8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

TodayisTuesday,August30,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.133882September5,2006
ANGELADELAROSAandCORAZONMEDINA,petitioners,
vs.
ORFELINAD.ROLDAN,LORNASANDIEGO,FLORDELIZAD.CATACUTAN,NORMAY.LACUESTA,and
ARSENIODULAY,respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
ThisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorarioftheDecision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCAG.R.SPNo.45560
affirming,onapetitionforreview,theDecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofTarlacinCivilCaseNo.8396,
whichinturnreversedonappealthedecisionoftheMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)ofTarlac,TarlacinCivilCaseNo.
6089forunlawfuldetainer.
TheAntecedents
The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tarlac,
Tarlac, both covered by respective titles the 261squaremeter lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT)No.7225,whilethe772sq.m.wascoveredbyTCTNo.7226.
Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale2 over the properties in favor of the spouses
Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa. Gideon dela Rosa, one of Asuncion's brothers, was one of the
instrumental witnesses in the deed. To pay for the property, the spouses Dulay, who were members of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured a P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate mortgage
overthetwolotsassecuritytherefor.OnSeptember16,1957,theRegisterofDeedsissuedTCTNos.29040and
29041inthenamesofthespousesDulay.
The spouses Dulay forthwith took possession of the lots, except a 500squaremeter portion which was then
occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina stood.
ThespousesDulaydeclaredthepropertyfortaxationpurposesintheirnamesandpaidtherealtytaxestherefor.
Sometimein1982,thespousesDulaymadedemandsonGideon,AngelaandCorazontovacatethepremises,as
their three daughters would be constructing their respective houses thereon. Gideon, Angela and Corazon
refusedtodoso,promptingthespousestofileacomplaintforrecoveryofpossession(accionpubliciana)against
themwiththethenCourtofFirstInstance(CFI)ofTarlac.ThespousesDulayalleged,interalia,thattheybought
thelotsfromthespousesRiverain1957defendantsoccupieda370squaremeterportiononthewesternside,
andwereclaimingownershipoveronehalfoftheproperty,asshownbytheirlettertoplaintiffsappendedtotheir
complaintandtheyneededthepropertysothattheirdaughters,whoalreadyhadtheirrespectivefamilies,could
buildhousesthereon.ThespousesDulayprayedthatdefendantsbeevictedfromthepropertyandberequiredto
payreasonablecompensationfortheiruseofthepremises.3ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.6261.
In their answer to the complaint, defendants alleged the following by way of special and affirmative defenses:
GideonandhissisterAsuncioncontributedequallytothepurchasepriceofthepropertyplaintiffssecuredaGSIS
loan of P9,500.00, out of which P6,500.00 was paid to the vendors Gideon and Asuncion verbally agreed that
plaintiffswouldbeindicatedasthesolevendeesinthedeedofsaleastheyweretheGSISmembersdefendants
hadalreadypaidtheirshareofthepurchasepriceofthepropertyasof1978,exceptfortheamountofP332.00
and,insofarastheonehalfportiononthewesternsideofthepropertywasconcerned,plaintiffsweretrusteesfor
defendants,wholikewiseownedthesame.Defendantsinterposedcounterclaimsfordamagesandprayedthatthe
saidonehalfportionbereconveyedtothem.4
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

