chua's testimony, which was the sole
evidence of the prosecution, was inconsistent and improbable. Specifically, it was irregular that Chua
was not able to produce any single receipt or documentary evidence of all the alleged stock dealings
which spanned for a long period of six years with Chiokthe purpose of which was to prove that he
misappropriated the amount contrary to her instructions of investing it to blue chip stocks. More
importantly, the acceptance by Chua of the checks issued by Yu Que Ngo ratified his application of the
funds based on the instructions to invest it. Simply put, the prosecution was not able to prove the
element of misappropriation (i.e., deviation from Chua's instructions). As to the civil aspect, the CA
found Chiok liable to Chua for the amount of P9,500,000.00, 38 the amount he admitted on record.
The OSG did not file a motion for reconsideration on the ground of double jeopardy. Chua, on the
other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration39 on August 8, 2007. Chiok also filed his own motion for
reconsideration,40 on the civil liability imposed on him.
In a Resolution41 dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua's motion for reconsideration and its
supplement on the ground that acquittal is immediately final and the re-examination of the record of
the case would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied the motions tor
reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, these consolidated petitions questioning the CA acquittal by way of a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, and the civil aspect of the case by way of appeal by certiorari.
Issues
The consolidated petitions raise the following issues:
I.
II.

III.

Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this petition.
Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of
double jeopardy.
Whether or not Chiok is civilly liable to Chua.
Discussion

I. Chua lacks the legal personality to file this petition.

Chua argues that her petition should be allowed because the circumstances of this case warrant
leniency on her lack of personality to assail the criminal aspect of the CA acquittal. She argues that
"the OSG did not take any action to comment on the position of Chua [and] that this case belongs to
the realm of exceptions to the doctrine of double jeopardy." 42

We disagree with Chua.

Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on
behalf of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.
In Villareal v. Aliga,43 we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG, as representative of the State,
which may question the acquittal of the accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (I),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall
have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The OSG is the law office of the
Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The
private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the
civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again
espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was categorically slated that if the
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of
the private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the
case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this
guiding principle.
xxx
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the
Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the
criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. 44 The interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.45 In the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may
be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. 46 The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 47
Although there are instances when we adopt a liberal view and give due course to a petition filed by
an offended party, we direct the OSG to file its comment. 48 When through its comment, the OSG takes
a position similar to the private complainant's, we hold that the OSG ratifies and adopts the private
complainant's petition as its own.49 However, when the OSG in its comment neither prays that the
petition be granted nor expressly ratifies and adopts the petition as its own, we hesitate in
disregarding, and uphold instead, the rule on personality or legal standing. 50
In this case, the OSG neither appealed the judgment of acquittal of the CA nor gave its conformity to
Chua's special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. In its Comment 51 dated March 27, 2008, the
OSG is of the view that Chua's petition will place Chiok in double jeopardy:
x x x Notably, while petitioner [Chua] imputes grave abuse of discretion on the Court of Appeals in
acquitting private respondent, a perusal of the allegations will reveal errors of judgment in the
appreciation of evidence, not error of jurisdiction. Verily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals

abused its discretion when it pronounced that "we have also reviewed the evidence of the accused in
order to satisfy ourselves about the essential question of misappropriation or conversion" and hold
thereafter that "review now justifies us to pronounce that his version on the matter was probably
credible." Petitioner argues that a simple review of the evidence of respondent accused readily leads
to the conclusion that it is very far from being probably credible.
Clearly, the errors ascribed to the Court of Appeals are errors that go deeply into the appreciation and
assessment of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the trial. Thus, the
present petition smacks in the heart of the Court of [Appeals] appreciation of evidence x x x. 52
In view of the contrary position of the OSG, we do not subscribe to Chua's view that the circumstances
of this case warrant the relaxation on the rule. Even if we do relax this procedural rule, we find that
the merits of the case still calls for the dismissal of Chua's petition.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.
The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.53 Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for
double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a
valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. 54
In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a
judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and
immediately executory upon its promulgation.55 This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule.
The rationale for the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:56
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into
"the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in
unequal contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with sill its resources and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's
liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection lo insure that
the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a
single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be
able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution
conclusively presumes that a second trial would be unfair. (Citations omitted, Emphasis
supplied)

There were cases, however, where we recognized certain exceptions to the rule against double
jeopardy and its resultant doctrine of finality-of-acquittal.
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,57 we remanded a judgment of acquittal to a trial court due to a finding
of mistrial. In declaring the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno
Simeon "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr., which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, we found
that "the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court
and biased [Tanodbayan] under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the
authoritarian [p]resident to assure the carrying out of his instructions." 58 We considered the acquittal
as void, and held that no double jeopardy attached.
In People v. Uy,59 we held that by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
Chua assails the acquittal of Chiok on two grounds. First, the first jeopardy did not attach because the
CA did not have jurisdiction over the appeal; Chiok having lost his right to appeal when the CA found
him to have jumped bail. Second assuming that the first jeopardy attached, the circumstances of this
case is an exception to the rule on double jeopardy.
A. The CA had jurisdiction to entertain Chiok's appeal.
Chua claims that the SC bail decisions set aside as bereft of any factual or legal basis the CA
resolutions in the bail case which enjoined the cancellation of bail of Chiok and his warrant of arrest by
the trial court. The logical and legal consequence of the nullification of the CA resolutions is to
automatically revive the CA's Resolution dated September 21, 1999 dismissing the appeal of Chiok.
Accordingly, the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Chiok and the proceedings therein
are null and void.
We find no merit in Chua's claims.
At the outset, the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal. Chiok filed his Notice of Appeal
on June 18, 1999 at the time when the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure was still in effect. Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that the right to appeal is not
automatically forfeited when an accused fails to appear during the promulgation of judgment. 60 Upon
perfection of Chiok's Notice of Appeal and the subsequent denial of the prosecution's Motion to Deny
Due Course to the Notice of Appeal by the RTC in its Order61 dated July 15, 1999, the CA completely
acquired jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal.
After acquiring jurisdiction over the appeal, the CA took cognizance of the unserved order of arrest.
Exercising jurisdiction over Chiok's appeal, the CA in its Resolution dated September 21, 1999
dismissed his appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment, or failure to prosecute. - The appellate court may, upon
motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The aforecited section gives the CA the authority to dismiss an appeal for abandonment if the accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal. This authority to dismiss an appeal is, nevertheless, discretionary.62 When an accused
jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal, the appellate court may exercise its discretion whether
to proceed with the appeal or dismiss it outright.63 In several cases, we still proceeded to acquit an
accused who remained at large during the pendency of the appeal. 64

In this case, the CA exercised this discretion when it found that Chiok jumped bail because the order
of arrest was not served. Subsequently, when Chiok moved for its reconsideration, the CA again
exercised its discretion, this time to entertain the appeal. Notably, neither the prosecution nor Chua
attributed any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court when it reinstated the
appeal via a Resolution dated February 29, 2000. This resolution, which effectively replaces the
original resolution dismissing the appeal, has already attained finality.
Thus, contrary to the claim of Chua, the SC bail decisions which set aside the CA resolutions enjoining
Chiok's arrest did not automatically revive the CA resolution dismissing the appeal; the dismissal being
a discretionary act on the part of the appellate court. Consequently, we reject the claim of Chua that
the first jeopardy did not attach because the whole proceedings before the CA, and the CA acquittal,
are null and void.
B. Exceptions to the rate on finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrine do not apply.
Chua next asserts that certain exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy are present in this case.
Particularly, she submits that: (1) the appellate court's proceeding is a sham or mock proceeding; (2)
the People through the OSG, was deprived of the opportunity to be heard and its "day in court"; and
(3) the result is a null and void judgment of acquittal. Chua cites the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan65 to bolster her assertions.
Chua claims that the "trial in both the bouncing checks cases and this estafa case, is a sham insofar as
they have resulted in acquittals."66 Chua anchors her claim on the report submitted by Judge Elvira
D.C. Panganiban that there were unauthorized tamperings in the evidence in the bouncing checks
cases67 (BP 22 case) she filed against Chiok, and that a TSN in the same BP 22 case, where Chiok
allegedly made an implied admission of guilt, has been secretly removed from the record.
We do not see any exception to the rule on double jeopardy in this case.
The factual milieu in Galman v. Sandiganbayan68 is starkly different from this case. In Galman, we
concluded that there was a mock or sham trial because of the overwhelming evidence of collusion and
undue pressures made by former President Marcos on the prosecution and the Justices who tried and
decided the case, which prevented the prosecution from fully ventilating its position and offering all
evidence. We recognized the intensity and gravity of the pressure exerted by the highest official in the
land that resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
In this case, Chua presents a report submitted by Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban showing irregularities
in the BP 22 case against Chiok, including the loss of a TSN containing an alleged offer of settlement
by Chiok equivalent to his implied admission of guilt. We, however, do not see the same evils
presented in Galman when the alleged anomalies pointed out by Chua were in a different case and
when the main basis of the acquittal is not on the credibility of the physical evidence but of the
testimony of Chua herself. Moreover, it is apparent from the CA acquittal that the appellate court
considered Chiok's offer of settlement in arriving at the decision, having included it in its statement of
facts. In essence, Chua is asking us to nullify the CA acquittal because in her opinion, if the appellate
court considered these pieces of evidence, it would have convicted Chiok. These are purported errors
of judgment or those involving misappreciation of evidence which cannot be raised and be reviewed in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
We are also not convinced that the State was deprived of due process in presenting its case. The OSG,
in fact, actively participated in prosecuting the case before the CA. It was able to file an Appellee's
Brief69 dated December 23, 2003, as well as its Rejoinder Brief 70 dated October 6, 2004. As Chua even
admits in her petition, the OSG was able to present its case before the appellate court as when "[t]he
OSG's position in this case on the merits is clear in the submissions it has filed, as most eloquently
expressed in the Rejoinder Brief..."71 Certainly, no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed where
both parties had the opportunity to present their case and even required them to submit memoranda
from which its decision is based, as in this case. 72
Although we do not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the appellate court

blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.73 Chua failed to do so.
III. Chiok is civilly liable to Chua in the amount of P9,563,900.00.
Chiok claims thai the Joint Decision74 dated November 27, 2000 in the BP 22 case docketed as
Criminal Case No. 44739 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) San Juan, Manila - Branch 58, which
absolved Chiok from civil liability, is res judicata on this case. On the other hand, Chua. claims that the
CA erred when it ordered Chiok to pay only the amount of P9,500,000.00 when it was shown by
evidence that the amount should be P9,563,900.00.
We rule that Chiok is liable For the amount of P9,563,900.00.
In Castillo v. Salvador75 and several cases before it, we ruled that if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt, the accused is not automatically exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.76
While the CA acquitted Chiok on the ground that the prosecution's evidence on his alleged
misappropriation of Chua's money did not meet the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, we
hold that the monetary transaction between Chua and Chiok was proven by preponderance of
evidence.
Chua presented in evidence a bank deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 to Chiok's Far East Bank, Annapolis
account in the amount of P7,100,000.00. She also testified that she delivered to him in cash the
amount of P2,463,900.00. Chiok's admission that he issued the interbank checks in the total amount
of P9,563,900.00 to Chua, albeit claiming that it was "for safekeeping purposes only" and to assure
her that she will be paid back her investment, corroborates Chua's evidence. In any event, as found
by the appellate court, Chiok admitted that he received from Chua the amount of "P7.9" million in
June 1995 and for "P1.6" million at an earlier time. It is on this basis that the CA found Chiok civilly
liable in the amount of P9,500,000.00 only.
However, we find that during the direct and cross-examination of Chiok on September 15, 1997 and
October 13, 1997, the reference to "P9.5" million is the amount in issue, which is the whole of
P9,563,900.00:
TSN September 15, 1907 (direct examination of Wilfred Chiok)
ATTY ESPIRITU[:] Mr. Witness. The amount here you are being charged in the information is
P9,563,900.00 covered by I lie two (2) checks Exhibits "C" and "D" of the prosecution. x x x 77
TSN Octobcr 13, 1997 (cross examination of Wilfred Chiok)
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] Do you know how much Mrs. Chua is claiming from you [which is the] subject
matter of this case of estafa?
WITNKSK[:] Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] How much?
WITNESS[:] More or less 9.5.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] In peso or in dollar?
WITNESS[:] In Peso.
PROSECUTOR RASA[:] 9.5 Million what?

WITNESS[:] Million Peso, ma'am.

PROSECUTOR RASA[:] You admit that you received 9.5 Million from Mrs. Chua?
WITNESS[:] I admitted that, ma'am.78 (Italics supplied)
Accordingly, the amount admitted should be P9,563,900.00.
There is also no merit in Chiok's claim that his absolution from civil liability in the BP 22 case involving
the same transaction bars civil liability in this estafa case under the doctrine of res judicatain the
concept of "conclusiveness of judgment."
The doctrine of res judicata under the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" is found in paragraph
(c) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under this doctrine, a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. 79 Stated differently,
facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different cause of action. 80 This
principle of res judicata bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 81
In Rodriguez v. Ponferrada,82 we explained that a civil action in a BP 22 case is not a bar to a civil
action in estafa case. In rejecting the theory of petitioner therein that the civil action arising from the
criminal case for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding civil action in the
criminal case for estafa pending before the RTC, we ruled that Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly
allows the institution of a civil action in the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, without need
of election by the offended party. There is no forum shopping because both remedies are
simultaneously available to the offended party. We explained that while every such act of issuing a
bouncing check involves only one civil liability for the offended party who has sustained only a single
injury, this single civil liability can be the subject of both civil actions in the estafa case and the BP 22
case. However, there may only be one recovery of the single civil liability.
We affirmed this in Rimando v. Aldaba,83 where we were confronted with the similar issue of whether
an accused's civil liability in the estafa case must be upheld despite acquittal and exoneration from
civil liability in BP 22 cases. We held that both estafa and BP 22 cases can proceed to their final
adjudication-both as to their criminal and civil aspectssubject only to the prohibition on double
recovery.
Since the Rules itself allows for both remedies to be simultaneously availed of by the offended party,
the doctrine of res judicata finds no application here.
Moreover, the principle of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment presupposes that
facts and issues were actually and directly resolved in a previous case. 84 However, the records show
that in the BP 22 case, the facts and issues proving the transaction were not actually and directly
resolved in the decision, viz:
The court is not persuaded.
First, what the law requires is a notice of dishonor of the check to be given to the accused after its
dishonor. There is no showing dial this requirement was complied by the prosecution. Second, the
drawer must be given at least 5 banking days from such notice of dishonor within which to pay the
holder thereof the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of
such check. Indeed, there was no notice of dishonor established to have been furnished the accused
and therefore there is more reason that the accused was not given the requisite 5-banking day to
make good aforesaid cheeks. The 5-day notice serves to mitigate the harshness of the law in its
application by giving the drawer an opportunity to make good the bum check. And, it cannot be said
that accused was ever given that opportunity simply because the prosecution failed to prove that
accused was notified of the dishonor of the checks in suit.
xxx

Even assuming without admitting but only for the sake of argument that accused was notified of the
dishonor of the checks in suit by the demand letter adverted to above, still the prosecution cause must
fail because there are more reasons not to believe than to believe the theory of the prosecution as
compared with that of the defense as will be explained hereunder.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby absolves the accused from
criminal as well as civil liability and orders these cases DISMISSED for lack of evidence to support the
charges levelled against him.
Costs de officio.
No other pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.85
The basis or Chiok's acquittal therein is the prosecution's failure to show that a notice of dishonor was
first given to Chiok. The discussion that the prosecution's version is incredible was merely secondary,
and was not necessary, for accused's acquittal. There were no findings of fact on the transaction which
gives rise to the civil liability.
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In light of these, we reject Chiok's claim that res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment
bars Chua from recovering any civil claims.
Following this Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,86 the foregoing amount of P9,563,900.00 shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995, the date of
Chua's extrajudicial demand, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total amount shall
thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from such finality of judgment until
its satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 179814 and the special civil action for
certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 180021 are DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R.
No. 180021 is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated July 19, 2007 and the Resolution dated October
3, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Wilfred Chiok is
ordered to pay Rufina Chua the principal amount of P9,563,900.00, with interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum computed from October 25, 1995 until the date of finality of this judgment.
The total amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

8.

G.R. No. L-8238

May 25, 1955

CESAR M. CARANDANG, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
and TOMAS VALENTON, Sr. and TOMAS VALENTON, Jr., respondents.
S. Mejia-Panganiban for petitioner.
Evangelista and Valenton for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M.
Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the
result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal
case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed
against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in the criminal case was rendered
on September 1, 1953 and petitioner herein filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to recover from the defendant Tomas Valenton, Jr. and his parents, damages, both
actual and moral, for the bodily injuries received by him on occasion of the commission of
the crime of frustrated homicide by said accused Tomas Valenton Jr. After the defendants
submitted their answer, they presented a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case,
pending the termination of the criminal case against Tomas Valenton, Jr. in the Court of
Appeals. The judge ruled that the trial of the civil action must await the result of the criminal
case on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was submitted, but the court denied the same;
hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code, which is as follows:
In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed (under Article 33) is similar
to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law (Reports
of the Code Commission, pp. 46-47). But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries"
is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, and therefore said
term should be understood in its peculiar and technical sense, in accordance with the rules
statutory construction (Sec. 578, 59 C. J. 979).
In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the
defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily
injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason
that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises
whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised
Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or
not.

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to
them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With
this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is
difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article
some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries,
because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code
Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article
intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code
Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of
physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.
A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the
appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that
inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the
person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The
court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly
"founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal
injury resulting in a crippled body.
For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in
suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the
pending criminal case. With costs against the defendant-appellees.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion
and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ.,concur.

9.

[G.R. No. 127934. August 23, 2000]

ACE HAULERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS AND EDERLINDA ABIVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 106, except for the award of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, which was deleted.The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision reads as follows:
[1]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay

plaintiff:
1. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) as actual damages;
2. the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
3. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages;
4. the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;
5. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[2]

The facts, culled from the findings of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
The case was an action for damages arising from a vehicular mishap which
took place on June 1, 1984, involving a truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers
Corporation and driven by its employee, Jesus dela Cruz, and a jeepney
owned by Isabelito Rivera, driven by Rodolfo Parma. A third vehicle, a
motorcycle, was bumped and dragged by the jeepney, and its rider, Fidel
Abiva, was run over by the truck owned by petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation,
causing his death. Upon his untimely demise, Fidel Abiva left behind a wife,
respondent Erderlinda Abiva and their three (3) children.

On July 27, 1984, a criminal information for reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the two drivers, Dela Cruz
and Parma, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-37248 before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 103.
While the criminal action was pending, on March 11, 1985, respondent
Ederlinda Abiva filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a
separate civil action for damages against the two accused in the criminal
case, as well as against Isabelito Rivera and petitioner Ace Haulers Corp., the
owners of the vehicles involved in the accident and employers of the accused.
In her complaint, respondent Abiva prayed that:
1. A Writ of Preliminary Attachment be immediately issued against the
properties of the defendants as security for the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be recovered;
2. Defendants in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of P200,000.00 as actual
damage;
3. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees;
4. Defendants, in solidum, to pay plaintiff the amount of moral and exemplary
damages which this Court may reasonably assess.
On January 31, 1986, petitioner Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela Cruz filed
a motion to dismiss bringing to the trial courts attention the fact that a criminal
action was pending before another branch of the same court, and that under
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the filing of an independent civil action
arising from a quasi-delict is no longer allowed. Furthermore, said defendants
alleged that respondents private counsel actively participated in the criminal
proceedings, showing that the respondent was in fact pursuing the civil aspect
automatically instituted with the criminal case.
On February 21, 1986, respondent filed an opposition to the motion arguing
that she was not pursuing the civil aspect in the criminal case as she, in fact,
manifested in open court in the criminal proceedings that she was filing a

separate and independent civil action for damages against the accused and
their employers, as allowed under Articles 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
On February 28, 1986, the trial court dismissed the action for damages on the
ground that no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution in a case for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. Respondent Abivas motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal was also denied by the trial court. She then elevated the case
before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) by way of a petition for
certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. 09644. The appellate court reversed the
dismissal order of the trial court. It was then petitioner Ace Haulers
Corporation and Jesus dela Cruzs turn to appeal the judgment of the IAC
before the Supreme Court. On August 3, 1988, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution denying the petition for review of Ace Haulers Corp. and Jesus dela
Cruz for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed
any reversible error in the questioned error. The case was remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
In the meantime that the petition for review was pending before the Supreme
Court, fire razed the portion of the Quezon City Hall building which housed the
trial courts and the records of the case were among those that the fire
reduced to ashes. It was not until March 26, 1992 that the records of the case
was reconstituted by the trial court.
While the pre-trial proceedings in the civil action for damages was still being
set and reset upon motion of the opposing parties, on July 6, 1992, the RTC,
Quezon City, Branch 83 rendered judgment in the criminal case, finding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of both accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz for the offense
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, this Court finds them guilty of
said offense charged and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and
undergo imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and TEN
(10) DAYS also of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.