1/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

Duringthetrial,thespousesDulayadducedinevidencethefollowing:theDeedofAbsoluteSaledatedJanuary
16,1957,withGideonasaninstrumentalwitness5thetaxdeclarationsintheirnamescoveringthepropertyand
receiptsofrealtytaxpaymentsmadeovertheproperty.6
Defendants spouses Dela Rosa adduced in evidence a small notebook containing therein an alleged list of
payments to the spouses Dulay of their share in the purchase price of the property.7 They presented an NBI
Questioned Documents Expert to prove the authenticity of the signature of Asuncion Dulay on one of the
receipts.8However,AsunciondeniedthatsheboughtthepropertywithherbrotherGideon,andthatshereceived
anyamountfromhimandhiswifeaspartofthepurchasepriceoftheproperty.Shelikewisedeniedthatitwasher
signaturethatappearedonthepurportedreceipt.
On July 17, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6261 in favor of the spouses Dulay and
ordered the spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina to vacate the property and turn over possession to
plaintiffs.9Thetrialcourtdeclared:
ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE, there is no doubt that the registered owners of the lots in question are the
plaintiffsspouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (Exhibits "A" and "B"). They bought these lots
fromthespousesAdrianoRiveraandAuroraMercado(Exhibits"D"and"D1").
Defendants' claim that they bought from the plaintiffs onehalf (1/2) portion of the lots in question is
untenable.Firstly,ifitistrueasclaimedbythemthattherewassuchanagreementtopurchasefromthe
plaintiffs a portion of the lots in question, why did they not reduce [the] same in writing? In fact, it's the
defendants, particularly Gideon dela Rosa, who induced and accompanied the plaintiffs to go to a Notary
PublicfortheexecutionofExhibit"D."TheamountsmentionedinExhibit"5"does(sic)notclearlyindicate
whether they were payments made for the purchase price in installment or for monthly rentals for their
occupation of Lot 3B2. The defendants were the only ones who made entries and a perusal of such
entries were not recorded in sequence of alleged monthly payment but merely entries dictated and/or
writtenatwill.
RegardingExhibit6andtheallegedsignatureofplaintiffAsunciondelaRosa,thereport(Exhibit"7,""7A"
and "7B") and the testimony of the Chief NBI handwriting expert when presented by the defendants
themselvesisveryemphatic.Thus:
"However,thequestionsignaturewassignedoveratypewrittencarbonorduplicate."
What we mean by that, Sir, is that there is here a purported receipt with the body typewritten
underlining below the supposed signature Asuncion R. Dulay, it is a little surprising because if a
document is prepared in one occasion, then the body should be in ribbon impression and the
underlining should be in ribbon. The supposed typewritten body above the signature is an original
ribbonimpression,thatis,itisdirectfromthetypewrittenwiththeribbonstrikingthesheetofpaper,
theunderlining,however,onwhichthesignatureissignedisacarbonimpression,thatmeansitisa
duplicateimpression.(pp.89,tsn.,Oct.30/85).10
The spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina appealed to the CA. The case was docketed as CAG.R. CV No.
15455. On June 29, 1990, the appellate court rendered judgment granting the appeal and reversed the trial
court's ruling. According to the appellate court, the complaint was premature on account of plaintiffs' failure to
allege, in their complaint, that there had been earnest efforts to have the case amicably settled as mandated
underArticle222oftheNewCivilCode.11
ThespousesDulayfiledaMotionforExtensionofTimetoFileaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariwiththisCourt
which was granted. The motion was recorded as UDK10069. However, the spouses Dulay failed to file their
petition.Thus,onNovember19,1990,theCourtresolvedtodeclarefinalandexecutorythedecisionoftheCAin
CAG.R. CV No. 15455 for failure of plaintiffsappellees to file their petition for review.12 The resolution of the
Courtbecamefinalandexecutory.13
In the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela and Corazon Medina continued residing in the property without
payinganyrentalstherefor.AsuncionDulaypassedawayonJune26,1995,survivedbyherhusbandArsenioand
theirchildren:OrfelinaRoldan,LornaSanDiego,FlordelizaCatacutan,andNormaLacuesta.
In a letter dated October 2, 1995, Arsenio and his children, through counsel, made demands on Corazon and
Angelatovacatethepropertywithin30daysfromreceiptthereof,withawarningthatfailuretodosowouldimpel
them to file the necessary legal action.14 Nevertheless, they suggested a conference to discuss the amicable
settlementofthematter.CorazonandAngelaignoredtheletter.ThispromptedArsenioandhischildrentofilea