Accused Rodolfo Parma and Jesus dela Cruz are hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of the deceased Fidel O. Abiva, jointly or pro rata, the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnification for his death and the
amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) by way of actual
damages.
SO ORDERED.
On March 9, 1993, the pre-trial conference of the civil case was finally set on
April 6, 1993, and notices thereof were sent to the parties and their respective
counsel. On the appointed date, however, no representative nor counsel for
petitioner Ace Haulers Corporation appeared. Consequently, upon motion of
respondent Abiva, the petitioner was declared as in default. Furthermore,
defendants Jesus dela Cruz, Isabelito Rivera and Rodolfo Parma were
discharged as defendants, and the case against them dismissed.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, ruling against petitioner
Ace Haulers Corporation. The trial court summarized its findings thus:
Hence, Mrs. Ederlinda Abiva as part of plaintiffs evidence, testified that she is
43 years old, a widow and housekeeper, residing at Cefels Subdivision,
Deparo, Novaliches, Quezon City.She told the Court that she is the widow of
Fidel Abiva, who died on June 1, 1984 after he was ran over by Isuzu Cargo
Truck Plate No. NWY-T Phil 93 owned and operated by the defendant Ace
Haulers Corporation, then driven by Jesus dela Cruz and
that because of thedeath of her husband, she suffered damages, among
which, moral, exemplary and actual damages for her expenses and attorneys
fees. She claimed that she is lawfully married to the late Fidel Abiva as
evidenced by their Marriage Contract (Exhibits A and A-1). Out of their
wedlock, (sic) they begot three (3) children, namely: Noel, Gina and Argentina
with ages 25, 21 and 15, respectively. Her husband died on June 1, 1984 at
around 11:45 p.m. (Exhibits B, B-1 and B-2), because of the vehicular
accident which involved the wheeler truck of Ace Haulers Corporation driven
by Jesus dela Cruz, a jeepney owned by Isabelito Rivera, then driven by
Rodolfo Parma and a motorcycle driven by her husband. Her husband, after
his death, was autopsied, as reflected in an Autopsy Report (Exhibit C) and by
the Postmortem Finding (Exhibit C-1). This was also covered by a police

report (Exhibit D) which shows that Jesus dela Cruz is the driver of the
defendant (Exhibit D-1). This fact is reiterated in a sworn statement which she
executed relative to this vehicular accident (Exhibit E) wherein the said driver
mentioned and confirmed the name of his employer (Exhibit E-1). A criminal
case was lodged against the drivers of the two vehicles and a Decision was
rendered thereon in Criminal Case No. Q-37248 entitled People of the
Philippines versus Jesus dela Cruz and Rodolfo Parma finding both of them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2, F3, F-4 and F-5). This decision has now acquired finality as no appeal was
taken by the accused. It is established, however, that prior to the filing of the
instant case, Mrs. Abiva pleaded to Ace Haulers to compensate her for the
death of her husband. But her plea went (sic) to deaf ears. She was thus
constrained to file this case for damages.
Further testimony of Mrs. Abiva revealed that before the death of her
husband, he was employed with Philippine Airlines (PAL) earning
P4,600.00.00 a month, as evidenced by the Pay
Statement covering the period of 4-15-84 in the amount of P2,065.00 (Exhibits
G, G-1, G-2 and G-3); that when he died, he was only 40 years old and
healthy, and that based on the life history and pedigree of his family where
some of its members lived up to 100 years, she expects her husband to live
for no less than 15 years more and could have earned no less than
P828,000.00 for the family. But this, her family was deprived, because his life
was snatched away by this accident while her husband was riding in a
motorcycle which he bought for P11,850.00 (Exhibits H and H-1) which was
also totally wrecked.
Resulting from her husbands death, Mrs. Abiva told the Court that she
incurred expenses for his burial and funeral in the total amount of no less than
P30,000.00 and for his wake of six days, in the amount of about P40,600.00
(Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and J-6). She also spent around P80,000.00
as litigation expenses, in her quest for justice since she has to engage the
services of four (4) counsels from the time of the filing of this case before the
Hon. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, then Presiding Judge of this Court who once
dismissed this case, and which led eventually to an appeal by certiorari which
was later elevated up to the Supreme Court. (Exhibits K, K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4, K-

5 and K-6). Blaming the defendant, Mrs. Abiva claimed that had Ace Haulers
exercised diligence, care and prudence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, her husband would have been spared from this accident.Hence,
her prayer for the award of P200,000.00 for the death of her husband, who by
now, could have risen in the promotional ladder to a senior Executive of PAL
and could be earning about P30,000.00 salary per month by now. She further
prays for award of moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 exemplary
damages of P100,000.00, attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and litigation
expenses of P50,000.00.
After the testimony of Mrs. Abiva as the lone witness for the plaintiff, counsel
formally offered his exhibits and rested his case.
Gathered from the evidence presented, testimonial and documentary, the
Court finds enough legal and factual basis to grant the claim for damages by
the plaintiff. The insinuations of negligence on the part of defendants driver is
amply shown as one, who drove his vehicle fast, impervious to the safety of
life and property of others, his utter lack of care and caution and his
unmitigated imprudence, rolled into one, all these predicated the occurrence
of this accident which took away a precious human life.
Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict x x x (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
Corollary to this, is the civil law concept that:
The obligations imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible
(Art. 2180, 1stparagraph, New Civil Code)
xxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, x x x
(Article 2180 paragraph 5, New Civil Code).

Taken in their appropriate context, and predicated on the evidence adduced

which has not been evidentiarily traversed by the defendant, this Court is left
to (sic) no other recourse but to grant the remedies and reliefs which in her
complaint plaintiff prays for, all of them having been by her adduced evidence,
preponderantly shown and established and out of which, she has shown
herself to be completely deserving.
[3]

On September 13, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

[4]

On January 17, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, except for the award of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, which is hereby set aside, the Decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respect.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.

[5]

The issues raised are whether or not in an action for damages arising from
a vehicular accident plaintiff may recover damages against the employer of
the accused driver both in the criminal case (delict) and the civil case for
damages based on quasi delict, but not recover twice for the same act; (2)
whether the Court of Appeals erred in not lifting the order declaring petitioner
as in default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference; and (3) whether
the damages awarded in the civil case were excessive, much more than the
previous award in the criminal case.
In Padua v. Robles, we held that Civil liability coexists with criminal
responsibility. In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the
option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. x x x Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery
of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.
5

Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender
in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
7

Hence, in this case, respondent Abiva shall have the choice which of the
awards to take, naturally expecting that she would opt to recover the greater
amount. It has not been shown that she has recovered on the award in the
criminal case, consequently, she can unquestionably recover from petitioner in
the civil case.
As to the second issue raised, we find that petitioner was rightly declared
as in default for its failure to appear during the pre-trial conference despite
due notice. This is a factual question resolved by the Court of Appeals which
we cannot review.
8

As to the third issue regarding the award of damages to respondent Abiva,

we find the award of actual damages to be supported by preponderant
evidence. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence
obtainable of the actual amount thereof. However, there is no basis for the
award of moral damages, which is hereby deleted. The person claiming moral
damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result
of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to
have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.
9

10

The attorney's fees awarded is reduced to P20,000.00 which is ten (10%)

percent of the amount of actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals, with modification. The Court
11

deletes the award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages,

and reduces the attorney fees to twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

10.

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

+.wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR.
EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased,
Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja
reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in
Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the
gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:

t.hqw

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in
the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action

can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of
Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered
in the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
t.hqw

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
(Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest
from the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."
This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:
t.hqw

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the

citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of
the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to
individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon
the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in
many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is
proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in
the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it
is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation
for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)

And Tolentino says:

t.hqw

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to
institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The present
articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation,
fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed
independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation
made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation;
but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action
should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of
the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
t.hqw

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical
injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there
are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in
the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical
sense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to
mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used
with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil
action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article
intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for
the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for
assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs.
Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)

Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely
concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 is
hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil
action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under
article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil
Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
(Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See
Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise
to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless
imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine
because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil
action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under
article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil
Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
(Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See
Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise
to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless
imprudence is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine
because it was concurred in by only five Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.

11.

G.R. No. 172505

October 1, 2014

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 11, 2005 and its resolution dated April 27, 2006, denying petitioner
Antonio Garcia's motion for reconsideration.
1

Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer,
entered into a deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock on July 15, 1988. The
deed was for the sale and purchase of shares of stock from various corporations, including
one class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and one proprietary membership in the
Manila Polo Club, Inc. These shares of stock were in the name of Antonio Garcia. The
contract was allegedly entered into to prevent these shares of stock from being sold at
public auction to pay the outstanding obligations of Antonio Garcia.
4

On March 3, 1989, a deed of right of repurchase over the same shares of stock subject of
the deed of absolute sale and purchase of shares of stock was entered into between
Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. Under the deed of right of repurchase, Antonio
Garcia can redeem the properties sold within 180 days from the signing of the agreement.

Before the end of the 180-day period, Antonio Garcia exercised his right to repurchase the
properties. However, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the repurchase ofthe shares of
stock. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed an action for specific performance and annulment of
transfer of shares.
8

10

On September 6, 1989, the class "A" share in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and proprietary
membership in the Manila Polo Club, Inc., which were included in the contracts entered
intobetween Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., were sold at public auction to
Philippine Investment System Organization.
11

On September 3, 1990, the information based on the complaint of Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
was filed against Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial Court. He was charged with
estafaunder Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly
misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered
into were free from all liens and encumbrances. The information reads:
12

The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor accuses Antonio M. Garcia of the felony of Estafa as
defined and penalized under Art. 318 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, committed
as follows:
THAT on or about 15 July 1988, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident bad faith and
deceit, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misrepresent to FERRO
CHEMICALS, INC. (FCI) represented by Ramon M. Garcia, that his share of
stock/proprietary share with Ayala Alabang Country Club, Inc. and Manila Polo Club, Inc.
collectively valued at about P10.00 Million Pesos, being part of other shares of stock subject
matter of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Purchase of Shares of Stock between the accused
and FCI, were free from all liens, encumbrances and claims by third persons, when in truth
and in fact, accused well knew that aforesaid share of stock/proprietary share had already
been garnished in July 1985 and subsequently sold at public auction in September 1989,
and which misrepresentation and assurance FCI relied upon and paid the consideration in
accordance with the stipulated condition/manner of payment, all to the damage and
prejudice of FCI in the aforestated amount of P10.00 Million Pesos.
Contrary to law.

13

In the decision dated December 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Antonio Garcia was
acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The Regional Trial Court held:
14

From the foregoing, it is very clear that private complainant was aware of the status of the
subject CLUB SHARES. Thus, the element of false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means which constitute the very cause or the only motive which induced the private
complainant to enter into the questioned deed of sale (Exh. "A") is wanting in the case at
bar. (Underscoring in the original)
15

Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Regional
Trial Court in the order dated July 29, 1997.
16

On August 25, 1997, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals the July 29,
1997 order of the Regional Trial Court as to the civil aspect of the case. The notice of
appeal filed was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil
Aspect of the Case)." It alleged:
17

18

4. Herein private complainant hereby gives notice, out of extreme caution, that it is
appealing the Decision dated 12 December 1996 and the Order dated 29 July 1997 on the
civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is notin accordance with
the law and the facts of the case.
5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due
course thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the consolidation of this appeal
with the said petition.
19

On October 15, 1997, the Makati City Prosecutors Office and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. also
filed a petition for certiorari with this court, assailing the Regional Trial Courts December
12, 1996 decision and July 29, 1997 order acquitting Antonio Garcia.
20

21

The petition for certiorari filed before this court sought to annul the decision of the trial
court acquitting Antonio Garcia. People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. argued
that the trial court "acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it rendered the judgment of acquittal based on affidavits not at all
introduced in evidence by either of the parties thereby depriving the people of their
substantive right to due process of law." The verification/certification against forum
shopping, signed by Ramon Garcia as president of Ferro Chemicals, Inc., disclosed that the
notice of appeal was filed "with respect to the civil aspect of the case."
22

23

24

In the resolution dated November 16, 1998, this court dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed, and entry of judgment was made on December 24, 1998.
25

26

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in its decision dated August 11, 2005, granted
the appeal and awarded Ferro Chemicals, Inc. the amount of P1,000,000.00 as actual loss
with legal interest and attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The appellate court
27

28

29

found that Antonio Garcia failed to disclose the Philippine Investment and Savings
Organizations lien over the club shares. Thus:
30

The issue in this case is whether or not Antonio Garcia disclosed to Ferro-Chemicals, during
the negotiation stage of the impending sale of the imputed club shares, the third attachment
lien in favor of Philippine Investment and Savings Organization (PISO) which, ultimately,
became the basis of the auction sale of said club shares. We have scrutinized the records
of the case but found no evidence that Antonio Garcia intimated to his brother the third
attachment lien of PISO over the said club shares. While it is true that Antonio Garcia
divulged the two liens of Security Bank and Insular Bank of Asia and America, the lien of
PISO was clearly not discussed. The affidavits executed by the two lawyers to the effect
that the lien of PISO was considered but deliberately left out in the deed cannot be given
much weight as they were never placed on the witness stand and cross-examined by FerroChemicals. If their affidavits, although not offered, were considered inthe criminal aspect
and placed a cloud on the prosecutions thrust, theycannot be given the same probative
value in this civil aspect as only a preponderance of evidence is necessary to carry the day
for the plaintiff, Ferro Chemicals.
While Antonio Garcia insists that no consideration was ever made over the club shares as
the same were merely given for safekeeping, the document denominated as Deed of
Absolute Sale states otherwise. It is a basic rule of evidence that between documentary
evidence and oral evidence, the former carries more weight.
Also, We have observed that in Antonio Garcias letter of redemption addressed to Ferro
Chemicals, he mentioned his interest in redeeming the company shares only. That he did
not include the club shares only meant that said club shares no longer had any much
redeemable value as there was a lienover them. To redeem them would be pointless.
If they had no redeemable value to Antonio Garcia, to Ferro Chemical they were certainly
marketable assets. The non-disclosure of the third lien in favor of PISO materially affected
Ferro Chemicals since it was not able to act on time to protect its interest when the auction
sale over the club shares actually took place. As a result, Ferro Chemicals suffered losses
due to the unfortunate public auction sale. It is but just and fair that Antonio Garcia be made
to compensate the loss pursuant to Articles 21 and 2199 of the Civil Code.
The actual loss suffered by Ferro Chemicals amounted to P1,000,000.00 which
correspondents to the bid value of the club shares at the time of the auction as evidenced
by the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. (Citations omitted)
31

Antonio Garcia filed a motion for reconsideration and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a partial
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. These motions were
denied in the resolution dated April 27, 2006. Thus, Antonio Garcia filed this petition for
review on certiorari, assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
32

33

34

Antonio Garcia argues that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals were erroneous and
insists that "[Ferro Chemicals, Inc.] was fully aware that the shares covered by the Deed of
Absolute Sale, including the Subject Club Shares, were not free from liens and
encumbrances and that the Deed [of] Sale was executed [to] warehouse [Antonio Garcias]
assets based on, among other evidence, the affidavits executed by Jaime Gonzales . . . and
Rolando Navarro. . . ."
35

36

Antonio Garcia faults the Court of Appeals in disregarding the affidavits executed by Jaime
Gonzales and Rolando Navarro. Antonio Garcia argues that even thiscourt in G.R. No.
130880 entitled People of the Philippines and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. v. Hon. Dennis Villa
Ignacio and Antonio Garcia where the admissibility of the affidavits was put in issue held
that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in the challenged
decision. He then reasoned that "pursuant to the law of the case, [the affidavits of
Gonzalez and Navarro] are admissible and should be given weight."
37

38

Finally, Antonio Garcia claims thatboth he and and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. acted in bad faith
when they entered into the deed of absolute sale as a scheme to defraud Antonio Garcias
creditors. Thus, they are in pari delicto and Ferro Chemicals, Inc. should not be allowed to
recover from Antonio Garcia.
39

In its comment, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. points out that Antonio Garcia raised factual issues
not proper ina Rule 45 petition and reiterates the findings of the Court of Appeals.
40

41

There are pertinent and important issues that the parties failed to raise before the trial court,
Court of Appeals, and this court. Nonetheless, we resolve to rule on these issues.
As a general rule, this court through its appellate jurisdiction can only decide on matters or
issues raised by the parties. However, the rule admits of exceptions. When the
unassigned error affects jurisdiction over the subject matter or when the consideration of
the error is necessary for a complete resolution of the case, this court can still decide on
these issues.
42

43

44

45

We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law or patently erroneous
decisions or resolutions simply because the parties failed to raise these errors before the
court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes of the parties
counsel and condoning reckless and negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the
litigants. Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication of our duty to dispense
justice to all parties.
The issues are:
I. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case

II. Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision
amounted to forum shopping
III. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability ex
delicto
The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law. In criminal cases, the
imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has
jurisdiction over the case.
46

47

The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month
and one (1) day to six (6) months. Article 318 states:
ART. 318: Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed
upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in
the preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or
take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.
....
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of
jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial courts proceedings and the judgment
rendered. Although the trial courts lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any
part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we proceed with resolving the
matter.
48

In Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals, this court held:

49

Thus, we apply the general rule thatjurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the
issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded fromruling that the lower court had
no jurisdiction over the case[.]
....
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to try
the case against the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised
as the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.
50

The trial courts lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties silence on the
matter. The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed
as a waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the
parties.
51

The assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the
Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping
Forum shopping is defined as "theact of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some
other court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court,
then in another." Once clearly established that forum shopping was committed willfully and
deliberately by a party or his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with
prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative
sanctions.
52

53

Forum shopping is prohibited, and sanctions are imposed on those who commit forum
shopping as "it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration
of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets." This court has said:
54

What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks
different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially
the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in
which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action. (Citation omitted)
55

The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant commits forum
shopping are the following:
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicatain
another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties asrepresent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicatain the action under
consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant
or lis pendens. (Citation omitted)
56

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an
appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the
same trial court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.s notice of appeal to the
Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The
Civil Aspect of the Case)." The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation
before the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor
institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.
57

There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals,
Inc., are both parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for
certiorari before this court.
There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it
may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the
Court of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the trial courts decision while the petition for
certiorari before this court is allegedly only onthe criminal aspect of the case. However, the
civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the
criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not
reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor
institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. Thus, it is an adjunct
of the criminalaspect of the case. As held in Lim v. Kou Co Ping:
58

59

1wphi1

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delictois based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal
action.For this reason, the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delictois instituted prior to or subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the
criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist." (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
60

When the trial courts decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for
certiorari before thiscourt, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus,
the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is
asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals.
Even the allegations in the notice of appeal readily show that Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
committedforum shopping, to wit:
5. This notice of appeal is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the criminal aspect, upon the giving of due
course thereto, private complainant shall endeavor to seek the consolidation of this appeal
with the said petition.
61

As to the third requisite, on the assumption that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case,
this courts decision in G.R. No. 130880 affirming the trial courts decision acquitting the
accused for lack of an essential element of the crime charged amounts to res judicatato
assert the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense. This courts resolution
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. states:
In any event, petitioners failed to sufficiently show that any grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Regional Trial Court in rendering the challenged decision and order which,
on the contrary, appear to be in accord with the facts and the applicable law and
jurisprudence.
62

Litigants cannot avail themselves of two separate remedies for the same relief in the hope
that in one forum, the relief prayed for will be granted. This is the evil sought tobe averted
by the doctrine of non-forum shopping, and this is the problem that has happened in this
case. This court denied the petition for certiorari filed byFerro Chemicals, Inc. resulting in
finality of the trial courts decision. The decision found Antonio Garcia not guilty of the
offense charged, and no civil liability was awarded to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. However, at
present,there is a conflicting decision from the Court of Appeals awarding Ferro Chemicals,
Inc. civil indemnity arising from the offense charged.
1awp++i1

When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal
action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior
filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The civil action cannot
proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the
criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public
prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the
petition for certiorari.
63

64

We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from
filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a
decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the
private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court." As
discussed in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa:
65

66

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence, if a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of
the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as
the criminal aspect there of is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or
in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or
offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal
aspect of the case.However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the
civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party
need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for
reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for
certiorarior mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown
and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. (Citations omitted)
67

This is in consonance with the doctrine that:

[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction ofthe civil
action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The
offended party may still claim civil liability ex delictoif there is a finding in the final judgment
in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists.
Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds
acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court

declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;and (c) if the civil liability of the accused
does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
68

However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court
acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a
separate civil action,the civil liability ex delictothat is inherently attached to the offense is
likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the
petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot
anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of
non-forum shopping.
On the other hand, the conclusion isdifferent if private complainant reserved the right to
institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial
Court orinstitute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance
with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appealas to the civil
aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation here.
1wphi1

We see no more reason to discuss the issues presented by the parties in light of the
foregoing discussion.
Entry of judgment having been made on the resolution of the court in G.R. No. 130880
involving the same parties and issues and by virtue of the doctrine of finality of judgment,
we reiterate the resolution of this court.
WHEREFORE, the resolution in G.R. No. 130880 is reiterated. We grant the petition insofar
as it prays for the setting aside of the Court of Appeals' decision d~ted August 11, 2005 and
resolution dated April 27, 2006 as a final decision over the assailed Regional Trial Court
decision that was rendered on November 16, 1998 in G.R. No. 130880.
SO ORDERED.