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

2/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

complaint for eviction against Angela and Corazon in the Office of the Barangay Captain. The parties did not
arriveatasettlement,andonDecember1,1995,thePangkatSecretaryissuedacertificationtofileaction.15
On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
CorazonandAngela,asdefendants,intheMTCofTarlac,Tarlac.Plaintiffsallegedthefollowing:
3.PlaintiffsarethecoownersoftwoadjoiningparcelsofresidentiallandlocatedatTarlac,Tarlac,andmore
particularlydescribedasfollows:
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.29040
"Aparcelofland(Lot"B"ofthesubdivisionplanPsd2284,beingaportionofthelanddescribedon
theoriginalplanII5215,G.L.R.O.RecordNo.7962),situatedintheBarrioofSanRoque,Municipality
ofTarlac,ProvinceofTarlac.BoundedontheN.E.,byLot"C"ofthesubdivisionplanontheS.E.,by
LotNo."3B2"ofthesubdivisionplanandpropertyofConcepcionCiderontheW.,bypropertyof
Timotea Mercado and on the N.W., by Lot "A" of the subdivision plan, containing an area of TWO
HUNDREDSIXTYONE(261)SQUAREMETERS,moreorless."
TransferCertificateofTitleNo.29041
"Aparcelofland(LotNo."3B2"ofthesubdivisionplanPsd2284,beingaportionofLotNo."3B,"
plan II2977Amd., G.L.R.O. Record No. 1955), situated in the Barrio of San Roque, Municipality of
Tarlac,ProvinceofTarlac.BoundedontheN.E.,byLot87CofthesubdivisionplanontheS.E.,by
LotNo.3B1ofthesubdivisionplanontheS.W.,bypropertyofConcepcionCiderandontheN.W.,
by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTYTWO (772)
SQUAREMETERS,moreorless."
CopiesofthetransfercertificatesoftitleareattachedasAnnexes"A"and"B,"respectively.Thetotal
assessedvalueofsaidlandsdoesnotexceedTwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00).
4. Said parcels of land were formerly owned by the spouses Asuncion dela Rosa and Arsenio Dulay.
PlaintiffsOrfelinaRoldan,LornaSanDiego,FlordelizaCatacutan,andNormaLacuestaarethechildrenof
thespousesAsunciondelaRosaandplaintiffArsenioDulay.UponthedeathofAsunciondelaRosaon26
June1995,saidparcelsoflandbecamejointlyownedbyhereinplaintiffs.AcopyofAsunciondelaRosa's
certificateofdeathisattachedasAnnex"C."
5.ThespousesDulayboughtsaidparcelsoflandsometimein1957.Defendantsandtheirpredecessorsin
interest have occupied and are continuously occupying about five hundred (500) square meters, more or
less,ofsaidparcelsofland.Defendantsandtheirpredecessorsininteresthaveoccupiedsaidparcelsof
landsince1957withoutpayinganyrent.
6.TheoccupationbydefendantsofsaidparcelsoflandwereatthemeretoleranceofthespousesDulay
and,thereafter,oftheplaintiffs.Defendantshavepromisedtovacatethepremisesifandwhenneededby
thespousesDulayandplaintiffs.
7.Demandsweremadeondefendantstovacatethepremises,whichdemands,however,wereignoredand
not heeded. Defendants refused and continues to refuse to vacate the premises. A copy of the final
demand letters sent to Angela dela Rosa and Corazon Medina are attached as Annexes "D" and "E,"
respectively.
8.Inanattempttoarriveatanamicablesettlementandinrecognitionoftheirbeingbloodrelatives,plaintiffs
exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise with defendants. Defendants were invited to discuss and
settlethematteramicably.Defendants,however,refusedtomeetanddiscussanysettlementandignored
theinvitationextendedbyplaintiffs.
9.IncompliancewithSection412oftheLocalGovernmentCode(R.A.No.7160)andasafurtherattempt
tosettlethedisputeamicably,plaintiffsbroughtthemattertothelupongtagapamayapa of their barangay.
Defendants, however, refused to discuss an amicable settlement. The certification to file action issued by
theluponchairmanisattachedandmadeanintegralparthereofasAnnex"F."
10.Defendantshavebeenoccupyingandusingthepremiseswithoutpayinganyrenttherefor.Thepresent
reasonablerentalvalueofthepremisesisFiftyPesos(P50.00)permonth,whichamountdefendantsshould
bemadetopayfromSeptember1957untilpossessionisrestoredtoplaintiffs.
11. By reason of the unjustifiable refusal to vacate and the unlawful detainer of the subject property by
defendantsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunderthem,plaintiffswereconstrainedtoseekredressincourt
toprotecttheirownrightsandinterests,therebycausingthemtoincurlitigationexpensesintheamountof
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

3/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

notlessthanFiftyThousandPesos(P50,000.00),forwhichamountthedefendantshouldbemadeliableto
plaintiffs.16
Plaintiffsthereinprayedthat,afterdueproceedings,judgmentberenderedintheirfavorasfollows:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,plaintiffsmostrespectfullypraythat,aftertrial,judgmentberendered
bythisHonorableCourtinfavorofplaintiffsandorderingasfollows:
1.Defendantsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunderthemtoimmediatelyvacatethepremises
2.DefendantstopayallrentalarrearsatthemonthlyrateofP50.00fromSeptember1957untilpossession
isrestoredoratotalofP23,000.00
3.DefendantstopaylitigationexpensesintheamountofP50,000.00and
4.Defendantstopaythecostsofthissuit.
Plaintiffsprayforsuchotherandfurtherreliefsjustandequitableunderthepremises.17
ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.6089.
Intheiranswer,defendantsreiteratedtheirallegationsintheiranswertothecomplaintinCivilCaseNo.6261in
theCFIofTarlac.
On April 30, 1996, Angela filed a complaint against Arsenio and his children in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac for
recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No.6154.Angela,asplaintiff,reiteratedherallegationsinheranswerandcounterclaiminCivilCaseNo.6261as
allegations comprising her causes of action. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in
theirfavor,thus:
WHEREFORE,itismostrespectfullyprayedofthisHon.Courtthatjudgmentshallissue:
1. Ordering that an immediate temporary restraining order restraining the defendants from disturbing the
possessionofthePlaintiffoverthepropertyinquestionuntilthecaseisfinallydissolved
2. Declaring the Plaintiff as owner of the onehalf (1/2) property in question, thereby reconveying the
ownershipthereofandcancellingthetitle
3.Orderingthedefendants,jointlyandseverally,topayPlaintifftheamountofP30,000.00asattorney'sfee,
plusP1,000.00perhearing
4.Orderingthedefendants,jointlyandseverally,topayPlaintifftheamountofP10,000.00 as acceptance
fee,plusP20,000.00aslitigationexpenses
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages
6. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as moral
damages
7.Andgrantingsuchotherreliefsandremediesjustandequitableinthepremises.18
OnJuly17,1996,theMTCissuedapretrialorderinCivilCaseNo.6089definingtheissue,thus:
Whether or not Unlawful Detainer is proper in the premises considering the claim of ownership by
defendants from the beginning of these litigations sometime in 1982 followed by this case at bench.
Otherwisestated,istheoccupationofthelandindisputebythedefendantsbytoleranceofplaintiffs.19
OnSeptember25,1996,theMTCrenderedjudgmentinCivilCaseNo.6089infavorofCorazonandAngelaand
ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.20 The court held that the issue
between the parties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of the
propertybydefendantswasnotbymeretolerance,butbyvirtueofaclaimofownershipinfact,defendantsnever
recognizedtheplaintiffs'claimofownershipovertheproperty.InrulingagainstArsenioandhischildren,thetrial
courtreliedontheirpleadings,thedecisionoftheCFIinCivilCaseNo.6261,therulingoftheCAinCAG.R.CV
No. 15455, and the resolution of this Court in UDK10069.21 It declared that, although the CA reversed the
decisionoftheCFIinTarlac,thefactsshowthatthedisputebetweenthepartiesconstitutespossessiondejure
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