12.

[G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005]

OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, petitioners,

vs.SPOUSES
PRUDENCIO
NOBELA
and
SERLINA
NOBELA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This petition for review[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision
dated 25 September 2000 and its Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CAG.R. CV No. 49822. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 (trial court), dated 26 January 1995,
dismissing the case for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed
by petitioner Oscar Maccay (Maccay) against respondent spouses Prudencio
Nobela (Prudencio) and Serlina Nobela (Serlina) in Criminal Case No. 85961.
Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court,
are as follows:
In the first week of May, 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of
Pasig, Metro Manila, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land
belonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the
spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money to market
vendors on a daily basis.
Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who
desired to sell or mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one
in Antipolo. She went to the Nobelas at 145 Buayang Bato at Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. She brought with her many titles. She became friendly with the spouses.
Potenciano went on to brag about her connections, that she is related to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so she has to dispose
of her properties.

After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves
as husband and wife. Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had
jurisdiction over Mandaluyong, according to Potenciano. The Nobelas were
impressed. They were pleased when the couple became very close to them. They
confided their family problems. They even went to the office of Maccay in Fort
Bonifacio.
In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they
should be the ones to buy the property because it will only cost P300,000.00. They
would be able to make a profit because the current price was P1,500.00 per square
meter.
Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of
the hospitality of the accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano
was treated like a queen. She was fanned and massaged. She was served her meals in
the sala.
After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property.
They advised Maccay and Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.
On May 17, 1990, Potenciano with Serlina went to Barbas lawyer, Atty. Alfonso
Jimenez, at Las Pias where she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. 1) prepared and notarized.
She signed it there. They were riding in the jeep of the Nobelas and passed by the
office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio. Potenciano went alone to his office and
returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of both accused at Buayang
Bato, Mandaluyong. Serlina paid the P300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was
given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other
documents. When she offered to take them, they declined saying they were going
home to their Magallanes house.
Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where
they were given VIP treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the
phone for her transactions and to drive the couples jeep.
xxx
On June 19, 1990, the taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title had not
been transferred to the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter

driving, rode the Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On the way to town, the jeep broke down.
The engine fell off. Potenciano volunteered to go to Antipolo herself, pay the taxes
and bring a mechanic to repair the jeep. The taxes had been paid.
The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a
stroke. He was brought to the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano
called and talked to Prudencios doctor. She had Prudencio transferred to a suite and
confided to Serlina that she is also known as Adelaida Potenciano; that the owners of
the hospital are her mother and father. Serlina need not worry about the bill.
Potenciano started sleeping in the hospital.
After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting
department. She tried to pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not
accept. She asked Serlina to go with her to a money changer at Kalentong to change
the money to pesos but the foreign exchange dealer refused saying the foreign
currency was fake.
Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first
marriage. Maccay drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.
At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was
beginning to slip off. The Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that
Potenciano, who has boasted of being not only wealthy but also influential, invited
Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances which she claimed were brought by
her nephew from Japan. To Serlinas dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier
where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from De Lara
Merchandising (Exhs. 15 to 15-C) showing her payments. The last receipt is dated
July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw
Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the
relationship began to sour.
Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple,
Potenciano executed an Affidavit of Loss (Exh. 3-B). She related that when she went
to Antipolo on June 19, 1990 in her stainless steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a
mechanic and when she returned the jeep was gone or carnapped.

In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that
Potenciano was trying to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that
Potenciano had a string of cases against her.
On July 30, 1993, Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and
executed an affidavit-complaint (Exh. 4) against the accused spouses before P/Lt. Col.
Nestor E. Cruz relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela on July
14, 1990. She related how the accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No.
473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related how she was prayed over and
mesmerized by Serlina. She stated that ginawa panloloko sa akin at pagnanakaw ng
Transfer Certificate of [T]itle (par. 12, p. 1, Exh. 4) and the TCT ho ay maaring
nawala noong pecha 25 ng Hunyo, 1990 natuklasan ko nawala ito noong 27 ng
Hunyo, nang itong nasabing TCT, ay aking ipa-seserox (par. 16, p. 1. Exh. 4).
xxx
In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to
them because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega,
to help them in the registration of Deed of Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la
Vega as she used to frequent a real estate agent living in their place. When they were
told that for the P300,000.00 consideration, they would need around P20,000.00 to
include capital gains taxes, she gave P21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was
supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new title (Exh. C) was
delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional 2,000.00 to de
la Vega for other expenses.
Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor
E. Cruz (Exh. 5) on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of
Potenciano for Estafa and Theft.
When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a
subpoena from the Fiscals Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.
Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused
and she was astonished to discover (Exh. 6) as the Deed of Sale registered by de la
Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains
tax as only P1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged falsification

charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given
to them (Exh. 1) for P300,000.00 which they paid the Maccays was not the one
registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother Juanita
Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They filed
a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at
Judge Alfredo Flores sala.[2]
Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses
for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the
Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961.
After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered
petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages
and attorneys fees. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners appeal and affirmed
the trial courts Decision. The appellate court also denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts
The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners
swindled respondent spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay
filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the tables on
respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered
petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages, to wit:
In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the prosecution has not proven the
Accused Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and hereby acquits them. The complainants Oscar Maccay and
Adelaida E. Potenciano are hereby ordered to reimburse Prudencio Nobela and Serlina
Nobela the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) paid to them by
the accused spouses in the sale of the litigated property. Further the complainants
Oscar Maccay and Adelaida Potenciano are hereby ordered to pay P50,000.00 to

Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela as moral damages and P40,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate
court reasoned that the award of damages was justified because it was in the
nature of a counterclaim and as the very defense put up by the accused
[respondents] in the criminal proceedings x x x.[4]
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT
RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;
2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.

The third issue raised by the petitioners, assailing the appellate courts
affirmation of the trial courts factual findings, deserves no consideration. A
Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law.[5] Findings of fact are not
reviewable, except in clearly meritorious instances.[6] This Court is not a trier of
facts.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the
accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the
accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the
proper proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and
prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case,
to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent

spouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7] that a court trying a
criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused,
thus:
[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil
liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or
third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without
prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.
The
Court
recently
reiterated
this
ruling
[8]
[9]
Laroya and Republic v. Court of Appeals.

in Casupanan

v.

The appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts award of damages by
justifying it as a counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent
spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111
provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero on the absence
of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action
and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. In the present
case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for
maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.
The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner
Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages
to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties
to the action.[10] A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a
person who is not a party to the case. [11] The records clearly show that
petitioner Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the

prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant. [12] The Verification
attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as
complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a
role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would
violate petitioner Potencianos constitutional right to due process.
Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent
spouses. Petitioners admit the validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584
and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in favor of respondent spouses.
Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in
exchange for P300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners to
reimburse respondent spouses the P300,000.[13]
However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their
title through fraud. Petitioners must decide which version they want to
advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the title of respondent spouses is valid
to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that
respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on
respondent spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners
inconsistent arguments reveal their dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners
should not forget that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners
perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the
hapless victims here.
Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died
while trying to defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering
from severe complications due to the strain of litigation. While this Court is
constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial courts procedural error,
we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive matter of the
case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and position to
swindle the respondent spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality
and kindness in the process. Petitioners have the temerity to turn the tables
on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes. This Court will not allow
the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate this
Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for
damages against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the

Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal
Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio
and Serlina Nobela is deleted;
2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000 as
attorneys fees are likewise deleted.
SO ORDERED.

13.

[G.R. No. 116463. June 10, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES thru the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

WORKS and HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon,
Metro
Manila,
and
NAVOTAS
INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 July 1994, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33094. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon (Malabon trial court)
which denied the motion of petitioner to consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN
pending before it with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900 filed with the
[1]

[2]

Sandiganbayan. This petition seeks to restrain permanently the Malabon trial

court from further hearing Civil Case No. 1153-MN and to dismiss the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Private respondent Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC) is a corporation
engaged in dredging operations throughout the Philippines. On 27 November
1985, then Public Works and Highways Minister Jesus Hipolito requested
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos to release P800 million to finance the
immediate implementation of dredging, flood control and related projects in
Metro Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. Of the total funds approved for
release, P615 million went to the National Capital Region of the Ministry of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
[3]

The DPWH allocated the P615 million to several projects covered by

twenty-one contracts. The DPWH awarded one of the contractors,
NIC, P194,454,000.00 worth of dredging work in four contracts for completion
within 350 calendar days.
NIC alleges that the dredging work proceeded pursuant to specific work
schedules and plan approved by DPWH. NIC contends that it accomplished
95.06 percent of the required total volume of work or P184,847,970.00 worth
of services based on an alleged evaluation by DPWH. However, NIC
maintains that DPWH paid only 79.22 percent of the accomplished work,
leaving a balance of P30,799,676.00.
On 20 September 1988, NIC filed a complaint for sum of money with the
Malabon trial court against the Republic of the Philippines, thru the
DPWH. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1153-MN, was raffled to Branch
73 of the court, presided by Judge Amanda Valera-Cabigao.
In its Answer, petitioner contends that NIC is not entitled to the amount
claimed. Soon after the February 1986 Revolution, DPWH created a factfinding committee to audit the flood control projects in the National Capital
Region, Bulacan, Pampanga and Leyte. Then DPWH Minister Rogaciano
Mercado, who replaced Minister Jesus Hipolito, ordered the suspension of all
projects funded by special budget released or issued before the snap

elections on February 1986, pending inventory and evaluation of these

projects.
Petitioner contends that upon verification and investigation, the DPWH
fact-finding committee discovered that the dredging contracts of NIC with
DPWH were null and void.Petitioner claims that NIC worked on the project five
or six months before the award of the dredging contracts to NIC. The
contracts of NIC were awarded without any public bidding. Moreover, DPWH
discovered that NIC, through its corporate officers, connived with some DPWH
officials in falsifying certain public documents to make it appear that NIC had
completed a major portion of the project, when no dredging work was actually
performed.The scheme enabled NIC to collect from DPWH P146,962,072.47
as payment for work allegedly accomplished. Petitioner thus filed a
counterclaim for the return of the P146,962,072.47 plus interest and
exemplary damages of P100 million.
On 14 July 1986, the DPWH fact-finding committee filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan a case for estafa thru falsification of public documents and
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against former Minister Hipolito. Other
DPWH officials involved in awarding the dredging contracts to NIC, as well as
Cipriano Bautista, president of NIC, were also named respondents. The
charges were for four counts corresponding to the four contracts that DPWH
entered into with NIC. The case was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-01163.
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

However, it was only on 17 June 1991 that former Ombudsman Conrado

Vasquez approved the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor
finding probable cause for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA No. 3019. Subsequently, the
Ombudsman filed the corresponding Informations with the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan against all the respondents in TBP Case No. 86-01163. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900.
[8]

On 14 April 1993, petitioner filed before the Malabon trial court a Motion to
Consolidate Civil Case No. 1153-MN with Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900
in the Sandiganbayan.Petitioner argued that the civil case for collection and
the criminal cases arose from the same incidents and involve the same

facts. Thus, these cases should be consolidated as mandated by Section 4(b)

of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.
On 18 June 1993, the Malabon trial court issued a Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Consolidation. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Malabon trial court denied on 7 November 1993.
On 19 January 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
33094. In a Decision dated 18 July 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. On 12 September 1994, petitioner filed with the Court this petition for
review.
On 26 September 1994, the Court resolved to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for by petitioner. Consequently, the Malabon trial
court desisted from hearing further Civil Case No. 1153-MN.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by
petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
It is clear that in the same manner that the RTC would have no jurisdiction relative to
violations of Republic Act Nos. 3019, as amended, and 1379, neither could the
Sandiganbayan acquire jurisdiction over collection of sum of money, the latter not
involving recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. More
specifically, the said Sandiganbayan would have no power whatsoever to order the
defendant in the civil case (the Republic of the Philippines thru the DPWH) to pay the
private respondent the amount of P30,799,676.00 claimed by the latter. One of the
averred purposes then of consolidation (to avoid multiplicity of suits) could not be
realized. A civil action would still have to be instituted by the private respondent to
recover the amount allegedly due.
The Issues
I.

WHETHER THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

ORDERING THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 1153MN WITH CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 16889-16900 WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 4(B) OF P.D.
1606.
[9]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Timeliness of the filing of the petition
We first resolve a minor issue raised by NIC regarding the timeliness of
the filing of this petition.
In its Comment, NIC seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
it was not served on time. Petitioner admittedly filed two motions for extension
of time, each for fifteen days. The last day for filing the second motion for
extension was on 11 September 1994.NIC, however, asserts that a copy of
the petition was sent by registered mail to its counsel only on 12 September
1994 or a day after the last day for filing.
NIC, believing that this petition was filed out of time, now asks the Court to
consider the instant petition as not having been filed, making the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals final and executory.
We do not agree.
NIC harps on the fact that the petition was sent by registered mail only on
12 September 1994, when the last day for filing was on 11 September
1994. NIC, however, overlooked one significant fact. The last day for filing, 11
September 1994, fell on a Sunday.
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and as applied in
several cases, where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by
law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
[10]

[11]

court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Thus, petitioner
filed on time its petition on 12 September 1994, the next working day,
following the last day for filing which fell on a Sunday.
Second Issue: Consolidation of the Cases
The main issue before us is whether Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending with
the Malabon trial court should be consolidated with Criminal Cases Nos.
16889-16900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the civil case for collection of sum of money and the
criminal cases for estafa thru falsification of public documents and for violation
of RA No. 3019 arose from the same transaction and involve similar questions
of fact and law. Petitioner claims that all these cases pertain to only one issue,
that is, whether NIC performed dredging work. Petitioner argues that a
determination in the civil case that NIC performed dredging work will entitle
NIC to the balance of the contract price. Similarly, petitioner claims that the
criminal cases also involve the same issue since petitioner charges that the
accused connived in falsifying documents and in fraudulently collecting
payments for non-existing dredging work.In sum, petitioner asserts that since
the issues in all these cases are the same, the parties will have to present the
same evidence. Therefore, the consolidation of these cases is in order.
We do not agree.
Consolidation
is
a
matter
of
discretion
with
the
court. Consolidation becomes a matter of right only when the cases sought to
be consolidated involve similar questions of fact and law, provided certain
requirements are met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of
suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial
court, and save unnecessary expense.
[12]

We cannot order the consolidation of the civil case for collection with the
criminal cases for two reasons. First, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the collection case.Second, the Rules of Court do not allow the filing of a
counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal case.

First, the Sandiganbayan was created as a special court to hear graft

cases against government officials of a particular salary grade for violations of
specific laws. Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic
[13]

[14]

Act No. 8249, outlines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction as follows:

[15]

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
xxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the public officers or employees, including those employed in governmentowned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.
x x x.
The law does not include civil cases for collection of sum of money among
the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. If we
consolidate the collection case in the Malabon trial court with the criminal
cases, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
collection case. Even if NIC proves it is entitled to payment, the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction to award any money judgment to
NIC. NIC will still have to file a separate case in the regular court for the
collection of its claim. Thus, the avowed purpose of consolidation which is to
avoid multiplicity of suits will not be achieved.
Petitioner invokes Naguiat v. Intermediate Appellate Court in claiming
that a civil action not arising from the offense charged may be consolidated
with the criminal action.Indeed, Naguiat allowed the consolidation of the
criminal case with a civil case arising ex contractu. In consolidating the two
cases, Naguiat relied on Canos v. Peralta where the Court consolidated a
civil action for the recovery of wage differential with a criminal action for
violation of the Minimum Wage Law. Canos, however, made an important
qualification before a court may order the consolidation of cases. Canos held
that:
[16]

[17]

A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and

depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has
jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an essential requisite of consolidation is that the court must have
jurisdiction over all the cases consolidated before it. Since the Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction over the collection case, the same cannot be
consolidated with the criminal cases even if these cases involve similar
questions of fact and law. Obviously, consolidation of the collection case with
the criminal cases will be a useless and empty formality since the
Sandiganbayan, being devoid of jurisdiction over the collection case, cannot
act on it.
Second, we cannot order the consolidation of the civil action filed by
NIC with the criminal cases in the Sandiganbayan because the civil
case amounts to a counterclaim or a third-party complaint in a criminal
case. While NIC, as a corporate entity, is not an accused in the criminal cases,
a consolidation of NICs collection case with the criminal cases will have the
same effect of a counterclaim or a third-party complaint against petitioner and
DPWH. In such case, the rule against counterclaims and third-party
complaints in criminal cases may be applied by analogy.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly
requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim separately from the criminal
action.
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) xxx
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused
in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
This paragraph was incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure to
address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero v. Cantos where the Court noted
the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted
[18]

civil action and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. In the
same vein, the Court in Cabaero clarified that:
[19]

[T]he counterclaim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal case
because, as already discussed, it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the
criminal proceedings. Thus, the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect
and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The
counterclaim (and cross-claim or third party complaint, if any) should be set aside or
refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the
proper time.
Thus, a counterclaim in a criminal case must be litigated separately to
avoid complication and confusion in the resolution of the criminal cases. This
is the rationale behind Section 1 of Rule 111. The same rationale applies to
NICs collection case against petitioner and DPWH. Thus, NICs collection case
must be litigated separately before the Malabon trial court to avoid confusion
in resolving the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner lodged its own counterclaim to the collection case filed with the
Malabon trial court, praying for the return of the payment DPWH made to NIC
arising from the dredging contracts. However, petitioners counterclaim is
deemed abandoned by virtue of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended. The
last paragraph of Section 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
[20]

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall
be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been
filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioners counterclaim in the civil case pending with the Malabon trial
court for the return of the amount DPWH paid NIC is an action to recover civil
liability ex delicto.However, this action to recover civil liability ex delicto is by
operation of law included in the criminal cases filed with the Sandiganbayan.
By mandate of RA No. 8249, the counterclaim filed earlier in the separate civil
action with the Malabon trial court shall be deemed abandoned.
The only question left is whether NICs civil case before the Malabon trial
court for collection of sum of money can proceed independently of the criminal
cases filed with the Sandiganbayan. NICs collection case for unpaid services
from its dredging contracts with DPWH obviously does not fall under Articles
32, 33 or 34 (on Human Relations) of the Civil Code. Neither does it fall under
Article 2176 (on quasi-delict) of the Civil Code. Under Section 3 of Rule 111,
civil actions falling under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 may proceed
independently and separately from the criminal case. However, NIC cannot
invoke any of these articles.
The only other possibility is for NICs civil action to fall under Article 31 of
the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter .
An example of a case falling under Article 31 is a civil action to recover the
proceeds of sale of goods covered by a trust receipt. Such civil action can
proceed independently of the criminal action for violation of the trust receipt
law. In such a case, the validity of the contract, on which the civil action is
based, is not at issue. What is at issue is the violation of an obligation arising
from a valid contract - the trust receipt.
[21]

However, when the civil action is based on a purported contract that is

assailed as illegal per se, as when the execution of the contract is alleged to
violate the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Article 31 does not apply. In
such a situation, the contract if proven illegal cannot create any valid
obligation that can be the basis of a cause of action in a civil case. Under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or purpose is
[22]

contrary to law, or a contract that is expressly prohibited or declared void by

law, is void from the very beginning. No party to such void contract can claim
any right under such contract or enforce any of its provisions.
Under Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, entering
into a contract that is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government is declared to be unlawful. If the act of entering into the contract is
assailed as a crime in itself, then the issue of whether the contract is illegal
must first be resolved before any civil action based on the contract can
proceed. Only the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to decide whether the
act of entering into such contract is a crime, where the salary grade of one of
the accused is grade 27 or higher, as in Criminal Cases Nos. 16889-16900
filed with the Sandiganbayan.
[23]

Article 31 speaks of a civil action based on an obligation not arising from

the act x x x complained of as a felony. This clearly means that the
obligation must arise from an act not constituting a crime. In the instant
case, the act purporting to create the obligation is assailed as a crime in
itself. That act, which is prohibited by law, is the entering into dredging
contracts that are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
A contract executed against the provisions of prohibitory laws is void. If the
dredging contracts are declared illegal, then no valid obligation can arise from
such contracts.Consequently, no civil action based on such contracts can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
[24]

[25]

In contrast, where the civil action is based on a contract that can remain
valid even if its violation may constitute a crime, the civil action can proceed
independently. Thus, in estafa thru violation of the trust receipt law, the
violation of the trust receipt constitutes a crime. However, the trust receipt
itself remains valid, allowing a civil action based on the trust receipt to
proceed independently of the criminal case.
Clearly, NICs civil case before the Malabon trial court does not fall under
Article 31 of the Civil Code. This calls then for the application of the second
paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 111 which states that if the criminal action is
filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the

merits. Consequently, the civil case for collection pending in the Malabon trial
court must be suspended until after the termination of the criminal cases filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
The suspension of the civil case for collection of sum of money will avoid
the possibility of conflicting decisions between the Sandiganbayan and the
Malabon trial court on the validity of NICs dredging contracts. If the
Sandiganbayan declares the dredging contracts illegal and void ab initio, and
such declaration becomes final, then NICs civil case for collection of sum of
money will have no legal leg to stand on. However, if the Sandiganbayan finds
the dredging contracts valid, then NICs collection case before the Malabon
trial court can then proceed to trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 July 1994 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
counterclaim of petitioner in Civil Case No. 1153-MN pending with the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 73, is deemed abandoned. The
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 73, is ordered to suspend the trial of
Civil Case No. 1153-MN until the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. 1688916900 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.