4/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

theactionofthespousesDulayinCivilCaseNo.6261whichwasanaccionpublicianacannotbeconvertedinto
oneforunlawfuldetainerinCivilCaseNo.6089.
ArsenioandhischildrenappealedtotheRTC.ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.8396.OnJune25,1997,
it reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the eviction of defendants, holding that the issue was the
entitlement to the physical possession de facto of the property, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
MTC22 in contrast, the issue between the parties in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and not
possessiondefacto.TheRTCfurtherdeclaredthatthespousesDulayhadatorrenstitleoverthepropertywhich
wasconclusiveagainstthewholeworldassuch,theywereentitledtothepossessionofthepropertyasowners
thereof.CitingtherulingofthisCourtinPeranv.Espera,23theRTCruledthatCorazonandAngelapossessedthe
propertyforaconsiderablelengthoftimeonlythroughmeretoleranceofplaintiffs.
CorazonandAngelamovedtoreconsiderthedecision,whichtheRTCdeniedinanOrder24datedSeptember22,
1997.TheyfiledapetitionforreviewintheCA,prayingthattheRTCdecisionbereversedandthedecisionofthe
MTCbeaffirmed.AngelaclaimedthatsheownedonehalfofthepropertyascoownerofthespousesDulay.The
casewasdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.45560.
OnMarch16,1998,theCArenderedjudgmentinCAG.R.SPNo.45560affirmingthedecisionoftheRTCand
dismissingthepetition.TheCAruledthat,contrarytotheclaimofAngela,therewasnotrustcreatedoveronehalf
of the property in her favor. Since the complaint against Angela and Corazon in the MTC was one for unlawful
detainer,theMTChadexclusivejurisdictionoverthecase.Moreover,theyhadbeeninpossessionoftheproperty
bytolerance.Inanycase,theiractionwasbarredbyprescriptionandlaches.
AngelaandCorazonfiledamotionforreconsideration,whichtheCAdenied.
AngelaandCorazon,nowpetitioners,filedtheinstantpetitionforreviewoncertiorari,claimingthattheCAerred
asfollows:
I
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE AT
BAR IS ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER, WHEN IT IS ONE OF RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND
POSSESSION.
II
THEHON.COURTOFAPPEALS,WITHDUERESPECT,ERREDINCONSIDERINGTHATTHEREWASNO
TRUSTCREATEDBYAGREEMENTOFTHEPARTIES.
III
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THE
PETITIONERS'CLAIMHASBEENBARREDBYPRESCRIPTIONORLACHES.
IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEE FOR
RESPONDENTS.25
According to petitioners, during the pretrial in the MTC, the parties stipulated on the following issues to be
resolvedbythecourt:whetherornottheactionforunlawfuldetainerofrespondentswasproperconsideringthat
petitioners claimed ownership over the property in their answer to the complaint and whether petitioners
possessedthepropertybymeretoleranceofrespondents.Petitionersinsistthatduringthepretrialconference,
respondentsadmittedthattheyhadfiledacomplaintforrecoveryofpossessionofpropertyagainstpetitionersin
theCFIofTarlac,docketedasCivilCaseNo.6261.
Petitionersmaintainthattheprincipalissueisoneofownershipoverthepropertyandnotmerelywhetherornot
respondents,asplaintiffs,wereentitledtopossessiondefactoastheregisteredownersthereofhence,theMTC
hadnojurisdictionovertheactionofrespondents.
PetitionersareoftheviewthatthetrialcourtandtheCAerredindeclaringthattherewasnotrustcreatedover
theproperty.TheymaintainthattherewasaverbalagreementbetweenGideonandhissisterAsuncionthatthe
property would be purchased by them that the purchase price thereof would be advanced by Asuncion that
AsuncionwouldbeindicatedasthevendeeinthedeedofabsolutesaletoenablehertosecureaGSISloanto
payfortheproperty,withtheconcomitantagreementthatGideonwouldpayonehalfofthepurchasepriceforthe
property and that the property will be titled in their name as trustees for the spouses Gideon and Angela dela
Rosaoveronehalfportionofthelots.Theyinsistthattheyarenotbarredfromassailingthedeedofabsolutesale
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

5/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

executedinfavorofthespousesDulaybythespousesRivera.Thereislikewisenofactualandlegalbasisforthe
awardofattorney'sfees.
Intheircommentonthepetition,respondentsaverthatthestayofpetitionersinthepropertyafter1982wasby
mere tolerance. The MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over their action because it was filed within one year from
petitioners'lastdemandtovacatetheproperty.TheCAcorrectlyruledthatnotrustwascreatedovertheproperty,
withpetitionersastrustorsandrespondentsastrusteeswhetheratrustagreementwascreatedisaquestionof
factwhichcannotberaisedinthisCourtinapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.
Inanyevent,petitioners'claimofaconstructivetrustwasbarredbyprescriptionsincemorethantenyearshad
elapsedfromthetimethetitlesoverthepropertiesinfavorofrespondentswereissuedonSeptember16,1957.
Respondents further point out that the MTC of Tarlac rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6154 dismissing the
complaintonthegroundofprescriptionorlachesonApril6,2000,theRTCaffirmedthedecisiononappealthe
CA affirmed the decision in CAG.R. SP No. 58857 on February 14, 2002 and on January 22, 2003, this Court
denied petitioners' petition for review of the decision of the CA in G.R. No. 155599.26 Thus, the fact that no
constructivetrustexistedinfavorofpetitionershasbeenlaidtorestbytheCourt.
TheRulingoftheCourt
Thethresholdissuesare:(1)whethertheMTChadjurisdictionovertheactionofrespondents(plaintiffstherein)
(2) whether the CA erred in declaring that there was no trust relationship between petitioners as trustors and
respondentsastrustees(3)whethertheappellatecourterredinrulingthattheactionofpetitionerstoenforcethe
trustagainstrespondentshadprescribedand(4)whetherrespondentsareentitledtoattorney'sfees.
Onthefirstissue,weagreewiththedecisionoftheCAthattheactionofrespondentsagainstpetitionerswasone
forunlawfuldetainer,andthattheMTChadjurisdictionoverthesame.Indeed,petitionersclaimedownershipover
onehalf of the property in their answer to the complaint and alleged that respondents were merely trustees
thereoffortheirbenefitastrustorsand,duringthepretrial,respondentsadmittedhavingfiledtheircomplaintfor
recoveryofpossessionofrealproperty(accionpubliciana)againstpetitionersbeforetheCFIofTarlac,docketed
asCivilCaseNo.6261.However,thesedidnotdivesttheMTCofitsinceptialjurisdictionoverthecomplaintfor
unlawfuldetainerofrespondents.
It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not
plaintiffisentitledtoanyandallofthereliefsprayedfor.27Thejurisdictionofthecourtortribunaloverthenature
oftheactioncannotbemadetodependuponthedefensessetupinthecourtoruponamotiontodismiss,for
otherwise,thequestionofjurisdictionwoulddependalmostentirelyondefendant.Oncejurisdictionisvested,the
sameisretaineduptotheendofthelitigation.28
Jurisdictioncannotbeconferredbythevoluntaryactoragreementofthepartiesitcannotbeacquiredthroughor
waived,enlargedordiminishedbytheiractoromission.Neitherisitconferredbytheacquiescenceofthecourt.It
is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.
Thus,thejurisdictionoverthenatureofanactionandthesubjectmatterthereofisnotaffectedbythetheoriesset
upbydefendantinananswerormotiontodismiss.29
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the law in
effect when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that "Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the questions of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership,theissueofownershipshallberesolvedonlytodeterminetheissuesofpossession."
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that they were the
owners of parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041, hence, entitled to the possession of the
propertypetitioners(defendantstherein)andtheirpredecessorsininteresthadoccupiedthesaidparcelsofland
since 1957 without paying any rent their possession over the property continued even after the spouses Dulay
purchased the property and that their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the spouses Dulay
and, after Asuncion died on June 26, 1995, by respondents petitioners promised to vacate the premises when
respondents needed the property demands were made by respondents on October 2, 1995 for petitioners to
vacate the property but the latter refused, prompting an action to be filed in the Office of the Pangkat and, on
December1,1995,thePangkatSecretaryissuedacertificationtofileaction.Asgleanedfromthepetitoryportion
of the complaint, respondents likewise prayed for the eviction of petitioners from the property with a plea for
judgment for reasonable compensation for petitioners' occupation of the premises. Respondents filed their
complaint on January 29, 1996 in the MTC, within the period of one year from the final demand made against
petitionerstovacatetheproperty.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