14.

G.R. No. 73836 August 18, 1988

ANTOLIN T. NAGUIAT, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THIRD SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION, TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION RATION AND MANUEL
P. LAZATIN, respondents.

Ricardo B. Bermudo for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the decision

* of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 9 October 1985, in AC-G.R.

SP No. 06521 and AC-G.R. SP No. 06522, entitled "Manuel P. Lazatin and Timog Silangan Development Corporation versus The Honorable
Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IX Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, and Antolin T. Naguiat," which
set aside the Orders ** of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX, dated 20 March 1985 and 29 May 1985, issued in Criminal
Case No. 6727 and Civil Case No. 4224.

Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC, for short) is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in Timog Park," located
in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin (Lazatin, for short) as its President.
On 7 February 1983, petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four (4)
lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park. Each
lot consists of 300 square meters. The four (4) lots have a total area of 1,200 square
meters, with a price of P60.00 per square meter, as alledged by petitioner. On the same
date above-mentioned, 7 February 1983, petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00,
representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4) lots. A
corresponding receipt for the downpayment was issued by TSDC to the petitioner. 1
While the Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-year period
within which to pay the total contract price, the latter made substantial payments in the
months of June to August 1983. Then on 10 August 1983, he paid the sum of P 12,529.30
as his alleged full payment for Lot. No. 16, after which, TSDC caused to be issued in the
name of the petitioner the title to said lot. 2
On 7 November 1983, petitioner paid TSDC the amount of P 36,067.97, which was
allegedly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14 and 15.
A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to the petitioner. 3
Thereafter, from December 1983 up to June 1984, petitioner demanded from TSDC the
issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the
private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused on the ground that the petitioner had not
fully paid for said three (3) lots.
According to private respondents, sometime in January, 1983, TSDC's Board of Directors
approved the petitioner's contemplated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To confirm the
agreement, respondent Lazatin wrote petitioner a letter reiterating standard conditions of
the sale, which the petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity to said letter. The

conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, "(i) 10% down payment with a
commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one month's time; (ii) said
construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; and, (iii) the effective price was
P 70 per square meter with a rebate of P 10.00 per square meter upon completion of the
house in six (6) months." 4
But, as alleged by the private respondents, petitioner commenced the construction of a
house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months. And as
to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct houses on them. 5
Hence, private respondents contend that since petitioner did not comply with the
agreement, he was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and as a consequence, the
previous payments made by petitioner did not amount to full payment as required for all the
lots and which would have entitled petitioner to the issuance and delivery of the certificates
of title to all the lots.
Thereafter, on 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance with
damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX docketed as Civil Case
No. 4224. In his complaint, petitioner prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered
ordering private respondents to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title covering the
three (3) lots which he had allegedly fully paid for, and which private respondents had
refused to do so.
Moreover, the complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the private respondents
to jointly and severally pay the petitioner, actual damages equal to P320,000.00,
representing unrealized gross profits; moral damages at the discretion of the court; and,
attorney's fees equal to P15,000.00, plus the costs of the action. 6
Before the civil action was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal of
Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically Section 25 thereof, which provides:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957
REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS,
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF.
SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of
the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except
those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds
shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over
the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the
buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the

corresponding portion thereof within six months such issuance in order that
the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the
buyer in accordance herewith.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 39. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of
this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this
Decree, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten
years: Provided, that in the case of corporations, partnership, cooperatives,
or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person who
has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally
responsible for any violation of this Decree andlor the rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
On 13 September 1984, an information was filed against respondent Lazatin, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 6727, and was raffled to Branch LX where Civil Case No. 4224 was
docketed earlier.
On the basis of Rule 111, Section 3(a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the petitioner
filed on 23 February 1985 a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case
No. 6727. Despite the objection and opposition of the private respondents, in an Order
dated 20 March 1985, the trial court granted the motion and ordered consolidation of the
two (2) cases.
On 14 May 1985, at the pre-trial hearing of both cases, petitioners's counsel appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4224, and as private prosecutor in Criminal Case
No. 6727, Private respondents objected, and filed their Motion and Opposition to
Appearance of Plaintiff as Private Prosecutor with respect to the trial of the Criminal Case;
the opposition was overruled by the trial court, in its Order dated 29 May 1985.
Hence, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the respondent
appellate court, seeking the annulment of the orders of the trial court, dated 20 March 1985
and 29 May 1985. In due course, the respondent appellate court rendered a decision
favorable to herein private respondents, the dispositive part of which is quoted hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and probihition is hereby GRANTED,
and the questioned orders dated March 20, 1985 and May 29, 1985 are set
aside. The respondent Court is ordered to suspend trial of the civil action until
final determination of the criminal case, in line with the spirit of Section 3,
Rule 111 (Rules of Court) and not (to) allow the intervention of the privaterespondent in the active prosecution of Criminal Case No. 6727. No costs. 7

The decision of the respondent appellate court was received by petitioner's counsel on 16
October 1985. On 30 October 1985, petitioner's counsel filed with the respondent appellate
court a Motion for Extension of Time to file a motion for reconsideration of aforesaid
decision, praying for fifteen (15) days from 31 October 1985, within which to file said motion.
On 15 November 1985, petitioner's counsel filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time to
file a motion for reconsideration, praying for another fifteen (15) days from 15 November
1985, within which to file said motion for reconsideration.
On 18 November 1985, petitioner's counsel received the resolution of the respondent
appellate court dated 12 November 1985, denying the first motion for extension of time,
stating among others that the fifteen (15) day period to file a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible.
On 2 December 1985, petitioner's counsel still filed his motion for reconsideration.
On 16 December 1985, petitioner's counsel received the resolution of the respondent
appellate court, dated 12 December 1985, denying petitioner's second motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, thus reiterating its Resolution of 12 November
1985.
On 21 February 1986, petitioner's counsel received the resolution of the respondent
appellate court dated 14 February 1986, denying the motion for reconsideration filed on 2
December 1985.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Before going into the merits of the petition, the procedural aspect should first be threshed
out and settled.
As admitted by petitioner himself, he filed with the respondent appellate court two (2)
motions for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration of the latter court's decision,
with the justification that the two (2) motions were timely and properly presented, since they
were filed before the expiration of the respective periods sought to be extended. 8
The case of Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, 9 has ruled that:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall
be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Habaluyas case, motions for extension of time to file
a motion for new trial or reconsideration may no longer be filed before all courts, lower than
the Supreme Court. 10 The rule in Habaluyas applies even if the motion is filed before the expiration of
the period sought to be extended, because the fifteen (15) day period for filing a motion for new trial or
reconsideration with said courts, is non-extendible.

But as resolved also in the Habaluyas case, the rule that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court, shall be strictly
enforced "beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution." The Court
promulgated the Habaluyas resolution on 30 May 1986. Thus, the Habaluyas ruling became
effective, and strictly enforced, only beginning 1 July 1986.
In the case at bar, the petitioner filed his motions for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration on 30 October 1985 and 15 November 1985, both within the periods sought
to be extended. Hence the Habaluyas ruling did not yet apply to bar said motions for
extension.
Coming now to the merits of the case, petitioner prays for the reversal of the decision of the
respondent appellate court, and the reinstatement of the orders of the trial court, allowing
the consolidation of the civil and criminal case before said trial court, and the intervention of
the petitioners's counsel as private prosecutor in the criminal case.
As a ground for the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111,
Sec. 3 (a), Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party
shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense, as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the
following rules shall be observed:
(a) "After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action
arising from the same offense shad be suspended, in whatever stage it may
be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil
action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is
granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to
the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present.
(Emphasis supplied)"
xxx xxx xxx

Under the aforequoted provision, the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal
action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto.
In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with
damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title
to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell
between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the
petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex
contractu and not one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law
invoked by the petitioner is inapplicable.
But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, 11 the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil action arising
not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law

or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any
or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
In Canos v. Peralta, where the Court sustained the order of a trial court to consolidate a civil
action (an action for the recovery of wage differential, overtime and termination pay, plus
damages) with a criminal action (for violation of the Minimum Wage Law), it was held that:
A Court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together
where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or
like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence,
provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and
that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties. ...
The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits to guard
against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets,
to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. 12
In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil
and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the
lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the
certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise would virtually be the
same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the
purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official
receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents.

Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a
special law where, irrespective of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by
said special law, constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as
private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused.
The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as
counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will
instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the
benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court,
dated 9 October 1985, is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court, in Civil Case No. 4224
and Criminal Case No. 6727, dated 20 March 1985 and 29 May 1985 are REINSTATED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

15.

G.R. No. 150157

January 25, 2007

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which
affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42,
in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent
Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number
CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2)

owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and
driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his
owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for
treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December
1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case
was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as
the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence
of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of
the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although
there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs)4of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad
sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the
stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia
Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job.
She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when
he did not return after one month. She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but
she was informed that he did not go there.
1awphil.net

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court
where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,5 Marcelo Mendoza6 and Fernando Ramos7 in said case, together with
other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was
Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified
the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he had
brought.8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from the said
criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not brought to the
trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and documents could be
offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The
TSN9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No.
684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he
was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs 10 of
the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case
No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute
in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took
place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70
kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus

overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the
rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was
about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of
the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff
and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit
Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff
overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus
which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After
that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy
portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine
Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped
by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus
was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left
because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the
RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which
of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their
respective vehicles.]11
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00
as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair
of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the
lawyer. In addition, the defendants are also to pay costs. 12
Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 13
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in
the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 14
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE
ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF
EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this
Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs.
Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb,
Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.15
In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision 16 of
the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 17 of Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy
thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan,18Marcelo Mendoza19 and Fernando Ramos20 should not be admitted
in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in

the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. 22
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the
Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had
no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was
filed exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases
dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. 23
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the
testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI
failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except
to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of
the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for
being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 24 Hearsay evidence alone may
be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. 25
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when
the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 26Moreover, petitioner PRBLI
even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the
criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs
witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it
offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears
that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs of
the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not be
admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the
accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the
testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and
to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when
the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the

criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground
for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it
waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite
therein petitioners assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN,
the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly
done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted
in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or
deposition." We find such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of
testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the
testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the same
weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 29
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as
to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their
contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from,
or based on, quasi-delict.30 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless
imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the
above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon
Expressway heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA,
who was then driving the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the abovedescribed motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit
Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one
Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling
recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle
was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its
drivers side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor
vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was
rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and
trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which
compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from
July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described
motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the
reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of
existing traffic rules and regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers;
x x x"31
Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent
"when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of
the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the
jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
beyond the control of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.32

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic
was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the
act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The aforequoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused.33
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. 34 It is now settled
that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. 35
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However,
if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the
crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil
liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. 36 An acquittal or

conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case 37 based on quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to
disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the
process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to
the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court.38 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a
review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 39
After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would
warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in
driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the
version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was
correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
operation of their respective vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given
to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the
fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place.
The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified
to by him only in Crim. Case No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos,
Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of
Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the
incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would be
considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading

(Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial
Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency
between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the
collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be
true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of
overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit
Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one
day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement should not escape attention. The one-day
difference between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough to entertain
the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart
from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of
the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly
head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to
overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine
Rabbit bus took place.
xxxx
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor,
Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when
the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the
left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road
itself rather than having been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the
Philippine Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted
by the defendants.40
Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof
of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.41 Under Article 218042 of the New
Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection
or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic
underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the
supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and
Cabading) is sufficient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of
its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and
impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied
with everything that was incumbent on them. 44
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 45 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer
has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of
said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the
employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter
has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but
also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to
overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of
various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is
not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a
very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles.
There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has
been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage
and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus
company has been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their
vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is
not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as an
employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees, particularly the
driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner
Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases abovementioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown
and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by
the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the
drivers of PRBLI. 46 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be continually
informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible
for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the
towing and repair of his jeep.47 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
same, under the circumstances, must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00.48 Exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 49 The amount awarded by the
trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.50 The award of P15,000.00 for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and
(2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

16.

G.R. No. 150785

September 15, 2006

EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,

vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No.
23054:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed
Decision dated May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan,
affirming the Decision dated January 11, 1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of
respondent Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22, 3 this petition
involves the following facts:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of
BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996,
from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore
[,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some
obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of
[respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month,
she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount
reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open
dated Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire
amount is not paid within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:

Check No.

Amount

7277

P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7348

150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12118

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

8812

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12102

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7255

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

2286

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

8128

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7254

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7278

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

4540

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

4523

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

12103

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

7294

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

P1,150,000.00

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the
sums [above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the
indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned
checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money
given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all
returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount
represented by the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for
violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent]. 4(Citation omitted)
After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases 5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471)
for violation of BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest
were issued against respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She
pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her.
Respondent was sentenced to pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment
equivalent to one year for each violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan. Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed
the decision of the lower courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain
substantial facts were overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly
considered, justified a different conclusion on the case. 6
Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly
liable to her for the sum of P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent
obtained loans from her in the aggregate amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have
not been paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against
the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the
private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion,
espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person
injured by the crime7). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone
to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.8
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.9

On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one
that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to
satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5
banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to
achieve a goal intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to
whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and
conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant. 10
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under
the Civil Code.11 A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly
free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond
reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of
evidence12). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be
based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. 13 If the acquittal is based merely on
reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he
did not commit the act complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved did not
constitute the offense charged.15
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where
the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where
the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted.16
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the
CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by
payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was
acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil
liability:
[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by
petitioner in [the stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented
payment of a previous obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was
presented by the prosecution to substantiate their claim that there was indeed
a previous obligation involving the same amount for which the demand draft
was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-serving, no
documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous
transactions involving the subject amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on
a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It
however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate
of intereston a daily basis. xxx In any event, the cash payments [made] were

recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own

handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in
evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her
obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and
that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had
already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely
much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from
[petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there
was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan
obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx

xxx

xxx

By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long
before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account
only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing
obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We
therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented
by [respondent] worthy of credence.17 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

17.

[G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL

CONSING, JR., respondent.
DECISION

JOSE

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001
order of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. 7668-00 denying respondents motion for deferment of arraignment.
[1]

[2]

[3]

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they
are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus,
Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of
Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot, which
was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po
Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI
purchased the questioned lot.
[4]

In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have
a valid title over the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and
Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT
No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the
Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by
Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands,
respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79
alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 68, an action for Injunctive Relief docketed as Civil Case No.
SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires,
Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does.
Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother,
Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to
the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
[5]

On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a
complaint for Damages and Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. 9995381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Respondent filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil
Case No. SCA 1759.
[6]

[7]

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of

public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and
his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
[8]

On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the

ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759
and 99-95381. On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondents
motion.
[9]

A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27,

2001.
[10]

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court
of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through
falsification case. The Court of Appeals granted respondents prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19,
2001.
[11]

[12]

On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27,
2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with
the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive
Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General,
filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of
Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for
Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension

of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document, filed against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question
must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For
a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil
action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
[13]

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is
intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question
would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will
not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question.
[14]

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case
No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted
as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 9995381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for
the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an

agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot,
he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may
be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the
purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability
of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the
return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that
respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI
should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily
absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be
established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under
Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
[15]

Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case

for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new
chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without
consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil
case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of
which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the
previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that
the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the
ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which
was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial court
[16]

denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial
question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of
action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the
defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that
his D-6 Caterpillar Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was free from all liens and
encumbrances will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said
Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial
question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are
based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which
provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred
to in the instant petition was not made with grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment
on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of
the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial in
Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
SO ORDERED.
18.

G.R. No. 166836

September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR.,
MAXY S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA,
JR., MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND
ANTONIO V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of
residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to
compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is
properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25
of Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative
determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on nondelivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation
engaged in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F.
Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its
duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),2 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque,
containing a total area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00.
The transactions were embodied in three separate deeds of sale. 3 The TCTs covering the
lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties,
but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters
purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel
Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel
Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its
rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as
receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the
SEC.4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San
Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
City (OCP Las Pias) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-

delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release
the 20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256, 7 respondent directors and
officers of BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties assertions by contending that: (a) San
Miguel Properties claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have
the authority to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF
Homes rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying
the lots were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been
brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it
was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the
receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference
that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved
were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily
stripping the OCP Las Pias of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the
OCP Las Pias,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC. In its
comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting
San Miguel Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes comment/opposition
coupled with a motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the
intervening termination of the receivership. 9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel
Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that
no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had
appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the
liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the
HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there
appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories
in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for
reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes directors and officers
could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957
without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendains actions; and that the criminal

liability would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB
directing it to deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the Department of
Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
ruling of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Established jurisprudence supports the
position taken by the City Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still
pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint
for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the
validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty.
Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court
had ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate
business and practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union
Bank of the Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres
Enterprises vs. Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.
The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the
transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty.
Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge
criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant
cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have
ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration. 13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on certiorari
and mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had
acted with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and
officers of BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel
Properties submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183

presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008, 14 the
CA dismissed San Miguel Properties petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question
generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the
respondents. In this case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial
question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of
the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the
application of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on
prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just
compensation should the demolition of private respondents building proved to be illegal as
a result of a pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a
boundary dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an
administrative proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good
order, courts can suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely
interrelated or interlinked with it.
It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when
he applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the
issue on the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes,
Inc., is closely intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as
officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the
parcels of land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioners theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not
determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to
espouse an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation
to delve the subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to
pursue a criminal case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title

which they are not under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the
government as represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the
discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A
public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of
guilt nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the
Department of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration
and resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONERS CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
PETITION TO ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT
RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE
TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION
DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES,
INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO
PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER
SECTIONS 25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF
RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.
IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION"
TO THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO

THE PRESENT CRIMINAL CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM
THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLYPAID PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE
WITH THE HLURBS RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONERS CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS
PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance
and damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its
filing of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the
HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the
SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the transactions in BF
Homes behalf, because the final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the
determination of the issue involved in the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the
HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
affirmed the HLURB Arbiters decision, holding that although no prejudicial question could
arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the other administrative, it nonetheless
opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final outcome of the administrative
proceeding in the interest of good order.18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004,
the OP reversed the HLU

19.

[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.
BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner
Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage
with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit,
an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a
civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on
the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend
the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
[1]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent
should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism
pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
[2]

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a

civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense
must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in
the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter
action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to

the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of
the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is
that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity
or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for
lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It
should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a
subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the
existence at the material time of the first marriage.
[8]

[9]

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of

nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to
prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the
subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the

absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract

a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on
the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:

[10]

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for

themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such
authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for
lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this case is limited to
the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds." Hence, parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be
submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how
obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of
the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family
Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as
ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be
suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of
nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. This
[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence
of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should
he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of
the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it
as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper
in the criminal case.
[16]

[17]

The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, but that is a matter
that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be
stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower
court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover,
when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two
marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by
petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely
resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of
frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above,
this cannot be done.
[18]

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said
to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal
[19]

intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into
a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot
be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.
[20]

[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29,

1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.

20.

PHILIPPINE AGILA
SATELLITE, INC. represented
by MICHAEL C. U. DE
GUZMAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -

G.R. No. 134887

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

SEC.
Promulgated:
JOSEFINA TRINIDADLICHAUC
July 27, 2006
O and the HON. OMBUDSMAN,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding[1] (MOU) was entered into by a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) represented by then Secretary Jesus
B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the launching, ownership, operation and management of a
Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or
corporation.
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium of private telecommunications
carriers formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name Philippine Agila
Satellite, Inc. (PASI), herein petitioner.
By letter[2] dated June 28, 1996, PASI president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio)
requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official
government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and
153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
In response to Silverios letter, Secretary Lagdameo, by letter [3] dated July 3, 1996,
confirmed the governments assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E
to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its
capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial
payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a French satellite manufacturer.
Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO), later informed Jesli Lapuz (Lapuz), President and CEO of the Landbank of
the Philippines, by letter[4] of December 3, 1996, of the governments assignment to
PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E and requested the banks confirmation of its
participation in a club loan in the amount of US$ 11 million, the proceeds of which
would be applied to PASIs interim satellite.