6/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

It is true that during the pretrial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue to be litigated by the parties
whetherornotunlawfuldetainerisproperinthepremisesconsideringdefendants'claimofownershipfrom1982
otherwisestated,whetherpetitioners'occupationofthelandindisputewasbymeretoleranceofrespondents.As
framed by the MTC, the issue before it was basically one of physical or material possession of the property,
althoughpetitionersraisedownershipasanissue.Thus,theMTCerredwhenitdeclaredthat,sincedefendants
claimedownershipovertheproperty,itwasdivestedofitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofanddecidethecase
onitsmerits.
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution, independent of any claim of
ownershipbyanypartylitigant,is:whoisentitledtothephysicalandmaterialpossessionofthepropertyinvolved?
Themerefactthatdefendantraisesthedefenseofownershipofthepropertyinthepleadingsdoesnotdeprive
the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendant raises the
question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of
determiningtheissueofpossession.However,thedispositionoftheissueofownershipisnotfinal,asitmaybe
thesubjectofseparateproceedingspecificallybroughttosettletheissue.Hence,thebarefactthatpetitioners,in
their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the property as trustors of a constructive
trust(withthespousesDulayasthetrustees),didnotdivesttheMTCofitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthe
caseanddecidethesameonitsmerits.30
Petitionerswerewellawarethattheissueofownershipoverthepropertyhadtoberesolvedinaproperactionfor
thepurpose,separatefromandindependentofCivilCaseNo.6089intheMTCofTarlac.Itisforthisreasonthat
petitioner Angela filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title and damages
againstrespondents,docketedasCivilCaseNo.6154,whereinsheprayedthatrespondents,asdefendants,be
orderedtoconveytoheronehalfportionoftheproperty.However,herclaimwasrejectedbythetrialcourt,which
orderedthecomplaintdismissedtheRTClikewisedismissedthecaseonappeal.InaffirmingthisdismissalinCA
G.R.SPNo.58857promulgatedonFebruary14,2002,theCAratiocinatedasfollows:
Nevertheless,notwithstandingtheforegoing,thisCourtfindsthatpetitioner'scomplaintshouldbedismissed.
Thisissobecausepetitionermiserablyfailedtoestablishherclaimtotheproperty.Itmustbestressedthat
whileanimpliedtrustmaybeestablishedbyparolevidence,suchevidencemustbeasfullyconvincingasif
the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v.
CourtofAppeals,312SCRA603[1999],atpage609).Animpliedtrustcannotbemadetorestonvague
andinconclusiveproof.(Ibid.)
Unfortunately for petitioner, the evidence she presented in her attempt to establish their socalled trust
agreementisnotsufficientorconvincing.Thelistofdatesandamountswrittenbyherpurportedlyshowing
payments made to the late Asuncion dela Rosa Dulay cannot even be given credence as appreciation of
such list can be equivocal (see Exhibit "H," page 152, Original Records). The list was made in petitioner's
handwritingandtherewasnocountersignaturemadebyDulayshowingacknowledgmentofsuchlisting.At
best,thelistcanmerelybeappreciatedasitis,alist,butdefinitely,itdoesnotprovepaymentsmadeonthe
purchasepriceoftheportionoftheproperty.
Also, the Court notes the NBI's Questioned Documents Report No. 316884 (dated Nov. 14, 1984) finding
thatthesignatureofAsuncionDulayinthereceiptallegedlyacknowledgingpartialpaymentintheamountof
P500.00wassignedoveratypewrittencarbonorduplicateimpressionwhichisnotpartofthemainentries
inthereceipt(seeExhibit"7,"page154,OriginalRecords).Suchconclusionshowsthattheentriesmadeon
the receipt were not written on a single occasion but rather separately executed. Thus, the Court cannot
giveanyevidentiaryvalueonsaidreceiptconsideringthatitscredibilityissuspect.
Meanwhile,privaterespondentshaveintheirfavorTCTNos.29040and29041inthenameofthespouses
Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (see Exhibits "1" and "2," pages 181182, Original Records) the
DeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedin1957bythespousesAdrianoRiveraandAuroraMercado(petitioner's
paternal grandparents) conveying the entire property to the spouses Dulay for the price of P7,000 (see
Exhibit"3,"page148,OriginalRecords)thetaxdeclarationreceiptsshowingtaxpaymentsmadebyprivate
respondents on the property (see Exhibits "3" to "3b," pages 183185, Original Records) and the tax
declarationofrealpropertyfortheyear1974inthenameofthespousesDulay(seeExhibit"C"to"C1,"
pages150151,OriginalRecords).
Alltold,petitionerfailedtodischargethatonusincumbentuponhertoproveherclaimovertheproperty.31
Angela assailed the decision of the CA in this Court in G.R. No. 155599, and this Court resolved to deny the
petitionasfollows:
G.R.No.155599(AngeladelaRosav.OrfelinaRoldan,etal.). Considering the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