It appears that Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzmans letter to then DOTC

Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco, (Lichauco) who, by letter[5] of December 5,
1996, wrote Lapuz as follows:

1. Kindly be informed that there is simply no basis for Michael de

Guzman to allege that the DOTC has assigned two (2) slots to PASI.
He conveniently neglected to attach as another annex, in addition to
Sec. Lagdameos letter of 3 July 1996 (Annex A) the letter of 28 June
(Annex B) in response to which the July 3 rd letter had been sent to
PASI. Annex B precisely provides that one slot (153 E, to which the
interim satellite was supposed to migrate) was to be used for the
migration of the Russian satellite in time for the APEC
Leaders Summit. This particular endeavor was not successful. The
interim satellite Gorizont never moved from its orbital location of
130E Longitude. Annex C is a letter from an official of the Subic Bay
Satellite Systems Inc., with its attachments, addressed to me stating
that as of the 13th of November, no such voyage to 153E orbital slot
had been commenced. In fact DHI hid this fact from me, and in fact
stated that Gorizont had already moved and was on its way to 153E.
Since this timely migration did not happen in time for the APEC
Leaders Meeting on 24 November, this 153E Longitude slot can no
longer be assigned to PASI.
The other slot 161E Longitude is the one that can be made available
for PASIs eventual launch, in 1998 most likely, in exchange for one
free satellite transponder unit utilization, for all requirements of
Government. These have yet to be embodied in a contract between
PASI and the DOTC.
2. I understand from my meeting with DHI/PASI this morning, and
from the de Guzman letter you sent to me, that the latter are still
interested in pursuing their interim satellite project and are applying
for a loan with your bank. Of course they can always pursue this as a
business venture of DHI/PASI which is their own corporate business
decision. The DOTC supports this venture but they will be getting
only one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite Project and for the

Launch Project. I understand from todays meeting with them that this
is technically feasible.
3. As regards the use of the name Agila, Mr. de Guzmans allegation that
DHI/PASI has registered Agila as a corporate alias/trademark is
FALSE. There is no such thing as registration of a corporate alias.
Nor for that matter can the trade name of a satellite be registered for
just any satellite, where it was the President who chose the name for
the first Philippine satellite in orbit. No one else coined that name
but he. He has therefore given the name Agila I to the Mabuhay
satellite now in orbit at 144E, being the first Philippine satellite in
orbit. He made this announcement in the presence of all the APEC
Heads of State just before the presentation to him of the Manila
Action Plan for APEC. (Underscoring supplied)

Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997, a Notice of Offer [6] for several
orbital slots including 153E.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it
subsequently came to learn that another company whose identity had not been
disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153E, filed on
January 23, 1998 a complaint[7] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the Unknown Awardee, for injunction to
enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages.
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavitcomplaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended, reading:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and

employees of officers or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The complaint was docketed as OMB Case No. 0-98-0416. The Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, by
Evaluation Report[8] dated April 15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial
question after considering that the case filed with the RTC involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and that the
guilt or the innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined in the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil case. It thus concluded that the filing of
the complaint before the Ombudsman is premature since the issues involved herein
are now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC, and accordingly
recommended its dismissal.Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved
on April 24, 1998 the recommendation of the EPIB.
PASI moved to reconsider[9] the dismissal of the complaint, but was denied by
Order[10] dated July 17, 1998.
In the meantime, a motion to dismiss the civil case against respondent was denied
by the trial court. On elevation of the order of denial to the Court of Appeals, said
court, by Decision dated February 21, 2000, ordered the dismissal of the case. This
Court, by Decision dated May 3, 2006, ordered the reinstatement of the case,
however.[11]
PASI is now before this Court via petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint.
In issue are 1) whether there exists a prejudicial question and, if in the affirmative,
2) whether the dismissal of the complaint on that account is in order.
Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rationale for the principle of prejudicial question is that although it does
not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused, it tests the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint or information in order to sustain
the further prosecution of the criminal case. [12] Hence, the need for its prior
resolution before further proceedings in the criminal action may be had.
PASI concedes that the issues in the civil case are similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal case. It contends, however, that the
resolution of the issues in the civil case is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of Lichauco, it arguing that even if she is adjudged liable for damages, it
does not necessarily follow that she would be convicted of the crime charged.
To determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the case before the
Ombudsman, it is necessary to examine the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
for which Lichauco was charged and the causes of action in the civil case.
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which was earlier quoted has the following elements:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official
functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross, inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private
party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties.[13]

The civil case against Lichauco on the other hand involves three causes of
action. The first, for injunction, seeks to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, the
DOTC having previously assigned the same to PASI; the second, for declaration of
nullity of award, seeks to nullify the award given to the undisclosed bidder for
being beyond Lichaucos authority; and the third, for damages arising from
Lichaucos questioned acts.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot 153E is, in the civil
case, declared valid for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her
from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would
there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The
finding by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial question is thus welltaken.
Respecting the propriety of the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the
complaint due to the pendency of a prejudicial question, PASI argues that since the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is silent on the matter, the
Rules of Court, specifically Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which now
reads:
SECTION 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition
for suspensionof the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When
the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (Underscoring supplied),

applies in a suppletory character.

The Ombudsman, on the other hand, argues that the above-quoted provision
of the Rules of Court applies to cases which are at the preliminary or trial stage and
not to those, like the case subject of the present petition, at the evaluation stage.
The Ombudsman goes on to proffer that at the evaluation stage, the
investigating officer may recommend any of several causes of action including
dismissal of the complaint for want of palpable merit or subjecting the complaint to
preliminary investigation, and the evaluation of the complaint involves the
discretion of the investigating officer which this Court cannot interfere with.
While the evaluation of a complaint involves the discretion of the
investigating officer, its exercise should not be abused[14] or wanting in legal basis.
Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
reads:
SECTION 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint,
investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:

the

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;

b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding
investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (Underscoring
supplied)

From the above-quoted provision, a complaint at the evaluation stage may be

dismissed outright only for want of palpable merit. Want of palpable merit
obviously means that there is no basis for the charge or charges. If the complaint
has prima faciemerit, however, the investigating officer shall recommend the
adoption of any of the actions enumerated above from (b) to (f).[15]

When, in the course of the actions taken by those to whom the complaint is
endorsed or forwarded, a prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a suppletory character.[16] As
laid down in Yap v. Paras,[17] said rule directs that the proceedings may only
be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not
at the instance of the judge alone or as in this case, the investigating officer.
To give imprimatur to the Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioners criminal complaint
due to prejudicial question would not only run counter to the provision of Section 6
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would sanction the extinguishment of criminal
liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis Articles 90
and 91 of the Revised Penal Code which respectively read:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
Article 344 of this Code. (Underscoring supplied)
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. Crimes punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty
years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which
shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one
year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall
prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest
penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained
in the first, second, and third paragraphs of this article. x x x
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without
the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to him.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 17, 1998 of respondent Ombudsman

dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 against respondent then Secretary Josefina
Trinidad Lichauco is SET ASIDE.
The Ombudsman is ORDERED to REINSTATE to its docket for further
proceedings, in line with the foregoing ratiocination, OMB Case No. 0-98-0416.
SO ORDERED

21.

[G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003]

ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. The Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON. ZEUS
ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and LORELEI IRA, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

seeking to nullify the Order dated October 2, 1998 issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City (Branch 150) in Civil Case No. 982125 which considered Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati (Branch 67) as withdrawn;
and, the Order dated November 23, 1998 which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
[1]

The facts of the case:

Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with
the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a
Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. In a resolution dated November
20, 1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private
respondents for violation of said law and accordingly filed the respective
Informations against each of them before the MTC, docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895, which, except for the names of the accused,
uniformly read as follows:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Prosecutor accuses VIOLETA S. BAGUIO of the crime
of Violation of Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code (False Testimony), committed
as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously give false testimony upon a material
fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542, relative to a complaint for Collection of sum of
money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short)
against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc. for short) in the following
manner, to wit: during the trial of the aforesaid civil case on aforestated date before
Branch 137 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro Manila, in which one of
the principal issues was whether or not payment of the claim of ARK, Inc. has been
made by NFMA, Inc., the said accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., with
malicious intent, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
knowingly testified on direct testimony, by way of a sworn statement, and while under
oath on the witness stand, that the claims of ARK, Inc. supported by a statements of
accounts (Exhibit E to GG) sent to and received by defendant-corporation NFMA,
Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which testimony as accused very well knew and
ought to know, by reason of accuseds position as cashier, was false inasmuch as the
claim based on the statement of accounts of ARK, Inc. (Exhibits E to GG are, in truth
and in fact, valid, legal and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc.,
herein represented by private complainant MA. PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

Private respondents filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutors

resolution dated November 20, 1996 with the Department of Justice (DOJ). In
a resolution dated March 9, 1998, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuo
reversed the City Prosecutors resolution dated November 20, 1996. The
prosecution office of Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to Withdraw
Information.
[3]

[4]

However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition for
Automatic Review with the DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary
Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the urgent petition as a motion for
reconsideration, reversed its resolution dated March 9, 1998 and directed the
City Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos.
200894 and 200895. For this reason, the MTC issued an Order dated June
10, 1998, denying the aforesaid Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
prosecution, to wit:
[5]

It appearing that the Department of Justice had reconsidered its previous ruling
directing the City Prosecutor of Makati City to withdraw the information filed against
the accused in the above-entitled cases, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by
the prosecution is hereby DENIED.
Set these cases therefore for arraignment on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.

[6]

In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 27, 1998 resolution of then Secretary Bello III,
alleging that: (1) the March 9, 1998 resolution of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo
finding no probable cause to indict them has become final and executory
because the Urgent Petition for Automatic Review was filed way beyond the
10-day reglementary period; and (2) the said resolution of May 27, 1998 did
not reverse the finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that respondents did
not really act with malice/criminal intent because the resolution of the
Secretary merely stated that there was false testimony.
[7]

DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing For the Secretary,

granted the Motion for Reconsideration in a resolution dated June 26, 1998,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, our resolution dated May 27, 1998 is reconsidered and set aside; and
consequently, our resolution dated March 9, 1998 is reinstated. You are accordingly,
directed to immediately cause, with leave of court, the withdrawal of the informations
for false testimony in a civil case filed against Violeta S. Baguio and Lorelei
Ira. Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
Consequently, private respondents filed with the MTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of its June 10, 1998 Order alleging that there is no longer any
obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the granting of the Motion to Withdraw
Information previously filed by the prosecution. The MTC denied the motion in
an Order, dated July 21, 1998, which we quote verbatim, as follows:

Submitted for resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused through
counsel which seeks a reversal of the courts order denying the Motion to Withdraw
filed by the prosecution.
In the Crespo Mogul case, it was held by the Supreme Court that once an information
is filed in court, such filing sets in motion the criminal action against the accused
before the court, and any motion to dismiss or withdraw information is always
addressed to the discretion of the court. The denial or grant of any motion is done by
the court not out of subservience to the secretary of justice but in faithful exercise of
its judicial prerogative. This is the ruling in the case of Robert Jr. et al. vs. CH et al.
vs. CA G.R. No. 113930 promulgated on March 5, 1996.
A reading of the information sufficiently alleges the facts which make out the offense
charged and in keeping with the above ruling of the Supreme Court, this court hereby
denies the Motion for Reconsideration.
Set this case for arraignment of both accused on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.
SO ORDERED.

[8]

Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and
July 21, 1998 via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the respondent
RTC of Makati.
The RTC issued herein assailed Order dated October 2, 1998, portions of
which read:
...
As aptly stated in Ledesma vs. CA (Supra) and Marcelo vs. CA (Aug. 4, 1994) the
trial Court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of the said motion
and not reply merely on the awaited action of the secretary.
No such evaluation was ever conducted by the respondent Court before it issued the
two (2) questioned orders.
In view hereof, it is this Courts opinion and stand that the respondent Court may have
indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

when it denied the Motion to Withdraw and the motion for reconsideration based
solely on its bare and ambiguous reliance on the Crespo Doctrine, since an
independent evaluation and assessment of the existence of a probable cause is
necessary before such orders denying the said motions could be issued.
Foregoing Premises Considered, the petition for Certiorari is hereby granted. The
questioned orders dated June 10 and July 21, 1998 are hereby set aside and the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 are hereby considered
withdrawn. (Emphasis ours)
[9]

SO ORDERED.
The RTC denied Ark Travels motion for reconsideration in its Order dated
November 23, 1998, to wit:
[10]

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent which was
temporarily held in abeyance on account of the manifestation of movants counsel that
they intend to file a motion to inhibit; however, despite the lapse of the 10-day period
given to them to do so, the intended motion has not been filed.
After an extensive study of the motion as well as the opposition thereto, and with
careful consideration and assessment of the circumstances which led to its earlier
order, the Court finds no compelling reason to alter, amend and/or reconsider its order
dated October 2, 1998.
Wherefore, the above-mentioned motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari which raises the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT NULLIFIED THE ORDERS OF THE COURT A QUO,
ENJOINED THE SAID COURT A QUO FROM HEARING CRIMINAL CASES
NOS. 200894 AND 200895, AND THEREAFTER, ORDERED THE OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL OF SAID CRIMINAL CASES.
[11]

Ark Travel argues that the ruling of the RTC contravenes the doctrine laid
down by this Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul which enunciated that
once a complaint or information is filed in court any disposition of the case
such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the court. Ark Travel likewise insists that criminal
prosecutions cannot be enjoined.
[12]

In their Comment, private respondents counter: (1) Appeal and

not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate
remedy. But even if the petition at bar is treated as an appeal, the filing thereof
way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal, renders
the instant petition outrightly dismissable; (2) Assuming arguendo that petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy, the petition should still be
denied and/or dismissed outright for having been filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period provided by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (3) The RTCs
Orders have become final and executory, and consequently may no longer be
disturbed; (4) The filing of the petition with this Court is grossly violative of the
principle of hierarchy of courts; (5) There is no ground to reverse public
respondent RTCs Orders which considered the criminal cases as withdrawn
because the petition does not rebut the validity of the ruling of the DOJ that
there is no probable cause to charge herein private respondents with the
crime of false testimony.
In its Reply, Ark Travel argues that herein petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy and not appeal because what is being questioned is not the
correctness of the subject Orders but the jurisdiction of the RTC in considering
the criminal cases as withdrawn when said cases are not pending with it but
the MTC; that appeal is not a speedy and/or adequate remedy; and that
herein petition does not violate the principle of hierarchy of court because it
presents a question of law.
We shall first address the procedural aspect.
The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the
RTC in ordering the dismissal of the criminal cases pending before the MTC
and therefore, the proper remedy is certiorari. As such, the present petition for
certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late filing. The assailed Order

dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark Travel on October 16, 1998.Ark
Travel filed the Motion for Reconsideration fourteen days later or on October
30, 1998. On November 27, 1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, then prevailing, the petition should have been filed on the
forty-sixth day (60 days minus 14 days) from November 27, 1998 or on
January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day reglementary period; instead, the
petition was filed on January 26, 1999.
However, during the pendency of herein petition, the Court promulgated
A.M. No. 00-2-03, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, effective September 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
in which case, the filing of the petition on January 26, 1999 was filed on the
60th day from November 27, 1998, Ark Travels date of receipt of notice of the
order denying Ark Travels motion for reconsideration.
We have consistently held that statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. In view of such retroactive application of procedural laws, the
instant petition should be considered as timely filed.
[13]

[14]

Further, herein case is a clear exception to the principle of hierarchy of

courts. The Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature
of the issues raised. This case commenced in the MTC way back 1996 and
still pends. We therefore set aside such principle for this particular case, in the
interest of speedy justice.
[15]

[16]

Anent the substantive aspect.

The general rule is that the denial of a motion to withdraw information, just
like a motion to dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore it
cannot be the proper subject of an appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on
the merits of the case is rendered. However, there are certain situations
where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, to wit:
[17]

a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where
there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not
prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy
as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects
of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and
compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the
court dockets by another futile case.
[18]

All three situations are present in this case. Thus, the petition for certiorari
filed with this Court is the proper remedy.
In the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, Ark Travel claims that the
MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw
Informations on the ground that the MTC disregarded the DOJs finding of lack
of probable cause without making an independent evaluation of the same.
Indeed, the MTC Order dated June 10, 1998 shows that the Motion to
Withdraw Informations was denied by the MTC solely on the basis of the
ruling of the DOJ that there exists a probable cause; while the MTC Order
dated July 21, 1998 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 10,
1998 order on the basis of the principle laid down in the Crespo vs.
Mogulcase that once an Information was filed in court, its disposition rests in
the discretion of the court and that the allegations of facts in the Information
make out the offense charged.
It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, the bounden
duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the
merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the
trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it
[19]

before proceeding further with the trial and should embody such
assessment in the order disposing the motion.
[20]

[21]

The subject MTC Orders do not show that the MTC made an independent
assessment of the merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations. The MTC
merely based its first order on the ruling of the DOJ that probable cause
existed. In the second order, the MTC merely stated that from its reading of
the Informations, and in keeping with the Crespo ruling, it is denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The MTC should have made an independent evaluation and embodied its
assessment in at least one of its assailed orders, especially considering that
the DOJ had issued contradicting rulings on the existence of probable
cause. Hence, on this point, we agree with the RTC that the MTC committed
grave abuse of discretion.
But the RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari before it, not only
committed grave abuse of discretion but acted in excess of or beyond its
jurisdiction in considering the criminal casespending in the MTC as withdrawn,
which in effect, causes the dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the
subject cases are not within the jurisdiction of the RTC to dismiss. The only
issue brought to it is whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to withdraw without making any independent
evaluation as to whether or not there is a probable cause. Second, while
ruling that the MTC should have made an independent assessment on the
merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself omitted to do the
very thing that it prescribed the MTC to do. It unceremoniously considered the
criminal cases as withdrawn, without evaluation or determination of the
existence of the probable cause.
The RTC should have only nullified the subject MTC Order and remanded
the case to the MTC for its determination of the existence of probable cause
pursuant to the aforementioned Crespo and Ledesma cases.
However, inasmuch as we have taken cognizance of this case in the
interest of speedy justice and considering that the entire records have been
forwarded to us, it is befitting that we determine the existence of probable

cause to put an end to this issue which had been unresolved since 1998, not
to mention the fact that the subject Informations were initially filed in 1996.A
remand of the case to the MTC for an independent evaluation of the existence
of probable cause will only delay the disposition of the case and contribute in
the clogging of the dockets.
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182
of the Revised Penal Code, the following requisites must concur:
1. the testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case;
3. the testimony is false;
4. the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be
false; and
5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the
issues presented in the case.
[22]

There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The
records show that Ark Travel filed a complaint for collection of sum of money,
torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMAI) and
Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 137),
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1542. In said civil case, private respondents
were presented by NFMAI as witnesses. They executed their respective
sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no
outstanding obligation with Ark Travel as the same had been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of
the subject testimonies of private respondents is yet to be established. It is
noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case filed
by Ark Travel is still pending decision. Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity
of its monetary claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that
the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and
correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately
connected with the subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
[23]

innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or

not the testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a
prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements of a prejudicial question are
present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of
private respondents in the civil case, the criminal action for false testimony
must perforce be suspended. As such, under the attendant circumstances,
although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private
respondents, orderly administration of justice dictates that the criminal cases
should be suspended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated October 2, 1998 and November
23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE insofar
only as said court, acting as an appellate court, considered Criminal Cases
Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn.
The Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati (Branch 67) in Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895
are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. In lieu thereof, the said Metropolitan Trial Court is directed

to SUSPEND the criminal proceedings until after the final decision in Civil
Case No. 95-1542 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 137).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

22.
MERLINDA
MONTANEZ,
-versusRepublic oi :!1-.: Phi!ippin~s
SupL, ,._;Court
]\! i!1i Ia
Compl;;;iti~\nt,
G.R. No. 1Hi089
Present:
VELASCO, JR.,.!., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
PERAIJTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, .JJ.
Pronaulgafcd:
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPHL\i ;O,
ResporhkiiL 22 Oc lober _ -4012
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - V( ~~-(/ tY!_~ X
DU:CISION

PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition l~)r review on certiorari which seeks to
annul the Order' dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990SPL which dismissed the lnf(mnation f()r Bigamy filed against respondent
Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC l~esolution 2 dated
January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Designated Acting I'Vlcmbcr, per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9. :201:2.
Rollo, pp. 54-55; Per Judge Sonia T. Yu-Ctsano.
Jd. at 52-53. I /
c--/ tl
Decision 2 G.R. No. 181089
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
Lezo, Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,
Laguna.4 In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July
18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended
Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void.
Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was

docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an

Affidavit8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumbmarked
and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that
respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
On November 17, 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San
Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one
SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with
SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial
authorities.11
3 Id. at 60.
4 Id. at 62.
5 Id. at 66-68.
6 Id. at 69.
7 Id. at 71.
8 Id. at 72.
9 Died on May 27, 2007; id. At 59.
10 Id. at 75.
11 Id.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 181089
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal

Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element
of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She
also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of
bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing
that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent
filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first
marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by
the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It
found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first
marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element
of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our
ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging
him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity
of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x16

12 Id. at 80-81.
13 Id. at 82-83.
14 Id. at 84.
15 G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122; 391 Phil. 809 (2000).
16 Mercado v. Tan, supra, at 133; at 824.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 181089
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the
RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or
more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the
commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004,
which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the
Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first
marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for
annulment was granted and became final before the criminal complaint for
bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given
any retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without
need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set
aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly,
let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a
second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the

Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the
issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first
marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place
before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled
state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity
17 Rollo, pp. 85-87.
18 Id. at 88-89.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 181089
of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that
laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the
accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the
annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2,
2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere
declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for
this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered
criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising
the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.

Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense

for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of
securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a
second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a
subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring
criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant
and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent
the government in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20
19 Id. at 8-9.
20 Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
provides:
Decision 6 G.R. No. 181089
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in
the past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant)
questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed
in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory
counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said
that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the

respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the

OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution
is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal
case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question
the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the
interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines,
we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we
had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule
that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition
for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. xxx
It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a

party.
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and
offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in
cases
involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision
and
control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.
21 G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
22 Antone v. Beronilla, supra, at 623.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 181089
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the
petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such
Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or
not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy
as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed

dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or

subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential
in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of
the first marriage.24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in
1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared
void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were
23 Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461, 477; 512
Phil. 818,
833-834 (2005).
24 Id. at 833.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 181089
alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she
alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage
with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April
2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. The said decision was never appealed, and became final and
executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her
marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the
beginning.

4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak

of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting.25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is
whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
And by contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the
accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
25 Rollo, p. 80.
26 Supra note 15, at 133; at 824.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 181089
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity

retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the

vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said
marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure
that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the
accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
27 G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
28 Id. at 568
29 Id.
30 G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272; 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
31 Id. at 284; at 744.
32 G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 181089
the accuseds first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void
by a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.

Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first
marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As
ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she
contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the
Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before
the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two
marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this
33 Supra note 30.
34 Landicho v. Relova, G.R. No. L-22579, February 23, 1968, 22 SCRA 731, 734; 130
Phil. 745,
748 (1968).

35 Id.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 181089
will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into before the
effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which
requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a
person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument
meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should
be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself
provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to
explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application
of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is
that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not

enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

36 G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24.
37 Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or
the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
Decision 12 (i.R. No. 181080
In the case ut bid. J ;::1,ul,L;nl's ~_!.._,~~ iiik11l is l1l
obtain a judicial d~clciJ(.,(l(>\ \Jl llilllity ,,j' hi,) rn~,[ lildliiuge
and therealtcr lu im\,Lc ll"l 1C.:) :;<.:de judgment to 1;1\:vcnl
his prosecution J(n bigumy. i i .. cc~r~nol l1~tvc hi:j ~_,d,c and
cat it too. Otherwise, all tk,.l dll u,h Lliltil dllS lliGdllliSl lhlS to
do is disregard Article :J:i ilr tLc i;_;n1ily C\,de, cotll<.ld u
subsequent marriagt.: and c:,c:up<- '-' l;is<~my ciJi;rgc Ly :;illiply
claiming that the lirsl r: u1 iag;.; is void and tk,l tLe
subsequent marriage is cqu:.lly void rur lack ur a pi ior
judicial declaration of llull[t:> (;J dn: Jlr:;L ;\ party llli.l)' even
enter into a marriage awmc ur the: <Jbscnce of a requisiteusually

the marriage licct.:;t: <11.d tl.c~ ci.dlc:r u,t.luld u

subsequent marriage without oLtaii1ing a decbr.llion or
nullity of the tirst on the as:iii!Jlpliun tLul i11c Jirdl tu,urit~gc
is void. Such scenario woLd,! i\:ndcr nugalury the provision
on bigamy.38 ,
WHEREFORE, considc:ri;1g the lcm.::g~)ing, the petition Is
GRANTED. The Order dated Scptcud>t:r 24, 2007 :..u.d the 1\esolution
dated January 2, 2008 of the Rcgidrwl Trial Court of S<.ill Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case :No. ,:jCJ<JO-SPL, are hereby SICI ASIDE.
Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ortk:red REMANDED to tl1e trial court t()r
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
23.

G.R. No. L-13172

April 28, 1960

GILBERT RILLON and MARCELINA RILLON, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FILEMON RILLON, defendant-appellee.
Hermenegildo, Gualberto for appellants.
Paulino Monongdo and Enrique D. Caloob for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a civil action instituted by the minor Gilbert Rillon, assisted by his mother, Marcelina
Rillon, as his, guardian ad litem, alleging the following facts:
3. Que en o hacia el dia 10 de Septiembre de 1953, en el municipio de San
Fernando, La Union, el demandado arriba mencionado valiendose de fuerza e
intimidacion cohabito, yacio con la demandante Marcelina Rillon en contra o sin la
voluntad de esta, sujetandola, y amenazandola; y como consecuencia de tal
ayuntamiento y yacimiento carnal se concebio el citado menor Gilbert Rillon, siendo
la demandante Marcelina Rillon y el demandado referido son de estado soltera y

soltero respectivamente al tiempo de la citada concepcion capaces de eontraer

matrimonio sin ningun impedimento legal, y siguen en el mismo estado civil hasta la
fecha.
4. Que el citado menor Gilbert Rillon nacio en o hacia el dia 12 de Abril de 1954 en
San Fernando, La Union, o sea despues de 180 dias, desde el yacimiento carnal o
coito y dentro de 300 dias.
In other paragraphs of the complaint it is further alleged that the minor needs food for
subsistence as he is living with his mother who has no means to support him; that his
mother has asked the defendant to recognize the has a natural child and provide him with
support, but these demands were refused by defendant; that the illegal act of defendant has
caused the mother mental anguish, physical and mental inconvenience, degradation and
shame, and has caused her moral damages in the amount of P5,000 and a right to support
for the amount of P200; that the plaintiff mother was a student of the Normal School in
Manila and needed only three months to complete her studies when her misfortune
occurred and by reason of the acts of the defendant she has been caused actual damages
in the amount of P30,000. In conclusion plaintiffs pray that the defendant be ordered to
recognize the minor as his natural child, declaring the latter entitled to the rights of a natural
child and to receive the sum of P20.00 a month for his maintenance and support, and that
the defendant be further ordered to pay the plaintiff mother P30,000 as actual damages,
P5,000 as moral damages and P200 as the expenses during the delivery and birth of the
child.
In his answer the defendant denies the material allegations of the complaint and, by way of
special defense, alleges that the minor is the son of plaintiff Marcelina Rillon by another
man with whom she had carnal knowledge long before September 10, 1952; that her failure
to finish her studies, was due to her amorous relations with her "boy friend," her failure to
pay her tuition fees and her poor and unsatisfactory scholastic record. By way of
counterclaim he alleges that plaintiffs' complaint is false, fictitious and malicious, made in
evident and wilfull bad faith, and has caused the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P40,000.
After the filing of a reply to defendant's counterclaim, defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint or proceeding on the ground that the action is premature as there is no final
judgment in a criminal case for rape against the defendant; and that no cause of action has
accrued against him. The court, Hon. Juan O. Reyes, presiding, dismissed the case without
prejudice, in order that a decision may first be had on the prejudicial question, that is,
whether or not defendant committed the crime as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. Failing to
obtain a reconsideration of this order, plaintiffs have appealed to us.
The legal question squarely presented is whether or not a civil action for recognition and
support and for moral damages filed by an offended party, under allegations of facts

constituting the crime of rape, can proceed even without the institution of a criminal action
for rape against the defendant and a judgment thereon convicting him of such crime.
Under Article 135 of the Civil Code of Spain enforced in the islands prior to the adoption of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the civil responsibility that devolves upon a man accused
of rape is to be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. Article 135 of the former Civil
Code is as follows:
ART. 135. The father is obliged to acknowledge the natural child in the following
cases:
1. When there exists an indubitable, writing of his in which he expressly
acknowledges his paternity.
2. When the child is in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child of
the defendant father, justified by direct acts of the father himself or of his family.
In cases of rape, seduction the provision of the penal Code with regard to the
acknowledgment of the issue shall be observed.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code regarding the civil liability arising from the crime
of rape is embodied in Article 345, which is as follows:
ART. 345. Civil liability of person guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons guilty
of rape, seduction or abduction shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman.
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing.
3. In every case to support the offspring.
To carry out the above provisions of the civil law, when General Orders No. 58 was issued,
Section 107 thereof provided that a person claiming to be injured by the commission of an
offense may take part in the prosecution thereof and may recover damages for the injury
sustained by reason of the said offense. Said Section 107 reads:
SEC. 107. The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by
the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to
recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to
be abridged by the provisions of this order; but such person may appear and shall be
heard either individually or by attorney at all stages of the case, and the court upon
conviction of the accused may enter judgement against him for the damages

occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promoter fiscal to
direct the prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to appeal from any
decision of the court denying him a legal right.
The rights of an offended party to take part in the criminal case, as recognized in the abovequoted section, are defined in Article 742 and Article 114 of the Law of Criminal Procedure
of Spain of 1882, as follows:
In said judgment there shall be decided all questions arising in the trial, and the
accused shall be condemned or acquitted not only of the principal offense and
offenses connected therewith but also of any incidental misdemeanors which may
have been proven in the case; and the tribunal, at this stage of the proceedings, can
not dismiss the case in respect to the accused persons who ought not to be
condemned.
All questions referring to civil liability and responsibility which in the trial shall also be
decided in the said judgement. (Art. 712).
When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a crime or
misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted; but the
same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it may be
found, until final sentence in the criminal proceeding is pronounced. (Art. 114)
Following the above provision we have held:
Instituting a criminal action only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well,
unless the damaged or prejudiced person waives the same or expressly reserves the
right to institute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be
any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the law of Criminal Procedure.) " (Almeida, et al. vs.
Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, 182.)
Therefore, all questions referring to civil liability and responsibility which arise in the trial (of
the criminal case) shall be decided in the judgment in the criminal case.
Interpreting the above-quoted provisions, this Court further said in the case of Almeida, et
al. vs. Abaroa, supra, that the Supreme Court of Spain had decided that in any criminal
case, the civil liability or responsibility must arise as a consequence of the criminal liability
and that, therefore, if the accused has been acquitted of the crime, the court cannot order
payment of indemnity therefor. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in U. S. vs.
Heery, 25 Phil., 600:
In this jurisdiction it is well settled that the civil liability of the accused must be
determined in the criminal action, unless the injured party expressly waives such

liability or reserves his right to have the civil damages determined in a separate
action. Section 107 of General Orders No. 58 reads: . . .
The procedure under the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure for determining the
civil liability of persons accused of crime, referred to in the above quoted section, has
been discussed by this court a number of times.
In Springer vs. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), it was said: By General Orders, No. 58,
section 107, the privileges secured by the Spanish law to persons claiming to be
injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense
and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same, are
preserved and remain in force, and it is therein expressly provided that the court,
upon conviction of the accused, may enter judgment in favor of the injured person,
against the defendant in the criminal case for the damage occasioned by the
wrongful act:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Almeida vs. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep. 178), was a civil action for damages brought by the
plaintiff against a person who had been previously acquitted on a criminal charge. It
was held that his acquittal in the criminal action was a complete bar to a civil action
for damages based upon the alleged criminal act of which the defendant had been
accused. In the course of this decision it was said:
Instituting a criminal action only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well,
unless the damaged or prejudiced person waives the same or expressly reserves the
right to institute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be
any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of Criminal Procedure.)
The right to bring the civil action, as reserved by the person damaged or prejudiced,
after the termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any reason
therefor, and so says the law, in the event that the judgment rendered in the criminal
cause is a finding of guilt against the accused; but if the accused be acquitted, then
the complaint in the civil action must be based on some fact and or cause district and
separate from the criminal act itself.
When the present Rules of Court was promulgated, the above provisions contained in the
Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure of 1882 and applied in the cases of Almeida, et al. vs.
Abaroa, supra, and U. S. vs. Heery, supra, and others, were recast into the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 107, as follows:
SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as
otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted; and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it
may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against
the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reperation or indemnity
for the damages suffered;
(e) A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability, is no bar to a criminal action.
The above provisions were in force on August 30, 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines was enacted. The Civil Code of the Philippines contain the following provisions:
ART. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with
the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
It will be noted that contrary to the provisions of Article 135 of the Civil Code of Spain, to the
effect that in cases of rape the provisions of the Penal Code regarding the acknowledgment

of the issue is to be observed, Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines does not make
the civil liability of the offender in a case of rape determinable in a criminal action only. This
is also to be inferred from Article 30, which provides:
ART. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from
a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of
the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the
act complained of.
This last article implies the right of an offended party to bring a separate civil action for the
criminal act without instituting the criminal proceedings for the prosecution of the offense.
This is the opposite of the provisions of the old Criminal Procedure of Spain of 1882 and of
Rule 107 of the present Rules of Court. For, whereas under Rule 107 the civil action for
damages for an offense has to await the results of the criminal action, and if civil action is
first instituted, the same shall be suspended until after the criminal action has been
instituted and decided, which provisions of the present Rules of Court are based on the old
Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure, said provisions are no longer in force because a civil
action may now be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment without awaiting the
institution and termination of a criminal action, as expressly declared in Articles 30 and 283
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. These new provisions are inconsistent with the
provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court and the latter must give way thereto. In
consequence, it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the
offended woman and the recognition of the offspring can be instituted and prosecuted to
final judgment. The provisions of Rule 107 of the present Rules promulgated in 1940 are,
therefore, considered repealed or modifiedpro tanto by the above-mentioned articles of the
Civil Code and, as above stated, the offended woman in the rape and the child born out of
the crime may institute a civil action for damages and for recognition and support without a
previous action and judgment in a criminal case for rape against the offender.
For the foregoing considerations, the order of the court, dismissing the case provisionally for
the purpose of awaiting the results of the criminal action for rape against defendant, is
hereby set aside and the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further
proceedings in accordance with this decision. With costs against defendant-appellee. So
ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez
David, JJ., concur.

24.

G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 - SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR
STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T. REYES,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO,
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that
may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action
may include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the
trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution2 dated
September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void Department of Justice
Order No. 7103 issued by the Secretary of Justice.4 The Department Order created a second panel of
prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first panel of prosecutors'
failure to admit the complainant's additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several
radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the
Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. 5 After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial
confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad),
Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.6
On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel
T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. 7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 8 creating a
special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel was
composed of Senior Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S.
Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina. 9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife,
filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her
husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former
Marinduque Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon

Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo O. Edrad, and
several John and Jane Does were also implicated.10
On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the
Resolution11dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which,
among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor
Reyes and Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. InocencioOrtega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8, 2011.
Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution 13 dated September 2, 2011.14
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new
panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel was
composed of Assistant State Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State Prosecutor Vimar M.
Barcellano, and Assistant State Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due
process"15 to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel in its Resolution dated
September 2, 2011. The Department Order also revoked Department Order No. 091. 16
Pursuant to Department Order No. 710, the Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring former
Governor Reyes to appear before them on October 6 and 13, 2011 and to submit his counter-affidavit
and supporting evidence.17
On September 29, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for
Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's Resolution dated September 2, 2011. 18
On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
assailing the creation of the Second Panel. In his Petition, he argued that the Secretary of Justice
gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel. He also argued that the parties were
already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was neither
new nor material to the case.19
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending
the filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes. 20 Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012. However, the
warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother were ineffective since the two allegedly left
the country days before the warrants could be served. 22
On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review
Ad Cautelam23 assailing the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012. .
On April 2, 2012, he also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order
impleading Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan. 24
In his Supplemental Petition, former Governor Reyes argued that the Regional Trial Court could not
enforce the Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and proceed with the prosecution of his
case since this Resolution was void. 25
cralawre d

On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered the
Decision26declaring Department Order No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First Panel's
Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
she issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel. The Court of Appeals found that
she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule

on Appeal27 instead of issuing Department Order No. 710 and creating the Second Panel. It found that
because of her failure to follow the procedure in the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, two Petitions for
Review Ad Cautelam filed by the opposing parties were pending before her.28
The Court of Appeals also found that the Secretary of Justice's admission that the issuance of
Department Order No. 710 did not set aside the First Panel's Resolution dated June 8, 2011 and
September 2, 2011 "[compounded] the already anomalous situation." 29 It also stated that Department
Order No. 710 did not give the Second Panel the power to reverse, affirm, or modify the Resolutions of
the First Panel; therefore, the Second Panel did not have the authority to assess the admissibility and
weight of any existing or additional'evidence.30
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated March 19, 2013. The Motion, however, was denied by the Court
of Appeals in the Resolution31 dated September 27, 2013.
In its Resolution, the Court of Appeals stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged
miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties
were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel. It also ruled that the
evidence examined by the Second Panel was not additional evidence but "forgotten evidence" 32 that
was already available before the First Panel during the conduct of the preliminary investigation. 33
Aggrieved, the Secretary of-Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari34 assailing the Decision dated March 19, 2013 and Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals. Respondent Mario Joel T. Reyes filed his Comment 35 to the Petition in compliance
with this court's Resolution dated February 17, 2014. 36 Petitioners' Reply37 to the Comment was filed
on October 14, 2014 in compliance with this court's Resolution dated June 23, 2014. 38
Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority when she issued Department
Order No. 710. They argue that her issuance was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial
function that could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition. 39 In their submissions, they
point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of
Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.40
Petitioners' position was that the First Panel "appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation"41 when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the
determination of the existence of probable cause.42 They assert that respondent was not deprived of
due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting
controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's additional evidence. 43 Petitioners argue that since the
Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial
court.44
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu
proprio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new
evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all
parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel so it
was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation. 45
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice's discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was
not "unbridled"46 since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling circumstances
for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. 47 He argues that the
Second Panel's Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was void since the Panel was created by a
department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice's authority to issue. He further argues that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel
was void.48
The issues for this court's resolution are:

chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse
of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710, and with regard to this:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

a.

Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the
scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition; and

b.

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

Lastly, whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul.49
I
The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasijudicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the
findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 50 A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc.,
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."51 Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs
quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their
decisions have the same effect as the judgment of a court. 52
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.
The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent-is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial."53 As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. In Santos v. Go:54
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary

[T]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare-his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it. is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as
quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is
an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity
ends at this point. A quasi-judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other
than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the
rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the
case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file
an information against a person charged with a criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is
reviewing the formers order or resolutions. 55
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In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice,56 a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was
filed against the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order. The assailed order directed all
prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the Legacy Group to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel created by the Department of Justice.

This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed
only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order
was a purely administrative or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of
Justice may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:
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The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasijudicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor
does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
. . . [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
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There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor's power to
conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true only to
the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
But the limited similarity, between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly ends there.
For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a legislative
office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming
before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not
the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable
cause in order to file a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or
whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor's orders or resolutions. 57 (Emphasis
supplied)
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Similarly, in Callo-Claridad v. Esteban,58 we have stated that a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court cannot be brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution dismissing a complaint
for lack of probable cause since this is an "essentially executive function": 59
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A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions,
resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in
Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the matter
of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to determine
whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there was 'probable
cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof.60
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A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against "the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions."61 The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform quasijudicial functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a
ministerial function.
An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts,
in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done."62 In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed."63 Considering that "full discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch
in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation," 64 the functions of the

prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.