7/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

Appeals dated February 14, 2002 and October 14, 2002, respectively, the Court Resolves to DENY the
petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
errorinthechallengeddecisionandresolutionastowarranttheexercisebythisCourtofitsdiscretionary
appellatejurisdictioninthiscase.32
The resolution of the Court became final and executory on May 20, 2003.33 Thus, the issue of whether or not
respondents were trustees of onehalf of the property had been finally resolved by this Court in favor of
respondents in fine, the validity of TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the names of the spouses Dulay had been
affirmed by the trial court, the MTC, the CA and this Court. The claim of coownership of petitioner Angela and
possessionoverthewesternportionofthepropertythushavenofactualandlegalbasis.
WeagreewithpetitionersthatthecomplaintofthespousesDulayfiledin1982docketedasCivilCaseNo.6261
wasoneforrecoveryofpossessionoftheproperty(accionpubliciana)andthattheylikewiselaterfiledacomplaint
withtheMTC,onJanuary29,1996,forunlawfuldetainerinCivilCaseNo.6089insteadofanaccionpubliciana.
However, respondents were not proscribed from filing a complaint for unlawful detainer five (5) or six (6) years
from the dismissal of their complaint for recovery of possession of real property. The dismissal of respondents'
complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 by the CA was not based on the merits of the case, but solely because it was
premature on account of the failure to allege that earnest efforts were made for the amicable settlement of the
cases as required by Article 222 of the New Civil Code. The dismissal of the complaint was thus without
prejudice.34
Itbearsstressingthat,aftertheCourtdeclaredinUDK10069onNovember19,1990thatthedecisionoftheCA
inCAG.R.CVNo.15455wasfinalandexecutory,respondentsdidnotimmediatelyfiletheircomplaintforunlawful
detaineragainstpetitionersfortheireviction.RespondentsfiledtheircomplaintonlyonJanuary29,1996,orafter
thelapseofalmostsix(6)years,butbarelyfour(4)monthsafterrespondents'finaldemandtovacatetheproperty
onOctober2,1995andtheissuanceofthecertificationofthePangkatSecretaryonDecember1,1995.
Weagreewiththecontentionofpetitionersthatforanactionforunlawfuldetainerbasedonpossessionbymere
tolerancetoprosper,thepossessionofthepropertybydefendantmustbelegalfromtheverybeginning.35Inthis
case,petitioners'possessionofthepropertywastoleratedbytheformerowners,thespousesRivera,andbythe
spousesDulayaftertheypurchasedtheproperty.Afterall,AngelawasthegranddaughterofConsolacionRivera,
thesisterofAdrianoRivera,andGideonwasthebrotherofAsuncion.However,whenthespousesDulayneeded
thepropertyfortheirchildren'suseandrequestedpetitionerstovacatetheproperty,thelatterrefused.Fromthen
on,petitioners'possessionofthepropertybecamedeforciant.Apersonwhooccupiesthelandofanotheronthe
latter's tolerance, without any contract between them, is necessarily barred by an implied provision that he will
vacatethesameupondemand.36Respondentsthushadtheoptiontofileacomplaintforunlawfuldetainerwithin
one year therefrom, or an accion publiciana beyond the oneyear period from the demand of respondents as
plaintiffsforpetitionerstovacatetheproperty.
TheCourtnotesthatthepropertywassoldtorespondents,andthatitwastitledintheirnames(TCTNos.29040
and 29041). The said deed and titles support the right of respondents to the material possession of the
property.37 Under all the circumstances and facts in this case, petitioners' claim, that they had the right to the
materialpossessionoftheproperty,hasnofactualandlegalbasis.WequotewithapprovalthedecisionoftheCA
inCAG.R.SPNo.45560:
Privaterespondentsareentitledtoitspossessionfromthetimetitlewasissuedintheirfavorasregistered
owners. "An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or
otherpersonagainstwhomthepossessionofanylandorbuildingisunlawfullywithheldaftertheexpiration
orterminationoftheirrighttoholdpossession,byvirtueofacontract,expressorimplied."
Second."Theageoldruleisthat'thepersonwhohasatorrenstitleoveralandisentitledtopossession
thereof'." Except for the claim that the title of private respondents is not conclusive proof of ownership,
petitionershaveshownnorighttojustifytheircontinuedpossessionofthesubjectpremises.38
OntheissueofwhethertheRTCactedinexcessofitsappellatejurisdictioninawardingP50,000.00asattorney's
fees in favor of respondents, petitioners aver that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondents are
entitled to a maximum amount of only P20,000.00 hence, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
awardedP50,000.00asattorney'sfees,asitisinexcessofthemaximumamountunderthesaidRules.Besides,
petitioners aver, the amount of P50,000.00 is unjust and inequitable. Moreover, the RTC ordered petitioners to
payattorney'sfeesofP50,000.00withoutevensupportingtheawardwithitsfindingandcitinglegalprovisionsor
caselaw.
Foritspart,theCAruledthattheawardofP50,000.00asattorney'sfeesundertheRulesonSummaryProcedure
doesnotapplyinacasewherethedecisionoftheMTCisappealedtotheRTC.Thelattercourtmayawardan
amountbeyondthemaximumamountofP20,000.00undertheRulesonSummaryProcedureasattorney'sfees
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

8/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

forthereasonthat,onappealintheRTC,theregularrulesofcivilprocedureapply.AccordingtotheCA,there
wasfactualandlegalbasisfortheawardofP50,000.00asrespondents'attorney'sfees:
Second.Decisionallawstates
"Thereisnoquestionthatacourtmay,wheneveritdeemsjustandequitable,allowtherecoveryby
theprevailingpartyofattorney'sfees.Indeterminingthereasonablenessofsuchfees,thisCourtina
number of cases has provided various criteria which, for convenient guidance, we might collate,
thusly:a)thequantityandcharacteroftheservicesrenderedb)thelabor,timeandtroubleinvolved
c) the nature and importance of the litigation d) the amount of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy e) the novelty and difficulty of questions involved f) the responsibility
imposed on counsel g) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the service h) the
professional character and social standing of the lawyer i) the customary charges of the bar for
similarservicesj)thecharacterofemployment,whethercasualorforestablishedclientk)whether
thefeeisabsoluteorcontingent(itbeingtherulethatanattorneymayproperlychargeahigherfee
whenitiscontingentthanwhenitisabsoluteandl)theresultssecured."
Inviewthereof,theawardofattorney'sfeesisjustified.Thatis,inadditiontotheprovisionsofArticle2208
oftheNewCivilCodewhichreads
"In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannotberecovered,except:
xxxx
(2)Whenthedefendant'sactoromissionhascompelledtheplaintifftolitigatewiththirdpersonsorto
incurexpensestoprotecthisinterest"
xxxx
considering that petitioners refused to vacate the subject premises despite demands by the private
respondents.
Finally,theSupremeCourthasexplained
"TheRuleonSummaryProcedureappliesonlyincasesfiledbeforetheMetropolitanTrialCourtand
Municipal Trial Courts pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. x x x Hence, when the
respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the
applicablerulesarethoseofthelattercourt."
Thus, the award of the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees is justified
considering that the jurisdictional amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) under Section 1,
paragraph (A), subparagraph (1) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure applies only to the
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourtsinCities,MunicipalTrialCourtsandMunicipalCircuitTrial
Courts.39
We agree with the ruling of the CA. The ceiling of P20,000.00 applies only in the MTC where the Rules on
SummaryProcedureareapplied.OnappealtotheRTC,theRTCmayaffirm,modifyorevenreversethedecision
of the MTC as such, the RTC may increase the award for attorney's fees in excess of P20,000.00 if there is
factualbasistherefor.
INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisDENIED.Costsagainstthepetitioners.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban,C.J.,YnaresSantiago,ChicoNazario,J.J.,concur.
AustriaMartinez,J.J.,nopart

Footnotes
1PennedbyAssociateJusticeDemetrioG.Demetria,withAssociateJusticesMinervaP.GonzagaReyes

(laterappointedSupremeCourtAssociateJustice,nowretired)andRamonA.Barcelona(retired),
concurringrollo,pp.108118.
2CArollo,p.26.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

9/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

3Rollo,pp.3438.
4Id.at3940.
5Exhibits"D,""D1"to"D2."
6Exhibits"C,""F,""F1"to"F2."
7Exhibits"5"to"5a."
8Exhibit"F."
9Rollo,pp.3449.
10CArollo,pp.2931.
11Rollo,pp.5055.
12Id.at56.
13CArollo,p.40.
14Rollo,p.64.
15Id.at65.
16Id.at5862.
17Id.at6061.
18CArollo,pp.5556.
19Id.at62.
20Id.at6071.
21Exhibits"1,""2"and"3."
22CArollo,pp.7281.
23G.R.No.L57259,October13,1983,125SCRA78.
24CArollo,p.90.
25Rollo,p.16.
26Id.at294301.
27UnionBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,352Phil.808,828829(1998).
28HeirsofRaphaelMagpiliv.DeJesus,G.R.No.167748,November8,2005,474SCRA366.
29Ramosv.StatelandInvestmentCorporation,G.R.No.161973,November11,2005,474SCRA726,737

738,citingOcav.CourtofAppeals,378SCRA642(2002).
30Tumlosv.Fernandez,G.R.No.137650,April12,2000,330SCRA718TalaRealtyServicesCoporation

v.BancoFilipinoSavingsandMortgageBank,G.R.No.129887,February17,2000,325SCRA768Arcal
v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.127850,January26,1998,285SCRA34Refugiav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.
No.118284,July5,1996,258SCRA347.
31Rollo,pp.298299.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

10/11

8/30/2016

G.R.No.133882

32Id.at301.
33Id.
34Section5,Rule16oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
35Valdez,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.132424,May4,2006.
36Refugiav.CourtofAppeals,supranote30.
37Boyv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.125088,April14,2004,427SCRA196,206.
38Rollo,p.116.
39Id.at117118.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html

11/11