However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave
abuse of discretion.65 In Auto Prominence Corporation v. Winterkorn:66
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In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking
the writ of certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough;
it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction
over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted without authority.67
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Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying the resolutions of
prosecutors may be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II
Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is authorized to
issue Department Order No. 710.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1007168 outlines the powers granted by law to the Secretary of Justice.
The provision reads:
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Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the Secretary of Justice includes
authority to act directly on any matter involving national security or a probable miscarriage of justice
within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the. provincial
prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition
for review as the law or the rules of the Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgments and
orders of the prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
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A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then conduct a
preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause to hold the accused for
trial in court.69 The recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on whether to dismiss the
complaint or to file the corresponding information in court is still subject to the approval of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor.70
However, a party is not precluded from appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice. Under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, 71 appeals may
be taken within 15 days within receipt of the resolution by filing a verified petition for review before
the Secretary of Justice.72
In this case, the Secretary of Justice designated a panel of prosecutors to investigate on the Complaint
filed by Dr. Inocencio-Ortega. The First Panel, after conduct of the preliminary investigation, resolved
to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open and a Motion for Partial Investigation,
which were both denied by the First Panel. Before Dr. Inocencio-Ortega could file a petition for review,
the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 and constituted another panel of
prosecutors to reinvestigate the case. The question therefore is whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal, the Secretary of Justice may, even without a pending petition for review, motu proprioorder
the conduct of a reinvestigation.
The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice
can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state

prosecutor.73 The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order to
resolve the petition for review. Under Section 11:
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SECTION 11. Reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case,
the reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons,
another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same.
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Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu
proprioreverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor
even without a pending petition for review. Section 4 states:
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SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify
under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally
examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to
submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
....
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or
motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move
for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in
preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis
supplied)
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The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within herauthority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals:74
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Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the
Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV. in relation to Section 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives
the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the .Chief Prosecutor and the
Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his power of supervision and control is delineated
in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of the Code:
(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units[.]75
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Similarly, in Rural Community Bank ofGuimba v. Hon. Talavera:76

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The actions of prosecutors are not unlimited; they are subject to review by the secretary of justice
who may affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their actions or opinions.' Consequently the secretary may
direct them to file either a motion to dismiss the case or an information against the accused.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of supervision and control over prosecuting
officers, is the ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting theories of the complainants and
the respondents should be believed.77
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Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on
any "probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional
prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of

Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a party in
order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open the preliminary investigation before the First Panel in
order to admit as evidence mobile phone conversations between Edrad and respondent and argued
that these phone conversations tend to prove that respondent was the mastermind of her husband's
murder. The First Panel, however, dismissed the Motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The
First Panel stated:
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Re-opening of the preliminary investigation for the purpose of receiving additional evidence
presupposes that the case has been submitted for resolution but no resolution has been promulgated
therein by the investigating prosecutor. Since a resolution has already been promulgated by the panel
of prosecutors in this case, the motion to re-open the preliminary investigation is not proper and'has
to be denied.78
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In the same Resolution, the First Panel denied Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration on the ground that "the evidence on record does not suffice to establish probable
cause."79 It was then that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710, which states:

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In the interest of service and due process, and to give both parties all the reasonable opportunity to
present their evidence during the preliminary investigation, a new panel is hereby created composed
of the following for the purpose of conducting a reinvestigation . . . .
....
The reinvestigation in this case is hereby ordered to address the offer of additional evidence by the
complainants, which was denied by the former panel in its Resolution of 2 September 2011 on the
ground that an earlier resolution has already been promulgated prior to the filing of the said
motion, and such other issues which may be raised before the present panel. 80 (Emphasis supplied)

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In her reply-letter dated September 29, 2011 to respondent's counsel, the Secretary of Justice further
explained that:
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The order to reinvestigate was dictated by substantial justice and our desire to have a comprehensive
investigation. We do not want any stone unturned, or any evidence overlooked. As stated in D.O. No.
710, we want to give "both parties all the reasonable opportunity to present their evidence." 81
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Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710
because she had reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may
cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn
the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including
the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of
Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner,'by reason of passion or personal hostility." 82
Accordingly, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Petition for Review before the Secretary of Justice was rendered
moot with the issuance by the Second Panel of the Resolution dated March 12, 2012 and the filing of
the Information against respondent before the trial court.
III
The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent's warrant of arrest
has already rendered this Petition moot.
It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the judicial determination
of probable cause. In People v. Castillo and Mejia:83
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There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether

probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined
by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority
to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.84(Emphasis supplied)
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The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are
given a wide latitude of discretion to detennine whether an information should be filed in court or
whether the complaint should be dismissed. 85
A preliminary investigation is "merely inquisitorial," 86 and is only conducted to aid the prosecutor in
preparing the information.87 It serves a two-fold purpose: first, to protect the innocent against
wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare the state from using its funds and resources in useless
prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz-Pao:88
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The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trials.89
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Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the merits. An
accused's right to a preliminary investigation is merely statutory;' it is not a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Hence, any alleged irregularity in an investigation's conduct does not render the
information void nor impair its validity. In Lozada v. Fernando:90
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It has been said time and again that a preliminary investigation is not properly a trial or any part
thereof but is merely preparatory thereto, its only purpose being to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause to'believe the accused guilty thereof. The right
to such investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution. At most, it is
statutory. And rights conferred upon accused persons to participate in preliminary investigations
concerning themselves depend upon the provisions of law by which such rights are specifically
secured, rather than upon the phrase "due process of law." 91 (Citations omitted)
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People v. Narca92 further states:

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It must be emphasized that the preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full exercise of the
rights of the parties. This is why preliminary investigation is not considered as a part of trial but
merely preparatory thereto and that the records therein shall not form part of the records of the case
in court. Parties' may submit affidavits but have no right to examine witnesses though they can
propound questions through the investigating officer. In fact, a preliminary investigation may even be
conducted ex-part'e in certain cases. Moreover, in Section 1 of Rule 112, the purpose of a preliminary
investigation is only to determine a well grounded belief if a crime was probably committed by an
accused. In any case, the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which may have taken cognizance of the information nor impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render it defective.93 (Emphasis supplied)
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Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to
dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of
the court. In Crespo v. Mogul: 94
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The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing
of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and
the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed
for the consideration of the Court, the only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on
the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does not
believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of
the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is -done
and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of
his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of
the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the
responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then
the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear
for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private
prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of
the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.95 (Emphasis supplied)
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Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to proceed with resolving respondent's
Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more prudent to refrain from entertaining the
Petition considering that the trial court already issued a warrant of arrest against respondent. 96 The
issuance of the warrant signifies that the trial court has made an independent determination of the
existence of probable cause. In Mendoza v. People:97
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While it is within the trial court's discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge

does not act as an appellate court' of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutor's finding. 98
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Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the
First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case,
therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of
arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial
court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case
and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari
questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy"99 provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for
Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not
without remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged
irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.
SO ORDERED.

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25.

G.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) AND HON.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ in his capacity as Solicitor General, and the HON.
OMBUDSMAN, respondents, MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT and JOSE R. ELEAZAR,
JR., intervenors.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Villareal Law Offices for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for intervenors.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In these petitions the issues raised are: (1) whether or not the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) has the power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the antigraft and corruption cases filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and
other respondents for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds; and (2) on the assumption
that it has jurisdiction to conduct such a preliminary investigation, whether or not its conduct
constitutes a violation of petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
On November 28, 1989, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to
prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above
directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the
possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.
On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent
PCGG docketed under I.S. Nos. 74 and 75. 1
The PCGG assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary
investigation. The latter scheduled both cases for hearing.
Del Rosario prepared a subpoena dated January 16, 1990 setting the preliminary
investigation on January 29, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to respondents Maria
Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazar, Felix Duenas Jr., and Salvador Escudero, III, and on January
31, 1990 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon as to petitioner Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.,
Rolando de la Cuesta, and Hermenegildo Zayco.
At the scheduled preliminary investigation on January 31, 1990 petitioner appeared through
counsel. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two
motions addressed to the PCGG, namely; (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG;
alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve
Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss.
Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings closed and the
cases submitted for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner requested the PCGG to resolve
directly his aforesaid motions.
On February 27, 1990, the PCGG issued an order denying petitioner's motions and required
him, together with all the respondents in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 to submit counter-affidavits
within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Petitioner did not submit the required counteraffidavit.
Instead, he filed in this Court on March 12, 1990 the herein petitions for prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction.

He alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaints
filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due process and equal
protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary
investigation. It is prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
respondents and any or all persons acting under their orders or in their behalf from
continuing with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 and enjoining as well the
PCGG from taking any further action on said cases; and after hearing on the merits, to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting respondent PCGG from conducting a
preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints and to order that the records of I.S.
Nos. 74 and 75 be forwarded to the Ombudsman for such action he may consider
appropriate and to pay the costs of the suits.
In a resolution dated March 13, 1990, this Court, without giving due course to the petition,
resolved to require respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On the same date, the PCGG issued an order that reads as follows:
Considering that none of the respondents have filed their counter-affidavits
and supporting evidence, except respondent Hermenegildo Zayco, the
complaints filed against them may now be considered submitted for resolution
by this Commission.
Since the respondents, except Hermenegildo Zayco, have not submitted
counter-affidavits and controverting evidence, the evidence submitted by the
complainants stands uncontradicted. And this Commission finds the findings
and conclusions of fact of the investigating prosecutor, that a prima facie case
has been established against all the respondents, including Hermenegildo
Zayco, to warrant the filing of an information for a violation of Section 3(1) in
relation to Section 3(i) thus making them liable under Section 3(a) of RA
3019, to be well-founded.
Wherefore, let the corresponding information be filed.

On March 14, 1990, two informations 3 were filed by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner and all other respondents named in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 which were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 14398 and 14399.

Meanwhile, the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG several other complaints against
petitioner and several others bearing on the misuse of the coconut levy funds. Two of these
complaints were docketed as I.S. Nos. 79 and 82. A panel of prosecutors designated by the
PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order to compel him to appear in the investigation
of said cases.

On March 20, 1990, petitioner filed a supplemental petition informing the Court of the filing
of said informations and the additional complaints aforestated. He prays that a temporary
restraining order be issued enjoining respondents and other persons acting under their
orders or in their behalf from continuing with the preliminary investigation of as well as
taking further action in I.S. Nos. 79 and 82 and similar cases filed with the PCGG. Petitioner
also prays that, after hearing, the PCGG be prohibited from continuing with the preliminary
investigation of I.S. Nos. 79 and 82 and that it be ordered to forward the records of the case
to the Ombudsman for appropriate action, and to pay the costs of the suit.
On the same date, petitioner filed a motion reiterating the petition for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction and alternatively seeking that the
case be set for hearing.
On March 22, 1990, the Court admitted the supplemental pleading of the petitioner; required
respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice; and issued a status quo order prevailing at the time this petition was filed on March
12, 1990.
On April 2, 1990, a consolidated comment was submitted by the respondents attaching as
annex thereto the letters of the Executive Secretary dated February 9, 1990 and February
21, 1990, respectively, addressed to the Chairman, PCGG, conveying the instructions of the
President of the Philippines that the complaints involving coconut levy funds be filed with
the PCGG, to conduct the necessary investigation and if warranted to file and prosecute the
cases before the Sandiganbayan; and it confirmed the earlier instructions of the President
dated November 28, 1989 to the same effect. 4
On May 4, 1990 petitioner filed a reply to the consolidated comment as required by the
Court. In a resolution dated June 5, 1990, the Solicitor General was required to file a
rejoinder. On May 31, 1990, a motion for hearing of said cases was filed by petitioner and
this was granted by the Court on June 21, 1990. It was directed that the Ombudsman be
impleaded as party-respondent. The Court required the Ombudsman to comment on the
petition within ten (10) days from notice. The case was set for hearing on Tuesday, July 17,
1990 at 10:00 in the morning.
The Ombudsman submitted his comment on July 3, 1990 and the Court required petitioner
to file a reply to the same.
On July 6, 1990, Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and a Motion to Admit Petition to Intervene wherein they ask that the PCGG
desist from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 77, 79,
80, 81, 82, 83, and 84 charging the intervenors and other respondents, including petitioner,
with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) in
connection with the, coconut levy funds. The intervenors question the authority of the

PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the said cases. They maintain that even
assuming that the PCGG has such authority, the same cannot be delegated to a prosecutor
or his assistants.
On July 10, 1990, the court granted the motion for leave to intervene and admitted the
petition for intervention. The PCGG was required to comment on said petition within ten (10)
days from notice.
On July 13, 1990, respondents filed their rejoinder to the reply of petitioner to their
consolidated comments. The Ombudsman filed his comment to the petition for intervention,
while petitioner filed his reply to the comment of the Ombudsman on July 16, 1990.
The hearing was held as scheduled on July 17, 1990 where all the parties including the
Ombudsman appeared and/or were duly represented by counsels. After the hearing, the
parties were required to submit their simultaneous memoranda within fifteen (15) days from
the date of the hearing.
On July 21, 1990, the Solicitor General asked for an extension of time within which to file his
comment to the petition for intervention. He filed said comment within the period of
extension asked for on July 31, 1990.
The memoranda of all the parties having been submitted, the petitions were deemed
submitted for resolution.
On the first issue wherein petitioner and intervenors question the authority of the PCGG to
conduct a preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints filed against them by the
Solicitor General, the Court finds and so holds the same to be devoid of merit.
Under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure the officers authorized
to conduct a preliminary investigation are the following:
Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation.
The following may conduct a preliminary investigation:
(a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court;
(c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and
(d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes

cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Under Section 2 likewise of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court before its present amendment,
the officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigation are as follows:
Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary examination: Every
justice of the peace, municipal judge, city or provincial fiscal, shall have
authority to conduct preliminary examination or investigation in accordance
with these rules of all offenses alleged to have been committed within his
municipality, city or province, cognizable by the Court of First Instance.
The justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the municipality in which
the provincial jail is located when directed by an order of the Court of First
Instance, shall have authority to conduct such preliminary examination or
investigation of any offense committed anywhere within his province at the
expense of the municipality wherein the same was committed.
Under Section 3 thereof in case of temporary absence of the justice of the peace or his
auxiliary, the municipal mayor may conduct the preliminary investigation. For complaints
filed directly with the Court of First Instance, the judge of the said court may refer the case
to the justice of the peace or he may himself conduct both the preliminary examination and
investigation simultaneously, under Section 13 of the same rule.
Upon the enactment of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on August 17, 1960, 5 and
Republic Act No. 1379 (covering unexplained wealth cases) on August 18, 1955, the preliminary
investigation of cases involving the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and/or unexplained wealth cases
was vested on the aforestated officers.

However, on July 17, 1979, Presidential Decree No. 1630 was promulgated whereby the
Tanodbayan was vested with the "exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan." 6Under Presidential Decree No. 1486 which was
approved on June 11, 1978, the Sandiganbayan was created and vested with exclusive jurisdiction over
all offenses committed by public officers enumerated therein. This was amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1606 dated December 10, 1978 and further amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 issued on
March 23, 1983 wherein the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined as follows:

Sec. 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read

as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial
jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereinafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Intermediate
Appellate Court shall apply to appeals and petition for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the
Tanodbayan shall represent the People of the Philippines.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees.
Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action

being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no
right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case maybe, for
consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be considered abandoned.
Sec. 2. All cases pending in the Sandiganbayan or in the appropriate courts
as of the date of the effectivity of this Decree shall remain with and be
disposed of by the courts where they are pending.
Sec. 3. The provisions of this Decree notwithstanding, the office of the
Tanodbayan shall continue to have the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation, file the necessary information, and direct and
control the prosecution of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No.1606, whether such cases be within the exclusive
original/appellate jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts
in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1630.
(Emphasis supplied.)
However, this exclusive jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to conduct preliminary investigation
of said cases was modified by Executive Order No. 1 signed by President Corazon C.
Aquino on February 28, 1986 creating the PCGG and constituting its membership to assist
the President in the recovery of ill gotten wealth accumulated by the former President, his
relatives and cronies. Therein it is provided, among others:
Sec. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the
President in regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time.

(c) The adoption of safeguards to ensure that the above practices shall not be
repeated in any manner under the new government, and the institution of
adequate measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigations as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Executive Order No. 14 signed by President Aquino on May 7, 1986, it is also
provided:
Sec. 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Presidential Commission on Good Government with the assistance of the
Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, is hereby
empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under Executive
Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986 and Executive Order No. 2, dated
March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings.
Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof .
Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for
consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic
Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing
laws, in connection with Executive Order No.1 dated February 28, 1986 and
Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from
and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved
by preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order
No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the
power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his
relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the
President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to
investigate extended to the PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation. 7
Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14
whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such
preliminary investigation and to prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan. 8 The power

of the PCGG to conduct a preliminary investigation of the aforementioned types of cases has been
recognized by this Court in Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. Inc. (BASECO) vs. PCGG. 9

Upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman was created
under Article XI, as follows:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or
employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with
original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents
relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity
to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information
necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if
necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so
warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud,
and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their
elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, in Zaldivar, 10 interpreting the aforesaid provision of the Constitution, particularly Section
13(1) thereof vesting on the Ombudsman the right and the power to investigate on its own or on
complaint, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency which appears "to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient", held that the general power of investigation covers the lesser
power to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, as the power of investigation vested on the
Ombudsman under the Constitution includes the power to conduct a preliminary investigation, then the
special prosecutor (former Tanodbayan) may no longer conduct such a preliminary investigation unless
duly authorized by the Ombudsman. 11

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of
investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.
Hence, the said provision of the Constitution did not repeal or remove the power to conduct
an investigation, including the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation, vested on the
PCGG by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 14.
Although under Section 26 of Article XVIII of the Constitution the authority of the PCGG to
issue sequestration or freeze orders was maintained for not more than eighteen months
after the ratification of the Constitution, it cannot be construed thereby that its power of
investigation had thereby been revoked by the failure to reiterate said power in the
Constitution.
Indeed, upon the passage of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman
Act of 1989," it is therein specifically provided in Section 15 as follows:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx xxx xxx
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten
and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking
government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money
and/or properties.
Under Section 15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any
stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial
and city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. 12
In other words, the aforestated provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory
agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under
Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the only qualification that
the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction.
It is also noted that under Section 15(11) of the aforestated Republic Act No. 6770, among
the powers vested on the Ombudsman is to investigate and to initiate the proper action for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986
and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. The Court agrees with the contention of
the public respondent PCGG that this provision is a tacit recognition that the authority of the
PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth
amassed before February 25, 1986 is maintained.
However, the Court finds and so holds that the aforesaid provision of the law cannot in any
manner dilute or diminish the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over all such types of
cases committed by public officers or employees as provided in Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution. Thus, notwithstanding the provision of Section 15(11) of Republic Act No.
6770, the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate covers ill-gotten wealth
and/or unexplained wealth cases that occurred even before February 25, 1986.
The second issue raised that the preliminary investigation by the PCGG of the aforestated
complaints violates the right of petitioner to due process and to equal protection of law is
impressed with merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, preliminary
investigation is defined as "an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the

Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial."
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of a
crime, from the trouble, expense, anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials. 13
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is the initial step towards the criminal prosecution
of a person. After such preliminary investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial, then the
corresponding complaint or information shall be filed in the competent court. It is the filing of
said complaint or information that initiates the criminal prosecution of the accused when he
is brought to court for trial.
Such a preliminary investigation is required for offenses cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court and the Sandiganbayan. 14 It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be observed in order to
assure that a person undergoing such preliminary investigation will be afforded due process.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is that the
person who presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation,
must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. 15
Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the
function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same
investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end
in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused.
Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is
tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary
investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act
becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for, the production and weighing
of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.
The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to
conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a
regional trial court judge. 16 While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the
nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi judicialofficer.

Soon after the creation of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG sequestered
and froze all the properties of petitioner Cojuangco in accordance with the powers vested in
it by law.
On July 31, 1987, said petitioner was sued by the PCGG before the Sandiganbayan by way
of a complaint entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.," et al.
docketed as Civil Case No. 0033. Among the allegations of the complaint are as follows:
This is a civil action against Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Ferdinand
E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and the rest of the Defendants in the aboveentitled case to recover from them ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and
other property which they, in unlawful concert with one another, had acquired
and accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations
as public officers with, grave abuse of right and power and in brazen violation
of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting
in their unjust enrichment during Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos' 20 years of
rule from December 30, 1965 to February 25, 1986, first as President of the
Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and, thereafter, as one man ruler
under martial law and Dictator under the 1973 Marcos-promulgated
Constitution.
2. The wrongs committed by Defendant acting singly or collectively and in
unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of
public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery,
embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse or power as more fully described below, all at the expense and
to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
(Emphasis supplied.) 17
The complaint was filed by the PCGG through its Chairman, Ramon A. Diaz, who verified
the complaint, and Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez and Assistant Solicitor General
Ramon S. Desuasido.
Petitioner in turn filed a counterclaim against the PCGG for the sequestration of his
properties and the institution of the suit. He also questioned the acts of the PCGG in several
special civil actions before the court. 18
On November 27, 1989, the first working day after petitioner Cojuangco returned to the
Philippines, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an information against said petitioner
for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr." docketed as Criminal Case No. 14161. However, the Sandiganbayan found
no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest so a petition for certiorari was filed

by the Solicitor General in this Court docketed as G.R. No. 91741. On March 29, 1990 this
Court denied the petition.
On November 28, 1989, President Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all
persons involved in the misuse of the coconut levy funds. The Solicitor General created a
task force for the purpose.
On January 12, 1990, the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG the first two criminal
complaints for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, bearing on the
anomalous use and/or misuse of the coconut levy funds docketed as I.S. Nos. 74 and 75.
Among the respondents were the petitioner and intervenors Lobregat and Eleazar. The
PCGG assigned assistant prosecutor Cesario del Rosario to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
As hereinabove related, a subpoena was issued by the said prosecutor for the preliminary
investigation on January 29, 1989 insofar as intervenors are concerned while that of
petitioner, de la Cuesta and Herminigildo Zayco was scheduled on January 31, 1990. In the
same subpoena, respondents were required to submit their counter-affidavits and other
supporting documents to controvert the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
On the scheduled investigation dated January 29, 1990, intervenors appeared through
counsel and moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of jurisdiction of the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation but this was denied by said prosecutor. They were asked by
the prosecutor if they will submit their counter-affidavits but intervenors' counsel replied that
they were not yet ready to file the same because of their pending motion. Thus, the cases
were considered closed insofar as they are concerned.
The intervenors contested the prosecutor's action before the Sandiganbayan through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as Criminal Case No. 0093. On March 13,
1990, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision wherein it declared the preliminary
investigation conducted by del Rosario null and void, enjoined the PCGG from filing an
information on the basis thereof and directed the PCGG to conduct another preliminary
investigation of I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 as to the intervenors and to assign another investigating
prosecutor.
Earlier however, that is, on February 27, 1990, the PCGG, overruling prosecutor del
Rosario's order, gave the intervenors in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 another period of five (5) days
from notice within which to submit their counter-affidavits and supporting evidence. Based
on this action the PCGG filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision of the
Sandiganbayan which had not been resolved.
As to petitioner, on the day of the preliminary investigation dated January 31, 1990, his
counsel filed a motion to disqualify or inhibit the PCGG, an alternative motion to dismiss,

and a motion to have the PCGG itself hear and/or resolve the motion to disqualify or inhibit
itself alternatively a motion to dismiss. The preliminary investigation presided by prosecutor
del Rosario started at 2:00 o'clock P.M. with eight other respondents duly represented by
their counsel. The said motion was denied and the preliminary investigation was adjourned.
Immediately thereafter petitioner brought the matter to Chairman Mateo A.T. Caparas of the
PCGG and in several communications sought resolution of the motion by the PCGG. On
February 27, 1990, the PCGG issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction but did not resolve the motion to disqualify. Therein, the PCGG directed
petitioner to submit his counter-affidavits within five (5) days from receipt of notice.
On March 12, 1990, the same day this petition was filed in this Court, the petitioner, instead
of filing the counter-affidavit, filed with the PCGG an urgent motion to defer proceedings in
I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 for at least until March 22, 1990 within which to seek judicial relief from
the order of February 27, 1990. Upon the filing of this petition, petitioner filed a
supplemental urgent motion to defer proceedings with the PCGG informing it of the filing of
this petition.
Nevertheless, on March 14, 1990, the PCGG filed two informations corresponding to the
complaints in I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 which are docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 14398 and
14399, respectively, at the Sandiganbayan. The PCGG recommended bail as P100,000.00
for each case.
Meanwhile, the Solicitor General filed two other complaints against the petitioner with the
PCGG accusing the petitioner of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and other penal laws in
connection with the coconut levy funds, namely, I.S. No. 79 which concerns an alleged
arbitration award in favor of Agricultural Investors Inc., and I.S. No. 82 which concerns the
acquisition of coconut oil mills.
Several other complaints were filed by the Solicitor General with the PCGG against
petitioner for preliminary investigation petition, to wit:
(a) I.S. No. 80 which concerns the acquisition of the First United Bank, now United Coconut
Planters' Bank; (b) I.S. No. 81 concerning shares of the United Coconut Oil Mills Inc.; (c)
I.S. No. 83 regarding the acquisition of coconut oil mills and certain indebtedness thereof;
and (d) I.S. No. 84 regarding settlement of an Anti-Graft suit in the United States. All of
these complaints were for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
The question that arises, therefore, is whether under the circumstances of this case, it
would be fair and just for the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of the said
complaint instead of the Ombudsman or any other duly authorized investigating agency.

Upon the creation of the PCGG under Executive Order No. 1 issued by President Aquino,
the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of
ill-gotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such
cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time and
to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1 provides as follows:
Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To conduct investigation as may be necesssary in order to accomplish and
carry out the purposes of this order.
(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or
possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties
may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their
destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper
the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its
task.
(c) To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent its disposal or
dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the
government of the Marcos administration or by entities or persons close to
former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by
the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities.
(d) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any
person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate, or
otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its tasks
under this order.
(e) To administer oaths, and issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and/or the production of such books, papers,
contracts, records, statement of accounts and other documents as may be
material to the investigation conducted by the Commission.
(f) To hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the
appropriate penalties, following the same procedures and penalties provided
in the Rules of Court.
(g) To seek and secure the assistance of any office, agency or instrumentality
of the government.

(h) To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry

out the purposes of this order.
From the foregoing provisions of law, it is clear that the PCGG has the following powers and
authority:
1. To conduct an investigation including the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
ill-gotten wealth cases of former President Marcos, relatives and associates, and graft and
corruption cases assigned by the President to it;
2. Issue sequestration orders in relation to property claimed to be ill-gotten;
3. Issue "freeze orders" prohibiting persons in possession of property alleged to be ill-gotten
from transferring or otherwise disposing of the same;
4. Issue provisional takeover orders of the said property;
5. Administer oaths and issue subpoenas in the conduct of its investigation;
6. Hold any person in direct or indirect contempt and impose the appropriate penalties as
provided by the rules.
Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to grant provisional
remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is
indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and receivership, there exists a prima
facie factual foundation, at least, for the sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order,
an adequate and fair opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or
nullification. Both are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and
regulations promulgated by the PCGG. 19
Thus, in Baseco, this Court held, as follows:
Executive Order No. 14 enjoins that there be "due regard to the requirements
of fairness and due process." Executive Order No. 2 declares that with
respect to claims on allegedly "ill-gotten" assets and properties, "it is the
position of the new democratic government that President Marcos . . . (and
other parties affected) be afforded fair opportunity to contest these claims
before appropriate Philippine authorities." Section 7 of the Commission's
Rules and Regulations provides that sequestration or freeze (and takeover)
orders issue upon the authority of at least two commissioners, based on the
affirmation or complaint of an interested party, or motu propio when the
Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is
warranted. A similar requirement is now found in Section 26, Art. XVIII of the

1987 Constitution, which requires that "sequestration or freeze order shall be

issued only upon showing of a prima facie case." 20
Insofar as the general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be
divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal
investigation stage is the fact-finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they
assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of
preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the said
complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is sufficient
evidence to bring a person to trial.
In the petition before this Court, it is not denied that the PCGG conducted the appropriate
criminal investigation of petitioner and intervenors as a law enforcer. In the process it
sequestered all the properties of the petitioner after a prima facie finding that the same
amount to ill-gotten wealth and/or were acquired in relation to allegedly anomalous
disposition or misuse of the coconut levy funds.
The PCGG then filed on July 31, 1987 a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against
petitioner and intervenors not only for alleged ill-gotten wealth as associates of former
President Marcos but for the unlawful concert with the former President and his wife to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people through the alleged misuse,
misappropriation and dissipation of the coconut levy funds, as enumerated in the complaint.
This complaint was verified and filed by the then Chairman of the PCGG and also signed by
the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General.
Among the allegations in the civil complaint, are the very transactions now subject of the
criminal complaints filed by the Solicitor General against petitioner to wit:
13. Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his
association, influence and connection, acting in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, embarked upon
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as, when he
13(a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara Lobregat Danilo Ursua, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr. and Herminigildo C. Zayco, the purchase by Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the First (sic)
(FUB)which was subsequently converted into a universal bank named United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) through the use of the Coconut Consumers
Stabilization-Fund (CCSF) levy initially in the amount of P85,773,100.00 in a
manner contrary to law and to the specific purposes for which said coconut

levy funds were imposed and collected under P.D. 276, and under
anomalous and sinister designs and circumstances, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
At pp. 22 to 22-A, Expanded Complaint, Civil Case No.0033)
[I.S. No. 080]
(c) misappropriated, misused and dissipated P840 million of the Coconut
Industry Development Fund (CIDF) levy funds deposited with the National
Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) as administrator-trustee of said
funds and later with UCPB, of which Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. was
the Chief Executive Officer in connection with the (i) development,
improvement, operation and maintenance of the Bugsuk Island Seed Garden
("BUGSUK") by Agricultural Investors, Inc. ("AII") as developer (both Bugsuk
and AII are beneficially held and controlled by Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr.) pursuant to a highly oppressive, anomalous and one-sided memorandum
agreement, dated November 20, 1974, (ii) sale by AII to PCA of the seed nuts
produced at Bugsuk Seed Garden at exorbitant prices pursuant to a very
onerous, oppressive and disadvantageous agreement, dated August 2, 1985
and (iii) payment of liquidated damages in the amount of P640,856,879.67
and arbitration fee of P150,000.00 pursuant to a decision rendered by a
Board of Arbitrators against UCPB for alleged breach of contract.;
xxx xxx xxx
(At pp. 26-27)
[I.S. No. 079]
(d) established and caused to be funded with coconut levy funds, with the
active collaboration of Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos through the issuance
of LOI 926, and of defendants, Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Maria
Clara Lobregat, Jose C. Concepcion, Inaki Mendezona, Douglas Lu Ym,
Teodoro D. Regala, Emmanuel Almeda, Eduardo Escueta, Leo Palma, and
Rolando de la Cuesta, the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) a
corporation beneficially held and controlled by Defendant Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and bought sixteen (16) competing and/or non-operating oil
mills at exorbitant prices in the total amount of P184,935 million, then
mothballed them in order to control the prices of copra and other coconut
products, and assumed and paid the outstanding loan obligations of seven (7)
of those purchased oil mills in the total amount of P805,984 million with the

express consent and approval of Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, thereby

establishing a coconut monopoly for their own benefit and unjust enrichment
and to the grave damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people;
(e) manipulated with the active collaboration of Defendants Mohammad Ali
Dimaporo and Teodoro D. Regala, the sale of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills
(MINCOCO) to UNICOM through the issuance of LOI 926 by Defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in violation of the Guaranty Agreement dated July 23,
1976, which prohibited the sale, among others, of the MINCOCO
assets/properties without the prior written consent of NIDC, under terms and
conditions grossly disadvantageous to Plaintiff and the Filipino people;
(f) drew up a scheme of payment to settle the accounts of MINCOCO and
other UNICOM-acquired mills with their respective creditors: namely the
National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC), Deveploment Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), under terms grossly
disadvantageous to Plaintiff;
xxx xxx xxx
(At pp. 27-28)
[I.S. Nos. 81, 82 and 83]
(g) misappropriated and dissipated the coconut levy funds by withdrawing
therefrom tens of millions of pesos in order to pay damages adjudged against
UNICOM, headed and controlled by Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., in an
anti-trust suit in California, U.S.A.;
xxx xxx xxx
(At p. 29)
[I.S. No. 84]
(h) misused, dissipated and unlawfully disbursed coconut levy funds with the
active collaboration and participation of defendants Maria Clara Lobregat,
Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose Eleazar, Jr., Rolando de la Cuesta and Herminigildo
Zayco as members of the PCA governing board for projects and purposes
completely alien to those for which the fund was collected and donations
made by PCA such as . . . P6 million to COCOFED; and other similar unlawful
disbursements, which all remain unaccounted for to date;

xxx xxx xxx

(At pp 28 to 28-A Emphasis supplied)
[I.S. No. 74 and 75]
Thereafter, as aforestated, the Solicitor General filed the first two complaints against
petitioner and intervenors among others, under I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 for alleged violation of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for donations allegedly made out of coconut levy
funds to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED).
Petitioner and intervenors questioned not only the authority of the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation but asserted a denial of due process and equal protection of the
law. There is cogent basis for their plea.
The PCGG, as a law enforcer, gathered evidence as to the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
petitioner and intervenors and, after satisfying itself that there is a prima facie case,
sequestered and issued a freeze order for all the properties of petitioner. Based also on the
said finding of a prima facie case, the PCGG filed a civil complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 0033 against petitioner and intervenors for alleged ill-gotten wealth including the alleged
misuse, misappropriation, and diversion of coconut levy funds.
As hereinabove discussed the criminal complaints under I.S. Nos. 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83
and 84 filed by the Solicitor General all for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, are
covered and alleged in the aforesaid civil complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033.
The PCGG conducted the preliminary investigation of I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 and is poised to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the other aforementioned complaints for the same
alleged violations of law subject of the civil complaint.
The Court cannot close its eyes to the glaring fact that in earlier instances, the PCGG had
already found a prima facie case against the petitioner and intervenors when, acting like a
judge, it caused the sequestration of the properties and the issuance of the freeze order of
the properties of petitioner. Thereafter, acting as a law enforcer, in collaboration with the
Solicitor General, the PCGG gathered the evidence and upon finding cogent basis therefor
filed the aforestated civil complaint. Consequently the Solicitor General filed a series of
criminal complaints.
It is difficult to imagine how in the conduct of such preliminary investigation the PCGG could
even make a turn about and take a position contradictory to its earlier findings of a prima
facie case against petitioner and intervenors. This was demonstrated in the undue haste
with which I.S. Nos. 74 and 75 was investigated and the informations were filed in court

even as the petitioner and intervenors questioned its authority, invoked the denial of due
process and promptly informed the PCGG of the filing of this petition.
In our criminal justice system, the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation,
gathered the evidence and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary
investigation cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint. It is to say the least arbitrary and unjust.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the same
time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he cannot be
expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own complaint, this
time as a public prosecutor.
The circumstances of the instant petition are even worse. To repeat, the PCGG and the
Solicitor General finding aprima facie basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and
intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent
criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation.
While ostensibly, it is only the Solicitor General who is the complainant in the criminal cases
filed with the PCGG, in reality the PCGG is an unidentified co-complainant.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner's
properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten and/or
were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court
finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal
complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter.
Add to this the fact that there are many suits filed by petitioner and the intervenors against
the PCGG and vice versa.
For lesser grounds this Court had disqualified a fiscal or a judge from handling a case.
A fiscal was disqualified from conducting a preliminary investigation because he had
appeared for the prosecution when said case was pending in the municipal court. 21 In a case
filed before the Commission on Elections this Court held Commissioner Opinion should not have
participated in the case since he was the former lawyer of Arturo Pacificador. 22 A judge was required to
inhibit himself in a case where he was a witness for the complainant. 23 A judge before whom the
extrajudicial statement of one of the accused was subscribed was disqualified from hearing the case. 24 A
judge who told the complainant is case was weak and it would be to his advantage to settle the case was
disqualified. 25 A judge against whom an administrative complaint was filed by one of the parties was also
disqualified. 26 In a case where the motion for inhibition was found to be groundless, this Court held that
the judge should inhibit himself considering the seriousness of the charges. 27 A judge was asked to inhibit
himself from trying a malversation case against the accused since he previously convicted the latter of
arson. 28 In another case, the judge was ordered to inhibit himself because of strained relationship with
the defendant. 29

There are numerous other cases wherein the judges and fiscals were disqualified on similar
grounds as those aforementioned. 30
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the
judge, such judge should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be prohibited from
handling the case. Judge must not only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 31 His actuation must inspire that belief. This
is an instance when appearance is as important as reality. 32

The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating officer conducting a preliminary
investigation. This is the reason why under Section 1679 of the former Revised
Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice, who has supervision over the prosecution
arm of the government, is given ample power to designate another prosecutor to handle the
investigation and prosecution of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is otherwise
disqualified by personal interest, or is unable or fails to perform his duty.
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire belief
that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside in the said
preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the PCGG
would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject
of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of the same should be
forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer has primary
jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take
appropriate action.
All violators of the law must be brought before the bar of justice. However, they must be
afforded due process and equal protection of the law, whoever they may be.
WHEREFORE, the petitions of Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and intervenors Maria Clara
Lobregat, and Jose Eleazar, Jr. are hereby GRANTED. The PCGG is directed to transmit
the complaints and records thereof under I.S. Nos. 74, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action. All proceedings of the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG of said complaints are hereby declared null and void including the
informations which it filed in the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and intervenors docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 14398 and 14399. The status quo order which this Court issued on
March 12, 1990 is hereby made permanent and the PCGG is permanently prohibited from
further conducting the preliminary investigation of the aforestated complaints. The Court
makes no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

26.

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 192935

- versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR.,
REP.
SIMEON
A.
DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 193036

Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 7, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution
that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined,
and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. [2] The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.
[3]
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides
of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations
and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the
people who run it.[4]
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases [5] both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated
July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the

legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution [6] as it

usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon
A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang
corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of
his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010,
signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people,
must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this
principle and notorious violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political,
economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector
of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in
the last elections kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn
pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution
of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION,
hereinafter
referred
to
as
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that
the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who
will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough factfinding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

In particular, it shall:
a)
Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption
which it will investigate;
b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the
cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end
require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books,
records and other papers;
c)
Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents
from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;
d)
Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the
courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator,
information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that
purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state
witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the
Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential AntiGraft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;
i)
Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other
personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j)
Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems
necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive
Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of evidence;

k)
Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in
connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission
refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for
inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall
provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its
powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its
mission on or before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared

unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it
has been described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity
within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which
have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to
establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of
international humanitarian law in a countrys past. [9] They are usually established by

states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to

serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of
abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they
are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report
containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are
usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and
recommend institutional reforms.[11]
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The
Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or
vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against
humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the
wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic
experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more
emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of
the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer [12] puts
it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: To
those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would
like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no
reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go

unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over

again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases
shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized
them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department
of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations,
past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
violates the consistent and general international practice of four
decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively

investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms

part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of
Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in
futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for
trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether
vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other
major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not
constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches
nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and
validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners
and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create
a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in
any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended
by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and not

a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or

erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection
clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other
executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the
creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee
on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE)by President Carlos P. Garcia
and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are
the principal issues to be resolved:
1.
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing
to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
2.
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise
of its power of judicial review are present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[19]
Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put
at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file
their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the
case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are
in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC.
Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will
not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their
power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held
in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the

power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,

powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action
which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no
standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. [23] It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable
to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an
assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise
judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules
on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides

that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the

real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and
taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in
a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the
right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a
public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a
public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme
Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte
Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court
ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must
show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action,

and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all

members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct
injury
test in our
jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a
litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la
Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations
omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is
a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[25]
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held
that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance [28] laid
down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are

of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly,
the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents
first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes
cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe
the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching
significance to society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President.[31]Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32] since there is no
provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office,
cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate,
merge, and abolish.[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to
reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office,
Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation
of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive
branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President
to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not
permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is
limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the

President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of

the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1,
the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the
creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission.
Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority
of the President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper
has long been recognized.[37]According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the
other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create factfinding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated
functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions. [38] This power, as the
OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President
under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of
the Constitution.[39]
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct
fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced
by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials. [40] The power of the President
to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his
other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates, [41] his power for rule
making, adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on
matters which he is entitled to know.[43]
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held
that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and

by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive

offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the
power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to,
among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government.[45]
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the
PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of
the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office
of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations
where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much
less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the
negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest
meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing
structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the
President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President

to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch
does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we
ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy
or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility
between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of
Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is
subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
[Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents
power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power
of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former
is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,
empowering the President to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to
the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize

the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has
been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification
for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale,
anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President
Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national
government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations
pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form
of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the
national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and

resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772, became functus oficioupon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted

was the last whereas clause of P.D.
1416 says it was enacted to prepare
the transition from presidential to
parliamentary.
Now,
in
a
parliamentary
form
of
government, the legislative and
executive powers are fused,
correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was
issued. Now would you agree with
me that P.D. 1416 should not be
considered effective anymore
upon the promulgation, adoption,
ratification
of
the
1987
Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416,
Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to
reorganize the entire National
Government is deemed repealed,
at least, upon the adoption of the
1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the

three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute

this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not
mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive
power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head
of state as well as head of government and whatever powers
inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers
that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his
power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987
Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,
the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to

create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No.
298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges
filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating
Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure
that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with
the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation
is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies

to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is
to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the
past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the
government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as
non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say
that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need
to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission

because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in
the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate
The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department.[57]
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasijudicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.[58] In simpler
terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power,
such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by
the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate
was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,
explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study
closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x

to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry."

The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out,
to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the
notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in
the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same:
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with
care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination;
the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of
issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the
entry of a judgment."[Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving
evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively,

subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even

respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial
power.[61]
Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or
the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The
actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of
the charges against them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the
commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that
of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman.[64]
At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus,
in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the
1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as
the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal
circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is
likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.
Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the
Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the
President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints
against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such
cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above

contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the
existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of
functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and
the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated
duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments
for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this

constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all
members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous
administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.
[66]
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.[67]
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of
graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations
where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies [68] were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification
formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions
because first, there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials
targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons
who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end
corruption.[69] In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate

that the commission should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the
Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the
previous administration as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section
17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption solely during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal
protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public officers during
the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid
classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which
the Executive Order seeks to correct. [72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration
from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which
have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government
and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the
object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with
administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely
bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous
administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a
separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of
possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of

public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to

ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more
easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current
administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their
predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are
pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence
and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by
the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President
Ferdinand
Marcos
and
his
cronies,
and
the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada
under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and
independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.[74]
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that
all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and institutions

to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The purpose of the

equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.[78]
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken. [80]
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. [81] Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.[82]
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must
include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. [83] The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those

covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application
of the law to him.[84]
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose
of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;

and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to
investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during theprevious administration,
and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and
secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created
the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to
as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action
or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of
justice shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall
have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving
third level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and

recommendations to the President,

Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

Congress

and

the

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration
only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are
not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice
Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to

limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration
only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this
point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the
legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the
evil it breeds.[90]
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that
the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into
is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC
expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given

the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex
non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must
not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in

appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope
is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should
not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is,
for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive,
must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the
earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm
the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in

partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited

number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary;
those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a
political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally
the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are
indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the
class.[97]
The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause. [98] Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can
be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by
step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run
the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[102]
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the
previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be

gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even
mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative
commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the
OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration. [104] The
OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in

the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of
the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the
investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the
prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by
way of a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts
of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the
commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would
decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only
fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to
tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.
[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case
of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive

Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was
arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of
action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating
fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political
situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it
continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial
review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality
of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the

two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good
source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.[107]
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing
its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions
under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify
the means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act,
but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. [108] The Court cannot just
turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution
and its enshrined principles.
The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to
the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its
strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as
nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would
allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the
most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance
or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for
the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws
and not of men.[110]
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist
from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.